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DISASTERS AND DISASTER RELIEF

Edited by

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Washington, D. C.

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
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The articles appearing in *THE ANNALS* are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index*.

OTTO T. MALLERY

1881-1956

Otto Tod Mallery, oldest in point of service of the members of the Board of Directors of the Academy, was killed by an automobile as he was walking in front of his home, on December 16, 1956.

Mr. Mallery was born in upstate New York in 1881, and was educated at Princeton and Columbia Universities and the University of Pennsylvania. Throughout his long and active life he was associated with more than a score of governmental, civic, and industrial agencies. At the time of his death he was President of the world-wide Interdependence Council and Chairman of the Board of the National Recreation Association. In previous years he had been President of the Philadelphia Public Education Association and had served on the Philadelphia Charter Commission. He had served as consultant to the President's Conference on Unemployment, the National Resources Planning Board, and the International Labor Office. Also, he had been a staff member of the National Youth Administration, the War Department, and the Department of Commerce.

These and many other associations, and his wide-ranging writing in the fields of industry and finance, illustrate the scope of his interests and his versatility. The Academy had been the beneficiary, since 1918, of his informed counsel and his restless energy.

FOREWORD

During the past decade we have seemed to be "more afraid of what man will do with nature than of what nature will do with man," and this changed emphasis has helped obscure the fact that during the last decade as many major natural disasters have occurred in this country as in the preceding four decades. Nevertheless, in recent years the human and economic consequences of major disasters and of the several hundred lesser disasters that occur here annually have increasingly come to be recognized as a matter of vital national concern. The possible impact of natural disasters on readiness for war has influenced thinking, as has the hope that measures of prevention, preparedness, prediction, and relief incident to natural disaster might be organized and co-ordinated in a way that would contribute significantly to an essential preparedness for enemy attack.

The intent of this volume of *THE ANNALS* on natural disasters and disaster relief is to increase understanding and sharpen thinking by bringing together for the first time a broad review of the physical characteristics and the human and physical consequences of natural disaster; the nature and scope of the truly far-reaching, complex, but well-co-ordinated efforts of government in preparation and avoidance, recovery and restoration; and the widespread but specific and detailed voluntary preparedness, relief, and rehabilitation measures; together with one or two examples out of recent experience in applying the plans and measures to acute major disaster situations.

Although many of the articles were written by those directly involved in administrative or other professional capacities, it is certain that if any objectivity was sacrificed it has been more than compensated for by the intimate knowledge and concern of those contributing. Each author is of course entirely responsible for his general treatment of the subject and for the facts and points of view presented.

Some common threads appear repeatedly throughout the studies and analyses: What basic principles can be identified, delineated, and observed? How does the actual disaster hazard as revealed through experience over the years compare with the existing theoretical potentiality? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current practice of equating natural disasters with situations created by enemy attack, and what are the specific similarities and differences? Recognizing how far-reaching, carefully co-ordinated, and meticulously detailed present planning is, what are the principal aspects that require further and continuing realistic study and practical action?

To me the most impressive single fact about this volume is that it shows the extent to which thought and action are being directed at many levels, by many agencies and persons, and in a wide variety of ways to minimizing the human suffering and material loss that are the inescapable aftermath of natural disaster.

DEWITT SMITH

Physical Characteristics of Disasters: Historical and Statistical Review

By HOYT LEMONS

Abstract: The article presents data on nature, incidence, causes, and consequences of peacetime disasters. Disasters tend to become more and more deleterious as population increases and occupies the wide expanse of the country. A map indicates that coastal areas and the "midlands" are most exposed. Detailed analysis is made of fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, earthquakes, hailstorms, thunderstorms, and winter storms. Analysis of American Red Cross records, 1925-55, is made, showing disaster effects by month, type of disaster, and state. Statistics are offered on the number of dead and injured, homes wrecked, and number of families involved.—Ed.

EACH day's news tells of explosions, wrecks, storms, and a variety of other "accidents" in which there are injuries, fatalities, and property damage. The sum total of loss from these occurrences in a year's time reaches staggering proportions. Obviously, not all such occurrences are of serious enough import to be classed as disasters. In 1955 there were 25,000 fatalities due to highway and domestic carrier accidents, yet accidents with four or fewer deaths each accounted for 23,500 of the total.¹ In a given year there are two million separate fires, causing a total loss of one billion dollars, yet in 1955 there were only 325 fires involving losses of \$250,000 or more each. When natural or man-made forces concentrate destructive forces in limited and inhabited areas, killer disasters are apt to occur. It is the intent of this article to present background material on the nature, incidence, causes, and consequences of the nation's disaster-type phenomena. Where data per-

mit, disasters, as such, are treated. In this discussion, the emphasis is naturally oriented toward deleterious happenings. The reader is reminded, therefore, that the weather is not always bad and that disasters are abnormal, not normal, occurrences.

Peacetime disasters considered according to their origins are of two main types, naturally occurring and man-made. A variety of both types occurs in this country and their deleterious effects—economic, political, and social—are increasing. This trend continues in spite of our best efforts to date with preventive and precautionary measures such as flood and hurricane forecasts, industrial safety measures, and public educational safety campaigns.

DEFINITION AND TYPES

The concept of disaster varies with the kind and degree of "ego involvement" of the person or groups concerned. "Disaster" signifies one thing to the family or community involved, another to the disaster research scientist, and yet another to the government-

¹ Sources: Interstate Commerce Commission; Civil Aeronautics Board; National Safety Council; Association of American Railroads.

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tal agency or voluntary relief organization which is charged with relief and rehabilitation measures. Webster says: "Disaster implies an unforeseen mischance bringing with it destruction of life or property . . . ; sudden and extraordinary misfortune; a calamity." Berkner has a sophisticated definition—"a disruption in the normal flow of energy that is uncontrolled."² In reference to communities, Powell states:

Disaster means the impinging upon a structured community of an external force capable of destroying human life or its resources for survival, on a scale wide enough to excite public alarm, to disrupt normal patterns of behavior, and to impair or overload any of the central services necessary to the conduct of normal affairs or to the prevention or alleviation of suffering and loss. Usually, the term disaster refers to an episode with tragic consequences to a substantial portion of the population.³

The American National Red Cross holds as follows:

Disaster means a great national catastrophe such as a flood, tornado, or hurricane, and also a sudden extraordinary catastrophe such as fire, explosion, transportation wreck, or similar public calamity in which numbers of persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering.

It would appear, then, that disasters, regardless of how or by whom they are defined, have certain common attributes. They include injury, suffering, and death for several people and damage or destruction to possessions and property. They may be man-made or naturally caused. Emergency situations

² L. V. Berkner, "The Common Aspects of Disasters," an unpublished address given at the American Association for the Advancement of Science Symposium on Disaster Recovery, St. Louis, December 27, 1952.

³ John Walker Powell, "An Introduction to the Natural History of Disaster," unpublished report of the Psychiatric Institute, University of Maryland, 1954.

involving fewer than five families are not recorded as disasters by the Red Cross. Resources within the community, if properly co-ordinated and utilized, are usually adequate for meeting the relief needs of fewer than five families. When the Red Cross does extend relief in such situations the activity is recorded as "emergencies involving fewer than five families."

There is no commonly accepted categorization of disasters, although they are ordinarily typed by the primary cause, whether natural or man-made. For operational purposes the Red Cross recognizes the following types: hurricanes; tornadoes; other windstorms; floods; flash floods; all other storms (for example, snowstorms, hailstorms, "cold weather," dust storms, electrical storms); explosions; fires, wrecks (for example, train, ship, airplane, bus); and other disasters (for example, earthquakes, landslides, drought, structural collapse, epidemics).

Some concept of the fatalities caused by disasters of different types may be gained from material prepared by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.⁴ Exclusive of military aviation, in the period 1937-46 there were 919 "catastrophic accidents" or disasters, involving 12,987 lives; three fourths of the deaths were attributable to man-made disasters and one fourth to natural ones (see Table 1). About half of the disasters and a third of the deaths were due to transportation, with about 30 per cent of the disasters and of deaths due to fires and explosions. In 1955

⁴ "Catastrophic Accidents—A Ten Year Survey," *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (March 1947), pp. 1-4; "Catastrophic Accidents—The Record for a Decade," *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1951), pp. 7-10; "Fewer Total Accidents in 1954," *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 12 (December 1954), pp. 6-8; "Accidental Deaths Rise in 1955," *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. 36, No. 12 (December 1955), pp. 5-7.

TABLE 1—CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS,* 1937-1946

TYPE OF ACCIDENT	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS	PER CENT OF TOTAL	NUMBER OF DEATHS	PER CENT OF TOTAL
All Types	919	100.0	12,987	100.0
Motor vehicle	270	29.4	1,829	14.1
Bus	58	6.3	535	4.1
Collision with railroad train	12	1.3	143	1.1
Other	46	5.0	392	3.0
All other motor vehicles	212	23.1	1,294	10.0
Collision with railroad train	69	7.5	441	3.4
Other	143	15.6	853	6.6
Conflagrations, burns, explosions	265	28.8	3,968	30.6
Dwellings, apartments	115	12.5	754	5.8
Hotels, boarding houses, rooming houses	31	3.4	517	4.0
Homes for aged, convalescent homes, etc.	12	1.3	140	1.1
Other	107	11.6	2,557	19.7
Air transportation	63	6.9	787	6.1
Water transportation	73	7.9	860	6.6
Railroads	46	5.0	818	6.3
Mines and quarries	62	6.7	1,136	8.7
Tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, etc.	96	10.5	3,137	24.2
Collapse of building, scaffolding, etc.	8	.9	92	.7
Ingestion of alcoholic beverage substitutes	7	.8	58	.4
Food poisoning	5	.5	75	.6
Asphyxiation by gas	8	.9	45	.3
All other	16	1.7	182	1.4

* The term "catastrophic accident" here denotes an accident in which five or more persons were killed.

Source: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Catastrophic Accidents—A Ten Year Survey," *Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (March 1947), pp. 1-4.

such catastrophes were responsible for about 1,500 deaths, some 300 more than in 1954.

CAUSAL FACTORS IN DISASTERS

There are two main elements involved in the ever increasing disaster hazard in the United States. First is the geographic position of the country, which makes it subject to a variety of causes of natural disaster. Second is the nature and trend of human occupation. The growth of population and the more widespread use of land make man, his works, and his society more vulnerable to natural disasters by increasing the number and size of targets for disaster forces. At the same time, these factors generate more opportunities for man-

made disasters. Generally stated, causes for the nation's disasters, both natural and man-made, stem from its physical geography and human occupation.

Physical geographic factors

The more important physical geographic factors of the country which give rise to natural disaster-producing phenomena include large size (3,020,387 square miles); large range of latitude (25° to 49° N. lat. approximately), allowing influences from both tropical and Arctic areas; weather and climate, including location in the westerly wind belt with its cyclonic storms; proximity to tropical hurricanes; extensive areas of forests and wild lands; lengthy rivers and coastlines with vast areas of flood

plain, delta, and coastal plain lands; the predominant low relief of the interior; and presence of earthquake-producing "faults" in certain places. Of all these, climate and weather are most significant.

Although popularly termed "temperate," the climate is, in actual fact, "intemperate," being predominantly continental and characterized by hot summers and cold winters and various deleterious phenomena in the different seasons. Low relief in the interior makes for ease of invasion by cold dry polar air masses from the north and warm moist tropical air masses from the south. Interactions of these masses in the form of cyclonic storms or of "lows" and "highs" and their attendant "fronts" are the prime causes of thunderstorms, hailstorms, and tornadoes in late winter, spring, and early summer. The Great Plains and adjacent areas, being of low and variable precipitation, are subject to disastrous droughts in summer. Late winter, spring, and early summer are the periods of precipitation for most of the country (fall and winter on the West Coast). During these periods, particularly with a coincidence in snow melt, runoff frequently overburdens streams and produces floods. The Southeast is in low latitude and in close proximity to a major source of tropical storms, several of which impinge on the coastal areas of the Gulf and Atlantic Coast states each year.

It may be concluded, therefore, that physical geographic factors give rise to a variety of natural disaster producers in the different regions of the country, particularly the "midlands" area, and in the different seasons of the year, especially from spring to fall.

Human occupancy factors

Man, directly and indirectly, plays a vital role in causing disasters. As his

numbers increase,⁵ as further encroachment is made on flood plains and coastal plains, as urban centers expand, and in general as industrial society increases in complexity, disasters and disaster effects increase. "Targets" become larger, more numerous, and more susceptible to tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and other natural forces. Further, an increasingly complex society itself produces more explosions, fires, smog, traffic accidents, and other catastrophic incidents. Fatalities and property damage resulting from traffic accidents illustrate this. For the eleven-year period 1945-55, more than 216,000 passengers died as a result of accidents in automobiles and taxis, buses, domestic air carriers, and railways.⁶ Fatalities approximating 13,000 in 1945 reached 25,000 in 1955, almost a 100 per cent increase. In 1955 there were 8,716 train accidents, resulting in only 259 fatalities and 1,183 injured (passengers plus workers), but a total property damage of \$48,143,403.

It is apparent, then, that a large and increasing population, farmlands, industry, urban areas, and transportation and communications networks provide excellent "targets," in most parts of the country, which are susceptible to "attack" by the forces of nature. In addition, human occupancy and activity produce a variety of their own, or man-made, disasters.

AREAL AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DISASTERS

Figure 1 indicates the principal disaster areas of the nation. Of particular note are the following: the area com-

⁵ Current population is estimated by the Bureau of the Census to be 168,000,000 (estimated at 168,361,000, August 1, 1956), and is increasing at a rate of 2.5 to 2.8 millions per year. It is estimated that it will be well over 200,000,000 by 1975.

⁶ For sources see note 1 *supra*.




FIG. 1. INCIDENCE OF DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES

prising the Midwest, the Great Plains, the South, and the Southeast is subject to a variety of natural disasters at all seasons, but especially in spring and summer, and to man-made disasters the year round; Gulf and Atlantic coastal areas are subject to natural disasters particularly in spring, summer, and fall and to man-made ones in all seasons; the Northeast is subject to both natural and man-made disasters in all seasons; and the West Coast also is subject to both natural and man-made disasters in all seasons.

MAJOR TYPES OF DISASTERS

Increasingly disastrous fires in the United States in the last hundred years have caused losses of life and property exceeding those for any similar period for any country in world history. Further, the problem grows in magnitude; for example, in 1930 losses from all fires approximated 500 million dollars and

6,000 lives; in 1955, 1 billion dollars and 12,000 lives.⁷ While most individual fires do not result in disasters, fire is one of our foremost disaster producers. During 1955 some 325 fires produced losses of \$250,000 or more each.

It is estimated that there are 2,000,000 individual fires of all kinds in a year, causing total loss of 1 billion dollars; only 40 per cent of all fires occur in buildings, yet they produce some 85 per cent of all losses⁸ (see Table 2). Most of these fires originate in homes, the principal causes being smoking and matches, electrical wiring and appliances, and heating and cooking equipment. The remaining 15 per cent

⁷ "Fire Protection Developments in 1955," *Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (January 1956), p. 201.

⁸ "Fires and Fire Losses Classified, 1954," *Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (October 1955), p. 186.

(approximate) of fire losses are of non-building-type origin, for example, aircraft, motor vehicles, forests, and rubbish. More building-type fires occur in winter than in summer, owing to winter heating of homes and other buildings. The predominance of forest and wild-land fires in the warm season is due to the dryness of the areas and the presence of tourists and hunters, and also to other causes. Some examples of "peak fire seasons" in forests and wild lands for selected states are: Idaho, June 1 to September 30; Colorado, July 1 to September 15; northern California, June 10 to October 10; New England states, April 20 to June 30 and October 1 to November 30; North Carolina, February 20 to May 20, and October 10 to December 10.⁹

For the five-year period 1951-55, there was an average annual occurrence of 165.8 thousand forest and wild-land fires, burning 10,334,000 acres and caus-

⁹ Source: A. A. Brown, Division of Forest Fire Research, U. S. Forest Service.

ing damage of 90.4 million dollars. States of the south, southeast, and central areas together with California ranked highest in acreages burned and damages sustained.¹⁰ During an eighteen-day period in late August and early September of 1955, forest and watershed lands of California were subjected to unprecedented losses by wild fires. Preceding months had had below normal precipitation and vast areas were dangerously dry far earlier than usual. A total of 436 fires resulted; 377 were man-made and 59 naturally occurring.

Floods

Floods are a major source of disasters in this country. A normal, not an abnormal, part of the laws of nature, they occur throughout the country and follow the seasons with regularity. They are not increasing in magnitude or frequency, yet damage

¹⁰ Source: C. C. Buck, Division of Forest Fire Research, U. S. Forest Service.

TABLE 2—UNITED STATES FIRE LOSSES BY "OCCUPANCIES," 1954

TYPES OF FIRE	NUMBER OF FIRES	LOSSES
Building-type fires		
Public buildings.....	18,900	\$ 62,258,000
Residential.....	507,800	258,262,500
Mercantile.....	82,900	200,993,500
Manufacturing.....	38,200	155,060,000
Miscellaneous (oil storage, lumber yard, etc.)..	126,800	198,876,000
Total.....	774,600	\$875,450,000
Nonbuilding fires		
Aircraft.....	300	70,000,000
Motor vehicles.....	161,500	16,100,000
Forest fires.....	176,900	44,385,000
Rubbish, grass, brush.....	820,000	—
Miscellaneous.....	60,000	10,980,000
Total.....	1,218,700	\$141,465,000
Grand Total.....	1,993,300	\$1,016,915,000

Source: *Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (October 1955), p. 192.

from them is increasing to such an extent (estimated 40 per cent increase since the first of the century)¹¹ that they may be termed a menace to our national welfare, because man's utilization of flood-susceptible areas—rivers, flood plains, delta lands and coastal lands—is outstripping preventive measures. The destructiveness of floods results from the mechanical force of the water and of the debris which it carries, from the dirtiness of floodwaters as well as their wetness, and from the strong winds and ice jams which sometimes accompany them.

Floods are frequent in winter and early spring on the Pacific Coast, and in southwestern and southeastern states because of the heavy precipitation that results from the cooling of warm, moist, tropical air masses. Spring rains, plus the melting of snow in the mountains of the West and in northern states and occasional ice jams in streams, bring high flood incidence to the rivers which have headwaters in those areas, for example, the Columbia, the Colorado, the Missouri, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Susquehanna. Throughout the summer, sporadic and localized floods due to heat and orographic thunderstorms may be expected in most parts of the country, except the West Coast. The Gulf and Atlantic Coasts are subject in late summer and fall to floods due to hurricanes and other tropical storms. The record of flood losses indicates clearly that the major stream and hurricane floods account for the bulk of flood damage.

Land subjected to flooding in the United States has been estimated at fifty million acres—2.5 per cent of the nation's land area; some ten million people, 6.5 per cent of the population, occupy these lands and hence are subject to flooding. This population den-

sity on flood plains is judged to be more than twice the national average.¹²

Flood losses are of two sorts: direct losses in which property or human life is wholly or partially destroyed and indirect losses in which community or other services are impaired and there is social dislocation and distress, and psychological and traumatic effects to individuals, families, and groups. Indirect damage may be categorized as follows: urban (damage to industrial plants, stores, residences, and so forth); highway and railway (damage to bridges, roadbeds, goods in transit, and so forth); public and semipublic (damage to schools, churches, theaters, and so forth); utilities; and agricultural (damage to farmland, buildings, equipment, crops, and so forth).¹³

Weather Bureau records indicate 95 disastrous floods from 1902 through 1955, at least one occurring in almost each year of the period. There were five in both 1955 and 1954. Average annual property loss due to floods in recent years approximates 500 million dollars.¹⁴ Weather Bureau records indicate total property loss for the thirty-two-year period 1924-55 as almost 5.5 billion dollars, and average annual loss as 170 million dollars. During the last five years, however, the average annual loss has been close to 500 million dollars. Monthly rankings and total losses (1924-55) are as follows: July, \$1,127,021,461; April, \$887,145,258; June, \$678,455,791; May, \$555,483,887; January, \$492,205,581; and March, \$327,182,878. In 1955, August had a total damage of \$686,516,000 and December, \$103,744,000. There were

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁴ *Federal Disaster Insurance*, Staff Study for the Commission on Banking and Currency, U. S. Senate, November 30, 1955 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 41.

¹¹ William G. Hoyt and Walter B. Langbein, *Floods* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 88.

2,743 lives lost through flood action (1924-55), with an annual average loss of 86. In 1927 there were 423 fatalities. In recent years loss of life from floods has been relatively low except for 1955, when it totaled 296.

Property damage, considered for the country as a whole, is about equally divided between farm and nonfarm categories, aside from miscellaneous and unclassified types:¹⁵

AREAS OF DAMAGE	PER CENT
Rural.....	32
Urban.....	18.5
Transportation and public utility.....	12.5
Miscellaneous and unclassified.....	37
Total.....	100

However, the situation varies in the different regions of the country. In the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence regions, losses to urban property are foremost, whereas in the North Atlantic and New England areas, losses to railways, highways, and public utilities are somewhat higher than urban losses, as is the case also in the Ohio Basin and on the West Coast. Elsewhere, losses on farms account for more than half of total flood damage.

The East sustains the greater proportion of the nation's flood damage, some 40 per cent of the total occurring in the Ohio Basin and in the Northeast.¹⁶ The Ohio Basin has more damage than any other single river basin in the country. The Missouri Basin and the drainage basins of the West Coast are the principal areas of flood damage west of the Mississippi River.

Hurricanes and tropical storms

The term "tropical storm" refers to a tropical cyclone. If accompanied by winds exceeding seventy-five miles per hour such a storm is generally termed

¹⁵ Hoyt and Langbein, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), p. 82.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

"hurricane." In this hemisphere, "West Indian" hurricanes and other tropical storms frequently produce extensive damage to property and injury or death to people, as a result of the high winds, heavy seas, and rain and floods which they bring. Gulf and Atlantic Coast states form the hurricane and tropical storm regions of the country (Fig. 1). Since the first of the century, coastal areas of these states as far north as Massachusetts have sustained major destruction from tropical storms ten to fifteen times, and southern Alabama and Florida and the coastal areas of North Carolina, fifteen to twenty times.¹⁷ Inland areas of these states are also affected but to a lesser extent.

Weather Bureau records indicate recent increases in numbers of tropical storms and hurricanes affecting this country.¹⁸ For the past sixty-nine years (1887-1955) there has been an average of four a year; for the past thirty years, five a year; and for the past ten years, seven a year. The greatest number in any one year was eleven in 1950. The period of August through October constitutes the principal season for hurricanes and other tropical storms in this country. The average life of a hurricane is about nine days; those of August average twelve days; and those of July and November, about eight days.

For the forty-one-year period 1915-55, a total of 142 tropical storms (including 78 hurricanes) produced in this country approximately 3 billion dollars of damage and 4,863 deaths, or a yearly average of about 71 million dollars and 119 deaths. In the past twelve years, yearly damage, averaging about 186

¹⁷ *Federal Disaster Insurance* (cited note 14 *supra*), p. 128.

¹⁸ U. S. Weather Bureau, *Notes on Hurricane Habits and Habitats*, L. S. 5504, Revised June 1, 1956 (Washington, D. C.) and *Summary of Tropical Storm and Hurricane Occurrences, 1915-1955*, L. S. 5604, Revised May 1, 1956 (Washington, D. C.).

million dollars, has more than doubled, probably because of the increased value of property subject to tropical storms, while deaths, averaging 47 per year, have dropped as a result of better warnings.

In years past, the death toll from hurricanes has at times reached catastrophic numbers; for example, in 1900, 6,000; in 1915, 550; in 1928, 1,836; in 1935, 414; and in 1938, 600.

Tornadoes

Although small in size compared with hurricanes, tornadoes are highly destructive of life and property and occur in greater numbers in this country than anywhere in the world. They have been reported in all states, although they are of serious occurrence only east of the Rockies, specifically in the central and southern Great Plains and portions of the Midwest and South (Fig. 1). An occasional one brings disaster to the East and Northeast when it strikes a large city, for example, the Worcester, Massachusetts, tornado disaster of June 9, 1953.

Tornadoes occur in all months but are most frequent in spring.¹⁹ Monthly distribution is as follows: 68 per cent, March through June; 21 per cent, July through October; and 11 per cent, November through February. In those states where they are most frequent they occur at all hours of the day and night; however, 50 per cent of them occur in the afternoon from 2:00 to 7:00 P.M.²⁰ In the South the most destructive ones have occurred between midnight and nine o'clock in the morning.

Early in the year tornado activity begins near the Gulf of Mexico and advances northward as the season progresses. In March maximum activity is

in northern Mississippi and adjacent areas; in April, in western Missouri, northern Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas; in May and June, at the peak of activity, a zone of activity extends up the Great Plains and Midwest from northern Oklahoma to southern Minnesota, where it remains, diminishing in intensity through the summer and receding southward in the fall. During the hurricane season there is an increase in tornado frequency along the east coast.

Some 8,000 tornadoes occurred in the period 1916-55, an average of 200 per year.²¹ Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma, and Iowa had the most, with average annual frequencies respectively of 26, 21, 18, and 14. During the period 1951-55 there were 2,567 tornadoes, a yearly average of some 513. This apparent recent increase in annual incidence is explained by more comprehensive reporting by the Weather Bureau.

Total property loss for the period 1916-55 was \$824,438,100, or an average yearly loss of \$20,610,952.²² Damage was greatest in 1953 (\$224,345,900). States sustaining greatest loss were Texas, Georgia, Oklahoma, Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio. Over the period, 137 tornadoes caused damages of one million dollars or more each or an average of 3.5 such tornadoes per year, while 931 tornadoes produced damage of \$100,000 or more each, or an average of 24 such tornadoes per year.

There were 8,899 deaths due to tornadoes from 1916 through 1955, giving an annual average of 222.²³ Such fatalities are most frequent in south central United States between western Oklahoma and the Appalachians of Kentucky and Tennessee and between east central Texas and coastal South

²¹ *Federal Disaster Insurance* (cited note 14 *supra*), p. 132.

²² *Loc. cit.*

²³ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁹ Snowden D. Flora, *Tornadoes of the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), p. 51.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 54.

Carolina and Georgia. Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and Oklahoma have average annual fatality rates ranging between 25 and 17.

In a study of tornado deaths in the United States for the years 1916 through 1953, Linehan found that four fifths of such deaths occur in the period March through June.²⁴ Further, three fourths of all tornado deaths occur between 1:30 and 9:30 P.M. He concludes that there is a long-term downward trend in such fatalities due primarily to improved Weather Bureau forecasting and warning services.

Earthquakes

Compared with other types of disasters such as those resulting from floods, fires, and hurricanes, earthquake disasters in this country are considered of relatively minor significance. While activity in recent years has centered near the Pacific Coast, the strongest United States quake occurred in New Madrid, Missouri, in 1811 and was felt throughout two thirds of the country.

Major United States earthquake belts exist along the San Andreas Fault in California, the St. Lawrence River valley, and the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.²⁵ Other areas of the country have had earthquakes which caused minor and moderate disasters and nearly all regions receive tremors each year. Earthquakes occur at any time of the year, and pinpoint prediction as to time and place of occurrence is not presently practical. Some areas are obviously susceptible, such as the San Andreas Fault area of California. Figure 1 shows the dis-

²⁴ Urban J. Linehan, "Tornado Deaths in the U. S.," Ph.D. dissertation (unpublished), Clark University, 1953; the U. S. Weather Bureau is preparing a technical bulletin for publication from this manuscript.

²⁵ *Federal Disaster Insurance* (cited note 14 *supra*), p. 140.

tribution of past earthquake disasters and classes them as major, moderate, and minor. A dozen or so major earthquake disasters have occurred in the United States and Canada within the past three hundred years.²⁶ These are as follows:

Great Quebec Earthquake	1663
Great Boston Earthquake	1755
Great New Madrid (Mo.) Earthquake ..	1811
Great San Francisco Earthquake	1865
Great San Francisco Earthquake	1868
Great Owens Valley (Calif.) Earthquake	1872
Charleston (S. C.) Earthquake	1886
Great San Francisco Earthquake	1906
Calexico-Mexicali (Calif.) Earthquake ..	1915
Great Santa Barbara (Calif.) Earthquake	1925
Calexico-Mexicali (Calif.) Earthquake ..	1927
Bakersfield (Calif.) Earthquake	1952

According to estimates of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, earthquakes have caused the deaths of some 1,300 people in this country from 1811 to the present, 700 of these occurring in the San Francisco earthquake alone. Moderate to major earthquakes have produced approximately \$300,000,000 in property damage from 1865 to the present. This estimate of damage includes \$90,000,000 of loss in the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and \$60,000,000 of loss in the Bakersfield earthquake of 1952. The estimate does not include 1.5 billion dollars of loss (in terms of 1950 dollars) as a result of fire damage during the San Francisco disaster.

It has been suggested that California should expect a severe earthquake causing damage once in twenty-five years and New England, a disastrous one in each hundred years.²⁷

Hailstorms

Hailstorms in this country, while not a menace to life, are of serious import

²⁶ John Ripley Freeman, *Earthquake Damage and Earthquake Insurance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932), p. 98.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

to agriculture. While most states receive visitations of these storms, those of the Great Plains and Central Lowland are most seriously afflicted. The field crop and other property damage which these areas sustain results from the following factors: these areas have the highest incidence of hail (some ten to fifty damaging hailstorms per state annually); they contain the most extensive croplands of the country and the crops are types which are highly susceptible to damage by hail; and the majority of the crops are in the field during the period of high frequency of hailstorms, that is, spring and summer.²⁸

Some 90 per cent of the mean annual loss from hailstorms occurs during the six months of the warm season, April 1 to September 30, June having the greatest damage. Some fifty million dollars or more are lost through crop damage each year. Originating in the Gulf Coast area in early spring, hailstorms develop progressively northward, accompanying the northward unfolding of the growing season. It is not infrequent for a given hailstorm to cause damage of a million dollars or more. In one year Kansas had six different storms each of which caused a million dollars' worth of damage.

Thunderstorms

The common thunderstorm frequently produces damage to local property, because of its high winds and heavy precipitation. It contributes to flash floods and other types of floods, and, by lightning, to forest and wild-land fires. Thunderstorms cause sizable losses each year to electric utilities and communication networks. Many thunderstorms also contain hail.

Thunderstorms are warm-season phe-

²⁸ Hoyt Lemons, "Hail in American Agriculture," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1942), p. 364.

nomena. United States Weather Bureau records for the period 1904 through 1943 indicate average annual number of days with thunderstorms as follows: South and Southeast, 60 to 90; East and Northeast, 20 to 40; Midwest and Great Plains, 20 to 60; and the Rocky Mountains and intermontane basins, 10 to 50.²⁹ Few thunderstorms occur on the West Coast.

Winter storms

Tropical storms, tornadoes, and hail and thunderstorms are predominately occurrences of the warm season. In the winter the country is subject to blizzards, glaze storms, and snowstorms. Winter storm disasters occur primarily in the northern and central Midwest and Great Plains areas and in the Northeast, with the northern tier of states most affected³⁰ (Fig. 1). The South occasionally has widespread damage, of disaster proportions, to crops and orchards through invasion in winter of cold air with subfreezing temperatures.

DISASTERS AS REFLECTED IN RED CROSS OPERATIONS³¹

Relief operations of the American National Red Cross reveal significant aspects of disasters—their incidence by months and by states and their effects on people and property. Through the courtesy of the Red Cross, its records were analyzed for the thirty-one-year

²⁹ *Federal Disaster Insurance* (cited note 14 *supra*), p. 137.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

³¹ For the data used in this section, and much of its preparation, the author is indebted to the American National Red Cross, and particularly to its staff members and offices as follows: Chester Whelden, Jr., Burton L. Quigley, and Hilda M. Seal, all of the Office of Research Information; the Office of Machine Records.

TABLE 3—EFFECTS OF DISASTERS^a BY MONTHS: RED CROSS EXPERIENCE, 1925–1955

MONTH	NUMBER OF FATALITIES	NUMBER OF INJURED	NUMBER OF FAMILIES SUFFERING LOSS ^b
January.....	1,483	7,184	133,121
February.....	1,298	5,819	205,661
March.....	3,667	20,915	301,124
April.....	3,156	14,981	217,007
May.....	1,767	13,214	179,848
June.....	1,286	9,892	184,233
July.....	1,315	5,038	108,263
August.....	1,142	14,670	313,372
September.....	4,407	25,794	173,886
October.....	747	3,926	206,055
November.....	1,707	5,098	81,742
December.....	1,269	7,691	73,236
Total.....	23,244	134,222	2,177,548

^a Includes disasters of ten types: hurricanes; tornadoes; other windstorms; floods; flash floods; all other storms (e.g., snowstorms, hailstorms, "cold weather," dust storms, electrical storms); explosions; fires; wrecks (e.g., train, ship, airplane, bus); other disasters (e.g., earthquakes, landslides, drought, structural collapse, epidemics).

^b Includes all families suffering loss in "Red Cross disaster areas" regardless of whether they received Red Cross assistance.

period 1925 to 1955, and the findings form the basis for the discussion which follows. These records include only those disasters in which the Red Cross has participated in relief operations. The Red Cross groups disasters into ten types, including both natural and man-made ones.³²

Disaster effects by months

Table 3 indicates that for the period 1925–55, a total of 2,177,548 families suffered loss³³ and 23,244 people were killed and 134,222 injured in the various disasters in which the Red Cross

³² Hurricanes; tornadoes; other windstorms; floods; flash floods; all other storms (e.g., snowstorms, hailstorms, "cold weather," dust storms, electrical storms); explosions; fires; wrecks (e.g., train, ship, airplane, bus); other disasters (e.g., earthquakes, landslides, drought, structural collapse, epidemics).

³³ It is known that because of variations in reporting requirements and practice the figures for families suffering loss in the first ten or twelve years of this period are incomplete by a considerable margin.

was active. These disaster effects were well distributed in all twelve months, although effects were greater in the months March through May, and August through October. August was first and March second in total numbers of families suffering loss. September was first and March second in both number of persons killed and number injured.

For the period 1925–55, high lights of disaster effects by months are as follows: September had the highest total of dead (3,375) and injured (12,535) from hurricanes, but August the highest for families suffering loss (230,533). March was highest in fatalities (2,025) and injuries (12,920) resulting from tornadoes, with April the highest in numbers of families suffering loss (39,991). November was first with fatalities (66), injuries (509), and families suffering loss (50,109) from "other windstorms." March was first in total fatalities (484) and number of families suffering loss (224,585) from floods, with December first in total number injured (4,410).

August was first in fatalities (228), injuries (8,597), and families suffering loss (47,226) from flash floods. With "other storms," February was first in total fatalities (50), and January first in number injured (907) and families suffering loss (34,749). March and April were about the same in total fatalities resulting from explosion (approximately 730), with April first in total injuries and May first in total numbers of families suffering loss in such disasters. April was first in fatalities resulting from fire (709), although November approached it with 604 fatalities. September was highest in injuries from fire (4,509) and December in number of families suffering loss from fire (6,041), although all months were high in this respect, with the months from September through March approaching this figure. Fatalities from wrecks were highest in November (455), as were families suffering loss (3,407), although injuries were highest in February (1,338). Fatalities from "other disasters" were highest in March (97), and total injured highest in September (5,035), with

March also approaching that level (4,967), while January was first in number of families suffering loss (5,432).

Disaster effects by types of disaster

Table 4 summarizes effects from ten types of disaster from 1925 through 1955. Floods ranked first and hurricanes second as causes of families suffering loss, the former affecting more than a million families and the latter more than one-half million. For number of people killed, tornadoes with 6,117 fatalities ranked first, explosions with 4,288 fatalities second, hurricanes with 3,644 fatalities third, and fires with 3,289 fatalities fourth. For injuries, tornadoes (46,681) ranked first, fires (16,433) second, floods (16,098) third, and hurricanes (15,516) fourth.

Table 4 also indicates rankings of disaster types as to property damage and destruction. For the thirty-one-year period, the disasters of all types brought destruction to 97,763 homes and damage to an additional 1,111,523 ones. Further, they resulted in destruction to 221,883 and damage to 629,317 build-

TABLE 4—DISASTER EFFECTS BY TYPES OF DISASTER: RED CROSS EXPERIENCE, 1925–1955

TYPE OF DISASTER	NUMBER OF FATALITIES	NUMBER OF INJURED	HOMES		OTHER BUILDINGS ^a		FAMILIES SUFFERING LOSS
			Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	
Hurricanes.....	3,644	15,516	23,200	324,259	44,979	161,946	552,111
Tornadoes.....	6,117	46,681	31,094	93,510	70,557	80,047	155,474
Other windstorms...	137	1,368	1,172	74,788	5,195	22,533	128,915
Floods.....	2,125	16,098	29,608	492,823	90,022	316,664	1,068,552
Flash floods.....	409	9,494	1,837	50,892	4,143	15,554	91,940
All other storms ^b ...	103	1,289	201	31,004	257	19,898	86,359
Explosions.....	4,288	8,702	499	7,392	290	2,445	17,893
Fires.....	3,289	16,433	8,045	2,113	6,042	2,126	52,329
Wrecks.....	2,797	7,153	88	24	2	3	9,343
Other disasters ^c	335	11,488	2,019	34,718	396	8,101	14,632
Total.....	23,244	134,222	97,763	1,111,523	221,883	629,317	2,177,548

^a Barns, apartment houses, business structures, public buildings, etc.

^b Snowstorm, hailstorm, cold weather, dust storm, electrical storm, etc.

^c Earthquake, landslide, drought, structural collapse, epidemic, etc.

ings other than homes.³⁴ Tornadoes were first in homes destroyed (31,094), floods second (29,608), and hurricanes third (23,200). Floods were first in homes damaged (492,823), while hurricanes were second (324,259) and tornadoes third (93,510). With destruction of buildings other than homes, floods were first (90,022), tornadoes second (70,557), and hurricanes third (44,979). With damage to buildings other than homes, floods were also first (316,664), hurricanes second (161,946), and tornadoes third (80,047).

Disaster effects by states

States ranking highest in effects sustained from the various types of disasters for the period 1925-55 are as follows: Hurricanes—Florida with 2,800 fatalities, 9,419 persons injured, and 136,503 families suffering loss; tornadoes—Illinois with 756 fatalities and

³⁴ Includes barns, apartment houses, business structures, public buildings, etc.

Texas with 5,019 injured and 21,426 families suffering loss; "other windstorms"—New Jersey with 30 fatalities and 350 injured and Texas with 16,710 families suffering loss; floods—California with 417 fatalities and 5,629 injured and Kansas with 105,492 families suffering loss; flash floods—Pennsylvania with 96 fatalities and Connecticut with 5,136 injured and 19,665 families suffering loss; "other storms"—Utah with 40 fatalities, Nebraska with 408 injured, and Texas with 36,923 families suffering loss; explosions—Texas with 827 fatalities and 2,054 injured and Nevada with 4,679 families suffering loss; fires—Massachusetts with 600 fatalities, California with 6,388 injured, and Illinois with 6,891 families suffering loss; wrecks—New Jersey with 368 fatalities, Ohio with 763 injured, and New York with 3,261 families suffering loss; "all others"—California with 144 fatalities and 5,268 injured and Wyoming with 4,000 families suffering loss.

Floods

By SAMUEL DAVIS STURGIS, JR.

Abstract: Floods can occur in almost any river valley at almost any time. They are unpredictable. Flash floods and the sudden failure of dams and other structures offer the greatest threat to life; major sustained floods are most threatening to health. The average annual potential damage to property is estimated at nearly a billion dollars. Even though floods are no worse or more frequent than formerly, they are more costly as the flood plains increase in population and economic development. The flood-control measures of the federal government are described; those completed or authorized will prevent about three fourths of the potential damage under present conditions of flood-plains use. The program is, however, still incomplete.—Ed.

RIVERS are the natural drainage channels which carry away part of the precipitation that falls on the earth's surface. The sizes and shapes of the river channels are constantly changing and adjusting to the variable demands of the precipitation and runoff. The type and amount of adjustment depends on the degree of variation of precipitation and the physical characteristics of the terrain. Most rivers have developed a main channel which is adequate to contain the amount of flow that occurs practically every year. Adjoining the main channel there is usually a rather well defined flood plain which is inundated to a greater or lesser extent at irregular intervals depending on the variable amounts and rates of precipitation that occur. These periodic inundations are natural, not man-made, phenomena that were occurring long before men began to alter the environment; they have left their record through the ages, both on the land itself and in the history of man's use of the land.

There are many variations in the

causes, types, incidence, and consequences of floods. Many of the variations can give rise to disaster conditions. For example, a small flash flood might do more harm than a greater but more gradual flood because of the absence of opportunity to move people and property out of the path of the flood. Moderate floods during the growing season can destroy a crop, whereas a larger flood before planting might have caused little agricultural damage and could even have beneficial effects.

CAUSES

Steady rain for long periods, high concentrations of rain over small areas, the torrential rains during hurricanes, and other combinations of meteorologic conditions may cause floods of sufficient magnitude to have disastrous effects. From studies of the most adverse meteorologic conditions theoretically possible it is known that the potentiality exists for much greater rates, amounts, and concentrations of rainfall than have yet been recorded.

Lieutenant General Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Washington, D. C., has been Chief of Engineers, United States Army, since 1952, having previously been Commanding General, Sixth Armored Division and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Commanding General of the Communications Zone supporting the United States Army in Europe.

In northern latitudes, snow may be a principal or a contributing factor to floods. The snow cover may accumulate high moisture content when the insulating effect of the snow during the winter keeps the ground frozen and reduces infiltration. When the snow melts the runoff will concentrate into stream channels more completely and more quickly if the ground is still frozen. The snow may melt more quickly during abnormally warm spells or during prolonged rains. Ice jams may complicate the situation. A combination of these influences can result in disastrous floods. The worst possible combination of such factors would in most cases cause much greater floods than have yet been experienced.

The condition of the ground on which the precipitation falls and runs off into stream channels may somewhat affect the timing, peak, volume, and duration of floods. Ground conditions are important, particularly when they lead to such adverse effects as loss of top soil, scouring, gullying, and deposition of sand and silt. Nevertheless, variations in these conditions are seldom if ever a major factor in the cause of extreme floods.

Man-made obstructions or encroachments in river channels or on flood plains often aggravate flood conditions and may be the cause of considerable local damage where, under natural conditions, the flood peaks might have been innocuous. Extreme examples of this aggravation are failure of inadequately designed and poorly built dikes or dams and high backwaters resulting from unreasonable encroachment by bridges or fills in channels.

TYPES

In the headwaters of rivers, particularly in rugged terrain and on small streams where the time of concentration of runoff into stream channels is short,

floods may develop in a matter of minutes. When floods are caused by unexpected precipitation such as a cloudburst, rather than from more or less predictable rains, the lack of warning may be disastrous. This type of flood may cause damage from the sheer destructive force of a wave or wall of water moving with great speed. Accumulations of debris and boulders in the fast-moving water add to the destructive possibilities.

As the size of the river and its contributing drainage area increase, the susceptibility to sudden floods decreases and there is more chance of predicting the nature and extent of flooding and of benefiting from warnings.

Several days may be required for a flood peak to arrive at the downstream reaches of a large river. Here the flood waters rise slowly and the stage they will reach can often be predicted within approximate limits several days in advance and with fair accuracy several hours in advance. In these situations maximum use can be made of predictions and warnings to minimize the possible adverse effects of the flood. Nevertheless, such floods can be serious from the standpoint of disaster relief, primarily because of the large areas affected and the long duration of flooding. Disruption of normal activities and damage from sustained inundation are often of major proportions.

WHERE AND WHEN FLOODS OCCUR

There are possibilities of a flood of some kind in practically all parts of the nation. Even in the arid and semiarid sections there is the threat of cloudbursts that may cause sudden floods, with attendant serious hazard to life and property. In fact, it is in these areas, where stream flow is intermittent and channels poorly defined, that there are likely to be domestic, agricultural, or industrial developments in flood

plains or on debris cones that are particularly susceptible to damage.

In the northeastern United States, the spring floods resulting from snow melt, or from a combination of snow melt and rain, often reach major proportions. However, this region is also subject to floods at all other times of the year, notably during the hurricane season when some of the region's most disastrous floods have occurred.

In the southeastern section flood-producing rains are most apt to accompany hurricanes in the fall or occur during the rainy winter season.

In the Great Plains and central United States floods from sustained rainfall usually occur in the spring, but cloudbursts are also an important factor in the flood situation, particularly in the South.

In the West the seasonal characteristics are most pronounced on streams having their origins in the mountains where melting snows account for many major floods. Floods may also result in this area from heavy rains during the winter rainy season and at any time of year from sudden storms.

Generally, therefore, floods can occur in almost any river valley at almost any time. Because they are unpredictable on either a short-range or a long-range basis, they must be regarded as a constant hazard.

MAGNITUDE AND FREQUENCY

The length and accuracy of the records of floods on America's rivers vary greatly. For most major rivers there exist at least fragmentary records of the approximate stages dating back to the original settlement of the areas. For many streams, however, complete and reliable records reach back only a few decades; in some cases, particularly for the upper reaches of tributaries and small streams, there are no records at all.

From the available data, computa-

tions can be made of the theoretical frequency of occurrence of floods of various magnitudes. For example, a flood of a given magnitude is referred to as having a recurrence interval of once in fifty years or as having a chance of occurrence of 2 per cent. These expressions of probability are useful in the study of floods and solution of flood problems but they do not afford a reliable means of determining how large a flood to expect or when to expect it. Extreme conditions, approaching the theoretically worst possible conditions, could occur at any time and could recur within a much shorter period of time than indicated by their theoretical recurrence intervals.

CONSEQUENCES

In an area left in a completely natural state, the effect of recurrent floods would usually be the formation of a channel of the proper size to carry flows about equal to or slightly greater than the smallest of the annual maximum flows, and the formation of a flood plain by deposition of sediment at intervals when the normal channel was overflowed. On a portion of this flood plain, the frequency and duration of inundation might be sufficient to preclude plant growth and use by animals. On some of the remainder, the plant growth would be periodically damaged or destroyed and animals might be harmed directly or indirectly through loss of food or shelter. The higher portions of the flood plain would be inundated so infrequently that there would be little or no effect on vegetation and use of the land by animals.

The adverse effects of floods in valleys occupied by man increase directly with the extent and value of use. Some man-made developments in rivers and their flood plains are clearly necessary or economically desirable despite the flood hazard. Many are made in igno-

rance of the hazard involved and, once established, are difficult to change.

It is easy to visualize how advantageous, how necessary even, was the use of river valleys during the early development of this country. Rivers were often an essential source of water supply. For many years, travel was impracticable except by water or on trails, roads, and railroads adjacent to the rivers, which provided natural passes and routes. Sites for homes, farms, and commercial establishments became established on and near the natural communication routes. Other advantages to river valley sites were the availability of water for power or industrial processes and the fertility of valley land for agriculture. Even today, aside from the great difficulties involved in changing established patterns of development, many compelling reasons remain for continuing use of valleys and flood-plain lands, despite the increasing cost of repairing or preventing the damage from floods.

Life and health

The hazard to life is greatest from flash floods and from sudden failure of dams, dikes, or other structures that may be damaged during floods. During the unprecedented and fast-rising floods in the northeastern United States in August 1955 there were 179 deaths, mostly by drowning when the victims were caught without warning by a sudden and complete engulfment of cars or dwellings. In contrast, during the slower-rising Kansas floods in the summer of 1951, when property damages were comparable to those suffered in the northeast in 1955 (870 million as compared with 750 million dollars), there were only twenty-eight deaths attributed to the flood despite the fact that some 87,000 persons were forced to leave their homes.

The hazard to health and the danger

of epidemics are greater during sustained major floods than from floods of short duration. Even though the latter may damage water and sewage services and disrupt normal activities, repairs can usually be undertaken immediately, whereas in an area subject to prolonged inundation, the disruption of normal services may continue for some time. These differences may be important in determining the type of relief and preventive measures needed.

Economic consequences, immediate and secondary

The nature and extent of damage to property vary with the type of flooding. Fast-moving water has erosive effects and destructive force, particularly when carrying boulders or debris. Although the cost of repairing damage caused by slowly rising flood waters may sometimes be moderate with respect to the value of the property, cleanup costs are often large. In addition, the disruption of normal activities has an impact on the welfare and economy of regions even far beyond the flooded area.

Appraisal of the economic consequences of a flood requires consideration of both the physical destruction and the consequent economic disruption. Many estimates, such as those of the United States Weather Bureau, deal more adequately with physical than with induced effects, some of which cannot be immediately ascertained even by those directly affected by the flood. The Corps of Engineers of the United States Army assembles as comprehensive data as possible on all damage and loss directly attributable to floods. These data are used to compile estimates of potential future flood damage, which may be tabulated as annual averages over whatever period may be taken as the expected useful life of proposed flood-control works—currently, fifty years or less. These estimates in

turn help provide an indication of the amounts that may feasibly be spent to prevent flood damage in any given area. In making such use of the data, however, the record of past losses must be converted to reflect current price levels and changes in the extent of economic development in the area affected.

Potential flood damage

The latest (1954) Corps of Engineers estimate of the average annual damage potential of floods in the United States is 911 million dollars. This figure represents the amount of damage that would occur on sections of rivers downstream from sites where major flood-control structures could be located, if no preventive measures were taken. (It does not include potential damage in headwater areas nor damage from erosion caused by water before it reaches established stream channels, both covered in the programs of the United States Department of Agriculture.) Slightly more than half the potential damage is or will be prevented by major flood-control works now completed or in partial operation, and an additional one fourth would be prevented by measures now in the planning phase.

Increasing damage, not increasing floods

A question is often raised as to whether floods in the United States are getting worse. As far as the stage, duration, extent, and frequency of floods are concerned, the answer is no. On some rivers, however, the greatest flood of record has been a recent one; for example, in Kansas it was in 1951, and on some New England streams, in 1955. In many river valleys, on the other hand, there is some evidence that the largest floods occurred many years ago, though accurate records are not available.

It is clear, however, that the damage caused by floods is increasing as a result

of increased development in the flood plains and the increased value of previous developments. A flood of given size today may cause several times the damage that the same flood would have caused fifty years ago. For example, William Glenn Hoyt and Walter Basil Langbein¹ have estimated that if flood-plain development paralleled general development the Ohio River floods which caused damage of \$100,000,000 in 1913 would cause damage of \$550,000,000 today.

EFFORTS TO AMELIORATE FLOOD LOSSES

Typical of the earliest measures to reduce the damage involved in using the flood plains of the rivers of the United States were the levees built by individual landowners and communities along the lower Mississippi. In most cases, these efforts were unco-ordinated and inadequate, and in response to a growing realization of the need for assistance to the states and local groups, Congress enacted the "Swamp Acts" in 1849 and 1850, under which all unsold swamp and overflowed lands were granted to the states to be sold by them, the proceeds to be used for levees and drainage works to protect and reclaim the lands. However, the acts failed in their purpose as flood-control and reclamation measures, principally because of the lack of co-ordination of the efforts of the individual organizations and states.

The first direct participation by the federal government in flood control, which occurred in connection with its responsibility for navigation, was the formation in 1879 of the Mississippi River Commission to operate under the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, and assignment to it of a program of improvements in the alluvial valley of

¹ *Floods* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 86.

the Mississippi for navigation and flood-control purposes.

In 1893 the California Debris Commission was formed to plan, under the Chief of Engineers, the control of mining debris and to protect the navigability of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. The first work in this area was authorized by the River and Harbor Act of March 1, 1917. In the same year an appropriation of \$45,000,000 was made for carrying out plans of the Mississippi River Commission for flood control.

In the 1917 act Congress also recognized a growing national concern with flood control and the close relationship between flood control and navigation and other water-resource development. The 1917 act specified that examinations and surveys for flood control should be comprehensive and include consideration of the development of water power and such other functions as might be properly related to or coordinated with any project. This act was the forerunner of federal planning and participation in flood control on a nationwide basis, and placed the federal interest in flood control under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers. It was followed by authorization for surveys on many streams in 1924 and by the initiation in 1927, by House Document No. 308, of surveys of all navigable streams of the nation for the purpose of "navigation, the development of water power, the control of floods, and the needs of irrigation." These "308" surveys gave the Army Engineers a framework from which it was possible a decade later to move quickly into a program of construction of key projects needed to prevent disaster-type floods.

Jadwin Plan for Mississippi River

The comprehensive "Jadwin Plan" for the lower Mississippi River (named for

Major General Edgar Jadwin, then the Chief of Engineers) was adopted by the Act of May 15, 1928. Under this basic plan and subsequent modifications and extensions, approximately \$900,000,000 have been expended to construct levees, channel improvements, floodways, emergency spillways, and reservoirs for the protection of more than two million people living in a hundred urban areas or on 200,000 farm units involving nearly twenty million acres. This great project is technically about two-thirds complete, but it has been advanced to the point where it affords substantial protection to this tremendously valuable alluvial valley. It is estimated that these works have prevented over five billion dollars in damage since 1928 on the basis of the state of development and price levels prevailing at the time the potentially damaging floods occurred. This is a significant accomplishment in an area which only thirty years ago suffered a disastrous flood costing 313 lives and affecting 18,000,000 acres of land with 300 million dollars in damage. Larger flows have since been experienced without significant damage.

Flood Control Act, 1936

By the Flood Control Act of June 22, 1936, Congress declared that "flood control on navigable waters or their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with States, their political subdivisions, and localities thereof"; and that "the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected." This was the first general federal flood-control legislation.

Current program

Pursuant to this policy, a general flood-control program of over a thousand projects with an estimated eventual cost of 11 billion dollars has been authorized for construction by the Corps of Engineers. Work is complete or underway on some four hundred of these projects with an estimated cost of 6 billion dollars. About three hundred projects with an estimated cost of 3 billion dollars are classified as active and ready for construction as funds become available. The remaining three hundred projects with a cost of 2 billion dollars are currently classified as inactive or subject to re-examination to determine whether they are still suitable to the intended purposes. These figures include some costs for purposes other than flood control, because on some

multiple-purpose projects the costs have not yet been allocated among the purposes.

The effect of the federal flood-control program (including the Mississippi River project) is summarized in the accompanying table.

The total cost of completing all flood-control projects now authorized for construction by the Corps of Engineers and presently considered as active projects is estimated at 5,865 million dollars. As of June 30, 1955, appropriations for such work totaled 2,300 million dollars. Thus 3,565 million dollars' worth of work remains to be performed to complete the present program. These figures do not include the costs of about 600 million dollars allocable to flood control in authorized multiple-purpose developments.

At recent rates of appropriation and

ESTIMATED EFFECT OF FLOOD CONTROL PROGRAM
(In millions of dollars, at July 1954 levels and conditions of development)

REGION	AVERAGE ANNUAL FLOOD DAMAGES					Remainder
	Potential without federal works	To be prevented by works				
		in full or partial operation	under construction but not in operation	authorized but not started	total	
New England	\$ 21.0	\$ 7.3	—	\$ 4.5	\$ 11.8	\$ 9.2
North Atlantic	47.9	15.3	\$ 5.3	10.8	31.4	16.5
South Atlantic ^a	32.0	8.1	0.1	0.6	8.8	23.2
Lower Mississippi Valley	218.5	214.6	—	—	214.6	3.9
Upper Mississippi Valley ^b	119.1	75.5	2.0	13.8	91.3	27.8
Red River of the North	2.6	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.4	1.2
Ohio River Basin	112.0	46.6	10.0	34.3	90.9	21.1
Great Lakes Basin	11.5	2.1	0.1	0.6	2.8	8.7
Missouri River Basin ^b	60.0	28.8	10.3	18.8	57.9	2.1
Arkansas-White-Red	52.3	26.6	2.3	5.6	34.5	17.8
Gulf Southwest	55.4	11.7	1.0	14.7	27.4	28.0
Pacific Southwest	111.6	34.7	51.3	12.1	98.1	13.5
Pacific Northwest	67.1	19.3	10.8	21.0	41.1	26.0
Total U. S.	\$911.0	\$491.4	\$83.4	\$137.2	\$712.0	\$199.0

^a Flood damages and benefits being re-evaluated for entire Central and Southern Florida project.

^b Flood damages and benefits being re-evaluated to include data obtained during 1951 and 1952 floods. Values may be materially higher.

construction, this program might be finished within twenty-five to thirty years. It will be noted that even after completion of this program a substantial portion of the estimated annual damage potential, amounting to about 200 million dollars a year, will remain unprevented. Meanwhile, however, the economic growth of the nation will undoubtedly have caused further commercial, industrial, and other development of flood-plain lands, requiring still further construction for protection. At the same time, it has become increasingly apparent that flood-control measures must be integrated with plans for other aspects of water-resource development, such as inland waterway navigation, municipal and industrial water supply, and pollution abatement. Hence the end of the task of protecting American river valleys from floods is not yet in sight.

SOME HEADWAY EVIDENT

In reviewing the nature, evolution, and present status of the flood problem, and the outlook for the future, especially from the standpoint of the problem of disaster and disaster relief, the following observations are pertinent:

1. The meteorologic, hydrologic, and other natural physical factors that cause major floods have not changed significantly.

2. Future floods can be expected to be as large as, and on some rivers, larger than, those of the past.

3. The disaster potential of floods depends on the type and extent of use or encroachment on flood plains.

4. Over the years the increased use of flood plains, whether justifiable or unjustifiable, has reached the point where economic losses from floods run into

many millions of dollars annually. Such use will undoubtedly continue to increase, thus constantly augmenting the need for protective measures.

5. In some flood-plain areas, particularly those which have not yet been intensively developed, zoning may be a possible solution. Where effective flood-control measures are not economically justified flood-plain zoning may be the only other possibility for reducing flood losses.

6. Efforts to control or restrain floods in order to reduce losses involved in occupying flood plains were ineffective until federal participation was instituted on a large scale.

7. Major flood-control measures completed or authorized will prevent about three fourths of the potential damage under present conditions of flood-plain use, but the program is incomplete and the need is increasing.

In the light of these considerations, it would appear that some headway is being made in reducing the possibility of disasters from floods. The trend in lessening the loss of life through improvement of warnings and protection is already evident. The substantial reduction in the average annual economic loss from floods should become more apparent as the beneficial effects of completed and planned works come into play.

THE JOB REMAINING

The job remaining to be done includes completion of major control and protective works wherever justifiable in order to preserve valuable investments already made; further improvement of warning services; and perfection of disaster plans for areas that will continue to be threatened after all preventive measures have been taken.

Hurricanes, Tornadoes, and Other Storms

By F. W. REICHELDERFER

Abstract: Loss of lives and property through abnormal weather occurrences has become a national concern. It is difficult to conclude that these phenomena have become more frequent in late years, but they certainly strike at more people owing to the increase and distribution of our population. The different types of weather disasters are discussed in considerable detail, especially hurricanes and tornadoes. Information is given on various features of the "warning services" set up to permit the taking of precautionary measures in threatened areas and on research projects now under way designed to improve forecasting and warning services.—Ed.

IN recent years the huge loss in life and property from hurricanes, tornadoes, and other storms (Table 1) has become a matter of great national concern.

Hurricanes Carol, Edna, and Hazel, which in 1954 struck Middle and North Atlantic states, cost about two hundred lives and property damage amounting to about a billion dollars. A year later this record loss was exceeded when Hurricanes Connie, Diane, and Ione brought more high winds and floodwaters to most of the same states.

Of the 532 tornadoes that occurred in 1953, three cost the lives of more than three hundred persons in three widely separated communities: Waco, Texas; Flint, Michigan; and Worcester, Massachusetts. The disastrous Worcester tornado also caused within a few minutes property damage of more than fifty million dollars. Of the 870 tornadoes reported in 1955 one hit Blackwell, Oklahoma, and another, Udall, Kansas, on the same night, bringing death to more than a hundred persons.

Great as the combined losses from hurricanes and tornadoes are, still larger losses normally are recorded annually in

the United States from the sum total of flood-producing rains, thunderstorms, lightning, violent wind squalls, blizzards, cold waves, hailstorms, droughts, freezing rain, sleet storms, and other abnormal weather occurrences.

The secondary human and economic consequences of these annual weather disasters, while not easily measured, are serious and widespread. Public fear and apprehension of similar disasters in the future may have significant effects on property values and development, on the location and expansion of business concerns, and on the personal planning of millions of people.

Although hurricanes, tornadoes, and other storms are all disturbances in the general flow of the atmosphere around the globe and have certain fundamental similarities, they are so different in their major characteristics and their usual locations that they are best discussed separately. For example, a hurricane may cover an area of thousands of square miles at one instant and may travel for days over the ocean with a forward motion of only ten miles an hour. A tornado, on the other hand, may cause damage along a narrow path

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TABLE 1—FLOOD AND TROPICAL STORM DAMAGE IN U. S., 1925-1955

YEAR	TROPICAL STORMS		FLOODS		TOTAL	
	Deaths	Damage	Deaths	Damage	Deaths	Damage
1925.....	6	— ^a	36	\$ 9,922,000	42	\$ 9,922,000
1926.....	269	\$106,500,000	16	23,470,000	285	129,970,000
1927.....	0	— ^a	423	347,658,000	423	347,658,000
1928.....	1,836	25,000,000	15	44,614,000	1,851	69,614,000
1929.....	3	653,000	89	68,099,000	92	68,752,000
1930.....	0	— ^a	14	15,850,000	14	15,850,000
1931.....	0	— ^a	0	2,810,000	0	2,810,000
1932.....	0	— ^a	11	10,295,000	11	10,295,000
1933.....	63	45,650,000	33	36,679,000	96	82,329,000
1934.....	17	4,760,000	88	10,361,000	105	15,121,000
1935.....	414	11,500,000	236	127,130,000	650	138,630,000
1936.....	9	2,300,000	142	282,549,000	151	284,849,000
1937.....	0	42,000	142	440,740,000	142	440,782,000
1938.....	600	300,245,000	180	101,100,000	780	401,345,000
1939.....	3	2,000	83	13,834,000	86	13,836,000
1940.....	51	4,744,000	60	40,466,000	111	45,210,000
1941.....	10	7,675,000	47	39,525,000	57	47,200,000
1942.....	8	27,101,000	68	98,506,000	76	125,607,000
1943.....	16	16,765,000	107	199,733,000	123	216,498,000
1944.....	64	165,010,000	33	101,079,000	97	266,089,000
1945.....	7	80,133,000	91	165,797,000	98	245,930,000
1946.....	0	5,200,000	28	70,814,000	28	76,014,000
1947.....	53	135,758,000	55	272,328,000	108	408,086,000
1948.....	3	18,400,000	82	229,960,000	85	248,360,000
1949.....	4	58,750,000	48	93,932,000	52	152,682,000
1950.....	19	35,850,000	93	176,049,000	112	211,899,000
1951.....	0	2,000,000	51	1,028,742,000	51	1,030,742,000
1952.....	3	2,750,000	54	254,064,000	57	256,814,000
1953.....	2	6,163,000	40	122,203,000	42	128,366,000
1954.....	193	755,473,000	44	99,149,000	237	854,622,000
1955.....	218	290,000,000	281	875,000,000	499	1,165,000,000

^a Minor or none.

Source: U. S. Weather Bureau.

only fifty yards wide and may last only a few minutes as it sweeps across the prairie at forty miles an hour. Other storms also have important differences.

HURRICANES

Hurricanes,¹ the most widely destructive of all storms, are great vortices of

¹For reference material see I. R. Tannehill, *Hurricanes*, 8th rev. ed. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952) and *Hurricane Hunters* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1955); Malcolm Righy (Ed.), *Meteorological Abstracts and Bibliography* (Boston, Mass.: American Meteorological Society); re-

ports, technical papers, and other informational material issued by the U. S. Weather Bureau, Washington, D. C.

air swirling in a counterclockwise direction around a nearly calm center. (In the Southern Hemisphere, tropical cyclones, the general type comprising hurricanes, rotate in a clockwise direction.) Those tropical revolving storms that affect the United States usually form in the southern portion of the North Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, or the Gulf of Mexico. Similar tropical storms in the western Pacific Ocean are called

ports, technical papers, and other informational material issued by the U. S. Weather Bureau, Washington, D. C.

typhoons. Both hurricanes and typhoons are accompanied by violent destructive winds, heavy rains, and mountainous seas.

Tropical revolving storms when first formed are usually embedded in the trade winds that blow from an easterly direction, between ten and twenty degrees north of the Equator. They therefore move generally toward the west. After gradually increasing in size and intensity, these storms usually curve toward the north and then northeast. They may either strike the eastern coast of the United States or travel out over the North Atlantic Ocean with the prevailing westerlies found in these more northern latitudes. In other cases the storms may continue their westward movement across the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico to reach the coasts of Central America, Mexico, or the Gulf states.

The fastest and therefore the most destructive winds of a hurricane blow counterclockwise in a band twenty to fifty or more miles wide around the storm's center, the "eye," where the winds are light or even calm for a brief time. In this band or ring of violent winds, velocities at the surface of the earth may reach 150 miles an hour, even in brief gusts up to 200 miles an hour. Beyond the zone of highest wind speeds, the winds decrease gradually as the distance from the hurricane's center increases. Frequently there are large differences in wind speed in the four quarters of a hurricane, with the strongest winds in the right forward quadrant of the advancing storm.

The central eye of the storm, usually from five to twenty-five miles in diameter and frequently cloudless, is surrounded by a wall of clouds thousands of feet high, which since it is within the circle of strong winds appears as a cloud mass whirling around the center. Inasmuch as hurricanes reach their

maximum development over the sea, the best observations of their interior structure have come from ships or reconnaissance aircraft. Shipboard observers have reported with amazement the sudden calm air as the ship enters the center of the storm, and the partly cloudy or even clear skies replacing the dark clouds and driving rain. But the ship continues to toss violently on confused and mountainous seas, and the respite from wind and rain is brief, usually only a few minutes before she as suddenly re-enters the circle of hurricane winds and driving rain on the opposite side of the "eye."

Hurricane movements and areas

As a hurricane moves northward out of tropical waters, the forward speed of the entire storm usually increases, occasionally to a marked degree. For example, the famous 1938 New England hurricane and the equally famous Hurricane Carol of 1954 rapidly increased their forward speeds after passing Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, until they were moving northward at more than fifty miles an hour when they hit the New England coast. With some hurricanes, on the other hand, there is for a time practically no forward movement of the storm's center, so that the hurricane winds blow steadily over the same place for hours or even for a day or two. In unusual cases the hurricane center may go through one or more loops or hairpin curves or move from north to south or double back to strike the same land area twice.

The width of destruction caused by the winds of a hurricane as it moves over or near land varies considerably. In a small hurricane the region of major destruction may be less than twenty-five miles wide, but in great hurricanes it may be two hundred miles wide and up to a thousand miles long.

The destructive waters

High water brought on shore by a hurricane has caused great loss of life. A century of records shows that more than three fourths of all deaths in hurricanes can be attributed to drowning in coastal high waters brought in as storm surges. Water eight to sixteen feet above normal tides has been recorded during some of the larger hurricanes along the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts; wave action and pounding seas on top of these high water levels may bring frightful destruction to exposed coastal and bay communities. These wind-driven storm surges can also cause sudden rises in water levels outside the storm's center, usually to the right of the path of the hurricane as it approaches the coast. Local topography, as well as the path, speed, and intensity of the storm, can increase or decrease the effects of storm surges and account for wide variations in water damage over short coastal stretches. Such pre-storm and poststorm changes in water level may produce strong currents and bring unexpected danger locally, especially in bays and other confined water areas.

Hurricane rains are responsible for many of the major inland floods that have occurred in the Gulf and Atlantic Coast states. The most intense twenty-four-hour rainfall from a hurricane on record in the United States occurred in September 1921, when 23.11 inches fell in one day on Taylor, Texas. Up to

twenty inches of rain fell on parts of Connecticut and Massachusetts during the final phases of Hurricane Diane in August 1955; these hurricane rains in New England were the cause of the record floods there.

Hurricane duration

The average life span of a hurricane is about nine days. August hurricanes have the longest average life span, twelve days, and July and November hurricanes normally last only about eight days from origin to disappearance.

Frequencies

Principal hurricane months are August, September, and October (see Table 2).

In recent years the widespread hurricane reporting system has probably observed all well-developed tropical storms, and before the reporting network was so well organized, a few tropical storms may have escaped observations; therefore statistics comparing hurricane frequency in recent decades with earlier periods may be misleading. They indicate long-term irregularities in frequency, with the decade 1946-55 showing a return to greater frequency (see Table 3 and chart). The increase is less impressive, however, when the figures for 1887-95 are converted to comparable basis (1887-95 averages 8.7 per year; 1946-55, 9.5 per year) and it cannot be proven that this small difference is not entirely the result of inadequate reporting during the 1880's and

TABLE 2—TROPICAL STORM AND HURRICANE FREQUENCIES BY MONTHS, 1887-1955

TYPE OF STORM	JANU- ARY*	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEP- TEMBER	OCTO- BER	NOVEM- BER	DECEM- BER	TOTAL
Tropical storms	1	9	26	34	102	181	130	32	3	518
Tropical storms reaching hurricane intensity . . .	1	2	12	16	63	114	59	9	1	277

* No tropical storms have been observed during the months of February, March, and April.

TABLE 3—TROPICAL STORM AND HURRICANE FREQUENCIES BY DECADES, 1887-1955

TYPE OF STORM	1887-95*	1896-1905	1906-15	1916-25	1926-35	1936-45	1946-55	TOTAL
Tropical storms	78	63	55	53	83	91	95	518
Tropical storms reaching hurricane intensity	45	32	24	29	44	38	65	277

* Nine-year period only.

1890's. For the past sixty-nine years the greatest number of tropical storms to attain hurricane intensity in any one year was eleven (1950). In 1893 and again in 1950, four hurricanes were in progress at the same time, including occurrences in the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the western Atlantic. The annual average for the entire sixty-nine-year period is four.

HURRICANE WARNING SERVICE


The Weather Bureau is responsible for issuing warnings of hurricanes which approach United States territory and contiguous waters. During the summer and fall, when most hurricanes occur, forecast offices at San Juan, Miami, New Orleans, Washington, and Boston have special communications facilities and maintain an alert day-and-night watch for developing tropical storms and hurricanes.

When there are definite indications that a hurricane is forming, even though it is a thousand miles or more from the mainland, the broadcasting of "advisories" is begun. These are issued every six hours day and night to tell where the storm is, how intense it is, and its speed and direction of movement. Advisory messages are also radioed to ships at sea so that they can steer clear of the storm, and to small isolated islands in the storm's path so that they too can take precautionary action. If the hurricane moves toward the mainland, "bulletins" for press, radio, and television are issued at frequent intervals to keep the public in-

formed of the progress of the storm. Small craft are warned to stay in port or in inland waters.

When a hurricane threatens any portion of the United States coast, extra emergency warning centers are set up at Weather Bureau offices in the threatened area. Representatives of newspapers, radio and television stations, civil defense, Red Cross, city governments, public utilities, and other agencies come to the center to obtain first-hand information on the storm. Special telephone and radio lines are used so that this vital information may be quickly disseminated to everyone concerned.

While a hurricane is forming, special



weather observations are taken at frequent intervals. Upper-air soundings, normally made every twelve hours, are made at shorter intervals to measure meteorological conditions at all levels up to 60,000 feet or more above the earth; reports from ships at sea are requested every three hours or even hourly. Another important source of data is the reports from the specially equipped Air Force and Navy hurricane reconnaissance airplanes. These courageous fliers patrol areas hundreds of miles from land, often penetrating to the center of the storm to obtain direct information on its location, intensity, and movement. During the last few years storm detection radar equipment installed at coastal points has been used to track hurricanes as they approach land. Storms as far as 250 miles from the radar can be located and their courses continuously tracked day and night.

Hurricane watch

Should the hurricane continue to approach the coast so as to constitute considerable threat to coastal areas, a "hurricane watch" is announced for the vulnerable areas. The hurricane watch does not constitute a warning that hurricane conditions are imminent; rather, it provides advance information that the hurricane is close enough so that everyone within the area of the hurricane watch should listen for further advisories and be ready to take precautionary action in case hurricane warnings are issued later.

Hurricane warning

As soon as the forecaster determines that a particular section of the coast will feel the strong effects of a hurricane, he issues a "hurricane warning" specifying the coastal areas where winds of seventy-five miles per hour or higher are expected to occur. When a *warning* is issued, all precautions should be taken

immediately against the full force of the storm, for hurricane warnings are seldom issued more than twenty-four hours in advance and sometimes, in case of unusual or erratic hurricane movement, they may even be issued only a few hours in advance of the onset of hurricane conditions. Issuance of hurricane warnings, however, does not always mean that the center of the hurricane is expected to pass inland over the area warned. It does mean that winds of hurricane force or dangerous high tides or very rough seas are expected within the area of hurricane warning. In some cases the center may pass outside the coastline and still bring hurricane winds to coastal communities.

Usually winds increase gradually as the center of the storm approaches the coast and reach hurricane force six hours or more before the center actually crosses it. Since dangerous winds may extend outward considerable distances from the center of the storm, the area of danger is usually several times greater than that covered by the center itself.

Storm warning

"Storm warnings" as distinguished from "hurricane warnings" are issued to coastal areas when winds of more than thirty-two miles per hour but less than hurricane force are expected to occur not only as a result of tropical cyclones but also for other types of coastal storms. In connection with hurricanes, storm warnings may be issued if a hurricane approaches close enough to cause strong winds but not close enough to cause hurricane conditions. If the hurricane continues to move toward the coast, the storm warnings may become hurricane warnings, and storm warnings may then be issued for other areas on either side of the expected hurricane wind zones, close enough to get gale winds but not close enough to expect winds of hurricane force.

NATIONAL HURRICANE RESEARCH PROJECT

The public interest in further improvement and expansion of severe storm warning services, following the hurricane catastrophes of 1954, resulted in appropriations that enabled the Weather Bureau to enlarge its storm warning operations and to expand its storm research program.

As part of this expanded research program the Weather Bureau has sponsored a National Hurricane Research Project, which includes the consultation, co-operation, or active participation of outstanding authorities on tropical meteorology from universities, scientific institutions, the Air Force and the Navy, and other governmental agencies. Some of the work was begun in the fall of 1955 and the intensive data-collection program in the summer of 1956. Studies under way are designed to advance present understanding of the inception, movement, and development of tropical storms. The program is expected to continue for at least five years.

The research has been paralleled by improvements in service operations and facilities that will result in a considerably improved hurricane warning service. For example, three high-powered hurricane-tracking radar stations, with ranges of 250 miles, are now in operation at Hatteras, North Carolina; Nantucket, Massachusetts; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. Other high-powered sets will be installed early in 1958, at selected points along the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts. In addition to these three long-range radar units, there now are radar installations with a more limited range of 125 miles in operation at several key sites along the coast.

Other recent improvements in hurricane service operations include many new surface and upper-air observing stations in the West Indies and Carib-

bean Sea area; additional ships that report weather conditions while at sea; development of a new storm-surge (floodwaters) forecast program and the assignment of storm-surge specialists to nine major coastal stations; establishment of new river-stage and flood-forecast centers at Windsor Locks, Connecticut (for the New England states), and at Augusta, Georgia (for the South Atlantic states); additional teletype-writer and facsimile chart installations at coastal stations; installation of new radio communication camera and radiophoto equipment at the radar outposts at Hatteras, North Carolina, Nantucket, Massachusetts, and Burrwood, Louisiana, for transmitting radarscope photos of hurricanes to the nearest forecast center at Washington, Boston, and New Orleans, respectively; more hurricane reconnaissance flights by the Air Force and the Navy; and development of a co-operative information program to advance public understanding of the available warning services and the nature of tropical storms.

TORNADOES

Tornadoes² are rotary storms of small diameter and extreme intensity—the most violent of all windstorms, though hurricanes are "most destructive" in their total single-storm destructiveness. The winds of a tornado vortex whirl counterclockwise inward and upward at tremendous speeds which, combined with the partial vacuum at the center, produce explosive effects on surface structures hit by the vortex. None but indirect measurements of such great

² For reference material see S. D. Flora, *Tornadoes of the United States*, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954); Malcolm Rigby (Ed.), *Meteorological Abstracts and Bibliography* (Boston, Mass.: American Meteorological Society); reports, technical papers, and other informational material issued by the U. S. Weather Bureau, Washington, D. C.

speeds have been possible, but reliable estimates suggest that these rotary winds in some instances exceed four hundred miles per hour.

The most characteristic visual indication of a tornado is the dark funnel-shaped cloud which seems to be hanging from the clouds above as it moves across the countryside, often with the lower end of the ropelike or cone-shaped funnel not quite reaching the ground. At night identification is more difficult, since the funnel is seen only during brief flashes of lightning.

Also characteristic of tornadoes is a roaring sound, sometimes audible several miles away, which has been likened to the sound of hundreds of airplanes flying overhead, the rumble of trains crossing trestles, the buzzing of millions of bees, and the whining of strong winds in cables or rigging.

Size, speed, and direction

The diameter of a tornado is usually measured in feet or yards rather than miles. The average width of the destructive path along the ground is about four hundred yards, although some paths have been no more than ten feet wide, and a few have had evident damage tracks over a mile wide. An amazing feature of tornado paths is that the areas of total destruction are often separated by only a few feet from areas that have not been even slightly disturbed.

The lengths of tornado paths have varied from a few yards to perhaps a few hundred miles, with the average about sixteen miles. At least seven tornadoes have been reported with paths more than two hundred miles long. The average duration is less than an hour. However, on May 26, 1917, a tornado traveling across Illinois and Indiana lasted seven hours and twenty minutes and had a record path of 293 miles.

The forward speed of this tornado was forty miles an hour, which is slightly above average. Forward speeds have been known to range from almost zero to as much as sixty-eight miles an hour.

Nearly two thirds of all tornadoes move from the southwest towards the northeast, the direction of prevailing surface winds in the areas where tornadoes develop. If tornadoes that move from the northwest or west are added to those from the southwest, they include altogether seven eighths of all tornadoes. But tornadoes have been known to come from all directions, and some have completely stopped movement, some have sharply changed direction, and a few have made looping paths. It frequently happens that several tornadoes occur on the same day in the same general area and move in nearly parallel lines.

Destructive power

The destructive power of the tornado is terrifying. Strong buildings are torn apart and scattered about like kindling wood, the pieces sailing through the air in a dangerous barrage; walls collapse or topple outward; large trees are twisted or uprooted and the bark is often stripped off; people and farm animals are whirled through the air and then dashed to earth; bridges are wrenched from their foundations and left in twisted masses of metal; heavy machinery is lifted and deposited miles away. The awesome force of the whirling winds within the storm is demonstrated by the shearing off of large tree limbs; by straws and slivers of wood driven deep into boards and posts; and by the penetration of large pieces of wood, javelinlike, deep into the earth or entirely through tree trunks.

Tornadoes in the United States cause on the average more than two hundred deaths and thousands of injuries each

year. The average annual property damage in the United States is more than twenty million dollars.

Formation

Tornadoes usually occur in connection with thunderstorms, and especially with those accompanied by hailstones. They start to form several thousand feet above the earth's surface; some never reach the ground and others barely touch it and immediately rise again.

For tornadoes to form requires the presence of layers of air of contrasting temperature, moisture, density, and windflow. When cool, dry air from the west or northwest moves over warm, moist surface air from the Gulf of Mexico and is accompanied by a narrow band of strong winds at intermediate levels, the kinetic and potential forces sometimes combine to produce a vortex or whirl. The origin and development of the tornado are not fully understood.

Where and when

Tornadoes occur in many parts of the world and have been reported in all of our states, but no place is more favorable for their formation than the central part of the United States (see map, Tornado Distribution in the United States). They normally start to increase in number during February, most frequently in the Gulf states, and the frequency reaches a peak there in March. The seasonal increase shifts northwestward to reach a maximum in Kansas during May and June. In the summer they develop farther north. From July until January there is a rapid decline in the number in the United States.

Tornadoes can occur at any hour of the day or night, but they appear to form most readily in the hours closely

following the warmest parts of the day. About 82 per cent occur between noon and midnight and about 43 per cent between 3:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M.


Annual frequency

Tables of annual frequency of tornadoes observed in the United States might at first glance be taken to mean that these storms have increased greatly in recent years, for two to five times as many have been reported in the years 1952 to 1956 as in the years a decade or more ago. In earlier years, however, only the more spectacular tornadoes got into the annual records, whereas in recent years the reporting system has been greatly amplified in many ways; for example, reports are now received from aircraft pilots, who see funnel-shaped clouds that would have escaped detection in earlier years. The reported recent increase in the number of tornadoes probably thus signifies not so much an actual increase in annual frequency as (1) greater density of population (to report tornadoes in areas which formerly were relatively unpopulated); (2) greater public awareness and observation of tornadoes through tornado forecasts disseminated over radio and television stations; (3) improved storm-reporting networks and techniques; (4) more trained co-operative observers; and (5) the establishment of community warning networks.

Somewhat similar reservations are necessary in comparing recent annual property losses with losses in earlier years, bearing in mind changing dollar values and the greater number and size of towns in tornado areas.

TORNADO FORECASTS AND WARNINGS

It may never be possible to predict much in advance the exact spot where a tornado will occur, just as it is un-



likely that man can ever determine just where a bolt of lightning will strike. However, recent advances in tornado forecasting techniques now permit predictions up to six or more hours in advance for defined areas (approximately 20,000 square miles in size) where there is a reasonable possibility that one or more tornadoes will occur. The detection and tracking of rain squalls by modern radar equipment have been particularly helpful in the issuance of life-saving tornado forecasts and warnings.

Tornado forecasts for all parts of the United States are now prepared at the Weather Bureau's Severe Local Storm Forecasting Center (SELS Center) in Kansas City. Tornado specialists there analyze and interpret a large number of meteorological charts, diagrams, and reports in their day and night watch of all conditions that may lead to tornadoes. Forecasts are promptly distributed to the public by local Weather Bureau

offices, which make use of radio and television stations in and near threatened areas. The civil defense organizations, the Red Cross, state and local police, sheriffs, school officials, and many others co-operate in relaying tornado forecasts to people throughout threatened areas.

These "tornado forecasts" are issued by the Weather Bureau to alert volunteer storm reporters, police, and the public to watch for tornadoes if the sky becomes threatening. People are advised to take necessary preliminary action so that a place of safety can be reached quickly if a "tornado warning" is later issued.

Tornado warnings are announcements that a tornado has been sighted. These warnings are made possible through the co-operation of many public-spirited people who promptly notify the nearest Weather Bureau office when they see a tornado. Tornado warnings are then

issued announcing the storm's location and direction of movement; this information can be used by those in the expected path of the advancing tornado to find places of safety or to speed away from the path of the storm.

ing their own areas of community responsibility.

WEATHER BUREAU TORNADO RESEARCH PROGRAM

The severe local storm warning network program

The Weather Bureau has responsibility for warning the public of all forms of severe weather developments that offer a significant threat to life or property. Tornadoes are of a much smaller scale, however, than the usual storms for which the regular network of weather-observing stations is designed; hence, tornadoes may pass between established Weather Bureau reporting stations completely undetected and may strike large communities without advance notice.

To meet this limitation, the Bureau has developed in most states a system of severe local storm warning networks. Under this plan, co-operative storm observers are selected at many points surrounding population centers and in rural areas. These observers are trained to recognize tornadoes, and their co-operation is enlisted in telephoning reports to a central point responsible for distributing warnings to others. In many areas, the central point for receipt of reports and origination of warnings is the local Weather Bureau office. To meet the problem in thousands of communities in the United States without a Weather Bureau office, public-spirited local groups have been encouraged to set up their own severe local storm warning networks and to furnish reports to the nearest Weather Bureau office for use in warning other communities.

More than one hundred and fifty Weather Bureau offices east of the Rockies have established local storm warning networks, most of them cover-

In the past few years there has been a great increase in research studies dealing with tornadoes and severe local storms. Efforts are now directed primarily to three distinct phases of the main problem of forecasting the time, location, movement, and intensity of severe local storms: (1) the nature of the storm setting, that is, the environmental atmospheric conditions favorable for a tornado outbreak; (2) the cause of the storm trigger or mechanism that concentrates the energy of the storm into the destructive tornado vortex; and (3) the characteristics of the storm itself.

In December 1955 a Severe Local Storm Research Conference was held to discuss how federal funds could best be used in a detailed study of tornadoes which would lead to improved forecasts and warnings. Participating in meetings held over a three-day period were 117 specialists from forty organizations representing the civilian and military branches of the government, universities, airlines, instrument companies, and other research agencies. They gave much attention to the need for special observing networks and special instrumentation to secure data at a greater frequency and on a smaller space scale than are customary for general meteorological services. Examples include frequent aircraft and instrumented probes of upper-level tornado conditions, cloud photography, denser networks of surface and upper-air observation stations, and a more intense radar photography program.

The current research in tornado forecast problems—with the help of modern telecommunication and observation

networks, special instruments, and aircraft probing—carries promise of new knowledge about tornadoes and severe storms and further effectiveness of the storm warning services.

OTHER STORMS

Hurricanes, the greatest of storms, and tornadoes, the most violent of storms, together cause appalling losses in lives and property each year in the United States, yet greatly in excess of these losses is the total damage wrought by other abnormalities of weather—heavy flood-producing rains, thunderstorms, lightning, windstorms, blizzards, hailstorms, heavy snows, squalls, ice storms, cold waves, hot spells, drought, dust storms, and sleet storms. Almost every day in the year one or another of these weather extremes occurs somewhere in the United States and not infrequently one or another is visiting half of our forty-eight states simultaneously.

For example, the annual loss from floods on the main rivers of the United States averaged more than 300 million dollars a year over the past ten-year period. The annual loss from flash floods on the upper tributaries of rivers has been estimated to be equally large. In an average year several hundred persons are killed and still more hundreds injured by lightning, and an even larger number are killed and thousands injured in the extremely high winds that accompany many thunderstorms. Lightning each year causes damage to innumerable buildings, sets off hundreds of forest and other fires, and causes widespread damage to power lines and other equipment of public utilities. Windstorm losses occur in an endless variety of ways, occasions, and places—from swamped canoes to beached freighters, from torn roofs to collapsed warehouses, from a single upturned tree on a sub-

urban lawn to flattened crops and orchards, and from residential television antennas to thousand-foot radio towers.

When windstorms blow trees over power lines, communities are often blacked out. Transportation can be interrupted for days by blizzards, heavy snows, and ice or sleet storms. Extended cold waves, hot spells, hailstorms, droughts, or prolonged rainy periods can cause crop losses measured in hundreds of millions of dollars and forcing bankruptcy on thousands of farmers and business concerns.

The total losses due to all types of storms and extremes of weather conditions can never, perhaps, be measured or counted in precise figures, nor can all the losses be prevented. They can, however, be further reduced through better understanding of the complex meteorological variables that determine weather and through better public utilization of the warnings, forecasts, reports, and other weather information now available. Much of our new research effort and new operations are designed with this paramount objective in mind.

THIS PUBLIC SERVICE

In any service to the general public like that provided by a national meteorological bureau effectiveness depends greatly on an understanding of the purposes and limitations of the service. Weather services are based on the initiative and intelligent co-operation of many organizations and many individuals. For the original observations on which weather maps and forecasts are based, the Weather Bureau must depend not only on the reports from its own hundreds of stations but also on those from stations of the United States Coast Guard and its lighthouse service and from the other military services, from foreign meteorological services,

and from many unpaid co-operative observers. Collection and analysis of these reports is only the first part of the work. To be useful to the public the data must next be put into readily understandable terms. Many channels of communication must then be used to disseminate weather forecasts, warnings, and other vital meteorological information to cities, towns, and rural areas. Most of this distribution is done without cost to the government by radio, television, and the daily press as part of their general public service.

But in times of destructive storms,

full dissemination of information is not the final step in an effective service. Frequently there must be further action by advisory and rescuing agencies like the Coast Guard, the Air Force, the Army and Navy, the Red Cross, civil defense, state and local public safety organizations, many community interest groups, and countless public-spirited individuals. The prompt and expert service of Red Cross workers, for example, has often been a bright light in the somber picture of widespread destruction from nature's violence.

Earthquakes

By L. DON LEET

Abstract: The effects of earthquakes are well known. Less known are their causes, hidden in the shifting pressures of the substrata of the earth. Their annual number has been estimated at from 50,000 to 1,000,000; accurate instrumental locations date from about 1918. At present, seismographic stations register 600 to 700 a year, over a hundred of which are of major intensity. They cluster in two zones, one bordering on the Pacific Ocean and representing 80 per cent of the total energy released, the other running from Burma through the Himalayas westward through Europe's Alps. However, earthquakes may occur anywhere. They seem to run in cycles, but accurate prediction is impossible. Planning can do much to reduce damage, but their relative rarity and unpredictability make planning difficult; it encounters barriers in inertia, self-interest, and long-term costs.—Ed.

SAN Francisco, on Tuesday, April 17, 1906, was a sprawling example of one of the big cities of its time. Spread among the hills of its bay it had spawned humble dwellings, Nob Hill mansions, and a sprinkling of the "skyscrapers" of that day. Life was filled with the bustle of commerce and living of a growing, prosperous community.

Without warning, at 5:12 A.M. the next day, catastrophe struck and all this was changed. The sharp tremor of an earthquake was followed by a jerky roll. The roar and crash of man-made structures mingled with a dull booming from the earth itself. Then, within about a minute, the shaking tapered off and the disturbance ceased.

A number of buildings were shaken into various stages of collapse. The new seven-million-dollar City Hall was one of these. Many frame buildings were wrenched and distorted, some by the slumping of loose soil under their foundations, but the damage to well-

designed and solidly built structures was less than generally realized. The fourteen-year-old, eleven-story Crocker Building, the steel-framed James Flood Building, the Mint, the new Post Office Building, the partially completed Hotel St. Francis, and scores of others escaped lightly. Authoritative estimates charge the earthquake's shaking with responsibility for less than 5 per cent of the total damage to property on that day. This was what is known as the San Francisco earthquake, one of history's most important.

Before people had gained the open air and begun to take stock of what had happened, puffs of smoke were mingling with the great cloud of dust that rose from the city. Realization of the full sweep of disaster was slow to come. The day wore on, and people discussed their experiences. Some mourned their dead. All paused in momentary panic as repeated aftershocks swept under the city and on to the eastern horizon, but

none of these matched the first great temblor, and gradually the tenseness of the populace eased. Then the significance of a growing pall of smoke down Market Street and over a widening area began to appear. There was insufficient pressure in the city water mains, which had been broken in many places. Ordinary means of combating conflagration failed. The fire was beyond control. Residents of the threatened districts began a trek to open spaces in outlying sections. Three days passed. By the dynamiting of structures in their path, flames were robbed of fuel. Finally, rain fell. Meanwhile crowds of refugees, huddled together without elementary sanitary precautions, were attacked by epidemics of filth-borne disease to cap a week's nightmare. This was the San Francisco fire, which occasioned property losses estimated at \$400,000,000.

Nature produces over a hundred earthquakes every year capable of causing these effects on a modern city. Only the luck of location has spared all but a few in modern history.

Two that were not spared were Tokyo and Yokohama, in 1923. There, again, fire following the earthquake accounted for the loss of 100,000 lives and uncounted values in property. There were 242 fires started simultaneously in different places in Tokyo within minutes after the quake struck. Yokohama was burned 100 per cent and Tokyo 65 per cent. It was noted at the time that modern steel and concrete structures resisted the shaking quite well. Had it not been for the fire, they would have been little damaged.

WHAT CAUSES EARTHQUAKES?

Many of the effects of earthquakes are widely known, but less is understood about what causes them. And to have a proper respect and understanding, yet remove some of the aura of

superstition and fear, a brief look at the causes might be in order.¹

As you look about you on the surface of the earth you see many different materials: soil, pebbles, rocks. Had it ever occurred to you to wonder which, if any, of these constitute the main body of the earth?

Geologists have learned in recent years that the main portion consists of rock 1,800 miles thick wrapped around a liquid core. But if we could see some of this rock at a depth somewhere between a few miles and several hundred it would look and behave quite differently from the types we know on the surface. For one thing, it is under great pressure and in continuous slow motion as the earth shrinks and wrinkles. These pressures are uneven, and in places where they are greatest earthquakes are more common. Every time a block of rock is distorted beyond endurance by these forces, it breaks. The vibration set up by the break is what we call the earthquake.

There are large earthquakes that can be felt for a thousand miles, and small ones that can be felt for only a few miles, and then still others that are never felt at all.

INSTRUMENTAL RECORDS

The compilation of precise statistics concerning earthquakes is in its infancy. Only since 1918 has there been concerted international co-operation in exchange of information leading to the determination of locations of the largest ones from instrumental records. In that short time, the numbers of readings

¹ For reference material on earthquakes see L. Don Leet, *Causes of Catastrophe* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948); John R. Freeman, *Earthquake Damage and Earthquake Insurance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932); L. Don Leet and Sheldon Judson, *Physical Geology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954).

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available for this purpose have tripled by reason of increase in number and improvement in quality of seismographic stations. As a partial result, the number of earthquakes located instrumentally each year has nearly doubled, though it is certain that the actual number of earthquakes has not done so.

Historical records show that a given region may undergo a spasm of activity followed by a lull of one or two centuries, yet our modern instrumental records cover only half a century. Inevitably, therefore, many seismic sections of the globe are not represented in current statistics, an assumption confirmed by the fact that consistently about half of each year's locations are in places from which there was no previous instrumental record. Indeed there are probably not many, if any, square miles of the earth's surface which have not experienced and will not at some future date again experience earthquake vibrations strong enough to be felt or even do damage.

HOW MANY A YEAR?

At the present time, instrumental records are being used to locate an average of from six to seven hundred earthquakes a year. Of these, over a hundred are literally world-shakers capable of causing catastrophe in a large center of population near at hand. In such matters, as illustrated at San Francisco, at Tokyo, and throughout history, man is his own worst enemy in that it is his own devices that trap him, not the absolute fury of nature as in some other forms of catastrophe. If we stretch the thing to some kind of limit by including everything down to the smallest trucklike tremors unrecorded in remote spots, it is likely that a figure of 50,000 earthquakes a year (more than 130 a day) is far short of the true num-

ber. One seismologist's estimate reached 1,000,000 per year.

EARTHQUAKE ZONES

Of these, the majority in our current records tend to cluster in two zones. One of these borders the Pacific Ocean, where 80 per cent of the energy represented by earthquakes is now being released. Of the total energy released by all earthquakes 15 per cent is in a zone that extends from Burma through the Himalayas, into Baluchistan, across Iran, and westerly through the Alps of Mediterranean Europe. On the other hand, major quakes occur outside these zones, and statistics should be viewed with caution when one exception can be a catastrophe. The most violent earthquake in the United States in historic times centered at New Madrid, Missouri, within damage range of Memphis and St. Louis, in 1811; another major shock was at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1886 and another near Boston, Massachusetts, in 1755. All these places are outside the so-called earthquake zones outlined by statistics.

SOME PREDICTIONS

These details throw some light on the value of the predictions of perennial prophets who discover in themselves an ability to foretell earthquakes. In 1935, a resident of New York City achieved some publicity along those lines. Using a system involving planetary conjunctions, first tried unsuccessfully by Konrad von Megenberg in 1359, he named a certain week within which there was to be "an earthquake in islands northeast of Australia." The approximate magnitude was not stated, but to make this any kind of an argument at all, we have to assume that a large one was meant; in the hundreds of thousands of

square miles of active seismic region thus loosely designated, it is unlikely that a week has passed since the dawn of the present geological epoch without the occurrence of several hundreds of small ones. In spite of the latitude (and longitude) which the man allowed himself, he had the amazing misfortune to select one of a dozen or so weeks of the year when not even a moderately large shock was reported from his region. It did happen that the volcano Krakatoa belched during the week, a thousand miles in the wrong direction, and through some species of journalistic legerdemain and geographic confusion, this was published as a fulfillment of the prophecy. Thereupon, dusty professors in highly endowed universities were called upon to blush that an amateur with globe and compass had penetrated the mysteries of earthquakes where their vaunted science and shiny (?) laboratories had failed for generations. Within a month, the prophet had slept undisturbed through the vibrations of a major, but unpredicted, shock in Canada which was felt as far south as Washington, D. C. He promptly did a private act of planetary conjunction popularly known as going into an eclipse.

IRREGULAR CYCLES

Earthquakes, like so many things in nature, occur in cycles, but they are not regular enough to permit even a rough guess as to when another one is due. Our records in California, for example, go back about a century and a half. Concentrating our attention only on the most severe, we find there were major ones in 1812, 1857, 1865, 1868, and 1906.

Northeastern America, though not in the principal zones of present activity, has a history of earthquakes of which records have been kept for the past three hundred years; they include a

major quake at Boston in 1755. Water-supply investigators have found evidence of a progressive tilting of the ground resulting in subsidence of the land relative to sea level at the rate of one foot per century at Boston and about two-thirds that amount at New York. Geologically recent sea beaches are found 700 feet above present sea level near Montreal. The restlessness of the crust necessary for the production of earthquakes appears to be present.

A sweep of nine centuries is covered by records from Lisbon, Portugal, starting in 1009, continuing in one of the world's greatest known earthquakes on November 1, 1755, and carrying through to today. The intensity of the earliest shocks is in doubt, but a major one in 1344 was followed by a principal shock in 1531, followed, in turn, by the shock of 1755. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the region has been quiescent. Thus Lisbon and Boston, which had their most recent great earthquakes in the same month nearly two centuries ago, are two good candidates for a return to the active class within this century.

WHAT OF THE CITIES?

Without particular regard to the intensity of the shocks, the presence of earthquakes of any kind near spectacularly large cities like New York, Chicago, and Boston is intriguing. All these cities have had them, Chicago as recently as Saturday, February 12, 1938, and New York several times within a little over a year in 1937-38. On Sunday, July 18, 1937, a quake originated on Long Island within fifteen miles of Times Square and shook 1,500 square miles of adjacent land perceptibly. There were several subsequent slight shocks in the vicinity.

Minor activity of this type distributed throughout the northeastern part of the

continent has led to the suggestion that the area may be entering an epoch of increasing numbers of earthquakes which probably has not yet passed a climax. There is absolutely no way of knowing that there will be so much as a single quake more in the next century, but experience in New England and other parts of the world indicates the strong probability that there will be more, some strong and some in the central and southern parts of the district.

PLANNING WOULD HELP

Nothing that has been said should be interpreted to mean that residents of large cities in northeastern America, any more than in California or any earthquake country, should simply resign themselves to the inevitable, in the death-and-taxes tradition. We are not the helpless creatures of fate in connection with earthquakes that statistics make us appear. Precautions can be taken to reduce greatly many of the worst hazards to life and property.

Plans can be made that include a careful analysis of the pattern of water distribution, so that individual sections of a city could be isolated where damage was greatest and pressures maintained in the others for fighting fire. Such planning, as a matter of fact, would meet some of the hazards of fires from other causes. The fact that past earthquakes near large eastern cities have not been of major proportions should not blind us to the risk, for even a minor quake can start devastating fires which get out of control, especially in wintertime New England.

So far as sheer violence of shaking is concerned, many types of first-class modern construction are almost automatically earthquake proof. This is particularly true of the large buildings in a city like New York. If the public could be educated to that fact, fewer

would run wildly into the streets to be hit by falling debris from the outside of buildings otherwise intact.

The effects of an earthquake well short of major intensity were demonstrated in Long Beach, California, and the vicinity on Friday, March 10, 1933. Most striking was the vulnerability of certain types of school-building design and construction. With demand, owing to their special uses, for many window openings and large floor spans, when these were constructed of brick and wood without bracing against horizontal forces, they failed spectacularly by the collapse of walls and fall of floors. The earthquake occurred just before 6:00 P.M. If it had come during school hours, the death toll would have been appalling. The hour of occurrence further reduced loss of life in downtown sections, where streets were nearly deserted when parapet walls, cornices, and various ornamental units crashed into them.

Public interest in earthquake-proof design and construction, earthquake insurance, and public planning for emergency spurts to a high level near such areas after an earthquake. Then certain members of the community discover that proper precautions would involve condemnation of structural types in which they have an interest, others discover that an increased tax rate would result from bond issues for correcting school or public building conditions, and finally the tapering off of aftershocks and the subsequent period of ground quiet remove the prod of immediate fear. Lessons are soon forgotten, while other communities (which really should be the most concerned) look with pity on the stricken district as experiencing things remote from their own sphere, things that "can't happen here."

Seismologists are striving, and probably will have to strive for generations,

to get large cities to prepare in advance rather than after the fact. Perhaps their greatest handicap is factual honesty, which forces them to admit the inadequacy of their own warnings. The average responsible property owner, however, thinks nothing of insuring against fire when the statistical risk in some cities may be less than that from earthquake-caused fire (not generally covered by ordinary policies). We keep hoping for a miracle, for a day when a Boston or a Memphis will develop a community conscience in connection with earthquakes and earthquake fires before its number comes up; and ultimately when every large city will have

building codes which require horizontal bracing in school buildings, removal of loosely hung gingerbread and precariously perched water towers, and similar obvious steps toward what, after all, is nothing but structural sanity anyway.

Since the very nature of an earthquake creates mass panic more quickly and uncontrollably than most types of natural disaster, special planning is needed to cope with this difficulty. Present consideration by the Red Cross, civilian defense, and others of preparation for emergencies of the type to be expected in the event of enemy attack actually outlines many important features needed in a plan for earthquake emergencies.

The Human Being in Disasters: A Research Perspective

By CHARLES E. FRITZ and HARRY B. WILLIAMS

Abstract: Many groups and agencies have a vital need of accurate information on how people behave during disasters. This article presents information which seems to have particular pertinence for disaster preparedness, control, and amelioration. Among the subjects discussed are the problem of how to make disaster warnings effective, behavior during disasters and in the subsequent emergency period, the problem of people's flocking into the area, the need and difficulties of co-ordination and control of rescue and relief activities, the traumatic effects of disaster on its victims, and the sources of possible conflicts between rescue and relief agencies and their clients.—Ed.

SUDDEN disaster strikes a community. How do human beings act in such a situation? According to a pervasive popular conception, they panic, trampling each other and losing all sense of concern for their fellow human beings. After panic has subsided—so the image indicates—they turn to looting and exploitation, while the community is rent with conflict. Large numbers of people are left permanently deranged mentally. This grim picture, with its many thematic variations, is continually reinforced by novels, movies, radio and television programs, and journalistic accounts of disaster.(22)¹

Those experienced in actual disasters are able to reject this picture as a product of ignorance, inaccurate observation, and fertile imagination. In more subtle form, however, stereotypes of this kind influence the thinking of disaster officials and experts and affect their plans and operations. This imagery, therefore, affects both the general public and persons who are responsible for protecting and helping the public in case of disaster.

¹ Numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references at the end of the article.

In 1950, a concerted effort to study human behavior in disasters in a systematic manner began. Since that time, there have been numerous opportunities to test the adequacy of these popular conceptions, as well as the more scientific hypotheses relevant to behavior under conditions of stress and crisis. As a result of nearly forty studies of both domestic and foreign peacetime disasters, there is now emerging a clearer, more fundamental understanding of both the typical human responses to disaster and the recurrent human problems of disaster planning and management.(5)(24)

This article will report and analyze some of the more salient general findings of these peacetime disaster studies. In making a selection from the total range of findings contained in the many research studies currently available, we have been guided by a twofold emphasis: First, since much of the current thinking about disaster behavior is based upon observations of the unusual, the dramatic, and the abnormal, we hope to supply a corrective by emphasizing the more general, typical, and recurrent forms of behavior found in disasters. Second, since there are many

groups and agencies which have a current vital need for accurate information on human actions in disaster, we have selected those findings which seem to have particular pertinence for disaster preparedness, control, and amelioration.

DISASTER WARNINGS

The possibility of warning is conditioned by the extent to which the different types of disaster can be predicted reliably. Even with reliable knowledge about a probable danger, however, it is difficult effectively to warn a large population which cannot directly perceive the danger of a disaster. First, there is the question of whether the warning should be issued or not; next, if the answer is affirmative, of how it should be given. (2) The official who makes these decisions worries about what people will do if he has warned them and the disaster does not occur; conversely, he worries about what will happen if he does not warn them and the disaster does occur. In addition, warnings are sometimes withheld because officials fear that people will "panic" if warned, but the relatively extensive evidence now available from studies of warning situations gives no support to this last fear.(1)(7)(13)(21)

An effective warning message must be clear and specific. If it is vague or ambiguous, if it leaves the individual with as many choices of action as he had before, it will almost certainly be ineffective.(14) Warning messages must be transmitted accurately through channels which will reach the entire public. Care also must be taken to ensure that the population to be warned does not receive additional information which contradicts or distorts the intended warning message.

People are reluctant to accept and act upon warnings of those dangers which they do not directly perceive as immediate and personal. Marysville and Yuba

City, California, were flooded during December 1955:

In spite of intensive mass media coverage, Weather Bureau forecasts of flood danger were either ignored or actually not received by substantial portions of those interviewed in the disaster areas. Furthermore, thirty-nine percent of those who remembered receiving such reports indicated that they did not fully believe them.(1)

The investigators found the following reasons, also supported by other studies, for disbelief and reluctance to act upon flood warnings:

Lack of past experience with disasters, the delusion of personal invulnerability [the feeling that "it won't get me"], the inability to adopt a new frame of reference so as to expect unusual events, dependency upon protecting authorities, and the willingness to seize upon reassuring communications or to deny or disregard communications predicting disaster. . . .(1)

Reluctance to abandon property and personal possessions is also a common factor weighing against evacuation of threatened areas.

This brief rehearsal of the difficulties of warning is not intended to mean that effective warning is impossible. Effective warning of an impending tornado, for example, is credited with saving the lives of many school children in San Angelo, Texas.(16) The difficulties are real and well documented, however, and we stress them in order to call attention to the need for further research and to emphasize the importance of human factors in planning warning systems.

SURVIVAL BEHAVIOR

When people have no prior warning, the recognition of danger is frequently delayed. One reason is the commonly noted tendency of persons to associate disaster signs with familiar or normal events. In tornadoes, for example, the roar produced by the high winds of the

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vortex is often interpreted as the sound of a train passing nearby. In events involving carbon monoxide or other toxic agents, people often attribute their physical symptoms to chronic ailments or predisaster experiences which might account for their disturbances. Particularly in cases where people are unfamiliar with the disaster agent or cannot directly perceive it, this tendency may continue until it is too late to take adequate protective action.(11)(15)

When danger is recognized as imminent and personal, people seek safety by flight, by taking shelter, or by combating the disaster agent. When a tornado funnel is sighted or the house begins to shake or water comes over the dikes, the behavior of people is generally adaptive; they usually take action aimed to protect themselves and others, rather than "freezing up" or engaging in irrational acts which increase the danger. These actions, of course, are not always effective in protecting them against danger. In the first place, the situation usually permits only a limited choice of actions; in the second place, many people, having had no disaster training or previous experience, do not know which of the available courses of action would be most effective.(13)(15)

One method of survival is flight. "Flight" does not necessarily mean "panic," or uncontrolled flight. It is more often orderly and controlled, with people continuing to think of others and continuing to use critical judgment. Often it is the only rational choice individuals or groups can make if they wish to live.² The period of threat,

² The cultural stereotype which equates flight with cowardice and absence of flight with bravery tends to obscure the fact that flight can be a rational, adaptive form of behavior. The thought is well expressed in the old Chinese saying: "Of the thirty-six ways to escape danger, running away is best." Cf. Carlton Culmsee, "Tight Little Island off China," *New York Times Magazine*, August 19, 1956, p. 66.

however, is the time when there is the greatest likelihood of panic.(11) Panic is most likely to occur when (a) people perceive an immediate, severe danger, (b) they believe there is only one or at best a limited number of escape routes from the danger, (c) they believe those escape routes are closing (not closed) so that escape must be made quickly, and (d) there is a lack of communication to keep them informed of the situation.(6)(17)(18)

During the actual impact of the disaster agent, people try to stay alive and protect their immediate associates. Even during hectic, violent impacts many people continue to act, when they can, with reference to other people in the immediate environment, particularly loved ones. Mothers try to protect their children; fathers their wives and children. The extreme importance of the family group in disaster is revealed in the periods of threat and impact, and it continues throughout the disaster.

Actual behavior during impact is largely determined by the nature of the situation as the individual assesses it. Thus during a brief, violent impact one holds on to things and people, seeks cover from flying objects or collapsing walls, tries to shield children, and so forth. People isolated by floodwaters, after reaching a place out of the water's reach, must await rescue (or in some cases devise further means of escape, such as rafts). If isolation continues long enough, they must combat as best they can the rigors of exposure, hunger, and other deprivations. The chief survival problem in an epidemic or toxicological episode is to keep oneself and one's loved ones as much as possible from contact with the dangerous element.(8)

BEHAVIOR IN THE POST-IMPACT EMERGENCY

Although most persons may be temporarily stunned, confused, and some-

what disoriented after impact, they usually regain sufficient self-control within a brief time to extricate themselves, if they are physically able, and assist family members, kin, neighbors, and friends.(10)(15)

People in the impact zone cannot be expected to act as efficiently and discerningly as they normally do, but if they are isolated for periods of an hour or more, they will accomplish many of the immediate and pressing rescue and relief tasks before the arrival of outside aid. In a study of the White County, Arkansas, tornado, for example, the National Opinion Research Center found that during the first half hour after impact, 32 per cent of all persons in the impact area engaged in search for the missing, 11 per cent took an active role in the rescue activity, and 35 per cent performed emergency relief functions. During the following six hours, 28 per cent engaged in search for the missing, 22 per cent in rescue work, and 46 per cent in emergency relief.(15)

These and similar findings refute the notion that psychological disturbances render the population of the stricken area completely dependent and helpless. It should not be inferred, however, that the victim population can handle all the essential rescue, relief, and control tasks by itself or that it can handle them as efficiently as an organized outside force. Much of the relief activity by the victim population, as well as the informal aid from peripheral areas, is sporadic, unsystematic, and inefficient. It tends to be "grooved" along the channels of intimacy and friendship, so that many of the more general community needs are neglected or overlooked.

Where the stricken area is not isolated by physical circumstances or lack of communication, the victim population is soon joined by volunteer helpers from neighboring areas. It has been estimated that in the Flint-Beecher tornado disaster of June 1953 the victim

population and volunteer helpers evacuated two thirds to three fourths of the casualties to hospitals within two hours following the disaster.(20) One participant later stated:

In spite of all that can be said, pro and con by outsiders, they must realize that the first one and one-half hours of this disaster was practically in the hands of the immediate neighbors . . . the problem of moving bodies and saving lives was in their hands. (20)

To an outside observer the initial behavior of persons in a disaster-struck area is likely to appear completely irrational, chaotic, and confused. In the physical devastation surrounding him, the observer sees what appears to be aimless, random, uncontrolled, or conflicting activity on the part of the survivors. People are running or driving vehicles in opposite directions, oftentimes passing each other without acknowledgment or seeming awareness. Some persons are moving out of the impact area, many others are moving into it. Others are "standing around," apparently just looking or talking with each other. Here and there small groups of people are digging in debris, comforting the injured, or attempting to retrieve their scattered belongings. Behavior is so heterogeneous that it defies description in terms of a few simple categories.

It is this lack of uniformity in action that often leads the outside observer to the erroneous conclusion that the population has "panicked." What the outside observer is witnessing is not panic, but social disorganization—uncoordinated activity on a general, community level. It is important to recognize that this social disorganization does not necessarily indicate individual irrationality or personal disorganization. Many individuals and small groups are working within the disaster area with purpose and some degree of organization. How-

ever, they are likely to be focused on discrete, limited tasks and to appear oblivious to the more general needs for assistance. The central problem of disaster management is to broaden the focus of attention and re-establish general, co-ordinated action for this mass of individual and small group actions. (15)

CONVERGENCE BEHAVIOR

One of the central problems of disaster co-ordination and control derives not from the victim population itself, but from the informal, spontaneous, "convergence action" of persons residing outside the disaster area. (12) Contrary to the popular image of behavior in disasters, movement *toward* the disaster area usually is both quantitatively and qualitatively more significant than flight or evacuation from the scene of destruction. Within minutes following most domestic disasters, thousands of persons begin to converge on the disaster area and on first aid stations, hospitals, relief, and communications centers in the disaster environs. Simultaneous with this physical movement of persons, incoming messages of anxious inquiry and offers of help from all parts of the nation and foreign countries begin to overload existing telephone, telegraph, and other communications and information facilities and centers. Shortly following, tons of unsolicited equipment and supplies of clothing, food, bedding, and other material begin arriving in the disaster area or in nearby relief centers. Although the initial convergence derives from areas contiguous or proximate to the disaster site, the process continues for days and weeks following the disaster as wave upon wave of persons from successively distant points send messages and supplies or personally travel to the disaster area.

In virtually every disaster studied, the informal convergence on the dis-

aster area and the mass assault (20) on the problems posed by the disaster have seriously hampered the administration of organized rescue, medical, emergency relief, and rehabilitation programs. The movement of emergency vehicles is often blocked by severe traffic congestion; essential outgoing messages are frequently delayed as a result of the heavy volume of incoming inquiries and messages; and the tons of unsolicited goods, in large proportion comprised of unneeded and unusable materials, greatly contribute to traffic congestion and require personnel and facilities in handling and storage which could be used for more essential tasks and functions.

The misconception that a disaster-struck population automatically panics and flees wildly from the disaster area has tended to center attention on the victim population as the source of control problems. In reality, however, the victim population is much more cooperative and subject to control than persons who converge from the outside. The population affected by a disaster is not confined to the immediate geographical area of destruction, death, and injury but includes all persons who are related to or identified with persons and organizations in the stricken community. Even in isolated, single-community disasters, the converging people, messages, and supplies originate in many parts of the nation and in a number of foreign countries. (12) The effective unit of disaster management is usually national in scope and, therefore, requires national planning and control measures.

Effective control of the convergence process requires not only broadening the unit of disaster management but also recognition of the different motives of the convergers. The problem of convergence is often too narrowly conceived as a problem of blocking or restraining "sightseers," "looters," and other "un-

authorized personnel." This type of thinking often derives from the erroneous notion that most people who converge on a disaster area from outside have exploitative motivations. The actual incidence of looting and other forms of exploitation found in peacetime disasters, however, is relatively insignificant when compared with actions motivated by anxiety over missing loved ones, sympathy for and desire to assist the stricken population, and the need to perceive and comprehend an unusual or unfamiliar event. (12) (15) Satisfaction of these needs depends upon adequate information, positive direction, and guidance rather than indiscriminate restraint.

CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL

In the light of what has been reported above, it is evident why control and co-ordination of the rescue and relief effort are difficult to achieve. The amount of confusion in disasters is often overemphasized; nevertheless, it does exist. It has its roots in a number of factors: (a) the physical disorganization of the disaster-stricken area; (b) darkness, if the rescue and relief effort is conducted at night; (c) the effects of convergence behavior; (d) a great sense of urgency to act, to get something done to help the victims, which makes taking the time to communicate and co-ordinate decisions seem a luxury; (e) the fact that under stress it is difficult to exercise the more complex intellectual processes, such as looking ahead and thinking about the indirect consequences of a decision—except for the highly trained and experienced and those few individuals who become unusually efficient in crisis; (f) lack of workable, pre-existing plans on a community-wide basis; (g) inadequate

* Arrangements between pairs or groups of collateral agencies are frequent, and community-wide disaster plans sometimes exist on

communication, partly because of the destruction of communication facilities, but more generally because of inadequate and improper use of these facilities; (h) ambiguity concerning what official or agency has the authority for certain decisions; (i) the absence of an agreed-upon, understood division of labor among different groups and agencies; (j) the occurrence sometimes (though not as frequently as rumors would often suggest) of disputes concerning authority, responsibilities, and jurisdictions; (k) the lack of systematic reconnaissance and other procedures for maintaining a central strategic overview of the problem; and (l) the lack of essential central co-ordinating mechanisms, such as means of co-ordinating requests for supplies. (9) (12) (16) (19) (20)

The brief discussion above must, of course, oversimplify a complex situation. The statement that lack of division of labor is a factor impeding co-ordination and control, for example, is not intended to imply that different groups and agencies cannot work efficiently and usefully on the same kinds of task. Nor do we intend to imply that the existence of disputes invariably disrupts the community or affects the services rendered to the victims. Nevertheless, the factors recited above often impede and sometimes confound disaster management; they are problems which must be taken into account if it is to be improved.

EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOSOMATIC AFTEREFFECT

Most persons who directly experience a disaster or who are closely identified with the victim population suffer some form of emotional or psychosomatic

paper or in an embryonic stage of organization; but if plans are to be effective they must be understood and accepted by all those who have a part in them, including the general public, and they must be practiced.

aftereffect in the early postdisaster period.(11)(15)(23) Despite the universality of such disturbances, however, they usually do not eventuate in heavy drains on psychiatric and medical facilities. Since so many symptoms arise out of such situational factors as fear for the safety of self and intimates, separation of family members, disruption of normal routines, and anxieties concerning the future, an effective "treatment" lies in the alleviation of the situations which produced them. The minimization of exposure to secondary traumatic stimuli, the rapid reuniting of families, the restoration of familial and occupational routines, rapid and efficient efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation, and measures designed to protect the populace from future danger are positive measures that can be taken to prevent and ameliorate negative emotional and psychosomatic aftereffects.(15)(19) In a small proportion of cases, persons may need individual psychological or psychiatric help.⁴

SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

The net result of most disasters is a dramatic increase in social solidarity among the affected populace during the emergency and immediate postemergency periods. The sharing of a common threat to survival and the common suffering produced by the disaster tend to produce a breakdown of pre-existing social distinctions and a great outpouring of love, generosity, and altruism. During the first few days or weeks following a major community-wide disaster, persons tend to act toward one another spontaneously, sympathetically, and sentimentally, on the basis of com-

⁴ For a further discussion of psychological effects, see the article in this issue of *THE ANNALS* by Calvin S. Drayer, "Psychological Factors and Problems, Emergency and Long-Term."

mon human needs rather than in terms of predisaster differences in social and economic status. This solidarity is of major significance in facilitating both personal and social recuperation. It helps persons to overcome the shock of severe personal injuries, losses, and deprivations and motivates volunteer participation in the numerous rescue, relief, and restoration tasks.

This local solidarity, however, also poses operational problems for outside relief and control agencies. If the informal mass assault has fulfilled a large share of the immediate emergency needs, as it usually does in domestic peacetime disasters, a strong in-group feeling of euphoria and pride of accomplishment tends to develop. If the actions of the outsiders do not coincide with the new sentiments and emergency norms that have arisen among the affected populace, the outsiders tend to be criticized and resented. Outside persons or agencies which adjust to the local sentiments of solidarity and enable the local populace to pursue their self-determined course of action, on the other hand, usually are accepted and accorded high praise.(9)(12)(15)(16)

If there is no recurrent or persistent threat to community survival after the various emergency tasks have been completed and restoration gets under way, the newly engendered social solidarity gradually disintegrates. As larger and larger numbers of people re-establish themselves and return to normal pursuits, the process of social differentiation returns and the standards of reference change from values of survival to values associated with continuity and stability. People begin thinking of the consequences of the disaster not in terms of the immediate present, as they have done during the emergency period, but in terms of the longer-range future; in terms of the effect on them-

selves and their intimates rather than on the community as a whole. Property values and concern with material symbols of status reassert themselves. This return to the normal conditions of existence is likely to be uneven, varying in accordance with the extent of personal loss and property destruction. It is during this period, when persons begin comparing their losses and deprivations in terms of predisaster standards of value, that normal social conflicts and resentments may reappear. In some cases, though certainly not inevitably, pre-existing conflicts may be intensified by the disaster experience.(13)

The rapid shift in values from normal to emergency, from social differentiation to social homogeneity, and the uneven, selective return to normal standards often create difficulties for organizations which have standardized policies and procedures for administering disaster relief and rehabilitation aid. Many of the problems of disaster management result from the temporary lack of "fit" between the conceptions of need of the victim population and of the organizations attempting to administer to this population. As a consequence of these different conceptions, the activities of the organization and the needs of the clients get out of phase; incompatibility and even conflict may result. From an organizational viewpoint, solutions to this problem lie primarily in developing greater sensitivity to the prevailing climate of opinion among the victim population and greater capacity to make rapid adjustments to local situations.

HOSTILITY AND BLAME

Although it is true that conflicts often develop between different agencies and groups and old controversies within the community are sometimes reawakened

in disaster, it is also true that other schisms are healed and new forms of co-operation arise. The commonly held stereotype that in the wake of disasters people inevitably and universally become hostile and irritable, engage in irrational aggressive acts against authorities, or heap blame for the disaster on innocent victims finds little support in systematic research findings.(3)(12)(15)

People, of course, do attempt to assess the causative factors in disaster, the remedial action needed to prevent recurrence, and the groups or agencies responsible for this remedial action. The outcome of this assessment process, however, is not necessarily the focalization of blame, resentment, or hostility on fortuitous or irrational targets. In one city where three airplane crashes occurred within a period of two months, it was found that many persons were attempting to determine responsibility for the crashes, but only a minority of them resented those whom they held responsible.(3)(15) The process of blame assessment is essentially a future-oriented response to disaster; agents who are blamed are not blamed for the disaster just past but for the disaster that may occur in the future. If the responsible authorities are sensitive to the public fear of recurrent danger and deprivation and communicate to the populace that they are genuinely concerned with the problem and are doing everything in their power to take effective measures to provide future protection, the problem of blame assessment can be minimized. In disasters which are defined as purely accidental and nonrecurrent or those in which there is clearly nothing that responsible individuals or agencies can do to remedy the situation, blame assessment is not likely to occur.(3)(15)

An erroneous impression of widespread faultfinding and search for a

scapegoat is often fostered by a few vociferous persons in the community who try to use the disaster to secure power, status, prestige, or other rewards for themselves or for special interest groups. These "issue makers" oftentimes utilize newspaper editorials, feature articles, letters to the editor, and other media of mass communication to express themselves, thereby creating a misleading picture of the generality and representativeness of their viewpoints. In many cases, hostile outbursts by local public officials and representatives of local professional and voluntary associations are inspired by what they interpret as unwarranted outside encroachments of authority, attempts to usurp power and dictate policy, or an attempt to claim credit for success of the relief work.(20) Although they usually do not have widespread public support for their viewpoints, they create issues on which the public is expected to take a stand.(15) They therefore pose the possibility of engendering disruptive conflicts which may hinder the effective administration of relief and rehabilitation programs. Outside agencies, in particular, must be sensitive to this problem and anticipate it in their disaster plans.

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CONCLUSION

The possibility of maladaptive, disruptive, or antisocial behavior should not be overlooked in planning for disaster management. Disaster agencies are likely to fall into error, however, if they focus primary attention upon the popular stereotypes of disaster behavior and overlook the more common and recurrent forms of behavior reported in this article. Most of the human problems of disaster originate in the lack of co-ordination among the great mass of people, small groups, and official disaster agencies, each of which is viewing and attempting to meet the needs of the disaster in terms of its own perspective and capabilities. When communities or groups have no practiced plans of action which fit into an organized, overall disaster plan, behavior tends to be too segmental, too limited in scope, and too much dominated by the immediate present to provide efficiently for the more general, continuing human needs posed by a disaster. The challenge for future planning lies in the development of realistic plans for organizing, training, integrating, and co-ordinating the actions of both the general populace and the formal disaster agencies.

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Co-ordinating and Extending Federal Assistance

By VAL PETERSON

Abstract: As a result of the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, the national government can now provide disaster aid to states in the most effective way, co-ordinating, through the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the activities of all pertinent federal authorities. The prerequisites and the procedure which set this machinery into operation are described, and a graphic example of how the system works is given in a story of the floods of August 1955, which caused the governors of several northeastern states to call for federal assistance and brought forth the combined efforts of six federal departments and four other federal agencies.—Ed.

ALL assistance by federal agencies in major peacetime disasters is now a co-ordinated operation under Public Law 875 of the Eighty-first Congress, which is the Federal Disaster Act of 1950.

So far as it can be defined in this case, co-ordination means inducing independent agencies to work together for a common purpose. In the Disaster Act of 1950, Section 5(a) declares:

In the interest of providing maximum mobilization of Federal assistance under this Act, the President is authorized to co-ordinate in such manner as he may determine the activities of Federal agencies in providing disaster assistance.

In 1953 the President delegated to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator the carrying out of the Disaster Act, which concerns peacetime assistance to state and local governments.

The opening section of the Disaster Act reflects the uncertain history which brought it about. It reads:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to States and

local governments in carrying out their responsibilities (1) to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters, (2) to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and (3) to foster the development of such State organizations and plans to cope with major disasters as may be necessary.

Early federal assistance was neither continuing nor orderly. It was voted by Congress to fit each disaster, usually in the form of a money grant some time afterwards. When physical assistance was attempted, it was usually belated and confused. Whether in money or in kind, assistance in general was determined by the outcry.

The first continuing nationwide plan of private assistance to disaster victims was launched by the Red Cross in 1881, by extending its original purpose of relieving suffering on the battlefield to include relieving suffering caused by floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, fires, and other misfortunes. Disaster relief by Red Cross volunteers developed so effectively that Congress in 1900 chartered the American National Red Cross as a quasi-governmental organization, to provide disaster victims with food, cloth-

ing, medical care, shelter, and eventually rehabilitation.

For decades, the humanitarian assistance provided by the Red Cross and by the local organizations that rallied to a disaster continued to be hampered and sometimes frustrated by the interruption of public facilities. In an emergency there were not enough trained fire fighters, rescue crews, and equipment crews to clear away debris, open roads, repair bridges, and expedite transportation for the injured and for food, clothing, and medical and other relief supplies.

The first enactment of a general federal policy of disaster assistance was the Surplus Property Disaster Act of 1947. Whenever the President determined it to be necessary, he was authorized by this act to direct the Federal Works Agency (or its successors under various reorganizations) to draw surplus property from the War Assets Administration and donate, lend, or sell it to states and local governments in a disaster area. Under this authority, the Federal Works Agency could utilize any other federal agency and could legally expend any funds in hand with assurance that reimbursement would be appropriated.

Some time after the Surplus Property Disaster Act of 1947 became ineffective owing to the exhaustion of wartime supplies, which had ranged from bulldozers to household furnishings, Congress enacted the present Disaster Act of 1950.

Meanwhile a division of functions had developed between the Red Cross and federal agencies that had been given special responsibilities in disaster. In substance, the Red Cross was to relieve human suffering; the federal agencies were to repair the special government facilities that protect life and property—such as flood works, highways, public health services. This understanding on the division of functions was written into the Disaster Act of 1950.

The American National Red Cross was confirmed explicitly in its humanitarian responsibilities in Section 4 of the act, which reads:

Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to limit or in any way affect the responsibilities of the American National Red Cross under the Act approved January 5, 1905, as amended.

Similarly the agencies already assigned disaster responsibilities, such as the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Public Health Service, are protected in their established positions in Section 3(d), which reads:

The authority conferred by this Act, and any funds provided hereunder shall be supplementary to, and not in substitution for, nor in limitation of any other authority conferred or funds provided under any other law.

AUTHORITY TO FILL GAPS

The co-ordinating authority of the act is applicable where needed to keep all federal agencies from neglecting any task. The co-ordinator may not limit, duplicate, or make substitutions for the statutory authority of any federal agency, but he has authority to add tasks to any agency, and the President has a Federal Disaster Fund to pay for such tasks at his discretion. The effect is to stop any gaps in the pattern of federal assistance.

The needed assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Act, as amended, is stated in Section 3, as follows:

In any major disaster, Federal agencies are hereby authorized when directed by the President (or his delegate) to provide assistance:

- (a) by utilizing or lending, with or without compensation therefor, to States and local governments, their equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel and other resources, other than the extension of credit under the Authority of any Act;

Val Peterson, Washington, D. C., has been Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration since 1953. Previously he was Governor of Nebraska during three terms, 1946-52, and for a time Administrative Assistant to President Eisenhower.

- (b) by distributing, through the American National Red Cross, or otherwise, medicine, food and other consumable supplies;
- (c) by donating or lending equipment and supplies determined under existing law to be surplus to the needs and responsibilities of the Federal government, to States for use or distribution by them for the purposes of the Act, including the restoration of public facilities damaged or destroyed in such major disaster and essential rehabilitation of individuals in need as the result of such major disaster; and
- (d) by performing on public or private lands protective and other work essential for the preservation of life and property, clearing debris and wreckage, making emergency repairs to and temporary replacements of public facilities of local governments damaged or destroyed in such major disaster, providing temporary housing or other emergency shelter for families who, as a result of such major disaster, require temporary housing or other emergency shelter; and making contributions to State and local governments for the purposes stated in subsection (d).

This authority to fill gaps in the historic pattern of federal assistance comes into action when the governor of a stricken state applies directly to the President and certifies that the damage outruns the resources of his state. The President may, or may not, declare it a "major disaster" meriting federal assistance. His declaration is guided by the information which he requests from his delegate administering agency.

Usually, assistance takes the form of federal payments for emergency replacement of bridges, roads, culverts, drainage ditches, water works, sewer systems, schools, hospitals, penal and welfare institutions, public buildings, such as courthouses and police stations, and other facilities which have been pro-

vided by local governments for public use and which are essential.

The Congress which passed the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 also passed the Civil Defense Act of 1950 with the understanding that civil defense would later take responsibility for natural disasters. Meanwhile the responsibility for natural disasters was lodged with the Housing and Home Finance Agency. When the President transferred the function to the Federal Civil Defense Administration in January 1953, the key operating personnel of the disaster organization which the Housing and Home Finance Agency had set up were transferred also to the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

ENLARGED AUTHORITY

In transferring the responsibility for maximum mobilization of peacetime disaster assistance to the Federal Civil Defense Administration, Executive Order 10427 enlarged the field of co-ordination.

The President ordered federal agencies to "make suitable plans and preparations in anticipation of their responsibilities in the event of a major disaster" and he added that "the Federal Civil Defense Administrator shall co-ordinate on behalf of the President such plans and preparations." The executive order also recognized explicitly that independent federal agencies with statutory disaster responsibilities can go into operation without waiting for the President to declare it a "major disaster," but it added that "such action shall be subject to coordination by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, acting on behalf of the President." This statement made the Federal Civil Defense Administrator the federal co-ordinator before, during, and after any disaster and also put a Presidential emphasis on the co-ordination.

In accordance with Executive Order

10427, the Federal Civil Defense Administration negotiated formal memorandums of understanding with certain federal agencies that have independent responsibilities in disaster and also further capabilities on which the Federal Civil Defense Administration might call in an emergency.

The following points were mutually understood in various terms:

1. Co-ordination by the Federal Civil Defense Administration will consist of evaluation of disaster requests and of the total assistance needed and the facilitation of agreement among the various federal agencies to meet the problems involved.
2. The Federal Civil Defense Administration will not directly supervise the operations of the federal agencies but will evaluate the result.
3. The public is to be fully and correctly informed of the assistance provided by each agency.

In the civil defense memorandums of agreement with the various independent agencies, the Federal Civil Defense Administration nominated its Regional Administrators as field authorities to deal with the corresponding field representatives of the other agencies. The field representatives of other federal agencies were to inform the regional civil defense administrators about that agency's functional and geographic responsibility; were to maintain current inventories of their manpower, materials, and equipment usable for disaster in each region; were to instruct the regional civil defense administrators about the operating procedures of the independent agency; and were to exchange between agencies a directory of key personnel and telephone numbers.

The memorandum of understanding with the American National Red Cross recognized that the Red Cross would have full control over its own traditional operations of mass care and rehabilitation. Co-ordination was to con-

sist, in substance, of the exchange of disaster information and of mutual assistance.

Within a year after the transfer of federal responsibility for peacetime disaster assistance in 1953, the legislatures of forty-one states followed federal suggestion and gave responsibility for peacetime disasters to the civil defense director of the state. The remaining states have such legislation pending.

THE COURSE OF DISASTER

Emergency action in disaster now follows a regular course from the locality to Washington and back again. It is important to know what happens as the disaster alarm spreads through state and federal channels.

Locality

At the point of disaster, recovery begins with self-help. It calls out the regular fire and police departments, the transportation and communication services, engineers, bulldozers, rescue trucks, health and sanitation teams.

The load immediately exceeds the regular day-to-day capacity of these services. That is what makes it a disaster. In such a situation, local manpower, equipment, and ready cash are not enough. The locality needs more teams of men who are already equipped and trained and who know how to work together to get the injured out of the wreckage, to give them first aid, to take quick engineering measures which will keep the disaster from involving more people or more property in fire, flood, or collapse.

The source of on-the-spot expansion of the local governmental services in such an emergency is the local civil defense force. Auxiliary civil defense firemen, rescue men, and policemen who are ready to deal with the effects of an atomic blast can deal likewise with the effects of a tornado. The auxiliaries

are welcomed by the regular public services because the regular services have trained them. The officers of the regular services are usually officers of the auxiliaries. They know what the auxiliaries can do. In localities where there is a civil defense force in readiness, emergency operations expand when needed without the handicap of willing but untrained volunteers who often endanger the people they try to rescue and who spread confusion instead of relieving it.

As debris is cleared and fire fighters, rescue crews, medical assistance, and police begin to move into the scene for the restoration of local governmental services, they are welcomed by the Red Cross. In humanitarian assistance the Red Cross has established a position of organized leadership among local and private organizations. In each of the 3,049 counties of the United States there is a Red Cross chapter which is required under its national rules to organize a workable plan for disaster relief and to keep it in readiness. That is the Red Cross position, which is protected explicitly by the Federal Disaster Act.

By agreement, Red Cross volunteers and civil defense volunteers work together. For instance, the Red Cross does not undertake to put out a fire but it does set up canteens to feed the firemen and it undertakes the care of the rescued population—often with the assistance of civil defense volunteers whom the Red Cross has previously trained in first aid and mass care. In peacetime disasters, some civil defense volunteers become, in effect, Red Cross workers. In wartime, the roles would be reversed.

In general, disaster is a local problem at the outset. The mayor of a stricken city or his representative picks up the reins of co-ordination and commands and mobilizes all the community resources. The local action becomes a

holding action while reinforcements are brought up.

State

The call for outside assistance goes from the mayor of a stricken city to the governor of his state. Heretofore the governor's resources were limited to the National Guard, the state militia, the state police, and small detachments of the regular governmental services of the state. Now his capacity to render disaster assistance is multiplied many times by the civil defense organizations of all the political subdivisions of the state.

If the governor finds he cannot mobilize sufficient forces within his own state, he calls on the regional office of the Federal Civil Defense Administration to spread the call for assistance to neighboring states and the federal government.

Regional

The forty-eight states are divided by the Federal Civil Defense Administration among seven regional offices. Each regional office has operating responsibility for interstate and federal assistance to its group of states, in natural and enemy-caused disasters. The regional office co-ordinates the interstate movement of local civil defense forces, and it controls the application of federal resources other than military.

Each regional office is required by the central office of FCDA to establish a register of federal, state, and other agencies operating within the region which have disaster functions or resources, together with the policies which govern their actions and the methods of reaching their key personnel at any hour. This preparation enables the regional office to produce relief forces immediately and to steer them effectively into action.

The regional office co-ordinates the interim actions of any federal agency

which has a standing authorization to intervene in natural disasters without waiting for the Presidential declaration that it is a "major disaster." It also keeps headquarters of FCDA informed of the immediate magnitude of the disaster or its progressive development toward a "major disaster."

National

The Federal Disaster Act comes into effect only after the governor of a stricken state has applied directly to the President, certifying that the damage outruns the resources of his state, and after the President has thereupon determined that it is a "major disaster."

The President is guided in his determination by a formal recommendation which he requests from the Federal Civil Defense Administrator. In turn the FCDA is guided by information from its regional office as to the kind of relief and outlay of disaster funds to be recommended. The federal purpose is to supplement, not to supplant, the state and local efforts.

There is no precise test for a "major disaster." In general, disaster to a limited area or a single establishment, such as the destruction of a school or power-house, is not rated a "major disaster." There are four to five hundred ordinary disasters in the United States in a year. The disasters declared "major" in a year have ranged from ten to twenty-five.

Declaration by the President that a "major disaster" is in progress opens up the resources of all federal agencies in addition to those which may already be acting on their own statutory authority—fighting a flood or a forest fire, restoring flood control works, highways, bridges, transportation, communications, power. The resources of the various federal agencies that may now be called upon by the Federal Civil Defense Ad-

ministration to furnish disaster assistance include professional and skilled personnel able to advise or supervise such operations as debris clearance, emergency evacuation, temporary shelter, the feeding of animals, clothing, water supply, sanitation, sewage, the free distribution of supplies, emergency credit.

The Disaster Act limits assistance by the federal government to the protection of life and property by removal of health and safety hazards and to the emergency repair and temporary replacement of essential public facilities. These operations are intended merely to permit the stricken area to pick itself up and begin to take the real measure of the upset. Permanent restoration is the responsibility of the local body after the disaster is brought under emergency control.

The process of bringing a disaster under emergency control now takes hours where it formerly took days—and days where it used to take weeks. The Federal Disaster Act has contributed several elements which were conspicuously missing when natural disasters struck this nation in the past. We now have organized preparedness, rapid information as to the extent of the disaster, authority to act, and channels of immediate action.

Disasters which are large enough to call for federal and interstate assistance are large enough to cause slow assembly and confused operation of a large relief force, if there is no central direction. Decisions involving the emergency use of governmental equipment or personnel or money, at federal, state, and local levels, used to wait for the answer to the necessary governmental question: "What is the authority for all this?" Now FCDA comes into a disaster situation with clear authorization to expand resources and unroll red tape. It knows where to turn, whom to call, and what to expect.

It should be noted that in all major disasters, in so far as the federal government is concerned, there are two broad phases. In the first, while life and property are in jeopardy the federal government, like any good neighbor, rolls up its sleeves and plunges in to be of assistance without regard to cost accounting. In the second, the cleanup and rehabilitation phase, the federal government lends assistance only upon request from the governor of the state, and accounts are carefully kept. Although figures are not available, the federal government's contribution in the first phase of many disasters is substantial.

IN OPERATION

For about two years and a half, in one disaster after another, the independent federal agencies exercised their statutory authority in their specialized fields according to their established practice and also carried out additional tasks assigned to them by the Federal Civil Defense Administration in accordance with predisaster plans. Then came the first great test of the "maximum mobilization of Federal assistance" referred to in the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, the "suitable plans and preparations" called for in Executive Order 10427, and the co-ordinating responsibility of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, "acting on behalf of the President." The course of events seems therefore worth recording here in some detail.

NORTHEASTERN STATES FLOODS, AUGUST 1955

On August 18 and 19, 1955, Hurricane Diane reached the northeastern section of the United States and dumped a record rainfall which filled the river basins from Pennsylvania to Massachu-

setts. The Federal Civil Defense Administration had been following its development and had alerted the regions and agencies. Disaster specialists were at the scene in advance. On August 19, when the Governors of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, one after the other, asked the President to declare the floods a "major disaster," it was possible for the Federal Civil Defense Administration to concur immediately. The President declared the floods in these states a major disaster on August 20.

The toll of Diane was 180 dead and 7,200 injured or ill. More than 6,000 homes were destroyed and 35,000 families suffered losses. The damage to all types of property was half a billion dollars. The floods wiped out homes, farms, industries, utilities, roads. Lieutenant General Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Chief of Engineers of the Army, inspected the area and pronounced it "one of the biggest, toughest rehabilitation jobs since Noah."

When the magnitude of the disaster became apparent, President Eisenhower interrupted his vacation at Denver on August 22 to fly to the scene, as he said, "to make sure everything possible is being done." The President met at Hartford for a conference with the governors of the six disaster states and with the heads of the principal federal agencies having disaster responsibilities.

By nightfall, orders were issued assigning functional responsibilities to the Secretaries of Defense, of Commerce, of Agriculture, and of Health, Education, and Welfare, and to the Administrators of the General Services Administration and the Housing and Home Finance Agency. These and all other agencies having potential assistance capabilities were directed to send daily reports of their activities in the disaster areas directly to the national office of the Fed-

eral Civil Defense Administration, to be consolidated into a single daily progress report for the President.

Section 5 of Executive Order 10427 gives the Federal Civil Defense Administrator authority to redelegate any of his functions to any other federal agency. The agencies having primary responsibility in the measures assigned were directed to co-ordinate their own activities directly with other agencies having similar or related assignments.

The President flew from Hartford to Washington to make sure the necessary disaster funds could be made available. He further directed every federal agency to canvass what it could do in the flooded areas and to report to the Administrator of Federal Civil Defense. The President made it clear that he wanted disaster assistance to come first and that he wanted red tape cut.

Following the Hartford meeting, I returned to the White House to conduct a conference of key officials of the principal federal agencies which were to bring the disaster assistance to a maximum. The representation included the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Health, Education, and Welfare, Treasury, and Labor; also the Housing and Home Finance Agency and the Bureau of the Budget.

The disaster assistance thus mobilized set a new mark in speed and scope. To list all the actions taken by every federal agency would fill volumes and would not now—a year later—be complete, because some of the work still goes on. Here, however, are the high lights:

Department of Agriculture

The Agricultural Marketing Service, in co-operation with the American Red Cross, furnished food (butter, cheese, cottonseed oil, shortening, dry milk, rice, and beans) for more than 33,500 persons in mass feeding programs, and

for more than 16,000 persons as individual recipients. The Farmers Home Administration processed more than a hundred disaster loans. From the President's Emergency Fund, \$500,000 was used to supplement the Department's regular agricultural conservation programs.

Department of Commerce

The Bureau of Public Roads assigned teams of engineers to work with FCDA in evaluating road damage and recommending emergency repair. The disasters caused damage of more than \$30,000,000 to federal-aid road systems, and the Bureau processed requests from states for road-repair funds, anticipating that requests by states for federal matching funds would exceed \$16,000,000. The Maritime Administration shipped 35,000 blankets, sheets, and pillowcases into New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania.

Department of Defense

Local military commanders responded promptly to emergency requests for assistance from city and state officials and the Red Cross, prior to official declarations of emergency, rescuing trapped persons by boat and helicopter, clearing debris, providing emergency communication facilities, and assisting in emergency sanitation and health measures. More than a hundred diesel-electric locomotives were released from Army War Reserve stocks to help offset the disaster effects on rail transportation systems. The Army Corps of Engineers, with a long record of disaster relief, directed the emergency rehabilitation work of the military. At the request of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, under authority of Public Law 875, recovery work was performed directly by the Corps and its contractors in nearly four hundred lo-

calities. The work included restoring some 100 water and sewer systems, channel work at more than 235 locations, emergency repairs to 35 dams, and extensive temporary bridge work and highway repairs. At the peak of operations, the Corps had 608 officers and civilians, 3,365 contractors' employees, and 1,423 pieces of heavy equipment engaged in recovery work. The Corps obligated more than \$30,000,000 in its disaster-relief operation.¹

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

The Public Health Service sent fifty-five sanitary engineers, sanitarians, medical officers, bacteriologists, and health educators into disaster areas to work with local and state health authorities, FCDA, and the Red Cross in epidemic control, sanitation measures, the disposal of contaminated food, and insect and rodent control.² More than sixty food and drug inspectors and other professional personnel of the Food and Drug Administration assisted in surveying more than 5,600 establishments in some forty primary disaster areas. Food, drugs, cosmetics, and similar products valued at more than 35 million dollars were ordered destroyed because of the potential health hazards involved in their use.

Housing and Home Finance Agency

Vacant units among 2,500 units of public housing in disaster areas were opened for emergency housing by order of the Public Housing Administration. At the suggestion of that agency, the Federal Civil Defense Administration

¹ The relief and rehabilitation operations of the Defense Department are recounted more fully in the article in this issue of *THE ANNALS* by Carter L. Burgess, "The Armed Forces in Disaster Relief."—Ed.

² See also *infra*, L. E. Burney, "Public Health Problems in Major Disasters."—Ed.

ordered 141 surplus family trailers moved from Portsmouth, Ohio, to seven cities in Connecticut and Massachusetts. In Connecticut, PHA also turned over 300 units of temporary defense housing to state officials for disaster emergency housing. The Federal Housing Administration provided for the temporary suspension of payments on FHA-insured mortgage and repair loans in the disaster areas, and sent teams of specialists into disaster areas to advise local builders, lenders, and public officials on how to use FHA-insured financing for new construction or repairs. The Federal National Mortgage Association set aside \$10,000,000 to make advance commitments to purchase disaster-relief mortgages where private mortgage markets were not available.

Department of Labor

Some 130,000 workers in six states were unemployed because of the disaster. In the first week after the August floods, state employment security agencies processed more than 43,000 initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits from persons unemployed because of the disasters. Special provisions were made for quick processing of the claims. Local offices of state employment security agencies became focal points for reconstruction activity, and they established streamlined procedures for recruiting workers for reconstruction operations.

Small Business Administration

Small Business Administration established twenty-four temporary offices in disaster areas for processing disaster loans, and sent loan application forms to 1,500 banks in the areas. It worked closely with local bankers and attorneys in making disaster loans. To speed the loans, the temporary offices were authorized to make loans up to \$20,000 without additional referral (double the

authority given in any previous disaster). Regional offices were authorized to make loans up to \$50,000. A simplified, short-loan application form for disaster home loans up to \$2,000 was devised and rushed to field offices. These procedures meant that only a relatively few large loan applications had to be submitted to the Washington office of SBA. By late November 1955, SBA had approved 1,730 disaster loans totaling \$25,036,152.

Department of the Treasury

The Department's Coast Guard personnel saved more than 300 lives and moved nearly 1,000 other persons to places of greater safety. The Coast Guard also transported more than 1,000 trained disaster personnel by helicopters, amphibious aircraft and trucks, and surf boats, provided communication trucks and personnel with portable radio equipment, and helped secure yachts and fishing boats in areas of high waters. Under the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Treasury Department approved disaster loans to private industry of more than \$14,000,000. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue instructed regional commissioners serving disaster areas to take the disasters into consideration in deferring income tax payments and to speed tax refunds to residents of afflicted areas.

Office of Defense Mobilization

The Office of Defense Mobilization, acting to maintain the mobilization readiness of the United States, directed the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Maritime Administration to channel procurement contracts to disaster areas whenever possible. It also ordered government procurement agencies to extend dates of delivery by contractors in disaster areas, and in some cases progress payments were advanced to provide damaged con-

tractors with additional working capital. The agency granted accelerated tax amortization for the rehabilitation of facilities damaged by the floods, making it possible for many firms to write off their reconstruction expenses in five years instead of the longer period normally permitted by the Internal Revenue Code. Under ODM direction, idle government-owned machine tools and production equipment were leased in considerable number to damaged defense plants by the Departments of Commerce and Defense. ODM deferred delivery to the government of some 26,000 tons of copper, making it available for the relief of disaster areas, and authorized the sale of copper already in government inventory.³

General Services Administration

Under an FCDA directive, General Services Administration initiated a program whereby surplus federal property and equipment were made available to small business concerns in disaster areas at about 10 per cent of the procurement costs. Federal surplus property valued at about \$11,000,000 was made available to states for disaster rehabilitation. Under ODM direction, GSA sold more than 12,500,000 pounds of copper from government stockpiles for use in disaster areas.

INTERAGENCY CENTERS IN LATER FLOODS

The lessons learned in the northeastern states during the floods of August 1955 have been carried further by experience. No two disasters—no two floods, even—are alike.

In the Christmas floods in California and Nevada in 1955, the Federal Civil

³ For a more detailed description of ODM's role in the August 1955 floods see the article in this issue of *THE ANNALS* by Arthur S. Flemming, "The Impact of Disasters on Readiness for War."—Ed.

Defense Administration introduced Interagency Centers at strategic points in the disaster areas. At each center, representatives were maintained by the federal agencies operating in the surrounding area, whether under statutory authority in their own specialized fields or under additional disaster assignments from the Federal Civil Defense Administration. A representative of the Federal Civil Defense Administration was designated as co-ordinating head of each Interagency Center.

The arrangement found immediate acceptance. Twenty-three independent agencies were represented at the first Interagency Centers, together with the Red Cross.

PROBLEMS

The broad powers of the Disaster Act give rise to certain problems.

The most recurrent problem arises when localities seeking repair or replacement of their public facilities attempt to disregard the modifying words of Section 3(d) of the Disaster Act, which says that such work shall be "emergency" and "temporary." The words are not defined in the act, but the Federal Civil Defense Administration has given them administrative definition by saying public facilities will be put back into such condition that they can be operated while the locality arranges to restore them to their original condition at its own cost. The disaster localities generally want new, not repaired, facilities. In this case, financial aid equivalent to a temporary repair can be given.

Another problem that permits of no forthright solution is the application of the wording of the Disaster Act which says that the declaration of a "major disaster" by the President shall depend on a governor's "giving assurance of the expenditure of a reasonable amount of

the funds of the government of such State, local governments therein or other agencies, for the same or similar purposes with respect to such catastrophe."

There is no prescribed or agreed test of what is a "reasonable amount." In practice, the Federal Civil Defense Administration takes the governor's word that the state is unable to cope with the situation without federal assistance.

TRENDS

As states and localities become aware that systematic federal disaster assistance is available, they want more of it.

The Federal Disaster Act defines a "major disaster" only by listing a few types. It says: "Major disaster means any flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, storm or other catastrophe in any part of the United States which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government."

Another trend is the use of the mechanism for the declaration of a "major disaster" to trigger other relief statutes, particularly in agriculture. Under Public Law 115 of the Eighty-third Congress, the Department of Agriculture has an appropriation to use for emergency loans to farmers, feed for livestock, and seed for planting, if the governor of a state applies to the President for such relief and if investigation by the Secretary of Agriculture seems to justify it. A certificate of need must go from the Secretary of Agriculture to the Administrator of Federal Civil Defense, who sends it to the President with a recommendation. If the President declares a major disaster in the specified agricultural areas, the Secretary of Agriculture can proceed to administer the agricultural relief of Public Law 115 in accordance with his own rules.

OUTLOOK

The most constructive outlook for the Administrator of federal disaster assistance is to contemplate the measures being taken to prevent disasters or reduce their impact.

Flood-control works and flood insurance

Floods cause about two thirds of the damage among our recurrent disasters. General Sturgis, Chief of Engineers of the Army, testifying before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in November 1955, said the flood-control works built by the Army Engineers during the last quarter century have cut flood damage in half and that the present rate of congressional appropriation would bring the flood-control program to completion in another quarter century.⁴

President Eisenhower strongly recommended and supported an experimental insurance program for the immediate relief of victims of flood damage, and Public Law 1016, the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956, was enacted by the Eighty-fourth Congress. It sets up an experimental federal system of indemnification of flood losses, within certain limits, together with guaranteed loans where necessary to complete reconstruction.

In signing the act into law on August 8, 1956, President Eisenhower recalled the flood scenes he had visited, and he added:

The average annual flood damage that the Nation suffers runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, and in years of major disaster, such as 1951 and 1955, is in excess of a billion dollars. Private insurance companies have found no way within the limits of their own resources to venture

into this field of risk without danger of being wiped out before adequate reserves can be established.

This new program is a venture into an untested field of risk protection, and it is admittedly experimental. It does not propose putting the Federal Government permanently into the flood insurance business. On the contrary, it provides for the government to lead the way on a basis that will enable this field of responsibility to be absorbed into our private system in the shortest possible time.

As I see it, it is a proper function of the Federal Government to pioneer the establishment of a system of insured protection against the crippling losses of flood and tidal disaster.

The administration of the new federal flood insurance and loan system has been lodged in the Housing and Home Finance Agency, which has the responsibility of applying the complex provisions of the act. It is authorized to provide up to 3 billion dollars of outstanding flood insurance (or 5 billions if the President approves). In its annual report to the President to be submitted to the Congress in 1961, the administering agency is required to analyze the intervening five years experience and to recommend what should be done about flood insurance thereafter.⁵

Improved precautions against other disasters

Hurricanes and tornadoes are being studied to develop better predictions and precautions. Hurricane studies by the United States Weather Bureau, Navy, and Air Force include methods of determining how much rain a tropical hurricane will dump on the United States. A state-wide radar tornado

⁵ The terms of the Federal Flood Insurance Act are discussed further in a later article in this issue, "The Flood Peril and the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956," by Edwin S. Overman.—Ed.

⁴ For further details on flood-control work see the article in this issue of THE ANNALS by S. D. Sturgis, Jr., on "Floods."—Ed.

warning system has been installed in Texas, using Air Force radar apparatus obsolete for military purposes but capable of being adapted to tornado warning. Throughout the tornado regions of the nation, the Ground Observer Corps, recruited by civil defense and used by the Air Force to spot low-flying enemy planes, is now being used also to spot tornadoes.⁶

In drought areas and dust bowls, a measure of long-range relief may be expected from improved agricultural conservation practices.

⁶ Projects in hurricane and tornado forecasting and warning are outlined also in F. W. Reichelderfer, "Hurricanes, Tornadoes, and Other Storms" in this issue of THE ANNALS.—Ed.

In the earthquake regions, shock-resistant structures are being more generally built in cities, and mutual aid plans for earthquakes are developing along civil defense lines.⁷

Skirmish with reality

The nation is further ahead in its readiness to deal with peacetime disasters than with enemy attacks. For civil defense, each peacetime disaster is a mere skirmish with reality, compared to the possible onslaught of a nuclear bomb. It is through such skirmishes, however, that the nation moves toward a civil defense which could be a deterrent of war—the greatest of all disasters.

⁷ See also *supra*, L. Don Leet, "Earthquakes."—Ed.

The Impact of Disasters on Readiness for War

By ARTHUR S. FLEMMING

Abstract: The Office of Defense Mobilization is essentially a planning and coordinating agency in the Executive Office of the President. Its chief purpose is to organize and focus governmental activity at all levels to the end that production in an area struck by disaster—natural or man-made—can be quickly restored. This requires techniques for assessing damage and facilities for promoting a rapid resumption of production. The 1955 floods in the northeastern states and California provided a test of the effectiveness of civil defense preparations and caused them to work out new procedures. The author discusses the specific actions taken at that time, the Disaster Readiness Plan since prepared, and the relation of that plan to planning against the disaster of thermonuclear attack.—Ed.

NATURAL disasters bear a close affinity, in what they do to us and what we do about them, to the unnatural disasters caused by man in modern warfare. It is this affinity which justifies my writing an article for this issue of THE ANNALS.

I should note at the outset that the historical trend is in the direction of reducing that affinity. Over the centuries, and particularly in recent decades, man has learned to conquer the plagues and pestilences which once decimated whole cities and peoples. He has built levees and dams, and constructed his cities to be ever more resistant to fire and earthquake. And he has improved the administrative mechanisms by which he fights back against the ravages of disaster. Unfortunately, however, as natural disasters have lessened, man-made disasters have increased tremendously. Modern technology has given man the ability to snuff out lives by the millions in a few hours and to create catastrophes of a magnitude so great as to be almost unimaginable. It is against such catastrophes that this nation now must plan.

A natural disaster may have both a negative and a positive impact on our mobilization readiness. The impact is negative in the extent to which parts of our mobilization base are destroyed. The impact may be positive to the extent that the experience of fighting the disaster helps us to create the organizations and learn the techniques needed to fight the much greater disaster of war.

Many man-made disasters in the past have resulted in actions to contribute to the safety of the rest of us. The sinking of the *Titanic* in mid-Atlantic resulted in an iceberg patrol and stricter lifeboat requirements; the Cocoanut Grove inferno aroused civic authorities throughout the nation to renewed vigilance over fire safety regulations; and the wave of train wrecks in 1943 emphasized the railroads' need for more widespread use of two-way radio communication. In like manner, the floods last year in the Northeast and California provided a test of the effectiveness of civil defense preparations at the state and local levels and caused the Office of Defense Mobilization to work

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out new procedures for assessing damage to the mobilization base and for promoting a rapid resumption of production.

In the following pages I shall discuss the specific actions taken by ODM during these floods to minimize their negative impact—actions to maintain, protect, and reconstruct the mobilization base. In a broad sense, the mobilization base is that combination of people, materials, facilities, and equipment that would be available to deal with an emergency situation. Then I shall comment on the way in which our thinking has developed as to the best means of dealing with disaster—small or catastrophic.

THE ROLES OF ODM AND FCDA

The Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration have closely related and somewhat complementary roles to play.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration is responsible for the development, co-ordination, guidance, and leadership of a national program of civil defense designed to protect life and property from attack. It is also, under Executive Order 10427 of January 16, 1953, the central point of responsibility in the federal government for directing and co-ordinating the assistance of all federal agencies to disaster areas.¹ This responsibility includes the co-ordination of military activities to alleviate the disaster and the co-ordination of ODM's efforts to maintain the mobilization base.

The present Office of Defense Mobilization was established by Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 to enable one

¹ The role of FCDA in "major disasters" and its functioning in the August 1955 floods are described in more detail in the article in this issue of THE ANNALS by Val Peterson, "Co-ordinating and Extending Federal Assistance."—Ed.

agency in the Executive Office of the President to exercise strong leadership in our national mobilization effort, including both current defense activities and readiness for any future national emergency. It is essentially a policy-planning and co-ordinating, rather than an operating, agency. In addition to co-ordinating actions to develop and maintain the mobilization base, ODM also directs and co-ordinates the overall mobilization readiness planning of the federal government, including the determination of the wartime functions of the various agencies.

ODM IN THE AUGUST 1955 FLOODS

When Hurricane Diane struck the Middle Atlantic and New England states on August 1955, ODM, in concert with the other federal agencies, moved quickly to lend aid and assistance. ODM's role was limited to actions within its legal powers, designed to maintain, protect, or reconstruct the mobilization base and to maintain the mobilization readiness of the United States. The methods employed included procurement assistance, fast tax write-offs, loans and loan guarantees, production equipment leases, priority assistance, and the supply of government-owned materials. These methods were mostly carried out by our delegate agencies, as I shall describe.

Procurement assistance

On August 24, 1955, ODM directed² the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Maritime Administration to do what they could to channel procurement contracts to disaster areas. The order stated that preference in awarding contracts to disaster

² Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense Mobilization Order VII-7, Supplement 1, *Emergency Action for Maintenance of the Mobilization Base under Disaster Conditions*, August 25, 1955.

areas was to be considered in the public interest and the interest of national defense.

Through April 15, 1956, when application of this order was discontinued, the military departments had awarded 6,285 contracts of \$10,000 or more in disaster areas, valued at \$2,052,283,716. Of this total, 313 contracts, valued at \$33,236,927, were awarded as a result of preference given these firms by the ODM order. Purchases or contracts of the Atomic Energy Commission in these areas totaled \$21,380,334, and Maritime Administration purchases \$264,341.

All of the procurement agencies also made necessary adjustments in existing contracts to meet disaster conditions, chiefly extensions of delivery dates because of damage to facilities of the contractors or their subcontractors. In some instances, the agencies advanced progress payments to provide additional working capital to damaged contractors.

Fast tax write-offs

We also announced³ on August 24 that we would grant accelerated tax amortization for the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and replacement of facilities destroyed or damaged by the floods. This order applied to all facilities used for the production of materials or services covered by any of the 225 expansion goals issued since Korea, although most of these expansions had been completed and the goals were closed. Through June 15, 1956, ODM allowed ten firms to write off reconstruction costs of \$13,803,660. The largest applicants for this assistance were railroads.

³ Office of Defense Mobilization Regulation 1, Amendment 1, *Granting Accelerated Tax Amortization for the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Replacement of Emergency Facilities Destroyed or Damaged by Major Disaster*, August 25, 1956.

Loans and loan guarantees

The President on August 25, 1955, issued Executive Order 10634, which provided that whenever financial assistance was not otherwise available on reasonable terms, loans or loan guarantees could be made under the Defense Production Act to aid in carrying out the reconstruction, rehabilitation, or replacement of facilities covered by open or closed expansion goals.

Following the flood disasters, ODM certified eleven DPA loans, of which the Treasury Department approved seven, amounting to \$19,871,000. The largest of these was a deferred participation of 90 per cent in a loan of \$16,000,000 made to the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company by twelve New York banks.

Production equipment leases

ODM also helped some defense plants to get back into production quickly by authorizing the lease of idle government-owned machine tools and production equipment to them.⁴ Leases at the rate of 1 per cent of cost per month were made for the period of time necessary for the lessee to obtain delivery on replacement equipment. In September, ODM directed that the monthly rental charge should not begin until ninety days after the arrival of the equipment at the lessee's plant, so that distressed firms would not have to pay rental charges long before they could get back into production.

No over-all statistics are available on the leasing program; however, a considerable number of tools were made available in this way by both the Commerce and the Defense Department. A

⁴ Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense Mobilization Order VII-4, Supplement 1, August 25, 1955 (and Amendment 1 thereto, September 21, 1955), *ODM Policy Guidance on Government-owned Production Equipment*.

considerable amount of Army railroad equipment was also leased to damaged railways in the disaster areas.

Priority assistance

Another means of speeding the resumption of production was by the use of priorities and allocation authority under the Defense Production Act to provide materials for the restoration of productive capacity.⁵ This also applied to all productive capacity covered by open or closed expansion goals.

The Commerce Department sent a number of staff officers into the field to handle this and the other programs of assistance. When applicants were not eligible for formal assistance, the Commerce Department's Industry Divisions, through their close working relations with industries and individual companies, endeavored to get suppliers to provide the materials or products needed.

Supply of government-owned materials

On August 25, 1955, ODM authorized the deferment until June 30, 1956, of some 26,000 tons of copper scheduled for delivery to the government to fulfill existing contracts. On September 14, additional deliveries of 11,000 tons of copper were deferred. This copper was made available by the producers for the relief of flood-damaged areas in New England.

On August 27, ODM authorized the sale of copper already in the Defense Production Act inventory for rehabilitation in the New England disaster areas. The copper was sold by the General Services Administration to fabricators at the market price plus transportation and handling charges, for use in reconstructing power, communica-

⁵ Office of Defense Mobilization, DMO VII-3, Supplement 1, August 27, 1955, *Policy on the Control of Materials and Facilities by the Use of Priorities and Allocation Authority under Disaster Conditions*.

tions, and other facilities and for defense orders. By the end of the year 4,925 tons of copper had been released for New England flood disaster relief and another 955 tons for urgent defense needs.

On January 13, 1956, ODM authorized the sale from DPA inventories of up to 2,100 tons of copper to meet needs arising from the December floods in the Pacific Coast area. By the end of February, 1,923 tons had been released for flood relief and 150 tons for urgent defense needs.

DISASTER READINESS

The orders and actions which I have described constitute a new approach to federal assistance to disaster areas. Precious time was lost while we determined the actions to take and then developed the necessary orders to carry them out. To save that time in the future, we have developed a Disaster Readiness Plan. This plan constitutes a part of the over-all federal plans for disaster assistance which are co-ordinated by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Its purpose is to provide a list of actions which can serve as standing operating procedure in any future major natural disaster. Most of the orders and directives are "self-triggering," that is, they are drafted so that they go into effect automatically whenever the President declares a major disaster pursuant to the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 1109).

In addition to the orders discussed above, two other standby orders have been issued as a part of the Disaster Readiness Plan.

One order provides that in the event of major disaster, all agencies having defense mobilization assignments shall promptly advise ODM of the quantities and qualities of materials needed for specific defense projects.⁶ If other meas-

⁶ Office of Defense Mobilization, DMO V-6, November 15, 1955, *Provision of Materials*

ures are not adequate to supply the needed materials. ODM will again arrange for diversions of material under contract to the government or for release of materials from the Defense Production Act inventory or the Commodity Credit Corporation inventories. A companion order provides that when a disaster has either reduced the supplies of materials needed for defense purposes or has increased defense requirements, all agencies having defense mobilization assignments shall promptly recommend appropriate programs to the ODM for expansion of supply under authority of the Defense Production Act.⁷

Damage-assessment procedures

We have also explored the possibility of adapting for natural disaster purposes the damage-assessment procedures which we are developing for use in the event of attack. In essence, this is a system for rapidly computing assumed bomb damage effects on the basis of information as to the size of bomb, the height of burst, and the location of various mobilization resources. The resources information is recorded on magnetic tapes so that the computations can be made quickly through the use of an electronic calculator. So far, with the co-operation of a number of agencies, particularly the Census Bureau, we have recorded on tapes precise information regarding the location, shipments, and number of employees of approximately 20,000 manufacturing plants in potential target areas; the 400 largest

stations generating electric power; producers of the most important military end items and their principal components and subassemblies; and other key resources data.

This damage-assessment technique has been developed to provide rapid though rough assessments after a major attack when many other channels of information and communication might have broken down. In the case of the more limited natural disasters, ordinary news-gathering media plus judicious use of the telephone would probably provide full information more quickly than this special procedure. Accordingly, adaptation of this technique to disaster reporting is mainly of value as a means of testing the technique and training personnel in its use.

Under arrangements currently being worked out, FCDA would be responsible for reporting on the area of disaster damage, in terms of map co-ordinates. These co-ordinates would then be run through the electronic calculator, which would report on the important facilities damaged. Census enumerators would then visit these facilities to obtain detailed information on damage by means of a previously prepared questionnaire. This technique was tried out experimentally during the recent floods in California. It is still in the planning stage, however, pending the availability of funds for the Bureau of the Census which would permit it to train enumerators and stockpile questionnaires.

MOBILIZATION READINESS

As I have indicated above, the experience of fighting disasters teaches us a good deal about the problems of dealing with the much greater disaster of thermonuclear attack. Another way in which we gain this experience in advance is through the creation of simulated disasters for training purposes, such as Operation Alert 1956. Our ex-

under Government Control As Needed to Supplement Supplies Commercially Available in the Event of a Major Disaster (As Defined and Determined Under 64 Stat. 1109) for Use in Reconstruction or to Meet Defense Orders.

⁷ Office of Defense Mobilization, DMO V-5, November 15, 1955, *Programs for Expansion of Supplies of Materials Needed for Defense Purposes in the Event of a Major Disaster (As Defined and Determined Under 64 Stat. 1109)*.

perience in both real and simulated disasters has affected considerably our thinking and our plans for dealing with massive attack. We recognize the need for continual readiness to act instantly when such a disaster strikes. Accordingly, we have developed the concept of "self-triggering" orders such as those in the Disaster Readiness Plan. Corollary to this is the need for administrative mechanisms at regional and local levels which can move quickly to take the necessary actions without constant referral back to Washington. One response to this need has been the development this year of Regional Mobilization Co-ordinators of the Office of Defense Mobilization, backed up by interagency Regional Mobilization Committees.

Within the past year FCDA's post-attack role has been broadened in an allocation of post-attack responsibilities which I approved with the concurrence of the Administrator of the FCDA, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under this allocation of responsibilities, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator would be responsible for taking the lead in all civil defense, relief, and rehabilitation matters. The Administrator would direct all efforts in providing and distributing emergency food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and cash allowances; in maintaining order, sanitary safeguards, fire protection, and countermeasures against the hazards of special weapons or unconventional warfare; in essential clearance of debris and restoration of public facilities and utilities basic to the resumption of commerce and industry; and in the establishment of programs that would result in the distribution of goods required to meet consumer requirements.

Under this same allocation of post-attack responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense would determine the necessary personnel, material, and facilities within

the Department of Defense required to carry out the Department's primary responsibility for the defense of the United States and the conduct of military operations incident thereto. All other personnel, material, and facilities under his command would be used to render all possible support and assistance to the Federal Civil Defense Administration in emergency relief and rehabilitation. The Office of Defense Mobilization would be responsible for mobilizing resources, directing production, and allocating resources to the Department of Defense and the FCDA.

Thus it can be seen that our concept of civil defense has changed radically in the few years since World War II, when civil defense meant fire fighters and wardens in tin hats. And the role of the Federal Civil Defense Administration has also evolved substantially since passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Although FCDA was originally designed to meet the requirements of the atomic age, the planners and legislators at that time could not fully anticipate the quantum jump in thermonuclear technology which has since taken place. FCDA is now coming to be the primary federal agency for dealing with broad programs of human assistance under conditions both of attack and of disaster. Concurrently, ODM is developing government-wide mechanisms to assure quick and effective responses to disaster situations at all levels of government.

The experience of dealing with natural disasters and with simulated attack disasters is increasing our competence and capacity to handle the problems of a surprise attack upon us. And by the same token, our ability to handle the problems of an attack will stand us in good stead in responding quickly and effectively to the lesser problems of any future natural disasters with which we might be afflicted.

The Armed Forces in Disaster Relief

By CARTER L. BURGESS

Abstract: Although the basic responsibility for disaster relief lies with civil agencies, national, state, local, and private, the Armed Forces, because of their mobility and organization, are frequently utilized to lend urgently needed aid in emergency situations. National disaster relief, including military, is authorized by the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 and co-ordinated by the Federal Civil Defense Administration when the President declares a "major disaster." However, compelling humanitarian requirements inevitably put the military relief machinery in action the moment disaster strikes. The magnitude of several recent disasters has widened the scope of Department of Defense relief. Beyond the prompt emergency aid rendered, under the authority of the 1950 Disaster Act the Department has helped in postdisaster rehabilitation of public works and basic production facilities in disaster areas.—Ed.

THE American people can take comfort in the knowledge that when disaster strikes, the Armed Forces traditionally move with speed and efficiency to give relief and assistance to stricken areas. Even before the forces which generated the disaster have settled, our servicemen frequently are clearing debris, providing emergency communications, building bridges, reinforcing levees, and bringing in food, medical supplies, and equipment to save lives and ease the suffering of the victims.

The responsibility for alleviating disaster conditions rests primarily with individuals, private industry, local and state governments, the American National Red Cross, various federal agencies having special statutory responsibilities, and other federal agencies having resources that can be utilized. The Armed Forces, however, because of their organization, the widespread location of their posts, camps, and stations, and their resources in manpower and equipment, frequently are called upon in the earliest stages of a disaster to provide

the humanitarian relief which could not otherwise be given in such timely fashion.

During the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906, immediate assistance by Army troops helped reduce the suffering brought on by the initial impact of the disaster. Military control of the area was necessary for ten months, until civil officials were ready to reassume their responsibilities.¹

The extent and diversity of military assistance is demonstrated in the Texas City disaster of 1947, which resulted when a ship exploded while loading chemicals: relief supplies included field ranges, fire helmets, asbestos suits, immersion heaters, oxygen cylinders, tents, water cans, lister bags, lanterns, lime shovels, chlorine tablets, flashlights, soap, mess kits, blankets, cots, embalming fluid, formaldehyde, gas masks, penicillin, ether, and bathrobes and pajamas. In the spring of 1955 the Army

¹ Capt. Freda M. Boyle, "The Army in Disaster Relief," *Army Information Digest*, No. 4 (April 1954).

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was called on to use smoke generators to save a million-dollar peach crop in Utah; and in January 1949 the Air Force, in Operation Haylift, dropped bales of hay and feed from planes to snow-stranded cattle and sheep in five western states.

Military assistance in flood relief goes back a long way—to Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in 1889; along the Mississippi River in 1912; at Galveston, Texas, in 1915, and in Vermont in 1927. In recent years military assistance was provided the victims of the 1938 New England hurricane and the victims of Hurricanes Carol, Edna, and Hazel along the east coast in 1954. In 1955 floods on the Pacific Coast and in the north-eastern states created the need for more military assistance. In commenting in a report on the 1955 eastern states floods, the American National Red Cross had this to say:

Heroism became routine as people awoke and warned each other to flee threatened areas, guided each other to safe high ground, rescued the marooned. Among these heroes were firemen, policemen, civil defense workers, national guardsmen, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, first aid squads, Red Cross chapter workers, and hundreds of others. All in those frightening early hours were simply people working together in selfless concern for one another. This spirit of working together was to mark the entire month-long job of helping the region back to its feet.²

Such is the spirit in which the Armed Forces come to the relief of communities when disaster strikes.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

Under Department of Defense policy,³ disaster relief by the Armed Forces is

² American National Red Cross, *1955 Eastern States Floods*, ARC 1576, January 1956.

³ Department of Defense Directive No. 3025.1, "Responsibilities for Civil Defense and Other Domestic Emergencies," dated July 14, 1956.

provided only in accordance with the authority delegated by the Congress under the Federal Disaster Act of 1950⁴ or by the direction of the President, except when (1) the overruling demands of humanity compel immediate action to prevent starvation, extreme suffering, and property loss or (2) local resources available to state and municipal authorities are clearly inadequate to cope with the situation. Disaster relief by the Armed Forces generally is limited to the emergency period.

Public Law 875 in no way precludes action by the Armed Forces where required in emergencies, pending determination by the President that a disaster is a "major disaster" under the terms of the law. Military assistance before the declaration of a major disaster may be provided under the control and authority of the local military commander.

Typical is the action of the Commander, Hamilton Air Force Base, in the case of the Yuba City-Marysville, California, area disaster in December 1955. He reported his action as follows:

At 1230 hours, 22 December 1955, Beale Air Force Base declared an emergency in the Yuba City-Marysville area. All personnel at Beale Air Force Base are participating in this emergency. Assistance includes patrolling, reinforcing levees, evacuating civilians from Yuba City and Marysville to Beale Air Force Base, and the furnishing of housing, food, bedding and medical service to approximately 8,000 evacuees.

On the following day, the disaster was declared a major disaster.

Armed Forces action subsequent to such a finding, however, is under the co-ordination and direction of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. The extent, manner, and duration of Armed Forces participation is as directed by

⁴ Public Law 875, 81st Congress.

the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, to whom the President has delegated the responsibility for carrying out the authorizations and functions of the act.⁵

ORGANIZATION

The Secretary of Defense has designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve) to co-ordinate disaster relief activities within the Department of Defense and to maintain direct liaison with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the American Red Cross on military assistance in these activities.

Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army has been delegated the primary responsibility for providing disaster relief assistance in the continental United States and for co-ordination and control of participation by the Navy and the Air Force.⁶ Field responsibility for military participation in disaster relief has been delegated to the Commanding General of the Continental Army Command and the six Zone of Interior Army Commanders. They have full authority to act on requests for aid from civil authorities within the policies established by the Department of the Army.

The Departments of the Navy and the Air Force have issued instructions to their field commands to authorize unilateral action in disaster relief operations under Army co-ordination.

An appeal for aid by state or local authorities to the commanding general of the Army area involved or to the commanding officer of the nearest military establishment will result in mili-

⁵ Executive Order No. 10427, dated January 16, 1953.

⁶ Army responsibility and policy in disaster relief operations are prescribed in Army Regulation AR 500-60, "Emergency Employment of Army Resources, Disaster Relief," dated October 1, 1952, as changed.

tary assistance in cases where life and property may be in jeopardy. In this event, the commanding officer receiving the appeal will take immediate action to save life, to prevent human suffering, and to prevent or lessen destruction or damage to United States property. Except in such critical situations, local and state authorities normally should request the state governor to obtain military assistance or aid authorized under the Federal Disaster Act of 1950.

After a major disaster declaration by the President, all requests for military assistance from state and local authorities are channeled through the Federal Civil Defense Administration Regional Administrator to the corresponding Army commander. The commander attempts to meet requests for military assistance with resources within his area, including those of the Navy and the Air Force (see Fig. 1). If the resources are not available in his area, he calls for assistance from the Continental Army Commander, who in turn may call upon any of the geographical Army commanders or the other services to fulfill the request.

ROLE OF THE RED CROSS

Under its charter, the American National Red Cross is responsible for continuing a system of national and international relief in mitigation of suffering caused by pestilence, famine, fire, flood, and other great national calamities.

The Red Cross always arrives rapidly at the scene of disaster. Military commanders take advantage of every opportunity to use the experience, organization, and facilities of the Red Cross for providing disaster relief. Because of its nationwide organization, the Red Cross is able to provide advice and recommend action to be taken by military commanders confronted with disaster conditions.




FIG. 1. STEPS TAKEN TO REQUEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN A DECLARED MAJOR DISASTER

Military equipment, supplies, and services furnished to any organization in compliance with direct requests or recommendations made by the Red Cross are receipted for by accredited representatives of the Red Cross. Such receipts are accepted as evidence that the equipment, supplies, or services are needed by the Red Cross, or by the agency that requested them, for relief purposes and that every reasonable care will be exercised to restrict their use to relief purposes only; the Red Cross also accepts thereby responsibility for the return of nonexpendable equipment and supplies to the issuing office as soon as the emergency need has ended. In disasters not designated by the President as major disasters, the Red Cross reimburses the Army for the assistance furnished. If in major disasters the Army furnishes assistance directly to the Red Cross at its request, the Red

Cross similarly assumes responsibility for reimbursement.

In addition to the disaster relief supplies and services furnished by the Armed Forces, the Red Cross may desire to buy from the Army, for reasons of economy and efficiency, certain other supplies and services, such as food, medicines, lumber, gas, oil, and transportation. If the desired supplies and services are available, the Secretary of the Army may authorize such sales.

Where the relief of disaster conditions does not come under the scope of Red Cross activities, representatives of that organization may provide military authorities with information concerning the destruction and the needs in the affected areas and make recommendations for emergency assistance by the military. In such cases, the Red Cross is not held financially responsible for such materials. Cognizant military com-

manders are required to maintain property accountability and ensure the return of items furnished local authorities under these circumstances.

ARMY ENGINEERS IN FLOOD CONTROL AND RELIEF

The prevention and control of floods is, by law, the responsibility of the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The special continuing statutory authority for the Corps of Engineers is contained in the Flood Control Acts of 1941, as amended in the Flood Control Acts of 1946 and 1948, and Section 210 of the Flood Control Act of 1950,⁷ as amended by Public Law 99. Eighty-fourth Congress. Operations under these laws are limited to flood fighting, rescue operations, and emergency work on flood-control projects, such as dams or levees threatened, damaged, or destroyed by flood. Public Law 99 authorized an emergency fund in the amount of \$15,000,000 for operations and provided for the annual replenishment of the fund by congressional appropriation. Emergency rescue and flood-fighting operations under this law are designed to supplement the rescue and flood-fighting work of other agencies.

Only when the normally responsible local authorities are unable to cope with a flood emergency and make specific request for such action may a Division or District Engineer of the Corps of Engineers assume full responsibility for direction of flood-fighting operations. When a flood of dangerous proportions threatens, the District Engineer notifies the Department of the Army, the Commanding General of the Continental Army Command, and the appropriate Zone of Interior Army Commander of developments (including the Corps of Engineers flood-fighting activities). There is the closest co-operation between these military authorities and the

Regional Administrators of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the Red Cross, and other relief agencies to mitigate the results of disastrous floods.

Military assistance in relief of human suffering under the terms of the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, as distinguished from the flood control and relief functions of the Corps of Engineers, is furnished through the Army area commander. In a major disaster under the provisions of the act, however, the Corps of Engineers may be called upon by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator to participate in flood-disaster assistance. When the assistance to state and local agencies thus requested is beyond the statutory authority of the Corps of Engineers the Division or District Engineer informs the Army commander concerned and requests concurrence before such assistance is furnished. At the same time he requests an allotment of funds for such assistance. If available from military appropriations, the Army commander provides the funds. If the military funds are not available, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator certifies that necessary funds are available under the provisions of Public Law 875 and that the Corps of Engineers may provide the assistance from any available civil funds, pending reimbursement.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN INDUSTRY REHABILITATION

Disaster relief by the Armed Forces generally is limited to emergency relief. In order to conserve military manpower, equipment, and supplies their use is authorized only during the actual emergency. Normally all troops and equipment are withdrawn and the issue of military supplies terminated at the earliest practicable moment.

However, the magnitude of the disaster occurring in 1955 in the flood-stricken northeastern United States, fol-

⁷ Public Law 516, 81st Congress.

lowed later by the Pacific Coast floods, created a special disaster relief problem for the federal government. The Department of Defense became involved first in the emergency disaster relief operations and secondly in the rehabilitation of disaster-stricken industries in these areas.

Northeastern states floods, August 1955

The most extensive military participation in disaster relief occurred as a result of the August 1955 hurricane floods in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.

The military services acted promptly to assist city, state, and Red Cross officials even before the President had declared the floods a major disaster—rescuing trapped persons by boats and helicopters, replacing bridges, providing emergency communications, transporting emergency medical and other supplies to affected areas, and providing emergency water and sanitation facilities.

The affected areas were declared “major disaster areas” by the President on August 20, 1955. The Federal Civil Defense Administrator assumed responsibility for direction of federal assistance in the disaster area as soon as the President had issued his declaration.

Under a delegation from the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Army Corps of Engineers rendered rehabilita-

tion assistance in the six affected states. This widespread disaster relief operation became known as “Operation Noah.” It included work essential for the preservation of life and property, debris and wreckage clearance, and emergency repair and temporary replacement of public facilities. The Corps, in addition, gave guidance and reimbursement to local agencies for work in these categories that were performed by them, when certified by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator as being eligible for reimbursement.

The total estimated cost of Operation Noah was \$35,180,000. A total of \$31,600,000, including the sum of \$12,000,000 which represented reimbursement to local agencies, was allotted directly to the Corps, leaving \$3,580,000 to be reimbursed by the Federal Civil Defense Administration (see Fig. 2). A breakdown of the estimated total cost shows \$1,118,800 for protective work, \$15,625,500 for debris and wreckage clearances, and \$18,435,700 for repairs and replacement of public facilities.

The scale of the operation is further indicated by the fact that about 675 localities were affected by flooding. In addition to debris and wreckage clearance, the recovery work performed directly by the Corps and its contractors in 400 localities included restoration to operation of about 100 water and sewer systems, channel work at over 200 locations, emergency repair to 35 dams, and extensive temporary bridge work and highway repairs. At its peak, Operation Noah employed 608 officers and civilians of the Corps of Engineers and 3,365 contractors’ employees, and used 1,423 pieces of heavy equipment.

Western states floods, 1955–56

No less severe was the flood disaster which occurred in the western states in the floods of December 1955 and Janu-




FIG. 2. OPERATION NOAH—FEDERAL COST

ary 1956. Armed Forces emergency military assistance in the affected areas included military manpower, care of evacuees, and the loan of thousands of blankets, cots, and sleeping bags. The Corps of Engineers, under its flood-control authority (Public Law 99, 84th Congress), in California alone awarded 183 contracts for a value of over ten million dollars, and 77 contracts for debris and other clearance operations of over one million dollars value.

Industry rehabilitation

The disaster conditions in the northeastern United States impelled the Department of Defense into a new role in disaster relief when it undertook to aid in the rehabilitation of industries in the flooded areas. In order to provide immediate relief to the eastern states hit by floods, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, in Defense Mobilization Order VII-4, Supplement 1, authorized the loan of government-owned war reserve production equipment upon request by producing establishments crippled by the floods.⁸ The authority for the immediate release of such equipment to enable damaged establishments to resume normal operations was limited to the disaster areas and to the duration of the flood emergency as established by the President.

This release of war reserve equipment resulted in many types of equipment being put into service in numerous damaged industrial establishments during August and October 1955. The list included machine tools, metal work-

ing equipment, generators, motors, and transformers, as well as testing and measuring equipment. Illustrative of the type of assistance furnished is a statement in a Defense Department Disaster Bulletin of September 1, 1955:

The Department of the Army authorized the Chief of Transportation to loan to the railroads affected by the flood disaster in the Northeastern States locomotives from reserve stocks as follows: Erie, 6; New York Central, 20; and Pennsylvania, 43. These locomotives are in addition to 20 loaned to the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad and 25 to the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad on 25 August. Railroads in all cases will pay costs involved.

Leases of equipment under this order were only for such periods of time as were necessary for the lessee to obtain delivery of equipment to replace that which was damaged or destroyed. In no case were leases entered into for more than one-year terms.

In order to maintain the mobilization base, the Director of Defense Mobilization issued Defense Mobilization Order VII-7, Supplement 1, which states that it is essential to the national defense that productive facilities in major disaster areas be used to the maximum practical extent.⁹

The provisions of Defense Mobilization Orders VII-4 and VII-7 were made applicable to the areas of the West Coast affected by the December floods on December 29, 1955.

To accomplish this objective, Department of Defense procurement agencies used their best efforts to award procurement orders to contractors located in disaster areas and to encourage prime contractors to award subcontracts to

⁸ Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense Mobilization Order No. VII-4, Supplement No. 1, Subject: “ODM Policy Guidance on Government-owned Production Equipment,” dated August 25, 1955, and Amendment thereto dated September 21, 1955. (On the role of ODM during the August 1955 floods see also the article in this issue of THE ANNALS by Arthur S. Flemming, “The Impact of Disasters on Readiness for War.”—Ed.)

⁹ Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense Mobilization Order No. VII-7, Supplement 1, Subject: “Emergency Action for Maintenance of the Mobilization Base under Disaster Conditions,” dated August 25, 1955.

TABLE 1—MILITARY PRIME CONTRACT
AWARDS FOR WORK IN DISASTER AREAS
AS OF APRIL 15, 1956

New Procurement Actions of \$10,000 or More
for Military Supplies, Services, and Construction
Awarded Under Supplement 1 to DMO VII-7

(In thousands of dollars)

STATES	NUMBER OF CONTRACTS	VALUE OF CONTRACTS
California.....	1,174	185,068
Connecticut.....	729	694,477
Massachusetts....	1,510	236,230
Nevada.....	4	331
New Jersey.....	1,020	440,066
New York.....	610	347,209
Oregon.....	72	2,939
Pennsylvania.....	1,053	138,007
Rhode Island.....	108	7,972
Washington.....	2	73
Total ^a	6,282	\$2,052,373

^a Detail may not add to totals owing to rounding.

firms in those areas. A total of 6,282 contracts with a value of 2.05 billion dollars were awarded under this authority. The authority in the order was terminated April 15, 1956. Table 1 shows the distribution of these contracts by states.

Military departments were authorized to pay price differentials to make awards to other than the lowest bidders—a treatment similar to that authorized by Armed Services Procurement Regulations for bidders in labor surplus areas. New procurement actions awarded as a result of preference authorized in Defense Mobilization Order VII-4 and Defense Mobilization Order VII-7, totaled 320 such contracts for a value of 41.7 million dollars. The application of these orders was terminated April 15, 1956. Table 2 shows a breakdown of such actions by states.

Other actions taken by the military to assist suppliers included speeding up of payments to contractors, suspension of automatic termination of contracts in

damaged facilities, extension of delivery dates, guarantee of loans, and the establishment of industrial clinics to advise potential contractors in those areas of the benefits that could be obtained.

THE RESERVE FORCES IN DISASTERS

Stronger and more effective Reserve Forces are being developed under programs authorized by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.¹⁰ When objectives of the Reserve program are achieved, there will be organized and trained units in or available to potential disaster areas throughout the United States. This will provide on-the-spot leadership and stability in organizing emergency measures at the scene of a disaster.

The National Guard has traditionally performed such a role. It has a long and outstanding record of professional military support and response to the control of disaster situations. Reserve units under appropriate circumstances could be similarly employed.

The training of Reserve Forces units

TABLE 2—NEW PROCUREMENT ACTIONS OF
\$10,000 OR MORE AWARDED AS A RESULT OF
PREFERENCE AUTHORIZED BY DEFENSE
MOBILIZATION ORDERS VII-4 AND
VII-7 AS OF APRIL 15, 1956
(In thousands of dollars)

STATES	NUMBER OF CONTRACTS	VALUE OF CONTRACTS
California.....	55	\$ 2,709
Connecticut.....	50	12,224
Massachusetts....	89	7,359
New Jersey.....	45	11,892
New York.....	24	2,050
Oregon.....	1	30
Pennsylvania.....	44	3,910
Rhode Island.....	12	1,568
Total ^a	320	\$41,742

^a Detail may not add to totals owing to rounding.

¹⁰ Public Law 305, 84th Congress.

lends itself to employment in mass feeding, medical support, field engineering, first aid, and sanitation, all of which are urgently needed when disaster strikes. Their work in disaster relief furnishes firsthand the best practical training for meeting the demands that may be thrust upon them in the event of an enemy attack on the United States. In addition, these Reserve units can provide military experience for pre-disaster emergency planning by local civilian disaster units.

The Reserve Forces are only one component of the military potential that is available to come to the assistance of the nation whenever and wherever disaster strikes. In their entirety the Armed Forces are as vital to the nation in combating natural disaster as they are in defending against enemy attack. The Armed Forces are proud of the help they have given in the past and, as always, stand ready to respond if needed in the future.

SALIENT POINTS IN REVIEW

In summary, these salient points should be noted:

1. The Armed Forces, which are organized, trained, and equipped to defend the national way of life against aggression, are ready to provide military assistance to civil authority when the

overruling demands of humanity compel immediate action.

2. Upon the declaration of a major disaster by the President the Armed Forces furnish assistance under the direction of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, through the FCDA Regional Administrator. Normally, this assistance is already being furnished well ahead of the time a major disaster is declared.

3. The Red Cross and the Armed Forces co-operate closely in disaster relief. Assistance furnished by the military to the Red Cross upon request of that organization is reimbursed by the Red Cross. Under certain circumstances the Red Cross may purchase military equipment and supplies.

4. The Corps of Engineers has a statutory responsibility in flood control. During a major disaster this requirement is extended to furnishing additional and reimbursable assistance under the direction of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

5. The improved Reserve program will increase the ability of the Armed Forces to furnish assistance in disaster relief throughout the nation, on a state by state and county by county basis.

6. The Armed Forces are as vital to the nation in combating natural disasters as they are in defending against enemy attack.

Public Health Problems in Major Disasters

By L. E. BURNEY

Abstract: It is impossible to predetermine rigidly the public health problems in major disasters or the official relief actions to be taken; each disaster presents its own characteristics. Good public health organization must, in such circumstances, be able to co-operate quickly with other relief agencies, identify and evaluate actual and potential public health hazards, mobilize existing health resources, take emergency measures to control or eliminate hazards and restore public health facilities. The co-operative functioning of local, state, and federal health agencies is described by the author, and especially the organization and work of the federal Public Health Service in disaster operations. The author illustrates the functioning of the Service in connection with the outbreak in 1952 of mosquito-borne encephalitis in the Central Valley of California and the 1955 hurricane and floods in the northeastern states.—Ed.

IT is no easy task to separate from the multiple problems of a major disaster those hazards to the affected populations that can be defined exclusively as public health problems. The safety of water and food supplies and the control of communicable diseases, it is true, are readily identified as public health problems of extreme urgency in certain types of disaster. However, the emphasis that has been given to these aspects of public health in the development of national, state, and local disaster relief programs in the United States may reflect rather a tendency to perceive the health problems of human beings under catastrophic conditions in terms of the traditional role of public health agencies than a thorough evaluation of the potential hazards to public health of all types of disaster, and of the substantial federal, state, and local public health resources available at the present time to cope with such hazards.

WHAT EMERGENCY PROBLEMS?

One can visualize, for example, some disasters in which water and food sani-

tation and communicable disease control would be of minor concern, if emergency problems at all. The major public health problem might be deadly air pollution. If one casts a very long look back to A.D. 79, one may observe that in the famous eruption of Vesuvius the major loss of life was due to poisonous fumes, of which the elder Pliny died with his fleet at Stabiae some distance from the volcano. In the continental United States in recent times there have been comparable episodes, smaller but nonetheless disastrous. In 1929, the combustion of X-ray films in the Crile Clinic at Cleveland took 125 lives as a result of poisonous fumes. In 1948, smog conditions at Donora, Pennsylvania, took twenty lives and caused several thousand disabling illnesses. An accident in some types of industrial installations today, or in a nuclear reactor in the future, might pose a similar public health problem on the scale of a major disaster. Such an occurrence might require the full complement of organized disaster relief—rescue, evacuation, emergency housing and

feeding, emergency medical service, protection of essential facilities and services, and so on. But the major public health problem would not be sanitation and communicable disease control. It would be prompt identification and control of atmospheric pollution, emergency diagnosis and treatment of severely affected persons, and protection of affected populations from further exposure.

It appears, then, that public health problems in major disasters can no more be rigidly predetermined than can the immediate, specific actions of responsible officials on the scene of a disaster. The characteristics of the disaster itself determine the problems and the actions. It is essential, therefore, that public health organization for disaster relief be geared to accomplish the following general purposes: (1) automatic liaison with all other components of organized disaster relief; (2) immediate identification and evaluation of the present and potential public health hazards; (3) automatic mobilization of all the public health resources that will be needed, as determined by the evaluation; (4) emergency action to control or eliminate the public health hazards and to protect affected populations from exposure; (5) emergency restoration or substitution of basic public health facilities and services in affected communities; (6) evaluation of damage to structures and property in terms of effects on public health; (7) restoration of public health facilities and services in disrupted and damaged areas; (8) identification of actions needed to avert the recurrence of similar disasters; (9) evaluation and reporting of disaster relief activities, in terms of effectiveness in protection of public health.

Whether a disaster is natural or man-made, whether it is national, regional, or local, whether the costs of relief are to be deferred by official, quasi-official,

voluntary, or private funds, there should be a public health organization capable of fulfilling such purposes. The United States is fortunate that its federal, state, and local public health agencies have been developed to the point that such an organization for public health disaster relief is in being today. Especially during the past twenty years, our state and local health departments have been greatly strengthened and their responsibilities expanded. In many instances, the state health authority is responsible for all emergency public health and medical services in the governor's civil defense and disaster relief organization, and the health officers of many municipalities hold the same position in local civil defense and disaster relief organizations.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Thirty years ago, state and local health organizations in most parts of the country were not strong enough to assume their full responsibilities for protecting the public's health even in disasters of state or local scope. Very often little could be done, or was done, until the disaster had wreaked its utmost damage and passed on, leaving the organization of relief and public health controls to outside agencies. Today, every state and territory has a well-organized central public health department operating on the one hand in close co-operation with the United States Public Health Service and on the other with local health organizations or local governments if no local health department is in existence. The capacities of the Public Health Service to assist state health departments, both in the normal operation of their programs and in public health emergencies, also have been strengthened and expanded. In addition, research activities in the Service have been enormously augmented within the past decade, thus implement-

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ing a growing, intensive search for better methods of coping with old problems and for effective means of dealing with new or potential hazards in disasters occurring in our very much altered mid-twentieth century environment.

A certain type of natural disaster—severe and rapidly spreading epidemics—was responsible for the establishment of most of our state and local health departments and for the emergence of the Public Health Service in the second half of the nineteenth century as the federal partner of the states in combating disease, providing a safe and healthful environment, and promoting the health of the people. In fact, one might say that the Service and many of our state health departments “cut their eye teeth” on epidemic control and that their joint activities in this field constituted the first organized “disaster relief” work in the United States.

A century ago, however, state health organization was embryonic—in some instances, established to function solely in emergencies—and the Public Health Service was the only agency capable of putting into the field enough trained personnel to deal with rapidly spreading epidemics. Today, our state and local health departments bring most communicable disease outbreaks swiftly under control and contain them within their own borders without any assistance from the Public Health Service. If assistance is needed, it may take the form of expert consultation or of assignment of specially trained personnel to the state health department, with a loan of equipment and supplies. Personnel so assigned are under the direction of the state health officer, and their disposition and use in the epidemic are at his discretion.

Public Health Service co-operation with the states in epidemic control has been established in law since 1893. The

concurrent growth in scientific knowledge of communicable disease control and in permanent public health organizations has minimized the threat of epidemics as natural disasters; but the increased mobility of the United States population and the lack of effective control measures for some diseases, especially those due to viral infections, require continued vigilance, readiness, and teamwork on the part of our federal, state, and local public health organization.

Mutual experience and a simple administrative mechanism have made it possible for the Public Health Service and the state health departments, co-operating with local health agencies, to establish a national network of public health teams ready to go into action for the protection of public health in any type of disaster. The same public health organization is at the disposal of national and state disaster relief agencies through whatever channels may be available in a given situation.

PUBLIC HEALTH RESOURCES FOR DISASTER RELIEF

The federal law which makes it possible for the Public Health Service and the states to maintain this national organization for public health disaster relief is the Public Health Service Act of 1944.¹ Among many other provisions affecting the nation's health, the following three authorizations in this act are applicable:

First, the Service is authorized to maintain a Commissioned Reserve; that is to say, to commission individuals skilled in the several specialties of public health work who shall be subject to call to active duty for training or service.

Second, the Service is authorized to provide direct assistance to the states in any type of emergency affecting health

¹ Public Law 410, 78th Congress.

and sanitation beyond the resources of the states.

Third, the Service is directed to promulgate and enforce foreign and interstate quarantine regulations as a means of preventing or controlling the spread of communicable diseases from state to state or from foreign countries into the United States.

The Commissioned Reserve

The Commissioned Reserve offers many advantages in the development of disaster relief activities. Through this simple mechanism, the Public Health Service can promptly supplement its Regular Commissioned Corps and other technical staff by calling to active duty in a disaster area Reserve Officers who are resident in the area or nearby and assigning them to the state health department concerned. The same mechanism makes it possible to bring together groups of personnel, both those employed by the Service and those in outside agencies, for training in the newest public health techniques that may be applicable in all types of disaster.

During the past three years, the Commissioned Reserve of the Public Health Service has been expanded to a present strength of 2,436 as of July 1, 1956. Many of these Reserve Officers are staff members of state and local public health departments who have long held reserve commissions in the Service. In recent years, however, the major effort has been to recruit physicians, engineers, sanitarians, and other personnel from industrial establishments, universities, and private practice. Special training courses in basic procedures for epidemic and disaster relief, as well as advanced training in public health civil defense problems, have been organized and more than 3,000 public health workers, including 720 Commissioned Reserve Officers, have received at least

a minimum of training in these procedures.

Regular PHS personnel and emergency action

The permanent staff of the Public Health Service, of course, is immediately available in the event of a serious outbreak of disease or other type of disaster. At headquarters in Washington, a Health Emergency Planning Office in the Office of the Surgeon General serves as the focal point for all emergency activities. This office maintains continuous contact with the Bureau of State Services and its Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering Center at Cincinnati, and Communicable Disease Center with headquarters at Atlanta, and with the nine Regional Medical Directors who are in charge of all field personnel of the PHS in their respective regions, covering the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In the event of disaster, the Regional Medical Director or his designated representative becomes the immediately responsible official for Public Health Service activities.

The Public Health Service has available for emergency assignment to affected areas the following categories of personnel: (1) medical and nursing personnel to assist in emergency medical care and control of communicable diseases; (2) engineers, entomologists, sanitarians, laboratory technicians, and related personnel to assist in maintaining adequate and safe supplies of water and food, safe disposal of wastes resulting from the disaster, as well as normal refuse disposal, and control of insects and rodents; (3) epidemiologists, bacteriologists, chemists, and other laboratory specialists to investigate outbreaks of communicable diseases and other widespread illnesses, to determine effective procedures for controlling the

disease or cause of illness, and, if necessary, to carry out such procedures; (4) public health veterinarians to investigate and determine the means necessary to curtail diseases of animals affecting the health of people.

PHS hospitals and clinics

In addition, the Public Health Service maintains a system of hospitals and out-patient clinics located in strategic coastal and interior cities throughout the country. These facilities may be made available when local medical services and hospitals are overtaxed. Research staffs of the Service, located at the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, and in several field stations also may be assigned to specific activities in severe epidemics or disasters.

Emergency equipment

The major centers of the Public Health Service for epidemic and disaster relief, however, are the Communicable Disease Center and the Sanitary Engineering Center. Through these organizations, the Service maintains in constant readiness emergency equipment and materials to supplement the resources of state and local health departments and other federal agencies.

For emergency water treatment, the Service can put into the field truck-mounted filtration and sterilization units, collapsible storage tanks, trailer-mounted heavy-duty chlorinators, pumps, hypochlorinators, truck-mounted electric generators, and motor-drying equipment. The necessary supplies of chemicals are also available.

The control of disease-carrying insects and rodents requires power equipment for spraying. The Service has such equipment mounted on trucks and aircraft, as well as hand sprayers and dusters. Supplies of insecticides and rodenticides which are difficult to ob-

tain commercially on short notice are also stocked routinely for use in emergencies.

Mobile laboratories for the detection of water pollution and for the diagnosis of infectious diseases also are valuable facilities in emergencies. The Public Health Service maintains seven mobile laboratories for detection of water contaminants and one for detection of disease organisms.

All types of emergency equipment, including various types of field vehicles adapted for use on or off highways, are based at strategic points. Currently, the base areas are located in certain southeast, southwest, and mountain states where distances are long and the resources of large metropolitan areas are not available.

FEDERAL-STATE PUBLIC HEALTH TEAM

It should be understood that the total Public Health Service resources in personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies merely supplement those of the states and local communities which, in sum, constitute the major national resources for public health disaster relief. How does this federal-state team for epidemic and public health disaster relief perform in action? Several recent episodes come to mind as illustrations.

Encephalitis epidemic in California

In 1952, there occurred a severe outbreak of mosquito-borne encephalitis in the Central Valley of California. No one ever thought of it as a disaster, but in terms of deaths and illnesses and of the area affected, the effect of the encephalitis epidemic exceeded that of many recognized disasters.

Western equine encephalitis is a virus disease of man and horses and is transmitted by a specific mosquito, *Culex tarsalis*. Before the outbreak was curbed, 49 persons had died of the disease and 747 additional cases had been reported.

California's excellent state health department was alert to the threat of an outbreak, since its entomologists had predicted an unusual prevalence of the mosquito because of the unusually long rainy season in the affected areas.

Doctor Wilton L. Halverson, then State Health Officer, acted promptly and decisively. He first obtained from Governor Warren an emergency fund of \$250,000 to step up mosquito control work in the affected area. And on the same day, in his own words:

I called by long distance telephone the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, informed him of the situation and requested aid in epidemiological studies in order to devise better ways to control this disease which strikes at random over various parts of the country. Within half hour of this call, I received word from the Communicable Disease Center . . . that the request was fully granted; and by the following Tuesday, twenty-two physicians, veterinarians, engineers, and entomologists had actually reported for duty and were assigned to assist local physicians and hospitals in studying and controlling this disease.

The area of action of these federal-state-local teams was a 465-mile stretch, comprising twenty counties. The work was carefully co-ordinated and conducted by local mosquito-abatement districts and health departments, or, where none existed, directly by the state health department. Approximately five hundred individuals worked intensively for two months—not only to bring this "natural disaster" to an end but to avert its recurrence.

The technique devised for this particular situation may be applicable in similar outbreaks involving mosquito-borne diseases for which no effective immunization is available. A "barrier band," one-quarter mile wide, was thrown around more than three hundred towns and cities and these "bands" were

heavily treated with residual insecticides. This was to prevent the movement of mosquitoes from rural areas into towns. Aerosol sprays were applied periodically on a routine plan over the cities and towns. Breeding places of *Culex tarsalis* were inspected and eliminated or treated. Six field zones were established for intensive mosquito abatement in areas surrounding the towns. In addition, four teams consisting of medical and veterinary personnel were stationed at field locations. Their main responsibility was to learn as much as possible about the disease in man and animals, but they also assisted in the diagnosis of cases.

A remarkably comprehensive and sound approach to this "natural disaster" was formulated quickly and as quickly followed up. It was designed to curb the outbreak and to learn more about the disease itself. The intricate and baffling epidemiology of infectious encephalitis, as well as its impact on a community, makes it comparable with certain other virus diseases such as poliomyelitis. To quote Doctor Halverson again: "Federal, state, and local health workers teamed up and did the job which needed to be done in a manner which I believe did credit to public service."

I have given special attention to this episode because it so clearly illustrates the need for continuous, permanent, well-trained, and well-organized staffs—not only for the normal protection of public health, but also for emergency action in peacetime or in war. It also illustrates the value of a simple administrative mechanism for bringing the right kind of expert help to the affected area at the right time.

Epidemic Intelligence Service

The PHS operating unit for epidemic assistance is the Epidemic Intelligence Service of the Communicable Disease

Center. Organized in 1951, this branch provides epidemiologists and related specialists on request to assist the states in combating epidemics, including those that may occur in the course of major disasters. Of equal importance is the accumulation in the PHS of information on outbreaks of unusual diseases, often difficult to identify, as well as on unusual outbreaks of more common diseases. In connection with this intelligence service, laboratory diagnostic tests may be performed by the Communicable Disease Center or by collaborating laboratories equipped to perform such tests. Services of this type were intensified in 1955, and a special unit was set up to provide in co-operation with the states complete epidemiologic information on poliomyelitis in relation to use of the Salk vaccine. The significance of such teamwork between the Public Health Service and the states is enhanced when one considers the possible necessity for very rapid identification and control of artificially stimulated epidemics in connection with biological warfare.

Northeastern states floods, August 1955

In the types of natural disaster most familiar to the American public, such as floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes, it has become increasingly evident that emergency public health services must be brought into action with the onset of danger and continued until all such services have been restored to normal. In addition, many special hazards to health must be recognized promptly and dealt with. The hurricane and floods in the northeastern states in August 1955 present a useful lesson in how these emergency health needs may be met.

The violence and destructiveness in lives and property of the 1955 hurricane and floods have been widely reported. There were radio and tele-

graphic warnings on the morning of August 19, but it would appear that little or no preventive action was taken. When the disaster actually struck, communications failed and an accurate evaluation of the situation was not made until after the damage was done. Rescue and evacuation, the first and most essential components of disaster relief, had to be improvised by local communities with such on-the-spot help as they could obtain from state and national personnel in the area.

Disaster relief, in terms of action on the part of federal agencies and the national headquarters of the American National Red Cross, was essentially postdisaster operations. By August 21, however, state, regional, and national contingents were in action. In Pennsylvania, for example, the state health department had 55 sanitarians, drawn from other sections, in the flooded areas of that state.

Between August 20 and August 26, the PHS dispatched forty-five officers to the affected areas, the majority of whom were assigned to state health departments. Several of these officers served as liaison on behalf of the health department with the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Army Corps of Engineers. Others were assigned to the FCDA to appraise the damage to community health facilities and determine priority needs in cleanup operations; still others were assigned to the American National Red Cross to appraise the damage to residential structures as a basis for determination by the Red Cross of cash allowances for the rehabilitation of private homes.

Most of the PHS personnel on disaster relief duty, however, worked directly in the field as members of state health department staffs. Their activities illustrate the wide range of sanitation problems that such a disaster commonly presents. Water, milk, and

food supplies in a large area had to be checked for safety. Safe water supplies had to be made available through emergency chlorination or filtration, or by the importation of drinking water in tanks. "Boil water" notices had to be posted. Raw milk supplies had to be diverted from damaged pasteurization plants to undamaged plants. Large quantities of contaminated foods had to be disposed of. The removal of debris and the maintenance of satisfactory sewage and refuse disposal constituted the chief problems confronting health officials in the wake of the floods. The control of flies and rodents in flooded areas after the water receded, as well as at dump areas where debris was being taken, also required such sanitation methods as spraying, burning, and landfill operations.

LIAISON ACTIVITIES IN NATIONAL AGENCIES

The co-ordination of national agencies and the administration of federal financial assistance to communities affected by severe disasters are provided in the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 (Public Law 875). This law may not be invoked, however, until the President has declared that a major disaster exists. Under these conditions, the Federal Civil Defense Administration is responsible for co-ordinating the activities of all federal agencies in the disaster area, for reimbursement of certain expenditures of federal agencies, and for the certification of federal financial assistance to affected communities.

Various federal agencies and the American National Red Cross have made formal agreements as to their disaster relief responsibilities and, in many instances, permanent liaison is maintained. The Public Health Service, for example, maintains liaison with all branches of the armed services so that

arrangements can be made promptly for the transportation of equipment and supplies into disaster areas. Through these arrangements emergency equipment or critical supplies can be allocated either from the Public Health Service or the nearest military installation.

For many years, the Public Health Service and the American National Red Cross maintained close working relationships during disaster relief operations. In 1953, a formal understanding was developed and subscribed to by both agencies for continuous planning and co-operation in the event of natural disasters.

The President has directed federal agencies to make suitable plans and preparations for carrying out their responsibilities in anticipation of a major disaster. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Federal Civil Defense Administration have developed such plans and procedures, in which the Public Health Service plays a major role on behalf of the Department. These procedures provide for (1) interchange of information and continuing liaison between DHEW and FCDA, both at national headquarters and in the field; (2) accurate and prompt information to the public on DHEW activities relative to the disaster; (3) co-ordination of DHEW disaster activities with state and local efforts and those of other national agencies; (4) delegation of authority by FCDA to DHEW to undertake specified disaster operations and reimbursement by FCDA for services and facilities provided by DHEW under such delegations.

Additional plans and procedures have been developed within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to assure prompt activation of its many regional and field organizations for disaster relief. The regional offices of the Department, located in nine strategic

cities of the United States, are responsible for the direction and co-ordination of all disaster assistance provided by the Department to the states. Hence, the Regional Medical Director of the Public Health Service becomes the commanding officer for the Service's disaster relief activities in any given region. All assignments of personnel and allocation of equipment and supplies are made with his approval. He may draw on any part of the Public Health Service for assistance to disaster areas.

Regional offices of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare have developed plans and procedures which provide for (1) interchange of information with the appropriate FCDA regional office regarding existing or threatened disasters, including requests for assistance from the states; (2) preparation of inventories of manpower, equipment, and supplies available for use in disasters, which are supplied in summary form to the FCDA regional office; (3) exchange of directories of key regional and field personnel of DHEW and FCDA; (4) definition of geographical areas covered by DHEW regional offices and of their operating responsibilities; (5) operating procedures having sufficient flexibility to cover all types of disaster.

In some parts of the country, state and local governments have adopted plans for mutual aid in the event of disaster. In such instances, the state and local health departments will be involved in rescue, emergency medical and hospital care, housing, and mass feeding, as well as in the sanitation and preventive health operations. As state and

local disaster relief programs and staffs gain more experience in planning and action, there is no doubt that additional mutual aid plans will come into being. Reports by Public Health Service personnel assigned to disaster duty frequently document the greater efficiency of relief activities in those areas where advance planning, systems of mutual aid, and full-time local health departments have been in existence.

We have not yet arrived at the stage when the preventive philosophy of public health can be applied to all types of disasters. Prevention, however, should be the aim of disaster relief activities. At present, disasters caused by tornadoes, fires, earthquakes, and explosions seem to strike without warning, so that there is little or no opportunity for protective action. In most instances, however, warning of approaching danger from hurricanes and floods can be given. Every threat of danger and every disaster—whether local, regional, or national in scope—should be used as a training exercise in the efficacy of our national, state, and local planning for disaster relief. Reports by the responsible officials at each level of government should be co-ordinated into one report of the specific disaster, and this report should be studied critically by the same officials with the serious intention of determining those components of disaster relief that need improvement, as well as those that operate satisfactorily. Only by such critical evaluation of existing plans and operations can we build a nationwide network of teams capable of meeting the modern threats of natural and man-made disasters.

How a State Prepares for Disaster

By WILLIAM L. MCGILL

Abstract: The State of Texas leads the other states of the nation in the number of major disasters: it is first in tornadoes and devastating floods and second in hurricanes. This article describes how Texas, under its Civil Protection Act of 1951, without setting up an independent state agency, has gone about mobilizing and utilizing the resources of the state in time of major disaster. The "Texas Plan" is discussed in detail and attention paid in particular to its cost and financing, the planning of disaster relief, preparedness, and training.—Ed.

THE Texas Civil Protection Act of 1951 grants necessary powers to state and local governments to cope with emergencies threatening life and property within the state, and charges the Governor with the duty of providing for "the organization and co-ordination of a program of civil defense and disaster relief adequate to protect life and property in this State in case of natural disaster, enemy action, or the threat thereof."¹

In practice, the act is taken as authority for state and local governments to conduct training in disaster preparedness and the techniques of survival and to co-ordinate action of government and private agencies and individuals in time of disaster caused by explosion, widespread fire, falling aircraft, wrecks, tornado, hurricane, flood, and enemy action. These are considered situations requiring joint action of several agencies and groups and do not include such "emergencies" as highway accidents, public health needs, and similar matters which are the responsibility of individual departments and agencies of government.

This act formalized a long-existent

practice of providing through the regular staff of the Office of the Governor the action required to mobilize and utilize state resources in time of major disaster. In such situations as that caused by the Texas City explosion, a representative of the Governor maintained close liaison with the several departments of state government more largely concerned and with the Red Cross, and served as the co-ordinating agent for these operations.

In the past ten years, 215 natural disasters have occurred in Texas in which 979 people were killed, 5,345 were injured,² and a property loss of \$265,820,100 was sustained.³ The insured loss from fire in Texas in 1955 was \$32,472,785 dollars, representing an economic loss of over one hundred million dollars. Five hundred Texans are killed by fire each year—80 per cent of them women and children.⁴ These sta-

² Report from Ralph Husted, State Liaison Officer, American National Red Cross, "Red Cross Disaster Statistics."

³ Telephone interview with Richard D. W. Blood, State Climatologist, U. S. Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, Austin, Texas, August 20, 1956. This figure covers property losses from January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1955.

⁴ Telephone interview with Eugene Sanders, Fire Insurance Commission, Austin, Texas, August 20, 1956.

¹ Texas Civil Protection Act, Chap. 312, p. 531. General and Special Laws, 52nd Legislature of Texas, Regular Session, 1951.

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tistics illuminate the questionable honor Texas holds as first in the nation in the number of all major disasters, first in tornadoes, second in hurricanes, and first in devastating floods.⁵

The size of the state—an area of 271,401 square miles—and its great diversity of natural conditions make inevitable a wide variety of hazards and disaster potentialities. Its significance to the military and economic might of the nation also makes the state an area of particular interest to the country's enemies in the divided world of today.

THE TEXAS PLAN

Civil defense and disaster relief activity in Texas on the state level is handled through the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief, created under the authority of the Texas Civil Protection Act of 1951,⁶ notable as one of the few pieces of major legislation ever adopted by a unanimous vote in both houses of the legislature. Though the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief has round-the-clock availability, it does not operate as an independent state agency but functions by combining the facilities and activities of all agencies of state government able to contribute to the joint effort. It is an integral part of the Governor's Office,

⁵ William L. McGill, "Federal-State-Local Government Relationship in Disaster Relief," Speech April 16, 1954, to the Annual Convention of the Southwestern Social Science Association, Dallas, Texas, April 16, 1954.

⁶ House Bill 784, passed by the 52nd Legislature, Regular Session, and signed into law by the Governor on June 1, 1951. On May 27, 1953, the act was amended by Senate Bill 352, which further defined the authority of the state to accept gifts, grants, or loans for purposes of civil defense and disaster relief, and to use, allocate, and distribute such items directly or to political subdivisions of the state. This amendment was a result of the emergency created by the Waco and San Angelo tornadoes of that month.

and the Governor—acting through his appointed State Co-ordinator of Defense and Disaster Relief—is the directing head of the civil defense activity.

The basic concept of this type of plan—a government operation by co-operation—is to bring together all the resources of the state government in a unified, integrated organizational pattern rather than to establish an entirely new department of government. Such a plan is not only more economical but more effective and functional than the creation of a new state agency, which involves competition for the state tax dollar, training of new personnel, and danger of duplication in governmental functions. If the full possibilities of the plan are realized in Texas, the services of all 32,000 state employees can be utilized in case of necessity for civil defense and disaster relief duty.

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

Operationally, the state departments directly concerned with the protection of the public safety form the State Civil Defense Council, although state law authorizes the participation of all state agencies in this combined operation if the need arises. The State Civil Defense Council includes the State Co-ordinator of Defense and Disaster Relief as the Governor's representative, and the heads of the Departments of Public Safety, Public Welfare, Civil Aviation, Health, Fire, Highways, the Railroad Commission (Transportation), the Employment Service (Manpower); the Adjutant General; state consultants on engineering and education; and a liaison officer of the American National Red Cross, together with a representative of the Attorney General of Texas, who serves as legal adviser.

The State of Texas is divided into sixteen disaster districts, which parallel

the Highway Patrol Districts as created by the Department of Public Safety. The Highway Patrol Captain in each district serves as the liaison officer between the district and the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief. Counterparts of all other state departments are also found in each of these district organizations.

Under the county judge for the county and the mayor for the city, defense and disaster relief organizations are established in the political subdivisions of the state. Usually, there is a County Defense Council, consisting of the county judge and the mayors of incorporated cities in the county, which has a defense director as its administrative officer. In some cities, there is a separate co-ordinator for the city. In all, there are 159 counties and 300 cities of the state with appointed civil defense directors. The other counties and cities make this a responsibility of some other local official such as the county judge, the mayor, or the city manager.

In the event of disaster, word is received by the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief through the Public Safety liaison, and if the emergency is of major proportions, the State Control Center in the State Department of Public Safety Building at the capital in Austin is activated. Here in the Center all communications are received, via the Public Safety state-wide radio network, and representatives of all agencies making up the State Civil Defense Council are present. District control centers have been established in all Highway Patrol headquarters, and alternate control centers have been designated for use if needed.

Since it is a basic tenet of our system of government that all people should help themselves to the fullest possible extent, a community suffering from a disaster will try to solve its problem with the resources and personnel at its

immediate disposal. If these are inadequate, the resources of the State Disaster District in which the community is located are immediately offered. In the event of a major catastrophe, resources of surrounding districts and of the state are furnished, with federal assistance being requested when the resources of the state are exhausted. These requests for assistance are made through the Highway Patrol Captain of the district and are co-ordinated by the representatives at the State Control Center, who are constantly in touch with the situation.

As a matter of course, arrangements have been made for the district control centers to co-ordinate mutual aid and mobile support and to maintain district-wide inventories of emergency resources of shelter, clothing, food, and medical supplies, and engineering data on all communities, together with information on all vital industries and facilities.

FINANCING DISASTER ACTIVITIES

To carry out its task of co-ordinating this activity, the operating budget for the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief for the biennium beginning September 1, 1955, was \$205,526.⁷ Other state agencies participating in the effort finance the activity from their regular budgets. Under state law, "in the event of war declared by the Congress of the United States and in order to permit the diversion of sufficient monies . . . for meeting the emergency needs for citizens of the State resulting from such war,"⁸ the Governor has the authority to transfer to civil defense the unexpended balances in appropriations for capital expenses for all agencies of state gov-

⁷ "General Appropriations by the 54th Legislature, Regular Session," House Bill 140, p. 88.

⁸ "General Appropriations by the 54th Legislature, Regular Session," House Bill 140, p. 209.

ernment. The amounts of any such transfers, the agency from which the transfers were made, and the purposes and objects for which transferred amounts were used in the civil defense and disaster program must be detailed in the Governor's message to the next session of the Legislature.⁹ The amount in the state's budget available for this purpose, as of September 1, 1955, was \$6,496,758.¹⁰

PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

The Division of Defense and Disaster Relief, as its prime function, must make advance plans for coping with disasters and, when the emergency is at hand, must direct disaster relief activity. From the beginning, the state plan has contemplated the handling by one organization of disaster situations resulting from all causes. Therefore, civil defense and natural disaster relief activities are directed under the same program.

Warning network

One of the most important sources of disaster preparedness developed in Texas in the last few years is the radar storm-warning system, which the United States Weather Bureau has characterized as one of the finest of its kind in the world. Surplus radar sets of the United States Air Force were converted by the Research Foundation of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas into storm-warning apparatus, and installed in sixteen Weather Bureau stations throughout the state. The cost of conversion and installation of each set, which varied from approximately \$10,000 to \$12,000 as a result of differences in locality and installation prob-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

¹⁰ From statistics furnished by the Legislative Budget Board, June 12, 1956.

lems, was met by the city or county government, in several instances with the assistance of private industry and foundations.¹¹ Each set is currently valued at \$100,000. Bulletins of severe weather conditions—tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, thunderstorms—are transmitted by the Weather Bureau to all stations of the network, and to the district Highway Patrol headquarters for transmittal to the state office, and advance warnings are issued to all affected communities.

Also part of the state warning network is a state-wide emergency communications system, including tie-ins with sheriff's and police departments and state and private agencies.

Within the past year, the Ground Observer Corps has been established in Texas, the Air Defense Command of the United States Air Force furnishing a liaison officer who remains on duty in state headquarters and, together with the State Co-ordinator of Defense and Disaster Relief, directs and maintains organization of the Corps, including 1,397 observations posts, 7 filter centers, and 39,000 volunteer observers.¹² The Ground Observer Corps now cooperates with the severe-weather warning system and, in turn, members of the Texas Highway Patrol assist in plane observation.

The air raid warning system of the state has 5 key-point warning centers, 16 disaster control centers, and 285 local centers.

Inventories

A civil defense organization is only as strong as its ability to provide rapidly

¹¹ *Texas Defense Digest*, Vol. 2, No. 9 (August 1953), p. 1.

¹² Personal interview with Lt. Col. Winton F. Matthews, State Liaison Officer, Ground Observer Corps, 33rd Air Defense Command, U. S. Air Force, on June 15, 1956.

and easily needed emergency supplies to stricken communities. The prime prerequisite to this ability is knowledge of where important resources are located—their kind and number—and accordingly inventories have been made by the state of all important resources and supplies as follows: (1) An inventory of all fire-fighting resources, including personnel, equipment, and matériel, has been made and plans for a state-wide system of mutual aid and mobile support have been completed. (2) Inventories of all hospital resources and facilities, together with all police personnel, equipment, and facilities, have been completed, as well as inventories of all transportation equipment of every agency of state government and listings of their trained personnel. (3) Under the sponsorship of the state Aviation Advisory Council, inventories have been compiled on all civil aviation equipment, facilities, landing fields, and personnel, and information gathered as to how aviation personnel can be contacted day or night.

Many private organizations of business, industry, and labor, and professional and technical associations have agreed to make available their equipment and facilities and the personal services of their staffs when required for emergency use.¹³

TRAINING

The state realizes that in great catastrophes the forces of the regular governmental services would not conceivably be adequate to handle the situation alone. The need of auxiliary aid therefore arises—of citizens who will volunteer for service as auxiliary firemen and policemen, nurses' aides, litter bearers, and in many other capacities. These auxiliaries will, of course, serve under

the training and direction of the regular agencies of government. To augment these citizen volunteers, furthermore, every responsible citizen is urged to prepare for self-reliance in the face of crisis and grave danger.

This philosophy entails the undertaking of a mammoth training program, not only of auxiliaries but likewise of the whole citizen body. Endeavoring to make a reality of its belief that civil defense is everybody's business, the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief has had a major interest in the development of these training programs.

It is felt that at least one person in every family should take the standard first aid course; that one woman in every family should be trained in the standard course in home care of the sick; that every member of the family should learn the simple but essential lessons found in such civil defense publications as "Emergency Action to Save Lives," "Survival Under Atomic Attack," and "Fire Fighting for the Householder"; that following the organization plans of the local defense organization, every area of approximately five hundred people should have a block organization consisting of a block warden, a co-warden, an evacuation warden, a fire warden, a first aid warden, an information officer, a rescue warden, and a communications warden; and that this neighborhood organization should be kept in constant repair, available for every neighborhood need and ready to work in close association with similar groups throughout the community.

Courses have been established by the state for the training of auxiliary police, and institutes have been held for instruction of the state's police personnel, such as the Police Mobilization Conferences now being conducted on the district level. In these conferences, all local police, constable's, and sheriff's personnel come together to form and

¹³ *A Report to the Honorable Allan Shivers, Governor of Texas*, Defense and Disaster Relief publication, July 1952.

train, under state sponsorship, a joint organization for handling the various phases of the police function for the entire district.

Training schools for fire-fighting forces of the state, conducted by the Fireman's Training School of Texas A. and M. College, are continually in progress. During the last ten years, 7,181 students have graduated from these courses, together with 167 students from the Texas Rescue Training School course given at the same institution since February 1955. The Rescue Training School is sponsored by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the state Defense and Disaster Relief organization, and the A. and M. College.¹⁴

Local government agencies in many areas of the state are also sponsoring training courses in auxiliary fire fighting and policing.

Special institutes were held in training state welfare workers in first aid and in disaster relief and, as part of their regular instruction, first aid training is given all state Public Safety personnel and the staff of the Texas Highway Department.

The state Health Department has held courses in radiology and in emergency medical and sanitation services, with instructors now trained and available in each target area. Radiological monitoring courses have been held by various civil defense organizations on the local level. Biological and chemical warfare defense training, under the supervision of the state Health Department, is in progress in each of the nineteen district laboratories serving Texas. Additionally, a state-wide organization has been formed to cope with the threat of biological warfare, and arrangements have been made for a state-wide report-

ing system on communicable animal diseases.

Besides training courses on the local and state levels, trainees have also been sent to the Federal Civil Defense Administration Staff College at Battle Creek, Michigan, and Olney, Maryland, and to the Federal Civil Defense Administration General Instructor's Course offered at Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College at Stillwater, Oklahoma.

One of the most important means of training volunteers and the local citizenry has been the first aid courses given by the American National Red Cross. During 1955, for example, a total of 31,476 certificates were issued for completion of this standard first aid course, as well as 8,896 in the home nursing course and 54,568 in water safety training.¹⁵

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

An endeavor in which the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief has been particularly interested is the development of its public information program. Civil defense material has been distributed regularly to newspapers and radio and TV stations in Texas, as well as to local organizations. The monthly information bulletin published by the state office, *The Texas Defense Digest*, was begun for general distribution throughout the state. Local trade and civic organizations have reproduced and distributed public information material released by the state and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. State and local trade magazines have offered their services and resources, and many carry regular articles on various aspects of the civil defense program. Advisory bulletins and executive orders on all perti-

¹⁴ Telephone interview with Chief H. D. Smith, Acting Director, Fireman's Training School, A. and M. College, College Station, Texas, on August 20, 1956.

¹⁵ From monthly statistical reports furnished the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief by Ralph Husted, State Liaison Officer, American National Red Cross.

nent phases of the defense program are distributed regularly to local defense directors.

Manuals and pamphlets covering particular fields of civil defense have been issued by the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief: a welfare service manual containing directives governing identification of casualties; an important pamphlet on "Women's Role in Civil Defense and Disaster Relief," distributed to local women's organizations (co-ordinated by the State Co-ordinator of Women's Defense Activities), with a total membership of approximately two million; a manual governing the role of youth in civil defense and disaster preparedness; a state "Plan for Health and Emergency Medical Services," prepared in harmony with the national pattern; and publications concerning various professional groups such as nurses, dentists, and the clergy. In all, some 711,000 copies of civil defense publications were distributed by the Division in 1955.

Civil defense films, made available by the state office free of charge to local groups and organizations through the services of the Audio-Visual Library of the Texas Education Agency, in 1955, were witnessed by over 230,500 people.

FEDERAL AID IN MAJOR DISASTERS

As indicated throughout this article, state and local defense organizations in Texas serve as co-ordinating agencies not only in the event of enemy attack but also in case of natural disaster. When the emergency markedly exceeds the maximum resources of state and local governments, and the President on appeal from the Governor has declared it to be a "major disaster," federal agencies and funds give assistance under the co-ordinating direction of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.¹⁶ In the

¹⁶ For procedure under the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 (Public Law 875, 81st Congress) and Executive Order 10427, dated January 16,

past four years, Texas has received \$982,405.24 of federal funds to disburse to affected communities for combating the results of various natural disasters, of which \$211,623 went for the Waco tornado of May 1953, \$12,791.25 for the San Angelo tornado of the same date, \$40,000 for the Orange-Newton flood of June 1953, and \$717,990.99 for the Upper Rio Grande Valley flood of June-July 1954.

In declared major disasters, as specifically provided in the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, the accepted responsibilities of the American National Red Cross continue—organizing and operating emergency welfare services; providing food, clothing, shelter, and emergency medical and nursing aid; and conducting and financing rehabilitation programs for families and individuals on the basis of need, including the repairing or rebuilding of homes and the providing of household furnishings and occupational supplies and equipment.

DROUGHT AND EMERGENCY AID TO FARMERS

The Division of Defense and Disaster Relief is concerned not only with sudden natural disasters, the main subject matter of this issue of *THE ANNALS*, but also with economic or so-called "creeping" disaster. The economic disaster has now assumed such proportions, in respect to loss sustained by the people and the economy of the state, as to make it an even greater disaster than many earlier natural disasters of the sudden-emergency type.

On June 23, 1953, Governor Allan Shivers requested President Eisenhower to invoke Public Law 875 for the western half of Texas, an area then in its fourth year of drought. In some areas, the drought had cut farm income as

1953, see *supra*, Val Peterson, "Co-ordinating and Extending Federal Assistance."—Ed.

much as 65 per cent and lowered real estate and land values 10 to 15 per cent. The cotton crops of 1952 and 1953 ranged from three fourths to one half of normal. The wheat crop in 1953 was one third of normal.¹⁷

To help alleviate the suffering of farmers and ranchers, the federal government instituted in 1953 the drought emergency feed program, which in Texas was supervised by the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief with the aid and co-operation of various state agencies. The United States Department of Agriculture announced a program of buying two million pounds of meat, and to make money more readily available to farmers and ranchers, the Farmers Home Administration made available under Public Law 875 over seventeen thousand two-year loans, totaling \$48,591,177 for the period July 1, 1953, to April 16, 1954.¹⁸

Along with the drought emergency feed program, the federal government also instituted the emergency hay program. The concept of the hay program was to permit livestockmen and farmers in designated drought counties to purchase hay at prices comparable to cost in non-drought counties, funds for the program being provided by both the federal and the state government. During the 1953 and 1954 programs a total of \$1,334,206.55 was expended.¹⁹

An allocation of \$2,322,000 was granted to Texas in 1954 for the development of the emergency wind erosion control program in the state.

On the state level, the Governor requested numerous state agencies to co-operate in the drought relief program.

¹⁷From statistics compiled by the Texas Department of Agriculture.

¹⁸From statistics furnished by the Farmers Home Administration, Regional Office, Dallas, Texas.

¹⁹From statistics compiled by the Texas Department of Agriculture.

He recognized three aspects of the drought problem—the necessity of undergirding the economy of the farming and ranching industries to enable them to withstand the crisis; the need for long-range plans for water and soil conservation; and the necessity for alleviating human suffering as a result of the drought conditions.

The drought disaster problem has been given attention in conferences of various kinds, including the meeting of the Governors of Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas with President Eisenhower in Amarillo, Texas, on July 10, 1953, and the conference for the entire Great Plains area held in Denver, Colorado, in June 1955 on call of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, attended by heads of various agriculture departments and agencies of the states in that area.

In June 1956, the United States Department of Agriculture instituted a new drought emergency feed grain program, again administered by the Division of Defense and Disaster Relief; the possibility of long-term, low-interest loans to farmers and ranchers in the drought areas is being worked out with the Farmers Home Administration.

PROBLEMS AND SUMMARY

Many problems remain to be solved. One of these problems which is the common experience of everyone concerned is that civil defense (taken to mean steps necessitated by enemy action or the threat thereof) is a new concept to this country and one we are reluctant to accept. If we do recognize the danger, we are apt to think of it as so great that no amount of preparation would enable us to prevail against it. These public reactions have come to be spoken of erroneously as apathy. The problem is to convince the people not only that there

is a danger but that to some extent at least something can be done about it. Then by combining civil defense training with preparation for inevitable disaster from natural forces and accidents, we give them greater interest and training in the techniques of survival and in other phases of the task at hand.

In sum, the co-operative plan of governmental operation in civil defense and disaster relief; the contribution in public spirit and service which is being made by private citizens as they volunteer for work as auxiliaries to govern-

ment agencies; revival of the pioneer spirit, and with it renewed self-sufficiency, self-reliance, self-help; and a finer concept of neighborliness and obligation to the common good—all of these things may, we can hope, make the effort in which we are jointly engaged of importance for present needs and of significance in strengthening the tradition that our system of government is indeed an organization of the people, conducted by the people, and designed to function, in all effectiveness, for the people.

The Flood Peril and the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956

By EDWIN S. OVERMAN

Abstract: Floods are the most destructive of natural disasters; the 1951 floods in the Southwest caused property damage estimated at two and a half billion dollars. By comparison, all property and casualty insurance companies pay annually for losses totaling about one billion dollars, or about twice the average annual cost of floods. Private insurance companies do not regard flood peril, therefore, as an insurable risk. The Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956 is designed to fill this gap. It provides for the establishment of a program of insurance, reinsurance, and loans to assist persons to recover from loss due to destruction by floods. The author analyzes the act in some detail.—Ed.

THE increasing frequency and severity of flood destruction during recent years have exerted strong pressure on the government to provide protection against the financial losses from this catastrophe. The manifestation of this public demand for flood coverage is the Federal Flood Insurance Act, which was approved August 7, 1956.

Floods rank first among the causes of natural disasters in the United States if measured by the amount of human suffering and the expenditures for relief and rehabilitation for individuals and families. Moreover, if measured by the damage and destruction to the properties, facilities, and installations of industrial and commercial organizations, to say nothing of federal, state, and local governments and agriculture, flood peril would exceed all other natural causes of disaster.

The extent of the losses resulting from the flood peril may be highlighted by two recent examples. The Southwest floods of 1951 in Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma caused property losses esti-

mated at 2.5 billion dollars.¹ Estimates of the total physical property loss suffered by the northeastern states in 1955 during the floods following Hurricanes Connie and Diane have ranged between 1 and 2 billion dollars.²

The significance of these figures is revealed when they are compared with the total losses paid by property insurance companies for *all lines* of insurance in an entire year in the United States. The total loss of the Southwest flood in 1951 is estimated at 2.5 billion dollars. This loss would be two and one-half times the total property losses of approximately 1 billion dollars paid by property and casualty companies each year. On the other hand, per-

¹ This estimate was presented in the House Appropriations Subcommittee proceedings as reported in the October 13, 1951, issue of the *Insurance Advocate*.

² From a flood damage summary appearing in the September 8, 1955, issue, of the *National Underwriter*. The report also indicated that approximately 50,000 families suffered some property damage with 1,300 homes destroyed, 4,800 seriously damaged, and 14,000 substantially affected.

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haps the average annual flood loss would be a more logical figure to compare with insured property losses. If the average annual flood loss in this country—estimated at 500 million dollars—is used in the comparison, annual flood losses would be equal to one half of the total of all losses for all lines of insured property each year in the United States.

Besides the two floods discussed above, serious flood conditions have occurred in other areas throughout the United States in recent years. Noteworthy were the losses suffered in the Sacramento Valley of California in 1955 and 1956. Disastrous floods have also occurred in the Mississippi and Missouri river valleys during the past few years; indeed, most of the major river valleys have experienced flood losses. One might conclude, therefore, that there is a real need for some form of protection against the financial losses caused by this peril.

PRIVATE INSURANCE UNAVAILABLE

"The traditional position of insurance company underwriters is that specific flood insurance covering fixed location properties in areas subject to recurrent floods cannot feasibly be written."³ The flood peril does not meet the major requisites of an insurable risk.

In the first place, everyone is not exposed to this peril in exactly the same way. Floods cause damage primarily to property located in lowlands—valleys of rivers and streams. Insuring this peril would result in a problem of "adverse selection," because the protection would be disproportionately attractive to those in the more hazardous and exposed areas.

Another important requirement for an insurable risk is that the premium

³ American Insurance Association, *Studies of Floods and Flood Damage 1952-1955*, p. 3.

charge must be adequate to pay all expected losses. At the same time, rates charged for the coverage must be sufficiently moderate for the majority of persons exposed to the risk to be able to afford the insurance. Because of the tendency to select against the insurance company noted above, the premium necessary to insure the peril of flood would in all probability be prohibitive.

A third important requisite of an insurable risk which the flood peril fails to satisfy, according to insurance underwriters, is that the potential loss must not be catastrophic.⁴ If loss expectations from a particular peril are so large that they exceed the amount of funds which could be collected in the form of premiums, then insurance is not feasible.

SUBSIDY, NOT INSURANCE

The conclusion reached by most insurance company representatives is that the flood peril does not measure up to the fundamental principles upon which insurance is based. The attitude of the insurance industry with respect to the government's new flood plan is aptly expressed as follows:

The industry hopes that the word "insurance" will not be used in the indemnification of flood losses under the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. The industry does not believe that the writing of specific flood insurance covering fixed-location properties in areas subject to recurring floods is a feasible undertaking for either private industry or for the government and any plan which the government develops and puts into effect is a subsidy and is not insurance.⁵

⁴ The 2.5 billion dollar flood loss in the Southwest in 1951 is equal to the total value of the free assets of the property-writing stock insurance companies, according to statements reported in a House Appropriations Committee report investigating the flood problem.

⁵ American Insurance Association, "News Release," May 11, 1956.

A spokesman for the insurance industry summarized the argument against federal flood insurance when he stated: "It will be a damage-reimbursement program that will hit the treasury whenever you have a serious disaster."⁶

In spite of the admonition by private insurance spokesmen to use the proper terminology in describing the nature of the benefits of the new government flood plan, the act uses freely such terms as "insurance," "reinsurance," "Disaster Insurance Fund," and "insurance premium." Perhaps the justification for use of such terminology by the government is contained in the safeguards or policy limitations described later in this paper. These restrictions were incorporated in the provisions of the act in an attempt to establish the program on a sound actuarial basis in the future. Only time will tell whether or not the new plan can accomplish this objective.

SELECTION OF THE ADMINISTERING AGENCY

In determining the proper government group to carry out the provisions of the Federal Flood Insurance Act, several federal agencies were considered. The Federal Civil Defense Administration was first discussed, in view of its role in the co-ordination of disaster relief, as provided under Public Law 875; it was rejected primarily because it lacked the insurance experience necessary to administer the new program properly.

The Small Business Administration was considered because of its experience in making disaster loans at the time of the 1955 floods in the Northeast. Although the granting of disaster loans is an important provision of the new flood act, it was felt that the insurance and

reinsurance portions of the act were even more significant and that administration therefore required an agency with this background.

With the idea of combining this new program with already existing disaster insurance programs such as federal crop insurance, the development of an entirely new federal agency was discussed. The conclusion was, however, that something like crop insurance should not be divorced from the Department of Agriculture, which is engaged in co-ordinating many different programs relating to farming.

Finally, the Housing and Home Finance Agency was accepted as the logical choice, primarily because of the agency's extensive insurance experience and because housing is one of the chief types of property which will be covered under the provisions of the new flood act.

MAJOR FEATURES OF THE ACT

There are three important types or elements of coverage provided under the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. The act is designed to provide a combination of (1) insurance, (2) reinsurance, and (3) loans, "in order to provide the greatest variety and amount of protection against loss to the greatest number of affected parties in accordance with individual needs."⁷

The act establishes insurance and reinsurance against loss resulting from damage to or destruction of real or personal property (including property owned by any state or local government) due to flood occurring within the United States.⁸

⁷ Public Law 1016, 84th Congress (Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956), Sec. 6, p. 3.

⁸ "United States," when used in a geographic sense, means the several states, the District of Columbia, the territories, the possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

The word "flood" as used in this act includes:

any flood, tidal wave, wave wash, or other abnormally high tidal water, deluge, or the water component of any hurricane or other severe storm, surface landslide due to excess moisture, and shall have such other meaning as may be prescribed by regulation of the Administrator.⁹

The reinsurance provision is designed to provide an opportunity for private insurance companies to enter the field of flood insurance on fixed property and yet to protect themselves from excessive losses by means of "reinsuring" substantial portions of their exposed properties with this government agency. One of the real sources of reluctance on the part of private carriers to insure the flood peril would, it is hoped, be removed by the opportunity to shift the burden of catastrophic losses to the government insurance fund through this reinsurance provision.

The provision for disaster loans is designed to take care of any subsequent loss resulting from damage to or destruction of real and personal property which may not have been covered by insurance or loss which exceeds the face value of the insurance carried. The terms of these loans were designed to encourage persons who suffer flood losses to make use of this provision. By providing disaster loans on very liberal terms, this provision will tend to help persons help themselves recover from flood destruction instead of turning to direct assistance or other forms of charity. To make the interest rate attractive, the act provides that it "shall not exceed 4 per centum per annum on the unpaid principal balance."¹⁰ The duration of the loans is also designed to encourage persons to utilize this fea-

⁹ Public Law 1016 (cited note 7 *supra*), Sec. 22, p. 9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sec. 5 (b), p. 2.

ture of the act. Loans "shall be on a long-term basis to the maximum extent practicable."¹¹

ELEMENTS OF "SUBSIDY"

The major criticism raised by spokesmen from the insurance business is that the new program is a subsidy rather than insurance. The basis for this charge is found in Section 7 (a), entitled "Estimated Rates and Fees."

A schedule of estimated insurance rates is to be established from time to time and must be adequate, in the administrator's judgment, "to produce sufficient proceeds to pay all claims for probable losses over a reasonable period of years." These estimated rates, however, are to be used only "as a basis for determining the actual fees to be paid by the persons insured." Herein lies an element of subsidy in the new program. Premiums actually charged recipients for coverage under the act must equal 60 per cent, *as a minimum*, of the particular estimated rate for that coverage. Or, as stated in the act, "no insurance policy shall be issued for a fee less than 60 per centum of such 'estimated rate.'" It would appear, therefore, that actual rates charged may vary all the way from 60 per cent to 100 per cent of each estimated rate and that the extent of the subsidy in each case depends upon how far the actual rate charged varies from the estimated rate.

A second element of subsidy may be noted elsewhere in Section 7 (a), concerning the matter of the *expenses* that are necessary to provide coverage established by the act. Each estimated rate must be based on consideration of the risks involved but "shall not include any loading for administrative expenses of the Federal Government under this

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Sec. 5 (c), p. 3.

Act." Therefore, the actual premium rate which a private insurer would have to charge for a given coverage would necessarily be higher than the government's, because of the item of administrative expense known in insurance circles as "loading."

Another indication of subsidy is found in the reinsurance portion of the program. The administrator is directed to negotiate with insurance companies seeking reinsurance for properties they cover against the peril of flood. In establishing fees for reinsurance, rates must be adequate to produce sufficient proceeds to pay all claims for losses but "... shall not include any loading for administrative expenses of the Federal Government under this Act."¹²

STATE AND FEDERAL PARTICIPATION

July 1, 1959, has been established as the date for states to begin their participation in the federal flood program. Prior to that time, the administrator shall pay federal funds into a newly created Disaster Insurance Fund in an amount equal to the difference between the fees charged for insurance policies issued and the amount which would have been charged if the estimated rates had been applied. After the 1959 date, however, each state shall pay from time to time into the Disaster Insurance Fund an amount equal to one half the difference between the estimated rates established and the actual rates charged for insurance policies issued on property in the state. The federal government will then pay the other half of this difference, so that in effect a grant-in-aid program will be established, beginning July 1, 1959.

The wording in the act implies that no coverage will be provided to a person whose property is located in a state which does not make its contributions

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

as outlined in the preceding paragraph. Section 4 states that insurance and reinsurance against flood may be established, "Provided, that insurance policies issued under this Act after June 30, 1959, shall be issued only with respect to property in those States which participate as provided in section 7(a) of this Act."¹³ It will be interesting to see what reaction the various states will have to this provision and whether or not all of them will comply with it.

FEATURES DESIGNED TO MEET CRITICISM

The plan to write flood insurance by the federal government has been opposed by the vast majority of individuals and groups representing the insurance industry. The principal reasons for their objection to this program are (1) flood insurance on fixed-location property cannot be based upon sound insurance principles, (2) the government plan is another encroachment into the private domain, and (3) the flood peril could be handled better by improved flood protection and prevention and through private charity.

Toward sound insurance principles

The argument that flood insurance cannot embody the sound insurance principles of other forms of coverage has already been discussed. The essence of this argument is simply that heavy losses from floods will exceed the amount which could be collected in the form of premiums.

In an effort to overcome this objection, the act provides a number of safeguards or policy limitations seemingly designed to assure that the funds collected in the form of premiums will be adequate to pay losses. These policy limitations are similar to those em-

¹³ Section 7 (a) provides for contributions by state governments into the Disaster Insurance Fund as described in this paper.

bodied by private carriers to guarantee adequacy of their insurance premiums to meet expected losses. For example, the use of deductibles is provided in the act:

Each insurance policy issued by the Administrator shall contain a loss-deductible clause relieving him from any liability for paying the first \$100 of a proved and approved claim for loss, plus 5 per centum of the remainder.¹⁴

A deductible feature is also included in the loan program under the act. Loans may be made only for amounts exceeding the first \$500 of the amount of the loss.

In addition to deductibles, maximum limits have been placed on policies and on the insurance program as a whole. The face amount on any policy of insurance shall not exceed \$250,000 per person. Moreover, the maximum face amount for any dwelling unit including any structures and personal property connected with it shall not exceed \$10,000. As far as the program as a whole is concerned, the total face amount of insurance policies and reinsurance agreements outstanding at any one time under the act is not to exceed \$3,000,000,000¹⁵ minus the aggregate amount of claims under insurance policies and reinsurance agreements but plus fees collected under the act. The face amount of all loan contracts outstanding at any one time shall not exceed \$2,000,000,000.¹⁶

¹⁴ The amount or percentage of this deductible may be larger if the administrator deems it necessary in various classes of risk.

¹⁵ Section 10 (d) states that this limit may be increased with the approval of the President by further amounts not to exceed \$2,000,000,000 in the aggregate if such increase is deemed advisable to effectuate the purposes of the act.

¹⁶ This limit also may be increased on approval of the President, by not more than \$500,000,000 in any one fiscal year.

As a further attempt to preserve the solvency of the insurance fund under the act, provision is made for the administrator to engage in risk selection. He may "issue appropriate regulations regarding the classification, limitation, and rejection of risks assumed by him under authority of this Act."¹⁷ He is authorized, for example, to restrict insurance on property which was constructed in violation of state or local flood-zoning laws. No doubt other specific restrictions on certain classes of property will develop, since the administrator has discretionary powers to issue any appropriate regulations concerning the selection of risks to be covered by the act.

The government and private companies

The second major argument advanced by insurance company spokesmen against the government flood program is somewhat paradoxical. They are in general agreement that private carriers cannot provide insurance against the peril of flood on fixed property. At the same time they object to the government's entry into the field. Their objection is based not only on the fact that the flood peril is such that it cannot be insured properly by any institution. They contend also that the government's entry into the field marks a step in the movement toward greater government activity in what has been recognized in the past as the private sector of the economy.

Several features of the new act seem designed to dispel any thought that the government desires to enter this field or wishes to remain in it permanently. One indication of the government's desire to turn over this program eventually to private carriers is contained in Section 11 (d):

¹⁷ Public Law 1016 (cited note 7 *supra*), Sec. 9, p. 4.

Wherever practicable, the Administrator may encourage, by offering suitable reinsurance . . . , the issuance by private insurance companies of policies insuring against loss resulting from damage to or destruction of real or personal property due to flood.¹⁸

Another significant indication of the government's attempt to draw private companies into the program relates to the matter of the face value limits explained earlier in this paper. "The Administrator shall use his best efforts to encourage private insurance companies to undertake the issuance of insurance policies covering that portion of the loss in excess of the limits"¹⁹ of \$250,000 per person and \$10,000 per dwelling unit mentioned earlier. The act suggests that the administrator may seek to achieve this end through a program of appropriate reinsurance of these excess amounts. Thus private companies are encouraged to carry this *excess* insurance on persons and dwellings and then obtain protection against serious losses through government reinsurance.

Under the loan provisions of the act, the loans must be negotiated through either a public or *private* financing institution, and the administrator is directed to guarantee against loss of principal and interest any loan which may be made by these institutions to persons suffering a flood loss. Direct loans by the government may only be made when funds are unavailable on reasonable terms from private or public lending institutions. This is an indication of the government's attempt to bring existing institutions into the program without creating a government lending institution whose funds would compete with private funds.

The act is clear on the matter of the government's entering an area of insur-

ance in which private carriers are already offering protection:

No insurance or reinsurance, or loan contract, shall be issued under the provisions of this Act covering risks against which insurance is available on reasonable terms from other public or private sources.²⁰

Another indication of the government's desire to co-operate with and encourage private carriers is contained in the provision which states:

The Administrator shall use to the maximum practicable extent the facilities and services of private organizations and persons authorized to engage in the insurance business under the laws of any State including insurance companies, agents, brokers, and adjustment organizations.²¹

Finally, provision is made for the administrator to undertake a continuing study of greater participation by private companies in the programs authorized by the act;²² the intent is to encourage private insurance companies to write as much of the protection authorized by the act as is practicable. The clearest indication of the government's desire to relinquish the entire program, however, is contained in the following provision:

The Administrator shall undertake a continuing study of the feasibility of having private insurance companies take over, with or without some form of Federal financial support, the insurance programs authorized by this Act.²³

Encouragement of preventive measures

The third important argument against government flood insurance propounded by insurance company spokesmen concerns the matter of improved preventive and protective measures to reduce losses

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Sec. 12 (a).

²¹ *Ibid.*, Sec. 13 (a).

²² *Ibid.*, Sec. 17 (b), p. 8.

²³ *Ibid.*, Sec. 17 (c).

caused by flood. They contend that if these means are employed, the balance of the losses will be such that they can be handled adequately by private charity.

The government's position in this controversy is stated in the "Declaration of Purpose" of the act:

Since preventive and protective means and structures against the effects of these disasters can never wholly anticipate the geographic incidence and infinite variety of the destructive aspects of these forces, the Congress finds that the safeguards of insurance are a necessary adjunct of preventive and protective means and structures.²⁴

Nevertheless, certain provisions of the act are directed toward furtherance of these preventive measures. Mention was made earlier of the provision which directs the administrator to restrict insurance on property constructed in violation of state or local flood-zoning laws. Another provision is designed to create zoning laws wherever they may be needed and are not in operation:

After June 30, 1958, no insurance or reinsurance shall be issued under the provisions of this Act in any geographical location unless an appropriate public body shall have adopted . . . such flood zoning restrictions, if any, as may be deemed necessary by the Administrator to reduce, within practicable limits, damages from flood in such location.²⁵

From the standpoint of flood control, perhaps the most significant provision of the act is the requirement that the contributions of each state to the disaster funds be based upon the difference between the estimated rates and the actual fees charged. If a state is successful in reducing the cause of floods, the estimated rates would tend to fall and thus to approach the actual fees

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Sec. 2 (a), p. 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Sec. 12 (c), p. 5.

charged for coverage under the act. This tendency for the estimated rates to equal the actual rates charged would cause the state's contribution to decrease or disappear, since contributions are based on the disparity between these two rates.

Many different means are available to the states for reducing flood losses, and as the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956 becomes effective greater attention is likely to be given to this problem of flood control. Moreover, the federal government also will probably intensify its efforts in this direction.

Lightening the burden of charity

The argument that charity can be used to provide for many losses from floods is perhaps answered by the loan provisions of the act. If funds are available for extra-long periods at very moderate interest rates, many persons may be encouraged to help themselves instead of turning to various charitable organizations for assistance. This provision would seem to be a most important one in the light of increasing pressures on private charity in recent years as a result of numerous floods and other catastrophes.

SUMMARY

Because of recent flood disasters, public pressure has resulted in the passage of the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. The flood peril on fixed property is considered by most insurance specialists to be outside the realm of "insurance" in the true sense of the word. This peril does not meet the principal requisites for an insurable risk, and coverage through private insurance is therefore unavailable.

In the absence of private insurance protecting against flood losses, the new act provides for the establishment of a

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Sec. 11 (d), p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Sec. 11 (c).

program of (1) insurance, (2) reinsurance, and (3) loans to assist persons in their recovery from loss and destruction by flood. The Housing and Home Finance Agency will administer the provisions of the new act because of its extensive insurance experience.

In order to assure the solvency of the insurance funds in the new program, provision is made for the states and the federal government to make contributions in the form of a grant-in-aid. Total contributions from states and the federal government will equal the difference between the insurance rates promulgated and the rates actually charged individuals for coverage. This is an element of subsidy embodied in

the new program for the purpose of guaranteeing that persons who desire insurance will be able to afford coverage.

Many safeguards have been placed in the new act to protect private insurance interests against competition by the government. If existing insurance is available, for example, no insurance, reinsurance, or loans may be issued under the provisions of this act. Moreover, a continuing study must be made to consider means of encouraging private insurance companies to enter the field, and in fact to take over the entire program from the government, with or without federal financial support, as soon as practicable.

The Voluntary Effort in Disaster Relief

By ELLSWORTH BUNKER

Abstract: The disaster relief service of the American National Red Cross is seventy-five years old. During this period it has engaged in over 6,700 disaster relief operations, all financed by voluntary contributions. The principles governing the work of the Red Cross in these operations are explained, and a description is given of the national, regional, and local structure and functions of the organization, which has about 3,700 local chapters; these have first responsibility for emergency action but can count on the help and guidance of professionally trained personnel from the national organization.—Ed.

DISASTER is older than the recorded history of mankind. Most of us have been brought up on the story of the great flood in the Book of Genesis. It is probably the earliest account of a disaster relief operation on record.¹ A question may well arise whether Noah's efforts can properly be described as entirely voluntary; an authoritarian aspect is certainly there. Nevertheless, Noah's effort in dealing with a great flood is a model of careful planning, organization, and effective disaster relief in its successive stages: advance warning to the populace, the building of the Ark (probably the first mass shelter in recorded history), evacuation of people by family units to a place of safety, and finally reconstruction and restoration.

TRADITION OF NEIGHBORLY HELPFULNESS

The early history of our nation records the occurrence of great disasters. A century ago Clara Barton (founder

¹ Variations of the story of the great flood appear in the history of several ancient peoples.

and first president of the American Red Cross) wrote:

... our southern coasts are periodically visited by the scourge of yellow fever; the valleys of the Mississippi are subject to destructive inundations; the plains of the West are devastated by insects and drought, and our cities and country are swept by consuming fires.²

We have no account like the chronicle of Noah, but can there be any doubt of the mutual helpfulness of the pioneers who settled this country? In the aggregate, voluntary help in emergencies must be tremendous, the help of one neighbor to another; neighboring communities, each helping the others; groups sharing a common faith and interest helping members of the group. Such help is not measurable, and no record of its extent or nature exists. Nonetheless, voluntary effort for the alleviation of human suffering is a recognizable fact. The impulse to help others is basic to both our religious and pioneering traditions. It has motivated disas-

² Foster Rhea Dulles, *The American Red Cross: A History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 14.

His Excellency Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador of the United States to India, was President of the American National Red Cross from 1954 through 1956. He was Ambassador of the United States to Argentina in 1951 and to Italy in 1952-53 and was previously chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Sugar Refining Company.

ter relief in the past as it still does in the present.

In the United States, an organized program of disaster relief had its beginnings, strangely enough, in the movement to enlist adherence to the Geneva Convention, providing for the neutralization of aid to the wounded in time of war. The convention was ratified by the major European countries in 1864. Although the United States was represented unofficially during preliminary conferences, the principle of no entangling alliances was cited by the then Secretary of State, William H. Seward, as a reason for withholding co-operation. While the United States was prepared "to forward all humanitarian action," he stated, its well defined policy was one of "holding itself aloof from all European congresses, or compacts of a political nature."³

It was not until 1882 that the Geneva Convention was signed by President Arthur on March 1 and approved unanimously by the United States Senate fifteen days later. The strongest and perhaps the most persuasive argument favoring the convention was the proposed peacetime role for the Red Cross in disaster. Clara Barton urged:

Although we in the United States may fondly hope to be seldom visited by the calamities of war. . . . In all such cases [disaster], to gather and dispense the profuse liberality of our people, without waste of time or material, requires the wisdom that comes of experience and permanent organization.⁴

Thus disaster relief became the oldest of the Red Cross services, antedating by two decades the duty imposed by federal statute in 1900. During the seventy-five years of its history, the Red Cross has served in more than 6,700 disaster relief operations; all its expenditures

were derived from voluntary contributions.

THE LEGAL BASE: QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL STATUS

Historically, the American National Red Cross was created, so-named, and incorporated by special act of the Congress approved by President McKinley on June 6, 1900,⁵ to implement the Geneva Convention of 1864. The text defining the principal purposes and duties of the corporation has survived in subsequent acts revising the original charter. The following relevant excerpt quoted from a study made by Dean Sturges of the Yale Law School is a carryover from the original text; the only change to date is the duty for prevention added by the 1905 Act of Reincorporation⁶ appearing at the end of the final sentence:

With respect to peace-time disaster relief services the corporation is declared duty-bound to "continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same."⁷

The nation's voluntary agency in disaster relief

All voluntary organizations operate within the framework of government; it could not be otherwise. Several national organizations other than the Red Cross have federal charters. The unique role of the American National Red Cross derives from the specific charge imposed by federal statute to furnish volunteer aid in "great national calamities." Gov-

⁵ Prior to that enactment, "the American National Association of the Red Cross" had been incorporated in 1881 under the corporation laws of the District of Columbia.

⁶ P.L. 4, 33 Stat. 599.

⁷ Wesley Alba Sturges, "The Legal Status of the Red Cross"; forthcoming article.

ernmental supervision in the fulfillment of that duty is implicit in the requirement that the President of the United States appoint eight members of the Board of Governors, including the principal officer of the Corporation, and in the provision for an annual audit of its expenditures, and an annual report to the Congress of its operations and finances.

Thus, the authority for Red Cross activities is federal, deriving from the Congress, and is national in scope. "It is at once closely associated with government in the promotion of these objectives and independent in organization, wholly supported by private contributions. It has no counterpart in other humanitarian or charitable organizations in this country."⁸

The official status of the Red Cross was again recognized by a joint resolution of the Eighty-fourth Congress on June 7, 1956:

Whereas more than fifty years ago the Congress determined that the work of the American National Red Cross was of such importance to the Government and people of the United States and to the preservation of the dignity of all human beings that provision should be made for its operation under such grant of authority and such Government supervision as would impart official status and thus invite the confidence and support of all the people, but that, to preserve and safeguard its impartial, non-political character, it should carry out its duties solely by means of the voluntary contributions of funds and services by the people. . . .⁹

The concluding paragraph reads:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress extend its greetings and felicitations to all the members of the American National Red Cross on the occasion of its seventy-fifth

⁸ Dulles, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 1.

⁹ House Concurrent Resolution 232, 84th Congress (70 Stat. B32).

anniversary, express to them its appreciation for their services to humanity, and urge the continued voluntary participation by the American people in the work entrusted to the organization by the Congress and the Government.¹⁰

Service to people in time of emergency is a shared responsibility. The achievements of the Red Cross in the field of disaster relief are built on the voluntary contributions of many individuals, groups, and agencies, too numerous to mention, working together in a common purpose to be helpful. In keeping with its mandate, the Red Cross will continue to co-operate with all volunteers and voluntary groups as their central rallying point for united and effective performance.

EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM OF DISASTER SERVICES

The program of the American Red Cross in disaster is the product of experience and adaptations to circumstances rather than of any preconceived doctrine. As with any institution, the program has been influenced by personalities, but more importantly by changing public policy growing out of the changing expectations of the population and the changing role of government in relation to individual need.

Many elements have contributed to its present strength. Of first importance is the spontaneous response of the American people, motivated by their basic impulse to help their neighbors, however remotely distant. Next is the co-operative, co-ordinated approach under national leadership vested by the Congress in the American National Red Cross. Third is its highly decentralized operation carried out in the main by volunteers in every community throughout the length and breadth of the land. No other voluntary effort in our nation

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ Dulles, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 1.

has been so well supported and equipped to deal flexibly and effectively with the complex human problems created by disaster.

Effects of disaster

Social disorganization and total community involvement are the common elements in disaster. It is this aspect of disaster that differentiates it from conditions dealt with by other social welfare activities. In disaster, suddenly the customary machinery of community living breaks up. Indispensable means of communication are crippled or annihilated; food sources are cut off; lighting and water systems break down; stores, banks, and industries are closed. Government and other community agencies to which people normally turn for protection and safety are disorganized, or, because equipped to meet only normal needs, are inadequate to the extraordinary demands of a disaster situation.

At the same time, people are dislocated from their familiar landmarks: homes, jobs, churches, schools, social relations. The shock and excitement of the disaster, compounded by personal loss of loved ones and destruction of homes and property, create uncertainty, crippling anxiety, loss of self-confidence, discouragement, dependence. In short, at the very time when the needs for social helpfulness are greatest and most acute, the normal protective and helping processes are inoperative or disrupted.

Social disorganization is directly related to the population density of the disaster-struck community. In sparsely populated communities, the effects of disasters are dispersed and consequently not so marked. Personal tragedy for those affected is just as great although general confusion and disruption may be less apparent.

Economic and social background, 1881-1904

In 1881, when the Red Cross program of disaster relief was in its beginnings, the family was the basic economic, as well as the social, unit of the community. The family farm provided both a source of livelihood and security against the hazards of unemployment, old age, and disaster. In a very realistic sense, the family unit was economically self-sufficient. Opportunity was limited only by individual capacity and effort. The prevailing culture attached high value to self-reliance and social stigma to dependence on outside aid.

For persons unable to work or otherwise in need, the concept of relief was simple and direct. Problems of human need there have always been, and charity comes naturally in our Western culture. Broadly speaking, American communities provided ways and means for meeting relief needs beyond the point where temporary neighborly help sufficed. The concept of local responsibility for relief has endured in the America of today.

When in 1881, therefore, Clara Barton undertook practical demonstration of the concept of peacetime service in disaster that would reach beyond the community, there was no blueprint or precedent to guide her efforts. No single organization or governmental unit was concerned with the problems created by disaster.

In the main, the program followed was the collection of relief money and supplies, delivered by Miss Barton to temporary local committees of inexperienced persons for actual distribution, with adjustments made as Miss Barton recognized changing needs.

To sum up, in Clara Barton's day the American National Red Cross was little more than a small volunteer committee,

active in disaster with the distribution of relief in kind.

Effect of the changing environment

Within the past seventy-five years the population of the United States has more than trebled. Perhaps even more significant than population figures is the fact that we have changed from a decentralized agrarian society of small communities to an industrial urban nation.¹¹ "Industrialization has made city dwellers or suburbanites out of most Americans. . . . Today, the farm population is less than a sixth of the total, and 2 people out of 3 live in urban areas."¹²

The changing environment, from agrarian to industrial and urban, has effected marked changes in outlook for many people. Reliance on the family farm and individual effort is no longer adequate. Problems of human need created by factors beyond the control of the individual and the separate community and involved with economic issues of money, wages, and employment have become increasingly complex. Solution could no longer be found in the unaided efforts of the individual and his local community. Intensified industrialization and mobility of people have affected public policy, particularly the role of the federal government in relation to individual need. "Many individuals who once looked no further than their city hall or State capitol now turn toward Washington when problems arise. We are doing today as a Nation

¹¹ In 1880: total population, 50,155,783; urban, 14,129,735; rural, 36,026,048. In 1950: total population, 150,697,361; urban, 96,467,686; rural, 54,229,675. In 1956: total population, 168,091,000; urban and rural not shown.—U. S. Census.

¹² The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 1955, *Report to the President for Transmittal to Congress, June 1955* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office), p. 15.

many things that we once did as individuals, as local communities, or as States."¹³

Red Cross responsibility in disaster

Our federal system of divided responsibility in relief matters, with primary responsibility vested in local government, precludes complete reliance on government for the necessary flexibility and freedom of action called for in disaster. Disasters are no respecters of legal jurisdiction, and human suffering cannot wait for the relaxation of statutory limitations and untangling of conflicting or overlapping authorities. While it is recognized that government has a basic responsibility, the traditional response to emergency in our American society has always been, and continues to be, self-help supplemented by neighborly aid.

The Congress by federal statute, and Presidents by proclamation, have therefore repeatedly distinguished between activities operated with public funds in disaster and services performed by the Red Cross with voluntary contributions. In accordance with both the statutes and the proclamations, the Red Cross has interpreted its responsibility to be that of providing assistance to individuals and families, rather than that of restoring utilities or other facilities or services maintained under supervision of public authorities.

Evolution of disaster services

It has been said that each generation creates its own institutions. The Red Cross program of disaster relief—as it operates today—was created by a generation deeply concerned with economic and social reforms. Significant changes in human relations throughout the country were evolving in the beginning years of this century. Responsibility for relief was changing from an individual

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

18 Dr. Edward T. Devine, general secretary of the Charity Organization Society of New York, and Mr. Ernest P. Bicknell, General Superintendent, United Charities of Chicago, were en route to assist on a voluntary basis. They arrived in San Francisco together.

sponsible government officials, served by Presidential appointment; a Board of Incorporators of sixty-five eminent citizens representing the country at large; and the requirement of an annual audit by the War Department and an annual report to the Congress. By contrast, Red Cross organization consisted of a few state branches, almost completely inactive, not one "competent to carry on the practical relief work."¹⁹ The national organization had about \$10,000 in money, no experienced staff, no established headquarters. But the precedent was established of defining the role of the Red Cross to be that of providing assistance to persons and families with funds contributed by the nation.

Organizational structure for disaster services

The period beginning with World War I, and with the impetus of United States entry, were the years of growth, development, and buildup of the machinery of organization for effective service in disaster.

State societies were prescribed in the original charter, but the organizational structure that ultimately evolved was national (with headquarters located from the beginning in Washington, D. C.), regional, and local community (chapter). This form has endured and has demonstrated in practice the flexibility needed to administer disaster relief effectively.

Over the years the geographical subdivisions of the national organization (areas) within the continental United States have varied from thirteen to three and are now established at four: the eastern and northeastern states with headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia; the southeastern states with headquar-

ters in Atlanta, Georgia; the midwestern states with headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri; and the Pacific Coast states and Alaska with headquarters in San Francisco, California. Chapters in territory of the United States outside of the continental limits and Alaska maintain direct contact with national headquarters in Washington.

Every community in the continental United States and Alaska, and in the other territory of the United States, is covered by a Red Cross chapter. These now number approximately 3,700. Each chapter covers a compact, geographically defined territory, county-wide for the most part, but otherwise where desirable in conformity with local conditions. The chapters create subdivisions (branches) as may be necessary to extend the work effectively over their jurisdictions; these branches now approximate 3,400 in number. The chapters are unincorporated branches of the corporation and, within the continental United States and Alaska, report through the respective area offices as indicated.

All chapters are expected to have a plan for instant action when disaster strikes. The chapter studies community hazards, arranges for buildings that would be available as shelters, first aid stations, and canteens. It should know where to locate quickly supplies of food, clothing, and medicines. Volunteers are trained in first aid, mass feeding, communication and transportation activities, and the handling of welfare inquiries. Professional nurses in the community are enrolled for voluntary disaster service.

But the chapter plan takes into account more than the immediate resources of the Red Cross. The chapter works with all community groups in the planning and sharing of responsibility—with veterans' organizations, labor groups, churches, the local civil defense organization, and the local government, especially the mayor. Above

all, the head of local government has an interest to see that this plan is kept current by frequent review and disseminated as the official disaster plan of the community.

Personal contact with chapters is maintained regularly by a professional field staff assigned from the Red Cross area offices to assist and support chapter workers according to their respective requirements.

Administration of disaster services

Administration of disaster services is highly decentralized; Red Cross organization has been described as "a working partnership between the 3,700 chapters and the national organization."²⁰ Two aspects of administration are involved in the partnership: local and national.

Of necessity, disaster relief begins with the chapter in whose jurisdiction the disaster occurs. Every Red Cross chapter has first responsibility for action in the emergency, in conjunction with local government and other organized groups closest to the scene. Red Cross responsibility is to provide temporary shelter, food, clothing, and emergency medical and nursing care for the injured. On request of governmental authorities, the chapter may assist with warning, rescue, and evacuation of people.

The national organization is the reserve for all chapters, providing assistance and support, guidance, and co-ordination of outside aid with local effort. The Red Cross follows the principle of leaving to its local chapter, and the community of which it is a part, as much responsibility as they can handle in meeting the emergency needs of disaster sufferers. Experience has shown that helpful elements are always present in every disaster situation and that there is never a dearth of willing volun-

teers. Frequently, experienced guidance is all it takes to unite the voluntary effort already there and to get them together under co-ordinated direction. But there is no equality in the effects of disaster and community resources to deal with them.

In major disasters, such as the great eastern states floods of August 1955, the resources of the affected community are inadequate to cope with the magnitude of the damage inflicted. In such situations the national organization takes over the administration of the relief operation, drawing on trained disaster workers from all over the country.

In essence, the national organization provides organizational continuity and co-ordination to the entire program, thereby assuring adherence to basic policy and standards of service while providing flexible adaptation to community patterns. The national organization functions as the accumulation point of operating knowledge, for the receipt and exchange of information, and its evaluation and practical application.

Financing disaster relief

All activities of the American Red Cross, including those related to disaster, are financed entirely from voluntary contributions. The Red Cross has never received—and does not now receive—appropriations by government from public funds.

Several factors peculiar to the disaster situation complicate the financing of disaster relief. In addition, like everything else these days, disaster relief costs more.

Since disaster relief needs fluctuate widely from year to year, the Red Cross follows the practice of seeking annually, during its general appeal to the public, funds for disaster services in an amount sufficient to cover what experience over a long period of years has shown to be the average needed. As with any aver-

¹⁹ Mabel T. Boardman, Secretary, American National Red Cross. See also her *Under the Red Cross Flag at Home and Abroad*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1915.

²⁰ E. Roland Harriman, Chairman, American National Red Cross.

age, actual spending never actually coincides in any one year. A disaster revolving fund is maintained to stabilize financing. Overexpenditures in any one year are met from the revolving fund, which is replenished by unexpended balances in other years. Experience indicates that under present conditions a fund of between ten and fifteen million dollars provides a reasonable safety factor for this purpose.

The entire plan is predicated on the fact that exceptionally large demands in the major disasters occurring with relative infrequency will require nationwide appeals following proclamation by the President. Even in smaller disasters many persons desire to make special contributions when disaster occurs; hence limited campaigns for funds are made, on a local or regional basis, as the particular circumstances warrant.

Summary

At the turn of the century, "The American National Red Cross" was in spite of its name anything but a national organization. "The struggling little society had no financial reserves whatsoever and no trained staff ready to swing into action at a moment's notice. . . . It had no nation-wide system of cooperating chapters."²¹

From very modest beginnings, the Red Cross has built up a truly national organization of more than 3,700 chapters that can go into action immediately whenever disaster strikes. The national organization maintains, among other things, as a reserve to support and assist its chapters:

1. A mobile staff of experienced professional personnel to assist chapters with training activities for volunteers the year round, and when disaster occurs with relief and rehabilitation services. Essential skills such as community organization, social work, nursing,

building and repair, accounting, and public information are included.

2. A roster of graduate professional nurses enrolled and trained for emergency medical and nursing aid in disaster.

3. A revolving reserve fund to meet without delay the emergency needs of disaster sufferers pending receipt of other voluntary contributions.

4. A network of about fifty Red Cross regional blood centers, with several hundred co-operating units, prepared to provide life-saving blood and blood derivatives for immediate use of hospitals and doctors in saving lives.

5. An independent telecommunications system linking the national headquarters, the area offices, and chapters in every section of the country into a single network for effective communication, so vital in emergency.

INTEGRATION OF VOLUNTARY AND GOVERNMENTAL EFFORT

The special value of looking at the past, it is said, is to help face the future more wisely. This brief look at the past voluntary effort in disaster, expressed through the social institution known as the American Red Cross,²²

²² In addition to publications cited earlier in the article, the following contain useful reference material: Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Relief, *A Subcommittee Report on Natural Disaster Relief*, submitted to the Commission June 1955 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office); *Disaster Manual for Chapters*, ARC 209, revised January 1955 (Washington, D. C.: American National Red Cross, 1955); Clyde E. Buckingham, *Red Cross Disaster Relief: Its Origin and Development* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956); Russell Sage Foundation, *The San Francisco Relief Survey: The Organization and Methods of Relief Used after the Earthquake and Fire of April 18, 1906* (New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1913); American National Red Cross, *Annual Report*, published yearly since 1900, ARC 501 (Washington, D. C.: American National Red Cross); [American National Red Cross, War Council],

²¹ Dulles, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 39, 41.

points up the great and growing importance of close integration of voluntary and governmental effort.

The Red Cross program in disaster developed in response to a need, recognized almost spontaneously when Clara Barton first made her public appeals, for a responsible medium through which the sympathy of the nation could be expressed in practical form to the victims of disaster. The Red Cross pioneered in finding better and more lasting ways of social helpfulness than the early distribution of donated goods. A program was evolved and established that looks beyond the immediate emergency needs of people to restoration of their human dignity and normal independence. Viewed from the perspective of its seventy-five years' experience, this voluntary effort in disaster relief has grown steadily in effectiveness and in popular support, both with personal participation and funds.

Disaster has a disruptive impact in many areas of life: homes, jobs, schools, churches, business—and politics too. Governmental machinery is necessarily involved, and the federal government has been active in disaster relief since the early days of our national history. Co-operative effort by the Red Cross with official agencies is obviously essential; it is nothing new in Red Cross history.

The development of new federal programs has not lessened Red Cross responsibility, either for emergency relief measures or for careful planning with

families for their recovery. It has necessitated, rather, successive readjustments to each new development and increased effort toward integration with governmental agencies.

This mid-decade of the twentieth century has brought new problems of adjustment in disaster as elsewhere. Granted the importance of large-scale planning, the impact of disaster with all its attendant dislocations and human suffering is still the lot of the local community and must be dealt with, in the last analysis, within the disaster-struck community. Many interests converge on the stricken community, each with its own special concern, adding to the inherent confusion at the scene of disaster. The Red Cross contribution to community recovery is to meet the needs of the basic unit of our society, family by family. This naturally places the Red Cross in a centralizing position. In integrating its organized voluntary efforts with those of government, together they can achieve greater co-ordination than if each worked separately.

A realistic program for disaster relief requires therefore decentralized planning and operation broadly based in local communities. But it requires also the establishment and co-ordination of policy by the national organization, and in the case of a major disaster, administration by that organization as well. Thus all the great resources of the Red Cross can be mobilized on a national scale to render prompt and effective assistance.

Finally, the need is for more, and strengthened, voluntary effort—not less—for the indispensable task of promoting the readiness and ability of each local community to assume its share in preparedness and relief. The American Red Cross offers its full support to all who work to safeguard our communities and to safeguard that greater community that is the United States of America.

The Work of the American Red Cross During the War: A Statement of Finances and Accomplishments for the Period July 1, 1917, to February 28, 1919 (Washington, D. C.: American National Red Cross, 1919); American National Red Cross, *Accomplishments, 1940-1945* (Washington, D. C.: American National Red Cross and Red Cross Service Record: *Accomplishments of Seven Years, 1939-1946*, ARC 541 (Washington, D. C.: American National Red Cross); American Red Cross reports on individual disaster relief operations.

Emergency Mass Care

By DEWITT SMITH

Abstract: Disaster, by common usage a term now applied to natural rather than war catastrophe, has brought about the development of emergency mass care—a means of meeting the urgent and temporary physical needs of populations suddenly made homeless. In the years 1950–55 almost a million persons have received such care from the American National Red Cross, the organization which has over the years built up an elaborate and well-functioning system for meeting the emergency needs of disaster victims. Nevertheless there is need for continued study and research in order to arrive at even more effective plans and action designed to minimize the effects of disasters.—Ed.

DISASTERS are generally defined by types or causes, as floods, hurricanes, or tornadoes, but they have been defined also in many other terms, depending on the approach and purpose. For purposes of emergency mass care, perhaps any situation may become a disaster when "man becomes the victim of forces . . . he normally controls."¹ However, this article is concerned not with the total physical and social disorganization that is large-scale disaster, nor even with all the destruction or damage to the installations and facilities of government and of industrial, commercial, and agricultural organization, but rather with the extent and nature of human suffering and need resulting from natural disaster.

NATURAL AND WAR-CAUSED DISASTERS

Increasingly, and for understandable reasons, the tendency in recent years is to equate natural disasters with situations that could be created by enemy attack. This tendency contrasts with the

philosophy and practice of the federal government during World War II, when the use of "disaster" to describe situations created by enemy attack was avoided, and assistance to civilians thus affected was designated "civilian war aid." In addition to the natural reluctance to describe any situation imposed by an enemy during war as a disaster, it was agreed:

Through long usage the word "Disaster" has come to have special significance as referring to natural and accident caused situations. . . . [Therefore] Civilian War Aid will be used to describe the relief aspects of situations created by enemy action.²

Now that "disaster" is generally used for both natural and enemy-caused situations, it is important from the standpoint of human need that differences as well as similarities in the two cases be recognized. Otherwise, the les-

² "Agreement Between the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services and the American Red Cross," in Thomas H. Reynolds, "American Red Cross Disaster Services 1930–1947" (Historical Monographs, American National Red Cross, Washington, D. C., Vol. 20 C), p. 206; unpublished.

¹ Lowell J. Carr, *Situational Analysis: An Observational Approach to Introductory Sociology* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 59.

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sons learned from experience with natural disasters cannot be brought fully to bear in the larger war-caused situation; nor, conversely, can the organization and other resources developed in anticipation of possible war-caused need be utilized effectively in time of natural disaster.

While steps toward preparedness, avoidance, and control have tended over the years to lessen some of the consequences of natural disasters, the destructiveness of weapons of war has increased so fantastically that the differences in degree between the consequences of war-caused and natural disasters may be expected further to increase rather than to diminish.

In addition, it is important that some of the problems peculiar to each should not be permitted to constitute a handicap in dealing with the other.

Despite great progress in recent years, many problems admittedly remain to be solved in the further development and permanent maintenance of an adequate civil defense organization throughout the country. "One of these problems which is the common experience of everyone concerned is that civil defense (taken to mean steps necessitated by enemy action or the threat thereof) is a new concept to this country and one which we are reluctant to accept. If we do recognize the danger, we are apt to think of it as so great that no amount of preparation would enable us to prevail against it."³

Another present consideration is that, while many of the human needs growing out of natural disasters are the same in principle as those that must be met following large-scale enemy attack, there is such a difference in degree that from the standpoint of natural disaster relief alone it becomes difficult to convince communities or regions of the necessity

³ William L. McGill, "How a State Prepares for Disaster," in this issue of *THE ANNALS*.

to develop and maintain continuously in being for natural disaster purposes an organization of such magnitude and elaborateness as would be required to deal effectively with the aftermath of enemy attack.

PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATURAL DISASTER HAZARD

It is true that present scientific knowledge supports the assumption that, in the most adverse combination of conditions theoretically possible, there exists the potentiality for even more destructive natural disasters than any thus far experienced.⁴ Moreover, the increased density of population and more intensive industrial, agricultural, and other development could conceivably create greater destruction and need from disasters no more severe theoretically than those previously encountered.

The record over a seventy-five year period shows it to be equally true that natural disasters in the United States are as certain as anything in human experience. Nevertheless, the precise time and place that disaster will strike remain unpredictable. In terms of the larger disasters an experience of several decades is necessary to provide a reasonable pattern and to develop guides for dealing with the infinite variety of needs that arise at such uncertainly spaced intervals. Disasters are highly variable not only in spacing but also in locale, circumstances, duration, and effect. Some, as in explosions and fires, happen quickly within a limited area. Some, as tornadoes, happen in a short time but may occur simultaneously over scattered areas. Others, like hurricanes, develop progressively over a period of time and considerable territory. Still others, like some floods, also develop progressively, spread over states and re-

⁴ See articles in this issue of *THE ANNALS* dealing with the physical characteristics of disasters.

gions, and in addition are more lasting in duration and effect.

Notwithstanding these many uncertainties, there is an actual seventy-five year record of disasters in the United States measured in terms of the persons or families given emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance. This is the record of the disaster relief operations conducted by the American Red Cross. They probably reflect the longest experience of any single organization in dealing with the effects of disaster.

Records and statistics

Disasters are defined by the Red Cross for its own operational purposes to include: natural catastrophes such as floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes; sudden catastrophes such as fires, explosions, and wrecks; and similar public calamities in which numbers of persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering.⁵

The Red Cross for statistical purposes records as a disaster only those situations of distress involving five or more families. Actually, much emergency assistance is given by Red Cross chapters when lesser numbers of families are affected. Observing the five-family definition, the Red Cross has conducted 6,755 disaster relief operations within the continental United States during the period from its inception in 1881 through the calendar year 1955.

<i>Period</i>	<i>Number of operations</i>
1881-1916 (36 years).....	60
1917-24 (8 years).....	430
1925-49 (25 years).....	4,248
1950-55 (6 years).....	2,017
Total.....	6,755

For many reasons this is not an accurate historical count of all disasters that occurred during the seventy-five-

⁵ *Disaster Manual for Chapters* (ARC 209, January 1955), p. 3.

year period, nor yet an accurate record showing trends in the incidence of disasters. It was not until the period of World War I (1916-1919) that the American Red Cross developed a constantly ready, truly nationwide organization reaching into every community and extending overseas as required.⁶ While this expansion resulted from the impetus of war, it provided for the first time the basic national, regional, and local organization necessary for effective disaster relief. It provided also strong financial support, together with volunteers by the millions and full-time professional workers by the thousands. Of equal or even greater importance, it brought the first vigorous interpretation of the authority under which the Red Cross serves persons suffering from disaster⁷ as "not only a grant of power but an imposition of duties."⁸ Moreover, it was not until several years later that the full potential of the Red Cross in disaster relief began to be realized, and more complete reporting became possible.

It is significant that more than two

⁶ *The Work of the American Red Cross During the War, . . . July 1, 1917 to February 28, 1919*, Washington, D. C.: American Red Cross, 1919.

⁷ Public Law 4, 58th Congress, 3rd Session, January 5, 1905 (33 Stat. 599); "... to continue and carry on a system of national and international relief . . . and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same."

⁸ John W. Davis, then Solicitor General of the United States and Counsellor of the Red Cross, to Henry P. Davison, the Red Cross War Council Chairman, August 15, 1918: "When any question arises as to the scope and activities of the American Red Cross, it must always be remembered that its charter is not only a grant of power but an imposition of duties. The American Red Cross is a quasi-governmental organization. . . . It owes, therefore, to the government which it serves the distinct duty of discharging all those functions for which it was created."

thousand disaster operations are shown during the most recent six-year period (1950-55). These figures point up the continuing importance and need for emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance following not only major disasters but also the three hundred or more other disasters that occur annually throughout the country, many relatively small but some rather large.

DISASTERS OF GREAT MAGNITUDE

Of greater significance in terms of emergency mass care (and likewise re-

habilitation assistance) is an examination of relief operations of the American Red Cross in principal disasters⁹ during the half century 1906-55 (see Table 1).

Of these thirty principal disasters, which aroused nationwide interest, half occurred during the last nine years and

⁹ Within the Red Cross these are generally referred to as "major disasters" but they are here designated "principal disasters" to avoid confusion with disasters declared "major" by the President of the United States under the terms of Public Law 875, 81st Congress (the Federal Disaster Act of 1950).

TABLE 1—PRINCIPAL DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS, 1906-1955

YEAR AND DESIGNATION OF DISASTER	PERSONS		DWELLINGS		PERSONS GIVEN EMERGENCY MASS CARE	FAMILIES GIVEN REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE	NUMBER OF COUNTIES
	Killed	Injured	Destroyed	Damaged			
1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire ^a	498	415 ^b	28,188 ^c	—	300,000	20,200	1
1913 Ohio-Miss. River flood.....	502	— ^d	3,042	70,672	323,000	10,000	— ^d
1918 Minn. forest fire.....	800	2,100	4,089	—	— ^d	16,000	5
1924 Northern Ohio tornado.....	84	650	—	1,100	2,900	1,509	9
1925 Midwestern tornado.....	796	2,939	7,250 ^c	—	13,200	5,075	18
1926 Florida hurricane.....	327	6,327	4,825	9,250	35,000 ^c	11,400	12
1927 St. Louis, Mo., tornado.....	76	1,500	5,000 ^c	—	10,000	5,534	1
1927 New England flood.....	45	27	639	1,525	9,200	3,504	35
1927 Miss. Valley flood.....	246	11,800	8,947	88,076	637,500	175,000	133
1928 Florida hurricane.....	1,810	1,849	4,561	13,981	30,300 ^c	10,300	13
1936 Spring floods (eastern and southeastern states).....	107	306	1,051	24,678	400,000	83,200	68
1936 Spring tornadoes.....	352	2,215	1,015	1,251	— ^d	5,668	37
1937 Ohio-Miss. Valley flood.....	137	544	3,211	43,866	1,062,000	236,147	318

^a Data in part from report by Russell Sage Foundation; emergency mass care was handled by U. S. Army.

^b Major injuries only.

^c Total buildings destroyed and damaged.

^d No record.

TABLE 1—Continued

YEAR AND DESIGNATION OF DISASTER	PERSONS		DWELLINGS		PERSONS GIVEN EMERGENCY MASS CARE	FAMILIES GIVEN REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE	NUMBER OF COUNTIES
	Killed	Injured	Destroyed	Damaged			
1938							
N. Y. and New England hurricane and flood.....	494	708	936	8,019	— ^d	13,446	52
1943							
Floods in midwestern states..	46	9,400	546	13,313	— ^d	16,211	17
1947							
Texas City explosion.....	512	1,784	129	950	9,000	1,954	1
Okla.—Texas tornado.....	165	1,017	752	1,092	5,000	1,045	12
Ala.—La.—Miss. hurricane.....	37	753	920	10,224	80,000	4,817	28
Florida hurricane.....	26	227	178	13,792	76,000	4,917	28
New England forest fires.....	10	9,784	712	23	41,200	1,189	13
1948							
Ore.—Wash. flood.....	16	35	602	2,980	45,600	8,272	14
1949							
Ft. Worth, Texas, flood.....	10	407	492	3,302	12,000	3,226	1
1951							
Kansas—Mo.—Okla.—Ill. floods	22	2,543	2,338	23,366	45,000	19,932	82 ^f
1952							
Southern tornadoes.....	231	1,829	1,041	2,350	3,000	2,097	42 ^f
Missouri Valley floods.....	2	312	498	4,273	52,000	3,158	59 ^f
1953							
Worcester, Mass., tornado...	94	1,310	630	2,781	16,000	1,309	4 ^f
1954							
New England hurricanes.....	63	1,158	1,943	59,093	42,300	1,883	68 ^f
Hurricane Hazel and floods...	39	423	2,435	52,591	14,400	3,985	99 ^f
1955							
Eastern states floods.....	206	8,565	1,208	30,995	144,000	14,961	108 ^f
Western states floods.....	80	4,338	1,277	17,455	86,450	10,342	70 ^f

^d No record.^e Incomplete record.^f Number of Red Cross chapters (frequently greater than the number of counties, particularly in the northeastern states).

the other half during the preceding forty-one years. The greatest number in any one year (1947) was five. The longest interval between them was eight years (1928 to 1936). Strangely, there was an almost total absence of such principal disasters during both world wars. In one disaster, assistance was given to more than a million persons (the 1937 Ohio—Mississippi Valley flood); in one other, more than 600,000 persons were assisted (the 1927 Mississippi Valley flood). Of the thirty disasters, twelve resulted from floods (plus

two others where floods followed a hurricane), seven from tornadoes, seven from hurricanes, two from forest fires, one from an earthquake and fire, and one from an explosion and fire. The greatest number of counties affected in any single disaster was 318 in twelve states (the 1937 Ohio—Mississippi Valley flood). Four of the disasters were so concentrated geographically that each affected but a single city or metropolitan area.

To relate this experience more directly to the subject of emergency mass

care,¹⁰ these disasters in which such care was given by the Red Cross to more than 25,000 persons are listed by order of number of persons (Table 2). There were sixteen such disasters during the half century. Of these, nine were floods, five hurricanes, one an earthquake and fire, and one a forest fire. Five separate disasters involved emergency mass care for more than a quarter of a million persons.

Comparisons on the basis merely of number of persons given emergency mass care must be made with caution. Space limitations do not permit the detailed analysis necessary to take into account length of time under mass care and other factors. In some large-scale flood situations extending geographically over several states and in time over several months, mass care was required for long periods of time but with considerable turnover among persons affected.

LESSER DISASTERS

In addition to these selected disasters of a principal nature, a far greater number of lesser disasters occurred, usually not involving physical and social disorganization on a scale representing total community or area involvement. However, many of these lesser disasters occurring in smaller or less well-organized communities do represent a proportionately difficult measure of physical and social disorganization.

The total number of disaster relief operations recorded by the American Red Cross during the six calendar years from 1950 through 1955 shows in the aggregate just under one million persons given emergency mass care; the maximum number in any one year was 330,000 and the minimum 88,000 persons. The maximum number during

¹⁰ The combination of relief methods employed in the immediate emergency temporarily to provide basic physical necessities to large groups of persons in need.

TABLE 2—DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS INVOLVING EMERGENCY MASS CARE TO MORE THAN 25,000 PERSONS, 1906-1955

Arranged in order of decreasing number of persons

Date and designation of disaster	Persons given emergency mass care
1937, Ohio—Miss. Valley flood.....	1,062,000
1927, Miss. Valley flood.....	637,500
1936, Spring floods (eastern and southeastern states).....	400,000
1913, Ohio—Miss. River flood.....	323,000
1906, San Francisco earthquake and fire.....	300,000
1955, Eastern states floods.....	144,000
1955, Western states floods.....	86,500
1947, Ala.—La.—Miss. hurricane.....	80,500
1947, Florida hurricane.....	76,000
1952, Missouri Valley floods.....	52,000
1948, Oregon—Washington flood.....	45,600
1951, Kan.—Mo.—Okla.—Ill. floods.....	45,000
1954, New England hurricane.....	42,300
1947, New England forest fires.....	41,200
1926, Florida hurricane.....	35,000
1928, Florida hurricane.....	30,300

the total period resulting from any one type of disaster (floods) was 584,000 persons; the next highest number was 175,000 persons, in hurricanes (see Tables 3 and 4).

HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS

No two disasters are alike but, whatever their nature, among the grim facts are sudden disruption of the daily patterns of work and other aspects of normal living; the dislocation of families and their members; personal injury, even death; and the destruction, loss, or unavailability of real and personal property. Many of the resources and ways of dealing with human needs and problems are suddenly not available or are inadequate.

The modern community depends on a highly organized and closely integrated network of public and private facilities that provides the necessities and niceties of our way of life. Any significant breakdown in these facilities,

TABLE 3—SELECTED DATA ON DISASTER RELIEF BY THE AMERICAN RED CROSS, 1950-1955, BY YEARS

YEAR	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS	PERSONS KILLED	PERSONS INJURED		DWELLINGS DESTROYED	DWELLINGS DAMAGED		PERSONS GIVEN EMERGENCY MASS CARE	FAMILIES ASSISTED
			Major	Minor		Major	Minor		
1950.....	392	718	3,804	2,420	2,375	4,993	62,625	160,497	35,871
1951.....	320	792	3,166	1,689	3,142	8,448	48,515	88,266	35,421
1952.....	308	549	2,530	2,304	2,317	3,000	20,179	130,898	11,266
1953.....	327	838	2,755	5,438	4,309	7,156	28,816	138,912	14,663
1954.....	346	459	5,846	2,564	6,126	14,263	126,014	139,642	14,286
1955.....	324	707	2,562	15,949	3,838	13,958	76,596	330,580	36,025
Total....	2,017	4,063	20,663	30,364	22,107	51,818	362,745	988,795	147,532

supplies, and services, added to the human suffering of persons directly affected by the disaster, creates stress, disorganization, and confusion. For obvious reasons, this confusion and disorganization are greatest immediately following the onset of disaster.

The victims of disasters are seldom any special group. They include those found in every community: the aged, in increasing number with the lengthening life span; the employed, who may lose their jobs or become injured or even permanently disabled; men and women beyond their most productive years, who have built up small businesses and would find it hard to start all over again; the widowed; the orphaned; and persons

otherwise handicapped. Most of these people have resources—some more than others—in personal ability, material goods, and relatives who can help. Some are more thrifty than others; some have never managed well but have lost what little they had. All are equal in their lack of responsibility for the misfortune that has suddenly befallen them, and equal in their appeal for sympathy and social helpfulness.

EMERGENCY MASS CARE

These chaotic conditions created by disaster call for measures of relief designed to deal with large numbers of bewildered and sometimes helpless persons. The emergency mass care serv-

TABLE 4—SELECTED DATA ON DISASTER RELIEF BY THE AMERICAN RED CROSS, 1950-1955, BY TYPE OF DISASTER

TYPE OF DISASTER	NUMBER OF OPERATIONS	PERSONS KILLED	PERSONS INJURED		DWELLINGS DESTROYED	DWELLINGS DAMAGED		PERSONS GIVEN EMERGENCY MASS CARE	FAMILIES ASSISTED
			Major	Minor		Major	Minor		
Hurricane.....	15	128	385	1,869	4,932	10,631	133,764	175,073	11,479
Tornado.....	232	989	3,608	6,594	6,619	8,354	23,356	99,845	12,494
Flood.....	291	646	6,888	14,308	7,605	24,997	136,770	584,196	100,747
Other storm.....	115	93	895	388	908	7,143	63,657	73,693	10,798
Fire & explosion..	1,258	1,096	1,787	6,189	1,910	661	4,354	43,812	10,936
All other.....	106	1,111	7,100	1,016	133	32	844	12,176	1,078
Total.....	2,017	4,063	20,663	30,364	22,107	51,818	362,745	988,795	147,532

ices are organized and operate in this setting of great confusion and personal tragedy; they should be recognized as unavoidable measures of expediency for meeting quickly, on a temporary basis, the immediate physical needs that people have in common, without regard for differences in their normal social or economic status. A pioneer in disaster relief thus described the method:

... This is not a time for hesitation over small questions but it requires judgment and firmness and allows little opportunity for discussion or the nice weighing of alternatives. . . .

The period of emergency relief is comparatively short and may roughly be said to end when the victims of the calamity have received or are receiving proper medical care, food, clothing and shelter, when families have been united, the dead buried, and the panic among the people quieted. . . .

During the emergency stage of relief the people are dealt with in large groups with little attention to the special needs of individuals. The chief object is food for all, clothing and shelter for all.¹¹

This concept of mass care was restated a decade later:

Obviously the exigencies of disaster often necessitate at the outset treating people in the mass. . . . It is the province of emergency relief to provide for immediate, common needs. The promptness and completeness with which they are met are the sole tests of efficiency.¹²

Mass care in this sense should not be confused with group or congregational care, as in the care of the aged and dependent children, or group care provided in hospitals or other specialized institu-

tions. As soon as possible, however, disaster victims falling within such categories of need should be suitably placed for proper care.

From the beginning emergency mass care has been concerned primarily with meeting the urgent and temporary physical needs of large numbers of persons suddenly made homeless: temporary shelter, food, clothing, and medical, nursing, and hospital care. With repeated experience, the methods most commonly used and the services provided in meeting these basic emergency needs have become established, and the term mass care is now generally applied to refugee shelters, feeding stations, clothing depots, and emergency medical facilities. In the course of time, both resources and methods developed to meet emergency needs have come to be signified by the term mass care, and the term has been extended in its application to war-caused and other emergency situations involving large numbers of persons when the customary resources are inadequate to the needs.

Shelter, food, clothing

Temporary shelter is usually provided in public buildings such as schools, churches, or assembly halls; in private buildings such as unoccupied dwellings or tourist camps; in tents, especially in rural territory, set up on home sites, or in groups on public or private property; and at times in erected temporary barracks or in trailers provided from public or private sources. Food is provided in a variety of ways, depending on the facilities remaining available: in shelters with cooking equipment; from mobile or fixed feeding stations; and through the distribution of cooked or packaged foods to families living in tents on home sites or in the habitable parts of damaged homes. Clothing, especially outer garments, is provided, particularly when the families are forced out of their

¹¹ Ernest P. Bicknell, "President's Address: Disaster Relief and Its Problems," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1909, pp. 6, 7.

¹² J. Byron Deacon, *Disasters and the American Red Cross in Disaster Relief* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1918), p. 168.

homes without opportunity to take essential items with them.

Medical care

Medical, surgical, dental, hospital, and nursing care is provided by the responsible professional groups at or near the scene of the disaster, at first aid stations, in hospitals, and in the offices of physicians. The Red Cross emergency mass care medical and nursing program is co-ordinated with the local public health officials, physicians and related professional groups, and hospitals. The primary functions for which the Red Cross may assume responsibility are: providing medical and nursing care in Red Cross shelters; establishing and staffing first aid stations and temporary infirmaries; providing nursing personnel when needed to ensure adequate care of patients; and providing whole blood and blood derivatives. Local community planning to meet mass needs in both natural and war-caused disasters, with full recognition of the roles of both the Red Cross and government, is particularly effective in the medical and nursing field.

Warning, rescue, and evacuation

Warning, rescue, and evacuation are primarily governmental responsibilities.¹³ In extreme situations, however, and on request of constituted authorities, Red Cross volunteers assist with and support these activities. Substantial progress in forecasting has been made in recent years by many governmental agencies; but all recognize that warnings of impending disaster, unless accompanied by precautionary measures and arrangements for the protection and care of people, may do actual harm. This again is an area of social helpfulness where the co-operative effort of govern-

¹³ See articles in this volume dealing with the government in preparation and avoidance, recovery and restoration.

mental and organized voluntary services pays dividends in saving lives, lessening human suffering, and reducing destruction of property.

Over the years, too, experience has shown that paralleling the physical needs of the emergency period are many less tangible but frequently no less important spiritual and psychological needs and those related directly to them. Prompt and effective material relief, quickly and kindly administered, has important therapeutic values. It is a truism, but nonetheless important, that "man does not live by bread alone." Especially in such situations as prolonged floods and tornadoes with extensive destruction of homes, along with physical needs of the emergency period are such needs as communication with loved ones, religious solace, recreation, and participation in group activities. Many effective plans and methods, including those for handling emergency welfare inquiries, for providing facilities to meet essential recreational problems, for providing opportunities to attend church services and schools and to participate in community events, and for dealing with morale and adjustment problems, are now integral parts of most disaster relief operations.

Red Cross manuals

Nowhere perhaps are the methods and techniques applicable to the aspects of these activities related to the alleviation of human suffering and need set forth in more detail than in the manuals of the American Red Cross.¹⁴ These have gone through revision after revision as a result of many decades of trial and error. Although experience in nearly

¹⁴ *Disaster Relief Handbook: A Manual for National Personnel* (ARC 234, August 1950); *Disaster Manual for Chapters* (ARC 209, January 1955); *Mass Care in Disaster* (ARC 1540, June 1951); and many manuals dealing with specific phases of emergency relief, subsidiary to the foregoing basic manuals.

seven thousand actual disaster relief operations, extending now over seventy-five years, has not required fundamental change, many adjustments to changing circumstances have resulted.

REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE

Disaster relief consists of much more than the distribution of food and clothing and the providing of temporary shelter and emergency medical and nursing aid. Just as those forms of relief must be preceded by the essential services of warning and rescue, and sometimes evacuation, so they must be followed by the necessary rehabilitation phases. Mass care is an important and essential emergency relief measure but it is by no means an end in itself. Seen in proper perspective, mass care is also the beginning step in restoring victims to their predisaster status. No responsible organization could properly undertake a program of emergency mass care without some plan for its early termination by substituting for it the more basic measures to meet continuing needs and to bring about a restoration to normal independence of the victims of disaster.

This is no mere theory; it has been demonstrated time after time over more than half a century and following several thousand disasters, large and small. The same pioneers who first defined emergency mass care simultaneously described rehabilitation with equal vision and in terms that have endured:

The second stage is that of re-establishing the normal regime within the shattered community. . . . the people must be carefully transferred from relief support to dependence upon their own earnings. . . . One by one the broken threads of familiar every-day life, the life of custom and habit, must be reunited.¹⁵

The province of rehabilitation is to help each family meet the needs peculiar to it

and return to its normal manner of life. Its efficiency is tested by the degree to which it succeeds in accomplishing these results. Emergency relief plans and acts to meet present needs, rehabilitation plans and acts for ultimate welfare. All disaster relief should be a process of evolving from dealings with its victims en masse to treatment of them as individual families. The wisdom of using every means of hastening the progress from mass to individual treatment is amply attested by the experience in all successful disaster relief work.¹⁶

The problems of people in disaster are of themselves no different from those encountered in the day-to-day experience of many social welfare agencies. They differ, however, in number and magnitude; the situations do not develop one at a time but occur simultaneously, frequently in exaggerated or distorted form and in unusual combinations. Furthermore, the people involved are normally self-reliant. It is important therefore to apply the customary casework methods as soon as conditions permit. People recover most quickly with individualized assistance; mass care is not a departure from this principle of effective helpfulness but only a temporary modification to alleviate physical suffering of many persons in an emergency situation. During the initial chaos of disaster, families should be kept together; young children especially should not be separated from their mothers except for the most compelling reasons. So far as possible, displaced families should be assisted in their normal groupings for mutual help and support; similarly, mass care should be provided in familiar surroundings. Public information on which people can depend should be released quickly from reliable sources to relieve anxiety, dispel false rumors and uncertainties, and to facilitate family planning.

¹⁶ Deacon, *op. cit.* (note 12 *supra*), pp. 168-69.

¹⁵ Bicknell, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), pp. 6-7.

FOUR PHASES OF DISASTER RELIEF

Today, the original and now time-proven concept of two phases of disaster relief should, perhaps, be expanded and thought of in four stages:

1. The period before disaster threatens or occurs, when hazards are being identified and plans made for warning and rescue, emergency mass care, and rehabilitation; when organization is perfected; and when volunteer and other personnel are recruited, trained, and assigned.

2. The phase of imminent threat or impact, when all combined effort, official, quasi-official, and voluntary, is directed toward saving lives and property.

3. The post-impact phase of emergency relief, which includes not only emergency mass care but also the clearance of debris; the making of temporary repairs; other arrangements for the restoration of public, corporate, and private facilities and services; and the general restoration of order.

4. The phase of permanent rehabilitation and restoration, not only of families but also of the public, corporate, and private installations, facilities, and services.

DISASTER PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

If we accept this fourfold concept, it will be found that never before in our history has such far-reaching, co-ordinated, and precisely detailed planning been done in stage one, the result in no small measure of our having accepted the necessity of being adequately prepared for the consequences of both natural disasters and enemy attack.

In this setting the Red Cross has been able to strengthen and intensify its long established preparedness measures in organization, in financing, in staffing and training, in the further development of steps for individual self-help, and in

many other ways that cannot be elaborated. During the World War II period the Red Cross issued certificates evidencing completed training in first aid, home care of the sick and injured, and related subjects to more than fourteen million persons;¹⁷ during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1956, comparable certificates were issued to nearly two and one-half million persons.¹⁸ As an outgrowth of its having provided to the Armed Forces during the World War II period more than thirteen million pints of voluntarily contributed blood, the Red Cross now operates a network of regional and subsidiary blood centers extending across the country, which provide a broad base for expansion to meet the greater needs of either war-caused or natural disaster and which currently supply some 40 per cent of the peacetime civilian blood needs of the entire country. In the national interest, the Red Cross, as an organized and trained community force, has pledged its support and assistance, in all those fields where it has special competence, to civil defense.

Civil defense

Actual experience in the United States with enemy-caused disasters is fortunately quite limited. During World War I supervision over civilian protection was exercised by the Secretary of War. During World War II "many state and local defense councils were revived"; a federal Office of Civil Defense was established in 1941 and "abolished" by Presidential directive on June 30, 1945.¹⁹

The current program of civil defense

¹⁷ *Red Cross Service Record: Accomplishments of Seven Years, 1939-1946* (ARC 541, November 1946).

¹⁸ *American Red Cross Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1955-56* (ARC 501).

¹⁹ Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress*, June 1955, p. 176.

was established to deal with enemy-caused disasters, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration was created to carry out its purposes.²⁰

The federal government and the Red Cross in disasters

The Congress acted also

... to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to states and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters, to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to foster the development of such state and local organizations and plans to cope with major disasters as may be necessary.²¹

Co-ordination having previously been handled through other offices, the President in 1953 delegated to the Federal Civil Defense Administration certain peacetime responsibilities related to natural disasters under these provisions of the act. They include predisaster planning, co-ordinating the activities of federal agencies, and administering federal grants to states and local governments.²²

In the Disaster Act of 1950, the Congress was careful to preclude any interpretation of it as a limitation or redistribution of the authority and responsibility of the Red Cross to continue its traditional disaster relief work, by providing that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to limit or in any way affect the responsibilities of the American National Red Cross under the

²⁰ Public Law 920, 81st Congress (Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950), approved January 12, 1951.

²¹ Public Law 875, 81st Congress (Federal Disaster Act of 1950), as amended, approved September 30, 1950.

²² Executive Order 10427, dated January 16, 1953; see also article in this volume by Val Peterson, "Co-ordinating and Extending Federal Assistance."

Act approved January 5, 1905 (33 Stat. 599), as amended."

To prevent possible confusion or overlapping of effort, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Red Cross have worked out general and specific mutual understandings that recognize this unchanged role of the Red Cross in carrying out its traditional services to people under its own administrative and financial control.²³

Figure 1 indicates the respective responsibilities of the agencies of government and of the Red Cross in natural disasters at the local community level. In the emergency period following disaster, co-operative effort is directed toward effecting rescue and evacuation, providing shelter, food, and clothing, and extending emergency medical and nursing aid to all in need. As quickly as possible after the emergency the government assists in restoring public works and buildings; providing sanitation and otherwise maintaining public health; rebuilding roads and bridges; and restoring or maintaining other essential public services. In contrast, the Red Cross serves people—individuals and families, and the proprietors of small businesses—who need emergency relief and help in returning to a self-sustaining basis.

CONCLUSION

In essence, the emergency mass care and other disaster needs of the country will be served most effectively if a number of basic considerations are recognized and observed.

The natural disaster hazard should be understood in terms of theoretical potentiality and actual experience over the years: what kinds of disasters are likely

²³ Statement of Understanding Between the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the American National Red Cross, February 6, 1953, and Supplement 1 (April 1953), Supplement 2 (April 1953), Supplement 3 (August 1953), and Supplement 4 (November 1953).




FIG. 1. RESPONSIBILITIES IN NATURAL DISASTERS

to occur, when and where will they strike, and what will be their human and material costs? In relating natural disasters to war-caused situations the differences as well as the similarities should be understood.

There is imperative necessity for advance planning and preparedness measures nationally, by regions or states, and locally, directly attuned to the hazards disclosed. Plans and organization must be constantly reviewed and modified as changing circumstances dictate. The public should be reasonably aware of the purposes, extent, and details of the co-ordinated plans of government, the Red Cross, and other organizations and groups. Although the authority and responsibility of government at all levels and of the Red Cross are clear and their prompt action in time of disaster is universally expected, it must be remembered that, however effectively their functions are co-ordinated, they need and welcome the co-operation of other agencies and indeed of the general public in carrying out their responsibilities. Great values as well as some problems

are implicit in the desires of all to help following dramatic disasters.

The news of major disasters evokes spontaneous public sympathy, generous giving, and widespread voluntary support. Moreover, in the aggregate, great needs result from a multiplicity of small disasters that do not get the headlines; these do not require large-scale governmental effort, but none the less bring acute needs to those directly affected. Consequently, plans, organization, personnel, and financing are required to meet the needs of minor as well as major disasters.

The limitations as well as the purposes of emergency mass care must be understood; the method should not be used at all if it can be avoided; when used, plans should contemplate its earliest termination.

There is vital need for continuing study and research, the results of which can be translated into more effective plans and action directed toward preventing or minimizing disasters or ameliorating their conditions when they cannot be avoided.

Relief and Rehabilitation of Families and Individuals

By ROBERT E. BONDY

Abstract: Using the casework principle, the American Red Cross has developed an effective system of disaster rehabilitation. Relief available to families is, principally, food, clothing, housing and repair, furniture, medical aid, and occupational equipment and supplies. Aid is rendered on a need basis and is limited to disaster areas and those immediately affected, supplementing local community efforts. Through sound personnel policies and modern techniques, the Red Cross has steadily improved its capacity to bring aid rapidly to stricken areas and to evolve long-range rehabilitation programs. Through its disaster relief, the Red Cross has also contributed to the social sciences by means of its community and casework studies and has brought about important improvements in national welfare.—Ed.

THE story of the relief and rehabilitation of families and individuals affected by natural disaster is largely the story written by the American National Red Cross. This is so because the Red Cross position for decades as America's voluntary disaster relief agency has made it responsible for both emergency care and rehabilitation of people in time of disaster; particularly in rehabilitation of families and individuals, the Red Cross has been the only agency over the years conducting a service to help the individual family restore its capacity to reach and maintain its predisaster standard of living.

The Red Cross defines rehabilitation as the process of assisting families and individuals in meeting disaster needs beyond their own resources so that they may become self-sustaining members of their community once again. Such an objective comes as close to facing and meeting a social problem as may be found in the field of social welfare.

The problem facing families and individuals affected by flood, tornado, hurricane, fire, or explosion is often one

of widespread chaos and devastation, with family members killed or injured, with home and household goods damaged or destroyed, often with livelihood threatened. The savings of a lifetime as represented in home and possessions may be gone. Health or other problems present in the family at the time of the disaster may make recovery a doubly difficult undertaking. Credit may be scanty or nonexistent. How can the family or individual confronted without warning by these problems return to a self-sufficient existence? To meet such problems the relief and rehabilitation service of the American Red Cross is provided.

REHABILITATION AN EXTENSIVE SERVICE

For each family assisted to become self-sustaining, rehabilitation service is of high significance and the total of such service to all families affected by disaster in any one year is an extensive contribution to America's well-being.

The number of disaster operations calling for Red Cross rehabilitation

service has increased year by year through various climatic, topographical, and other factors. For example, during the six calendar years from 1930 through 1935 the Red Cross gave service in 560 disaster operations compared with 2,017 during the six calendar years from 1950 through 1955. In the 1937 Ohio-Mississippi Valley flood 236,147 families were given rehabilitation assistance.

PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The basic philosophy is that people everywhere will do all that they can to help themselves in recovering from the effects of disaster. To the extent that the family or individual cannot make recovery, rehabilitation assistance is provided. Some of the underlying principles developed through the years should be stated at the outset.

1. Assistance is restricted to those families or individuals affected by the disaster. A disaster relief operation by restricting itself to disaster-affected families and individuals supports rather than duplicates the regular and continuing social welfare services of the community. Furthermore, donors to a disaster relief fund give because they desire to help people affected by the disaster.

2. The total resources and needs of each family should be considered as a unit. This means that the Red Cross functions as a family casework agency and uses the casework method.

3. Assistance is given on the basis of need. The rehabilitation process is primarily concerned with the adequacy or inadequacy of a family's resources to meet basic living needs following a disaster.

4. Assistance is given without political, religious, or racial discrimination when it has been established that the

family's resources are inadequate to meet basic living needs. Deviations from accepted standards, such as delinquency, immorality, and the like, are not regarded as sufficient grounds for withholding assistance when all other prerequisites exist. Neither United States citizenship nor legal settlement is considered in determining eligibility.

5. Loans are not made to disaster sufferers; relief given imposes no obligation of replacement; and there is no charge for any service.

6. Individual awards and case records are kept confidential in order to safeguard the applicant from inappropriate use of information. This casework principle does not prevent discriminate use of carefully selected case information for the benefit of the applicant and the program, as required in presentation of case material to the local advisory committee, in contacts with persons having specialized knowledge about the case, and in joint planning with another social welfare agency.

7. Public benefits available through tax resources such as old-age and survivors insurance benefits, public assistance, unemployment compensation, and veterans' benefits are considered as family resources. Assistance received from any organization prior to the disaster is expected to continue, as disaster rehabilitation is intended to meet disaster-caused needs. Rehabilitation assistance is not given to educational, charitable, or religious organizations or to government bodies. However, individuals connected with such agencies are entitled to the same consideration as others.

8. Rehabilitation includes aid to small businesses owned and operated by families who are dependent upon the restoration of income from such businesses for family living.

9. Consideration may be given to meeting predisaster problems including

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predisaster debts when the situation in the family resulting from the disaster would be best helped in that way.

10. An underlying consideration in all rehabilitation is that each family and individual is different and that assistance must be based upon facts carefully collected and evaluated in each situation.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DISASTER RELIEF

First responsibility for meeting the rehabilitation needs of families and individuals affected by disaster rests upon the families and individuals themselves. Each family is expected to draw upon its own resources for its own rehabilitation, utilizing those resources to the extent that is compatible with the continuing interests of the family. In the best tradition of American social welfare, the affected community takes its full measure of responsibility for the needs that the family cannot meet. The traditional expression of this responsibility of the community, whether it be the town or city or the nation, is through the American Red Cross disaster rehabilitation program. The Red Cross assists the family in the full utilization of its own resources and by advice and material assistance beyond that provided by the family when such assistance is indicated.

This system of rehabilitation of families and individuals in time of disaster has evolved over the seventy-five years of American Red Cross service, and in its present form more particularly over the past thirty-five years. However, some of the basic principles and assumptions in rehabilitation have their roots in the practices developed by Miss Clara Barton in rehabilitation assistance in the eighties and nineties of the last century.

In the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood, in Ohio Valley floods, and in the Sea Island, Georgia, hurricane disaster, the basic concepts of community assistance,

of responsibility of the family for its own recovery, were recognized.

DEVELOPMENT OF METHODS

In the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906 the practice of making loans to disaster sufferers rather than outright grants was found to be unworkable. Some beginnings were made there in co-ordination of rehabilitation under a common community plan. During the Cherry, Illinois, mine disaster Ernest P. Bicknell applied a plan of "pensions" for the survivors to assure a minimum maintenance over a period of years. While this plan recognized the differences in family needs based on the number of dependents, it was more automatic in the entitlement of families to it than are the individualized rehabilitation awards of today. But even so, this recognition that families required aid beyond the brief emergency care given and that the resources of the community should be drawn upon to assist in re-establishing at least some measure of the way of life existing before the disaster was indeed a milestone. There has been but little wavering from this concept of rehabilitation as well as of emergency care since those days almost fifty years ago.

In the early decades the rehabilitation processes that form the basis for today's program brought the more formalized and sharper policies of the family as the unit for relief, of need rather than loss as the basis for rehabilitation, of grants as opposed to loans as the method of assistance, of trained staff to get the facts and assist the family in the plans, of a strong local citizens' advisory committee, and of a centralizing of rehabilitation under the Red Cross.¹ Fortunately even these

¹ Clyde E. Buckingham, *Red Cross Disaster Relief: Its Origin and Development* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 31.

basic policies and procedures in rehabilitation have been kept flexible enough to adjust to the changing social and economic state of the country and to the expectations of the people.

ADAPTATION TO CHANGING CONDITIONS

A service as dynamic as disaster rehabilitation and as conditioned by the changing economy and expectation of the nation inevitably has flexibility as its conditioning feature. The social, economic, and political setting for disaster rehabilitation today is significantly changed from fifty years ago or even twenty-five years ago.

Today government's solicitude for the well-being of its people is expressed in the social security program and in health and other public welfare services. It is inherent in the times that people expect more than they used to from employers, and from government and voluntary organizations, in protection against the hazards of a dynamic and expanding economy. Voluntary hospitalization plans, industrial pension provisions, slum clearance and low-cost housing programs, huge federal expenditures for highways, millions of dollars in research to protect the health of the people, soil banks and crop insurance are public devices to ensure the general welfare of the people.

This dynamic, expanding situation has inevitably changed welfare agency concepts and policies, including American Red Cross disaster relief and rehabilitation. Community leaders and people generally have new and greater expectations. They expect flexibility; and particularly they expect responsiveness to the trends of the times and to the expectations of the people and particularly of the contributors.

All of this suggests that a flexible application of the basically sound need policy in rehabilitation would take into account such variable factors as the

economic and social setting of the day, the expectations of the community and the contributors, the standard of living of the community and the people affected by disaster, and the available funds. Administration of a flexible need policy calls not only for a lucid statement of the policy in instruction material, but also for a sensitive, informed, and adaptable staff leadership under which each disaster is viewed as a case in itself, with the level of assistance determined for it in the light of the factors given above.

Rehabilitation cannot be played by ear, done in a haphazard style according to mood and temperament. The only guide as yet found is need. But the definition of need is not the same everywhere, all the time. Need is a variable, imperatively demanding a flexible approach.

INDIGENOUS NATURE OF DISASTER RELIEF

The strength of the Red Cross disaster rehabilitation service lies in its indigenous nature. It is of and by the people and the communities in which they live. Its strength lies in making its national as well as its chapter service indigenous to the communities.² Part of the job of being indigenous is that of integration into the community. Strength comes through a philosophy and way of work in which people are generally aware that the rehabilitation program seeks to play its important part as part of the community effort.

Simplicity and warm humanity in administering relief brings hearty response and support from the community and the affected families in the future as in the past. Rehabilitation is an extremely

² For the organizational structure of the American National Red Cross see *supra*, Ellsworth Bunker, "The Voluntary Effort in Disaster Relief," under the subhead "Building an Organizational Structure."—Ed.

personal affair, and the manner of accomplishing it is vitally important, because any rehabilitation program must deal with people off normal balance and bruised. The sympathy need is sometimes greater than the money need.

These are some of the considerations that harmonize disaster relief rehabilitation with the demands of the times and with the expectations of the people. Basic policies and procedures are given flexible interpretation, though those policies and procedures may not be changed in their fundamentals.

CATEGORIES OF RELIEF

One basic element in rehabilitation is the categories of relief or assistance available to families. There are five principal categories: food, clothing, and other maintenance; building and repair; household furnishings; medical and nursing care; and occupational supplies and equipment and small business rehabilitation.

In contrast to immediate assistance with food, shelter, and clothing given during the emergency period on the stated need of the family, a rehabilitation maintenance award is planned according to the total budgetary needs of the family. The purpose of the award is to provide a livelihood for the family until other resources become available, such as earned income, benefits from social security, insurance vocational training, or transfer to another agency. The anticipated family income, either from earnings or from another source, should be kept in mind.

A rehabilitation program undertakes to assist homeowners with the basic needs in the building and repair of their homes and other essential structures after the maximum resources available to the family have been utilized to meet the need. A basic need in this category includes consideration of the mini-

mum cost of placing essential buildings in a safe and usable condition.

Assistance is given to families with the purchase of basic furnishings essential to family living. Furniture of adequate quality may be purchased. Such assistance is given when a study of the family situation shows that essential items have been lost and that the family does not have the resources to obtain them.

Prompt and adequate medical and nursing care to those individuals and families in need of such services is another category of relief. Assistance under this classification is intended for those who are ill or injured because of the disaster or whose condition is aggravated by the disaster, and who otherwise would be unable to obtain medical, dental, and nursing care.

The occupational supplies and equipment category is for the purpose of helping operators of small farms, owners of small businesses, and those who own their own occupational equipment with a view to re-establishing the family income, though not necessarily on the same scale as before the disaster. Also included under this category is vocational rehabilitation for wage earners or potential wage earners when such rehabilitation is necessitated by the disaster.

The relative amount needed in these different categories in any given disaster will vary according to the type of disaster. For example, a tornado or a hurricane may cause more deaths and injuries proportionately than a flood and therefore call for more medical and nursing care. The high velocity of water in a New England flood may result in more total damage to homes than in a slow-moving Mississippi River flood. Whatever the difference in type of disaster and in the relative amounts needed in categories of relief, the rehabilitation plan for each individual and family is based on a careful study of the needs

and resources of the individual or family.

APPLICATION OF CASEWORK TO DISASTER

The casework method may be regarded as the most fundamental of the procedural assumptions in disaster relief rehabilitation. Disaster rehabilitation is a social welfare program using the casework method in helping the individual family restore its capacity to reach and maintain its predisaster standard of living. The program is sufficiently broad to provide financial assistance adequate to meet any disaster-caused needs existing after the family has applied its resources. The disaster caseworker counsels with each applicant in studying the disaster losses, in order to determine the extent of his total needs and his ability to meet these needs, and to establish the amount of assistance needed. The caseworker must deal with individual problems, complex and varied, created by the disaster.

Rehabilitation in disaster follows the broad outlines of family casework in the use of such techniques as consultation with families, verification of pertinent information, consultation with outside sources, and the development of plans to meet the needs of each family situation on an individual basis. Family participation in planning is an integral part of this process, since each family is expected to effect as much of its own recovery as possible.

Special characteristics of disaster casework

Disaster creates special situations that must be handled by the caseworker:

1. The emotional shock, anxiety, and tension among families affected by a disaster situation are intensified among persons who suffer personal tragedy or loss, serious injury of loved ones, and loss of real and personal property.

2. The number of family problems that may need to be considered is larger than in most family casework situations; their scope is often greater.

3. The cost of rehabilitation usually far exceeds the cost of relief extended by casework agencies during a comparable period of time.

4. Disaster rehabilitation is primarily concerned with the adequacy or inadequacy of the family's resources to meet the problems caused by disaster.

5. A short-contact type of relationship is indicated, since the cause of the family's need is clearly established and rehabilitation policies are designed to deal directly and positively with material needs, illness, and injury. The specialized function of disaster casework precludes a long-range type of social treatment.

6. Disaster casework concerns itself only with problems caused by disaster.

7. Rehabilitation relief is given on a need basis only.

8. Speed in making plans with families whose whole way of life is disrupted and whose suffering will be increased by delay is of the essence.

Chronological procedure

The processes that often occur chronologically in dealing with a family's needs include the following: Following the occurrence of the disaster, the family receives emergency care largely on the basis of the stated need of the individual. Application is made by the family for rehabilitation consideration, the applicant filling out an application form giving the facts of loss and of resources. The family caseworker counsels with the family in the disaster office and in the family's home for the making of a plan of rehabilitation. The agreed plan is then presented by the caseworker to the local advisory committee for concurrence. Upon action of the committee, an award is then estab-

lished and the family notified. Opportunity is then given the family to do its own shopping for articles needed or to make its own contracting arrangements for building and repair or otherwise to proceed with the carrying out of its own plan. Payment is then made by the Red Cross.

Types of assistance

Rehabilitation assistance may be given in kind, through purchase orders, or in cash. Often donated supplies of clothing, household goods, or building materials are received and may become part of the assistance given under the rehabilitation award. Generally assistance is in the form of a purchase order made out to the vendor of the family's own choosing. With this purchase order in hand the family is then able to make its own decisions as to the items to be obtained or the building repair work to be done—all within the general spirit of the rehabilitation award and within the dollar amount approved.

Cash grants as a method of relief may be given when the facts show that cash assistance is the best way to meet a family's need. This procedure often expedites the rehabilitation of the family and enables it to proceed in the manner to which it is accustomed.

From emergency care to rehabilitation

Much of the effectiveness of the rehabilitation process is dependent upon the proper blending of the emergency care into the rehabilitation services. The disaster-affected family usually has its first contact with the relief organization during the period of emergency care. It learns then of the emergency and rehabilitation policies and procedures and the purposes and circumstances under which rehabilitation assistance is given. The application for rehabilitation service is usually made during the emergency care period; and the smooth-

ness of rehabilitation often is dependent on the rapport established between the disaster worker and the family, and the clarity with which policies are explained and the application process inaugurated during the emergency care period. The two periods of emergency and rehabilitation care are therefore two parts of but one period of recovery from disaster.

REHABILITATION AN EVOLVING PROCESS

Disaster rehabilitation has improved and evolved over the years because the Red Cross has kept its methods open to review constantly and has been responsive to changing times. For example, the high tempo of life today has seemed to have its counterpart in the expectation that disaster relief operations, including the rehabilitation process, be speeded up and up. Disaster relief operations that a decade or two ago consumed four to six months from the occurrence of a disaster until the completion of the last award may often be carried out today in two to three months. This has seemed to have justification in possible saving of funds and prompt provision of relief. In this process of expediting rehabilitation the Red Cross has established certain safeguards. The best interests of the families affected have been kept in mind as well as the protection of the disaster rehabilitation workers, both the paid staff and the citizen volunteers.

As rehabilitation is the very core of disaster relief, the Red Cross has given close attention to strengthening the organization and administration of the entire disaster relief operation. Sound administrative practices have been studied and applied to disaster relief operations where pertinent. The partnership of the professional worker and the volunteer worker has had attention. As the volunteer plays an important role in most disaster operations, a special ef-

fort is made to dignify the place of the volunteer, particularly at the point of contact with applicants.

The role of the professional or staff worker is that of a person trained and experienced in rehabilitation processes, including casework methods, ability to act with flexibility in a highly dynamic situation, strength and stamina for the grueling duties and long hours and the usual qualities of devotion to service and dependability. While the American Red Cross has a large body of experienced professional workers available for assignment in disaster, the larger disaster relief operations require additional people from public and voluntary organizations. Working understandings have been developed between these organizations and the Red Cross on staff availability and conditions under which staff will be loaned. As far as possible, continuing attention is given to the maintenance of sound personnel practices.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Service on the local advisory committee is one of the most significant contributions of the citizen volunteer in a disaster relief operation. Particular care must be taken to select for advisory committee service men and women of strong, representative qualities who will work in harmony with the basic policies and procedures in rehabilitation and willingly assume responsibility for decisions. Each advisory committee must be carefully oriented in its authority and responsibilities.

The role of the local advisory committee is to share with the staff administratively responsible for the disaster relief operation the decisions on awards to individuals and families made in the rehabilitation process. This means that the committee is not merely advisory and is certainly not a rubber stamp; rather, financial authority for decision on awards is clearly accorded

the members of the committee. Such financial authority would rest in majority decision of the committee, and in extent would be equal to that vested in the staff administratively responsible for the operation. It should be understood that such financial authority may be exercised only in cases adhering to basic disaster rehabilitation policies.

Through such a partnership of local community leadership with the staff assigned to the relief operation, rehabilitation becomes responsive to the wishes of the community and also is based upon the best experience of the past.

As disaster relief rehabilitation calls for the use of the resources of the individual and the community, it is clear that the Red Cross as the responsible rehabilitation agency has taken an appropriate position in seeking co-operative relationships with other organizations, both governmental and voluntary. For example, the formal working agreement between the American Red Cross and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations well illustrates the scope and possibilities of such co-operative understandings. Provision is made for recognition of the role of the American Red Cross, and for training and participation of members of the labor organization in a disaster relief operation as well as for assistance in raising funds for the central Red Cross relief fund. The Salvation Army, the American Legion, fraternal organizations, and many local social welfare agencies have made significant disaster relief contributions of service over the years. Some of this relates to the rehabilitation period but more of it to the mass care period.

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Historically, government—federal, state, and local—has made its resources available in time of disaster. Some of the traditional roles of local and state

government are especially significant in time of disaster, such as maintaining law and order, protecting the public health, providing communication facilities. Federal and state government services have been and are called upon when local resources are inadequate. During the decades of this century significant disaster service has been given by the National Guard and state militia, Corps of Engineers of the United States Army and the Army itself, United States Coast Guard, Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture, United States Weather Bureau, the Disaster Loan Corporation, and during the 1930's the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

In 1947, an act to make surplus property available for the alleviation of damage caused by flood or other catastrophe formalized a federal policy of disaster assistance. The Federal Disaster Act of 1950 not only called for special federal aid in declared "major disasters" (Executive Order 10427 of 1953 assigning to the Federal Civil Defense Administration the co-ordination of government services and facilities) but also confirmed the American National Red Cross in its humanitarian responsibilities.³ Many agencies of local, state, and federal government now make their services and facilities available in time of disaster.

The most recent expression of federal government activity in disaster relief came with the passage of the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956 by the Eighty-fourth Congress. The act provides a system of federal subsidy for insurance against floods and authorizes study of the feasibility of extending insurance coverage to certain other types of natural disasters.⁴

³ See also *supra*, Val Peterson, "Co-ordinating and Extending Federal Assistance."—Ed.

⁴ See also *supra*, Edwin S. Overman, "The Flood Peril and the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956."—Ed.

Close working arrangements between the Red Cross and agencies of government are particularly important. Many people are the beneficiaries or recipients of government assistance and services, such as public assistance, old-age and survivors insurance benefits, and unemployment compensation. The responsibility of the Federal Civil Defense Administration for co-ordinating the resources of government in time of disaster, particularly for restoration of public property and governmental services, emphasizes the value of the close co-operation between the Red Cross and the Federal Civil Defense Administration that characterizes disaster relief operations.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

The best public relations are made possible by a highly effective rehabilitation service. Yet much must be done to acquaint the public with the services of rehabilitation and the accomplishments. This statement relates to good understanding on the part of the people of the country and also to effective interpretation of rehabilitation policies and procedures to the disaster sufferers themselves and the community immediately affected. The second is at times the more difficult of the two jobs. Public relations in the disaster area are a continuous process throughout the rehabilitation period, participated in not only by staff people on the disaster operation but by advisory committee and other local people. Broad policies should be stated but human interest and illustrative case material should also be employed. The channels of information most commonly known to the affected families should be utilized.

SIGNIFICANT BY-PRODUCTS OF DISASTER RELIEF

As a final word it may not be claiming too much to say that disaster reha-

bilitation as carried out over the years by the American Red Cross has had very significant by-products. Unfortunately the scope of this paper does not permit a complete listing. However, many thousands of individuals and families have been helped back to a way of independent living. Communities have been restored more rapidly as a result of rehabilitation and of the flow of business and cash that the rehabilitation process brings to the affected community.

Relocation of homes out of disaster hazard areas into new areas of safety has been planned in some disaster relief operations and carried out. The natural human tendency to want to remain in the same location calls at times for careful planning, but when that is possible a real by-product of high value results.

The rehabilitation and casework methods used in disaster relief have brought important technical and professional contributions to the field of social welfare and of casework. The short-time casework called for in disaster has been suggestive to organizations requiring that kind of service in their day-by-day activities. Staff loaned to a disaster operation have benefited from experience in dealing with community-wide forces and have had higher vision because of the adequacy of rehabilitation and the

measurability of restoring a family to its predisaster status. It may well be that some of the early Red Cross practice of giving long-time maintenance to orphans and widows and the basically sound policies inherent in the rehabilitation process have had much to do with forming the foundation for such public provisions as Workmen's Compensation and other governmental maintenance provisions.

The Red Cross has introduced new gardening and food habits to whole sections of the country to combat illness due to dietary deficiency found among families affected by disaster. The Red Cross was the first organization to provide for widespread use of yeast as a preventive of pellagra. It introduced screening and other measures for malaria control in areas where such measures were previously unknown. Organization of local Red Cross chapter committees on preparedness for disaster has resulted in measures being taken that in many instances have reduced loss of life and property damage.

Clearly, it may be said that for sheer social achievement the specific aids to restoration of families and individuals affected by disaster and the by-product values label American Red Cross rehabilitation services as one of the most significant contributions to human well-being.

Emergency Medical, Hospital, and Nursing Care

By HAROLD C. LUETH

Abstract: Carefully planned emergency medical service is essential if disaster casualties are to receive full benefit of modern facilities and techniques. Detailed but flexible plans are required, since nonprofessional assistance cannot otherwise be utilized to full advantage, a fact abundantly clear in recent disasters. Any plan should center on co-ordination with other community services. Basic elements of a plan should stress reception of casualties; sorting and initial diagnosis; emergency medical care; and evacuation of casualties. It is incumbent on the medical profession to initiate the training and guidance of emergency medical cadres to make any emergency plans effective.—Ed.

EMERGENCY medical service is a type of medical practice that is receiving increased attention from doctors. In the past, the average practitioner has not given it much consideration, and he has rationalized his neglect by assuming that if the problem should arise, he would simply go to work and do his best. But natural and man-made disasters are, unfortunately, ineradicable parts of modern living, and if they are to be met efficiently and effectively plans must be made in advance.

Plans must be made for proper reception and registration of casualties, for skillful and rapid diagnosis of injuries, for the utilization of recognized procedures, and for the formation of teams of skilled auxiliary workers. To be assured of having an opportunity to render good medical service during a disaster and its aftermath, physicians must take the lead in making certain that similar careful planning has been done in the related fields of rescue, communication, transportation, and fire and police work. Thus, two distinct obligations face the physicians: acquisition of

recognized techniques for the handling of medical emergencies, and stimulation and training of auxiliary workers. Men and women in related health fields are eager for the leadership which only the medical profession can give.

Daily papers and news broadcasts report disasters that give us pause. All of us feel regret and unhappiness after receiving these reports, but too frequently we reassure ourselves with the thought that nothing of the sort could happen to our locality. On the contrary, disasters are unpredictable and can happen anywhere. Tornadoes, floods, and severe fires can come suddenly or with little warning. Streamlined trains and airplanes have multiplied the possibilities of accidents and serious injuries; jet planes, with still greater power and speed, add to the potential destructiveness of such accidents; they are more and more likely to injure not only the fliers but people on the ground as well. The wide variety of chemical agents being used in commerce, many of them explosive, present new hazards. Technology, with the greater use of powered machinery, has added to the list of po-

tentially destructive agents, in spite of the advances that have been made in safety programs.

Physicians are being called upon to treat emergencies more frequently than in the past, but in too many instances emergency medical care has been the concern only of a small group of doctors—the industrial surgeons and the military surgeons. Increased possibilities of need for emergency medical service, including the possibility of thermonuclear warfare, make it essential that all physicians take an active interest in it.

All of us recognize disaster or emergency care as a professional obligation, one wholly unpredictable as to time, place, and extent. Many indications point to the likelihood that disaster in one form or another will always be with us. What has not been so generally recognized and accepted is the necessity of incorporating into everyday activities and planning some thought and practice for the proper handling of the varied medical repercussions of a disaster. Perhaps a broad review of the probable types of activities necessary for sound emergency medical care after disaster would serve to clarify the problems in professional practice confronting professional groups and help them find solutions to the complex and intricate problem of realistic, sound medical care in emergencies.

DISASTER PLANNING

It is imperative to plan for disaster well in advance of the event. Plans should be broad enough to cover a wide variety of conditions: tornadoes, fires, floods, earthquakes, explosions, and enemy attack. In planning, consideration should be given to building upon existing resources of the community, with medical services enlarged by the augmentation of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Disaster plans must indi-

cate the evolution from normal practice in civilian life to the maximum expansion of the medical facilities of the community. The advice of General Sir Frederick Morgan to the planning staff of the Normandy coast invasion, "Think big—plan carefully, soundly, and in realistic terms," applies aptly to plans for medical care in disaster. All possible eventualities should be weighed with a disciplined imagination.

Various types of disasters will produce casualties of different types and in different numbers. The heart of the problem to professional people is not the physical damage or the enemy action, but rather how the best care for the largest number of casualties can be given. All plans should be directed toward the proper professional care of sick and injured people, using the total resources of medical skills and within the supporting framework of the other technical services, as engineering for power, utilities, heat, and road maintenance; sanitation; communication; police; fire; rescue and warden work.

Too frequently, professional people are concerned with the provision of transportation, communication, engineering, and other services and have not realistically envisioned a plan of action for the *proper medical care of casualties*. Once a series of sound medical plans has been developed, it will be easier to co-ordinate these plans with supporting services and thus to assure a complete plan of action for the community as a whole. Many technical services (such as fire, police, rescue, and engineering) have adopted plans considerably in advance of those of the health fields, and are training for their execution.

A sound, realistic plan for emergency medical care, broad enough to cover a variety of circumstances and elastic enough to permit local changes and minor modifications, will most effectively cope with the multitude of prob-

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lems arising from any disaster. To prepare a specific, detailed plan to cover every possible disaster would be difficult, if not impossible. The unpredictable course of events in natural or enemy-caused disaster combines with many other things to make a rigid plan of action difficult to execute.

Expect the unexpected, and make minor changes in plans and operations promptly. The basic plan is merely a directional guide. Improvisations will be necessary. Plan for, and train personnel to meet, new situations. But the more resourceful the advance planning, the more comprehensive the professional training, the more closely knit the group or health team, the less will be the reliance that will have to be placed on improvisations. Adequately trained key personnel, acting within their own resources and guided by sound plans, under competent leadership will meet any or all types of disaster with skill, confidence, and efficiency.

PERSONNEL

Personnel trained as professional people are a very special and small segment of the general population. In civilian life under ordinary circumstances all phases of the health services are available to the general population. Nearly all types of civilian medical, dental, and nursing service are predicated on a small, orderly flow of patients seeking these services. Disaster carries the possibility of a large number of people requiring health services at the same time or within a short period of time, which will require major modification of the generally accepted modes of practice.

In ordinary circumstances, with the regular and slow flow of patients to the health services, professional people are able to give freely of their time and effort to each patient. The physician, dentist, nurse, and other personnel do all they can for that particular patient.

This basic principle underlies professional teaching and practice. In a disaster, there must be acceptance of a new principle—that of doing the greatest good for the largest number. Health services must be extended to cover the widest possible application to the largest number of people. The matter requires serious thought, after a critical scrutiny of current technical procedures from which there might evolve a series of new techniques for emergency medical care. Professional people have become so accustomed to various daily procedures considered basic and essential that it would not be easy to change them. In disaster, however, they might have to be radically changed in order to meet the requirements of emergency medical care and yet remain within good medical practice.

Personnel should be assigned to positions commensurate with their potentials for giving the best care to the largest numbers. Professional people will have to become accustomed to playing new parts, for certainly disaster can hardly be called "business as usual." They will have to learn new skills, teach different methods of handling patients, and accustom themselves to new positions. Drastic changes of this type require patience, tact, and gentle persuasion for their ultimate accomplishment.

A related and equally difficult problem is the development of the team spirit among professional people. Traditionally, physicians and nurses have worked together as a group. In a disaster, there must be the harmonious working of all members of the health services in a team. Physicians and dentists, and to a lesser extent nurses, have been accustomed to individual practice, which permits a wide latitude of individual action, but in a disaster, much of the individual action must be coordinated and harmonized with the actions of others. Through conferences,

planning sessions, and simulated operation tests, it will be possible to move toward these objectives. Adjustments and occasional deviations from original plans may have to be made under certain circumstances. It is desirable to retain as much individual action and operation as is consistent with the efficiency and harmonious working of the group.

Uncertainties as to the ready availability of all personnel make it desirable to assign key personnel in depth. It would be wise to have one or several assistants or alternates for each key position. A staffing pattern of this type would also permit the operation of the health team for a prolonged period of time and under conditions of severe stress. Nearly all professionally trained personnel should have assignments to at least one duty and preferably to several. Uncertainties as to the types and number of casualties combine to make this a prudent personnel policy. It should be anticipated, too, that some personnel will be away from home, sick, or otherwise unable to respond for immediate duty after a disaster. Assignment of personnel in depth and multiple-duty assignments are helpful in overcoming these problems.

FLEXIBLE PLANS NEEDED

For convenience, the complex problems of emergency medical service can be arbitrarily divided into (1) reception of casualties, (2) sorting and arriving at initial working diagnoses, (3) initiation of emergency medical care, and (4) evacuation.

When there have been few casualties, the usual methods of management suffice, but when large numbers of casualties have occurred simultaneously, there is a necessity for team effort, and team effort presupposes preplanning.

The medical aspects of emergency medical care start with speedy recep-

tion. Advance plans should include means of permitting large numbers of casualties to be received at the hospital with a minimum of confusion. Often hospitals and medical staffs have inadequate or unelastic disaster plans. Realistic, sound disaster planning takes time, thoughtful appraisal of small details, and careful co-ordination of all sections of the medical staff and of the elements of the hospital. Wasteful and unco-ordinated action by the staff can easily prevent the rendering of speedy and effective medical treatment to patients when large numbers of them have been brought in at the same time or in rapid succession.

Experience at Texas City, Flint, Worcester, and other disaster sites has shown the need for advance planning. Disorganization and resultant confusion in each instance prevented utilization of the full professional capabilities of the city. The major problem is not what the doctor will do after he and the patient have been brought together. It is the recruiting, training, and organizing of laymen and a relatively small number of professional people whose work will enable the doctor to reach the patients in the order that the nature of their injuries demands and to treat them adequately.

Disasters vary in type and in extent. It is desirable for each community or group of communities to make flexible plans for full and complete utilization of its medical resources. The worst must be planned for. Once the complete plan for full-scale disaster relief has been drawn, modifications to cover less extensive emergencies can be formulated rather easily. Plans should be flexible enough to cover all types of natural and artificial calamities. A serious train wreck near a small community would severely tax the entire medical resources of that town and of the surrounding ones as well. Each

community, large or small, should plan on the same basis. It matters little whether the casualties follow a tornado or a nuclear attack, for the medical problems are essentially those of number and types of injuries. Communities may be faced with the task of treating large numbers of severely burned patients after an explosion of some highly volatile chemical. Their injuries would not be very dissimilar to the burn cases produced by an A- or H-bomb burst. Alternate plans for using a part of the hospital's resources and personnel should be made for disasters of lesser magnitude.

Flexibility can be accomplished through planning, as far as possible, for each of the hospitals in the vicinity to prepare to handle no more than one or two types of casualties—shock, fractures, chest injuries, burns, and so forth. The number of casualties is merely expression of the extent of the disaster. Even in a minor catastrophe, there is strong likelihood of there being various types of injuries.

Plans should be simple and easily understandable. It is desirable that they be written, so that they can be studied by all hospital personnel. Printed operational plans will permit study by new staff members and new hospital employees. And if printed copies of the plans are available at the time a disaster occurs, they can advantageously be distributed to volunteer workers.

Experience indicates that in nearly all disasters the procurement of volunteers is no problem. They arrive on the scene in large numbers. The difficulty is that in many instances their help is utilized poorly, if at all. During a flood in a midwestern city, for example, a group of nurses offered their services, but no one about the hospital was able to suggest an assignment for them. When they had looked around them, they discovered that large numbers of evacuees,

many of whom had been injured, were crowded about the admission office. After making a few inquiries, the nurses began a registration service that permitted an orderly admission of patients to the hospital. These women rendered real assistance, but with advance planning, clerical personnel could have been secured to do the registering, and the nurses could have been utilized to greater advantage in caring for patients. Utilization of volunteers involves some real problems, best met by means of plans agreed upon in advance and written, printed, and publicized.

RECEPTION OF CASUALTIES

Reception and registration of patients is an important phase of combating any disaster. A hospital administrator, working with clerical personnel in his community, can devise methods of expanding these vital services rapidly. An information bureau should be established as early as possible. Inquiries concerning relatives and friends will be made in large volume, soon after the disaster. These personal inquiries, telephone calls, and telegrams must be answered promptly if the public is to be satisfied and if the chances of panic are to be reduced. The volume of messages is often staggering, and a fairly large staff must be recruited to handle them. There is no doubt that some of them scarcely deserve answering. An analysis of inquiries following disasters has shown that calls, wires, and letters come not only from close relatives, neighbors, and intimate friends of the people involved, but also from distant relatives and casual acquaintances. It is one of the vagaries of human nature that a person may become quite genuinely concerned about a distant relative or a one-time acquaintance on hearing of a disaster in which he may possibly have been killed or injured. Inquiries sometimes are made concerning people who

had moved from the region years before the disaster. Priorities, nevertheless, cannot easily be set up; it takes time to process all of the inquiries; and they must be answered if anxiety is not to be built up in the minds of the interrogators.

Traffic management is another problem that must be anticipated. Those who live relatively near to the disaster area drive over to see "how things look," and crowd the already heavily taxed highways. Physicians and auxiliary personnel must be provided with a means of passing through police lines if they are to get to the hospital to care for the injured. And congestion must be avoided on the streets and roads between hospitals.

Some people may wonder why these matters not directly related to medical practice are being permitted a place in this discussion. The answer is that unless adequate attention is given to the registration of casualties, to the establishment and operation of an information bureau, and to traffic control, physicians will be interrupted in their professional work or will be prevented from doing it at all. Physicians have a vital interest in seeing to it that lay men and women are ready to attend to these important details.

SORTING PATIENTS AND MAKING WORKING DIAGNOSES

As each patient is admitted to the hospital, a physician should examine him promptly and carefully, so as to arrive at a working diagnosis of his injuries and decide how promptly they need to be treated. The doctor will note the presence or absence of shock. He will refer the slightly wounded to the proper agency for further treatment. Injuries requiring specialized care will be referred for treatment on the spot, or will be transported to the hospital which, according to the plan, is special-

izing in the patient's type of difficulty. It is the sorting physician who makes that decision. He occupies a position that requires quick but sound judgment amid very trying conditions. It goes without saying, then, that he must be a well-experienced and mature doctor of medicine, for through sound judgment and proper classification he will probably save as many lives as anyone in the hospital.

INITIATION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE

Physicians too frequently assume that the group of nurses and hospital attendants with whom they are accustomed to work will always be available to them. But after a disaster, many if not all of the physicians in an area go to the hospital to give emergency medical care. The operating-room staff and the ward staffs that have previously worked with the private practitioners more or less in rotation cannot work with all of them at the same time. Disaster planning must therefore include provision for the augmentation of operating-room and ward staffs.

Administratively, the provision of auxiliary personnel of this sort poses an especially difficult problem. The teaching of untrained or partially trained people is time consuming and can be looked upon as a nuisance, for it upsets the well-ordered routines of a smoothly working operating-room staff. But if disaster is not to bring confusion, it must be done. Physicians and nurses should find places for teaching sessions and for trial runs of emergency disaster teams and, in addition, they should give the recruits some routine hospital training and experience. Following a disaster, the abilities of the professionals will be sufficiently taxed without their having the added responsibility of training their assistants "from the ground up." Sundays, holidays, and the least busy

weekday hours can be advantageously used as training periods.

Care should be taken so that casualties on medical and health-service teams will not seriously cripple their effectiveness. Having one or possibly two alternates for each position, selected and trained in advance to fill vacancies that may occur, is desirable, but if such detailed preparations for trouble are too much to ask, the establishment of a key group or cadre of staff members is a scheme which has proved effective in some places. As far as possible, they can prepare to coach the green or partially trained personnel who may be added to the hospital staff in a time of stress.

To a large extent, the effectiveness of surgical care in an emergency will depend as much upon the functioning of operating-room and ward staffs as upon the competence of the surgeon. After the Flint tornado, one middle-aged hospital attendant went to the hospital to work. She was a diet maid, and there seemed to be no opportunity for her to perform her accustomed duties. No one was able to suggest anything else for her to do, but she found an essential task for herself. After hearing nurses complain that soiled operating-room linen was accumulating, she summoned several of her friends and neighbors to come to the hospital to help her wash it. Thus she enabled the operating-room service to continue functioning.

The medical profession must take the initiative and exercise leadership in recruiting, selecting, training, and guiding professional cadres for emergency medical service.

EVACUATION

Evacuation plans must be made in advance of a disaster. It is natural for all sick and injured to be brought to a hospital for care, regardless of the magnitude of their ailments. Unless

some evacuation plan has been agreed upon in advance, hospitals soon become overcrowded. All hospitals in a locality and in surrounding communities must share in a master plan for coping with disaster. The evacuation aspect of that joint program especially demands careful planning, tact, and wise judgment. At Worcester, Flint, and Jackson, several hospitals were filled to overflowing when other hospitals only a few miles away were still waiting for patients. Careful planning could have prevented that difficulty, for transportation crews could have been instructed which type of patients to bring to each of the co-operating institutions.

Evacuation is dependent upon transportation facilities and adequate communication. Arrangements should be made in advance for individually powered radio nets between hospitals and between the hospitals and the transportation facilities. The disruption of electric power and telephone lines at Worcester completely isolated the various hospitals.

TRAINING

Training should be direct and specific. Each key person should review his position or positions and make a careful, complete job analysis. The essential elements of the job should be itemized and, if needful, taught to alternates. Job analysis is a time-consuming task, but it will repay the time and effort expended by giving a clearer understanding of the duties of each key person. Positions will be clarified, specific functions will be delineated, attention will be directed to the fields of mutual operation, and there will emerge a better understanding of who does what—when, where, and why.

There is an abundance of good teaching material and training aids for the instruction of civilian practice. Elements of emergency medical care or dis-

aster medicine are much more difficult to find, and the same thing is true of nursing. Many teaching aids must be developed. This circumstance is not unfortunate, for the development of new teaching media will give, inevitably, a greater understanding of the problem. Splendid lectures and graphic demonstrations of the proper handling of war wounds by members of the faculty of the Walter Reed Institute of Research and the Army Medical Service School are some of the newer helps in the field of emergency medical service. A small group in this field is doing pioneer work. Proper management of trauma and soft tissue wounds has wider application to peacetime practice than might at first be suspected. The Committee on Trauma of the American College of Surgeons is also making an important contribution. For the ultimate fulfillment of the task before it, each community must enlist the aid of all local professional groups to review and teach the lessons of emergency medical care, using the materials from the Army, the American College of Surgeons, the American Medical Association, the American Dental Association, the American Nurses' Association, the American Veterinary Medical Association, the American Pharmaceutical Association, and other professional groups. A local civil defense health council, using all of these resources together with the local personnel, can furnish the solution to the complex and intricate problem of emergency medical service.

Training, to be effective, must be progressive and continuous. Progress is constantly being made in professional fields, and the newer findings from the clinic, the laboratory, and research groups must be translated into current practice. A progressive system of training must be envisioned. For example, members of local professional associa-

tions should make arrangements to attend courses in emergency surgery given to the medical profession by surgeons. After some training, there should be opportunities for nurses, dentists, and others to assist surgeons in the handling of accident cases in the civilian hospitals, over the week end, on holidays, or at some other period. In time, there will emerge from among the nurses those who will be able to give emergency training to other nurses. Much the same sequence of events should take place in respect to dentists and veterinarians.

Training programs will vary with each community, and each should properly make its own arrangements. Experimentation with techniques for better adaptation to the hurried conditions under which emergency medical care is given is at this point of great importance. The outgrowth from such experimentation may well be a handy manual of standardized techniques (as in first aid) tested under normal conditions for the guidance of all physicians.

All professional people must be trained in the elements of emergency medical care. There are three phases to be considered: (1) pre-attack; (2) attack and immediate post-attack; (3) later post-attack. Pre-attack is from the present until the time of disaster. During this time planning, recruitment, training, and operational exercises should take place. In the attack, medical and health personnel must go to their posts and provide medical care. This period of emergency medical service may last from several hours to several weeks. The post-attack period will see a gradual shift from emergency medical service to normal civilian activities, a gradual resumption of the pattern of normal living.

Training must take place in several fields, for in disaster assignments are likely to include several duties. There

tion may limit in different degrees an individual's capacity to respond. Physical barriers (as in fires or floods) may modify considerably the avenues for appropriate action. Yet within these externally imposed bounds, a human being will be controlled chiefly by the overall meaning of the experience to him. As one writer put it very succinctly not so long ago, ". . . people are extraordinarily different in what bothers them."¹

It is true, of course, that all individuals are so constructed that certain disturbances in their internal equilibrium can be expected almost universally in any stressful situations. Quickening of the pulse, some tautening of the skeletal musculature, blanching or flushing of the face, and odd sensations in the throat, chest, or abdomen are examples of what all of us have noticed in ourselves at some time. For a number of years Selye has been emphasizing the nonspecificity of manifestations such as these and various associated changes in bodily chemistry which he includes under the term, "general adaptation syndrome." Extensive research has been initiated, and roughly five thousand articles are appearing annually which deal more or less directly with these nonspecific stress phenomena. Yet serious gaps remain in our knowledge. In the most recent Annual Report on Stress,² Selye himself states that we

¹ D. D. Bond, "The common psychological defenses to stressful situations and the patterns of breakdown when they fail," in *Symposium on Stress*, Army Medical Service Graduate School, March 16-18, 1953, Washington, D. C. Much useful information to which the author has not made specific reference in this article can be found in the *Symposium on Stress* of which Doctor Bond's article forms a part. An excellent review of much of the literature on civilian reactions to the disaster of bombing is available in I. L. Janis, *Air War and Emotional Stress: Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense*, New York, 1951.

² H. Selye and G. Heuser, *Fifth Annual Report on Stress, 1955-56*, New York, 1956.

know "virtually nothing" about the link between the "stressors" and the adaptive processes he and many other workers have studied so exhaustively. In this shadowy area between stimulus and response, it has long been recognized, lie the greatest mysteries of human behavior. Many somewhat overlapping terms such as "the mind," "the self," "the psyche," "the ego," and "the soul" have been proposed in various frames of reference in an effort to bridge intellectually this baffling hiatus. The intangibility of all these concepts remains frustrating to most thinking men, and the hope continues that some day the physiologist and biochemist or their successors will effect a "breakthrough" into this hazy realm. Awesome (and monotonous) as the prospect may be of an enlightened age in which all reactions of all individuals to all stimuli can be predicted (or controlled) with absolute certainty, there seems to be little basis for hoping (or fearing) that the dawn of this age is imminent.

TREATMENT AND THERAPY

On all sides we see a striving for "push-button" solutions to problems. "Automation," electronic "brains," and other technical triumphs are hailed as the heralds of a new day. Even in the author's own field of psychiatry, such advances as electro-convulsive treatments, psycho-surgery, and, more recently, the "tranquilizing" drugs have been regarded, and used by some, as sufficient means for dealing with the almost infinite complexities of psychological conflict. All these forms of treatment have real values in their proper place. They are *not* the panaceas some wish they were, and one may well agree with the amusing slip of the tongue by one of the author's patients who referred to the new tranquilizing drugs as "tantalizing" drugs!

Selye quotes an interesting case re-

port which illustrates the disturbing intricacies of the problem. A certain lady was given one of the adaptive substances to alter an unfavorable balance which was thought to have developed in her adaptive system. This lady had been a mediocre pianist. An unexpected side effect of the medication seems to have been a phenomenal improvement in her ability to play the piano. She began to master sonatas with almost the skill of a concert artist. Unfortunately she was concurrently becoming somewhat psychotic. To offset this regrettable development, the medication was gradually reduced. For every ten units the dosage was lowered, she lost a sonata!

In brief, we can tamper more potently with the human mechanism than ever before. The multiple results of such tampering cannot always be predicted in their entirety nor with certainty.

In dealing with psychological problems, therefore, it is still important to recall a distinction between treatment and therapy based on the etymological derivation of these terms. "Treatment" comes from the Latin verb meaning "to handle." "Therapy" comes from the Greek verb meaning "to serve" in the sense of "attending" or "going along with." We are yet unable completely to "handle" people psychologically by what we do *to* them. We have developed certain skills whereby we can help people by means of what we do *with* them in seeking resolutions for their individual conflicts.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR DISASTER

We may now consider the relevance of these considerations to the problems of psychological reactions to disasters.

On the one hand, we have no methods available whereby a given individual, to say nothing of whole populations, can be thoroughly "immunized"

against all unfavorable or inappropriate reactions to catastrophes. Some five years or more ago a somewhat unreliable Air Force officer claimed to the author that he had developed a chemical technique which rendered plane crews "panic proof." Unless his method has become one of the most "top secret" items in the Defense Department, there is no evidence that his claim has been substantiated.

On the other hand, procedures are available which do reduce inappropriate reactions below the disabling level in most disaster victims. These methods are far from new or revolutionary. Their essentials must have been recognized by the elder Pliny or he could not have behaved in so exemplary a fashion (as described by his nephew, the younger Pliny) before his death during the famous eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79. How to be brave in the face of mortal danger is an old and honored art. Yet even today the ways of developing this valuable skill seem strangely unfamiliar to many. Consequently, a somewhat elementary review of the subject appears to be fully justified.

The keynote to reliable bravery is *preparation*. Sporadic instances are found in most major disasters of individuals who, without obvious specific preparation, have met the challenge with almost unbelievable heroism. Some of these gallant people (like the elder Pliny) have actually been prepared in a general sense by having developed a remarkably flexible and adaptable personal philosophy. Others—and this is no reflection on the great value of their services—have been "brave" only because the shock of the catastrophe has, in a sense, numbed them to fear. Such "grass-roots" leaders are impressive, but it is patent folly to leave their appearance in time of trouble entirely to chance. Hence the principles of psy-

chological preparations for disaster are vastly important.

Ideally such preparation should provide the potential victims and their potential rescuers with reasonably definite answers to the following questions about potential disasters: (1) What may be the disasters? (2) What will be their characteristics? (3) When can the disasters be expected? (4) What courses of action will be useful?

The recurrent disaster

In practice, it is often most difficult to answer all or even some of these questions as fully as one might desire. A Kansas farmer belongs to a local culture which has a familiarity with tornadoes; he knows the time of year they are most common, and he knows that a cyclone cellar is the best solution if he and his family can manage to reach one in time. When the freak tornado hit Worcester, Massachusetts, however, there was no such specific cultural preparation, and great confusion resulted, especially in the rescue activity. Recurrent natural disasters lend themselves well to adequate psychological preparation of the population, particularly if the disasters have a tendency toward seasonal periodicity with enough frequency to give each succeeding generation some degree of personal experience with them.

The Far West has its earthquakes, the Midwest has its tornadoes, and recently the East has been having its hurricanes. Most sections of our country are occasionally subjected to disastrous floods. In all these situations a certain amount of knowledge about the various "natural" destructive agents accumulates in the regions most subject to them. Even though some (such as earthquakes or tornadoes) give little or no warning each time they occur, this lack of a definite answer to question 3 above seems to be counterbalanced by

a community awareness that recovery from the possible damage is probable. When much of San Francisco burned after the earthquake of 1906, a stabilizing factor in the population is said to have been the recollection that the symbol of the city was the phoenix. There had been five disastrous fires in the previous century; each time San Francisco had risen from the flames, been rebuilt, and continued to grow.

It is also interesting that recurring natural disasters seldom depopulate an area subject to them, unless the effects are prolonged, as from sustained drought (for example, the cliff dwellers of Mesa Verde and the "Okies" from the Dust Bowl). In other words, intolerable anxiety does not seem to develop often in a population during the interim between recurrent but episodic and rather cataclysmic catastrophes. Return to a familiar land from which they know they can wrest a decent living appears to outweigh any fear they may have of the next disaster, which can reasonably be expected to occur some time. Italians will climb back up the slopes of Vesuvius after each eruption and plant again the vineyards from which the wine called Lachryma Christi will be produced. The farmers on the lowlands of the Missouri, Mississippi, and Ohio Rivers will repeatedly return to the rich farms from which they have been flooded out many times, even though there may be no real prospect of adequate flood control in the section where they have their homes and raise their families.

Acts of God

It may also be suspected that people get somewhat less disturbed about "natural" disasters in which they feel little reason to blame any other human being for their misfortune—the so-called "acts of God" of which the insurance companies tend to wash their hands.

Earthquakes and volcanoes have a very impersonal quality that encourages attention to the needs of the immediate situation and discourages making a scapegoat of "the government" or some other human authority which might conceivably have lessened the danger. Hence, the victims' efforts are more inclined to be directed toward salvage or escape than is the case when they are filled with anger against some official or human agency which they feel has been negligent in regard to their safety.

Information about relief

While cultural experience with given disasters, willingness to take calculated risks in living in areas subject to recurrent disasters in order to gain certain ends, and a widespread tendency toward rather phlegmatic acceptance of "acts of God" can all be given considerable credit for the general lack of serious psychological disturbances in most natural disasters, this does not mean that better preparation for these disasters would not be well worth while psychologically. For example, the knowledge that organized relief will be on the way as quickly as possible contributes greatly to a sense of security among all disaster victims. Yet if they could know more in advance about the nature of relief efforts by having some elementary training themselves in relief work, they would be less upset by the unavoidable limitations of the relief when it arrives and be more responsive to the workers who are trying to help them.

The wrong questions

If we now turn to the peacetime disasters not usually regarded as acts of God (such as great fires, large explosions, and train wrecks), we see more clearly the need for answers to the questions listed previously. These are events

which can happen in many communities where prior experience and expectancy of disaster are lacking or negligible. Furthermore, the suspicion of some human responsibility for such disasters can easily lead to rumors from which several sorts of disruptive social behavior can arise. "Who set the fire?" "Who allowed explosive material to be stored here?" "Who derailed the train?" Important as these questions may be for the courts to decide after the damage is controlled and the injured are rescued, they are psychological dynamite immediately after the disaster has occurred. In communities where hated minorities live, even riots may develop, to the obvious detriment of effective relief work.

UNIVERSAL DISASTER TRAINING

Whatever the setting, it is evident that the more general the knowledge of what to do in the presence of human injury the less occasion there is to displace feeling into panic, scapegoating, and rumormongering. For many years the Red Cross and such other groups as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts have offered training in the essentials of first aid. More recently the Federal Civil Defense Administration has endeavored to arouse nationwide interest in relief organization for all citizens, to improve the handling of peacetime disasters as well as to prepare against the devastation of enemy attack. Commendable as these considerable efforts have been, it is the author's strong conviction that they fall tragically short of their basic goals by having to depend entirely on volunteer trainees who are under no obligation to keep their knowledge alive and useful once it has been gained. Personal involvement in gruesome disaster is *not* a fundamentally pleasing prospect to anyone who is not seriously ill mentally. It is hardly surprising that

large blocks of our population fail to find the strong, public-spirited interest within themselves which would offset their natural and deep-seated aversion to any training which implies they might some day have to care for mutilated fellow beings. Until we can devise some way in our democratic system to require universal disaster training with continuing rotation of assigned availability, our society will remain vulnerable to undue psychological disorganization from any really major disaster—whether that disaster be a freak “act of God,” the result of human carelessness, or the ultimate horror of enemy attack with nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons. Perhaps the political scientists who read *THE ANNALS* can conceive an answer to this dilemma!

In all candor, one must admit that continuation of the present very spotty training of Americans in even elementary relief procedures will probably not be a primary cause of our national downfall—*unless* we are ravaged badly by sudden enemy attack. We are told in no uncertain terms that whatever its probability, the possibility of such attack is painfully real, and the potential devastation is painted as virtually unprecedented in the history of man. How the present feeble efforts to train our civilian population in ways of taking care of themselves can do more than make the slightest dent on the danger of utter chaos, both psychological and physical, in the event of a major enemy offensive is completely beyond the author's comprehension. Yet the federal government, in its presumed wisdom, seems dedicated for an indefinite period to relying chiefly on military defense with relatively little attention to the concurrent development of an equally strong standing civil defense force. The author can only hope his gloomy forebodings about the results of this policy are largely unfounded.

COMMON PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTURBANCES IN DISASTER

Whether Pax Americana persists or not, disaster more within the bounds of past experience than truly total war will obviously continue to plague us from time to time. Earthquakes will rumble, tornadoes and hurricanes will lash our homes and persons, rivers will flood, trains will collide, and planes will crash. Unaffected segments of our population will shudder at the reports, and if close enough, many will clog the roads to the stricken site out of morbid curiosity rather than out of any awareness that they might personally be of some help. Yet the over-all tenor of national life will probably go on as smoothly as it has in the past after even rather outrageous “acts of God” that are only regional or sectional in their damage.

Those directly involved in the various inevitable disasters as victims or relief personnel will obviously be more affected than the rest of the nation. The degree (quantity) of psychological disturbances will vary considerably with the magnitude and circumstances of each disaster. The types (quality) of psychological disturbances are fairly predictable. For convenience, these common disturbances will be reviewed in relation to the three major time phases of any disaster: pre-impact phase, impact phase, and post-impact phase.

Pre-impact phase

The pre-impact phase varies most according to the nature of the disaster. With earthquakes, explosions, collisions, and flash floods it can scarcely be said to exist. With temperamental tornadoes and rapidly spreading fires it can be very short. With predicted hurricanes and floods it can extend over hours or days.

If the danger is accurately perceived

and appropriate courses of action are easily discernible, a fair number of people respond reasonably well during a short pre-impact phase, especially if they have had at least a slight amount of previous training and if the circumstances are not too different from what they have been led to expect. Students will often file out of a burning school building, in orderly fashion, if they are familiar with fire drills and the teachers do not lose their heads. Passengers on a sinking ship will assemble tensely but quietly at their proper boat stations if time permits and they have confidence in a disciplined crew. The greater the number of unexpected factors, however, the more likely it seems that at least a portion of the potential victims will dissociate themselves somewhat from what they suddenly conclude is an overwhelmingly threatening situation. As they narrow the view of a terrifying prospect, they necessarily restrict their awareness of suitable behavior. There may be a mad rush for already choked exits; useless quarrels may break out; and some threatened people will sink into hopeless apathy. Such dissociation from too threatening reality accounts in part for odd incidents such as the famous one in which a naked girl came walking down the stairs of a slowly burning building with nothing in her hand but a bird cage.

Longer pre-impact phases present their own problems. Morale is often reasonably well maintained as long as tasks are available, the doing of which will clearly reduce somewhat the damage which can be expected from the approaching peril. Boarding up windows before a hurricane; piling up sandbags along a rising river; laying in provisions before a severe blizzard—these are all examples of how many threatened people can maintain their psychological perspective and sense of personal value in the face of anticipated danger. Once

all possible precautions have been taken, however, the situation gradually changes. The longer the subsequent period of waiting before the danger materializes, the more tension mounts. Again some will become unduly irritable. More appear inclined to retreat into a rather hostile apathy. Nothing is so difficult to do as nothing—especially when danger looms ahead. This was expressed poignantly in a letter found by the author among the rubbish left by the Germans in a hospital in Rome that we occupied in 1944. The letter was dated March 15, 1944 (nearly three months before the invasion of Normandy) and had been written to a German soldier by a civilian friend in Berlin. After the writer had commented on the fact that the section in which he lived had not been too badly damaged by the air raids, he went on to say: “One is now wondering constantly what the next military developments in the West will be. On their outcome hang many, if not all my plans. Grant that we may not be kept waiting too long.”

Impact phase

By this term we mean direct and actual involvement with the destructive agent. The arrival of a hurricane and the final plunge of a sinking ship are examples. In almost all disasters this phase is relatively short—a matter of minutes. In spite of its brevity, it is in many ways the most critical. Here a peak effort for maximum efficiency is often urgently needed—sometimes even to survive. Under such stimulus a number who have sunk into depressed apathy during the pre-impact phase will be galvanized into some useful action. The irritable characters may also organize themselves better when action is clearly required. Unfortunately, others of the apathetic may simply become more remote and glassy eyed, presenting a distressing problem to those of

their companions who are in better contact with actuality. A few individuals may explode into pointless rushing about in a manner which can be well compared to the actions of a chicken with its head off. Such behavior obviously may add greatly to the peril already threatening the individual and his better oriented companions.

It should be pointed out, of course, that leaving the scene of disaster quickly can often be an act of wisdom and not of panic. No moral or social gain can be claimed for adding one's own death to that of a person who could not possibly have been saved. True heroes are those who realistically see at least a remote chance of saving a victim and consciously risk their own lives to do so. The heroism of a person who goes down with a drowning companion he has no conceivable chance of saving is more questionable.

Post-impact phase

Here a wide spectrum of human reactions may sometimes be seen. The survivor who had reacted with apathy before and during the disaster may gradually shake off his lethargy and join in the simple forms of salvage operations if these are being undertaken by others. The more aggressive victim, who has done rather well up to this point, may suddenly feel he has had a very close call and withdraw into himself, particularly if he has seen someone dear to him lost or badly injured in the disaster (the "near-miss reaction"). Others may cry uncontrollably, and many will feel the urge to talk excessively.

Most disaster victims seem to recover fairly well from their harrowing experience without much in the way of specific help, and long-term, severe psychological disturbances after the usual peacetime disasters are apparently not frequent. Severe personal loss of family

or possessions may so dislocate a person that continuing problems after the disaster will tend to overwhelm him. A sense of failure during a crisis may haunt some individuals, especially if they suspect others died or suffered unduly because of their own inadequacies. Thyroid disease is occasionally precipitated by the stress of disaster. Rates of actual insanity are not increased by even prolonged disasters such as the bombings of World War II.

Aids to recovery

In spite of the remarkable ability we find in the majority of human beings to recover psychologically from the commoner disasters, it is obviously advantageous to accelerate this recovery whenever possible. Restoration of contact with the immediate situation and its possibilities is the crux of psychological first aid. This can best be done by initial sincere acceptance of the normality of the victim's feelings which have led him to withdraw into apathy or become overly excited. Once he is helped to see that his feelings, as such, are natural and human, he can then begin to mobilize his resources to control them and return to some degree of normal function in the post-impact, salvage phase of a disaster. These principles are more fully described in the pamphlets on psychological first aid³ and disaster fatigue⁴ published by the author's *ad hoc* Committee on Civil Defense of the American Psychiatric Association at the request of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

No specific mention has yet been made of the bodily disturbances which may bedevil disaster victims as a re-

³ C. S. Drayer, et al., *Psychological First Aid in Community Disasters*, Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1954.

⁴ C. S. Drayer, et al., *Disaster Fatigue*, Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1956.

sult of the psychological tension to which they have been subjected. Tremors, excessive sweating, rapid pulse, vomiting, diarrhea, and splitting headaches are among the symptoms of Selye's "general adaptation syndrome" that may add to the misery created by the disaster. In war these symptoms are so frequent in battle that they are called "normal combat reaction." In peacetime disasters, they may afflict both the victims and their rescuers in varying degree during any of the disaster phases reviewed. They all tend to diminish with continued effort to function in spite of them, and the chief danger lies in the tendency of those suffering from them to suspect they indicate serious damage from concussion, radiation, or some other factor relevant to the particular disaster in question.

THESE GHOSTS . . .

In conclusion, the earlier statement about the fundamental importance of the *meaning* of a disaster to the casualties deserves more comment. By vir-

tue of our human abilities to recall and anticipate, and by virtue of our complicated communications with each other, no experience is a simple thing for any of us. What we have heard, as well as what we have been through personally in the past, colors deeply our interpretation of the present and the future. After the atomic bomb burst over Nagasaki, a little boy found himself pinned down by a spike just over his chest. He immediately thought he was being punished for having pinned butterflies to a board!⁵ Guilt, fear, anxiety—all sorts of unconscious feelings can be brought sharply to the fore by the pressures and horrors of serious disaster. The only known "magic" for laying these ghosts reasonably well is training which enables the person to deal with the crisis for what it is in fact and not in terms of what it may symbolize to him in relation to the individualized conflicts present in all of us.

⁵ T. Nagai, *We of Nagasaki: The Story of Survivors in an Atomic Wasteland*, New York, 1951.

How a Community Met a Disaster: Yuba City Flood, December 1955

By WILLIAM W. STILES

Abstract: The Yuba City flood of December 1955 was the worst disaster to strike California since the San Francisco earthquake. Initial attempts to bolster the levees, with the assistance of the military from nearby Beale Air Force Base, were unsuccessful; but as the waters swept over the countryside, well-organized evacuation took place. Beale provided emergency technical rescue and relief service. The Red Cross established numerous shelters and several giant kitchens and mobile canteens. As the waters subsided, the local health department undertook the massive task of arresting contamination and pollution, and the town contracted for the removal of the thousands of tons of debris. Flood post mortem suggests that long postponed control measures, including dam construction, might have staved off the disaster.—Ed.

NORTHERN California had seen plenty of rain before, so a little more did not seem unusual. But then it started in force on December 18 and, accompanied by violent gusts of wind, continued as an unremitting downpour for nine days, drenching a land area of about 100,000 square miles. Precipitation of 20 inches or more was recorded by numerous valley and coastal gauges, while several in the Sierra exceeded 30 inches, establishing a 78-year record. The runoff transformed obscure rivulets into angry streams which soon roared out of their usual channels. The resulting floods washed away railroads and highways, destroyed farmlands and orchards, engulfed towns, drowned animals, and inundated homes by the thousands. As a nightmarish Christmas week turned into a dismal New Year, the water gradually subsided; the stricken counted their losses: 80 persons dead, 335 hospitalized, 4,338 injured, 50,000 forced from their homes, 1,277 homes destroyed, 2,725 homes wrecked, 225 million dollars property damage, and

inestimable loss of fertile topsoil. Thus, California suffered one of its worst floods in history—in many respects its worst disaster of any kind since the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906; from the standpoint of relief expenditures, the nation suffered its sixth worst disaster since the founding of the American Red Cross in 1881.

One center of tragedy was Yuba City, the seat of Sutter County, situated on the west bank of the Feather River about 120 miles northeast of San Francisco. On the opposite bank is the twin city of Marysville, the seat of Yuba County. Both are fast-growing communities of about 10,000 population. Both are centers of prosperous fruit and dairy farms. Both are at an elevation of only 45 to 55 feet above sea level, while the height of the nearby levees is 82.5 feet. Soon after the original villages were laid out in 1849, hydraulic mining in the area began burying farms under debris and choking river bottoms with silt. But conditions were improved after 1875 when great earthen dikes

were constructed along both sides of the Feather. Thirty miles to the north, this river issues out of the foothills above the city of Oroville, while less than ten miles to the east the Yuba River enters the valley country to join the Feather just below Marysville. Each of these rivers carries the combined flow of a number of forks rising high in the Sierra. Precipitation over this mountainous area was extremely heavy during the six peak days of the storm. As the rivers rose to their brims the twin cities were threatened with floodwaters, but the danger was considered much greater in Marysville. This city, which lies in a bowl-shaped area completely surrounded by a separate levee 18 feet high and 7 miles in circumference, seemed to be doomed by the waters already lapping at the top of the levee. On the other side, Yuba City appeared to be safe, even though it had no secondary protective levee, simply because of the broad expanse of lowlands extending miles to the south and west.

MOBILIZING PROTECTIVE MEASURES

As the threat of flooding increased, personnel of the state Division of Water Resources and the various levee commissions and others began a watchful patrol of more than 200 miles of levees. Hydrologic data and information throughout northern and central California were collected by means of a radio stream gauge network, and constant telephone contacts were maintained with various agencies and personnel in the field. Incidentally, the levee systems in California are the primary responsibility of local levee districts, comparable to water or fire districts; each has its board of directors, its engineer, its levee patrol, and other employees. Of the 120 such quasi-independent bodies in the state, nine are in the Yuba City area. During the morning of December 22, the Marys-

ville Levee Commission requested one hundred men from Beale Air Force Base. From then on, as the danger increased, calls on Beale's reservoir of organized manpower continued. Within twenty-four hours about 2,000 troops and an equal number of civilians were thrown into the levee battle. Heavy equipment and supplies were mobilized from every conceivable source. A tremendous number of sandbags were used to bolster the weakening levees—the exact total will never be known. A large number of bags intended for packing the local rice crop were put into service, as well as gunny sacks from Beale and elsewhere. The Sixth Army furnished 60,000 sandbags from Martinez and another 50,000 from Brentwood. A fleet of trucks started hauling fill material from diggings at the old Chiem airport in Marysville, a luckily convenient deposit. In some spots the crown of the levees was supplemented with layer after layer of improvised construction. Where water ate into the walls, sandbags were rolled over the side by the scores or hundreds to pile up and protect the weakened spot.

EVACUATION

At about 3:00 A.M. on December 23, local officials ordered evacuation of the low-lying areas south of Marysville (Linda and Olivehurst districts). About 9,000 persons left these semirural areas by means of some 2,000 autos interspersed with trucks and buses, establishing a record of the largest and speediest escape from disaster ever staged in the West. Most of these persons took refuge at Beale Air Force Base seven miles to the east, where complete accommodations were provided for several days. Military police directed the new arrivals to parking places where they were given further instructions over loud-speakers. Five enormous mess halls were made ready and everyone finished

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his breakfast of hot cakes, fruit juice, and coffee by 9:45 A.M. Registration was attempted but proved cumbersome and incomplete because of the constant movement of evacuees. Assignments were made to sleeping locations, and persons who had not brought bedding with them were assigned military supplies. Tobacco, candy, and minor items were made available at the exchange; 10,000 cans of baby food and 2,000 pounds of old sheets for diapers were provided; and medical and nursing care were given the sick. Beale eventually served more than 100,000 emergency meals and either used or sent to relief agencies outside the base some 2,000 mattresses, 2,500 blankets, 1,200 comforters, 2,800 sleeping bags, 431 sheets, and 268 cots.

Members of the Marysville City Council met again at 5:00 A.M. on December 23, having adjourned the previous midnight. Later in the morning, on advice of the Levee Commission, they issued a warning of the impending dangers. The city's two hospitals (Rideout Memorial and Yuba County) were emptied of their patients. Improvised facilities were established in multistoried buildings for those who had not recovered sufficiently to be cared for in their homes. At 11:40 A.M. the first tragic event occurred eighteen miles downstream when a newly constructed section of the levee on the east side of the Feather gave way. As the water broke through, it spread over about 24,000 acres—mostly agricultural and dairy lands but also including the hamlets of Nicolaus and Verona. Here no human lives were lost, but hundreds of farm animals were drowned. Following this break, the decision was made to evacuate Marysville. Approximately 1,500 persons had already left the city and about the same number remained to work on the levee; most of the remaining 6,000 took off in their cars west-

bound across the bridge. Possibly 1,500 stopped with friends in Yuba City, while the majority continued on twenty-six miles to Colusa, and a few journeyed as far as Chico or Sacramento (about fifty miles).

Meanwhile, tension was mounting on the opposite side of the Feather, for waterspouts or "boils" were observed along the base of the levee which persisted in breaking through in spite of attempts to seal them off with hundreds of sandbags. As the situation worsened, Yuba City officials ordered evacuation of the lower portion of the city; and the Sutter County sheriff and his eight men took the initiative of evacuating residents of the outlying areas in jeopardy. Almost at the stroke of midnight, shortly before the crest of the river was expected, a second and more tragic event took place. The levee gave way at a point about a mile below Yuba City, opposite a landmark known as "Gum Tree" and just above the so-called "Shanghai Bend." A tremendous surge of water enlarged the original break to an estimated 4,500 feet. Two of the sheriff's deputies and three other persons riding in cars nearby were drowned by the deluge and buried in the silt. While a torrent poured into the Gilsizer Slough, a natural drainage channel to the south and west, a wall of water swept northward towards Yuba City. Houses in its path were torn from their foundations and some reduced to kindling. But as the water reached the fringe of the city it tended to flatten out, so that its entry into the city streets, while rapid, was not as violent as its action in the outskirts.

COMMUNICATIONS AND WARNINGS

Although telephones throughout most of the city had been silenced since mid-afternoon, when both the cables across the Fifth Street bridge and the structure itself were washed away, a dozen

walkie-talkies and the two-way radios in police cars were still operating. The alarm was spread by means of a loud-speaker mounted on one of the police cars and by sounding the city's fire horn. Announcements over the radio told of the levee break, but listeners were left with the impression that the flood danger was limited to the southern outskirts of the city. Meanwhile, another radio station confused the issue by relating a circumstantial account of the Marysville evacuation, frequent reassurances being given that these activities did not apply to Yuba City. An hour passed before many started to leave town. Even those who acted most promptly were in water hub deep before they escaped. It was estimated that 23,000 of the 30,000 residents of Sutter County were finally driven from their homes, and that the water rose to the contour line of 50 feet, inundating about 90 per cent of the city and 100,000 acres of land, including much of the famous "Peach Bowl."

RESCUE

About 3,000 persons in the Yuba City area were marooned by the floodwaters and had to be rescued by boats and amphibious vehicles. Over a three-day period, more than 400 of these were rescued by helicopters supplied by the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, 37 persons were drowned, and 8 others died of causes associated with the flood. In addition, 2,884 were injured or became ill, and of these, 124 were hospitalized. Most of the sick suffered respiratory infections, while the injuries included fractures, contusions, strains, circulatory disturbances, hernias, puncture wounds, abrasions, and lacerations. At the same time, ten babies were born. Rideout Memorial Hospital was used as a screening center for victims of the flood, while nineteen other hospitals, including one as far away as San Francisco, became

havens for the Yuba City area sick and injured. Behind these words there is a story of horror and terror, of heroic rescues and unbelievable self-sacrifice which will never be known to the rest of the world.

During the early morning hours of December 24, cars and truckloads of refugees began pouring into the nearby towns. Before the day ended, the Red Cross had established thirty-eight shelters in thirteen towns located in five different counties, caring for a total of 9,260 persons. About the same number were cared for on Christmas Day, but thereafter the number diminished so that there were 565 on New Year's Day, and less than 100 after January 6. When a partial evacuation of Yuba City was ordered again on January 15, the number increased to 1,007 but fell again after a few days. Some were still in shelters in mid-February. At the outset, the Red Cross was serving about 30,000 meals daily in these shelters, about half this number at the turn of the year, and several hundred daily for a month thereafter. Food, clothing, cots, bedding, and medical care were provided to meet the physical needs of these homeless persons, while registration, entertainment, and recreation were undertaken to relieve their anxieties. Thousands of telegrams and calls were made in an attempt to find missing persons and to reunite families. Both disaster and relief agencies relied heavily upon amateur radio operators, for often the efforts of these seemingly tireless "hams" provided the only means of communication of the stricken areas with the outside world. Those equipped with emergency power generators were especially valuable after power lines in certain areas were swept away. Commercial radio and television stations still on the air co-operated fully in broadcasting news of general interest and concern and provided entertainment for

many during their long wait. Newspapers and other publications likewise disseminated information and pictures to keep the people aware of the situation and to aid them in restoring their possessions. In the midst of all these activities, Christmas festivities could not be neglected.

MOVEMENT BACK TO FLOOD AREAS

Back in Marysville, the levee surrounding the city remained intact and the flood threat lessened, so on Christmas Eve the city officials announced that residents might return to their homes. Churches in the city carried on their humanitarian work in spite of tremendous odds, converting their facilities into relief centers. Two clergymen conducted services on Christmas Day for twenty-three and twenty-four persons, respectively, while in the midst of day and night work. Over in Yuba City, however, only those persons necessary for emergency operations were permitted to remain in the area. To assist the local police and civil defense deputies, some three hundred National Guardsmen were ordered in to prevent looting, to keep out the throng of sightseers, and to assist in other operations. The city council established its headquarters in the office of a concrete pipe plant on higher ground outside the town, and the city clerk acted as director until the city administrator returned from a trip to the East. The following day, the water had receded enough to permit access to the city hall. A control center was established there and chiefs of the various emergency services were appointed and each assigned to a desk. At first there was uncertainty and confusion in their operations, but these soon fell into an orderly pattern. After a few days, residents were permitted to return to their homes between 7:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. daily

to salvage what they could. This curfew was lifted on January 2.

Mass feeding in Yuba City proper was handled by the Red Cross in two major operations. One started as a canteen at their headquarters on December 28, and from the next day on was augmented by a cafeteria at the facilities of the California Packing Company. Operations went on around the clock, with nearly 2,000 meals being served daily until January 18. Two cooks and two cook helpers were hired for this task, assisted by some fifteen to thirty volunteers, including five school-lunch program supervisors. The second major feeding operation was that of mobile canteens. As many as sixteen motor vehicles were used for this task. For a few days, beginning December 28, they dispensed an average of 8,500 meals daily, but by January 4 the number had dropped to 4,000 and by January 11 to 1,500. When another emergency developed along the river, the mobile canteen routes were changed to include the levee workers and patrols. Two soldiers were sent from Beale to operate field ranges throughout the operation, while five to fifteen volunteers handled all the driving and serving. The Sacramento chapter of the Red Cross may be credited with the major support of this activity, which continued until mid-February.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES

Health services in the wake of the disaster were of paramount concern. Seven of the nine wells scattered throughout Yuba City, which provided the community's water supply, were inundated by the flood. Thus, warnings to boil all drinking water were immediately issued by the Sutter-Yuba Health Department. As soon as the floodwaters receded from the entire area supplied by a given well, it was heavily chlorinated and the sup-

ply lines were flushed out. This flushing-out process had to be applied to individual faucets in each home as well as to the main lines, for all contaminated water had to be voided from the lines before the water was safe to use. Bit by bit, the chlorine content was reduced until it was restored to normal. At one time there were as many as nine portable hypochlorinators in use, which had been supplied by the state Office of Civil Defense. A mobile water-testing laboratory from the state Health Department was sent to the fringe area to aid in the restoration of water services from private wells. Meanwhile, since the community's sewage system was rendered useless by the flooding of its two booster pumps, a hundred outdoor chemical toilets were moved in and strategically placed throughout the town as substitutes for the water-flushed toilets. Restoration of the sewage service was delayed a week because the motors of these two pumps were of a special type which could not be easily replaced but had to be dried out and completely rebuilt. Fear of typhoid fever, traditionally linked with polluted waters, led to a popular demand for mass inoculations; consequently, more than 6,000 were given "shots."

Inspectors from the Sutter-Yuba Health Department, in addition to personnel from other local, state, and federal health agencies, made the rounds of all food establishments and drug stores. They condemned most of the foods, drugs, and beverages that had been in contact with the floodwaters. Foods in sealed tins and frozen meats, as long as they remained frozen, were not discarded because they could be made safe by superficial cleansing and cooking. But meats and other frozen articles that had thawed out were condemned regardless of whether or not they had been contaminated by the water. Glass-packed goods, perishable

foods such as breads, and other edibles suspected of being contaminated were also condemned and then hauled off to the dump. Meanwhile the sanitarians inspected the emergency cafeteria and mobile canteens, but recorded no outbreaks of food poisonings or food-borne infections. Though all had been put out of business temporarily, the town's food stores, drugstores, and restaurants were back in operation within five to fourteen days after the flood.

Filth and debris strewn about the city presented a monstrous problem of hauling and disposal. Early cleanup operations were handled by military units, but after the emergency phase local construction companies were contracted by the city, removing fifty to sixty truckloads of material each day. Dead animals created a major problem, especially in the rural areas. Here at least 6,000 cows and many thousands of chickens and other animals were drowned—sheep, goats, dogs, and cats—even two deer and a bear. Floating carcasses were towed by boats; those left in mire were dragged by half-tracks, and some were handled by military weasels. Rendering plants utilized many of the carcasses, but after a few days the remaining animals had decayed so much that they had to be buried in great pits bulldozed out for the purpose. Proliferation of rodents, flies, and other vermin might have become a serious menace had these and other control measures been neglected.

RENEWED THREAT

After the breaks, there began the gigantic task of rebuilding the levees—a struggle against oozing mud and flowing water. The State Reclamation Board gave this project top priority. Four thousand men labored in considerable physical danger through new rains and in alternating daylight and darkness until the gaps were sealed.

Repairs were half accomplished by December 30 and nearing completion on January 17. Then followed the "desperate hours" with the river rising within 12 inches of the top of the 69-foot emergency levee. One-third of Yuba City and the surrounding countryside was again evacuated as a precaution. The saturated levee at "Gum Tree" was then described as a bowl of jelly; how it held together no one knows, but it did. Perhaps it was because an ingenious expedient was tried. Countless tarpaulins, hauled from as far away as Stockton, were stretched out to form a canvass skirt 30 feet wide and 5,800 feet long and pegged to the dirt slopes as a waterproof facing to save the soft earth underneath. Next it was decided to put a permanent riprapping of stone over the earth fill. From a nearby quarry came 160 trucks operating around the clock and moving through Yuba City by a special, patrolled route. Meanwhile a heartbreak was felt at Nicolaus. All but 300 feet of the break had been filled in by dredging operations when the rampaging river washed away all evidence of three weeks of backbreaking work. Water spilled out again into the countryside, filling the Nicolaus area to the brim. The million dollar patches at Nicolaus and "Gum Tree" were finally completed about February 25.

LOSSES OF PUBLIC AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Meanwhile, the state Division of Highways estimated that damage to the roads in the area (District III), would approximate another 1 million dollars, but would take much longer to repair. Destruction of streets and other public property in Yuba City itself was estimated at more than 2 million dollars. There \$60,000 worth of gravel was dumped as an emergency measure to make the streets passable and appro-

priate signs such as "Street Closed" or "Residents Only" were posted to keep out sightseers; however, these did little to ease the burden. Damages to Pacific Gas and Electric Company's property in the area were estimated to be \$540,000. Nevertheless, gas and electric utility service continued and street lights still burned even after residents were driven from their homes. When repairs of individual customers' facilities were needed, services were restored almost as soon as the owners were ready. Damages to the facilities of the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company made it necessary to send nearly a hundred pieces of mobile equipment and repair crews into the area, while 25,000 telephone sets had to be flown from the East to replace damaged instruments. Damages to railroad property in the area approximated \$200,000.

Damages to homes and personal possessions in the Yuba City area were estimated to be in excess of 13 million dollars. An analysis of these losses is shown in Table 1. The assessed valuation of the private property in Yuba City before the flood was 17.25 million dollars. Because two-thirds of the dwellings were affected by the flood in some way, the valuation dropped to an estimated 11 million dollars. Virtually none of this property in the Yuba City area was covered by flood insurance. Although little physical evidence of the devastation remained after four months, it was thought that at least two years would be required to rehabilitate the community completely.

GOVERNMENTAL AID

Early in the emergency, both Governor Knight and President Eisenhower declared most of Northern California "major disaster areas," clearing the way for more extensive use of state and federal resources for relief. Help came from numerous state agencies, including

TABLE 1—DAMAGE TO HOMES AND PERSONAL POSSESSIONS IN YUBA CITY FLOOD OF DECEMBER 1955

LOCATION	NO. DESTROYED (\$6,500)	MAJOR DAMAGE (\$1,500)	MINOR DAMAGE (\$600)	TOTAL NO. BUILDINGS	TOTAL COST
Yuba City and environs.....	280	1,520	4,500	6,300	\$6,800,000
Balance of Sutter County.....	80	150	4,270	4,500	\$3,307,000
Nicolaus area.....	263	740	597	1,600	\$3,177,700
Marysville and other Yuba County areas.....	10	65	100	175	\$ 222,500
Total no. buildings.....	633	2,475	9,467	12,575	
Total costs.....	\$4,114,500	\$3,712,500	\$5,680,200		\$13,507,200

the National Guard, Office of Civil Defense, Department of Agriculture, Health Department, and Department of Veterans Affairs (CALVETS). The University of California converted its facilities at Davis into an almost ideal shelter for refugees, and its Agricultural Extension Service produced and distributed thousands of a series of eighteen leaflets containing recommendations, policy statements from official agencies, and other current information of help in dealing directly with flood problems and aiding people in personal or financial distress. During the long period of rehabilitation, farm and home advisers and officials of the Farm Bureau Federation assisted families to find suitable replacement livestock, hay, and feed supplies; to lay out plans for farm buildings, corrals, and orchards; and to find means for reconstruction, bracing, silt removal, and termite control. Federal agencies also played an important role in almost every phase of these disaster operations, co-operation between military and civilian authorities being noteworthy. The Weather Bureau, Corps of Engineers, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard deserve special commendation.

On Christmas Day, a field office of federal agencies was established in the Chamber of Commerce building in Yuba City, an official of the Federal Civil

Defense Administration serving as coordinator. Representatives of the United States Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration, and Internal Revenue Bureau were active in dealing with problems of sanitation and narcotics control. The Housing and Home Finance Agency gave the community two hundred family trailers to be used as emergency housing, made interest-free loans to assist in planning construction and reconstruction of streets, storm sewers, and water facilities, and provided technical assistance for urban renewal projects. Under the latter program 1.8 million dollars of local funds would be increased to 5.4 million dollars by federal monies. In addition, it offered families with damaged or destroyed homes special financial assistance. The Small Business Administration estimated that its loans might total 10 million dollars in the West. The Veterans Administration granted a thirty-day grace period for veterans in the stricken areas who were unable to pay their government insurance premiums on time, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue granted appropriate delays in filing income taxes. Under Public Law 875, 1.61 million dollars was provided through the Federal Civil Defense Administration for rehabilitation of public property in the area; 9.5 million dollars throughout the state.

FAMILY REHABILITATION

During the period of rehabilitation, people came into the Red Cross headquarters by the hundreds requesting buckets, brooms, rubber boots, mops, and all sorts of cleaning equipment. In addition, disaster victims who were being cared for in the homes of friends were given purchase orders for food, clothing, cots, and bedding. Families and owners of small businesses suffering losses were advised to make application for rehabilitation of their property. An experienced caseworker was then assigned to help the individual owner evaluate his needs relative to food, clothing, and maintenance, building and repairs, household furnishings, medical and nursing services, occupational supplies and equipment. The granting of assistance was based on need instead of loss, families being expected to do as much as they could to help themselves. Awards for restoring families to their predisaster status were then reviewed by a local committee of citizens representing the various segments of the community. Purchase or disbursing orders were used, so that an accurate accounting was possible for all monies spent. The number of applications received by the Red Cross and the appropriated funds, which were free gifts of the American people, are shown in Table 2.

In addition to Red Cross awards, lesser gifts of money, goods, and serv-

ices came from the Salvation Army, relief societies, and religious, veteran, fraternal, labor, and youth groups. A few of these organizations found difficulty in administering their own programs equitably and turned to the Red Cross for assistance. Some 160 Red Cross staff members were assembled from various chapters and offices, many coming from distant states. Thousands of volunteers served under their leadership with such dedication and compassion as to warrant comparison with the highest traditions of that agency. The flood victims celebrated in many ways during their mucking-out process and their long road to recovery. One was a "Christmas in February," which first started out as a toy drive. Unfortunately, this celebration was almost washed out by the return of heavy rains and high winds.

IN RETROSPECT

Who was to blame? In the wake of this disaster, as in every other, human nature became manifested in fault finding. Everyone admitted that nothing could have been done to stop the rains, but there was general agreement that the runoff could have been handled better and that the disaster operations could have been more effective. Criticism seemed to center on the failure to build the long-authorized 400-million-dollar dam across the main Feather River above the town of Oroville, pro-

posed eight years ago and delayed by government and private agencies while alternate sites were considered. As it was, about one-third of the runoff was captured behind more than half-a-hundred existing dams, which helped save Oroville and Marysville and prevented greater destruction in Yuba City. Additional criticism was leveled at the original construction of the levees along the Feather River, particularly in the region of "Gum Tree," where the foundation was on loose sand and the angle of the curve was too sharp for rapid flow. Maintenance of the levee was decried, as was the failure to provide proper diversionary water escape routes. Some levees originally provided had been obliterated, notably the one eliminated ten years ago at Hazelbusch some twenty miles above Yuba City. A safety levee known as the "Bow" that protected Yuba City was removed only two years ago, allegedly because of selfish interests. Questions were asked why the waterspouts or "boils" that developed along the levees during the height of the storm were given so little consideration, and when the levee did break why the situation was not immediately recognized as serious. The Sutter County grand jury issued a blistering fifty-two page criticism of the state and local agencies, mentioning the state Division of Water Resources, the State Reclamation Board, the County Board of Supervisors, the directors of Levee District No. 1, the city-county civil defense organization, as well as an appalling lack of leadership and the eventual collapse of city government. In the state legislature there was a prompt proposal to create a central water-control agency. There were even attacks

on President Eisenhower's Annual Message because he barely mentioned the flood disasters. Litigation arose from the Yuba City incident which will undoubtedly continue for years, for even after months of argument it has not been fully decided who owns the houses that were washed from one lot onto another. To all of this was added the criticism of outsiders who contended that the whole community suffered from a strange forgetfulness of the dangers that existed in living behind the earthen banks of a potentially rampaging and murderous river.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Out of the adversity of the Yuba City disaster, many lessons were learned that are the hope for a better future. Perhaps the word should be "relearned," for the lessons were essentially the same ones already taught by hundreds of other disasters. Foremost among these was the fact that "it can happen here." This was especially true along the Feather, where serious floods have occurred over the years—even as recently as 1937, 1940, 1942, 1944, 1948, and 1950. The well-known aphorism that hindsight is better than foresight was hardly excuse under these circumstances. There was certainly a need to overcome the misconception that a disaster always happens to some other community, just as most persons have erred in thinking that an accident always happens to someone else. It was learned that there is no substitute for a carefully conceived disaster plan, for thorough training in emergency skills and techniques, for periodic trials of disaster operations, and for critical evaluation of the entire program.

TABLE 2—APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY THE RED CROSS IN YUBA CITY FLOOD OF DECEMBER 1955

LOCATION	NO. OF FAMILY APPLICATIONS	NO. OF BUSINESS APPLICATIONS	TOTAL APPLICATIONS	MASS CARE, AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO FAMILIES	FAMILY REHABILITATION AWARDS	TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS
Sutter County (Yuba City)	3,764	128	3,892	\$633,604	\$3,384,600	\$4,018,204
Yuba County (Marysville)	447	6	453	\$ 40,469	\$ 49,984	\$ 90,453
State of California	10,574	490	11,064	\$1,607,244	\$5,613,352	\$7,220,596

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SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*. Pp. viii, 357. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Company, 1956. \$10.00.

Works devoted to the methodology of the social sciences fall mainly into three groups. There are, firstly, treatises written *de haut en bas* by logicians or philosophers who themselves have had no experience of sociological research or contributed to social theory. There are, next, contributions by working social scientists who, however, have had no special training in logic or epistemology. These generally take the form of first or last chapters in textbooks or treatises, and more often than not the methodology throws no light on the material actually handled and does not arise out of it. There are, thirdly, discussions far more uncommon by those who are equipped both on the scientific and philosophical side. To this last group Professor Sorokin clearly belongs. There can be few sociologists who have his encyclopaedic command over the history of thought or who have contributed so much to the various branches of sociological investigation. What he has to say on methodology has therefore to be taken very seriously by all students of the social sciences.

In this work Professor Sorokin subjects "modern" social science, that is the social science of the last twenty-five years or so, to a ruthless examination. The main burden of his argument is that which is new in these studies is not good and what is good is not new. The root of the trouble, in his view, is to be found in the slavish

imitation by social scientists of the methods—generally ill-digested and misunderstood—of the natural sciences. Hence their "quanto-phrenia" or the reckless application of quantitative methods to problems to which they are not adapted, their predilection for a heavy terminology which serves to hide emptiness of content, their illusory search for an "objectivism" which leads them away from the really important subjects of investigation into a "blind alley of subjective and evanescent hear-say trivia." These charges are backed by a careful and detailed analysis of the use made in recent sociological investigations of intelligence and other mental tests, of mathematical models, scalograms, and the like. Sorokin shows that in these studies the underlying assumptions are not disentangled, so that methods which in their proper fields may be unexceptionable, are applied to data to which they are not suited. An examination of the results supposed to have been attained by these methods shows their sterility: they have led to nothing but "painfully elaborated platitudes and poorly reiterated generalizations discovered long ago and defined more accurately by preceding social thinkers." Should present trends continue, the social sciences are in danger of losing all vitality and failing completely to serve any interests, theoretical or practical.

To ward off this danger it is necessary, Sorokin thinks, to adopt what he calls an "integralist" conception of knowledge. This implies a combination of three modes of cognition, the empirical, the logico-mathematical, and the intuitional. These matters have, of course, been discussed by Sorokin in his other works. In the book before us

the relation between the three kinds of knowledge is dealt with only in outline. Sorokin recognizes that each is liable to error and that they therefore need to be mutually corrected. Is this process of mutual correction the work of the logico-mathematical method? Or has intuition the last word? Until these questions are answered we can hardly form any definite conception of the type of propositions which would go to the making of an "integralist" sociology.

MORRIS GINSBERG

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and Political Science

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD and ELEANOR STOKER BOLL. *The Large Family System: An Original Study in the Sociology of Family Behavior*. Pp. 325. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956. \$6.00.

The Large Family System is of a type which may come to be known popularly as the book reviewer's nightmare. It defies all standard approaches. Unqualified praise is no more appropriate in the case of this book than is summary dismissal. The damning-by-faint-praise gambit, while perhaps tempting here, would also be grossly out of place. The difficulty stems essentially from two sources. First, one must conclude that the net addition to our fund of knowledge concerning the American large family system contributed by this book is extremely slight. If this were the only consideration, then one might easily follow the more standard procedures of criticism. But there is another factor involved, namely that our fund of knowledge in this area is so pitifully meager that virtually any contribution to it must be deemed important.

The work describes certain characteristics of 100 large families, defined to be those in which the parents bore a minimum of six children, as seen through the eyes of one of the offspring. In only seven-teen cases was corroboration of these views sought by means of interviewing at least one other family member. The areas of interest were broad and undeniably of fundamental concern to sociologists. Attitudes

of the members toward the family, disciplinary practices, interactions among siblings, and socioeconomic factors were analyzed in detail together with several other important variables in order to determine whether there is "... a pattern of family living which is peculiar to the large, as compared with the small, family" (p. 16). And herein lies the rub, for what is true of the authors' 100 large families clearly need not be true for large families generally. These cases constitute the population of large families containing at least one member who both heard about the Bossard-Boll study and volunteered to participate in it. As such it cannot be said to constitute a random sample of any other population. Moreover, what is true of these 100 large families may or may not differ from what is true of small families, but we have no way of knowing because the authors make no attempt at systematic comparison.

The authors may have recognized these facts for they state at the outset that, "this book is not a statistical study. . . . To assume differently is to miss the purpose of the entire project" (p. 22). Then follow no less than fifty-eight statistical tables. And the bulk of the text, although generously larded with case excerpts, is given over to interpretation of these tables. Whether or not the purpose be missed, it must be reported that this is in fact a statistical study and that it is one which is far from being a model of rigorous procedure. Despite these shortcomings, the book does make a contribution which, in an area almost destitute of knowledge, looms large indeed.

ROBERT MCGINNIS

University of Wisconsin

WILLIAM J. GOODE. *After Divorce*. Pp. xv, 381. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$6.00.

Professor Goode has written a meaty volume on a subject which hitherto has yielded too many slivers and bones. As such, *After Divorce* will probably take its place among the top books in the family field. There are flaws in the research design—some perhaps major—but this is true of practically all of our large-scale family

studies, and in view of the pioneering nature of the task, Goode's venture has proved most rewarding.

Based on a random sample of 425 divorced mothers (Detroit, 1948) the author utilized the personal interview method to explore such areas as stated causes of the marital conflict, attitude toward ex-spouse, steps involved in the decision to divorce, social pressures experienced, property settlements, effect of divorce on children, as well as a variety of background characteristics of the divorcees; indeed, the flow of research findings is so vast that certain sections must be read and reread if one is to "stay with it."

Although the data were collected through personal interviews, no case histories are reported. (*Vive!*) The findings are almost entirely statistical. The tabular and correlational analyses are clearly superior, and—quite importantly—all the hypotheses and findings are framed in such a manner as to lend themselves to future empirical testing.

In terms of study design, whether Goode should have restricted his sample to divorced *mothers* can be debated. Most divorcees do not have children. Readers will probably wonder, also, to what extent the *husbands'* responses would have affected the over-all project results. These question marks are fully recognized by the author. The latter does not, however, explain why first marriages and remarriages are not given separate statistical treatment. In view of the basic variables in any divorce study—race, nativity, marital status—as well as such factors as age, socio-economic status, religion, duration of marriage, and children, the present reviewer would opine that Goode had too small a sample for the items which might have been held constant. (We can almost hear Goode replying, "Do you know how much an interview project that size would cost?")

After Divorce is more than a collection of findings. The author has deftly woven his findings into a fabric of theory. Tabulations and correlations lead to hypotheses, and hypotheses lead to further statistical explorations—and the end result is a series of major theoretical considerations, solidly rooted, capable of being pruned and shaped

by any one with enough gumption and ability to effect a replication study. Goode's theories as they relate to divorce trauma, concomitants of redating, the institutionalization of postdivorce adjustment, the potentially beneficial effects of divorce on children, and so forth—are the culmination of sharp data handling and originality of thought.

This is a substantial book. It is to be hoped that After Goode other family researchers may be inspired to similar efforts.

WILLIAM KEPHART

University of Pennsylvania

HORACE BELSHAW. *Population Growth and Levels of Consumption: With Special Reference to Countries in Asia*. Pp. xxix, 223. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. \$4.50.

This book's "central theme is the relationship between population growth and levels of consumption." The core of the book (Part II) is concerned with the economic and social changes which determine the rate of increase in production in underdeveloped countries. After a statement of the population situation in different parts of the world the author concludes that the hardships of various kinds, which, during most of man's history, have kept population growth down, are still operative to a greater or lesser degree in most underdeveloped countries. However, modern health knowledge and its application are leading to the reduction of death rates in many of these countries and the consequent growth of population, since the birth rates are little changed. This raises serious problems because it cannot be assumed that the increase of population is automatically accompanied by a like increase in production, to say nothing of a proportionally greater increase. Without a greater production increase the level of living will remain stationary or may even decline.

Part II, *Some Fundamental Relations*, treats chiefly of the conditions, both economic and social, which will determine whether or not production will increase faster than population in the underdeveloped areas, and hence whether levels of consumption will rise. It will only be

possible here to mention the chief topics treated. Under "A 'Development' Equation" almost the last statement is: "The discussion so far leads to the conclusion that a rise in levels of consumption in a growing population would require one or more of the following conditions:

(1) A rate of increase in capital stock (i.e., rate of investment) exceeding both the rate of increase in population and that in national income.

(2) Economies of a scale large enough to offset such diminishing factor returns as might occur if the rate of growth of population exceeded that of capital stock.

(3) An improvement in the ratio of labor to population.

(4) Improvements in the efficiency of labor and/or capital."

The author then proceeds to discuss some of the problems involved in attaining the changes implicit in the above conclusions: "Economies of Scale" (Chap. V); "Investment" (Chap. VI); "Savings" (Chap. VII); "Population and Effective Supply of Labor" (Chap. VIII); and "Innovation" (Chaps. IX and X). The reviewer was especially glad to see even the very brief discussion of the "Social Costs and Obstacles" to innovation (Chap. IX).

Mr. Belshaw's conclusions regarding what is needed to secure improvements in levels of consumption in underdeveloped areas may be summed up in what he calls the "approaches" to this problem:

"(a) An increase in the rate of capital formation.

(b) The most effective use possible of available capital in terms of its ability to generate income.

(c) An improvement in the utilization of the potential labor force.

(d) The promotion of innovations.

(e) A deceleration of the rate of population growth."

The readers of this little book will hope that the promise of a more complete treatment of the problems of increasing the per capita consumption of the peoples in underdeveloped areas will not be too long delayed.

WARREN S. THOMPSON

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BENJAMIN MALZBERG and EVERETT S. LEE. *Migration and Mental Disease: A Study of First Admissions to Hospitals for Mental Disease, New York 1939 to 1941*. Pp. x, 142. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1956. \$1.50.

This monograph is an important contribution to the literature on migration differentials.

As pointed out by the authors, interest in the relation between migration and mental disease is of long standing, both among scholars and the general public. With some exceptions, such as in the work of Ødegård, and of Malzberg and associates, most of the earlier studies have suffered from the lack of standardization of data for sex, age, and race so that their generalization about the relationship between mental disease and migration have been open to serious question. In this work great pains have been taken to hold constant the sex, age, and race variables.

To correct the defects of earlier studies, the authors have calculated age and sex specific rates for first admission to all mental hospitals in New York State for the years 1939 to 1941. Rates have been calculated separately for the foreign born and native New York born, for those born outside New York State and for those migrating to New York from other states. Rates have also been computed separately for recent migrants (those moving into New York within the last five years). Commitment rates for whites and nonwhites, and for each sex, have also been computed separately.

The major results point to higher commitment rates for migrants than for non-migrants when age, sex, and color are held constant. The foreign born do not differ significantly from the native born, the greatest differential appearing between females of the two groups. Rates for migrants from other states are substantially higher than for the New York born, with intermediate rates for the foreign born. Rates for recent white male migrants are approximately twice as high as those for the white New York born, and three times as high for the nonwhite. Recent migrants also show much higher rates than

earlier migrants. The notion that dementia praecox shows striking differentials holds only between immigrants and the native born and not between native born and migrants from other states nor between recent and early migrants.

The greater incidence of mental disorder among migrants may be due to selection at the point of origin, to the greater strain of social adjustment to which migrants are subjected or to differences in the incidence of various psychoses in different states. The latter interpretation is rejected by the authors, leaving the observed differences to be explained as the result of a combination of the first two factors. That some selection at the point of origin may be of importance is shown by the large number of persons who are admitted to hospitals soon after their arrival in the State.

The authors are careful to qualify their generalizations by pointing out that their results might have been affected by differences in admission policies in different states, by the heavy emigration from the State, which may also have been selective, and by the possibility that the same factors which impel migration may also result in mental disorder. It also occurs to the reviewer that the native-born and earlier migrants may have been exposed to the risk of admission for a longer period of time than have recent migrants, and this represents a more highly selected population than the latter.

The investigation is a milestone in method for studies of this kind. As the authors point out, New York, with its heterogeneous population and heavy urban concentration, is an atypical state. Definitive conclusions about the problem await a similar analysis with the same methods and the same painstaking procedures in other states.

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University of Missouri

JERZY ZUBRZYCKI. *Polish Immigrants in Britain: A Study of Adjustment*. (Studies in Social Life, III.) Pp. xix, 219. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. Guilders 11.65.

When one thinks of "Anglo-Polonica," which is the category in which this sociological study belongs, the late Wacław

Borowy comes at once to mind for his contributions in English as well as in Polish to our knowledge of Poles in England and, of course, of Englishmen in Poland. And so one misses his name in the long list of authorities cited, the more so since considerable space is given to the pre-1939 Polish migration to Britain, from Reformation times on; Jasnowski is cited (*England and Poland in the 16th and 17th Centuries*), though Borowy was the one who over a period of years performed the real and extensive research in this field.

The present work is, nevertheless, an important and needed study, not the least of its virtues being its fine perspective. Thus we see that World War II produced a Polish community in Britain, which is the main focus of the study, in relation to all Polish communities abroad, and not as an isolated phenomenon. This is to be expected in a work which had its prime spur and inspiration in the classic study of the Polish community in the United States by Thomas and Znaniecki. Professor Znaniecki, we may note, supplies one of the Prefaces to the present work.

Zubrzycki's study comes at the exact moment when the validity of the policy which has kept the community described intact, and which has informed it spiritually through and through ever since the earliest World War II arrivals, is being put to its first great test. Because of homesickness and the lure of Communist bait, outstanding leaders of the community, including some of the most vocal, one may even say the most Catonic, makers of the policy itself are returning to Poland, though they know there is no hope of realizing the community's great objective: the restoration of Poland to independence and a place of honor in the family of nations. The emigration is a political emigration, the Polish community in Britain a political community, Zubrzycki asserts, again and again, and as such it is conscious of an obligation to keep itself intact for the great end. Naturalization is frowned upon, assimilation not encouraged. A certain accommodation to British ways is conceded as inevitable, but in the hostels and industrial colonies of Polish composition, even this is often found unnecessary. Now, as

we know from the daily papers, this community is slowly beginning to disintegrate. A second Zubrzycki study is undoubtedly already in progress to chart its course.

One conclusion arrived at by Zubrzycki is striking: while for the population of the given country as a whole, in this case England, it may or may not be desirable for a community to come into being intact and apart from the general community, for the individual Pole in Britain, the existence of this Poland-outside-Poland has meant life itself. Adjustment to so differently traditioned, and so xenophobic, a society as the British would have been out of the question for vast numbers of the Polish immigrants had the Polish community not existed.

Zubrzycki's study is fully documented, and his conclusions are arrived at by use of primary materials, such as case histories, records of the many Polish associations in Britain, and newspaper reports. He supports his conclusions with lavish use of tables; and his study, though sometimes verbose, is to be recommended.

MARION MOORE COLEMAN

Alliance College

S. N. EISENSTADT. *From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure*. Pp. 357. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956.

My review falls into three folds: prospects and promise, technical problems of editing, and theoretical difficulties.

This volume is written by an able man who admires Max Weber and intends to carry on the massive comparative approach which Weber brought to bear with such provocative results. Professor Eisenstadt attempts some theoretical propositions based as firmly as the sources permit on empirical materials from a large number of different and apparently diverse societies. Though properly bold and daring, he is well aware of the difficulties posed by the state of his data. He is determined to do his best with the material at hand. He fears banality more than error.

Like Weber, Professor Eisenstadt starts his comparative analysis with an explicit problem. He has a major hypothesis about the structure and function of age groups in

different sorts of societies. Less general matters are related to his hypothesis as subsidiary forms of it. More general matters appear properly as assumptions.

Finally, his major hypothesis is relevant to many other theoretical problems, appears manageable in at least its present elementary form, and in my opinion is of considerable intrinsic interest. In a somewhat oversimplified form this hypothesis maintains: "Specifically organized age groups are necessary for the continued maintenance of any society in which the categorization of adults on a very wide variety of scores proceeds on the basis of what they can do as opposed to who they are or who they were before being classified as adults. This specifically organized age group must cover at least a portion of the development of the individual just prior to his being classified as an adult and frequently covers a period in which other members of the society are ambivalent about the classification of the individuals concerned as fully responsible adults." There is not space here to examine whither this leads.

This is without doubt the most poorly edited professional publication that I have ever tried to read. I am on the whole neither sensitive to nor picayune about the niceties of editing. I would probably not have noticed the deficiencies if they did not completely pie the main line of argument from time to time. The problem begins early: see the basic hypothesis of the volume in its initial statement (page 9, item VII); at the top of page 51 an extra negative makes the passage state the opposite of what is intended; the statements at the bottoms of pages 120 and 183 contradict one another (also the latter, if left standing, would contradict the entire main contention of the volume).

I believe that at least one approach from the purist point of view should be made to any volume with such prospects and promise. From that point of view, the work shows too little concern for the rigor necessary for its goal. For example, Professor Eisenstadt follows Talcott Parsons in use of the "patterned variables" set up on the basis of two mutually exclusive categories. When used in construction of a

model, this eliminates the need for the arduous consideration of differing combinations of any pair of patterned variables. It may be possible to do this and obtain fruitful results, but one cannot simultaneously claim the privilege of side remarks to the effect that phenomena classified as "universalistic," for example, really contain "particularistic" elements as well. If the distinction inheres in different degrees and kinds of "particularism" or "universalism" (that is, in whether something is "predominantly universalistic" or not with a given setting) the statement of the main argument in binary terms with side remarks in contradiction is little more than a subtly self-deceptive way of begging the question. That question hangs on what degrees and kinds of combinations of the variables concerned are relevant to the points that necessitated analysis in terms of these concepts in the first place. To be blunt, but plain, most current work in terms of the "patterned variables" seems to me to fall under what might be called the "fallacy of misplaced dichotomy" or the "error of untenable dichotomies" or some combination of the two. On pages 117, 118, 160, and elsewhere such difficulties arise. In general the theoretical difficulties are of this sort rather than ones which arise from the lack of a fertile and stimulating imagination.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Princeton University

ELIHU KATZ and PAUL F. LAZARSFELD. *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*. Pp. xx, 400. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. \$6.00.

A judicious combination of foresight and hindsight makes this book a major contribution to our understanding of the communication process and of the channels of influence which affect marketing choices, fashion changes, movie selections, and opinions about public affairs. The study which prompted the volume was conducted in 1945 in Decatur, Illinois. For ten years it was under analysis, years during which the authors and several colleagues at Columbia's Bureau of Applied

Social Research probed for motivations to explain the behavior of their data.

Results of the unusually successful analysis are presented in two parts. Part I summarizes recent investigations of opinion leadership, of decision making, of the role of reference groups in influencing response to communications, and of the patterns of communication within the group, as well as a large number of earlier studies by social psychologists. This excellent analysis of research relevant to the study of communication process and effects is lucid and readable. Special attention is paid to the role of the group, and of interpersonal relations, in modifying communication effects. But those brought up on the symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead, and familiar with previously published studies by Lazarsfeld, Merton, Berelson, the Rileys, and others, may consider the authors' pleasure in the "rediscovery of the primary group" as a variable in the communication process somewhat anti-climactic.

Part II constitutes an exhaustive examination of the Decatur study. The scope of this study was necessarily more restricted than the theoretical discussion which precedes it. Relying largely on self-designated opinion leaders—partially validated by follow-up interviews—the report includes the following among its major findings: influence, except in the realm of public affairs, tends to flow horizontally rather than to cut across class strata; opinion leadership is related to an individual's gregariousness, to his position in the "life-cycle," and—in the case of public affairs—to his social status; messages seem to flow from the media to opinion leaders, and from them to the less active section of the population; and personal influence is generally the most effective medium of communication.

The authors are refreshingly candid about the shortcomings of their study and the tentative nature of some of their hypotheses. The procedures used in the identification of opinion leaders seem inadequate in the light of more recent studies, and "life-cycle" as a factor in opinion leadership may merely reflect differences in interest and opportunity. But these are minor faults in a book which will prove

invaluable to both students and practitioners of mass communication.

KENNETH P. ADLER

University of Chicago

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT. *The American Experience of Swedish Students: Retrospect and Aftermath*. Pp. xiii, 129. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$3.00.

The benefits and glory of overseas travel and experience are well appreciated by Americans. But, with all the grants to individuals from foundations and governments, hardly any efforts have been made to see if travel creates better international understanding and good will.

Professor Scott, as one of several persons at work on studies of foreign students, has attempted to analyze what effects American travel has had upon a small sample of fifty Swedish students, professors, businessmen, government officials, and others. These persons were interviewed concerning their original opinions of the United States and what these later became. They were also asked whether or not travel in the States influenced their careers and to what use it had been put. Many other questions are conveniently summarized in a set of tables.

The results are hardly surprising in view of the characteristics of the sample taken. These persons sought opportunities for travel in the United States and arrived here with value judgments about certain aspects of American society and about the advantages of study here. Swedes generally found the United States a better place than they expected and, contrary to their preconceptions, somewhat less materialistic. They classed their experience as determinative for their careers. They continued to respond to American influences and found little difficulty in adjustment to either the American environment or to Swedish ways upon their return. Swedes, in other words, liked the United States and found their travel most beneficial.

Professor Scott indicates his own hesitation about conclusions for either Swedish visitors or other foreign students. The United States could neither be as unblemished nor the Swedes as nonperceptive as

this study makes both appear. The sample is too small and its selectivity too lopsided. No check seems to have been used against a natural "halo effect" nor upon an inclination to remember the best impression and to cancel out the worst. The size of the sample, the attitudes of individuals, the academic nature of the Swedish background, and the eager receptivity to the American milieu nullify most conclusions applicable to a general situation.

It is always pleasant to be flattered. Dr. Scott's study by its revelation of favorable predisposition and its absence of "built-in" controls is saccharine flattery of the worst sort. But it does point out the need for investigation of the values in spending funds on foreign travel and exchanges. Other studies are forthcoming which will give more substantial conclusions for judgment of these programs.

RAYMOND E. LINDGREN

Occidental College

ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST, and others. *Potentialities of Women in the Middle Years*. Pp. xiv, 198. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1956. \$3.00.

This is the report of a symposium on the situation, problems, roles, and potentials of middle-aged women in the second half of the twentieth century. The symposium was an observance of The Centennial Year at Michigan State University. Since there are some 20 million women between 40 and 65 years of age and because each contributor presented a serious and thoughtful paper, *Potentialities of Women in the Middle Years* must be regarded as a very significant document.

The central theme is that the position of women has changed from that of preindustrial homemaker and chorewoman to a confusion of roles as our country has shifted from an agrarian-craft society to a mechanized, urban economy. This socioeconomic revolution has changed the lives of all women, but particularly those in middle age who are freed from household responsibilities in the traditional kinship household at the same time the length of their lives is being extended.

Maintenance of health is discussed ex-

pertly in terms of physiological changes, nutrition, and psycho-physical problems. Dr. Pearl Swanson says that middle-aged women have much to learn about healthful eating. Dr. Harry August destroys the myth that psychological depression is a natural consequence of the menopause. Dr. Catherine Macfarlane urges that women make certain their physicians are correctly informed regarding the properties of the age-retarding therapies. Professor R. J. Havighurst and Dr. Lawrence Frank address themselves to the changing family responsibilities and social position of women at middle life and to their search for new and useful roles. Havighurst contrasts the subordinated nineteenth century women with twentieth century women who, he says, are becoming equal partners with men. Their great problem, he adds, is for women to develop new and expanding interests that will replace those of the parental period.

In tackling the same problem, Frank points out that women are not entirely able to make free choices. Some remain involved with children, some have responsibility for aged parents, and many have husbands with exacting needs. Frank suggests, too, that women must find new, absorbing activities if they are to be real persons throughout the second half of their lives. Some are meeting the challenge, he says, but many are regressing into unhappy, listless boredom.

Mrs. Agnes Meyer follows with a provocative essay on ways in which women with leisure can bestir themselves and find usefulness and satisfaction. Society and the community have responsibility too, say all three of these contributors, to help create favorable attitudes and conditions.

The conclusion must be that the middle-aged woman at mid-century is a pioneer in search of new sources of life fulfillment in a changing society which thus far offers little guidance. The book reports a number of researches that may help point the way to new outlets for the potentials of women in modern society.

CLARK TIBBITTS

U. S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

ELI GINZBERG and others. *The Negro Potential*. Pp. xvi, 144. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$3.00.

The Negro Potential has unusual interest from at least two standpoints. First, it represents one of the few current incursions of research economists into the area of demographic analysis and minority group problems; and secondly, since much of the materials appear to be drawn from work done on separate projects by the Director of the Conservation Project, one is apt to be pleasantly surprised at the continuity of treatment which is afforded by the theme of the conservation of human resources.

The wide range of materials covered by the authors warrants a review of each of the six chapters. In the opening chapter, called "The Challenge of Negro Potential," the authors detail both their point of view and a summary of their findings.

The economic progress of the Negro in the past fifteen years and the probable economic future of Negroes in the urban and rural South and in cities outside of the South are treated in the chapter on "Expanding Economic Opportunities." The economic progress and problems of Negroes in each of these demographic areas are carefully documented with emphasis on the problems of Negroes in obtaining jobs as production workers in the South and at supervisory and management levels outside of the South, and the difficulty of Negro women in the North as well as in the South in finding employment beyond the narrow confines of service work.

The chapter on "The Educational Preparation of the Negro" describes the serious deficiencies in the quantity and quality of the education of Negroes as compared to the education of the white population, not only in the South but in all parts of the country. The authors call attention to the poor quality of schools attended almost solely by Negroes in the North because of residential segregation, an oft-neglected item in discussions and measurements of the educational differentials between whites and Negroes.

The spectacular changes which have taken place in the armed forces are discussed in a chapter on "The Negro Sol-

dier." An insightful account is given as to how segregation affected the performance of Negro troops and how, with determined leadership, significant changes in behavior can be made in a relatively short time.

"Better Preparation for Work" stresses the importance of making Negro youth aware of the new opportunities in order to prepare themselves to take advantage of them; that preparation for work is a cumulative process that begins in earliest childhood and involves the total life of the individual, not only his formal education and training; and finally, that much of the responsibility for improving the Negro's preparation for work falls on the Negro community itself. Here the authors stress the importance of breaking down racial residential segregation in the North as well as in the South.

The final chapter deals with "Lessons for Manpower Policy." One finds here, perhaps, an unresolved dilemma in the authors' analysis. They declare on the one hand that "the first and perhaps most significant finding emerging from this study is that improvements in the position of the Negro occurred primarily as the direct outgrowth and consequences of forces unleashed in the market place. They were not primarily a result of alterations in our social and political thinking and behavior." On the other hand, they state, "the outcome of the struggle between the free world and Soviet Russia for the minds and hearts of millions of men who are not yet committed will depend on actions, not speeches. . . . For hundreds of years the private conscience and public morality of America have been weakened by the guilt we have carried over our treatment of the Negro. . . . The greater challenge that now faces us as leader of the free world has at last forced us to recall and to act upon Lincoln's warning: 'Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and, under a just God, cannot long retain it.'" In other words, is it not possible that the social and political "alterations" whose influence the authors tend to minimize were in large measure responsible for the unleashing of the "forces" of the

market place to which they attribute such great significance?

Dr. Ginzberg and his associates have given us a highly significant book, distinguished by balance and objectivity as well as by wisdom and clarity. It deserves careful attention and wide reading.

PRESTON VALIEN

Fisk University

GEORGE S. STEVENSON. *Mental Health Planning for Social Action*. Pp. x, 358. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. \$6.50.

Social movements generally are begun by persons acting with aggressive political motives, the spirit of religious revivalism or fanatic devotion to a cause. But if the movement survives and matures, it generally develops a new leadership, willing to build with patience and planning to develop a stable organization with a well-formulated program. The stability is usually purchased at the price of limiting itself to action on programs supported by sufficient social consensus about what is right and wrong. This allows technicians to apply what they know to a progressive diminution of a gap between conditions which exist and those we would like to see develop.

Mental Health Planning for Social Action is a textbook written by a distinguished physician who has led the mental health movement in America into its present stage of organizational "maturity." It avoids highly technical issues and is therefore all the more useful to persons interested in what is being done in the mental health field by community organizers, social planners, and educator-social actionists. The book is divided into two major parts. The first deals with activities to help people with *problems*—the mentally disordered, veterans, legal offenders, and others who are unable to cope with life in terms of standards regarded as *mentally healthy*. Other chapters deal with *preventive* mental health services through the family, church, school, the military, industry, and other institutions of society.

Students and public-spirited citizens interested in the mental health movement

will find this book a good guide to the topics that are regarded as relevant to it. Without ever saying so, Dr. Stevenson makes it quite clear that mental health encompasses every facet of social life. It is a movement not content with ameliorating conditions in mental hospitals, prisons, institutions for social outcasts like alcoholics and defectives; it has branched out to include the planning of programs for family life education, for social security, and for good international relations.

The book makes no pretense of being a thorough summary of what mental health specialists may know. It is primarily descriptive and illustrative. Professionals in the field of mental health will find little in it that is new to them, but may find it useful as a well-organized and easily readable summary of much of what they must know and use in the everyday pursuit of their work. Health educators will also welcome the appendix on visual aids. It is organized to run concurrently with each chapter of the book, greatly facilitating its use as a text for mental health study groups.

JOSEPH W. EATON

University of California
Los Angeles

NORMAN Q. BRILL and GILBERT W. BEEBE.
A Follow-Up Study of War Neuroses
(VA Medical Monograph). Pp. xviii,
393. Washington, D. C.: Veterans Ad-
ministration. No date. No price.

The problem of manpower shortage in the Armed Services prompted this investigation, as it did, three years ago, the work by Eli Ginzberg and his group (see my review of Eli Ginzberg *et al.* on *Psychiatry and Military Manpower Policy*, THE ANNALS, Vol. 292, March 1954, pp. 183 ff.).

Ginzberg's group sent out questionnaires to psychiatrists in order to pool their experiences. Brill and Beebe asked psychiatrists to examine veterans; they gathered 1,475 carefully devised questionnaires from 200 co-operating psychiatrists. Brill and Beebe's statistical methods will not be dealt with in my review because this reviewer's impression is still that of a task which an engineer would describe as submitting an unknown material, which should serve an unknown purpose, to little known

tests. The basic fact is that the Armed Services constitute to more than 75 per cent a logistic apparatus, so that only one at the most of four inductees ever sees combat action. What are the requirements for which the three others are inducted? This is one of the unknowns. Furthermore, according to the urgency of the momentary needs, the viewpoints in selection, with a given manpower pool, kept changing. The experience of one author, who is quoted, that 79 per cent of those rejected by psychiatrists for disorders not on the level of psychosis, were able to function in some capacity while wearing the uniform, is borne out by some of the case histories. These form a particularly valuable part of the book. As in the older study by Ginzberg, here again the need for experienced psychiatrists is made clear. Unfortunately, only 9 of the 393 pages of the book are devoted to case histories.

While all this is not said to detract from the value of this painstaking effort, it must be stated that objective psychiatric methods as such are not yet available to answer the question: will this man with this prehistory and these emotional and neurotic disorders be able to function in the Armed Services? A similar question has vexed us regarding the traumatic neuroses in civilian life. The experience of the individual psychiatrist is still the most important factor. However, as was said in the review of the previous publication, a better feedback of experiences to the individual examiners is still on the wanted list.

W. G. ELIASBERG

New York, N. Y.

PAUL RADIN. *The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology*. With commentaries by C. G. Jung and Karl Kerényi. Pp. xi, 211. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$6.00.

The Trickster myth is told, in one form or another, in almost all human societies, and, because of its wide distribution and known antiquity in the Mediterranean civilizations, is believed to be an extremely ancient story form. The Trickster, in the shape of a man, a god, or an animal (such as raven or coyote), is a picaresque hero: a being with voracious appetites, particu-

larly for food and sex, who in the course of trying to satisfy his hungers plays tricks with social and natural law, sometimes to his own discomfiture, and sometimes (to the delight of his audience) with success. Paul Radin in this volume presents one version of this widespread tale: the Winnebago trickster cycle, translated from a written text obtained by him in Nebraska from a Winnebago informant in 1912. The episodes are Rabelaisian and pan-humanly biological enough to amuse (or shock) most non-Winnebago readers.

Similar narratives are to be found in many ethnographic and historical sources. What give this publication a special significance to the general reader in the social sciences are the explanations of the psychological meaning of the Trickster cycle by Radin and by Jung. These explanations are certainly speculative, and they fall into the general class of theories of myth: an overpopulated domain within the region of comparative religious research. More narrowly, they belong to the psychoanalytically inspired tradition. Nevertheless, the subject is an important one and these theories are suggestive. Radin interprets the essential Trickster myth (that is, the *Ur-myth* divested of various theological arguments added to it in many versions) as a symbolic expression of the psycho-social development through which every human being must go. The Trickster is represented, at the start of the story, as an infantile creature without ego-boundaries, with uncontrollable appetites, ignorant of the workings of the world; he grows gradually, in the school of hard knocks, to accept (albeit somewhat regretfully) the inhibitions required by life in the real social and natural world. Jung, somewhat more metaphysically, sees the image of the primordial Trickster as representing the survival in modern man of an extremely ancient, almost precultural, stage of human psychic evolution, which we, in order to control (and also to enjoy vicariously), must maintain in consciousness by such devices as telling Trickster tales. By Jungian metaphysics aside, the argument is a plausible one. The ancient paradox of mythology—why do more or less civilized men invent and tell these grotesque tales?

—has been answered in many ways. The supposition that their telling is an ego-integrating process deserves consideration.

ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE

University of Pennsylvania

PETER VIERECK. *The Unadjusted Man: A New Hero for Americans, Reflections on the Distinction Between Conforming and Conserving*. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Professor Viereck's title is interesting; but the numerous short essays of which this volume is composed do no more than skim the surface of the problem of adjustment and individuality in modern life. One's impression of haste and confusion, on reading these pages, is heightened by Mr. Viereck's almost frenzied style, adorned with paradox and pun, which afflicts *The Unadjusted Man* as it afflicted Mr. Viereck's earlier books—despite the claim of his publishers that "there never has been such a Viereck before." Professor Viereck himself apologizes for his disorderliness by maintaining that he deliberately reflects, in his books, the confusion of the modern world. But the world always is confused, and the mission of the serious writer is to extract order from confusion.

Despite here and there a lively insight (insights, however, which Mr. Viereck already has labored in his earlier books), *The Unadjusted Man* is not very interesting. Professor Viereck does not really concern himself with his announced subject, but collects here his occasional reflections on political controversies and party struggles of recent years. He does not write for posterity. Already the portions concerned with the vices of Joseph McCarthy and the virtues of Adlai Stevenson—amounting to nearly two-fifths of this collection—are out of date, and five years from now the book will be bewildering to anyone who takes it from the library shelf. Mr. Denis H. Wrong, writing in last April's *Commentary*, shrewdly observed that "too many intellectuals nowadays have won a reputation for originality and profundity simply by negating yesterday's clichés, or by 'splitting the difference' between rival ideologies and presenting the synthetic re-

sult as a bold new philosophy for the times. Peter Viereck, an energetic publicist hailed as a challenging new thinker by people who ought to know better, carries this approach to extremes of absurdity. . . . It is hard to see how, at least at Viereck's level, such jousting with what is taken to be the public mood of the moment can ever transcend the kind of sloganized thought it aims to correct."

Regrettably—for Professor Viereck at times has shown courage and imagination—this new volume will confirm Mr. Wrong's judgment. Although inveighing against ideology, sometimes Professor Viereck seems himself to be erecting his "new conservatism" into a complex ideology, to which all conservatively minded persons are supposed to subscribe on pain of ostracism; and of that ideology, as Comte was the high priest of positivism, so shall Professor Viereck be king and judge. A new conservative must adore Mr. Stevenson, for instance, and abjure all the works of "cash-nexus Republicans." The trouble with President Eisenhower is that he is so unlike Governor Harriman. What we need is "mad squires." But of the particular political and economic institutions which produce squires, mad or sane, Mr. Viereck has almost nothing to say. To ape Professor Viereck's own rhetorical trick of allusion and inversion, "Tis pity he's a bore."

RUSSELL KIRK

Mecosta, Mich.

J. S. SLOTKIN. *The Peyote Religion: A Study in Indian-White Relations*. Pp. vii, 195. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$4.00.

This account of the North American Indian Peyote cult is noteworthy in two respects: it is written by a professional anthropologist who joined the cult, was "elected one of the Menomini delegates to the intertribal conference of the Native American Church of North America [an incorporated Peyote group], and at that conference . . . [was] elected an official of the Church"; it is the most comprehensive account of the Peyote cult, an objective account, largely historical, and a

revealing narrative of what the cult means to participants.

The nonlegal means employed, especially by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and certain missionaries, to suppress it, and outlaw it, are given in some detail. The author finds no warrant for the allegation frequently made that Peyote is a narcotic or a stimulant; it has less of these qualities, he alleges, than has coffee, tea, and tobacco. Many phases of Christian belief and practice have been incorporated into the cult; it is an amalgam of Christianity and native concepts and practices; "an Indian defense against consequences of white domination. . . . Peyotism socially is an example of accommodation rather than militancy; culturally, . . . it is a case of Pan-Indian nativism" (p. 7).

There is extensive annotation and a lengthy bibliography.

WILSON D. WALLIS

South Woodstock, Conn.

G. MURRAY MCKINLEY. *Evolution: The Ages and Tomorrow*. Pp. ix, 275. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1956. \$4.00.

The central topic of this interesting book is the present situation of man, his place and his prospects in the universe. An accomplished zoologist and teacher, Professor McKinley clearly sees and demonstrates that true knowledge of the nature of man can come neither from intuition nor from revelation, but only from painstaking study of the phenomenal world and of its long history. In five preliminary chapters current ideas on the origin of the earth and of life, on the mechanism of evolution, and on its course are reviewed very briefly—perhaps all too briefly for readers mainly interested in evolution, as such, or with no previous knowledge of those topics.

Then starts the main business of the book: discussion of man as the natural outcome of an inherently self-guiding process and, up to now, its highest product. The evolution of societies in animals and on to societies and civilizations in man is reviewed. Psychological evolution in its many aspects is followed for several chapters and the point is made that here, too,

the unique qualities of man are the inevitable outcome of natural processes and trends. Turning to the future, the author sees our principal dangers in overpopulation and in decreasing average intelligence. He endorses the search for rational, naturalistic ethics and expresses confidence that human capacities guided by such ethics can evade the dangers and ensure a long, worthy future for our species.

The treatment is reasonable, nonargumentative, and, as far as space permits, adequately supported by fact and authority. The central thesis must convince anyone who can approach it without prejudice or dogma. The author is under no delusions about the near universality of precisely such prejudice and dogma, but his book is a welcome contribution to the necessary struggle against them.

A reviewer who approves the aims of the book and who agrees with most of its conclusions would be happy to stop writing at that point. Yet, the ethics shared by author and reviewer demand addition of some less favorable remarks. There is some awkwardness of organization: a chapter on "The Trends of Evolution" quickly loses the thread and becomes a discussion of Korzybski's semantics. There are countless small infelicities. Some are mere slips of syntax or vocabulary: "Under the control of the American Army another 6,000,000 were added" to the population of Japan; "Man, a bipedal-bifocal ape." Some are flat statements on debatable points: "Geneticists know the ways by which the average capacities of the brain . . . could be raised." Others are unnecessarily incomplete simplifications: "The size of a population is controlled solely by the number of births and deaths." A few are definite errors: "Dry sperm (pollen)."

More important is a recurrent philosophical and semantic ambiguity. While insistent on a monistic view of the universe and a wholly naturalistic interpretation of evolution and of man, the author is no less insistent on the concepts of purpose in the universe and of a goal in evolution. This can become tautological or trivial: for "purpose" read "causation," for "goal," "result." If taken more literally, the wording indicates a personification, al-

most a deification, of nature that is inconsistent with the author's data and probably wide of his intentions.

GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON

American Museum of Natural History

MARVIN HARRIS. *Town and Country in Brazil*. Pp. x, 302. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$4.50.

A community study engaging in theoretical argumentation as well as the usual description is still refreshing fare, despite a generally increasing but still restricted tendency for ethnological work to concern itself with more than tidy and isolated little universes. But Mr. Harris has not been content with only this distinction. He has the temerity to suggest that the town of Minas Velhas, whose 1,500 citizens languish in lonely past glory and contemporary neglect in northeastern Brazil, is strongly imbued with an urban ethos, despite the lack even of electricity, let alone belching blast furnaces. Small size, high degree of isolation, and low level of technology do not automatically spell ruralism, says Harris on his first page, and proceeds to spend the rest of his space in demonstration.

Understanding the nature of the present growth of industrial urbanism in Latin America depends in great measure on an appreciation of the style of the pre-existing service and governmental cities. Of no less importance is the strong tendency toward town living, even on the part of agricultural workers. A lack of self-awareness has often led American social scientists to equate the small with the agricultural (and incidentally with the "good") to the detriment of noticing how poignant may be the aspirations for full urban culture and how sharp the rejection of the stultifying forms of agricultural work in almost all of non-Indian Latin America. *Town and Country in Brazil* seems to have chosen its example with care and to have presented its case with a praiseworthy "feel," both for Minas Velhas and for the national scene which is the object of the townsmen's gnawing yearning.

So far as can be told without knowing Minas Velhas itself, the book appears highly accurate. Certainly no one who has

ever spent time outside of Latin America's capital cities will fail to smile in recognition of many facets of country-town life recalling similarities in, say, Mexico, Guatemala, or Chile. Through the standard coverage (economics, a notable chapter in class and race, the family and the individual, government, religion, and folk belief) always weaves the thread of urban-national identification and of rural-isolationist rejection. The sad counterpoint of limited ability, poor resources, whining personalism, and the real gulf which does separate them from Brazil's metropolises prepares the reader for the unwholesome desire for a Messiah characterizing this town. And in truth, they will probably get one, should the astounding rhythm of national Brazil continue.

This reviewer is left with a desire for more information, such as on the administration of justice or attitudes toward crime, for example. But despite some gaps, this is indeed a very good book, flavorsome, cleanly written, well considered.

K. H. SILVERT

Tulane University

HISTORY

GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH. *History in a Changing World*. Pp. viii, 246. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, no date. \$4.00.

In the opinion of the reviewer, Professor Barraclough's volume is the most stimulating collection of historical essays to be published in the United States since the appearance of James Harvey Robinson's *The New History* in 1911. Like the brilliant Robinson book, it is mainly a collection of essays, lectures, and articles but has a unifying orientation and frame of reference.

The book, as a whole, is devoted mainly to three chief themes: the nature and purposes of history, an illuminating interpretation of the more critical periods in the historic past, and the nature and significance of the unique problems and perspectives created by the events of the last forty years.

The author believes that we are now in a great critical era or "climacteric," roughly comparable to the downfall of classical civilization, the trends in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Reformation, and the French Revolution. Specifically, our age most closely resembles the end of the Roman Republic and the trend toward Empire. But the extent of the disintegration, readjustments, and possible hope for the future in our era is unique and defies close comparison with any earlier crisis in human experience.

A notable phase of the current situation is that our era marks "the end of European history," in the sense of regarding the European continent as the center of institutional development and political power. This has now passed to the United States and Soviet Russia. The influence of Europe in the future will rest on tradition and culture, if anything. Ultimately, the main concatenation of power and control may pass to Asia and Africa.

Professor Barraclough gives much attention to the theory of progress. He contends that, for mankind as a whole, there is no doubt of the reality of progress, but the dogma does not hold for specific civilizations. For the most part, they have risen, prospered, and fallen apart. Much of the pessimism of writers, including historians, today is due to myopia and provincialism—the assumption that because the older European civilization is now disintegrating as the main custodian of political and military power, human civilization as a whole is in jeopardy or doomed. Every civilization in the past has had a similarly grim view in its declining epoch, but mankind has gone ahead, nonetheless. If we can control and inhibit the new technological implements of mass-murder in warfare, there is every reason to believe that better periods than the past has ever known may lie ahead.

In the reviewer's opinion, the only possible serious flaw in Professor Barraclough's argument lies in his failure to reckon with the Orwellian trends in our day, which can mean that the formula of cold and phony war—"perpetual war for perpetual peace"—may freeze our culture in a sterile pattern for an indefinite period.

In his selection of the critical and influential periods in the experience of Western society since Rome, most alert historians would criticize his rather old-fashioned emphasis on political and religious history; for example, placing the Investiture struggle, the Reformation, and the French Revolution ahead of the scientific and technological advances in the Middle Ages, the expansion of Europe after 1500, and the Industrial Revolution as dynamic impulses to a new era.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Malibu, California

EDMUND S. MORGAN. *The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89*. Pp. ix, 177. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. \$3.00.

This is a well-organized and beautifully written little book, whose great merit is that it combines much of the latest scholarship on the Revolutionary era with a coherent interpretative narrative of the principal events involved.

Professor Morgan's interpretation has a distinctively "Whiggish" flavor, and indeed it comes near to exemplifying the old saw: "scratch a historian and you find a patriot." Thus he emphasizes the novel and even revolutionary character of the new imperial tax program, and he dwells with evident sympathy upon the colonial argument that "taxation without representation is tyranny," while he condemns the British parliamentary argument for virtual representation as "specious nonsense." He draws heavily upon O. M. Dickerson's *The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution* (1951), to illustrate the essentially capricious and even rapacious character of the British customs service under the Townshend Acts. He rejects by implication the work of the historical school which finds class and sectional conflicts in the Colonial social order at the root of much of the disturbances incident to the Revolutionary crisis. Instead, he emphasizes repeatedly the great degree of unity which existed among the colonists of all classes in their growing quarrel with the mother country, and he caps the argument with the assertion that the appeal to arms was

successful in part because "it was a people's war." And finally, he finds the greatest significance of the Revolution to lie in Jefferson's dictum in the Declaration of Independence "that all men are created equal." The Revolution, in other words, was a vital step forward in the evolution of American democracy.

Thus we have an essentially conservative interpretation which Andrew McLaughlin would have heartily endorsed two generations ago. The same somewhat conservative view appears in the latter portion of the book, in which the author rejects firmly the thesis advanced by Jensen and other scholars that the Confederation government constituted a successful experiment in agrarian democracy. He concedes that the economic achievements of "the critical period" were "creditable," but emphasizes nonetheless the "impotence" of the government in finance, the decline of Congress, the growing irresponsibility of the states and the swelling hysterical talk of "dictatorship." And he concludes with a critical rejection of Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, evidently based in considerable part on Robert Brown's recent slashing attack in *Beard and the Constitution* (1956). In short, Professor Morgan has managed very nicely to work recent scholarship into an adequate and highly convincing defense of a rather conservative and traditional historical treatment of the Revolutionary era.

ALFRED H. KELLY

Wayne State University

WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN. *The Legend of the Founding Fathers*. Pp. 191. New York: New York University Press, 1956. \$4.50.

The study of American mythology has received far too little attention. While the traditional political historians have been counting the ballots of old elections—and have often seemed content with that—important influences helping to determine the results of those elections continue to be ignored. *The Legend of the Founding Fathers* is, happily, a case to the contrary. It describes, with unusual insight, the way the image of America was conceived, pur-

posefully altered, and thoroughly popularized.

Professor Craven has taken a long look at how we reshaped our early history to make it conform with our preconceptions. The reshaping was done at the popular level through uncounted numbers of 4th of July orations, political speeches, lectures, newspaper items, and certainly (one should add) through the give and take of a multitude of conversations which were never recorded but whose general content can be deduced. The reshaping at higher levels was done chiefly through the histories published in the first half of the nineteenth century. Both the histories of given states, Virginia and Massachusetts, for example, and the histories of the entire nation were characterized by an exaltation of this country which was as enthusiastic as it was naive. The enthusiasm focused on individuals, especially the founding fathers and George Washington. We built our pantheon and set their statues in it.

That is what Professor Craven is implying. But he states it with a moderation so great as to be inordinate. "There may even be some advantage," he says in a low voice, "in considering the whole effort as an attempt by a new nation to find for itself a suitable group of national heroes."

Though the individual played more of a part in the legend than did the mass, Professor Craven also explains the methods several prominent groups took in order to establish a tradition which would aggrandize them. We all know about the Virginians who have taught us to forget that they are descended from anything except ringleted Cavaliers. But the author shows us that the Scotch-Irish also, now perhaps the most respected of national groups in the pages of American history, were characterized by one clergyman in the late eighteenth century as "the worst vermin on earth." Such language, Professor Craven adds, was extreme; but it was probably far from unique. It was only as the succeeding decades moved along that the Scotch-Irish were able to win widespread approbation. The Catholic Irish too made efforts to hallow their patriotic role which

were all the more strenuous because the mass of Irish immigrants came in later than the Scotch-Irish. Other national groups as well yielded to the desire to affirm their high origins and great service to the United States.

Not the least value of this stimulating book is its unspoken reminder that attempts to manipulate history to suit the legend have by no means stopped. Various so-called patriotic organizations would still have us teach a brand of history in which America is always right and one American can still beat ten of any other breed.

The political effect of the legend, past and present, is not negligible even though its extent can never be precisely defined. In the Midwest today, to cite a case in point, the shade of Washington is frequently invoked by the isolationists. And other effects of the legend on our culture must be manifold. The way we think of ourselves as Americans and as inheritors of the American tradition may determine at times what books we choose to read, what church we join, what societies we belong to, and what entertainment we enjoy.

CARL BODE

University of Maryland

JOSEPH B. JAMES. *The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment*. Pp. ix, 220. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1956. \$4.00 cloth; \$3.00 paper.

This small book is volume 37 in the Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. The purpose of the author is to put the reader in the environment in which the Amendment was written. Use has been made of the "tremendous amount" of available correspondence and other manuscript material which has survived from the period. Some notice has been taken of the political and social movements prior to December 1865, which directly influenced Congress in framing the Amendment.

The reading of this book leaves one with the feeling that he really was present at one of the exciting and important periods of our history. This review is being written just after an election campaign and an international crisis. One feels that he can

learn almost as much about the characters and events of the ninety-year-old period covered by this book as he can remember about the more recent events.

The preoccupation of those who were active in framing the Amendment with the question of the right of Negroes to vote suggests some afterthoughts, after the lapse of ninety years. Their presentiment that Negroes would not in reality get their other civil rights if they were not secured in their right to vote was well founded, as history has shown. But it was politically impossible at the time to obtain a general guaranty of the right of Negroes to vote because many northern states denied them this right, as well as many other rights. So the best that could be done was the provision in section 2 of the Amendment for the reduction of representation in the House of Representatives of the states which denied the right to vote to any of their adult male inhabitants. The section was never enforced, and in spite of the seeming importance of the question at the time, it turned out to be quite futile. The book does not, of course, cover the subject of the Fifteenth Amendment, what was hoped for from it, and what was realized. Section 3 of the Amendment, disqualifying participants in the rebellion for public office, and section 4, repudiating the Confederate debts and guaranteeing the validity of the Union debt, were regarded as of great importance at the time; but they were, in the long run, of little importance.

Section 1 relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens and due process and equal protection of law was not the subject of much controversy. It was probably regarded as a formulation of pious and obvious abstractions, not comparable in importance to the problem of voting rights for Negroes or the "de-Nazification" of rebels. But its eloquently stated declaration has, of course, turned out to be one of the most important foundation stones of our liberties. It has been put to some surprising uses. The author in several places comments on the lack of evidence that it was intended to protect corporations. But the morality which the section legislates has grown and is still growing in vitality. Its undoubted purpose to protect

a minority and relatively helpless part of the population is better realized today than ever before. One must never underestimate the power of an idea, especially if it is expressed in clean and eloquent prose.

This book greatly illuminates one of the decisive events of our history.

J. WARREN MADDEN

The United States Court of Claims
Washington, D. C.

JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN. *The Militant South, 1800-1861*. Pp. xi, 317. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Without a doubt a martial air in ante bellum times and even down to the present was more evident in the South than in other parts of the country. With this thought in mind, the author sets out to sift the records and accumulate the evidence which would substantiate this fact and to explain here and there why it was so. His labors have taken him far and wide and left little untouched.

There were wars and rumors of war which kept Southerners on the alert. Even before the Revolution there were brushes with the enemies of Mother England, and then the Revolution swept the land. The South had a heavy hand in bringing on the War of 1812, took a principal part in the Mexican War, and in the meantime fought in a couple of Seminole wars in Florida. Where there was no open war, Southerners were quick to engage in the well-known filibustering schemes, first in the Mexican province of Texas, then in Cuba with Lopez, and later with the remarkable William Walker in his conquest of Nicaragua.

Switching from the purely martial atmosphere into personal broils and violence, the author goes into an account of the quick temper of Southerners to resist a fancied insult by fighting duels or merely wielding knives, pistols, and fists in rough-and-tumble fights. Preston Brooks beating Charles Sumner comes in under this category.

All these factors and others were evidence of the militant South; but how did the South get that way? Basically, the author thinks the reason was the fact that the

South was frontier in its conditions and ways of thinking and never in ante bellum times got away from it. Since the South was sparsely settled with big plantations adding to that sparseness, the individual was left largely to his own prowess for protection. The institution of slavery, both in its control internally and in its defense from outside Yankee interference, was a breeding ground for Southern self-assertiveness. Schools, what few there were, and even the churches encouraged the spirit of militancy in the individual as well as in society as a whole. A rash of military schools in the later ante bellum period was an expression of this spirit, nourished as it had been for a long time by the militia musters and volunteer military companies.

Sectional resistance to Northern aggression with the consequent solidification of the South played a fundamental part in Southern combativeness, and during the last decade before the Civil War, the author thinks the South was feverishly getting ready for that conflict. Industrialism, the lack of which had worried some Southerners for a long time, was now on the road—largely, in the author's opinion, for the purpose of providing sinews for the oncoming war. Briefly, this is an indication of what is in this book.

The reader is left somewhat puzzled as to whether it was the intention of the author to write a book on the martial South or on the violent South. It has certainly resulted in a rather illogical mixture of both—and that may account for the title. Militant may mean something less than martial and something more than violent, and therefore straddling both. By lumping together personal violence, pugnacity, militant braggadocio, and the martial spirit; by setting up George Fitzhugh, William L. Yancey, and such extremists as the legitimate spokesmen of the South; and furthermore by uncritically accepting as typical every facet of information in support of this point of view, the author has been enabled to portray a very unattractive picture of the South. From his first sentence to his last, it is evident that he disapproves of the ante bellum South for being so mean and uncivilized, and that he is equally dis-

pleased with the present South for not having thrown off this evil heritage.

E. MERTON COULTER

University of Georgia

W. C. NUNN. *Escape From Reconstruction*. Pp. xv, 140. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University, 1956. \$2.50.

While several articles on the Confederate exiles who fled from their homes after the collapse of the Confederacy have appeared, there is still room for a full study of the Confederate migration to Mexico. It is fortunate, in the judgment of the reviewer, that this study was cast in the form of a book—even though a slender one—instead of being buried in the volumes of some historical periodical.

In this story we find drama, romance, and high adventure based on careful research in American and Mexican sources, couched in an interesting style. The average reader, even one devoted to history, may not know the story of several thousand unreconciled Confederates—exact numbers cannot be cited—who shook off the dust of the United States from their feet to find a refuge and carve out a fortune in a foreign land. The author is able to convey much of the atmosphere of a tropical land and something of the insecurity in the last months of the colonization effort.

It was a short-lived movement for even before the withdrawal of the French sent by Napoleon III to Mexico to sustain Emperor Maximilian, the Confederates, discouraged by civil warfare, illness and fevers, unlicensed banditry, and unrewarding toil on a crop unfamiliar to them, like coffee, were slipping away from Mexico; many leaving unpaid debts. Instead of unbounded freedom, they had found all sorts of restrictions. After the French withdrew to the coast, a stampede on the part of the ex-Confederates followed to Vera Cruz and then a voyage on any bark afloat back to the once-despised homeland.

There are many prominent Confederate names running through the pages of this volume: Generals Kirby-Smith, Sterling Price, J. B. Magruder, and T. C. Hindman; Governor Henry Allen, who edited the *Mexican Times* in English for the exiles; Governors T. O. Moore of Louisi-

ana, T. C. Reynolds of Missouri, and the renowned Matthew Maury, to name but a few of the more famous of the group.

The volume contains a number of interesting illustrations: of Emperor Maximilian and his wife, in whose honor the most important colony, Carlota, was named; of Matthew Maury, who was named Commissioner of Colonization by Maximilian; and a group of five of noted Confederate generals in Mexico; of the French Marshal Bazaine and his wife. Not the least interesting is the picture of the bamboo huts of the Carlota colony.

ELLA LONN

Goucher College

BERNARD SCHWARTZ (Ed.). *The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World*. Pp. x, 438. New York: New York University Press, 1956. \$12.25.

On March 21, 1954, the French Civil Code was 150 years old. Energized by Napoleon, its draftsmen attempted to codify the law so that it would be readily accessible to all. The extent of their success is eloquently evidenced by the widespread adoption throughout the world of analogous codifications. Perhaps Napoleon was right when he wrote, while a prisoner at Saint Helena, that "... what will live eternally, is my Civil Code."

The Code's sesquicentennial was heralded by appropriate celebrations throughout the legal world.

The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World papers delivered during that commemoration contains eighteen essays, all but one of which were delivered at New York University. The exception is "Codification and National Unity" by René Cassin, which replaced an unfinished paper by Dean Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, whose death prevented its completion. However, Dean Mirkine participated at the opening session of the celebration and, from my own experience, as one of his listeners from time to time, I can only envy those who were, unfortunately, his last audience.

The title, *The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World*, is a misnomer. Most of the papers do not deal with the Anglo-American legal system, but rather with the French Civil Code in particular or codifi-

cation in general. Claude Léwy, for example, discusses property concepts under the Civil Code and Professor von Mehren its contract provisions. Dean Jean Limpens considers its territorial expansion and Professor Nikola Stjepanovic its application in postwar Yugoslavia. All in all, the papers are excellent even though they fail to justify the title that purports to unify them.

Perhaps the most interesting essay for common-law lawyers is Professor Angelo Sereni's "The Code and Case Law." It is Professor Sereni's hypothesis that, despite the basic differences between common-law and civil-law systems, the latter is seeking a uniform line of decisions which implement and are consistent with the broad provisions of the Code. This so-called *jurisprudence constante*, once established, becomes the rule of decision until overruled by a higher court. On the other hand, Professor Sereni sees common-law countries, particularly the United States, tending to subordinate the importance of precedents to the broad legal principles and issues involved in each individual case. This rapprochement between the two systems can only serve to make each more flexible in an age when flexibility is a cardinal virtue.

Professor Bernard Schwartz, the energetic director of the Institute of Comparative Law, is to be congratulated both on the calibre of his participants and on the good sense to make their papers available in book form. Students of comparative law will find it a valuable addition to their reading lists, and it is only to be regretted that its circulation will be somewhat restricted by its \$12.25 price.

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER

Kunstler & Kunstler
New York, N. Y.

AARON NOLAND. *The Founding of the French Socialist Party (1893-1905)*. Pp. viii, 233. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$4.50.

Professor Noland has put a large amount of work into this study of the development of political socialism in France during the twelve years between the substantial electoral successes of 1893 and the foundation

of the Unified Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.) in 1905, with Jean Jaurès as its leader. He has made full use of the available Congress reports of the rival Socialist factions and has read widely in the parochial writing of the period. In addition he had access to the Guesde Archives, now in the International Institute of Social History at Amsterdam—a fact which leads to a more intimate treatment of the Guesdist Parti Ouvrier than of either the Allemanists and Broussists (Possibilists) or the Blanquists. He does, however, deal very fully with the Independent Socialists, including Millerand as well as Jaurès, and with the joint parliamentary group of the 1890's—the Union Socialists. Sticking closely to his immediate subject, the factors leading towards the unification of 1905, he almost wholly ignores the strong antipolitical, or rather anti-parliamentary forces at work in the French working-class movement during these years. Neither Pelloutier nor Griffeuilles, nor even Sorel, appears at all in his index; and Lagardelle is barely mentioned. The Anarchists too are almost ignored, though Maitron's book on them appears in the bibliography. A great deal of attention is rightly given both to the Dreyfus and to the affaire Millerand—the combined effect of which was first to split the French Socialists into two sharply opposed blocs and then to impose unity upon them at the strong insistence of the Second International. Professor Noland rightly stresses the extent to which, up to these disturbing events, the theoretically revolutionary Guesdist and Blanquist parties had been modifying their practical policies and accepting reformist parliamentary methods. He also brings out clearly the underlying contrast that remained between Jaurès's devotion to the tradition of *la République* and Guesde's refusal to regard the defense of the Republic or its good name as a matter in which any responsibility could fall on Socialists hostile to the bourgeois régime.

Professor Noland's narrative, within its self-imposed limits, is competent and thorough; but these limits reduce it to much less than a history of French socialism during the period it deals with. It is in fact what it declares itself to be—a monograph;

and the lack of any attempt to relate it clearly to the wider background of Socialist and of social development inevitably renders it rather dull. It is in effect a praiseworthy and useful study based on an intensive study of a large mass of ephemeral material; but even within its limited field it is inadequate in its handling of the Possibilist and Allemanist tendencies, and also pays too little attention to the share of Benoît Malon in the development of his conception of *Le Socialisme Intégral* and in his influence on the shaping of the Independent Socialists. Only one of Malon's works appears in the substantial bibliography, which is in other respects also rather curiously selective.

G. D. H. COLE

All Souls College
Oxford

G. D. H. COLE. *A History of Socialist Thought: The Second International, 1889–1914*. Pp. xvii, viii, 1,043. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. \$16.00 (2 vols.).

The Second International (in two volumes) is the third instalment of Professor Cole's monumental history of socialist thought. In his Introduction the author expresses the hope that, if he will live to write it, volume IV will bring the record up to 1939. This hope will be shared by all students of modern political thought, since there is no one writing in any language to-day who is as qualified to write a history of socialist thought as is Professor Cole. In the present scope, the work is not only the best on the subject, but virtually the only one that can claim the scholarship and style so happily combined in Cole's writings. The author is one of the most prolific writers in the field of social thought (not to speak of his many detective novels, which he must have written just to do something in his spare time); yet it is safe to assume that of all his works his *History of Socialist Thought* will endure as his *magnum opus* and as the crowning achievement of his life. Moreover, he writes from intimate experience and participation in the socialist and labor movements over a period of over forty years, particularly in Great Britain, supplemented by documen-

tary research on socialist movements in many other lands, European and extra-European.

In *The Second International*, Professor Cole covers the period of 1889, its start, to 1914, its demise. In many respects, those twenty-five years are the most interesting in the history of world socialism; socialist movements were not marred as yet by the failures and frustrations of governmental responsibility, and socialist ideas and ideals still commanded an increasingly growing appeal to men of goodwill and humanitarian leanings. Moreover, communism—except in Russia as a minor fraction under Lenin's leadership—had not arisen as yet as a world-wide movement bent on competing with socialism, and on ultimately destroying it. Volume I of *The Second International* concentrates on the major European socialist movements in Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia. When he writes about British socialism, Professor Cole, one feels, is really at home, and his two chapters on British Labour are the best in the entire work. His study brings out clearly why British socialism ultimately emerged as the most successful democratic labor movement in the twentieth century. In the first place, British socialists operated within a democratic and liberal environment and could thus concentrate on social reform, whereas Continental socialists had to fight for political democracy and social reform at the same time. This two-front war was too much for most of them, as can be clearly seen from the present-day plight of the French socialists: by looking upon the defense of republican and democratic institutions as their first priority of policy, they have deliberately weakened themselves in the struggle for working-class social and economic achievements. The second advantage of British socialism during the period of the Second International lay in the fact that Marxism was never able to dominate the thinking of British socialist or labor leaders. On the Continent, most socialist movements suffered from intellectual paralysis and sterility, because by accepting Marx (verbally, at least) little seemed to be left that could still be said in the field of socialist theory. By contrast, British social-

ism continually drew upon new and diverse sources of intellectual inspiration, generally incompatible with Marx: the esthetic and artistic protest against capitalism of Ruskin and Morris; the idealism of Christian socialism as applied "practical Christianity"; the philosophical radicalism of Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the latter ending up, in his own words, as a "qualified socialist"; and finally, the empirical tradition of British thought and life, as reflected in the Fabians. As so often, Britain was out of step with the Continent, but this very fact may have saved British socialism from the fate of Continental socialism in many countries.

Volume II of *The Second International* deals with the lesser European countries and the extra-European movements in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Latin America, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, China, and Japan. Limitations of space frequently result in very sketchy accounts, as it is virtually impossible to give an adequate picture of Chinese socialism in fifteen pages or of South African socialism in six pages. Where the author allowed himself more space, as in the case of Austria, Belgium, or Scandinavia, the results are much more satisfactory. Despite the necessary brevity in several instances, the world-wide review of socialist thought adds a dimension of breadth and universality, indicating that socialist influence was not confined to a few advanced, major nations in the West.

All in all, *The Second International* is a worthy successor to the earlier instalments in Cole's *History of Socialist Thought*, and it is to be hoped that the author will be able to bring the story, not only up to 1939, but completely up to date.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

Princeton University

FRANK E. MANUEL. *The New World of Henri Saint-Simon*. Pp. xi, 433. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

With the Count de Saint-Simon so well established a figure in the history of ideas, it is quite surprising that only now, 130 years after his death, a full-fledged appraisal of the man and his work has be-

come available in the English language. Professor Manuel, the distinguished historian at Brandeis University, has written a book that all students of social and economic thought will peruse with profit and pleasure, and that undoubtedly will be the standard work on the subject for many years to come.

Drawing invariably on the original sources and frequently on material available in the French archives, Professor Manuel generally allows his hero and his contemporaries to speak for themselves, and he wisely abstains from burdening the discussion with arguments concerning the priority of some of the key ideas in nineteenth-century social thought with which the names of Saint-Simon and of other writers are linked. By the same token, Professor Manuel's principal concern is with Saint-Simon himself rather than with the impact of his work on others and the echo of this impact in the more recent literature, such as, for example, in the writings of Dean Mason and Professor Hayek.

The outstanding features of Professor Manuel's work are the biographical detail, which has been assembled with great care and ingenuity, and the synopses of Saint-Simon's writings, culled from the 47-volume edition of the works of Saint-Simon and *Enfantin*, and from many other sources—newspapers, pamphlets, advertisements, circular letters, and other depositories for the products of the Count's untiring pen. In the early chapters of the book we learn about young Saint-Simon's adventures in America, where he fought at Yorktown and eventually was elected to become a member of the Society of the Cincinnati. Saint-Simon's stay in America, limited, as it was, to a period of two months, was one of the turning points of his life; so at least it seems in the light of the evidence of his later writings. After his return from America Saint-Simon set out on his exciting career in politics and business, a career characterized by such episodes as the manufacture of republican playing cards (no Kings, Queens, and so forth) and the sale of the leaden roof of Notre Dame de Paris. Having become wealthy for the time being, Saint-Simon then kept open house for the Paris scientists, who, however, "ate much

and talked little," thus frustrating his desire for a scientific education.

Saint-Simon's literary career, which is the principal topic of Professor Manuel's work, had to wait until Saint-Simon was in his forties. In spite of many fiascos and harassments, which brought with them temporary insanity and attempted suicide, this career, during the last twenty-five years of his life, led him to a position of influence attained only by a handful of nineteenth-century thinkers. In the words of Professor Manuel: "Saint-Simon's 'industrial doctrine' ended in a vision of the good society, a social order administered by working industrialists, scientists, artists, and engineers, all in the service, not of the state, but of 'the most numerous and the poorest classes.' Because he grasped the essence of the new industrialized society before it became bewildering in its complexity, Saint-Simon's work is a revelation of western social ideals in modern times."

HENRY W. SPIEGEL

Catholic University of America

WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS. *Old Bullion Benton, Senator From the New West: Thomas Hart Benton, 1782-1858*. Pp. xv, 517. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. \$6.00.

Thomas Hart Benton's contemporaries saw him as the equal, even the superior, of his great senatorial adversaries: Clay, Calhoun, and Webster. As lawyer, soldier, editor, political leader, and publicist, for three decades Benton played a major role in issues of the day. Jackson found him a tower of strength in battling the "monster" Bank of the United States in the 1830's, and Benton fought equally hard to prevent slavery from disrupting the Union in the 1840's and 1850's. He worked for liberal land laws, for westward expansion, and for modification of the electoral college in the interest of democracy. His achievements entitled him to rank among America's great statesmen.

The loss of many of Benton's private papers in a fire shortly before his death made it difficult for later historians to present an adequate picture of his career. Theodore Roosevelt and William M. Meigs published biographies of him at the turn

of the twentieth century, but neither did the necessary work of searching for the scattered pieces of evidence essential to constructing a full-bodied picture of the man. As a consequence, Chambers gives us the first satisfactory biography of Benton almost a hundred years after his death. It constitutes a fascinating story.

Chambers presents Benton against the background of his times. In so doing, he takes the reader through the tortuous maze of politics in the Middle Period but with such facility of style and clarity of presentation that he makes the venture interesting throughout. As a good biographer should, Chambers probes the mainsprings of Benton's personality. Driven out of the University of North Carolina on the charge of petty thievery, Benton seems to have developed an enormous urge to prove himself and an extremely touchy sense of personal honor. He engaged in a dangerous brawl with Andrew Jackson as a youth in Tennessee and later killed young Charles Lucas in a vicious duel on "Bloody Island" near St. Louis, Missouri. Benton's egotism and domineering ways plagued him throughout his lifetime, but friend and foe alike had to recognize his courage, industry, and devotion to the right as he saw it. Within his own family circle he cast aside his imperious ways and became the devoted husband and doting father. Family sorrows cut him deeply but in public he never asked for quarter, even when a greater measure of compromise might have foiled his political enemies in the twilight of his political career. Even cancer could not conquer him until he had completed the last task which he had set for himself. Chambers brings Benton to life as a great statesman, a great personality, and a great American.

LEWIS ATHERTON

University of Missouri

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GEORGE F. KENNAN. *Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920*. Pp. xiii, 544. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

This is the first of several volumes in which George F. Kennan will tell the story of American-Russian relations during the first stages of the Soviet era. Volume I deals with the crucial first four months, from the Soviet upheaval in November 1917 to the Brest Litovsk Treaty and Russia's quitting of the war.

Mr. Kennan, who has had twenty-five years' service with the State Department, is an outstanding expert on the Soviet Union. He headed the Policy Planning staff for a time and later served as United States Ambassador to Moscow. Since 1953, when he left the government service, he has devoted himself to the writing of history. With this book he proves that he possesses all the qualities requisite for an historian: ability to find and to analyze original material, familiarity with the sources, contacts with surviving actors of the drama, and an exquisite literary style. His book is one of the finest works on American policy of the period and the initial Soviet steps in the field of international relations.

The American official family in Petrograd (the capital was not moved to Moscow until March 1918, near the end of the period covered by this volume) were not unanimous in their evaluations of the meaning of the Soviet upheaval, and the divergency of views as to the present and future of Bolshevism, while not too sharp, was nevertheless important. Some Americans were more sympathetic to Lenin's government than others; some wanted to believe in a "democratic" essence of the new regime, while others could not be reconciled to such a belief. To some extent, the attitudes which prevail in this country today can be traced to the disputes of those first weeks of the Soviet regime.

Hoping against hope, the Americans in Russia at that time tried to influence Lenin's government against concluding a separate peace with Germany; exaggerating the impression made by Wilson's Fourteen Points on the Soviet leadership, they expected that, with American backing, Russia would stay in the war. One American, William B. Thompson, who had donated a million dollars to the Socialist revolutionaries when Kerensky was in power, now

described the Bolsheviks as "kindly, earnest men, heartily desiring to live at peace with their fellow men and being absolutely unwilling to fight each other or to enter into any form of civil war."

The exciting and, in a way, tragic Diamandi incident is recounted in interesting detail by the author. When a conflict broke out between the Russian troops operating in Rumania and the Rumanian government and measures were taken by the Rumanians to expel the Russians, Lenin, still in his infancy as a chief of state, responded by simply ordering the arrest of the Rumanian minister, Constantine Diamandi. In a body, the entire diplomatic corps called on Lenin and protested his action. Lenin had obviously not foreseen such a reaction. Diamandi was set free after a few days and ordered to leave Russia. He was accompanied by a commissar Svetlitsky to Finland, where both fell into "the hands of the White Finnish authorities." According to one (though not entirely reliable) report the "White Finns" proceeded to search them, and "were astounded to find on Svetlitsky an order, signed by Trotsky and addressed to the local Red Commissar of Torneo, calling upon him to 'do away with' Diamandi at the border. With relish, the Finnish Whites executed Svetlitsky instead."

Although Allied intervention did not begin until later, its first steps are traceable to diplomatic exchanges between the United States, Britain, France, and Japan in these winter months of 1917-18. London and Paris were favorable to a Japanese intervention in Siberia, whereas the United States sternly rejected such an action; the Japanese themselves were divided on this issue, being apprehensive that the Americans would have too much leeway in the Pacific if Japan should get bogged down in the vast spaces of Siberia.

In Mr. Kennan's forthcoming volumes we may expect to read the details of the absorbing drama of the Allied expeditions into Siberia.

DAVID J. DALLIN

New York, N. Y.

HENRY L. ROBERTS. *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects*. Pp. xxxiv, 251.

New York: Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. \$3.50.

In the spring of 1953, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York organized a study group of distinguished Americans drawn from the worlds of business, law, and higher education to consider the problems of Soviet-American relations. In this group were individuals who had served in the government at home and abroad, scientists conversant with nuclear warfare, and experts in the field of Soviet studies. The chairman of the group was John J. McCloy, and author of the final report was Dr. Henry L. Roberts, director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

Mr. McCloy has contributed a long foreword to this study, in which he lays down broad perspectives of American foreign policy; he writes, "The struggle with Soviet Russia now extends beyond the military to the political, economic and social areas." While military aspects of Russian threat are not discounted by Mr. McCloy, he believes that we should concentrate more than we have in the past on these other areas of conflict. Mr. McCloy, however, very rightly does not consider that all of America's problems vis à vis the world are due to "Soviet devilry and cunning."

Dr. Roberts' report is divided into three parts: first, a statement of the atomic problem; next, the requirements of American policy; and finally, the areas of conflict between Russia and America. In the first part much valuable discussion is given on the implications of atomic and thermonuclear developments in regard to Russian-American rivalry and the nature of Communist totalitarianism. Dr. Roberts points out how difficult it is for us to grasp the nature of totalitarianism. He continues to assess the strength and vulnerabilities of the Russian-American problem by outlining three forms of antagonism: physical power—a full thermonuclear war, a limited war to attain specific gains, and a political war "to threaten, to bluff, to disarm, to discourage."

The second part of Dr. Roberts' report deals with what he calls "American Policy Requirements." He believes that a general

thermonuclear war or the world-wide establishment of Communism would be a "terrible disaster," but that the avoidance of both war and Communist domination is not an absolute policy requirement. He believes that if put in these terms the United States has to stop the world-wide establishment of Communism at the expense of a general war.

American policy requirements in this regard involve the following corollaries as he puts them: the maintenance of American strength, the coupling of American strength with that of our allies, and the stopping of further absorption of territory into the Soviet bloc. Dr. Roberts then discusses the implications of these minimum requirements through defense policy, keeping allies and winning neutrals, economic assistance, and social reform.

The final part of Dr. Roberts' formulation of the Committee study covers the areas of Russian-American conflict: Germany, the eastern European satellites, and Communist China and the question of Asian security. All of these questions are discussed in a very lucid analytical manner. Dr. Roberts believes that no final solutions are in sight, but his trenchant pen reflecting a very deep analytical ability to delineate these problems has contributed much to our further understanding of them.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS

University of Washington

MAO TSE-TUNG. *Selected Works*, Vol. IV: 1941-1945. Pp. 348. New York: International Publishers, 1956. \$3.00.

The present volume corresponds to the third volume in the original Chinese edition of Mao's selected works (*Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi*, Peking, 1951-53). Its scope encompasses the last four years of the ill-starred Kuomintang-Communist "united front"—actually, the period in which the breach took on its definitive form. These were also the four years of American participation in the Pacific war after Pearl Harbor. We have been learning that we cannot understand our postwar world without knowledge of what happened during World War II. Here we have a most important basis for understanding the difficulties that would beset Chiang Kai-shek after

V-J Day, for appreciating the inherent difficulties of the Marshall Mission, and for grasping the characteristic underpinnings upon which the present superstructure of Chinese Communism rests.

Mao Tse-tung is shown here as a many-faceted leader with an extraordinary gift for self-expression. In lucidity, he far surpasses Stalin. In contrast to Stalin's obvious contrivances, Mao's strong sense of humor seems to grow from the essence of China; even in sarcasm, Mao's lightness and deftness ("The Hurley-Chiang Duet is a Washout," pp. 324-27) stand in sharp contrast to Stalin's hard breathing and heavy-handedness. Mao is capable of drawing upon classical Chinese allusions, even to the point of referring favorably to Confucius, when his purpose is to lampoon his comrades' tendencies to clothe Marxism-Leninism in antiquated or formalistic terms ("Oppose the Party 'Eight-Legged Essay,'" pp. 46-62). The works of such personalities as Stalin and Mao Tse-tung are seldom evaluated as literature, because we are preoccupied with the political implications of what they have to say. But the present volume demonstrates Mao's appeal to the Chinese *literati* in form and style, and the intellectual acuity that underlies his leadership of the Chinese Communist party.

The thirty-two selections in the present volume include: major political documents, such as Mao's "report" to the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 ("On Coalition Government," pp. 245-315); directives for the "ideological reform" (Cheng Feng) movement of 1942-43, which gave Chinese Communism a distinctive character ("Rectify the Party's Style in Work," pp. 28-45); "Maoist" interpretations of the party's history ("Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party," pp. 171-218); an analysis of party policy with respect to art and literature, which has remained almost constant since 1942 ("Talks at the Yen'an Forum," pp. 63-93); and a wide variety of statements on strategic, tactical, political, economic, and organizational questions of the time. From one point of view, these materials offer an explanation of recent history; from another, they offer insights into contemporary policies unobtainable in other ways. Whoever wants to

understand how Chinese agriculture was substantially collectivized (or "cooperativized") during 1956 might well begin by reading "Let Us Get Organized" (pp. 148-56)—Mao's address of November 29, 1943!

H. ARTHUR STEINER

University of California
Los Angeles

NICHOLAS P. VAKAR. *Belorussia, the Making of a Nation: A Case Study*. Pp. xii, 297. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$6.50.

———. *A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia*. Pp. xii, 63. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$2.00.

These two volumes represent close to a decade of very diligent research on the part of the author and are made all the more important by the previous absence of a suitable introduction to Belorussia in the English language.

The introductory volume commences with a brief excursion into the ethnography, demography, origins, and popular traditions of Belorussia. Only six chapters—totaling some ninety pages—are historical in the sense that they deal with the pre-World War I period. The bulk of the volume is devoted to the beginnings of the national movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries under Russian rule, the conditions prevailing during the partition of the country by the Soviet Union and Poland during the inter-war period, the reunion of the country in the autumn of 1939 as a result of the Soviet attack upon Poland, the German occupation in World War II and postwar developments both in the Belorussian SSR and amongst the émigrés in the West.

Professor Vakar teaches Russian literature at Wheaton College and is a veteran associate of the Harvard Russian Research Center. He writes with detachment and caution explaining the Belorussian point of view with fairness. He has utilized the data obtainable from the Belorussian émigrés and their publications but has not accepted their views.

While this is a sound introduction to a people little known in the West, it is not an entirely complete analysis or synthesis. A social scientist might have written a

somewhat different volume. Be that as it may, this is a volume of substance with which the critic cannot easily quarrel, although it is not pleasant reading for many Poles because of the sordid record of Belorussian-Polish relations during the interwar period. One objection which can be made is that the evidence presented is often of a contradictory nature and the contradictions are not always resolved; in fairness to the author it should be stated that, given the nature of the subject matter, a certain degree of irresolution is inevitable. In general, Professor Vakar paints a dark future for Belorussian nationalism and even writes of it as moving "toward complete dissolution in the Soviet sea" (p. 225), but at the same time he refers to factors which might serve to qualify this conclusion.

The *Bibliographical Guide* contains more than two thousand entries and is an outgrowth of the principal volume under review. No scholar can readily use the introductory volume without employing the *Guide* since all sources referred to in the former are given in terms of the authors and the numbers which correspond to their listings in the *Guide*.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

University of Pennsylvania

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR. *Finland Between East and West*. Pp. xiv, 298. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956. \$6.50.

The fascinating history of Finland falls naturally into three unequal periods: over six centuries of union with Sweden during which the Finns were politically "native Swedes" in the full sense of the term; the precarious union from 1809 to 1917, as an autonomous state, within the Russian Empire, culminating in an independent Republic in 1917-19; and the story of nearly forty years under the Republic.

Professor Mazour has not made use of this pattern. Instead he has employed the concept that Finland has been and is a border area between East and West in which coexistence is no recent experience, but an old and unchanging condition of life. The use of this concept represents a simplification that cannot but be misleading in many ways. For instance, it ob-

scures the all-important fact that the Finns' political experience in general and their democratic institutions in particular, to say nothing of culture patterns in the large, are Western and in no way a hybrid product of existence "between East and West." Despite the limitations imposed by the author's formula, however, he has produced a lively narrative. The main accent is on the period since 1917, and half of the book is devoted to the years 1939-56. Twelve appendices covering roughly one-third of the volume contain documents illustrative of Finnish-Russian relations from 1920 to 1948.

The Russo-Finnish two-phase war in 1939-44 was an exceptionally interesting and dramatic one of World War II. The nature of Soviet aggression in 1939 and 1941 has been pretty well described by now, but the whys and wherefores of Finnish policy and the nation's resolve and capacity to resist will no doubt be debated for many a year. The author enters the debate with gusto. He combines enthusiastic admiration for the Finns with cautious weighing of pertinent fact and circumstance. He appears to conclude that a Finnish policy of "less daring and more statesmanship" would have produced better results than fighting (the book contains quite a bit of laborious argument in support of this notion), but fails to suggest how the Finns could have avoided subjugation by the USSR without resisting invasion. The author's verdict in the matter is curiously vacillating, probably because he has been unable to make use of pertinent Finnish materials and studies.

A final caveat is in order. The blurb on the jacket claims that Professor Mazour's book is more candid than Finnish accounts, and that Finnish scholars have never dared to be as frank as the author in describing Finland's post-1939 diplomatic and military relations and problems. The claim is extravagant. The fact is that Finland's development and history since 1939 have been described in a considerable number of Finnish studies of high calibre. Not one of those that have come to the reviewer's attention could be said to lack—whatever their other shortcomings may have been—the kind of daring claimed for

Professor Mazour's tome. This applies with special emphasis to the excellent study by Max Jakobson (its title in translation is *The Winter War of the Diplomats*), whom Professor Mazour identified in his Preface as one of many people to whom he is indebted for advice and "constructive criticism."

JOHN H. WUORINEN

Columbia University

ABRAHAM YESELSON. *United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921*. Pp. ix, 252. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Although excellent general texts dealing with American diplomatic history are abundant, rarely do they contain discussion of American foreign relations with the Middle East. "This area of the United States foreign policy," the author complains, "has been neglected"; and the purpose of his book is to "fill one of the gaps in the studies of American diplomatic history." Since the United States has found itself inevitably involved after World War II with Persian external and internal problems, an examination of the traditional American policy toward Persia since the establishment of a legation in the Persian capital in 1883 is deemed necessary by the author which may throw light on the understanding of present-day events and policies. In the formative period, American policy has stressed nonentanglement and nonintervention in Persian affairs in spite of the repeated requests of the Persian Government to invite American diplomatic support in its struggle against Anglo-Russian intervention. When finally an American financial adviser, Mr. Shuster, was appointed in 1911 to help reorganize the financial chaos, Russian and American pressure on the Persian Government led to his dismissal without even a formal protest made by the American Government. This policy has finally been greatly adopted under the changed circumstances of the post-war world in which American leadership in the Middle East as in other parts of the world is bound to assert itself.

The author presents a straightforward account of American diplomatic relations with Persia during the formative period.

He made extensive use of archives material, now accessible in the National Archives, and of all important published studies in Western languages; but he made no attempt to use native source material unless it is found in Western languages. However, his treatment of the subject is dispassionate, and the book is well-organized and lucid. The author is to be congratulated for a thorough and scholarly study.

MAJIID KHADDURI

School of Advanced International Studies
of Johns Hopkins University

V. P. MENON. *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*. Pp. 511. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. \$7.00.

Here are indeed stirring annals of achievements in political and social science accomplished in the vast laboratory of "princely" India by an indefatigable administrator of unusual competence and vision. Within five years, Mr. Menon and his associates in the States Ministry of the newly independent government of India brought to pass what many experts in Indian affairs had prophesied to be impossible without violent revolution—namely, the integration of nearly all the former princely States with the new Union of India. His book is a tribute to his chief, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel; it is no less a tribute to the co-operation between the leaders of the new India and the members of the former civil and military services. Mr. Menon had spent his life in the Indian Civil Service and was about to retire as constitutional adviser to the Governor-General when the challenge of this extraordinarily complex, formidable, and exhausting task confronted him.

Mr. Menon confines himself to a straightforward account of this great drama as he personally saw it. When he ceased to be connected with events, as in Kashmir after referral of the case to the United Nations, he does not pursue the subject further. His account provides an excellent demonstration of what he calls the "compulsion of events," especially in Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. He is most convincing in showing that in many states,

situations developed which were not foreseen in advance, and that many a crucial decision seemed the only one possible in the stress of the moment. He disposes quite effectively of the notion that the States Ministry, like the spider in the fable, enticed the princely flies into its parlor with the bait of "accession" to India in respect to "defence, foreign affairs, and communications only," and then swallowed them whole. Indeed neither princes nor ministers understood in 1947 that full integration would have to come so quickly. No one realized that a new constitutional structure could be so speedily built. What is more, no one, especially on the princes' side, realized that the traditional authoritarian government, especially in the smaller states, would have to be superseded by "responsible" government in some form if administrative chaos and communal strife within the princely states were to be avoided. Mr. Menon is quite right to point out that there could after August 15, 1947 be no such thing as the old "paramountcy" exercised by Indian government officials over Indians. Nevertheless, he seems strangely oblivious to the fact that his chief and he often coerced princes to an extent undreamed of by British officials. Janjira is a case in point: "We now informed the ruler that he must sign the merger agreement and that the Government of Bombay would take over the entire administration of his state. The Nawab consented" (p. 204).

In his narrative, Mr. Menon is eminently fair to the princes. The eccentricities and extravagances of the few disreputable rulers are referred to only in so far as they explain what took place. Mr. Menon is most anxious to leave his readers in no doubt that the immense advantages gained by the integration of the princely states with the new Republic of India far exceed the obligations incurred by the guarantees of "privy purses," titles, and dignities to the princes. At the end, one detects in the author a certain anxiety lest the further changes in the map of India now taking place may unsettle his work. Nevertheless, it remains an achievement in which he may well take great pride. Designedly written for those well informed on Indian

affairs, this book will not be easy reading for the uninitiated. It is to be hoped that a popular condensed version may be prepared and made available in Indian languages as well as in English for a few rupees a copy.

HOLDEN FURBER

University of Pennsylvania

A. B. LAL (Ed.). *The Indian Parliament*. Pp. xxiv, 296. Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1956. \$4.00.

This collection of fifteen essays examines significant aspects of the organization and work of the Indian Parliament, reviews the growth of parliamentary institutions, and assesses the current condition of parliamentary democracy in India. The symposium will no doubt be of greatest value to the layman who wishes to obtain a view of the "hub and pivot of the political system" in India, but who does not have readily available Indian constitutional documents. However, the work is not only descriptive; several critical essays introduce the reader to an inside view of the stresses within Indian democratic forms and processes.

The office of the President of India has often been referred to as little more than that of honorary head of State. Several authors in the book under review, however, call attention to the potential latent in the constitutional provisions regarding the office. Mohan Lal (of Allahabad University), in his chapter on "The President and Parliament," discusses the channels through which an unscrupulous President might be able to subvert the democratic principles upon which the Republic is founded. He concludes that the "real test" of the relations between the President and Parliament may not come until "either the extremist parties acquire a majority in Parliament or when the President and the Prime Minister belong to two different parties." India's first President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, has refrained from testing the extent of the powers of the office and, therefore, as Mohan Lal points out, the President and Parliament have "not yet found their level." Much will, indeed, depend upon the kind of party system which evolves, an observation in effect supported

by the chapter on "The Opposition" contributed by the Communist leader in Parliament, A. K. Gopalan.

Mr. Gopalan insists that the "real opposition" in India is that led by the Communists, but he makes no secret of the fate awaiting an opposition should Communists come to power. The opposition role, he states baldly, is "decided by the attitude taken by the ruling party towards the aspirations of the people. When there is no conflict between the two there is no room for another party" (p. 82).

Perhaps the liveliest chapter is that by Dr. Lanka Sundaram on "The Role of an Independent Member." He makes an excellent case for the contribution which can be made by the true Independent and illustrates from his own experience the frustrations but occasional triumphs possible for an Independent Member of Parliament.

A word of caution with regard to the short chapter on "The First General Elections" by Asoka Mehta: the statistical analysis is apparently a fragment culled from the author's 1952 booklet, *The Political Mind of India*, and has not incorporated later figures made available by the Election Commission Reports. It was a disappointment to this reader that Asoka Mehta had not contributed a chapter based upon his more recent experience in Parliament.

In the concluding chapter M. G. Gupta (of Allahabad University) reviews the problems which face parliamentary democracy in India and the achievements with which it may justly be credited.

Professor Lal has written a useful Introduction which reviews salient features of Indian government and raises some significant questions.

JOAN V. BONDURANT

University of California
Berkeley

PHILIP W. THAYER (Ed.) with the assistance of WILLIAM T. PHILLIPS. *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Pp. xvi, 394. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. \$5.75.

For some years the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University has been performing a notable

service by bringing together each summer a group of scholars and government officials to discuss contemporary issues in some major world area or region. From these conferences have come a distinguished series of volumes of which the one under review is the latest. This conference is distinguished from its predecessors in that a counterpart conference on the same theme was held abroad at the University of Rangoon where the School has co-operated in the establishment of a study center.

The contributions to this volume consist of papers delivered at these two conferences, together with a commentary on each paper. The thirty-seven contributors and commentators include such distinguished names, chosen at random, as Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; D. G. E. Hall, Professor of History from the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies; Professor Rupert Emerson of Harvard University; G. L. Mehta, Ambassador from India; Victor Purcell of Cambridge University; Brian Harrison of Hong Kong University; Soedjatmoko, Secretary, Indonesian Council of World Affairs; U Ba Nyunt, University of Rangoon. Topics covered include reciprocal views of each other by the United States and South and Southeast Asia: an analysis of the European impact on the area, progress of nationalism, political and economic development, demographic and racial problems, international relations, and foreign questions.

It is unavoidable that a symposium of this type should contain dull as well as bright spots, areas of duplication and gaps of omission. Southeast Asia receives a good deal more attention than South Asia, although Richard L. Park of the University of California contributes a paper on political development which underlines India's experience. Avoiding, in his own phrase, "resounding clichés and overstuffed generalizations," Park, while cautiously optimistic, calls attention to some of the difficult problems new parliamentary governments face, such as making a change "from a civil service of imperial control to a public service in the building of welfare

states," in which the claims of administrative competence may appear to clash with those of democratic control.

J. S. Furnivall, advisor to the Government of Burma, comments memorably on the paper on "Aftermaths of Colonialism" by Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations. Furnivall sharply asserts that the impact of the West on "oriental economy" was not attributable to "colonialism," by which he refers to settlement by European colonizers, nor even to the introduction of European capital, but rather to the intrusion of "capitalism as a social system," a system which, Mr. Furnivall says, caused "the transformation of the social order into a business concern."

For the economist, Abdul Aziz of the University of Malaya provides a vigorous attack on some widely accepted notions about the "lazy native's" preference for leisure to income, his unwillingness to increase work output in response to wage increases. Papers and comments by Harold H. Fisher of Stanford University, Lucian W. Pye of Princeton, now at M.I.T., and Roger Swearingen of Southern California shed light on the motivations which lead diverse groups of Asians to accept or reject Communism. An index provides an essential key to the volume as a whole, making it possible to browse here and there to satisfy one's own curiosity, perhaps a better way to approach this book than by an attempt to read it straight through.

FRED W. RIGGS

Indiana University

KENNETH INGHAM. *Reformers in India, 1793-1933*. Pp. xi, 150. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. \$3.50.

This valuable book is, according to the subtitle, an account of the work of Christian missionaries on behalf of social reforms. Its author is a man of experience and competence within the range of the social work depicted and evaluated on the part of his chosen characters. Although he dwells upon their social work, he reflects the true spirit and just accomplishments of Christian teaching in the mission field.

India profoundly furnishes the setting,

and Ingham's book brings into due perspective activities and accomplishments—and sometimes failures—between the years 1793 and 1833. It is, therefore, history with appraisal of forty years thereof, dependent largely upon the writings of active missionaries of the period—including official correspondence and personal letters. For its small compass as a book it is exhaustive, a prodigious survey brought into attractive form reflective of individuals and societies of Great Britain.

The duly educated reader will meet a host of familiar names, but may likewise meet a great array of the unfamiliar. He will have his grasp of the situation greatly broadened and strengthened. Nearly two hundred fifty Protestant Christian missionaries at work in India are specifically and appropriately referred to in well-integrated passages. This is indeed a valuable volume not only for the casual reader, but also for the student who is bent upon perspective and accomplishment in a momentous era of modern Christianity. No sincere reader will find its multiplicity tedious. In reading, however, one must give thought to its contents.

There is Indian atmosphere and detail in the volume, reflections of festivals, the lot of women, the scope of education, languages and literature, medicine and agriculture. Here is a worthy summary of forty years of Christian expansion. The reader who is so concerned will find the sources of the book's contents duly listed and may augment, if he will, what he immediately reads, although it must be conceded he may not find the sources always readily handy. In any case, the book will serve an excellent purpose in any earnest reader's stock. It is in itself a unique venture highly to be commended.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

Yale University

JOHN R. WILLIAMS. *The Conservative Party in Canada: 1920-1949*. Pp. x, 242. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

This is a chronicle of decline. From the high water mark of its popularity and power, under Sir John A. Macdonald in 1884, to its present position of being "prac-

tically a one Province party," the deterioration of Canadian Conservatism is traced in a series of well-documented chapters, each of which is a separate study in itself. Among the causes of decline the party leaders, "well intentioned men lacking in ability," are assigned a chief place. They were unable to cope with the strong tides of religious and racial prejudices which divided the country before and after World War I. Because of their conscription policy it might be truly said that the Conservatives "won the war but lost the party." Under the "cold, reserved, and dogmatic" Arthur Meighen in the 1920's the party became "a one man affair," lacking warmth and popular appeal. But it was the coincidence of the depression and the "bullying tactics" of R. B. Bennett in the thirties that produced the final debacle. Bennett's belated "New Deal" split the party beyond repair. Conservative seats in the House of Commons were reduced from 137 in 1930 to 39 in 1935. (The present representation is 51.) Among the expedients tried to rejuvenate the party were the introduction of a National Convention similar to the American system, and an attempt to build up a national organization. The author devotes considerable space to these experiments because of his own personal acquaintance with them during the election campaigns of 1948-49. American readers will be interested in the contrasts he points out between the Canadian political system and their own. The Convention, especially, appears to be an American importation only partially adaptable to the Canadian system. The result is that it has "created and spread disunity" and may be considered as one of the causes of decline. The National Organization of the Conservative party is also inadequate and exists mainly as "window dressing." The failure of the party to find a vital role for women and for youth, their inability to solve the problem of Anglo and French Canadians, and the general suspicion that, despite pronouncements, the Conservatives were unsympathetic with labor, complete the impression that any significant revival of the party is very doubtful.

The latter part of the book is devoted to rather detailed studies of Canadian elec-

tion returns and of the performance of the Conservative party in Parliament. These are supported by excellent statistical tables and charts. One becomes increasingly aware that the Conservative party has ceased to be a national party in any true sense of the word, and that for the most part its platforms are identical with those of its traditional rivals, the Liberals. The fact that the party has changed its name five times in twenty years, and now bears the incongruous epithet "Progressive Conservative," is an indication of the internal tensions. The author feels that there was great value and stability in a two-party system where the only difference was that one party was *in* office and the other party *out*, and, like a true Conservative himself, shrinks from the changes that might develop in Canada if the socialists became the alternative to the Liberals. However, he recognizes clearly that the Conservative party in Canada is "in a precarious position."

Since the author has approached his subject topically, leadership, conventions, organization, and so forth, there is considerable repetition. However, the book is very readable and thought-provoking and is certainly a welcome addition to the growing literature on Canadian history and politics. The footnotes are ample and are packed with interesting quotations culled from private interviews or from the study of unpublished papers. If there is any criticism of the present book it would be that it stops at the election of 1949 rather than that of 1953, and that it does not attempt to analyze the cause of Conservative decline beyond the federal level. The eclipse of Conservatism in the provinces, especially in the west, and the emergence of very strong farmer or Social Credit governments and political machines would seem to indicate that at the "grass-root" level a new political philosophy has already replaced "Progressive Conservatism" in Canada.

MAURICE W. ARMSTRONG

Ursinus College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER. *Argentine Upheaval: Perón's Fall and the New Regime*. Pp. x, 179. New York: Praeger, 1956. \$3.50.

This is not a great book. It is not intended to be. It is merely a running account, with intelligent interpretation, of the events that led to the overthrow of Argentina's Perón and the establishment of a provisional government in place of the "Justicialist" dictatorship. Yet within the modest framework designed by the author, the book undoubtedly serves a most useful purpose. It brings together within a single volume a substantial number of facts, and provides just enough background to make a well-rounded story.

This story begins on June 16, 1955, the day of the abortive revolt against Perón, and ends on December 1 of the same year, the day that the book went to press. Therefore it manages to include such significant events as the transfer of power from Lonardi to Aramburu. On the other hand, it necessarily omits all reference to dozens of subsequent happenings of major importance, such as the bloody uprising against the Aramburu regime in June 1956. One could wish that Professor Whitaker had waited a little longer before finishing his account, in order to tell a little more; but one must also admit that no matter how long he had waited, the story would still be unfinished. The trouble with history is that it never stands still.

Professor Whitaker is, of course, well qualified for the task that he has set himself in this book. He has visited Argentina many times, and has taught at a number of Latin American universities. His recent work, *The United States and Argentina*, is generally recognized as a model of scholarship. To some extent *Argentine Upheaval* may be considered a brief sequel to the earlier work, though of course it deals with much more than Argentine-United States relations, which are given special treatment in one of the final chapters. It is at this point that Professor Whitaker makes a rather curious suggestion—namely, that we might strengthen the present Argentine regime by engaging it in a sharp diplomatic controversy, and then offering financial aid as the price of peace. "This would cost no more than we were, by hypothesis, already prepared to pay and the 'defeat,' which would do no harm to so strong a nation as the United

States, would make possible the realization of the assumed objective of its policy." Perhaps such a diplomatic defeat would not hurt the United States, but it would almost certainly hurt the political party responsible for the incident.

AUSTIN F. MACDONALD

University of California

LOUISE W. HOLBORN. *The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations, Its History and Work, 1946-1952*. Pp. xiv, 805. London, New York, Toronto: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. Issued under the Auspices of the Liquidation Board of the International Refugee Organization, 1956. \$7.20.

This volume is the official record of the International Refugee Organization, the first international agency created by the United Nations and the most successful example of large-scale international co-operation for humanitarian purposes. It is happily concerned not merely with structural and administrative matters, but with the operations and achievements of this great service organization in meeting a vast and urgent human problem.

The IRO was established to deal with the residue of the problem of refugees and displaced persons at the end of the war, to do what the Allied military authorities, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees had been unable to accomplish. During the four and a half years of its operation it dealt with more than one and one-half million people dislocated by war or persecution, in search of asylum and livelihood. The great majority of these unfortunates were assembled in camps, which in many instances took on community aspects, located chiefly in Germany, Austria, and Italy but also in Western Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The IRO provided care and maintenance, rehabilitation, legal and political protection, counseling, vocational training, employment, and other services. It undertook to trace missing persons and reunite families, to repatriate those who so desired, and to re-establish the rest in coun-

tries of first refuge or resettle them overseas. These activities were carried on despite many material difficulties and at a time when the doors of most nations were closed to immigrants. The IRO also had to face the opposition of the USSR and its satellites which never officially recognized it and consistently voted against it in the UN. Although only eighteen governments out of the fifty-four of the UN participated in establishing and financing the IRO, they contributed over \$400 million and demonstrated what a limited number of governments can accomplish through joint effort.

Repatriation to their countries of origin or previous permanent residence was at first considered the primary means of reducing the refugee problem. Actually, due to fear of persecution, it concerned only a small part—some 72,000. More important among the permanent solutions were local settlement or integration in countries of first refuge, involving over 100,000; and resettlement overseas, which provided for more than 1,000,000. Resettlement was effected in forty-eight countries ranging from the United States which accepted 328,851 to Panama which accepted 63.

Dr. Louise W. Holborn, professor of political science at Connecticut College, has shown great skill in organization and exposition of a great mass of detail. Not only is this a valuable reference work; it also provides a readable and authoritative account of interest to the student of immigration, political administration, and international relations.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Yale University

ANDREW W. LIND. *Hawaii's People*. Pp. xii, 116. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955. \$2.75.

Hawaii has a distinguished reputation for successful race relations in a world that very much needs such examples. Professor Lind of the University of Hawaii, in this short, well-organized, and very readable book, surveys the facts of Hawaii's racial mixture, shows where in Hawaii the different races have lived and live, how they have earned and now earn their liv-

ing, and the trend of marriage and amalgamation. Five main groups live in Hawaii. In 1950, by the partly arbitrary census classifications, there were in the half million total population 37 per cent Japanese, 23 per cent Caucasian, 17 per cent Hawaiian, 12 per cent Filipino, 6 per cent Chinese and 4 per cent "other races."

What are the evidences of good adjustment over a century ago of one language (English); the rapid rise since 1890 in the per cent of the population of all races who are literate, and of young people of all races who have been attending school; the rising proportion of all races who are citizens and the rising numbers of voters of all races; and the similar income levels of all races (1949 data: lowest median income of males, Filipinos at \$1,995; and highest, Chinese at \$2,964). The pattern of early marriage and large families accepted in most of the peasant societies from which come Hawaii's immigrant and indigenous peoples has been generally giving way to postponed marriage and restricted family size. Sharply falling infant death rates indicate similar sanitation and medical practices. Inter-racial marriages have been rapidly growing among most races in the last forty years. There has been a steady decline (data of 1931 to 1950) in the proportion of children whose ancestry is exclusively of one race.

In brief, Hawaiians have been becoming more similar in many ways and they have been losing any sense of significant differences.

Why have Hawaii's race relations been so good? Lind feels the following factors help to explain it: the explorers and traders who visited Hawaii in the first fifty years were not interested in conquest of those small and isolated islands, but mainly in supplies of food and water. "Moral and racial tolerance was . . . a by-product of the market place." The missionaries, in from New England, were strong supporters of the pattern of racial equality set by the traders. The plantation system threatened for a time to impose a racial hierarchy, but that influence has been weakened and overbalanced by the effect of competition from the commercial centers for labor and by

compulsory education and other causes of social mobility. Since annexation to the United States in 1898 our constitutional guarantees of equality before the law have applied equally to all races. Tourists come to Hawaii in increasing numbers year by year and often with the racial prejudices of their home communities. But in search of adventure they may discard their stereotypes "with surprising ease."

I would myself add two further aids to racial harmony. Hawaii has been blessed with an expanding economy until today it has one of the highest income levels of the United States. Prosperity favors tolerance. Is it fanciful to feel that a remarkably fine climate and beautiful scenery dispose toward less personal tension and so also toward more tolerance?

THEODORE MORGAN

University of Wisconsin

KENNETH B. CUMBERLAND. *Southwest Pacific*. Pp. xviii, 365. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; New Zealand: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1956. \$6.50.

The highly versatile author, professor of geography, Auckland University College, offers all the physical and human geography of Australia, New Zealand, and their Pacific Islands neighbors: New Guinea, New Hebrides, Solomons, Loyalty Islands, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga Islands, and so forth. The book deals with the historical background of the various peoples and their economics, as well as with their future prospects and manifold problems.

The population of Australia, the most sparsely peopled continent, is about 9 millions, one-third of one per cent of the world's population—almost as many people live in New York or London. Australia and New Zealand's importance, however, in the world is greater than their numbers would suggest. "Their high levels of education and technology have enabled them to take maximum advantage of the resources at their disposal, given a high level of per capita productivity and of world trade and enabled their two countries to take a relatively prominent part in world affairs—economic, political, social

and military." The 125 million sheep of Australia produce one-quarter of the world's wool, the sale of which brings about half of what the continent gets from the sale of all its exports.

It is almost surprising the large number of facts that the author is able to demonstrate. The many statistical tables, the interesting ninety-nine photographs and ninety-two maps help us to understand the subject matter. There is no doubt that the author will attain his purpose "to make available to the people of Australia and New Zealand especially, and to the younger generation of future politicians, administrators and businessmen in particular, an objective geographic account of the territories of the Southwest Pacific." But this valuable work is not only designed for schools; because there does not exist any other study covering the same subject, general readers all over the world will need it.

The only data I miss has to do with my visit to Australasia in 1909 and covered in my book, namely, the highly developed social legislation, especially the old-age pensions in which Australia has been leading the world since 1898.

ALFRED MANES

St. Petersburg, Fla.

LUIGI VILLARI. *Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini*. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1956. \$6.00.

Dr. Luigi Villari has chosen to study and defend Italian foreign policy under Mussolini. His book covers over the two decades in which Italy, from the state of a war-weary and exhausted nation (1918-25), reached a relative state of well-being (1925-33), and then gradually drifted towards the tragedy of World War II and its dire consequences.

Dr. Villari attributes the failure of Mussolini's foreign policies to such Italian political expatriates as Count Carlo Sforza and Gaetano Salvemini, to communistic propaganda, and to the blindness of the political leaders of England, France, and the United States.

The work is well-documented and most of the events here presented are historically

accurate. The reader must, however, conclude that the thesis espoused by Dr. Villari can only ask its validity from the heart-breaking truth that nations are motivated in their foreign policies by egotism, lack of sincerity, and opportunism. By the strength of this argument, Dr. Villari cannot absolve Mussolini of his political and moral responsibilities. Even if one admits that undoubtedly Mussolini was trying to better the conditions of his country and give to it a greater international prestige, one cannot conclude that he was possessed of a truly new outlook in international life nor of new principles and methods. He followed the same road that nations have followed since time immemorial: strife, violence, and war.

In attributing to England the failure of Mussolini's policies in Ethiopia, Dr. Villari most assuredly knows that, here again, this claim does not relieve Mussolini of his moral responsibilities in the Ethiopian War. Mussolini was very rash, took steps that were condemned by the conscience of thinking men and women who were not represented in the Council of the League of Nations, and failed miserably in Ethiopia, destroying all the work and achievements that Italy had laboriously accomplished there in almost a century.

Dr. Villari's book appears at a moment that seems propitious to the author, in that European and Middle-East nations are following policies not different from those followed by Mussolini. Only a cynical philosophy of history could lead one to conclude that, because of this, Mussolini was justified in attacking Ethiopia, in joining Hitler and Japan in an avowed attempt to conquer the world, and in attacking France and England. In spite of the utilitarianism and a morality of political conduct, one has to conclude that, in looking at the screen of human history, the residuum of historical actions has positive connotations. No one will ever question the nobility of the aims and accomplishment of Lincoln in our own Civil War, nor that of Italy during the Risorgimento period. A dignified treatment of an historical period must conform to this positive connotation of history and of historical figures, if it wants to claim significance.

It seems to this reviewer that the weakness of the present book lies in the author's attempt to justify Mussolini in all that he attempted in the international sphere, on the ground that, in his foreign policies, he was not different from those who between the two wars held in their hands the destinies of the world.

DOMENICO VITTORINI

University of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EDWARD S. CORWIN and LOUIS W. KOENIG.
The Presidency Today. Pp. ix, 138.
New York: New York University Press,
1956. \$3.00.

The Presidency Today has a triple guarantee of excellence. It was produced by the collaboration of the writer of the most significant book on the Presidency and a younger man who has been making a name for himself in this field. Distilling the leading points as it does from Professor Corwin's book and other sources, it makes its own contribution by giving us a beverage which is 98 per cent proof. Drawing as it does upon many recent developments, it justifies the use of the word "today" in its title without sacrificing that historical perspective so characteristic of its senior author. It is, in short, one of those rare books which both the general reader and the serious student of government will find worthy of perusal.

The proposal is advanced once more that Congress and the President make a compact by which he would bring legislative leaders into his cabinet and consult this body before announcing important decisions, and Congress would consider his legislative recommendations regardless of whether they had the approval of the new cabinet. The reviewer can only hope that this suggestion will fall on deaf ears in the future as it has in the past. The secret of popular government lies in a wholesome interplay of leadership and responsibility, of tutorship and public response; and of these two elements the President "represents" the one and Congress the other. To

obscure the distinction would be to dilute leadership and compromise responsibility.

Nor can the reviewer accept as satisfactory the treatment of the steel seizure case. Though the application of so general a principle as the separation of powers to many situations is in the nature of things doubtful, the situation before the Court in that case came so near the bull's-eye of the principle that it could be said to be beyond its circumference only by reducing the principle itself to a very tiny circle indeed. This is the logical justification of the decision from which escape is not to be had by talking of many things, including, quite irrelevantly, Washington's neutrality proclamation.

Whether in these two respects Homer is caught nodding is a question which is well raised if it sends anybody to this fine book.

JAMES HART

University of Virginia

V. O. KEY, JR. *American State Politics: An Introduction.* Pp. xviii, 289, ix. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. \$4.50.

This book is a brilliant study of important aspects of the two-party system in states outside the South by means of a statistical analysis of state primary and general elections. The title, however, is somewhat misleading since the book is not a comprehensive survey of the field of state politics after the plan of Key's *Southern Politics*. The author examines the relationship in selected states between presidential and gubernatorial voting, the interrelation of cycles of national and state politics, the relationship between gubernatorial and legislative voting with special reference to the gerrymander, the relationship of popular voting in primaries to party competition, the growth and stability in split-ticket voting, and the residue of traditional voting. The author inclines to the view that the long ballot, the separation of powers, the rigid framework of local government, the unfair apportionment of state legislative districts in favor of the rural areas, and the direct primary have tended to prevent the development of a healthy two-party system in the states. He finds the states are incapacitated for effective

political action and there is a trend toward federal centralization. In some states he holds it almost impossible to displace the strangle hold that one party had on the legislature and upon local positions. While the author shows great ingenuity in working out tables and charts to support his thesis, he admits the limitations of his data. He has raised some challenging questions regarding the effects of the direct primary upon the organization and leadership of state parties. The book is basic for students of state political institutions, primary laws, and state politics.

Political scientists have not agreed upon how important the constitutional system and the election laws are in determining the character and strength of the party system. Key has presented a strong case for the thesis that over a period of a half century the direct primary has had a deteriorating effect upon state party organization and leadership. This book is limited in scope. Key would be the first to admit that many other influences shape the character of our state parties. Let us all hope that he will continue his studies in this field and throw light upon some of these other influences among which might be mentioned the changing social and economic characteristics of the electorate, the increasing complexities of modern living, the development of techniques of mass communication, and the development of national party leadership.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL

American University

ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT. *Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection.* Pp. 76. Boston, Mass.: Boston University Press, 1956. \$3.00.

Again the indefatigable Chief Justice of New Jersey has given us a careful and succinct statement of present professional thinking and aspiration in important aspects of the administration of justice. Here, with a wealth of technical and historical citation, he sets forth what is generally regarded by modern bar leaders as the most desirable qualities for those two great partners in law administration: judges and jurors. This little volume is quite invaluable as a student handbook.

The chapters consist of three lectures originally given at Boston University. The first discusses the historic roles of judges and jurors, stressing the traditionally commanding position of the judge and the unfortunate attempts in America to limit it to that of umpire and referee. The second, after defining the attributes of a good judge, considers the various methods of judicial selection, including appointment, election, and the present American Bar Association supported "Missouri Plan" of executive selection restricted to nominees chosen by a commission, with the judge running for re-election only against his own record, not opposing candidates. The last describes the selection and qualification of jurors historically and in modern practice, concluding with a brief note on criticisms of the jury and its substantial decline in England.

The author's commanding position as lawyer, law school dean, Bar Association president, and now Chief Justice of a model court structure gives him wide experience and also predisposes him to support the professionally sponsored movements for law reform. It is no criticism to point out that even this, useful as it is, may not be enough for final disposition of all difficult problems. Professional interest in selection of judges, though disinterested and high principled, naturally tends to stress technical ability; and the "Missouri Plan" does guard against the selection of incompetent judges. Yet historic contests between the courts and vigorous presidents from Thomas Jefferson to the second Roosevelt have shown that the able judge thus legally trained may not have the broad vision to serve well a developing era of governmental expansion. Thus these vigorously supported plans, though often affording welcome escape from politically motivated judges, may receive only lukewarm assistance from organized labor, for example. Again the pressure of litigation, notably of automobile accident cases, raises anew the question whether the jury is not too cumbersome and dilatory an instrumentality to cope with the problems of congested court calendars in metropolitan areas. On the other hand, its value as a political symbol is such that even scien-

tific study of it has been made criminal by recent legislation—a striking commentary on the difficulty of making any improvement in our governmental institutions once they become hallowed. The scope of this book did not call for consideration of these perhaps insoluble social problems. But this is only to say that professional thinking even on a high level does not exhaust the challenging possibilities of the field.

CHARLES E. CLARK

United States Court of Appeals

The States and the Metropolitan Problem: A Report to the Governors Conference. Pp. x, 153. Chicago, Ill.: Council of State Governments, 1956. \$3.00 cloth, \$2.50 paper.

The political scientist and the urban dweller have long been aware that we are faced in this country with a serious governmental problem in our metropolitan regions. The former is offended by the crazy-quilt pattern of units of government existing in these areas—governmental units often without adequate financial resources and lacking legal powers necessary to deal with the myriad of problems facing them. The latter is often bewildered by the complexities of metropolitan governments, and he can testify that he is not receiving the governmental services and protection which he wishes and requires.

This study deals then with one of the most important governmental problems facing us. It is a problem which demands our attention not only because of its grave proportions, but also because it will continue to grow increasingly critical as more of the people of this country become urban dwellers. This is a scholarly, although somewhat uninspired, treatment of the question. The rise of metropolitan areas is discussed and the problem is diagnosed as in fact a series of problems arising from such factors as an inadequate governmental structure, deficiencies in services and in regulatory activities, financial resources which are often inadequate and vary widely among units of local government, and ineffective citizen control of metropolitan areas.

Part II is given over to a consideration

of our efforts to solve the problem. Such traditional devices as annexation, city-county consolidation, city-county separation, federation, functional transfers and joint efforts, and metropolitan special districts are analyzed with reference to the history of their utilization. Since no one of these approaches to the problem has apparently proved a satisfactory general solution, this study suggests, as a possible approach, that the states establish metropolitan units with adequate powers and financial resources and that these units be so constructed that they will be directly responsible to and controlled by the people served. These units may be of three types—multipurpose metropolitan district, federation, and urban county. As is pointed out, all three types have their appropriate uses and all present their peculiar difficulties. Two possible approaches to improving metropolitan government which are advanced as of secondary importance are large-scale annexation and city-county consolidation.

Finally, it is recommended that each state appraise its units of local government with reference to size, financial ability, administrative organization and methods, and authority enjoyed. To do this, the state should create a new agency or adapt an existing one.

Students of local government will not find much new data in this study nor any startling proposals for reorganization. It is, however, a competent summary of the problem, succinctly stated. Its emphasis on the responsibility of the states to engage in a continuing appraisal of the effectiveness of their units of local government and its recommendation that some state agency should have responsibility for this program are ideas which state legislatures should seriously consider. The challenge of an effective metropolitan government is as serious as any now facing us and if local democracy is to flourish, municipal government must be reorganized to take cognizance of the fact that we are not only an urban people, but also a metropolitan civilization.

LAWRENCE L. PELLETIER

Allegheny College

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

FRANK H. KNIGHT. *On the History and Method of Economics: Selected Essays.* Pp. vii, 309. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. \$6.00.

It has become quite fashionable to publish the learned articles of eminent scholars between hardback covers. The appearance of *On the History and Method of Economics* marks the third time Professor Frank H. Knight has been so honored. Drawn from his prewar writings, which failed to appear in *The Ethics of Competition* (1935) or in *Freedom and Reform* (1947), and from his recent writings, the present selections focus on problems in the history and method of economics.

The task confronting the reviewer of such a book is extremely difficult. On the one hand, lack of space precludes comments on each article, while, on the other, notwithstanding the unifying rubric chosen by the editors—Professor Knight did not edit the volume—the articles are sufficiently disparate to defy terse characterization and comment. One thing should be made clear to the unwary reader, however: this is not the kind of book with which one curls up in front of the fireplace. Discussions of method are tedious; Professor Knight on method is in addition difficult to follow. In short, few people, other than specialists in methodology or in the peculiarly Knightian world of ethics and economics, will want to read the articles in the book consecutively.

As for the articles selected, this reviewer has little objection, particularly since the best of Professor Knight had already been pre-empted by the earlier volumes (unaccountably, one article, "Statics and Dynamics: Some Queries Regarding the Mechanical Analogy in Economics," also appeared in *The Ethics of Competition*). On examining them once again, however, one becomes conscious of the negative, and often querulous, quality of his criticism. Whether he is evaluating Ricardian economics from the "correct" viewpoint of neo-classical economics, or castigating sociologists for failure to appreciate the virtues of the free market, or chiding John

Maynard Keynes "who for a decade succeeded in carrying economic thinking back to the dark age" (p. 252), Professor Knight is never quite satisfied. But this is precisely why he occupies such a high rank among American scholars. He is never complacent, even about the market mechanism, and he will not allow us to become complacent. A true iconoclast, he had made it his special mission to destroy academic icons wherever they appear. A perusal of this latest anthology of his articles makes this abundantly clear. It will not be widely read, but for those who take the trouble it can be very rewarding. Professor Knight's criticisms are always incisive, particularly when they incise our own prejudices.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.

Northwestern University

LEO ROGIN. *The Meaning and Validity of Economic Theory.* Pp. xvii, 697. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$6.50.

This volume was unfinished when Dr. Rogin had to lay it aside in 1947. His widow and former associates completed it. Only the last chapter, on Keynes, was half-written, while marginal notes indicated proposed changes in some of the others. In all, however, it is Dr. Rogin's work.

The book bears a subtitle, *A Historical Approach*, but it is not an historical approach in the accepted meaning. He regards economics as a science of fact and then tests its validity by checking theory with real events. The critical historical issues that developed over the years are used to help explain the quality of the political economy that was developed. Dr. Rogin shows that the objective meaning of economic theories is found in the uses to which they are put, and that new systems of economic thought emerged as either pro or con arguments in social reform movements. Hence the study is concerned "primarily with the approach of different systems of theory at the time of their original projection" (p. 13) (*Italics original*).

Historical research provides a fruitful method of approach rather than a "series of definitive interpretations" (p. 13). The chapters on Ricardo and Malthus, which are excellent, illustrate the manner in which

the new theories are oriented to specific issues of policy. Ricardo dealt with problems of "long-run equilibrium" whereas Malthus was annoyed by intermittent disturbances. Keynes later showed the problem was created by the failure of effective demand. The economic facts were not clear to the disputants so they argued over matters of "gluts."

After an explanation of his approach to the study of "systems of economic theory" in Chapter I, there follows a chapter on the Physiocrats and thirteen chapters dealing with the best-known European economists presented in strict chronological order. They treat Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill, Marx, Walras, Jevons, Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Marshall, and Keynes. Each chapter is an essay in itself. In the reviewer's opinion the chapter on Marx is the best; Dr. Rogin's summary and critical evaluation of Marx's economics is as good as can be found. The Menger chapter lacks the excellence of the one on Böhm-Bawerk which is most incisive and reveals the famous Austrian as a prolix pedant. The reader will find Marshall in the setting of Victorian England as an eclectic thinker who never strays far from orthodox economics. It is unfortunate that some American economists are missing. The work is of high quality and a very worthwhile contribution to economic thought.

J. F. BELL

University of Illinois

HAROLD K. CHARLESWORTH. *The Economics of Repressed Inflation*. Pp. 126. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. \$2.50.

This is a closely reasoned study of a "Disequilibrium System": the postwar United Kingdom's, 1945 to 1950. With effective demand far in excess of the supply of factors and consumer goods, the government had to assume rationing responsibilities that the price system could not be allowed to assume for fear of at least labor, and at most social, disorder. In wartime the assumption of that responsibility is relatively easy, but in peacetime "the powerful emotional factor of patriotism" is not present "and the pub-

lic, with its vast hoard of liquid savings, acquired because of repression during the war years, will increase sharply its consumption expenditures in the goods market" (p. 95).

The dictates of limited space do not permit doing justice here to this important study. The model used to explain the theory is the case which is illustrated by the United Kingdom: "... a partially controlled economy exists where there are two markets—one controlled and one uncontrolled." We had this in the United States when we had partial, but direct controls. Three other "degrees or cases of repressed inflation" are distinguished as theoretical possibilities ranging from "permanent, universal and continued repressed inflation" to the much milder case of the United Kingdom. The more important bases of comparison among the four cases are the behavior of factor supply and the consumer reaction. Out of the compact analyses of these come successive chapters on factor allocation, repressed inflation from the single industry standpoint, and "the black market pressure against controls." Fiscal policy is the subject of the presummary chapter and there is a Postscript on the handling of inflationary pressures (U. K., 1950-54) when emphasis passes to indirect controls again. There is an Appendix.

This is a peacetime study. So it differs from Professor Galbraith's famous study of the United States during World War II (1947).

The losses of repressed inflation (one cannot say disadvantages, as there may be no practical alternative to governmental intervention) are productivity losses flowing out of increasing inelasticity of labor supply, declining productivity of substitute factors, bottlenecks because of capital shortages and labor-hoarding, irresponsibilities of management as a result of easy profits, the "umbrella" protecting the submarginal producer and the soporific effect of high and steeply progressive rates of income taxation (p. 98). The gains are social: fair shares and full employment.

The author uses systems of individual indifference curves to bring out the points that he wishes to make in connection with

his analysis of the "four degrees or cases of repressed inflation," as far as concerns the discounting by the factor supplier of the income received above the sum necessary to purchase the rationed goods. Demand and supply curves are used in the study of the effects of repressed inflation upon an industry. There are trade-and-payments-balances tables relevant to the Postscript study of the United Kingdom experience after the virtual ending of rationing in 1950.

ROBERT ROCKAFELLOW

University of Rhode Island

MAURICE DOBB. *Economic Theory and Socialism*. Pp. viii, 293. New York: International Publishers, 1955. \$4.00.

Here is a volume of some of Mr. Dobb's shorter writings collected from widely scattered and inaccessible sources, many appearing for the first time in this country. Seventeen essays are included, from an early lecture on "The Entrepreneurial Myth" to writings on capital investment in underdeveloped countries and on current problems of socialist planning.

These essays are a curious mixture composed at different dates, in different contexts, and for different audiences. Part I consists chiefly of articles written for academic journals and for specialist readers; Part II contains lectures or essays intended for a wider and less specialized public; Part III is a grab bag of shorter notes and reviews.

As a benighted "bourgeois" economist, I find Mr. Dobb's Marxist theorizing repetitious and boring. It is musty wine in old bottles. But Dobb is more than a Marxist theorist; he is, in many respects, an apologist—perhaps a sophisticated one—for the economic policies of the Soviet Union. As such, he succeeds in blinding himself to all we have learned about the Russian system—especially since World War II.

Some examples will illustrate my point. In his essay on class conflict, Mr. Dobb makes the traditional Marxist assertion that, under capitalism, labor is exploited by capital: "Even if it were true that a gain to labour and a gain to capital were generally associated, it might still be the case that the gain to labour is made

smaller, and any increase of income retarded, by the institution of private ownership of capital" (p. 99). Consider the foregoing in the light of this statement by the All Union Central Council of the Soviet Trade Unions for 1953: "The most important task of the trade union organizations in concluding collective agreements is the mobilization of all workers, engineers, technicians and employees for the unconditional fulfillment of the tasks set by the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . . Socialist competition must be more widely developed for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the state plan by each enterprise, shop and section; for further raising the quality of production and lowering the cost of production; for the careful utilization of raw materials, fuel and electric energy and the consistent application of a system of economy." Not a word about improving the workers' conditions or their standard of living in this classless workers' paradise!

Another example of Mr. Dobb's exaggerations is his discussion of Soviet economic development, where he claims that "the U.S.A. 1948-outputs would be comfortably surpassed in everything but oil by 1960" (p. 129). That this projection is palpably preposterous has been pointed out by the British economist Nove. "American electric generation," says Mr. Nove, "increased in the five years 1950-55 by more than the entire Soviet production of 1955. Soviet output of cement has roughly quadrupled since 1937, but the physical rate of increase in that period has been greater in the United States by a wide margin. Even in steel, in 1950-55 the United States has very nearly kept her lead in terms of tons. Of course, on a *per capita* basis, the gap is greater still." Russia certainly has a long way to go to catch the United States and, as Hodgman wisely remarks, she "may find the gap between Soviet and American industrial performance increasingly difficult to close the narrower it becomes."

Obviously the Soviet Union has made great strides in industrialization since the days of the Revolution. It would be foolish to ignore her economic challenge to the

West through an exaggerated concern with military problems or through obstinate complacency. On the other hand, it would be naive to accept Soviet propaganda claims about the superiority of "socialist" economizing in the economic war for competitive co-existence.

WALTER ADAMS

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SIDNEY FINE. *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865-1901*. Pp. x, 468. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956. \$7.50.

In the late nineteen-forties and early fifties the Committee on Research in Economic History sponsored a series of volumes on state economic policies before the Civil War. These studies of Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Pennsylvania together with Joseph Dorfman's *The Economic Mind in American Civilization*, Volume II, provide guides to ideas and policies regarding laissez-faire and state action before 1860. Mr. Fine has continued both types of study up to 1901 with emphasis on the entire national scene and a brief summary of legislation in the states. Unlike the committee volumes on the earlier period, the focus of Mr. Fine's book is on thought rather than action. Except for such laws as the Sherman Anti-Trust act, state and federal legislation is merely noted. The content and effect of laws tending to create the welfare state are not analyzed. In view of the length of the present study and the importance of the discussion, the slighting of action can scarcely be criticized, but it leaves to subsequent writers the task of a more detailed analysis of the patterns of regulatory legislation particularly in the states.

Mr. Fine's major contribution is in his critical and wide ranging discussion of opinions bearing on the concept of laissez-faire between 1865 and 1901. Politicians, academic scholars, businessmen, clergymen, journalists, and social reformers are all included. The gospel of wealth, for example, is placed in its relations to laissez-faire or state action, as are businessmen's ideas regarding labor unions or William Graham Sumner's views of Herbert Spencer. The

range of Mr. Fine's reading is impressive and his distinctions are clear and to the point. The footnotes serve as a valuable guide to the literature of the period.

A final chapter summarizes the defeat of laissez-faire and the general acceptance of the welfare state between 1901 and 1950. The Employment Act of 1946 which created the President's Council of Economic Advisors is selected as symbolizing the final victory of the welfare concept. In its support President Truman asserted: "Our economy within reasonable limits will be what we make it and intelligent human action will shape our future." President Eisenhower has continued to make use of the Council.

THOMAS C. COCHRAN

University of Pennsylvania

CORWIN D. EDWARDS. *Big Business and the Policy of Competition*. Pp. x, 180. Cleveland, Ohio: Western Reserve University, 1956. \$3.50.

This compact volume is based on four lectures delivered in April 1955, under the joint sponsorship of Western Reserve University and Case Institute of Technology and under a grant from the Merrill Foundation for the Advancement of Financial Knowledge. It includes a supporting appendix of thirty-six pages, cataloguing the antitrust record of the fifty corporations listed as the largest by A. D. H. Kaplan in 1948. This lists 102 cases which have gone against the companies (including *nolo contendere* pleas and consent decrees) plus twelve cases pending. The list goes back to the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases of 1911; but the bulk of the cases, as is natural, were decided in the last fifteen years.

Corwin Edwards is here epitomizing his views on the relation of bigness to the task of maintaining a healthy competitive system, drawing on his ample knowledge of the facts and avoiding doctrinaire theorizings. His diagnosis recognizes that size carries positive services as well as dangers, but leans toward emphasizing the latter. His policy judgments look toward a better informed vigilance and discriminatingly selective treatment, on a case-by-case basis.

His concept of competition avoids the

models of abstract theory and centers in free access to trades, absence of undue inequality of size and power, and the number and variety of independent alternatives offered to buyers as a result. Later, his discussion of oligopoly adds a conception of "fully competitive" behavior, as "resembling in kind and intensity that which economists attribute to an industry composed of small producers." This is his nearest approach to "pure competition." It appears that a few oligopolies meet this test, and "there is no reason to condemn" such (pp. 37-38). This standard falls short of definiteness—as is perhaps inevitable. As for the implication that there is reason to condemn most oligopolies, Edwards would apparently be satisfied to look for actions identifiable as violations of law and stand ready to use divestiture as one remedy, among others, to be used if appropriate.

The second chapter, on the dangers of size, is a brilliant piece of condensed exposition of a theme congenial to the author. Distinctions are recognized between "sheer size," fewness, and inequality between competitors; also between relations with customers and suppliers; but brevity prevents doing these distinctions full justice. The theme of the third chapter, "The Case for Bigness," seems less congenial. While the final judgment is balanced, much of the preceding argument is occupied with deflating "the case," using arguments not all of which appear co-ordinated. For example, the argument that great size does not always mean superior efficiency suggests that competition between firms of unequal size deserves more weight and fuller treatment than is given it (cf. pp. 91, 76-77).

However, Edwards has safeguarded most of the critical points that might occur to a captious reviewer, and the book as a whole is a distinguished performance.

J. M. CLARK

Columbia University

EDWARD C. BURSK (Ed.). *Human Relations for Management: The Newer Perspective*. Pp. ix, 372. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$5.00.

The objective of this book is, as the publisher states, to bring together the best of current thinking on the conduct of human relations in business. This takes the form of seventeen articles which have appeared in the *Harvard Business Review* of which Mr. Bursk is editor. These have been grouped under five headings: General, Communication, Administration, Supervision, and Personnel Relations. The authors range from General Robert Wood Johnson, chairman of the board of Johnson and Johnson, and Abram T. Collier, vice president, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, through a number of consultants in personnel work, researchers, and members of the faculties of Harvard and other universities to Solomon Barkin, director of research, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO. As might be expected, a considerable diversity of points of view results.

If the seventeen articles can be said to have a common theme, it is the importance of the *individual worker*, his problems and his social interrelations as they are encountered in industry. Almost without exception, they emphasize the need for industry to give the same consideration to human values as it customarily gives to technologies. General Johnson's article reviews the problem and needs in broad perspective. The articles which follow deal in a large measure with the implementation of these principles, for example, "Making Human Relations Work" by Elizabeth and Francis Jennings, "Communication in the Work Group" by Harriett Rinkin Lynton, and "Observing People" by the Rev. Theodore V. Purcell, to mention only a few. Several, particularly "Leadership Pattern in the Plant" by Chris Argyris, also raise some very searching and challenging questions concerning the *kind* of leadership employees need and want in terms of the realities of large-scale industrial operations. James R. Surface likewise raises some interesting questions concerning the actual effect of much industrial training in his article, "Resistance to Training."

As is inevitable in a symposium of this character, there is some unevenness in calibre of the pieces selected for inclusion.

The weakest appear to be those which deal with ethical and spiritual values as they apply to management-employee relations and the broader field of human goals and aspirations. The sentiments which are expressed certainly represent goals toward which men *should* strive; the question is: will they? In short, how tough-minded and realistic are the authors' recommendations in these areas?

Taken as a whole, the book is extremely provocative and stimulating. The articles which analyze specific problem situations and suggest methods for dealing with them are especially valuable to the working personnel man. However, the book has its greatest worth to members of top management. This is because it will give them a perspective on the role of the worker in industry today and an insight into a number of his more subtle but nevertheless urgent problems and their effects on his adaptation to "big industry" today. In this sense, it is must reading for every major executive.

ROBERT N. McMURRY

McMurry, Hamstra & Company
Chicago, Ill.

F. EMERSON ANDREWS. *Philanthropic Foundations*. Pp. 459. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956. \$5.00.

The sevenfold increase in the number of foundations within the past ten or twelve years and the more than 50 per cent growth of their assets within the current year, due in the main to the fact that 22 per cent of the stock holdings of the Ford Foundation acquired a market value, have caused this chiefly American phenomenon to become a matter of considerable interest not only to our society but to nations throughout the world. Indicative of this fact is the increasing interest of late, both on the part of foundation trustees and officers and leaders of nonprofit organizations seeking foundation support, in information as to how foundations are set up and how they function. Russell Sage Foundation's recognition of the need for a publication emphasizing the organization and administration of foundations has therefore been applauded.

This latest book of Emerson Andrews' yields a vivid current picture of how foundation trustees and officers function, covering such matters as the handling of foundation funds, the use of professional staff, the selection of grantees and their follow-up, the choice of fields of activity and accounting to the public. Moreover, throughout the volume, the author raises questions regarding current practice and out of his wealth of experience points in many instances to the road which will lead foundations in the direction of the greatest contribution to our society.

The author secured his facts through interviews with foundation executives, analysis of foundation reports and publications, testimony of foundation officers and trustees at Congressional hearings, and documents filed by foundations with Congressional committees. He approaches the subject from the angle of the broad aspects of the foundation movement and gives, where comparable material was available, the comparative development of foundations in several areas. The final chapter deals with trends and prospects. The Appendix, including a bibliography and selections from the Internal Revenue Code, adds to the book's value.

The chapter dealing with scientific research expenditures of the larger foundations is based upon research undertaken by Russell Sage Foundation for the National Science Foundation and was part of that government agency's project to estimate total research expenditures in the United States. Figures obtained were for the year 1953 with comparative data, where possible, for 1946 and 1939. For the base year it was found that 15 per cent of the expenditures of the 77 larger private foundations were devoted to the support of research in the life, physical, and social sciences. Of special note to readers of this periodical is the chart indicating fluctuations in foundation support of research in the social sciences between 1939 and 1953. In the last named year the amount involved was slightly in excess of 10 million dollars.

WILMER SHIELDS RICH

American Foundations Information
Service of Raymond Rich Associates

MARGUERITE GREEN. *The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900-1925*. Pp. xii, 537. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1956. \$5.50.

This solid book was written as a dissertation in order to "throw light on the relations between the NCF and the American labor movement." Pointing out that the available materials for a study of the relations between the two groups "are of a very high quality," Dr. Green has labored mightily to create a new body of factual knowledge. In this she has succeeded.

Ralph Easley, founder and chief organizer of the National Civic Federation, carried on a prolific correspondence and saved everything. The "mountain of papers" is now, happily, in the New York Public Library. The NCF was a coalition of serious-minded men, both industrialists and labor leaders, "interested in progressive reform," according to the author, although its conservatism was staunch in later years and its "great work . . . was accomplished . . . before 1916." A national forum for national questions, it enlisted the enthusiastic efforts of Mark Hanna, Samuel Gompers, Matthew Woll, and other persons well known to readers of the historical literature of twentieth century labor and business.

Although not always easy to read, particularly at first, this pioneering book about the NCF is destined to be pored over by scholars for many years. Its 1,202 footnotes refer overwhelmingly to private correspondence.

Many sidelights appear. Mark Hanna often said that he would rather give up his Senate seat than his position (1901-04) with the NCF. Hanna, we are told, "won the complete confidence of the national leaders of labor." Eight of the nine member Commission on Industrial Relations in 1914-15 were NCF members. Easley corresponded with Presidents and cabinet members, men of wealth, and labor leaders, arranging conferences and pulling strings. Like Woll, he was a fighter against Communism in years when such activity brought only ridicule. Eleanor Roosevelt wrote him June 15, 1927 that Woll only

criticized Communism to gain sympathy for the labor cause. She was unhappy over "fool organizations which are constantly sending out propaganda and letters and warning as to the Bolsheviks who is to be found around every corner and under every bed." The future First Lady of New York State and the United States wrote that the real danger to the country in 1927 could be found in the hysteria and fear complex of the patriotic organizations.

The validity of Dr. Green's historical periodization of NCF activities into initial accomplishments in industrial mediation, years of work on legislative changes, and final struggle against change and radicalism, seems reasonable. Yet the enormity of the subject and its attractiveness will soon bring other writers and other emphases. There may not be ultimate agreement with many of the author's interpretations. In any event, we are grateful for this view, *from the inside*, of an organization for many years important in American industrial life.

VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET

Menlo Park, Calif.

WALTER W. WILCOX. *Social Responsibility in Farm Leadership: An Analysis of Farm Problems and Farm Leadership in Action*. Pp. xi, 194. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$3.00.

This book is seventh in a Series on Ethics and Economic Life prepared under the direction of a study committee of the National Council of Churches. In *Social Responsibility in Farm Leadership*, the author discusses the relation of ethics to economic philosophy and legislation on the assumption that equity—defined as "fairness" or "evenhanded impartiality"—is a basic ethical goal in our society, largely shaping the legislation and other rules governing economic life. He points out that farmers, like other economic groups, organize to reach goals that they cannot attain by individual action, and that these goals often conflict with the interests of certain other individuals and groups, or with more general interests shared by many or all groups. The quality of farm leaders is demonstrated in and measured by their contribution to equitable solutions

of farm problems. Thus their best contribution is expressed in their endeavor to keep farm groups aware of the relation of their problems, policies, and goals to the interest of society as a whole. He cautions in this connection that "a democratic society will not long respect the claims of a merely self-seeking group."

In the light of this general frame of reference, the author discusses such matters as differentials in income between farm and nonfarm people; the concepts of parity price and parity ratio and the general usefulness of the parity formula; and such price stabilization measures as price supports and marketing agreements. Additional subjects considered are the ethical justification as to whether we should continue to produce surpluses and give them away abroad, what can we do about the low-income farm families, are hired farm workers to be considered a disadvantaged group, the special problem of migratory farm workers, achieving land tenure and credit improvements, soil conservation problems, and farm leadership in government. The entire second part of the book deals with farm leadership in action as expressed largely in a description and analysis of farmers' organizations as they function on local, state, national, and even international levels. An Appendix consists of a very interesting discussion of "Farmer Cooperatives" by Charles H. Seaver.

The author is eminently correct when he says that "effective farm leadership in government as in the farm organizations is based on both a sense of social responsibility and a mastery of the results of scientific analysis of farm problems." This book should be widely read by farm leaders everywhere, all of whom need, in varying degree, the sort of perspective it provides.

WILSON GEE

University of Virginia

- A. ZALEZNIK. *Worker Satisfaction and Development: A Case Study of Work and Behavior in a Factory Group*. Pp. xiii, 140. Boston: Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1956. \$2.00.

This is a study of the informal groupings and relationships identified by the author in his observations of the work habits of fourteen men in a machine shop, a single department in a small but growing manufacturing company. Distinct differences in social and ethnic backgrounds, in education, age, skills, jobs, and rates of pay might indicate a disintegrated, individualized work group. However, work habits and recreational activities observed indicate that a well established informal social structure existed, in addition to the fact that the men met the minimum work assignments of management.

In addition to being a case study of the social structure of this machine shop, the work group furnishes the author with an assumed typical work situation about which he can make a series of generalized observations, chiefly on the inevitability of the development of informal organizations in work groups and the challenge of this to the administrator. The author also relates the findings of several other human relations in industry research projects to his findings and observations in this situation.

This reader feels that the evidences of a social structure—patterns of tool borrowing and of seeking and securing advice and help on work problems, the card-playing group, and the conversational group—are perhaps too thin to stand up by themselves as the stuff of a true social structure. Four chapters of case study data do not serve to prepare the reader for the identification of Ron as the "informal leader" of the group in Chapter V, since the only evidence presented on him previously was as a tool lender and advice giver and as a nonparticipant in either of the two leisure-time activities of his fellow workers.

Although the author is enabled to range widely and challengingly in his observations as to the significance of group usages from the patterns of activity of these fourteen workers, he is notably unwilling to comment on the fact of the absence or the presence of a union in this workshop, or to speculate on the cause of its absence, assuming that there was none. Ron's role as informal leader is described as precarious; in a unionized situation, it would seem natural that he would be performing the

functions of the informal leader of the group, and as such would not be in a precarious position.

With such a large percentage of manufacturing industry now unionized, it would seem that the value of this type of study would be greatly enhanced for administrators by focussing research attention on shops which are unionized and by examining the role of the union in the formal and informal structure of the shop and its role in the leadership relations of the group, rather than being in a position of having to speculate on the possible development of informal work group activities along lines which are in "conflict with management purposes" (p. 103). Something new has been added to the work group in the shop since the pioneering case studies were made at the Hawthorne plant; the time has come to recognize this in such studies.

JOHN NEWTON THURBER

Bethesda, Md.

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
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CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Edited by

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FOREWORD

The remarkable growth of American interest in international affairs has encompassed the labor field. Government agencies concerned with labor problems, academic institutions, trade unions, and business firms are devoting an increasing share of their resources to the study of international and foreign labor movements and of comparative labor relations. The present volume of THE ANNALS represents an effort to indicate some of the most significant recent developments in international labor policies, activities, and research in the economically developed and underdeveloped countries of the free world.

The articles in the first section are concerned with truly international organizations and their activities. This is a period when the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions faces the World Federation of Trade Unions in labor's counterpart of the cold war, complete with technical and financial assistance programs, phony peace movements, boycotts, exchanges of delegations, wooing of the so-called neutralists, active use of labor intelligence services, and so forth. The structure of the organizations involved, their relationship to one another, their accomplishments and regional alliances, as well as the really difficult problems daily to be faced, are well worth recording at a time when in crucial areas of the world the industrial worker and his union have become focal points of attraction for democratic and Communist forces seeking to maintain or fortify hard-won positions. While the first three articles deal with international labor movements as essentially private and voluntary associations (making due allowance for the dubious voluntary character of Communist labor movements), the fourth considers some of the challenging questions presently faced by the International Labor Organization which is, of course, an intergovernmental agency operating within the framework of the United Nations.

The postwar emergence of new problems in labor relations abroad, as indicated in the second section of this volume, was followed by a search for new approaches and new solutions. The nationalization of substantial portions of industry in Britain and France, plus major changes in political configurations, led to reappraisals of established patterns of labor-management relations. The results were perhaps not as dramatic as had been either dreaded or hoped for. The German experiment in codetermination, which incidentally is by no means the only major development in the German postwar labor relations scene, has now reached the stage for preliminary evaluation. Here, too, the outcome seems to have been far from revolutionary, despite some earlier forecasts to the contrary. The postwar trade union movement in Italy has not yet become reconciled to Italy's own form of "underdevelopedness." Its structural problems reflect sincere efforts to establish viable plant-centered unions in the face of severe handicaps.

The achievement and maintenance of full employment in most industrialized countries of Western Europe (Italy being the outstanding unfortunate exception) and in other parts of the world have raised important questions of economic and social policy. Does the maintenance of full employment require the development of a national wage policy? To what degree do governments feel compelled to intervene in wage bargaining, and what is the character of their intervention? What changes in the wage structure—occupationally, industrially, geographically—have

occurred, if any? And in what measure has the power structure of the trade union movement itself been compelled to adjust to centralized forms of wage determination? Four articles in the third section analyze the experience of countries that have had to deal with these and related questions.

The final section contains five studies of labor problems in economically underdeveloped countries that have either achieved national independence in the immediate postwar period or are still striving to obtain it. India and Israel have gone the full distance; Ghana, which will still be known for some time as the Gold Coast, was on the threshold of self-government as this volume was being prepared; federation is in sight for the British West Indies; while Malaya's target date is August 1957. In all these countries the trade union movements are deeply imbued with nationalist feelings and must grapple with problems arising from, or connected to, the fight for political independence in addition to those which stem from the drive toward industrialization. However, they have not permanently submerged their traditional protective functions nor—and incomparably worse—have they become transformed into agencies of state control. Quite the contrary, whether in Kuala Lumpur, Accra, Kingston, Bombay, or Haifa, they do undertake organizing drives, do struggle to win recognition from employers, and do seek to incorporate their tangible gains into the form and substance of collective bargaining agreements. While they are thus approaching more and more the West's conception of the role of labor organizations, we may also confidently expect that for many years to come they will search for new forms of trade unionism appropriate to the particular conditions of their own environments.

It has of course been quite impossible to explore or even to span within the confines of this volume the full range of issues in international labor relations. Rather, the choice of articles represents an effort to highlight some of the crucial problems of policy which have arisen and some of the major developments which have taken place in the past ten years within individual countries and on the international scene. If some of the articles do not appear to take into account the very latest happenings as of March 1957, it should be noted that most contributions were completed by November 1956.

JOHN P. WINDMULLER

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The Structure of International Labor Activities

By LEWIS L. LORWIN

Abstract: The international labor movement, over a hundred years old, is embodied in the associations of trade unions and other labor organizations in different countries that are formed for mutual aid and joint action in matters of common interest. The history of the movement is sketched by the author. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, and the World Federation of Trade Unions are the three general organizations which are now active in the field, together with a number of International Trade Secretariats and regional organizations. The programs of work, organization, and financing of these various agencies are described.—Ed.

A SIGNIFICANT feature of international life today are the associations of trade unions and other labor organizations of different countries formed for the purpose of mutual aid and common action in economic, political, and social matters. These associations are the carriers of what is generally described as the international labor movement, whose aim it is to represent the interests of the labor group in world affairs.

ORIGINS AND PRE-1914 BACKGROUNDS

For historical, ideological, and organizational reasons, the structure of present-day international labor activities is complex. Historically, the international efforts of organized labor can be traced back for more than a hundred years to the international leagues formed by small groups of workers of a few West European countries between 1830 and 1848, to the International Working Men's Association (known as the First International), which achieved a considerable following in Western Europe and in the United States between 1864 and 1872, and to the Socialist, or Sec-

ond, International, which attained importance between 1889 and 1914. All these organizations were animated primarily by the Socialist idea of the "final emancipation" of the workers from "capitalism," but they were also instrumental in stimulating the formation of distinctly trade union internationals, and they developed some of the ideas—international aid to strikers, international control of migration, international regulation of labor standards, international labor co-operation for the prevention of war—which have since become an essential part of international labor programs.

In the course of these historical developments, the international labor movement evolved an ideological pattern whose outlines have not changed essentially since. By 1914, three main tendencies had asserted themselves, reflecting the diversity of outlook in the several national labor movements. The trade unions of Great Britain and the United States were pragmatic in their international programs, being concerned with measures for dealing with migration, mutual aid in strikes, and similar

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practical issues. At the other extreme were the labor unions of France and radical Socialist labor groups in other countries, which advocated methods of "class struggle" for "the abolition of capitalism" by means of a "social revolution" in the not distant future. In between were the social-reformist trade unions and labor parties of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, which professed faith in socialism as a goal to be achieved gradually and peacefully, but which were mainly concerned with immediate improvements in labor and social conditions. The international labor organizations managed to maintain a relative degree of unity between these three groups by means of *ad hoc* compromises.

By 1914, the international labor movement had also given form to its organizational structure. Three types of organization came into being, which have formed the framework of the movement since. One type was represented by international associations of trade unions in a given industry in different countries, for example, international associations of miners, transport workers, printers, textile workers. These associations, concerned with specific industrial and labor problems, became known as International Trade Secretariats. A second type was the association of various national labor federations (or national trade union centers) like the American Federation of Labor, the General Federation of German Trade Unions, and the British Trades Union Congress, which had as its aim the advancement of general economic and social programs. In 1914, there were two international labor organizations of this type, the International Federation of Trade Unions and the International Secretariat of Christian Trade Unions. The third type—that of international associations of political labor parties and groups—

was exemplified by the Socialist, or Second, International.

INTERWAR YEARS (1919–39)

The relative unity of international labor was shattered by World War I, but particularly by the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. After establishing themselves as a ruling dictatorship, the Russian Bolsheviks formed under their own auspices first (in 1919) an international political organization—the Communist, or Third, International (known also as the Comintern, or Moscow International)—and then (in 1923) a trade union International—the Red International of Labor Unions (or Profintern)—and unloosed a vigorous and violent campaign in all countries to "capture" existing trade unions and political labor and Socialist parties. On the other hand, the social-reformist labor unions of Western Europe in 1919 re-established and enlarged the pre-1914 International Federation of Trade Unions (which became known as the Amsterdam International) and the International Trade Secretariats. Between 1924 and 1928, several attempts were instigated by the British labor unions to bring about the unification of the Amsterdam and Moscow Internationals, but without success. The disruptive tactics of the Russian Bolsheviks, their dictatorial theories and methods, their violation of political freedom and individual liberty, their subjection of the trade unions to the control of the state, and their attempts to stir up revolutions in other countries aroused deep resentment among the moderate and social-reformist labor groups of Western Europe. The latter were determined to protect the political independence and the peaceful and democratic character of their international organizations.

The international labor movement thus split into opposing camps: the Comintern and Profintern made headway in

some countries of Europe, in the Far East, and in Latin America; the Amsterdam International and the International Trade Secretariats had the support of most West European labor movements. American labor, represented by the American Federation of Labor, kept aloof from Europe after 1920 and founded the Pan-American Federation of Labor to rally under its banner the labor organizations of Latin America.

Between 1933 and 1939, all international labor organizations lost ground as a result of economic depression, political tensions, and the onslaught of nazism, fascism, Spanish falangism, and Latin-American dictatorships. With the outbreak of World War II they practically ceased to function.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1939

The feeling that internal labor divisions had been a factor in bringing on World War II, and the hopes aroused by the war of a great social and international renovation, revived the desire for unity among organized labor groups in many countries. In 1945, at congresses held in London and Paris, the British Trades Union Congress, the French Confederation of Labor, the Soviet trade unions, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations of the United States (CIO) combined to form a new organization—the World Federation of Trade Unions—on a large program of postwar reconstruction, social reform, and political independence and economic development for underdeveloped countries. During the first two years of its existence, the World Federation of Trade Unions made rapid progress and began to exercise influence in the reconstruction of Western Europe, in the trade union movements of Asia and Latin America, and in the United Nations.

By 1948, however, the Federation was in deep internal crisis as a result

of three specific developments, which reflected the old divisive forces in new form. In the first place, the International Trade Secretariats, which re-established themselves after 1946 and whose continued concern was the concrete improvement of working and living conditions, were convinced that the Soviet Communists and their allies had no real interest in trade unionism and were manipulating the World Federation of Trade Unions in the political interests of Soviet Russia; the Secretariats, therefore, refused to co-operate with the Federation. Secondly, the opposition of the Soviet government to the Marshall Plan in 1947 shocked the labor leaders of Western Europe and of the United States, and when the pro-Soviet elements in the World Federation of Trade Unions tried to align the organization on the side of Russia these leaders rose in revolt. A third factor, by no means the least important, was the active campaign of the American Federation of Labor against any co-operation with the Soviet trade unions or with their allies in other countries.

After two more years of futile attempts at compromise, the British Trades Union Congress, the central labor organizations of several other West European countries, and the CIO finally broke with the World Federation of Trade Unions. They joined with the American Federation of Labor in December 1949 to form a new organization under the name of International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The World Federation of Trade Unions continued, however, under pro-Communist leadership. After 1949 the struggle between the two organizations was sharpened by the cold war and the general East-West conflict.

CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL SETUP

The developments sketched above have shaped the present structure and scope

of international labor activities. Today, these activities are carried on by three general organizations—the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)—and by a number of International Trade Secretariats affiliated with one or another of the general organizations. In addition, there are regional labor organizations in Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America that exercise a certain degree of local autonomy although they are subdivisions of the general organizations.

THE ICFTU

The most important labor International today is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Its affiliated members include the British Trades Union Congress (TUC); the strongest national trade union centers of Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, the German Federal Republic, and Austria; minority labor federations in France and Italy; the AFL-CIO and the United Mine Workers in the United States; the recently united trade union federation of Canada; central labor organizations in Mexico, Cuba, and several other Latin American countries; trade union federations in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, the leading trade union federations of India and Pakistan; a trade union federation and a number of important independent unions in Japan; the national trade union centers of Australia and New Zealand; and smaller independent unions in Asia and West and East Africa. In July 1956, the ICFTU reported that at the end of 1955 it had had 114 affiliated organizations in 81 countries, with a membership of over 53 million, and that in July 1956 it had 117 organizations in 83 countries.

Philosophy and program

The emphasis of the ICFTU, both in its structure and in its philosophy and program, is on freedom and democracy. It includes only "free" trade unions, that is, such as are voluntary in character, democratic in management, and not sponsored or dominated by governments or political parties; it refuses to admit Communist-controlled or Fascist or other government-sponsored labor organizations. Its general aims are to strengthen the process of collective bargaining as a method of improving working and living conditions, and to help build gradually and by legal methods a peaceful world based on political freedom, economic democracy, social justice, and co-operation between free and self-determining nations. These aims are summed up tersely in the phrase "a free society based on free labor" and in the slogan "Bread, Peace, and Freedom."

As the ICFTU sees it, social progress and world peace today are threatened by totalitarian trends, violent nationalist movements, undemocratic industrial relations, and extreme poverty in the underdeveloped countries. In view of this situation, the ICFTU considers it necessary to concentrate on five specific tasks: (1) to combat Communist and Fascist ideas and to defend the rights of free trade unions to organize and to bargain collectively; (2) to support the labor movements of the advanced industrial countries in their efforts not only to raise labor standards but to achieve greater participation in the management of industry (what the German unions describe as "codetermination"); (3) to help the workers in the underdeveloped countries to organize, to improve their working and living conditions, and to achieve political freedom and self-government; (4) to help strengthen the United Nations as the

chief instrument of collective security and world peace; and (5) to obtain adequate representation for organized labor in the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and in all other official international bodies, so that the workers may have an active part in shaping world policy.

In pursuance of the above tasks, the ICFTU carries on a wide range of activities. To combat communism it publishes special bulletins which present material highly critical of political and economic conditions in the USSR and in the "People's Democracies" and gives financial and organizing aid to its affiliated unions threatened by Communist tactics (in France, Italy, and elsewhere). In defense of trade union rights it tries to bring pressure on governments violating such rights by appeals to local and world public opinion. It maintains an International Solidarity Fund which extends financial and moral support to victimized trade union organizers. (The Fund voted £2,000 to the strikers in Poznań, Poland.) Owing largely to ICFTU demands, the International Labor Organization (ILO) established in 1950 a Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association and in 1951 a special committee of its Governing Body to make a preliminary examination of complaints addressed to ILO alleging infringement of trade union rights, with a view to their submission to that Commission. Allegations of this nature received by the UN Economic and Social Council when they concern states that are members of ILO are now referred to the Governing Body of that organization without being brought to the attention of the Council.

Relations with UN and other agencies

The ICFTU promotes its general economic and social program through regional conferences, special missions to

various countries, and particularly through participation in the work of the Economic and Social Council of the UN and of the specialized agencies, in which it has "consultative status." Representatives of the ICFTU attend regularly the sessions of the Economic and Social Council and try to influence its deliberations and decisions by submitting reports, by addressing the plenary sessions, by maintaining personal contacts with members of friendly delegations, and by lobbying generally. The main effort of the ICFTU is to stimulate the Council to bolder action and to more effective measures for implementing decisions with regard to forced labor, full employment, higher labor standards, larger financial contributions for technical assistance, international financing of economic development, and the inclusion of trade union advisers in teams of experts sent by the United Nations to underdeveloped countries. While the ICFTU has no "consultative status" in the General Assembly of the UN, it tries to influence the Assembly's position not only on economic and social questions but also on political issues such as self-government in dependent areas, French policy in North Africa, the admission of Spain to UN agencies, racial segregation in South Africa, and the international control of atomic energy, by addressing letters and documents to all members of the Assembly and especially by obtaining the support of trade union members of the delegations. Among the specialized agencies, the ILO offers the ICFTU opportunities for bringing its point of view to bear upon such problems as the forty-hour week, higher productivity and wages, migration and aid to refugees, labor-management relations, and vocational training in underdeveloped countries, while UNESCO helps the ICFTU in programs of general and workers' education.

Besides United Nations agencies, the ICFTU is also either represented on, or maintains regular relations with, such official regional bodies as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the headquarters of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Council of Europe, and particularly the European Coal and Steel Community. Of the seventeen workers on the consultative committee of the Community, twelve are leading members of trade unions affiliated with the ICFTU, and one of the nine members of the High Authority of the Community is the former president of the ICFTU.

Workers' education

A large part of the resources and energy of the ICFTU is devoted to specific programs of workers' education and training in trade union methods, especially in underdeveloped countries. Besides arranging international summer schools, particularly in Western Europe, the ICFTU maintains a resident Trade Union College in Calcutta, India, and regular trade union training courses in Africa and Latin America. Workers from Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are accorded scholarships by the ICFTU to attend these colleges and courses, which last from several weeks to a year and which serve to train organizers and administrators for free trade unions.

Organization

The activities of the ICFTU are directed by a general secretary (J. H. Oldenbroek), an assistant general secretary, and a director of organization, subject to the directives of and review by an Executive Board of some thirty members. The Board is elected on the basis of proportional representation from

all parts of the world and is headed by a president and seven vice-presidents. (George Meany and Walter Reuther are the two chief members of the Board from the United States.) The central headquarters are in Brussels, Belgium, with a staff of seventy or more persons. Branch offices are maintained in Paris, Geneva (for relations with ILO), New York (for relations with the United Nations), Singapore, Tokyo, Accra (in Ghana), Nairobi (in Kenya), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), and other areas.

In response to the needs and demands of its varied membership, the ICFTU has also set up three regional organizations—the European Regional Organization (ERO) with headquarters in Brussels, the Asian Regional Organization (ARO) with headquarters in New Delhi, and the Inter-American Regional Organization—*Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (ORIT)—with headquarters in Mexico City. These regional organizations combine the national trade unions of their respective regions affiliated with the ICFTU, have their own general secretaries and staffs, hold annual or biennial conferences, and carry on within their respective areas the programs approved by the ICFTU. While exercising considerable autonomy in local matters, they are subject to supervision and control by the ICFTU central secretariat in Brussels.

Finances

The ICFTU is financed by annual fees of its affiliated unions. Up to five million members, the rate amounts to \$10.50 per thousand. For members in excess of five million, the affiliation fee decreases to \$7.00 per thousand. As lower rates have been granted to less affluent organizations, the regular budget of the ICFTU in recent years has been about \$400,000 a year. In addition, it has collected considerable contributions

from its affiliates for a voluntary Regional Activities Fund. As the ICFTU attaches great importance to its work in underdeveloped countries, a decision was approved in 1955 to replace the voluntary fund with a regular assessment on all affiliated organizations of one U. S. cent per member per year. Up to the end of March 1956, some \$182,000 had been received from this assessment. The total income anticipated from this levy is about \$335,000 a year. Even then, the budget of the ICFTU will be less than \$1,000,000 a year, which is a modest sum for an organization with world-wide aims and interests and with a widely dispersed staff and activities involving extensive travel and numerous conferences and meetings.

Proposals for strengthening

Partly for financial reasons and partly for reasons of internal structure and leadership, the ICFTU has not fulfilled entirely the expectations of many of its affiliated members. American trade unions in particular have felt that the ICFTU is not vigorous enough in its campaign against communism, in organizing workers in the underdeveloped countries, and even in bringing to public attention the successful work it has done. Proposals for strengthening the ICFTU in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and in general for making it a more vital factor in international affairs will be a main topic of discussion at the Fifth World Congress of the ICFTU to be held in Tunis in July 1957.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS

The activities of the ICFTU are reinforced in scope and depth through interlocking relationships with the International Trade Secretariats (ITS). The latter, as already indicated, are organi-

zations of unions in specific trades and industries concerned primarily with industrial conditions (such as methods of wage payment, hours of work, paid holidays, industrial safety and hygiene, social security, and so on), whose unequal effects on the competitive position of workers of different countries in world markets may be mitigated by international agreements on labor standards and policies. The ICFTU recognizes the right of the Trade Secretariats to maintain independent organizations, to have full jurisdiction in trade and industrial matters, and to exercise autonomy in their internal affairs. The Secretariats, in turn, recognize the ICFTU as the representative international organization of labor which formulates and executes general policies. The relationships are cemented by a system of mutual representation, which allows delegates from the Trade Secretariats to attend meetings of the Executive Board and the biennial congresses of the ICFTU and which provides for closer contacts through a Consultative Council composed of officials of the Secretariats and the ICFTU.

There are nineteen International Trade Secretariats recognized by the ICFTU; in April 1955 they reported over thirty million members in sixty-seven countries. The three largest are the International Metalworkers' Federation with over 7,000,000 members, the International Transport Workers' Federation with over 4,600,000 members, and the Miners' International Federation with over 2,500,000 members. Seven other organizations with more than a million members each are the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers, the International Federation of Unions of Employees in Public and Civil Services, the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees, the International Federation of Textile Workers' Associations, the In-

ternational Landworkers' Federation, the International Federation of Industrial Organizations and General Workers' Unions, and the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International. Six Secretariats with a membership of less than a million but more than 100,000 are the International Garment Workers' Federation, the International Graphical Federation, the International Union of Food and Drink Workers' Associations, the International Shoe and Leather Workers' Federation, the International Union of Hotel, Restaurant and Bar Workers, and the International Federation of Petroleum Workers. The three smallest Secretariats are the International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions with some 80,000 members, the International Federation of Tobacco Workers with 70,000 members, and the Universal Alliance of Diamond Workers with 12,500 members in seven countries. Most of the Secretariats are still essentially European organizations, though a few have become world-wide in scope. American trade unions of miners, textile workers, steelworkers, auto-workers, garmentworkers, and so forth, are affiliated with seventeen of the nineteen Secretariats.

The main activities of the Trade Secretariats are to keep the unions of different countries informed on each other's problems and developments, to help in organizing, particularly in underdeveloped countries, to extend financial aid in strikes, to promote international labor legislation by participating in the work of the ILO, and to support the general aims of the ICFTU. As an example of financial aid, one may cite the case of the striking miners in Rhodesia in 1955, to whom the Miners' International sent £6,000 and who received further aid from the miners' union of Japan and from the steelworkers' union of the United States. The Trade Secretariats

have also made large contributions to the Regional Fund of the ICFTU for organizing in Asia and Africa; as an example of such activities one may cite the joint campaign of the Landworkers' International and of the ICFTU to organize the sugar and other plantation workers of Asia and Latin America. For promoting international labor standards, the Trade Secretariats are particularly active in the so-called industrial committees of the ILO, which are composed of representatives of governments, employers, and workers and which meet periodically to consider questions of productivity, costs and wages, hours of work, and labor-management co-operation for the expansion of output and of world demand in their respective industries. The Trade Secretariats have proved themselves staunch supporters of democratic principles and have played an important part in the struggle against Communist infiltration.

The main problems with which the Trade Secretariats are concerned today are to extend their membership and influence, to develop more effective methods of co-operation with the ICFTU, and to enlarge their representation in the ILO and in other official international organizations.

CHRISTIAN LABOR INTERNATIONAL

The free unions affiliated with the ICFTU and its Trade Secretariats aim to include all workers without regard to race, color, or creed. But from the earliest days of trade unionism, there have existed in some countries labor unions organized on a denominational Christian basis. These unions justify their separate existence not on economic but on moral grounds, namely, that it is necessary to cultivate in the workers religious and ethical ideas and to combat not only communism but also social-

ism and other doctrines which they regard as inimical to religion and to the Church. The Christian trade unions first formed an international organization in 1908. It was reorganized in 1919 and then again in 1946, and functions today under the name of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU).

The Christian labor international today is a relatively small organization, with affiliated trade unions in sixteen countries and a total membership of some two million. Its strongest affiliates are the Catholic unions of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada, the rest of its membership being in Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, other Latin American countries, and several North and West African countries. The organization is directed by a general secretary (A. Vanistendael) with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, under the guidance of a General Council and an Executive Committee. The IFCTU also has a number of affiliated trade secretariats of miners, metal, textile, and agricultural workers, public service employees, and workers in several other trades. The budget, financed by dues from affiliated unions, is small.

In its general philosophy, the IFCTU is guided by the ideas of social justice and labor welfare expressed in papal encyclicals and in other approved Catholic pronouncements. One of the leading ideas of the Christian unions is that of "industrial democracy," in accordance with which they advocate a larger share for workers in the management of industrial plants and the formation of national industrial councils in which employers and workers may co-operate for the consideration of problems of the national economy. Such councils are advocated as a means of combating both communism and "liberal capital-

ism" and of giving concrete expression to Christian ideals.

On issues of international policy, the IFCTU generally takes a position similar to that of the ICFTU, supporting the work of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies. Like the ICFTU, the IFCTU has consultative status in the Economic and Social Council of the UN and in the ILO, and is represented on the advisory committees of the European Coal and Steel Community and other official international agencies. Its role in these agencies, however, is modest.

On several occasions, suggestions have been made for closer organizational ties between the ICFTU and the IFCTU. A workable arrangement has, however, proved impossible, since the ICFTU sees no valid reason for the existence of separate Christian trade unions. The relations between the two organizations thus vacillate between ideological friction and practical co-operation on specific issues. In general, the activities of the IFCTU in the United Nations, in ILO, and in other governmental bodies tend to reinforce the demands and influence of the ICFTU.

WFTU

The ICFTU, the Trade Secretariats, and the Christian labor international (IFCTU) are faced in their activities with the challenge of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which, having been expelled from Paris (in 1951) and requested to leave Vienna (in 1955), now has its headquarters in Prague.

Since the split in 1949, the WFTU has undergone a change in composition, structure, and character. About 90 per cent of the eighty million members which it now claims are in the state-controlled trade unions of the USSR

and the "People's Democracies" of Eastern and Central Europe, China, and North Korea. Its other affiliates, such as the larger national labor federations of France and Italy, central labor federations in India, Indonesia, Ceylon, and the Philippines, trade unions in French Africa, and the Confederation of Workers of Latin America, are under Communist or pro-Communist leadership. In structure, the WFTU has been tightened by the setting up of twelve Trade Departments of metalworkers, miners, transport workers, and so forth, under the control of the central Secretariat (Louis Saillant, Secretary-General). In character, as evidenced by its activities, by its publications and official statements, and by its close co-operation with known Communist-inspired organizations, it has played the role of a front organization for the Communists and Soviet Russia. Its financial resources, which are not made public but which are said to be large, are derived in the main from contributions by the trade unions of Soviet Russia and the "People's Democracies" of Eastern and Central Europe.

Claiming to be a nonpartisan trade union organization, the WFTU, through its publications in many languages, public meetings, and conferences and in other ways, carries on continuous campaigns for such labor demands as higher wages, the forty-hour week, larger social security benefits, full employment, and so on. The general strategy of the WFTU is to outbid the ICFTU and its affiliated unions in formulating and urging extreme demands and to attack the ICFTU for making more realistic demands and for its advocacy of labor-management co-operation. At the same time, the WFTU continues to appeal for "unity" among all workers. As a means of promoting its propaganda, the WFTU and especially its Trade De-

partments have been organizing visits of trade union delegations from non-Communist countries to the Soviet Union and the "People's Democracies."

The WFTU is particularly active in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. With the aid of Communist groups, it utilizes the nationalist movements of these countries to gain ascendancy in the newly developing trade union organizations. Conversely it uses its influence in the trade unions to promote extreme nationalist movements and Communist-inspired causes. It also uses the opportunities offered by the UN Economic and Social Council and its commissions and by ILO, in which it also has consultative status, to support the demands and policies of the Soviet and other Communist delegations, in opposition to the delegations of Western Europe and the United States, and to the ICFTU and the Trade Secretariats.

Despite recent setbacks, the WFTU remains a force in many countries. To the extent to which it is effective, it is a disruptive factor in the effort to build a system of free and democratic international labor relations and activities.

OUTLOOK AND MEANING

As long as general international conditions remain unchanged, the several international labor organizations are likely to continue in their present course. This means, in particular, that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its affiliated Trade Secretariats will try to expand their present activities and especially to build up solid free trade unions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to cement their ties with the free unions of Western Europe and the United States. How successful such efforts of the ICFTU and the ITS may be will depend on

many conflicting factors of national and international life.¹

During its earlier stages, the leaders of the international labor movement believed that it would become the main directive force in international affairs. In the light of the experience of the past hundred years, it is clear that inter-

¹ For an analysis of these factors, see Lewis L. Lorwin, *The International Labor Movement* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 332-44.

national labor organizations can be no more than a subsidiary factor in international life. What is important, however, is that, as their activities show, the ICFTU and the ITS can play the role of a constructive opposition within the official and semiofficial international system. In the context of present-day international developments, such a role is a historic factor in the struggle for world-wide social progress and for the building of a free international society.

Regional Organizations of International Labor

By ARNOLD L. STEINBACH *

Abstract: Since World War II, the focus of power in the international labor movement is no longer in Europe. Events, in which American labor has played a significant role, have favored a definite trend toward decentralization and the strengthening of regional organization. This has been secured in part by the establishment of regional (Asian, European, Latin American) offices by international federations of unions in specific trades or industries, and in part by the creation of regional organizations in Europe, the Americas, and Asia by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The author discusses some of the problems involved in these trends, the specific difficulties which face the extension of the movement to Africa, and the rivalry between the leading world confederations of labor, the ICFTU and the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions.—Ed.

BEFORE World War II, international labor organizations, whether political or economic, were by and large of European vintage with some sprinkling of out-of-Europe membership. World War I brought about the beginnings of a shift of economic power from Europe to the New World and to parts of the European colonial possessions. World War I also represented a step in the process of freeing the political and economic life of the world from centuries of European domination. World War II accelerated by leaps and bounds a normal evolutionary process. The political and economic upheavals stemming from this acceleration affected the organizational forms of international labor. In the field of ideological organizations the Socialist International was the first victim. International solidarity of labor ended at the borders of Europe. Asian socialism declared its

independence, and the Socialist International today is more than ever a European organization with a sprinkling of outsiders.

Among economic labor organizations, the trend towards regional organizations of international trade union federations is a typical post-World War II phenomenon, a recognition of the shift of organized labor's power center from Europe to other continents. Some regional organizations of trade unions already existed before World War II. However, they were formed as independent area organizations by interested unions in the area concerned, not by international trade union federations in the process of decentralizing their functions. It is interesting to note that these earlier ventures occurred in the Western Hemisphere. The first tendencies toward an independent regionalism were evident in the formation by United States labor of the Pan American Federation of Labor in 1918. In 1938, a second and successful attempt was made, but without the co-operation of

the United States labor movement, when the Confederación de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL) was formed, under the leadership of Lombardo Toldano of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), as an independent Latin American regional federation of trade unions. In 1945, the CTAL became the regional organization (liaison bureau) of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Latin America, Communist-dominated and still in existence, though weak and with few adherents.

NEW CONCEPTS IN ICFTU

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was the first international labor federation which accepted, by statute, the end of European labor as the sole carrier of the gospel of trade unionism. The ICFTU's regional setup, with its consequent decentralization of power, came about mainly as a result of the influence of the United States unions, which had the foresight to recognize that the future and strength of international trade unionism lie in the areas which are still struggling to overcome backwardness. But full implementation of this principle for various reasons has not yet been realized. Some of the reasons will be set forth in this article.

Until the formation of the ICFTU, international labor federations of the past had been organized in a highly centralized way, with the center of gravity at the seat of the headquarters and with the main power in the hands of a secretary-general. The United States unions introduced two new establishments of regional organizations. Through the enhanced role of the new regional organizations, the central headquarters has become very sensitive to the needs, grievances, and major problems of its affiliated organizations. Beyond that, the previous pattern of domi-

nation of international organizations by their European affiliates was much weakened. The way was thus opened to a de facto shift of power away from Europe once the regions had developed sufficient knowledge, experience, and resources.

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) inherited a regional setup made to order, when the Latin American CTAL joined the WFTU at its founding convention in 1945. Most of the WFTU activities in Latin America have since been either initiated by CTAL headquarters in Mexico or are being carried out from there. No information is available as to the extent to which plans for regional activities are being made at the WFTU headquarters or in Mexico. The financial dependence of the CTAL headquarters on the WFTU makes it difficult for the CTAL to develop an independent policy in Latin America. CTAL's rights within the WFTU may be limited to making recommendations or to the distribution of allocated money, particularly for the purpose of sending delegates to WFTU meetings and visitors to Soviet bloc countries. While CTAL has lost strength and influence in recent years, it is still a potential power in the area. Its very existence strengthens the WFTU, which otherwise would not have any "watch-dog" in its relations with its Latin American affiliates. Overt CTAL activities consist mostly of infrequent conventions and of the encouragement of fellow-traveling conferences, some of which cater to unions in certain key industries.

Reacting to the formation of the ICFTU, the WFTU decided in 1949 to strengthen its position in Asia against an anticipated ICFTU challenge by establishing in December 1949 an Asian Liaison Bureau. This bureau was no regional organization of affiliated unions

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor.

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with specified rights and privileges but rather a transmission belt between headquarters and the area. Established Communist concepts of organizational centralization plus a possible fear of the increasing power of Communist China appears to have led the WFTU to the decision to establish a bureau rather than a regional organization in Asia. Nevertheless, the Liaison Bureau has come more and more under Communist Chinese supervision, which has sought to use the bureau for purposes not always identical with WFTU, that is Soviet Russian, objectives. European and WFTU influences were further reduced by the removal of the bureau's first secretary, the Australian Communist Ed Thornton.

The bureau has had an important role in Communist efforts to foment uprisings in certain non-Communist Asian countries. Subsequently, when this undertaking did not fully succeed, it planned and directed the efforts to torpedo the ICFTU regional organization in Asia through the attempted formation of a neutral Asian federation open to Asian Communist and non-Communist labor federations in line with the well-propagandized Communist unity drive. If successful, this Asia federation, though formally independent, would unquestionably come under the control of Communist China and would maintain only loose relations with the WFTU.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS

The only International Trade Secretariat (ITS) which has for years conducted extensive organization work beyond the borders of Europe is the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF). Its activities outside of Europe were dictated by the need for protecting the world-wide interests of its members. Thus, the ITF had established offices in Asia and Latin Amer-

ica well before the ICFTU created its own regional organizations. The Mexican ITF office, established in 1954, was on the way to becoming a model regional agency when the death of Trifon Gomez, its able local secretary, halted the full execution of plans to develop a net of branch offices around the Mexican office. It is interesting to note that the experience and the pioneering activities of the ITF in the international field outside of Europe have been recognized by the ICFTU by electing J. H. Oldenbroek, the former Secretary-General of the ITF, as its own Secretary-General, and some years later by making the present Secretary-General of the ITF, Omer Becu, its President. The two top positions of the ICFTU are thus held by a former and a present ITF Secretary-General.

Besides the ITF, the International Metalworkers' Federation has begun to make plans for the establishment of a regional office in Asia, but for the time being it is satisfied with using the Tokyo office of the ITF. The Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International has established a regional office in Latin America after an intensive membership drive which netted twenty-four new affiliates; it also intends to call an Asian conference. The International Union of Food and Drink Workers' Associations, which through the work of its United States representative, Ernest Schwarz, has been able to gain considerable membership in Latin America, has recently called a conference of its Latin American affiliates. It now maintains an office in Mexico. The International Federation of Textile Workers' Associations has also shown interest in activity in Latin America. As a beginning, a bulletin in Spanish is regularly issued for use in Latin America. The Miners' International Federation plans to call a conference of Latin American miners' unions early in 1957.

Influence of U. S. unions

The regional activities of most of the other International Trade Secretariats are still rather embryonic. Except for a few ITS's which have foreseen the slow but steady transfer of the center of gravity of the world labor movement from Europe to other parts of the world, in particular to Asia and the Western Hemisphere, most Secretariats have only an incidental membership outside Europe. Where "outside" membership has reached a substantial proportion, it consists mainly of United States unions. The latter have been instrumental in developing membership drives in other areas and have encouraged regional activities. Many United States unions have joined the Trade Secretariats not to obtain direct economic advantages, but rather to show their solidarity with the international labor movement. It is only quite recently that American unions have discovered that intensive international activities are necessary to safeguard their own standard of living by raising low labor standards in underdeveloped countries and have recognized that the security of the United States itself might be endangered by the infiltration of Communist ideologies in world labor. The participation of United States unions in the International Trade Secretariats acquires added importance because they have the hard currency without which effective work in underdeveloped areas cannot be conducted.

In the past few years, a number of International Trade Secretariats have sent missions to various parts of the world, to Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa. Latin America has become the main focus of ITS drives to gain members and to begin regional activities. Partly responsible is the increased interest of United States unions in ITS activities and in the development of a strong and free trade union movement

in Latin America which will be able to resist Communist and other totalitarian efforts to control Latin American labor.

THE ICFTU

Some of the early proponents of regional organizations in the ICFTU considered decentralization as a panacea which, once regional activities were established, would automatically result in organization of the unorganized, strengthening of the free trade unions, enhanced resistance to Communist infiltration, attainment of sizable economic gains, and so forth. It soon developed, however, that a regional organization is only as good as the composition of its membership. Material and financial help from the outside can accelerate progress but it cannot replace such vital factors as native leadership. The ICFTU regional organizations have thus developed quite unevenly.

The ICFTU has until now established three regional organizations which, in their aggregate membership, comprise 53.7 million out of the 55 million total ICFTU members. The organizations for Europe and the Western Hemisphere are about equal in membership strength, with 24 million each. The Asian organization represents almost 5.7 million.

European Regional Organization

The European Regional Organization (ERO), established in 1950, was the first ICFTU regional body. In a sense, the formation of ERO represented merely a continuation of close relationship between unions which for many years formed the nucleus of the international labor movement. Its member unions come from every European country where trade unions may organize freely. Excluded, therefore, are the Soviet bloc countries, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. About 70 per cent of ERO membership is derived from the affiliation of the British Trades Union Congress and

the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). With few exceptions, ERO component organizations are financially strong; have a tradition of able leadership risen from the rank and file, with much experience in organizing and collective bargaining; are skilled in handling administrative problems; and conduct extensive workers' education programs. Aside from France and Italy, where Communist trade union federations still play a powerful role, ERO member countries have not depended on ERO for assistance in their national activities; they have therefore been able to use the regional organization for joint and "supranational" undertakings. The European regional organization has few organizational problems. Most of its interest is in problems such as full employment, automation, economic and social integration of Europe, manpower and migration, and productivity.

Some have questioned whether it was necessary to form a special regional organization to attend to these important problems which go far beyond the interests of one specific region and which are clearly in the jurisdiction of the Economic and Social Department of the ICFTU. Whenever in the past serious problems have arisen in the European area, they have been handled, significantly enough, by the Executive Board rather than by ERO—to wit, the creation of the Berlin Committee to help the victims of the uprisings in East Germany; the actions in connection with the Poznań riots; the formation of the International Solidarity Fund; the assistance to the French and Italian free trade unions; the Saar problem. Moreover, some of the affiliates have organized intraregional groupings, such as Benelux and the Scandinavian countries, without the benefit of ERO leadership; these hold regular meetings and discussions of common problems. The

relations to the European Coal and Steel Community are being handled by a special committee on which the ICFTU and ITS are prominently represented. Although money and highly qualified personnel could be saved for other more essential ICFTU work by making the ERO an integral part of the Brussels ICFTU headquarters, the ERO will probably continue as a kind of successor of the prewar International Federation of Trade Unions.

Inter-American Regional Organization

The Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT) was established in January 1951. In a sense, it took the place of the Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores (CIT) which had been formed by the AFL and Latin American trade unions in 1948 as a counterforce to the Communist-dominated CTAL. In the transformation from CIT to ORIT, the major newcomers from North America were the CIO and the Canadian Congress of Labour. The first two years of ORIT's existence were marred by the absence of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), which had walked out of the founding congress of ORIT because of dissatisfaction with arrangements involving the location of headquarters and the general secretaryship. Reaffiliation of the CTM bolstered ORIT's prestige, and the decisions of the 1953 Congress to move the headquarters from Cuba to Mexico City and to install the able Costa Rican, Luis Alberto Monge, as Regional Secretary, laid the ground for continued growth in membership and influence.

ORIT now has members in thirty-three of the thirty-four countries and areas within the Western Hemisphere with ICFTU membership. Its United States and Canadian affiliates comprise nearly three fourths of total membership, with Latin America accounting for

almost one fourth, and the Caribbean area something over 1 per cent. Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico are the strongest Latin American affiliates.

A Caribbean Area Division has been created with headquarters in Bridgetown, Barbados. This division co-ordinates the special interests of the Caribbean area trade unions and in the formation of Caribbean federations of individual industrial union groups. ORIT offices are also maintained, jointly with the ICFTU secretariat, in Chile and Brazil.

Within the six years of its existence, ORIT has become an organization recognized and respected by friends as well as by enemies. In the trade union field, it has at present no serious competition in the Western Hemisphere. The number of countries in which the free trade union movement is restricted is now limited to two, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. The strongest trade union centers are well represented among ORIT affiliates. Bolivian labor may sooner or later make the decision to join ORIT, and only the labor movement of Ecuador is still under the control of a WFTU affiliate.

Problems of ORIT

The growth of strength is likely to accentuate past and present weaknesses. The addition of new affiliates has increased expenditures, without corresponding increases in affiliation fees. Most of the new affiliates need appreciable assistance. Without the substantial financial help from North America and Cuba, ORIT would have to restrict its services or go bankrupt. Large contributions by Cuban labor, both financially and by making organizers available, are not, however, easing the existing jealousies between the various major Latin American countries for leadership in the trade union field.

The contribution by the United States

unions, though highly welcome and vital for the development of effective programs, may be resented by those who have found it simple and popular to lay all the blame for economic ills and maladministration on the doorsteps of mystic Yankeeism. The anti-Yankee complex has already once come into the open—at the 1953 convention in Rio de Janeiro. It may again cause serious frictions and controversies in the light of basic differences which exist about the concept and objectives of trade unionism between the "free enterprise" United States trade unions and most of the Latin American unions, in particular those in South America. Rooted partly in anarchosindicalism and partly in old-fashioned Marxian socialism, unadjusted to the lessons of the last two decades, many Latin American unions still dream of the overthrow of the prevailing economic systems as the ultimate solution to social and economic injustices. Nationalization has become the favorite recipe in the action program of some unions, as a simple means of curing poverty and raising the standard of living. Recently, it has been propagated as a means of keeping foreign investors from exploiting basic resources. ORIT will have to take a stand on these issues. But it will take skillful leadership to find a common denominator on which to base actions and write resolutions on this and similar issues.

In addition, the dependence of most of the Latin American and Caribbean ORIT affiliates on their governments (these often of an uncertain fate related to the outcome of the frequent revolutions, with or without an accompanying total or partial dictatorship) has made ORIT policies and planning very sensitive to political developments. It took time and patience for the United States trade union movement to adjust itself to these weaknesses. Serafino

Romualdi, American labor's representative, has done pioneering work to build a bridge between the methods, objectives, and needs of labor north and south of the Rio Grande, but he has not been able to change the habits and traditions of the area. Some years ago, these differences threatened to split ORIT into a North American and a Latin American region of the ICFTU.

One of the many unknowns which may still change the course of ORIT is the entrance of the Argentine labor movement in force into ORIT. Since this movement will bring into ORIT not only membership, but also leadership and finances, it will certainly want to influence ORIT policies in a direction which nobody can yet foresee. Any increase in Argentine activity may also encourage a greater participation of the Brazilian labor movement, which up to the present has been in the main a passive partner. If Bolivia should finally join, there will be four countries within ORIT with a more or less vital interest in nationalization—Bolivia and Mexico with practical experience; Brazil and Argentina with a strong clamor for nationalization, at least in the oil industry.

Asian Regional Organization

The situation in Asia was not as favorable to the establishment of an effective regional organization as it was in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere. There were no strong and effective ICFTU affiliates in existence, nor did the affiliates have the financial strength to provide the means necessary to maintain a regional organization. In addition, there was no tradition of free trade unionism. Most of the countries had been under the rule of colonial powers for a long time and had only recently gained their freedom. The rank and file was often illiterate and had no

experience in trade unionism. The leadership was in the hands of intellectuals who were linked to political parties representing various ideologies. Friction existed between the newly freed countries, and many of them aspired to leadership or at least to a prominent place in Asian politics. These frictions and aspirations engulfed also the unions. For example any decision on the seat of the regional headquarters was bound to reflect upon the status of the country within the area. The wide range of languages and dialects spoken throughout the area did not facilitate the search for compromises. Under these circumstances, it was surprising and encouraging that the Asian Regional Organization (ARO) was able to hold its founding convention as early as April 1951.

Since then, the work of the Asian Regional Organization has been frequently and strongly criticized. It is claimed, in particular, that ARO has not made much progress in developing free trade unions in the underdeveloped Asian countries, and that communism has remained a strong factor in Asian labor. All this in spite of the fact that ARO has been heavily subsidized to carry out its organizational and educational program.

It was chiefly with an eye to Asia that the 1955 Vienna Congress of the ICFTU created the new post of Director of Organization. It was felt that more intensive efforts must be made to improve the trade union situation in underdeveloped countries and that a special office should be charged with the development of the necessary plans and action. How successful the ICFTU will be with this new venture remains to be seen. Its concern is understandable. Asia has become one of the most important parts of the world. The largest number of inhabitants of the world are crowded into the Asian coun-

tries. Most of the countries were long held back in their economic development. World War II destroyed the myth of the supremacy of the white man. Great numbers of underprivileged Asians have become aware of their potential strength and are demanding recognition as equals, politically and economically. This is the environment in which the Asian Regional Organization was formed and was expected to work miracles. Speaking in absolute terms, the accomplishments of the Asian Regional Organization are rather small; speaking in relative terms, they are significant and creditable. The very fact of continued existence in spite of internal frictions is already a major accomplishment. The strong emphasis upon trade union education was a wise decision. "Knowledge is power" was the motto of European labor. Creating the Asian Trade Union College in Calcutta was a good though modest start.

Singapore Office

The establishment of the Singapore Office by the ICFTU, in co-operation with interested International Trade Secretariats, for the purpose of organizing plantation workers was probably the most significant accomplishment in the Asian region. This step helped the Malayan plantation workers to consolidate and protect their organizations against Communist infiltration. Assistance given by the Asian Regional Organization may also have been a factor in the development of a strong free trade union movement in the Philippines.

WFTU in Asia

One of the major questions at this time is whether the WFTU will succeed in forming an Asian or Afro-Asian federation dominated by Communist trade unions. Alone, the ICFTU Asian Regional Organization may not be able

to prevent such a development. Until now, the existence of an Asian Socialist Federation with influence in countries where ARO has not been able to gain a foothold has been an important factor in halting Communist progress; it may also prove to be a serious handicap to the future aspirations of the WFTU in Asia.

Japan

A decentralization of some of the ARO activities is a must, considering the polyglot composition of the affiliates. At present, the Far East is neglected in the distribution of leadership of the ARO. Japanese labor and Japanese pride will never be satisfied with an organization centering its activities in far away India. Japan has a highly developed industry, a highly skilled labor force, and it has again a powerful trade union movement. This situation is being recognized internationally. It is notable that the ITF with its long tradition in Asia has found it necessary to move its Asian headquarters to Tokyo, thus acknowledging the revival of trade union power in the Far East. Up to now, Japan's participation in the ARO has been very small. The new ICFTU Director of Organization in studying the Asian situation will probably pay the necessary attention to the needs of the Far East area, particularly with respect to its sensitiveness to overtures from Red China.

Africa

The splurge in African activities has been to a great extent forced upon the ICFTU by the surge of anticolonialism which is engulfing ever greater parts of Africa. Economically, the basis for a mature free trade union movement prevails in only a few parts of Africa. Existing labor organizations are used by nationalists as a springboard for political objectives. The few able trade un-

ion leaders find themselves automatically lured into political activities. Of the underdeveloped countries of Central Africa, only Northern Rhodesia and the Gold Coast have been able to form a solid trade union movement which promises to withstand all the day-to-day tensions caused by a membership which has not learned as yet the art of restraint. The attempted formation of a regional organization may or may not succeed. As a first step an African Congress was held in Accra in January 1957.

All the odds are against the success of an African regional venture. A compromise may have to be found in making the existing strong points of the ICFTU in Tunis, Kenya, and the Gold Coast the seats of subregional activities without changing the basic character of the present organization. Such a subregional establishment may be success-

fully used to siphon off money from the new Director of Organization. This hope may, however, be shattered if the reports are true that the new Director of Organization is earnestly considering replacing some of the present grants by a system of repayable interest-free loans from a revolving fund. Apparently this plan would be designed to reward those affiliates willing to mobilize their own forces and make the necessary sacrifices for strengthening the labor movement.

A North African subregion may have the best chances of survival if it is centered around the powerful and highly developed Tunisian trade union movement. Its very existence and demands will, however, increase the differences within the Brussels headquarters, which must effect a compromise between the views and interests of some of its European affiliates and those of the affiliates in dependent territories.

Economic and Social Aspects of International Trade Union Work

By ALFRED BRAUNTHAL

Abstract: Social and economic activities are the primary concern of trade unions, but these can flourish only under political freedom; the fight against dictatorship and the support of democratic movements must be waged by unions. International trade union work knows no geographical boundaries, but its character is influenced by the stage of economic and social development of a region. In industrially advanced countries it encourages and strives to maintain policies of full employment and full share by labor in resulting benefits of a stable economy, for instance. In underdeveloped countries, where trade union movement has just begun, it seeks to help in economic and social development geared to needs. The community of interests of workers in these two types of economies is stressed.—Ed.

THE political, social, and economic interdependence of all countries, of the largest no less than the smallest ones, has become so intense in the free sector of the world that no individual trade unions in any of these countries can remain aloof from involvement in international affairs. But while many national trade union centers from time to time express their views on international problems, international trade union work is for obvious reasons concentrated in the international trade union organizations. Aside from the Christian trade unions—whose international organization by and large has a regional character—nearly all genuine trade unions, that is, trade unions organized independently both of governments and of employers, have affiliated themselves vertically, through their national centers, with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and many of them also horizontally, as industrial organizations, with the International Trade Secretariats. As, however, these hori-

zontally organized international trade union organizations, although strictly autonomous, are closely co-operating with the ICFTU and consider themselves associated with this organization, there is no need to dwell upon the division of international work between the ICFTU and the International Trade Secretariats. A survey of the economic and social aspects of the work of the ICFTU will suffice in the framework of this article.

RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WITH POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Since workers organize themselves in trade unions in order to better their conditions, social and economic activities must be considered the primary concern of trade unions. This applies to unions on all levels, on international no less than on local and national ones; but in actual practice trade unions will seldom be able to confine their activities to social and economic problems. First of all, in order to achieve social

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and economic goals, trade unions, like any other organizations representing social and economic interests, will often have to resort to political activities, be it directly or in co-operation with political organizations with which they have ties.

Moreover, since trade unions cannot truly represent the workers' interests unless they are really free, that is, independent of both governments and employers, they can act genuinely only under conditions of political freedom, and such conditions can be established only where democracy rules and people can determine their destinies for themselves. The establishment of democracy and self-determination where they do not exist, and their restoration where they have been destroyed, must be a major concern of the free trade union movement as a whole, and especially of the international trade union organizations. In order to ensure the rise and preservation of genuine trade unions in the whole world, the international free trade union movement must fight dictatorship, whether of the Communist or of the Fascist brand, everywhere in the world. It must for the same reasons help as much as possible to bring about a rapid development towards self-government and self-determination of peoples under foreign rule.

This political fight is necessarily intertwined with the social and economic activities of the international free trade union organizations; but since an account of these political activities would exceed the scope of this article, this brief reference to the relationship between political and social-economic activities will have to suffice.

Trade union freedom

In one field of trade union activities, however, a distinction between political and social-economic action of free trade unions cannot be drawn at all: in their

fight for trade union freedom itself. There is hardly any trade union organization, even in countries with well-established democratic systems, where at one time or another trade unions have not had to battle for establishing or preserving full trade union rights. The trade union legislation which was adopted in Great Britain after the general strike in 1926, the Taft-Hartley Act in the United States, and the right-to-work laws in some states of the United States, are well-known examples of measures which the trade unions have regarded as encroachments on their rights and against which they have taken up a determined fight. The same holds true for legal impediments to strikes of civil servants and restrictions in their bargaining rights, which can be frequently found in democratic countries.

In self-governing democratic countries trade unions will as a rule be able to achieve and preserve full trade union rights through their own means. For other countries the international free trade union movement will frequently have to act. The ICFTU plays indeed the role of a watchdog for the whole world. Wherever it finds that fundamental rights, and trade union rights especially, have been infringed, it will intervene, be it by a direct appeal to the government concerned, be it by appeals to the United Nations or the International Labor Organization. The complaint procedure which—largely as a response to pressure on the part of the trade unions and their representatives within the ILO—has been established by that organization has proved to be an effective instrument of world public opinion and has been frequently used by the ICFTU to submit complaints against governments which have disregarded trade union rights. For obvious reasons such complaints have been mainly directed against dictatorship governments and against metropolitan gov-

ernments which have curbed trade union freedom in dependent countries, as well as against such countries as South Africa which practice social discrimination. While international bodies like the United Nations and the ILO have no remedial powers in such cases, their moral authority, which has time and again been invoked against the violation of trade union rights, has doubtless increased the respect for labor rights and freedom.

DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In examining the international aspects of social and economic trade union activities, one is at first glance inclined to think of interests which are common to all workers in all countries. Very broadly speaking, there are a great number of such interests. All workers in all countries are interested in decent working conditions; in wages which secure to them adequate living standards; in the abolition of discrimination; in a continuous rise in real wages; in creating favorable conditions for wage increases, such as a steady rise in productivity; in a sound limitation of the hours of work; in corresponding limits of the working year (vacations with pay, public holidays with pay); in satisfactory industrial relations, including appropriate machinery for having the workers' voice heard and respected by management; in social security; in decent housing facilities; in the establishment or maintenance of economic conditions ensuring full employment; in economic stability as one of these conditions; in a continuously expanding economy as a condition of full employment of a growing population and as a condition of rising living standards. This catalogue can of course be enlarged ad libitum, by including among conditions for full employment, for a stable and expanding economy, and for

rising living standards, for example, appropriate fiscal, credit, public investment, foreign trade, and agricultural policies.

International trade union work might consist in establishing general principles for all these sectors of social and economic activities; in working out concrete programs on the basis of these principles; in agreeing upon joint or co-ordinated action on the part of all national trade unions; and in deciding upon a strategy aiming at achieving the maximum objectives which can be realized at any given moment.

Were the international trade union movement confined to countries in more or less equal or similar stages of economic and social development, such a policy would be perfectly adequate. There was indeed a stage in the development of trade unionism for which this policy proved to be so. That was the period in which trade unionism was more or less confined to the economically advanced countries of Europe, North America, and Oceania. The leading international trade union organization of that period, the International Federation of Trade Unions, was indeed able to conduct such a policy. And to the extent to which even at present certain problems affect this group of countries, this policy is still being pursued by the ICFTU or its European section, the European Regional Organization.

But while it is true that workers of all countries are interested in, and in the final analysis strive for, the goals enumerated above, the stages of social and economic development of the countries in which they live show such huge differences that the establishment of identical objectives for all of them would have hardly any practical meaning. The objective of adequate living standards, for instance, must necessarily mean something utterly different in the

United States where *hourly* wages of three dollars may appear adequate for large groups of workers, and for India or the Philippines or a great number of other countries where a *daily* wage of three dollars for any group of workers would appear utopian.

That the ICFTU a few years ago propounded the objective of the *full employment economy* for the industrially advanced countries, worked out a concrete program to this end, and coordinated the actions of the national trade unions in this field was of great importance for organized labor in this group of countries and proved to be a highly successful trade union action, since conditions were ripe for this achievement. However, to pursue the same policy in those economically underdeveloped countries in which the economic resources are far too sparse to absorb the huge masses of the underemployed would be meaningless. The arduous process of economic development must obviously precede the proclamation of such a goal.

It follows from these considerations that in a period in which the international trade union movement envelops countries in very different stages of economic and social development, its social and economic activities must differ for each of the major groups of countries. And that is the case in contemporary trade unionism. For reasons which to explain would far exceed the scope of this article, free trade unions have developed or are rapidly developing not only in countries in various stages of the process of industrialization, but even in countries in which there are hardly any manufacturing or mining industries, as is the case in most African territories. In such countries workers are organizing in plantations and in transportation and public services. The ICFTU comprises more and more of these young trade union movements; it

has become truly world-wide, with the exception of course of the Communist and other dictatorial countries.

Fundamental community of interest

Yet the necessity to differentiate in its social and economic work according to the stages of development of those countries in which free trade unions operate does not imply any clash of interests between the various groups of countries. On the contrary, never before has international solidarity of workers had such a profound meaning and such a world-wide scope as it has acquired with the expansion of free trade unionism and its international organizations over the whole free world. It is readily understandable that in a world-wide organization such as the ICFTU, composed of trade unions of such different traditions, working in countries with so widely differing interests, there will occur from time to time differences of opinion, difficulties in reaching agreement on certain matters, and tensions arising from these difficulties. Yet there has never been any major difficulty or tension within the ICFTU in the social and economic fields. There has never been any grave problem in working out social and economic policies for the various groups of countries and in the practical co-operation in these fields between the trade unions of the various groups of countries.

Such a harmonious collaboration cannot be coincidental. It must result from a fundamental solidarity of interests between the workers in the principal groups of countries, that is, in the industrially advanced and in the economically underdeveloped or developing countries. A brief survey of the chief social and economic problems with which trade unions in these two groups of countries have to cope may contribute to explaining this solidarity of interests.

PROBLEMS IN INDUSTRIALLY ADVANCED COUNTRIES

The main social and economic problems which trade unions in economically advanced countries have to face revolve around the need for combining economic stability and economic expansion. This combination, the establishment and preservation of a stable and at the same time expanding economy, is indispensable to ensure to the workers both full employment and rising living standards. Once this problem has been solved, trade unions in industrially advanced countries, given political freedom and true democracy, can be assumed to dispose of sufficient power and determination to ensure for the workers the maximum of social and economic protection, security, and progress which corresponds to the given economic situation.

The international tasks which derive from these problems can be grouped under two headings: functions connected with establishing general trade union policies to this end and functions directed towards the equalization of social conditions within the industrially advanced countries.

First of all, international co-operation and co-ordination are needed in developing and carrying out policies aiming at the establishment and preservation of a stable and expanding economy of full employment and of workers' full participation in the benefits arising from the achievement of these goals. This has been, as mentioned above, one of the main concerns of the ICFTU in tackling the social and economic problems of the industrially advanced countries.

In this connection, the relationship between wage policies, employment policies, and productivity problems must be continuously examined, especially with a view to fostering productivity,

but ensuring at the same time the prevention of technological unemployment and the full participation of the workers in the benefits arising from increased productivity.

Equalization of social conditions

Parallel with this function of the international trade union movement goes that of aiding in the equalization of the pace of social progress. Although the equalization of social conditions between the group of industrially advanced countries and that of the economically underdeveloped or developing areas is necessarily a long-range task, the equalization within the former group is an immediate trade union function, not unlike that of equalizing wages and working conditions within a particular country.

The interest which the American trade unions have in lowering and eventually abolishing the wage differentials between the South and the rest of the country is obvious. Their efforts towards organizing the South, although resulting from general considerations and ideals, are also connected with this objective. French trade unions, to mention one more example, are combating the regional differentials in the official minimum wages. In many European countries national union agreements, with uniform wage rates and working conditions, are prevailing. Under this aspect international efforts of the same kind are but logical.

A glance at international wage statistics will show that there is a wide gap between wages in North America and Oceania on the one hand and Europe on the other, and that, moreover, within Europe there is a wage ladder with several steps. To narrow the gap between North America and Europe, the international trade union movement, especially in its European sec-

tion, has concentrated its efforts on two objectives: the acceleration of the pace of technological progress in Europe—with proper safeguards, of course, for the workers' interests within this process—and the social and economic integration of Europe. Both objectives are to a large extent interdependent. Progress in the productivity of labor is obviously hampered by the narrowness of European markets. If the market for industrial products within which no custom or other trade barriers exist is confined to areas comprising from four to fifty million persons, the advantages of large-scale production cannot be exploited to the same extent as in industrial markets comprising 170 million persons.

Toward European integration

It is for reasons of this kind that the ICFTU and its European Regional Organization have been conducting a systematic campaign for the social and economic integration of Europe and for the introduction on the largest possible scale of a "common market." The close collaboration of the ICFTU in the launching of the Schuman Plan and its continuous co-operation in the work of the European Coal and Steel Community is no less traceable to the interest of the free trade unions in European integration, as are its co-operation with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and its intense propaganda for fostering the plans for a common market within the countries of the European Coal and Steel Community and for Euratom.

European integration has clearly the double objective of narrowing the gaps in economic progress and in social standards which exist between Europe as a whole and North America and of reducing the inequality in social and economic conditions between the various European countries themselves. In

other words, any step towards economic integration of Europe is a step towards social and economic equalization within the particular European countries. This does not mean, however, that the ICFTU and its European Regional Organization are holding back in carrying out their equalizing functions until Europe has been integrated. Much can already be done and is being done by the free trade unions to bring about a greater equality in working conditions, social legislation, and social security systems within Europe than exists at present. Such a process will in turn facilitate the economic integration process.

PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

As has been emphasized above, the social and economic problems of the economically underdeveloped or developing countries which the trade unions have to face are of an entirely different nature from those of the industrially advanced countries. That does not mean that each and every one of these problems is so fundamentally different that nothing could be learned from the experiences of the other group. Indeed, much can be learned in many respects. For example: India plans to introduce some kind of workers' participation in the management of industries. In order to choose as intelligently as possible among various already existing systems of workers' participation, the Indian government has established a tripartite study group consisting of government, employers, and trade union representatives and has sent it on a study tour through Europe. It was but logical that this group first visited ICFTU headquarters and discussed there the various problems and alternatives and that the ICFTU in turn was in contact with the trade unions of those countries which were to be visited by the study group.

The fundamental problem of the economically underdeveloped countries, a problem entirely peculiar to them, is that of social and economic development not within but towards an industrial society. Not that it would necessarily be rational for all the countries of this group to industrialize. There is no valid economic reason for imitating the policy of industrialization at any price—in practice, at the price of terrific sacrifices of human well-being—which has been consistently pursued by the Communist countries. The free trade unions have kept clear of the erroneous belief that industrialization is the only rational way of economic and social development. They realize that for many countries the development of a rational agricultural structure is no less important than speedy industrialization, and may in fact be more so. Rationalization of agriculture requires in many of the countries of this type a thorough agrarian reform, aside from, or as condition for, technological progress in the countryside by modern cultivation methods, adequate irrigation systems, and so forth. Surely, even in countries of this type much could and should be done as quickly as possible to develop or expand certain manufacturing industries. But this would not imply a radical change in the ratio between industrial and agricultural production.

Yet whatever type of economic development an underdeveloped country may choose, the fundamental problem remains that of organizing this process and of finding ways and means to finance it adequately and to create all political, administrative, and technical conditions necessary for carrying it through. Aware of the paramount importance of economic development for the underdeveloped countries, the ICFTU has been giving all its attention to the problems involved and has been making every ef-

fort to do its share in aiding the development process.

Outside financial aid

From the international point of view the outstanding problem with which the free trade unions have to deal in this connection is that of outside financial assistance. They have never approached this problem with an attitude of *either . . . or*. They have never ignored or neglected the important part which such undertakings as the Point Four program, the Colombo Plan, and the financing activities of metropolitan countries in their dependencies have been playing in furthering the economic and social development of underdeveloped countries. They have had to convince themselves, however, that this approach cannot suffice, but that for general development projects which do not qualify for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and for which financial aid from other sources cannot be expected or asked for but which are nevertheless of great importance for particular countries of this group, assistance from a general international development fund would be indispensable.

It is on these grounds that the plan to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) was launched and enthusiastically welcomed both by all economically underdeveloped nations and by the ICFTU. The free trade unions have never been inclined to exaggerate the importance of SUNFED or, for that matter, of any outside financial assistance. They have always been aware of the parallel need of creating within the underdeveloped countries conditions favorable for development and of the countries' themselves straining all their forces. But the unions are in serious disagreement with the position taken by the governments of the financially strong countries

that means for the establishment of SUNFED cannot be found until the need for high rearmament expenditures disappears. The ICFTU holds that if the readiness exists to make certain sacrifices, means and ways can always be found within wide limits for diverting economic resources from use at home to assisting foreign countries. The free trade unions are, moreover, convinced that financial assistance for the economic development of underdeveloped countries, far from competing with rearmament expenditures, should be considered to be a part of them, since it strengthens the resistance of this group of countries to Communist penetration. Needless to state that under this aspect the initial fund planned for the establishment of SUNFED can be considered only as the first step in a vast development effort.

This position has been repeatedly defended by the ICFTU before the competent international bodies. The ICFTU considers its insistence upon the creation of SUNFED and, generally speaking, upon the organization on the largest scale of international financial assistance to economically underdeveloped countries as one of its essential functions in the social and economic fields.

SOLIDARITY OF WORKERS' INTERESTS

It might appear at first glance probable that the interests of workers in economically advanced and in underdeveloped countries would clash. Workers in the former group of countries might consider the industrialization of economically underdeveloped countries as a threat to their own industries. Moreover, they might resist large-scale financial aid to these countries since it involves sacrifices on their own part. It cannot be denied that in certain instances workers in economically advanced countries feel that their living

standards or their employment opportunities are threatened by competition from low-wage countries and that they ask for protection against such competition. But by and large within the whole of the group of economically advanced countries these instances are rare and can be dealt with without shaking international workers' solidarity. In any event the solidarity of workers' interests between the two groups of countries prevails.

Competition from underdeveloped countries

This strong prevalence of international workers' solidarity in the social and economic fields rests on two considerations. First of all, the workers of the economically advanced countries have come to realize that the best guaranty for preventing competition from countries with extremely low living standards is social progress in these areas. However idealistic their motives may be in fostering social progress in that group of countries, by helping in the development of trade unions and in many other ways, it cannot be denied that their own well-understood material interests point in the same direction. From this position follows logically the awareness that economic development is a prerequisite for social progress in underdeveloped countries and that therefore sacrifices made by the workers of industrially advanced countries for financial aid to underdeveloped countries are justified for the same reason.

Economic interdependence

The second consideration which makes for international solidarity of workers' interests in the social and economic fields is the awareness of the economic interdependence between the two groups

of countries. For the underdeveloped countries their dependence on the industrially advanced countries is obvious. They cannot expect to receive from them a steady expanding flow of capital funds for their development unless economic stability and progress are ensured in the advanced countries themselves. In this respect the interests of the workers of the advanced and the underdeveloped sectors of the world economy are quite obviously identical.

In addition, the underdeveloped countries are depending on the advanced countries as the chief markets for the raw materials and foodstuffs which they produce. Whenever the stability of the economies of a large part of the advanced countries is disturbed, the international markets of raw materials and foodstuffs are immediately gravely affected. Whenever an economic depression occurs in the advanced countries, the markets of primary commodities collapse, with disastrous effects on employment, living standards, and development plans in the underdeveloped sector. This sensitivity of the international commodity markets towards disturbances in the economic stability of the advanced countries is another factor which contributes to the international solidarity of the workers.

Reliance on the general stability of the economies of advanced countries is, however, not a sufficient guaranty for the stability of the markets of each and every primary commodity. Even in a very stable world economy prices of particular commodities may fluctuate considerably unless institutions ensuring their stability to a certain degree are created. The ICFTU has therefore given its special attention to the problem of the stabilization of prices and production of primary commodities, has shown great interest in the conclusion of international commodity agreements, both for foodstuffs and for raw

materials, and has pressed for the continuation and improvement of existing agreements.

It is less obvious, but no less true, that the workers in the industrially advanced countries are also dependent on social and economic development in the underdeveloped areas. Their political interest in such a development is self-evident. The free trade unions consider the social and economic development of these areas, with the aid of the democratic countries and the United Nations agencies, as an essential condition for the preservation of the democratic world. But apart from these political considerations, economic stability and rapid economic progress in the underdeveloped sector of the world economy aid also in maintaining economic stability in its advanced sector. Even if for the advanced countries the ratio of trade with underdeveloped countries to their entire foreign trade is generally small, instability and lagging behind the general expanding trend in even a marginal portion of their foreign trade constitutes an unstabilizing element.

It is for all these reasons that the free trade unions of all countries have come to realize not only that their philosophy and their political views require international solidarity and co-operation but also that their immediate social and economic interests are best served by such policies. This holds true not only within the economically advanced countries, which prior to the foundation of the ICFTU formed the only international trade union group, but also for the relations between them and the economically underdeveloped countries, in which for the first time in history trade unions on a large scale have been emerging. The social and economic functions of the contemporary international free trade union movement concern to a very large extent these relations.

WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK

In this bird's-eye view of the social and economic aspects of international trade union work only the framework within which numerous concrete problems are constantly tackled could be outlined. It would have been impossible to discuss these concrete problems themselves, important as they may be for the day-to-day work of the trade unions. One example, however, may be mentioned, the recent and still continuing campaign of the ICFTU and the International Trade Secretariats for a reduction of the hours of work in economically advanced countries to forty hours. This action can in effect be un-

derstood as part of the trade-union-fostered process of adjustment of working conditions in Europe, where the forty-hour week does not yet exist, to those in North America and Oceania, where it does exist.

As this example shows, the whole network of particular social and economic activities of the ICFTU can in its essence be understood only if placed in the framework of the great social and economic tasks which the international free trade union movement has been undertaking and is consistently carrying out, as an essential element in the fight of the democratic forces for political freedom and continuous social and economic progress in the world.

The International Labor Organization in a Changing World

By DAVID A. MORSE

Abstract: The changing conditions of the world have changed also the program of the International Labor Organization. Organized in 1919 by the industrialized nations, much of its early attention was given to setting up labor standards to avoid "unfair" competition from countries with cheap labor standards. Today the main emphasis of the ILO is on improving working and living conditions by helping the less advanced countries to develop their economic potential and raise their productivity and by helping the more advanced countries to lay the social basis for greater economic co-operation. The machinery and the techniques developed to achieve these aims are described in some detail.—Ed.

TODAY, social conditions and the movements which they generate are the very stuff of world politics. Never before has consciousness of political goals touched so many people in so many parts of the world. Never before has the social objective of these goals been so explicit.

The past decades have seen the awakening and the dramatic, sometimes chaotic, progress of new mass movements. These movements, of different pedigrees and adopting different methods, have at least one common characteristic: the pledge to improve the welfare of the people. In Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the promise of social progress to overcome the poverty of ages is itself a strong force in political and economic life. It has become a living idea to many millions of people who have not previously been drawn into the mainstream of national and international development. It is at the root of the large-scale development programs which most industrially less advanced countries have launched during the past ten years.

INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

National independence is a cherished goal in these parts of the world. There are many reasons for this. Highly important among them is the fact that independence is viewed as a requisite for more rapid social progress. It is sought to end "exploitation" so as to be able to concentrate national energies and resources on economic and social development; to end "colonialism" by narrowing the gap in productive capacity, health, education, and welfare between the industrial countries and the areas of former colonization; to end poverty. But independence alone cannot close the gap. It cannot overcome poverty. Economic development is a slow process. Promises of improved social well-being are hard to fulfill and impossible to fulfill from one day to the next. Difficulties are inevitable. Social strain, deriving both from the changes which are taking place and from the fact that the pace of change is not fast enough, is very great.

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CHANGES IN INDUSTRIALIZED AREAS

In the more industrialized areas of the world, the past decades have also been characterized by great changes in technology, industrial organization, and social concepts. The last world war marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. The distinguishing characteristic of the era which began was, as in the awakening countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, the primacy accorded to the social objective and the consequent emphasis on social well-being. To be sure, many of the good intentions of the immediate postwar period have dissolved in the political conflicts and economic difficulties of these last ten years. Entrenched systems of national protection have been on the defensive, in Europe and elsewhere. Many of these traditional systems have made it difficult to develop the greater international co-operation needed for economic growth. True, limited efforts have been made to widen areas of co-operation. In Western Europe, for example, persistent attempts towards greater regional co-operation have made some progress in the last few years, particularly in limited practical fields. These efforts have been directed primarily towards improving the competitive position of the countries in this area of the world, but it is perhaps significant that the co-ordination of social policy has been—inevitably—a significant preoccupation.

SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The universal search for social progress has built up new rivalries in the world. The great powers are competing with each other in efforts to provide financial and technical assistance to countries in process of development. In some technical and specialized fields,

these efforts do not interfere to any great extent with traditional concepts and ways of life. In many fields, however, there is frequently a clash of outlook and methods, which comes primarily from differences of social systems.

Our work in the International Labor Office is necessarily part and parcel of this world picture. The recent history of the International Labor Organization has shown how close social policy lies to the heart of a complex of domestic and international political problems in the world today and how, at the same time, the political situation influences and conditions the achievement of the social objectives to which the peoples are committed.

THE WRENCH AND RISK OF TRANSITION

We are, I think, living through a social transition of tremendous importance to the future of mankind. It is a transition towards industrialization and interdependence in an increasingly interdependent world community. The problems of freedom, material welfare, and security are intertwined. Industrialization at any cost endangers many other values most people hold dear. The risk of social instability is very great. We have only to look around the world today to see how complicated the pattern, how great the risk. Our essential problem is, I believe, to learn how to combine economic progress with social progress, to combine the search for improved social well-being with the search for greater human freedom. The heart of this problem lies in the field of social organization and social relationships. The ILO, which deals with labor and social policy in a wide sense, should accordingly be able to make a unique contribution to peace and orderly change throughout the world.

The ILO was set up in 1919—thirty-

eight years ago—in a very different world from that in which we live today. It has worked steadily and usefully ever since then. In recent years, the Organization, like the rest of the world, has been going through a period of adjustment. It has been seeking to adapt its policies and machinery to the changes which have taken place since the last war and to discover how, in present circumstances and with limited resources, it can make the best contribution to the achievement of its unchanging goal—the improvement of the working and living conditions of people everywhere.

ILO MEMBERSHIP

Many will recall that the initial impulse for the establishment of the ILO came mainly from the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe and, though its membership from the earliest days included states from the Americas, Australasia, and Asia, it was essentially a European organization, shaped and tempered to the needs and problems of European countries. Since the last war, however, the situation has been radically changed, very largely as the result of the great increase in the Organization's membership. In December 1939 there were fifty-seven members; today there are seventy-seven. Most of these new members are non-European countries from Asia and the Middle East, countries which have newly become independent and are taking their place on the international scene for the first time.

CHANGING EMPHASES

The preoccupations of the Organization have also changed. Today, the Organization deals not only with problems of concern to the advanced countries but also with problems of particular interest to the less developed areas of the world—problems of underemployment, problems of plantation workers,

problems of agricultural workers, who still form the bulk of the working population in so many of our member countries, problems of handicraft development, and so forth.

Fair labor standards

In the past, a very large part of the ILO's work was aimed at setting "fair" labor standards, on the theory that such standards, accepted by all competing countries, were needed to avoid "unfair" competition in international trade. Indeed, to put it bluntly, an implicit purpose of the early ILO was to prevent any country, and particularly the less industrialized countries, from entering into international trade competition on the basis of cheap labor standards. Hence the concentration on the adoption of conventions and recommendations aimed, directly or indirectly, at formulating a body of uniform labor standards which would, it was thought, take human labor out of the world market place and help to equalize labor costs from one country to another.

Development of economic potential

Now, by contrast, a very great part of our effort is directed towards enabling countries to develop their industries and particularly towards promoting economic expansion and social growth in the less developed countries. Nowadays we know that the importance of differences in labor costs as factors affecting international competition has been greatly exaggerated, that by and large the high labor cost countries have not encountered any special difficulties in selling their goods abroad. Take the United States example. This country pays the highest wages in the world and its workers work about the shortest hours. But it can sell its products on the world's market to great advantage and in fact has shown a persistent tendency to export more than it imports.

The answer is to be found in the fact that the United States and other high-wage countries have a number of compensating advantages—rich natural resources, relatively abundant capital equipment, and relatively skilled entrepreneurs, management, and workers. And it is precisely these advantages that have enabled them to become high-wage countries. Wages, hours, and other conditions of work are only some of the factors entering into labor costs, and unit labor costs are only one factor in the over-all production costs entering into the trade complex. As the United States Commission on Foreign Economic Policy put it a few years ago:

Neither low wages nor low unit labor costs, in and of themselves, constitute unfair competition. But [it added] it is to the advantage of the United States that labor standards throughout the world be raised. . . . The Commission recommends that the United States attempt to raise labor standards through consultative procedures and co-operation in international conferences such as those sponsored by the I.L.O.¹

Today, therefore, we look at the ILO standards from a positive angle—as a means to promote the realization of the practical social aims of the different countries which now make up our membership. Our standards of labor and social policy are a clear expression of growing social demands in the different countries and often translate these demands into specific measures of policy. And, in consequence, our main emphasis today is on improving working and living conditions by helping the less advanced countries to develop their economic potential and to raise their productivity and by helping the more advanced countries to lay the social basis for greater economic co-operation.

This shift of emphasis does not in-

¹ Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, *Report to the President and the Congress*, January 1954, p. 62.

volve abandonment of the important role of the ILO as a standard-setting agency. I believe that it may be regarded as an advance, as rounding out our previous approach with the additional approaches found necessary to service the increasingly diverse needs of an industrializing world society.

NOT BY LEGISLATION ALONE

Labor and social legislation is, after all, only one aspect of social policy. Legislation relies on administration, and good administration is not easy to come by. Moreover, legislation touches only a fringe of the area of industrial and labor concerns. Employers and workers hold the primary responsibility for pursuing sound and progressive social policies in many parts of the central area. We have known instances in which overemphasis on the legislative side has discouraged employers and workers from positive action in their own areas of responsibility and has led to an unhealthy reliance on the state to solve problems which are the proper function of industry itself. It has been increasingly recognized throughout the world that management and labor have a significant and important role to play in making the social changes which are continuously necessary in order to adapt to the dynamics of modern industry.

POSTWAR ACTIVITIES

Since the war, I should say, the ILO has been reshaping its machinery and activities in response to several central needs of our times.

Wider contacts

First, I would emphasize the need to have direct contact with a wider range of people who deal with labor problems in the different countries, so that the Organization may have a fuller appreciation of the problems to be met in a

changing world. The holding of regional conferences reflects one aspect of our response to this need. Since the war, we have held four American Conferences, three Asian Conferences, a preliminary Middle Eastern Conference, and, in 1955, a first European Conference. The setting up of Industrial Committees to discuss the problems of the world's major industries is a further step to meet this need for wider contacts. Since the war such committees have been established in eight industries (coal mining, iron and steel, metal trades, chemicals, building and civil engineering, inland transport, textiles, and petroleum), and somewhat similar committees deal with the problems of salaried employees and of plantation workers. The maritime industry has special machinery dating back to the early days of the Organization. There is also a network of committees or conferences on particular subjects, say women's work, safety, labor statistics, or the employment of children and young persons. The contacts made possible in these ways keep the Organization alive to the practical problems of the industrial world, and the discussions which take place often help to suggest lines of solution.

Technical assistance

Secondly, there is the need to give practical assistance to governments in overcoming the obstacles to broader and more efficient labor policy. The basic response to this need is our developing technical assistance work, which has grown to sizeable proportions over the last five years or so. In 1955, the ILO sent 241 experts to 41 countries and territories and offered 602 fellowships and study grants to enable officials of 47 different nationalities to study abroad. Our technical assistance work corresponds to our emphasis on improving social conditions by improving the in-

fra-structure required for lasting social growth: higher productivity, higher human skill, better safety, healthier conditions of employment. Two thirds of our technical assistance effort goes into projects directed to these ends.

Aid to governments in negotiating international agreements

Thirdly, we have felt the need to increase the flexibility of our services as an international organization so as to encompass the practical problems of particular governments faced with particular international situations. In Europe, for example, the efforts towards greater economic and social co-operation have brought new problems into being and given us new opportunities for service. I would mention only two examples of our work in this area: the Rhine Boatmen Conventions, whereby the governments concerned negotiated under ILO auspices to reach agreement on several aspects of social security and conditions of work for the 45,000 workers on boats plying the River Rhine; and the European Inland Transport Social Security Agreement which gives a minimum of social security protection to the workers moving from one country to another in the course of their work. In both cases, the ILO has provided the necessary agency for bringing together the parties concerned so that they could negotiate and reach agreement on specific technical and human problems.

Labor-management co-operation

Fourthly, we have been drawn into the area of labor-management relations more deeply in order to see what types of relations are needed in the modern world to cope with industrial problems effectively. In this area of policy we are now seeking to expand our work so as to provide services which management and labor need today in order to

come to grips in their own way with their own problems. Some of these services are informational and others are advisory. A meeting of experts on industrial and human relations, held in Geneva in July 1956, suggested a program of research and technical assistance which has provided useful guidance in the work ahead.

Technological change

Finally, I would emphasize the need underlying all these others, that is, the need to study and give what guidance we can in dealing with the social problems consequent on economic and technological change, both in the rapid industrialization of the less developed areas and in the introduction of automation and analogous technological processes in the more developed countries. The spread of technology in the world today is a primary force changing industrial organization and work relationships inside countries and changing the relations between countries and the peoples which make them up. In the ILO, one of our principal concerns is to anticipate these changes and to draw on our membership to provide the guidance needed to move from one stage to another with as little friction and human suffering as possible. In June 1957, the Conference is to discuss the labor and social implications of recent technological developments, with particular reference to automation and atomic energy, and on the basis of the guidance so provided the ILO will expand its work in this field as may be necessary.

Determined by economic and social pressures

These needs which I have summarized in so general a fashion are not new. They have been recognized since the ILO was first set up. Each need is filled in terms of the times. What

seems new today simply derives from the evolution of industry and labor throughout the world and reflects the current position. Our contacts are wider, our practical assistance to governments and other bodies has increased, our services have become more flexible, our opportunities for assisting labor and management to cope with their problems have increased, our fact-finding and research field has widened. The expansion has been necessary because of the steady, inexorable growth of industry and labor over the last thirty-eight years; because of the equally steady and inexorable pressure of social demand everywhere and the impetus given to it by the social movements which have taken shape, particularly since the last world war; and because people are not willing to be pushed around by these forces—they want to know what is going on, today more than ever before.

THE NEED FOR EDUCATION

If I were to single out the element in our activities which seems to me to contribute most to growth, I would say it is the educational factor, education and training in the broadest sense—training of labor inspectors to translate laws into social practice; education and training of young people for the economies of tomorrow; management education and development to cope with the changing problems of these economies; workers' education so that the workers may play their full part in national development; education and training of administrators, technicians, statisticians in all fields of concern to us; and education through international contacts, however brief, however limited in scope. The need for education, in its wide sense, has been increasing with the spread of industrialization and urbanization and the many problems of social

adjustment arising with new ways of work and life.

POLITICAL CONTROVERSY

Despite the very broad measure of support which has been given to the types of ILO activity I have just mentioned, recent years have also seen political controversy in the Organization. This in itself can hardly be surprising in view of the close relationships between politics, ideologies, and social questions which affect national and international policies. The ILO has always been confronted with political issues of one kind or another and many of them have related to the representation of employers and workers within the Organization. But these so-called "political" issues have come particularly to the fore since the re-entry into the Organization of the USSR in 1954.

Current problems center around the representation of employers' and workers' delegates from Communist countries and the seating of these representatives at the Conference and on the committees and other bodies where the work of the Organization is done. Employers' representatives from other countries have challenged the credentials of employers' representatives from the USSR and other Communist countries on the ground that they were not, properly speaking, representatives of free employers but were really government representatives. A number of the workers' representatives tended to take the same view about the workers' delegates from these countries.

The problem was discussed by the Governing Body, which decided to set up a special independent committee to examine the extent to which employers' and workers' organizations were independent of government control in all the various states that are members of the ILO. This committee, chaired by Lord McNair (a former President of the In-

ternational Court of Justice at The Hague), submitted a report early in 1956. The ILO Governing Body, before considering this report, asked for the views of the annual ILO Conference, in order to obtain an expression of opinion on the question, particularly from countries not directly represented on the Governing Body at the present time. The Conference in June 1956 held an exchange of views on the general issues and the matter went before the Governing Body once again in November 1956. After debating the complex issues involved and hearing the divergent views expressed by government, employer, and worker members from different countries and backgrounds, the Governing Body finally decided to ask me to make proposals to it as to the desirability and practicability of setting up continuing machinery which would establish the facts regarding freedom of association in the ILO's member countries and report its findings to the Governing Body and the Conference. The Governing Body also asked, in this connection, for a report from me on improvement of the practical methods of working of the Conference. These proposals are now being prepared.

Healthy discussion and reappraisal

It would not be proper for me to comment upon the various points of view expressed on this issue. There are, however, two observations I might make. In the first place, despite the highly controversial nature of the issues, all parties have respected the law and procedures of the Organization. This both strengthens the processes of international co-operation and gives an example of how the most serious issues can be dealt with through free discussion and constitutionally reached decisions. In the second place, the result of this debate, which involved considerations of the structure and purposes

of the ILO, will, I believe, prove healthy for the Organization. The problem is one that must be resolved gradually, and I am sure that the representative organs of the ILO, with the wisdom they have consistently shown in dealing with the major issues in the life of the Organization, will prove able to deal constructively with those I have just referred to.

FUTURE NEEDS

Events of recent months have cast a graver mood upon international rela-

tions. It cannot be said as I write these lines exactly what new responsibilities may fall upon the international organizations, and in particular upon the ILO. It is clear to me, however, that these organizations (and the ILO not least among them) will need at this time and in the period ahead to call to the fullest upon their inner strength and resiliency and upon the support of nations devoted to international co-operation, so as to serve the world in troubled times as they were intended to do.

Nationalization in Britain: A Sobering Decade

By GEORGE B. BALDWIN

"In spite of the gains made by work-people in their conditions of employment and the increase in the power and influence of the unions, there does not seem to have been a commensurate improvement in the climate of industrial relations. There is in every nationalized industry a feeling among rank and file workers that no fundamental change has occurred. The behaviour pattern of the unions does not appear to be significantly different from what it was under private enterprise, and many observers are disappointed at what seems to them to be the failure of the unions to grasp their opportunity to contribute towards making nationalization a success."—B. C. Roberts, "Trade Unions and Nationalization," *Progress*, Winter, 1954-55.

A REVIEW of labor developments in Britain's nationalized industries makes sense only on the assumption that there ought to be something special to say arising out of the fact of nationalization. There would otherwise be no excuse for lumping together post-war developments in the coal mining, electricity, transport (railway and long-distance trucking), and iron and steel industries—let alone the Bank of England. For these are, in order, the industries touched by the wand of nationalization between 1945 when the Labour party came in and 1951 when it went out. Its exit was promptly followed of course by the denationalization of trucking and iron and steel, so that a record of experience really exists for only four industries.¹

¹ I am not insensitive to the importance of the struggle for life at the Bank of England; but in any properly weighted equation the class struggle in that venerable institution can probably be ignored. Omitted also will be any discussion of the other "minor nationalizations"—civil aviation and the overseas telegraph monopoly (Cable and Wireless, Ltd.). All of these "industries" were nationalized in a sense more technical than real. None has labor problems of general interest.

NATIONALIZATION AND LABOR RELATIONS: HOPES AND ACTUALITIES

In 1945 there were two reasons for thinking that there might be an important relationship between nationalization and labor relations. First, there were good grounds for believing that in some industries labor problems were so important to the efficient working of the industry, and were in such a sorry condition, that nationalization was necessary to put things right. Through nationalization the workers were to gain justice, the nation a more efficient industry. This argument was conspicuously true of coal mining and only slightly less so of the railways. The second hope was that even in those industries which were to be nationalized primarily for reasons having nothing to do with poor labor relations, nationalization might nevertheless bring important benefits to the employees in the course of fulfilling its larger economic purposes. This hope was applicable, for example, to the production and distribution of electricity and gas (nationalized mainly to secure co-ordinated de-

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TABLE 1—EMPLOYMENT^a IN GREAT BRITAIN IN THE FOUR MAJOR NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES, AND OTHERS, AT THE END OF MAY 1955
(In thousands)

INDUSTRIES	WORKERS		
	Male	Female	Total ^b
<i>Four major nationalized industries:</i>			
Coal mining.....	771	16	787
Railways (excluding shops & ancillary trades for which British Transport Commission is responsible).....	464	37	501
Electricity generating & distributing.....	177	24	200
Gas manufacturing & distributing.....	130	14	144
Total.....	1,542	91	1,632
<i>Other nationalized industries and government services:</i>			
Air transportation.....	23	7	30
Postal, telephone, and wireless communication.....	199	103	303
National government services ^c	406	163	570
Local government service.....	544	186	730
Total.....	1,172	459	1,633
<i>Industries nationalized by Labour, denationalized by Tories:</i>			
Trucking.....	163	14	177
Iron & steel.....	408	49	457
Total.....	571	63	634

^a Total employment in Great Britain as of the end of May 1955 was 21,460,000.

^b In a few cases the figures for male and female workers do not add up to the horizontal totals exactly because of rounding.

^c Excludes armed services and employees of departmental industrial establishments (e.g., ordnance factories).

Source: *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, February 1956. The above figures differ from those representing the number of employees in the service of each "nationalized industry" as reported in their annual reports. The most significant adjustment would be an inflation of the "railways" figure by about 20 per cent to include shopmen and others classified differently by the Ministry of Labour. Nationalization of trucking and iron and steel did not touch more than about half the total employees in those categories because of the exemption of certain large classes of firms left in private hands.

velopment, along with coal, of the nation's fuel and power industries) and to iron and steel. In iron and steel and in gas, labor relations were among the best in British industry; when iron and steel was denationalized, there was no protest from the leading unions in the industry.

The nub of nationalization is coal mining and the railways, two declining industries whose efficiency depends on the "human factor" to a degree not true

of gas or electricity. As Table 1 shows, these two giant industries employ 1.3 million people, or about one out of every fifteen in the British labor force. The coal mines and the railways have also been the principal storm centers of labor relations among the state industries, so that if nationalization has any special relationship to labor relations we ought to be able to find it in these two industries. I shall pay much more attention to these two giants than to

electricity and gas, industries in which the "labor problem" plays a *relatively* minor role.²

There is one overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from the first decade of nationalization that should be stated at the beginning. It is this: so far as labor relations are concerned, nationalization is essentially irrelevant. This is much too strong a statement to make, but it is worth making none the less. It is only another way of saying what it has become almost fashionable to say, that labor relations in a nationalized industry are no different from labor relations in any other industry. Generally speaking, this is a correct judgment on the past decade. But there are so many qualifications to enter against "general statements" that the matter cannot really be left there. As we shall see, nationalization has indeed affected labor relations at a great many points; but it has done little to affect them at precisely those points where everyone's hopes were highest. It does not help much that many of those hopes were foolish.

To say that nationalization has not been a huge success is not to say that it has been a failure. This would be true only if one's judgment were based wholly on the exaggerated hopes with which Socialist ideology had surrounded nationalization. If we put aside the ideological disappointment, we will find that nationalization has indeed meant progress in many areas involving the "human factor" in industry. But it has also meant some loss of the "personal touch" and an increase in the time it

² I shall say nothing more about iron and steel, since it was nationalized for such a brief period (about four years) and since labor relations in it have traditionally been excellent and were a negligible influence in the decision to nationalize. Had this industry remained in public ownership, the main interest would have been to see whether or not its good relationships deteriorated.

takes to make decisions because of the advent of centralized and sometimes remote control.

In Socialist circles it is fashionable to say that nationalization will justify itself if only it is followed by "socialization"—that is, by a progressive extension of industrial democracy. But "industrial democracy" can mean anything from more union representatives on the national Boards to smoother joint consultation or better supervision or employee voting over the price of tea in railway canteens. "Industrial democracy" really means the same thing as "good labor relations," and if we can spell out the one in specific, practical terms, we will already have hold of the other.

QUESTIONS FOR RE-EXAMINATION

If the ideological failure of nationalization has done nothing else, it is forcing a basic re-examination of two vital questions: (1) What can reasonably be expected of nationalization? and (2) What changes in the structure, attitudes, and policies of British unions and managements may be necessary to realize the objectives which many had vaguely assumed nationalization would satisfy automatically? And today many of the disappointments of nationalization are being put down not to bureaucracy and overcentralization, nor to the harsh facts of Britain's economic situation, but to the lack of adaptability of British unions, to the narrow conception of collective bargaining given by British tradition, and to an outmoded conception of industrial management. Added to these lessons concerning industrial relations is the growing realization that many traditional Socialist objectives long sought in part through nationalization (for example, full employment, greater equality, and increased security) are in fact achieved much more satisfactorily through a new

conception of fiscal policy and the welfare state. These are the reasons why the first decade of postwar nationalization has been a sobering one and why responsible leaders of both the Labour party and the trade unions are approaching the subject of further nationalization with more caution and less confidence than they approached it during the heady days following Labour's victory in the 1945 election.³

So much for some general preliminaries. I want now to turn to a summary review of some more specific developments that seem to be characteristic of all four of the nationalized industries under review. Later, I shall discuss a few of these points more fully.

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1945

Collective bargaining in the nationalized industries has certainly had to be conducted within the framework of pressures imposed by Britain's postwar economic situation—persistent inflation, a continuing balance of payments crisis, the ever-present fear of hurting Britain's ability to compete in world export markets, and the huge need for capital modernization and expansion in nearly all industries, not just the nationalized ones. There has been an almost continuous shortage of labor for more than fifteen years. Finally, Britain's future position in world export markets has depended on a structural reorganization of her economy represented by the need to expand new export lines (for example, engineering goods, aircraft, elec-

³ The more cautious trade union approach is evident in the Trades Union Congress pamphlet, *Public Ownership: An Interim Report*, which was approved at the TUC's 1953 Conference. For a first-rate discussion by a political leader, see Fabian Tract 300, *Socialism and Nationalisation*, by Hugh Gaitskell, M.P., Mr. Attlee's successor as head of the Labour party. The party, though far from unanimous, is today more interested in extending nationalization than are the trade unions.

tronic and electrical products, and chemicals) to compensate for the decline in old export staples such as coal, textiles, and the "invisibles" lost during World War II.

Against this economic background, I have selected thirteen points that I think illuminate specific relationships between nationalization and industrial relations.

Bargaining atmosphere

Nationalization has not provided workers with a horn of plenty into which they could dip their hands whenever they felt pressed by the struggle for life. Collective bargaining has been remarkably like what it is in any large centralized industry in the United States.⁴ Management has not been "soft" and the government has not intervened in wage negotiations any more than has the American government over the same period. Generally speaking, wages in nationalized industries have not risen faster than the general level of British wages since 1945. In coal, average wages have improved more than the national average (but the more important *entry* wage has barely kept pace); railwaymen's wages have lagged distinctly behind the general level; in electricity and gas wage increases have just about matched the national average. Many observers believe that the net effect of nationalization has been to

⁴ However, both the Labour and Tory governments have gone to unusual lengths to create a moral and political environment that would encourage people to act responsibly—that is, with restraint or resignation—in the use of their economic freedom. It is not surprising that the dynamics of union politics and union rivalries have made for certain difficulties. There have also been other difficulties that have had no relation to irresponsible pressures welling up from inside the unions. Prominent among these has been the difficulty of using wage increases to redistribute the labor force at a time when any wage increase has been officially frowned on.

keep wage levels from rising as rapidly as they otherwise would have. In 1956, after a decade of close co-operation with both Labour and Tory governments to restrain wage increases, the Trades Union Congress broke with this policy and accused the Eden government of using the nationalized industries as a "drag anchor" to keep down the British wage level.

Dominant wage pressures

Nationalization has greatly diminished competitive forces in wage determination. In effect, the nationalized industries still have to compete with other industries for labor, but competition for labor by individual operating units has gone in favor of uniform national or district rates. True, industry-wide bargaining has produced a nominal uniformity in many private British industries; but these rates are minimums, and individual employers have been free to pay higher rates if they needed to bid for labor. Thus the nationalized industries have wage levels that respond more exclusively to administrative decisions (centralized bargains) than most other industries. If competitive influences have been reduced by nationalization, there has been no reduction in the attention which both management and labor have had to give to problems of wage *structure*. With respect to both internal and external considerations, the intended or unintended shifting of the relative wage position of specific groups has produced constant problems. The attempts to rationalize the wage structures in both coal and railways have stumbled over this political and psychological problem, involving as it does personal and institutional rivalries and sensitive questions of status.

Rise in attention to welfare measures

Nationalization has meant a substantial increase in attention given to safety

and welfare, even though capital expenditures have been necessitated at a time when government has been forced to choose carefully among investment expenditures. Coal has benefited most, the railways least, in relation to need.

Spread of interunion rivalries

Ironically, nationalization introduced a period of insecurity for many unions. There has been an unforeseen intensification and extension of interunion rivalries and tension. These have expressed themselves in disputes over jurisdictions, employer recognition, and compulsory union membership. But these were temporary problems associated with getting nationalization started; now that the situation in each industry has been restructured, considerable stability has been achieved.

Absence of syndicalism

Experience so far has not resulted in any responsible sentiment for a radical extension of "workers' control" in the old syndicalist sense. There are exceptions among some unions, like the National Union of Railwaymen which has long wanted more direct union representation in the councils of management. But while this has led to some grumbling among railwaymen, the NUR has not tried to force its views on the industry through industrial action. Syndicalist sentiments can still be found in many local and national unions as a minority commotion "in the wings." But the British labor movement was far more militant a generation ago than it has been since 1945. This is hardly surprising in view of the responsibility which the unions have brought on themselves by virtue of their historical rise to power.

Industrial relationships

The approach to more democratic industrial relationships has been pri-

marily through a vast extension of joint consultation, or advisory labor-management committees. This machinery has been kept separate from the negotiating machinery in coal and electricity and at some levels in gas; but in the railways the same machinery has tried to serve both ends. Everywhere the trade unions have been sensitive to the threat which independent consultative bodies represented to their own authority, and they have pressed for and secured substantial control over the membership on such committees.

The system of consultation—essentially a vast experiment in union-management co-operation—has required a great effort but has so far yielded only small results. There is as yet no movement to abandon this new institution (which is also widely used in private industry). Many advocates put their hope in the passage of time to make the system work better; a few are asking if this is the most hopeful way of securing the kind of workers' control over labor matters that Socialists have always wanted. They wonder if the area of collective bargaining might be widened as to topics covered, and deepened by encouraging more local bargaining, than has been customary in Britain. This would help remove some continuing confusion between matters appropriate for consultation and collective bargaining.

Union structures and officers' workloads

Nationalization has greatly increased the workload on trade union officials, and doubtless on most management officials as well. Unions have been very slow to adapt their structures and organization to help them perform better the many new tasks which nationalization requires of them. At a time when the amount of responsibility exercised by the unions has greatly increased, they

have not shown any disposition to increase their staffs, their meager research efforts, or their educational work. This unimaginative conservatism is frequently cited to help explain the widespread apathy about union affairs among large sections of the labor movement.

Changed position of union officials

Trade unions have had to assume considerable moral and political responsibility for the performance of the nationalized industries, mainly by trying to resist the pressures to pursue policies that officials know would not be best for the industry. This fact has altered the way union officials have had to think about their jobs, their attitudes toward management, and their political position vis-à-vis their own memberships. They have necessarily developed more understanding of management problems, more sympathy for managers, and they have had to put away their traditional, instinctive response: "Our members' interests, right or wrong." With the continuing low salaries paid British union officials, nationalization has probably decreased the attractiveness of union careers, except as a bridge to jobs in management. These jobs, heavily concentrated in the labor and welfare fields, have opened an important new set of career opportunities for union officials.

Efficient use of labor

With some exceptions, nationalization has not made it easier for management to undertake reorganization schemes that involve changes in long-standing labor practices. Such "rationalization" involves the closing of uneconomic canals and branch lines on the railroads and of uneconomic coal mines, the modification of some featherbedding practices on the railroads (such as the abolition of "knockers-up"—a group of about six hundred who used to wake up train

crews before the invention of the alarm clock), and the elimination of redundant labor where jobs are found to be overmanned. The Herbert Committee, for example, criticized the Central Electricity Authority for its "passive attitude" towards redundancy for fear that it would be too difficult to handle:

[This attitude] has caused management at all levels to be disinclined to seek out redundancy because it is known that it will be difficult to deal with that redundancy when ascertained. In consequence we find that work-study, operational research and investigations into restrictive practices are undertaken without enthusiasm, if they are pursued at all. The effect on management itself is therefore bad because the most effective deployment of manpower is never possible. The effect of hidden under-employment upon the workpeople themselves is equally bad and is likely to undermine . . . morale. . . .⁵

This is an area where some unions have given contractual pledges of co-operation with management in "efficiency" measures, but where practical results have been few because the unions have understandably shrunk from the practical implications of their pledges.

Modernizing personnel practices

Nationalization has unquestionably been a powerful instrument for "modernizing" labor relations in the affected industries. The amount of attention now being paid to the training of new recruits, to providing opportunities for higher education, to systematic promotion policies, to job evaluation and work study, to the improvement of methods of wage payment, to personnel records and to personnel research—the attention that management is giving to these subjects is immeasurably greater than

⁵ *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Electricity Supply Industry* (Sir Edward Herbert, LL.B., Chairman), p. 73.

it was before nationalization. True, personnel management has not been carried as far in Britain as in the United States. But the nationalized industries, which once included some of the most backward on this score, must now be counted as among the most advanced. Where labor relations only recently exercised a residual claim on management's attention and energies (chiefly at the periodic crises produced by negotiations), today it constitutes an "overhead" claim that is constant, specialized, and formalized. The rapid improvement in personnel policies and their administration is helping to increase vertical mobility in British society.

Spread of voluntary arbitration

Nationalization has greatly extended the use of arbitration. In coal, for example, there is a voluntary agreement between the NUM and the Coal Board to submit *all* unresolved disputes to arbitration, including disputes over new contract terms. This does not mean that unions have given up the right to strike under nationalization (the basic arbitration agreement could be scrapped if the union got sufficiently fed up with arbitrators' awards); it simply reflects their feeling that they can now secure satisfactory settlements by less primitive means. The only union-approved strike in any nationalized industry has been the nineteen-day strike of locomotive personnel called in June 1955 by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen. Although this stopped 80 per cent of Britain's rail traffic for nearly three weeks, there was no serious government proposal to introduce any special measures for controlling strikes in "essential industries." The strike did lead the Trades Union Congress to one minor reform: it authorized its General Council to inter-

vene at an early date, and member unions.

Persistence of unofficial strikes

Despite the spread of arbitration, the improvement of management personnel effort, and the responsible attitude of union leaders in most situations, unofficial strikes have presented major difficulties in every nationalized industry. Management and union officials have been firm in refusing to negotiate while such strikes were in progress. These unofficial strikes seem to have been similar in cause and in frequency to unofficial strikes in pre-nationalization days: they do not seem to represent a substitution of unofficial for official direct action. Since nationalization, union officials have been much more co-operative with management in trying to head off and end such strikes.

The two "sides" of industry

There has been an unmistakable improvement in working relations—in understanding and respect—between union leaders and management in all the nationalized industries, save possibly on the railways. This new top-level relationship is not duplicated at the employee level—there has not been any marked reduction in the "we-they" psychology that has traditionally separated employees and management. The real question is how strongly this traditional sentiment persists; this is a matter of opinion very hard to test (statistical measures of absenteeism, turnover, unofficial strikes, and so forth are not very helpful). My own judgment is that there has been some improvement in morale in coal and electricity, but some deterioration on the railways. Labor relations in the gas industry have traditionally been good; nationalization does not seem to have changed the situation significantly.

UNION SECURITY

One of the ways in which nationalization has changed labor relations most unexpectedly was the unsettling effect it has had during the early years on the security enjoyed by particular unions. These problems were partly transferred from the old order of industry—they have not sunk entirely out of view. A discussion of these problems can illuminate some of the more pedestrian but still very important aspects of industrial relations in nationalized industries.

A union's security depends upon many factors—the sincerity and degree of acceptance of its presence by employers; the acceptance of its jurisdictional claims by other unions; the satisfaction of various groups with the service and status given them within the union; and the extent of nonunionism within the union's jurisdiction. The handling of these questions differs greatly in Britain and the United States.

In America there is a long tradition within the union movement of granting exclusive jurisdiction to individual unions; this principle is not recognized in Britain. British unions do indeed have "demarcation" disputes, but they are softened by the absence of the American principle of "exclusive jurisdiction" and by a tradition of interunion negotiations. These factors structure jurisdictional battles so that British unions "pull their punches."

Recognition has depended on the employers' will, sometimes forced by pressure from the union but never by any government authority (there is nothing comparable to the National Labor Relations Board in Britain). Unions recognized by employers do not enjoy exclusive bargaining rights for everyone in a well-defined bargaining unit; sometimes one finds two unions signatory to a joint agreement with an employer

covering their respective members in a common bargaining unit.

Finally, British unions have rarely sought any kind of "union security" clauses from employers, mainly because they did not regard employers as bent on destroying them at the first opportunity and because the British respect for voluntarism, even among working-class leaders, is so strong that most of them shrink from compelling nonunionists to join or stay in. However, there is a universal contempt for nonunionists, and union membership is normally very high.

These questions of union jurisdictions, union recognition, and compulsory membership were rarely if ever discussed in terms of nationalization. No one seems to have anticipated that nationalization would greatly disturb these rather routine areas of union life. In practice, however, nationalization produced an atmosphere within the affected industries not unlike that produced in the United States by the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. For nationalization offered British unions prizes something like those offered American homesteaders when the federal government threw open new territories for "staking" a century ago. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that there ensued a very early scramble to stake out new claims, that there was much jockeying and postling among the contenders, and that the unions' behavior was affected by the ground rules governing the way the game was to be played.

Determination of bargaining rights

The most important fact about these "ground rules" is that nationalization formalized them. Each nationalization act, for example, carries a clause similar to this one from the Coal Act of 1946:

It shall be the duty of the Board to enter into consultation with organisations appear-

ing to them to represent substantial proportions of the persons in the employment of the Board, or of any class of such persons, as to the Board's concluding with those organisations (collective bargaining) agreements. . . .

The effect of this clause was to make the National Coal Board its own "National Labor Relations Board" for determining representation questions. In private industry, which unions were to represent which employees was traditionally left up to the unions alone. Furthermore, the Board was under a legal compulsion to recognize unions that raised their heads for any class of employees (including clerical, technical, professional, and managerial employees), provided only that the union represented a "substantial proportion" of those employees. Without intending anything so subtle, the unions had transferred the right to determine bargaining rights from an internal concern of the union movement into an exclusive right of the employer. The heart of the matter was how the new giant employers would choose to exercise their new authority.

One can imagine the scramble for bargaining rights that developed when one realizes that by 1951 there were more than fifty unions active in five of the nationalized industries.⁶ In coal mining and on the railways, two huge industrial unions—unions which had played leading roles in the historic drives for nationalizing their industries—asserted jurisdictional claims over all

⁶ Coal had 9, electricity supply 10, gas 14, the railways 12, London transport (part of the British Transport Commission) 20, and civil air transport 16. For a useful list of which unions were active in which industries, see the table on pages 30-31 of the Acton Society Trust's first-rate study, *The Future of the Unions*, No. 8 in a twelve-part series of studies of nationalized industry published in 1950-51. This slender pamphlet is one of the best studies of how nationalization has affected union-management relations.

employees in their industries. These claims embraced not only clerical workers but any others who might show any interest in becoming union members. These moves naturally threatened other unions which had long been active among particular classes of employees, as well as outside unions which moved in to seek a place in the nationalized industries.

The reaction of the new employers was to reject these claims and to avoid any direct exercise of their legal power by throwing recognition questions back into the unions' own laps. That is, both the Coal Board and the Railway Executive, in certain important recognition disputes, said that they would recognize whatever unions the Trades Union Congress suggested they recognize. Several potentially explosive rivalries in coal yielded to this treatment, but on the railways the TUC's inability to persuade rival unions to adjust their disputes left the Transport Commission with no alternative but to make its own choice. When it chose to recognize only unions which had been active in trucking before nationalization, a union which had moved in rapidly only after nationalization withdrew from the field. There was no serious strike threat by the militant NUR to try to coerce the Commission into granting its claim to represent everyone in railroading.

Organization of nonmanual employees

So far it is clear that we have been talking only of horizontal rivalries. One important product of nationalization has been the rapid extension of organization among grades of employees not formerly organized, or only slightly so—clerks, technicians, and both lower and higher managerial grades. For these employees, nationalization meant that their employer had become the only employer in their industry, that it had become a somewhat more im-

personal employer, that the terms and conditions of employment became more standardized and less personal, and that decisions affecting these matters were now made at a greater distance and with longer delays. The result was to introduce a new feeling of uncertainty and loss of control over one's situation among these clerical, professional, and managerial employees. These grades accepted organization fairly rapidly, if often somewhat apologetically. But one thing became clear very quickly: these special groups wanted to be represented by their "own" unions and resisted the embrace offered by some of the manual workers' organizations. The general rule in all four industries was to grant white-collar and other nonmanual employees representation by unions limited to their own kind. But a great deal of energy and maneuvering went into decisions concerning which unions many borderline classifications ought to belong to.

Break-away movements

A somewhat similar representation problem has involved "break-away" movements—usually dissident craft groups which were represented by a larger union at the time of nationalization and which hoped to look out for their own interests by securing independent recognition under the nationalization acts. The most important of these break-away movements has involved the attempt of the colliery winding enginemen, a key craft group, to get out of the National Union of Mineworkers and bargain independently. In this bitter dispute between the winders and the NUM, the Coal Board has been caught in a hopeless middle: the winders have repeatedly engaged in strikes to force recognition by the Board; but the Board could not recognize the winders without facing a counterstrike by the NUM to prevent such recognition.

The NUM has supplied "scabs" to keep the pits running when the regular winders struck. In civil aviation, the Amalgamated Engineering Union has similarly prevented the British Overseas Airways Corporation and British European Airways from recognizing the Aeronautical Engineers' Association. On the railways, the National Union of Railwaymen has held a similar club over the Union of Railway Servants, a craft union of signalmen that has grown since nationalization but which did not feel it could use the advent of nationalization to win a recognition long denied it under private ownership.

Membership

In this scramble for position in nationalized industry, compulsory union membership might have taken on a new appeal for two reasons. First, union shop agreements would have been one method by which one union could have prevented any others from securing a foothold in a particular bargaining unit. The NUM did in fact submit a closed shop demand to the Coal Board during the first round of bargaining, but the Board rejected the demand "on principle," though it granted a dues check-off. Second, it might have been thought that the unions would have used the occasion of nationalization to achieve 100 per cent membership by widespread resort to union shop agreements. But nothing like this occurred; there was only a rather timid flurry of interest in such clauses. The British tradition of voluntarism led the employer to reject such demands and led the unions to accept his decision without a fight.

In sum

To sum up: nationalization had the effect of greatly stimulating interest in union membership among many groups that had traditionally remained outside trade unions, of stimulating many old

unions and several new ones to stake out claims in the new industries, of bringing many unions into conflict with each other both horizontally and vertically, of raising delicate and knotty questions of allocating union representation on joint negotiating and consultative boards, and—as a result of all these developments—of putting to a severe test the ability of rival unions to co-operate with each other by settling their rivalries through compromise rather than by force. Despite a few major eruptions, these rivalries were settled with remarkable success. Another effect of some importance was the ending of all employer resistance to recognition of unions representing groups close to higher management, for example, clerical employees on the railways or technical and managerial employees in all four industries. Historically, these were areas where British employers had not recognized unions without resistance—and in which organization was therefore weak and spotty.

The resultant pattern of union-management relations in the nationalized industries is complex and untidy, and the amount of energy expended on these mundane matters by trade union and management representatives has been huge. Although these problems were not foreseen, it is difficult to see how they could have been avoided.

UNION APPRAISALS OF NATIONALIZATION

It is easy to let the ideological disappointment with nationalization tempt people into calling it a failure. But this would be a shallow and superficial conclusion: if all union members over thirty-five years of age were given an opportunity to vote on whether or not, on balance, they preferred life under nationalization to their previous lot, I am reasonably sure that the coal miners would give nationalization a strong

endorsement,⁷ electricity and gas employees a rather weak and neutral endorsement, and only the railwaymen would probably feel sufficiently disappointed by nationalization to want to return to a private existence. The vote "for" nationalization would run more favorable among union officials than among their membership.

SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC REALITY

Even though nationalization cannot be called a failure, it should have produced a bigger improvement in labor relations than it has. The most important explanation of this gap between hopes and performance is the unreality of the expectations which socialism had historically generated for nationalization. Socialists had long claimed that they could make a unique contribution to the labor problems of modern industry; a decade's experience has shown this claim to be much less valid than many once believed. The main reason for this disappointment is that the ideological symbols of socialism's political struggle are not closely related to the economic and social motivations that determine morale in the workshop. The body of insights and principles developed over the past twenty years in the fields of industrial relations and personnel administration are more important to industrial morale than whether or not an industry is nationalized. This statement might not be true if conditions deteriorated badly in the product market: a nationalized monopoly industry would

⁷ The best evidence is the fact that despite an abundance of other job opportunities nationalization has succeeded in re-establishing a respectable rate of juvenile recruitment to the pits, something absolutely necessary to prevent a disastrous fall in manpower over the next twenty years and something that could not have happened if mining parents had not fundamentally revised their feelings about the industry.

probably be able to shelter its employees from such pressures better than private profit-minded employers struggling for existence under competition. But the greater ability of nationalized industries to dampen down shocks in the product market might be at some expense to the structural flexibility of the economy. The past decade has not given us any test of nationalization's behavior under deflationary conditions.

NOT ENOUGH HELP FROM BRITISH UNIONS

There is a second explanation, an ironical one. It is that the organization, attitudes, and policies of the British trade union movement present as many difficulties to "making nationalization work" as does the bureaucratic organization of the huge new state employers. This is not a truth widely acknowledged within the British labor movement. But there are enough respected students of the British scene who have come to this conclusion to put it beyond doubt. Here is how one of the most perceptive of these, Professor John Mack of Glasgow, puts the matter:

Broadly speaking, the formal relationship between trade unions and the wider society in Britain is much the same as it was in 1913. . . . The only new factor in the situation is that the balance of industrial power has swung decisively in favour of the unions. They have increased in weight and influence, but they have retained their former attitudes. They are unwilling to exercise the responsibilities which . . . are a condition of the proper exercise of their growing power.⁸

He goes on to say that while many leaders wish to exercise the new responsibilities they feel, they are frustrated by a reluctant rank and file. The fundamental shift in the role which nationali-

⁸ John A. Mack, "Trade Union Leadership," *Political Quarterly*, January-March 1956 (Special Number on Trade Union Problems), p. 73.

zation requires of a trade union is that it stop pursuing purely sectional interests and invariably protecting the interests of its members whenever the latter feel injured, rightly or wrongly. No longer can unions afford the luxury of simply standing in protest against society and against employers; under nationalization and the welfare state unions must take some responsibility for seeing that what has to be done is not made impossible. This is an extremely difficult and delicate adjustment to carry through within a framework of freedom, especially for an institution with the deep and democratic traditions of the British unions. For individual British unions are not disciplined by anything like the degree of structural centralization that characterizes the Swedish or German unions, to take two examples from Continental countries whose national economic problems are not unlike Britain's. Without such centralization, it is much easier for irresponsible leadership to throw its weight around at the expense of the general interest. The only restraint on such conduct becomes self-restraint induced by an understanding of the problems of the country and of particular industries. The extent of self-restraint and understanding has not been negligible among union leaders in postwar Britain; but it has served negative rather than positive ends: the unions have seen to it that nationalization did not fail but they have not done much to help it succeed. To do the latter may require far-reaching changes within British unions and in some attitudes toward industrial relations traditional in Britain on both sides of the bargaining table.

NEEDED REFORMS

Some progress might be made if British unions were willing to spend more time and money on education and re-

search, of which there is now very little. There are some structural reforms that seem overdue: the addition of specialized staff to deal with the affairs of the nationalized industries, a rethinking of the kind of workshop organization the unions ought to have (it is now weak in many industries, though not in mining); more attractive terms of employment for union officials. But perhaps the most hopeful source of progress lies in a re-evaluation by labor and management alike of the kind of collective bargaining that would best suit their objectives. For example, by encouraging more local bargaining on local topics it should be possible to eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the proper role of joint consultation—by defining as negotiable many issues now haggled over on a consultative basis and in so doing to set up a clearer grievance procedure wholly separate from consultative meetings.⁹ Again, a more widespread use of "horse trading" in bargaining, instead of the characteristic approach of trying to negotiate separate agreements for each subject "on its merits," would contribute to an easier position for union officials when it comes to accepting measures which they know

⁹ Professor Cole has written that workers need to be given much more control over questions at workshop level than consultation has so far yielded them. How does he see this being realized? ". . . By building on joint consultation an extended kind of collective bargaining, under which, in each establishment, the rules and regulations governing workshop practice will be embodied in negotiated agreements, accepted as binding upon both parties and backed by the Trade Unions as an integral part of the structure of collective bargaining." This is nothing but "workers' control" as it exists in the United States. The British difficulty today stems from national bargaining without any provision for supplementary local bargaining. It is the latter that needs building up, not the former that needs to be broken down. (See G. D. H. Cole, *What Is Wrong with the Trade Unions?*, p. 20.)

the industry needs but their members will not like. Management can then be made the chief lightning rod for absorbing the emotional aggression generated by rationalization moves. This is, I realize, a characteristically American reading of some of the difficulties in which the British unions find themselves (and not only in nationalized industries—the difficulties only stand out more sharply there). But some British observers, such as B. C. Roberts, are urging this point upon their countrymen.

NATIONALIZATION NO CURE-ALL

We are brought, then, to a very pedestrian conclusion, one that should perhaps have been obvious in advance before history drove it home. It is that the most significant and most interesting aspects of labor relations in Britain's nationalized industries have comparatively little to do with the fact of nationalization. They have to do either with attitudes and practices that

are characteristically *British*, or with the history, technology, and environmental characteristics of a particular *industry*. The form of ownership of an industry is less significant than either of these other two major influences on what labor relations are like within Britain's nationalized industries. This is not to say—as I did say in an unguarded moment at the start of this essay—that nationalization is irrelevant. But its primary relevance is that it provides a more auspiciously structured environment within which the specific labor problems of these industries are being tackled and a more professional and systematic approach to these problems.

If nationalization was to have proved the decisive, almost surgical, solution for an industry's labor problems that many thought it would be, the reality of social relationships would have to be much simpler and human nature much less perverse than history shows them to be.

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Labor Relations in Postwar Germany

By WILLIAM H. MCPHERSON *

Abstract: After the last war, the reconstruction of German labor organization faced great difficulties but proceeded rapidly and along partly new lines, compared with earlier decades. Once the Republic was established in 1949, the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) was created, uniting sixteen industrial or multi-industrial unions including 87 per cent of seven million organized workers and pledged to a nonpartisan political policy. So far attempts to split the DGB have failed, but the effort to inject a political program, in particular by the Social Democratic party, may yet succeed. The author discusses these and other problems, such as collective bargaining, work councils and other forms of employee representation and participation, and the settlement of labor disputes.—Ed.

WHEN the Nazi government finally capitulated in 1945, Germany lay in ruins. Not only had its industrial equipment and its housing been extensively demolished, but its political structure was annihilated, its social institutions had crumbled, and the psychology of its citizenry was shattered. For the moment, the people were living in almost an economic and social vacuum.

What needed to be done on the economic front was relatively clear. The mines, the factories, and the transportation system had to be reconstructed and rehabilitated. The task was enormous, but both the path and the goal were fairly plain. For a time there was uncertainty as to whether industrial reconstruction would take place along capitalistic or quasi-socialistic lines, but it gradually became evident that there would be no socialization. Factories soon began to rise from the rubble as executive and supervisory employees toiled side by side with laborers and office workers to rebuild a work place for themselves.

* Mr. Herbert Oestreich assisted in studying recent German periodicals.

The road to political and social reconstruction was less clear. Revulsion from the Nazi philosophy and methods was widespread, so that there was broad acceptance of Allied insistence on the removal of all formal vestiges of totalitarian rule. But the constructive problem of shaping new democratic institutions to take their place was formidable. Dire need brought quick action on the economic front, but on the social front disillusionment and apathy were widespread.

UNION STRUCTURE

The Nazi's German Labor Front was immediately disbanded. Its basic function of employee regimentation rather than employee representation had become discredited. Labor naturally looked back to the pre-Nazi period for a pattern of union structure and operation, but sought to avoid the weaknesses of the earlier system.

The occupation authorities insisted that the new union structure be built from the ground up. Organization began at the plant level, extended rapidly to a community basis and gradually to

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a regional basis. After the French, British, and American zones were merged to create the Federal Republic, the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) was established, in October 1949.

A major early issue regarding the structure of the new labor movement was whether the national industrial unions should be relatively autonomous organizations or mere departments of one big union. Labor leaders in various parts of Germany were sharply divided on this issue,¹ so that strong advice from the occupation authorities in favor of relative autonomy was perhaps a determining factor in the final outcome.

The new union structure differs from the old one in two major respects. In the first place, the pre-Nazi General Federation of German Trade Unions included some craft and mixed groups, whereas the DGB unites sixteen industrial and multi-industry unions encompassing workers from all branches of the German economy. In the second place, while the old labor movement had been divided along political and religious lines into competing Socialist, Christian, and Liberal federations, the DGB comprises about 87 per cent of the seven million organized workers² and is pledged to a nonpartisan policy.

In retrospect, it seems probable that Allied insistence on organization from the ground up may have been a factor in determining the industrial and nonpartisan characteristics of the new German unions. When organization takes place widely and suddenly at the plant level in a highly industrialized nation,

¹ J. F. J. Gillen, *Labor Problems in West Germany* (Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952), pp. 9-10; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1950), pp. 389-90.

² *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1956), p. 128.

craft and political cleavages are unlikely to develop. On the other hand, it appears equally unlikely that the old labor leaders who were most active in union reconstruction would have emphasized such distinctions even if they had been able to rebuild the unions from the top down, since they had had such a sad lesson on the importance of labor unity at the end of the Weimar period.

THREATS TO UNION UNITY

It is still uncertain whether unity can be long maintained. Constant attacks on it have come from certain circles among the employers, the churches, and the political parties. Some industrialists have assumed that a divided labor movement would be a weaker one, but they have not taken effective open steps to promote division.

Some Catholic churchmen, on the other hand, have not hesitated to make pronouncements in favor of separate Christian unions, and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions has worked vigorously to re-establish a German affiliate. To the time of this writing, these efforts have borne meager fruit. A new German Federation of Christian Trade Unions was founded in October 1955 with strong financial backing which came in part from assessments on members of some Christian unions outside Germany; but it attracted only insignificant defections from the DGB. At the time of its first convention in June 1956, its undisclosed membership was estimated by outsiders at less than 20,000,³ and it appeared that its only prospect of gaining any significance lay in merger with the Christian unions of the Saar.

Party pressures have also threatened union unity. The first serious blow from this source came with the establishment of the initial West German

³ "Fiasko der Spalter," *Die Quelle*, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 1956), p. 294.

government. If Adenauer and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had formed a coalition with the Social Democratic party (SPD) on their left instead of with the parties on their right, the political division within the DGB would have been much less significant and the possibility of dissension resulting from political activity would have been sharply reduced.

SPD leaders have longed for the more practical aid they could receive from the unions if the policy of political neutrality could be broken. They have felt that the party would gain from having a major union federation to serve as its industrial arm—as during the Weimar period—even if such an alliance should lead to the withdrawal of 10 or 20 per cent of the DGB membership. Many Socialist union leaders have wondered whether political neutrality was not too big a price to pay for union unity.

It has recently appeared possible that political activity within the DGB in sympathy with the SPD may bring about the defection of union members who belong to the CDU. Among the Christian elements in the DGB there has long been dissatisfaction with what they consider to be their inadequate influence in policy formation and inadequate share of official union positions, and occasional complaint that the DGB has given political aid to the SPD. It seems probable, however, that Christian influence has been more than proportionate to its numbers. In 1931 the Socialist unions were nearly eight times larger than their Christian counterparts, and the division of allegiance within the DGB membership today is probably not significantly different. With such a preponderance of membership it is indeed difficult for the DGB Socialists to exercise enough political restraint to accommodate their CDU brothers.

The nonpartisan policy was subjected

to serious strain in the closing sessions of the DGB convention in October 1956 when resolutions were adopted in favor of such political issues as the priority of German reunification, condemnation of atomic tests, and opposition by all legal means to rearmament and the draft. While these actions did not disrupt the DGB, they serve to underscore the possibility that the most serious threat to union unity may come from SPD sources rather than from the churches and the Christian unions in other countries. The strains may mount until the national elections in the fall of 1957.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Contract negotiations are normally conducted on a multi-employer basis, except when they concern government employees. They result, therefore, in industry-wide agreements—usually regional in scope, but sometimes national and occasionally local. The unions bargain with employers' associations organized on an industrial basis. The agreements governing wage rates are typically separate from those dealing with the other terms of employment. If they cover more than a single community, they often classify the areas covered into several wage groups, instead of providing a single set of rates. As in many other European countries, the collective agreements initially govern only employers belonging to the contracting association, but may be extended by government action to apply to all employers and employees in the industry.

These master agreements—unlike labor agreements in the United States—do not set the actual terms of employment, but only the minimum terms. Employers may deviate from their provisions, provided the deviation is to the advantage of the employee. Such deviation in wage rates is now a normal practice, and the spread is often sub-

stantial. Thus industry-wide bargaining, as conducted in Germany, comes far from resulting in wage uniformity.

In addition to the master agreements negotiated by the unions and the employers' associations, there are two types of agreements that are frequently negotiated with a single company or plant management. These are (1) the shop regulations, which deal with certain details of wages and other terms of employment for the purpose of implementing the master agreement and adapting it to special local conditions and (2) the shop agreement, which deals with various details that are not covered at all by the master agreement (for example, timing of shifts and assignment of vacations).

A striking feature of employee representation in Germany is that these supplementary shop agreements are not negotiated by the unions, for there are no local unions in Germany. The employee belongs directly to the national industrial union. Its local office in his community is not the counterpart of a local union in the United States, but resembles more the district office of an American union. When a local membership meeting is held, it is not limited to the employees of a single company. The local union official seldom deals with an individual company, and the worker seldom has any personal contact with his union.

Only recently have the unions become generally aware that this lack of contact is a source of weakness. The use of shop stewards, which has long existed in some unions, has increased rapidly in recent years. In some unions the stewards are appointed, while in others they are elected by the union members in the individual plant. The function of the shop steward is to recruit new members and collect dues. He seldom deals with a grievance, except in some of the largest plants. He

is often useful as a line of communication between the members and the local officers of the union.

WORKS COUNCILS

It is the works council that performs the employee representation function at the plant level. These councils, whose members are elected by all the employees of the plant, were first established at the end of World War I. During the following decade, when the employees of many organized plants were divided between unions affiliated with the three major federations, the works councils performed a useful function of co-ordinating the approach of the three unions in the conduct of labor relations at the plant level. In the absence of the American concept of exclusive bargaining rights for one union in a bargaining unit, some method of co-ordination was essential. In negotiating with the employers' associations the unions used joint negotiating committees, while the works councils served a similar purpose in the negotiation of the supplemental shop agreements. Under present conditions of union unity the co-ordinating function of the works council has become unnecessary.

It was unfortunate for the unions that the early labor organization in the separate plants at the end of World War II took the traditional form of the works council rather than developing into local unions, as they might have done if the occupation authorities had exerted a real influence in that direction. By now there is no possibility of the repeal of the legislation on which these councils are based, for the employer prefers to deal with his own employees and the worker identifies himself much more closely with his fellow employees on the council than with his union officials. The unions make the best of this situation by maintaining close relations with the works coun-

cils. They hold conferences and provide training for the great majority of the councilors who are union members.

The law that now governs the structure and functions of the works councils is the Works Constitution Act of October 1952.⁴ It provides that all plants with over twenty employees shall have a works council with from three to thirty-five members, depending on the size of the work force. A multiplant company has an additional united works council.

The works council negotiates the plant regulations and agreements that supplement the master agreement negotiated by the union and the employers' association. It also handles grievances. It is to be consulted prior to a dismissal, and new hires must be cleared with it. It may protest a hire on the grounds that the prospective employee has been selected because of his personal connections and is unqualified; that his selection constitutes discrimination against other applicants on the basis of race, sex, religion, nationality, union activity, or political views; or that there is reason to anticipate illegal or antisocial conduct.

Certain items regarding terms of employment are to be settled only on agreement of the council. These include the setting of shift hours, establishment of incentive rates, assignment of vacations, administration of employee welfare institutions, and rules of employee conduct. If agreement cannot be reached on such items, the parties are obliged to set up an *ad hoc* arbitration board to decide the issue.

The council has a lesser influence on

⁴ International Labor Office, *Legislative Series*, 1952, Ger. F.R. 6. For summary of this and other current German labor laws see H. C. Nipperdey, "Development of Labor Law in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1945," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 70, Nos. 1-2 (July-August 1954), pp. 26-43, 148-67.

economic questions that seriously affect the employees, such as the sharp curtailment or shutdown of operations, movement of production to another site, merger, or basic change in the type of activity. In the event of disagreement on such matters, the parties shall establish a mediation board, which may make a nonbinding recommendation for settlement.

Under the terms of this law the works councilors are not the sole representatives of the workers at the company level. The employees also elect one third of the members of the supervisory board, which is roughly similar to our board of directors. At least two of those chosen must be employees of the company. This representation is not a complete innovation. It is similar to a provision of the Works Councils Act of 1920,⁵ except that the earlier legislation permitted only two employee representatives on the board and called for their election by the works council.

No significant field study has yet been made of the actual operation of the 1952 law, but on the basis of experience during the Weimar period and what is known regarding the recent operation of similar provisions introduced in some German industries prior to 1952, it seems reasonable to surmise (1) that new hires are rarely challenged, (2) that recourse is seldom had to the *ad hoc* boards, and (3) that the influence of the employee representatives on the supervisory boards is largely psychological, their presence making the other members more conscious of employee interest in board decisions.

CODETERMINATION

A much stronger form of employee representation, known as "codetermina-

⁵ International Labor Office, *Legislative Series*, 1920, Ger. 1-2. For the more detailed provisions of a subsequent law see *ibid.*, 1922, Ger. 1.

tion," or joint management, was introduced in the steel industry at the time of decartelization in 1947. The Codetermination Law of April 1951⁶ gave it a statutory base in this industry and extended its scope to the mining industry. Under the terms of this act the functions of the works council are roughly the same as in other industries, but labor consultation is reinforced by labor participation in top management. Labor has not one third representation on the supervisory boards but representation equal to that of ownership. If the board has eleven members, five are selected by the stockholders, two by the works council, three by the national industrial union and the DGB, and the odd man is selected by the first ten. It will be noted that the labor representatives are chosen by the works council and the unions, whereas in other industries they are elected directly by the employees.

Top management in the steel and mining firms takes the form of a managerial board, consisting normally of a production manager, a business manager, and a labor manager. The latter is in a sense a labor representative, since his appointment or dismissal requires a majority vote of not only the supervisory board but also the labor representatives on that board. All major managerial decisions are made jointly by the members of the managerial board, but primary responsibility for routine administrative action is divided among them.

From the studies⁷ of the operation

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1951, Ger. F.R. 2.

⁷ W. M. Blumenthal, *Codetermination in the German Steel Industry* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University, 1956); Herbert Spiro, "Codetermination in Germany," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 1954), pp. 1114-27; W. H. McPherson, "Codetermination in Practice," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (July 1955), pp. 499-519; W. H. McPherson and

of this unique form of corporate control, it is clear that this innovation has worked less well in the mining industry than in the steel industry, where it was introduced four years earlier, at a time when management was in desperate need of the full co-operation of the work force. It also appears that within each industry codetermination has worked to the satisfaction of all concerned to a greater extent in some companies than in others. In general, the results have been much less striking than was widely anticipated. While they are pleasing to labor and displeasing to stockholders, neither the high optimism of the one group nor the extreme fear of many in the latter group has proven justified.

The actual day-to-day operation of codetermination has been much smoother than was expected. Sharp division in voting has generally been avoided in both the supervisory and managerial boards. Decisions are reached typically by consensus rather than by nose counting. When strong differences of judgment are encountered, it is usual to defer action until a compromise solution can be worked out. In some companies the odd member of the supervisory board has never cast a deciding vote. In general, the labor members play a major role in decisions regarding personnel and social questions, and the action on strictly financial and technical questions is left largely to the ownership members.

The extent of influence of the labor manager within the managerial board varies with the capability of the person appointed. It is difficult to find men who combine a strong labor background and managerial experience, but the position has not proved to be quite as incongruous as many anticipated. While

others, "German Experience with Codetermination," *Proceedings of Eighth Annual Meeting*, Industrial Relations Research Association (1955), pp. 118-49.

it is the responsibility of the labor manager to present the labor viewpoint, most union officials—if not always the workers—have come to recognize that he must have a major interest in the success of the enterprise and must be management-minded, as distinguished from ownership-minded.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CODETERMINATION

The ultimate effect of codetermination on collective bargaining cannot yet be clearly determined. It would appear that labor, while occupying all the chairs on one side of the bargaining table, has also some seats on the other side. Such a picture may be misleading. In negotiations at the industry level, the union deals with the employers' association. That association in the mining industry limits its membership to the production and business managers, so that the labor managers have no influence on its policies. The association in the steel industry admits labor managers, but the actual negotiations are conducted by staff members. The labor managers, moreover, tend to take a management point of view, although they are in close touch with the union leaders.

The labor influence on the other side of the bargaining table is probably greater at the company level than at the industry level. But here again it must be recognized that the labor manager, while generally sympathetic with the labor point of view, is essentially management-minded. His attitude may be much like that of a union official who has been appointed as personnel director in an American corporation. He can be expected to have a full appreciation of the labor point of view, but he is no longer a labor representative.

In collective bargaining under codetermination, it may reasonably be expected that management will better understand employee interests and be less

likely to take an unreasonable position and that union officials will have a better picture of the problems of the industry. In the long run the result should be fewer strikes. Already the events seem to support this expectation, though it is too soon to make any final appraisals.

To what extent labor has benefited from codetermination is difficult to determine. There is some indication that increases in plant wage rates above master agreement rates have been larger in the steel industry than in metal fabricating, where the same union operates without codetermination. There is also evidence that, during minor recessions, steel companies have made more of an effort to avoid or defer layoff than would have been expected in the absence of codetermination. In addition, employee welfare programs have probably been expanded to a greater extent in steel than in most other industries, and codetermination tends to reduce their paternalistic aspects. Yet, to many workers, the chief gains have been psychological. They report a new sense of participation and responsibility and an improved status in their relations with supervisors.

Managers in some plants have reported that the company has gained by a reduction in problems of supervision and discipline resulting from the improved sense of responsibility on the part of workers.

CODETERMINATION IN HOLDING COMPANIES

After the occupation, the Allied program of decartelization was reversed. Coal and steel companies have been regrouped under new parent corporations to which the Codetermination Act was held to be inapplicable. The control of the parent corporations over the individual steel and coal companies threatened to undermine the significance of

codetermination. A number of the parent companies agreed to introduce codetermination without legal compulsion, but some later modified this willingness. For three years there was sharp debate on this issue both in the industry and in Parliament. Finally in June 1956 a law⁸ was passed applying a modified form of codetermination to the parent corporations in the coal-steel industries. The principal modifications are that (1) the labor manager is chosen in the same way as the other members of the managerial board, without any special voice for labor, and (2) a majority of the labor members of the supervisory board are elected by the employees from among their own number, with only a minority selected by the unions.

UNION POLICY

Codetermination has been the major legislative goal of the German unions largely because of union unity. Here was an issue on which Socialists and Catholics could agree. The former thought that they saw in it a step toward socialism, though it now seems more probable that, as many industrialists have hoped, it will reduce worker interest in socialization.

The unions have tried without much success to extend the application of codetermination. In 1952, as we have seen, it was applied to other industries only to the extent of providing a one-third representation of labor on the supervisory boards. Finally, it was extended in still more limited form to government employees by the Personnel Representation Law of August 1955.⁹ Here the role of the union is sharply reduced. Personnel councils at each administrative level may confer with ad-

⁸ *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Teil I, 1956, No. 38 (August 8), pp. 707-11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1955, No. 25 (August 6), pp. 477-89.

ministrators on a variety of employment details. Disagreements may be appealed to higher levels and, on certain issues, to a mediation board. The results of the legislative battles on the laws of 1952 and 1955 can scarcely be regarded as union victories. In any case they indicate an increasing legislative strength of union opponents.

Similar indications were seen in the drafting of the Labor Court Act of September 1953¹⁰ and its revision of December 1955,¹¹ where certain past prerogatives of the unions have been extended to religious employee associations.

As a result of their legislative defeats, the unions have recently modified their traditional policy of seeking their major goals by statutory means and are making more vigorous efforts through collective bargaining. Until recently the postwar unions have followed a moderate wage policy. After experience with severe inflation in the 1920's and the early postwar years, they have been extremely fearful of contributing to a new spiral. The reluctance to strike has also been due in part to a hostile public opinion, the lack of employee financial resources after wartime devastation, and the inadequacy of union funds to finance strike benefits during an industry-wide stoppage.¹² DGB leadership provided little or no support to its member unions in case of strife. Probably as a result of this situation, there have been but modest gains during recent years in union membership, which has failed to keep pace with the growth of the labor force.

Finally, there was a revolt of the delegates to the DGB convention of 1954, evidenced in criticism of DGB

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1953, pp. 1267 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1955, pp. 743-44.

¹² Union funds have, however, grown fairly rapidly from dues that are scaled to approximate one hour's earnings per week.

officials and demands for an action program.¹³ Since then the unions have been pressing wage and hour demands with new vigor and with considerable success. The average annual percentage increase in real earnings in manufacturing was 5.7 in 1955 as compared with 2.5 in 1954.¹⁴

A major plank in the unions' new action program is the forty-hour week, to be achieved by degrees through collective bargaining. Heretofore a forty-eight-hour week has been the norm in Western Europe. The workday of underground miners has been reduced from eight to seven and a half hours; and by agreement of June 1956 the metal union has won a forty-five-hour week with an 8 per cent wage increase to more than offset the reduction in hours. The winter of 1956-57 has witnessed a vigorous and largely successful strike for vacation and sick-leave gains in the metal-fabricating industry of Schleswig-Holstein. This struggle appears to be regarded by the unions as a pilot or pattern-setting action, and may well indicate a new interest in "business unionism."

SETTLEMENT OF LABOR DISPUTES

Grievances not settled by the works council and the employer can be taken by the employee—with legal assistance from his union, if he is a member—to a local labor court composed of an employer, an employee, and a neutral chairman.¹⁵ Under certain conditions an appeal can be carried to an appellate court and to the Federal Labor Court. These courts deal with violations of labor agreements and labor

laws. They provide a prompt hearing at slight cost before persons having a background in labor relations.

In disputes regarding the terms of a new labor agreement the parties may call upon a state conciliator, but there is no federal mediation service. Most unions and employers' associations have established their own mediation machinery by agreement. In September 1954 the DGB and the Federation of German Employers' Associations agreed on a model draft of a conciliation agreement, which they recommended for adoption by their members. It called for bipartite mediation commissions with rotating chairmanship and a time limit for acceptance or rejection of the mediation proposal before a stoppage is permissible.¹⁶ The machinery established in the various industries deviates considerably from this model and lacks uniformity. For example, the mediation agreement of June 1955 for the steel and metal fabricating industries provides for mediation only at the request of either party, so that a stoppage without prior mediation is possible.¹⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The phenomenal postwar recovery of German industry has been accompanied by a substantial reconstruction of its labor relations. A strong union structure has been built. A relatively high proportion of the employees are union members, and substantial union financial reserves have been accumulated. A strong and extensive system of workers' education has been developed. After following a policy of moderation in

¹⁶ "Bewährungsprobe der tariflichen Schlichtung," *Die Quelle*, Vol. 5, No. 10 (October 1954), pp. 441-42. The addition of an impartial chairman was mentioned as a possible alternative.

¹⁷ "Die I. G. Metall vereinbarte tarifliche Schlichtung," *Die Quelle*, Vol. 6, No. 7 (July 1955), pp. 316-17.

¹³ *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 87-88.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (June 1956), p. 666.

¹⁵ W. H. McPherson, "Basic Issues in German Labor Court Structure," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (June 1954), pp. 439-52.

bargaining demands, the unions have recently adopted an "action program" that has resulted in significant wage increases and a widespread reduction of the previous forty-eight-hour work week.

There is evidence that a novel wave of negotiations for improvements in fringe benefits is in the making. We may be witnessing in 1957 a fundamental shift of union interest from the legislative chamber to the bargaining table—a shift that may drastically alter the character of German unionism. The German labor movement has heretofore been characterized by a considerable preoccupation with broad socialistic reform. In the future it may be much more concerned with the "business unionism" that has typified its American counterpart.

The chief union weakness lies in the fact that the labor relations activities that are most meaningful to the employee—those at the plant level—are in the hands of the works councils rather than the unions. There seems to be no present possibility of replacing the councils by local unions. On the contrary, labor legislation has in recent years consistently placed additional limitations on union activity and reduced the union's role as labor representative by expanding the significance of the works councils and of religious employee associations. Most of these changes, however, have been minor and have affected union prestige more than union power.

Since 1951 legislation on employee representation appears to have been based increasingly on the concept that the labor-management relationship at the industrial level takes the form of conflict, but that at the plant level it should take the form of collaboration; and that the unions should be confined to the industrial and interindustrial levels, with the works councils holding a monopoly on labor representation at the plant level.

Such a concept might be dangerous not only for the unions but also for industry. If the unions are excluded from activities that emphasize the partial commonality of interests among labor, management, and ownership and are confined to areas where they face constant opposition, may they not be expected to become increasingly hostile? Furthermore, a weakening of the relationship between the unions and the works councils means an illogical dissociation of the agents negotiating labor agreements from those who will implement and administer them. It is to the interest of everyone concerned that the negotiating unions have a full understanding of plant problems, an understanding possible only as long as the unions retain a close relationship with the works councils.

Another danger in augmenting the autonomy of the works councils is their susceptibility to Communist control. German unions have been largely freed of Communist influence, but in works councils Communists have occasionally won influential positions.

As of now there is still a fairly good working relationship between the unions and the councils, but a number of apparently minor provisions in recent labor laws give evidence of strong forces at work to weaken this relationship.


The drive for codetermination has made no substantial progress since it gained extension of this system from steel to the mining industry in 1951. Certain industrialists became more outspoken in their opposition after the steel and coal industries were returned by the occupation authorities to private ownership, and by the rebuilding of giant industrial combines they succeeded for a time in largely negating the intent of the new corporate structure. Only after a surprisingly lengthy parliamentary struggle did the unions finally win legislation which applies the principle

of joint management to the new parent corporations. Even here the structure was modified to the disadvantage of the unions, but it is unlikely that the changes will significantly alter the operation of the system.

Codetermination has been the most novel aspect of German postwar labor relations. It has been beneficial in some respects to the employees, though not to the extent that many had anticipated. These gains have not greatly aided the unions, for most employees probably credit their benefits more to

the works councils than to their labor organizations.

While many industrialists bitterly resent codetermination, others—more in steel than in mining—consider it workable and in some ways beneficial. Industrialists were probably correct in their expectation that codetermination would weaken the drive for socialization. The amazing recovery of German industry and the rapid expansion of its exports demonstrate that its competitive strength and earning power have not been undermined by this experiment.



Collective Bargaining in Postwar France

By VAL R. LORWIN *

Abstract: The labor movement in France since 1944 has had a hectic history. The unions, especially those united in the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), played a strong role in the resistance movement and gained great political influence. By 1946, labor had won a place on the boards of directors of all the nationalized services and industries and had gained influence in other industries. After 1946, Communist politics split the CGT and in the process a considerable number of workers simply left organized labor. The author discusses the resultant disorganization and strife, the attempts of the state to regulate collective bargaining, the introduction of a new collective bargaining law in 1950, the initiative of some managements, public and private, in introducing plant bargaining rather than industry-wide or area-wide bargaining, and the forces making for change in industrial relations and those holding back change.—Ed.

COLLECTIVE bargaining in France is more interesting than happy. Among the factors that make it interesting are these:

1. The contrast between the advanced social aspirations and social legislation of France and the underdeveloped state of its industrial relations.
2. The weakness, in collective bargaining and in action at the plant level, of the union movement, divided along political and religious lines, with its major segment dominated by the Communist party.
3. The strength of employers' associations.
4. The extensive role of the government in determining not only conditions of employment and the structure of wages but also the very conditions of union functioning in the plant.
5. The contrast between centralization of general wage movements (through

state action and through employers' association bargaining) and the anarchy of actual wage-rate determination in the plant.

6. The failure, thus far, of nationalization of a number of basic industries to change the climate of industrial relations.

Since 1950 France has been engaged in its third attempt to generalize collective bargaining. The first was an attempt to meet worker unrest at the end of World War I; it foundered almost immediately on the rocks of political schism in the unions. The second, much broader, attempt came with the Popular Front in 1936. Again, political strife in the unions and employer opposition limited the possibilities of free bargaining, and the state stepped in with compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes. The war halted the all too brief experiment, and from 1939 to 1950 the government itself set wages.

UNIONS AT THE LIBERATION

To understand the state of collective bargaining today, we must go back to

the hectic several years following the liberation of Paris in 1944 and the war's end in 1945.

The liberation was the high point of all time in the prestige of labor and the political left in France. The unions revived rapidly, both those of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT, *Confédération Générale du Travail*), the oldest and most important wing of French labor, and those of the French Confederation of Catholic Workers (CFTC, *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*). The Communists soon took control of the CGT's leading industrial unions and the confederation's central apparatus. Politically, the Communist party emerged from the underground period with the strongest party organization France had ever seen, a scarcely challenged predominance in working-class support, and about five million votes (one fourth of all those cast) in every national election since liberation.

The CFTC, long restricted chiefly to white-collar employment and textiles in a few regions, for the first time became a significant minority in a number of basic industries. For the first time too, thanks to the role of many Catholic unionists in the resistance, its *bona fides* was not seriously challenged by the dominant CGT.

A new confederation appeared, the General Confederation of Supervisory Employees (CGC, *Confédération Générale des Cadres*). It became the leading union of foremen, salesmen, and supervisory staff.

POST-LIBERATION REFORMS

Employers and the political parties of the right were discredited at the liberation. They were publicly held responsible for the nation's lack of political, material, and military preparedness against the Nazis, for the tawdry Vichy regime, and for the nation's old social

injustices. Thus they were unable to offer any real resistance to the measures of social and economic reform which the nation, led by the basically conservative General Charles de Gaulle, then enacted.

These measures set the stage for later union-management relations. To handle worker grievances, shop stewards are elected in all establishments with ten or more workers. To give workers greater industrial democracy and greater interest in production, plant committees are elected in establishments with over fifty employees; they operate employer-financed social welfare programs and advise on production problems and on mass dismissals. Both stewards and plant committee delegates are elected by all workers, whether union members or not, from among competing union slates.

Social security, especially health insurance and family allowances, was greatly enlarged in coverage and in benefits, and the law gave the unions places on the elected boards of administration. The nation took over the coal mines, gas and electric power, the biggest banks and insurance companies, air transport, and Renault, France's largest automobile company. The unions were given representation on the boards of directors of all these public enterprises and of the previously nationalized railways.

DECLINE OF THE UNIONS

All this was done by 1946; then social reform halted. In 1947 began the great decline of the unions. The Communists, after three years of co-operating in the national reconstruction, followed the Soviet lead into the cold war—at the expense of the CGT. They launched a general strike, ostensibly for overdue wage increases, but actually against the Marshall Plan and French economic recovery. The anti-

* I wish to thank the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development for the support which made possible research in France on which my discussion of the most recent developments is based.

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Communist minority (Socialists and nonpolitical trade unionists) helped defeat the strike, then withdrew from the "old house" of labor to form the new Workers' Force Confederation (FO, Force Ouvrière). For the third time in a single generation the CGT was split—again, as in 1921 and 1939, by Soviet and Communist international politics.

The CGT has lost over two thirds of the six million members it claimed at its 1946 peak, by the 1947 split and later hemorrhages of membership following other politically inspired strikes. But it remains the strongest organization among manual workers in practically every major industry. Most of the disaffected instead of joining the CFTC or FO have dropped into what the French call the "largest organization of all, the unorganized." FO and the CFTC have their chief strength among white-collar employees, FO especially among government clerks.

The unions are disunited not only in every branch of private and public employment, but in almost every shop of any size. They suffer from the old weaknesses of French union structure, dues, and discipline.

Membership is such a loose concept that no membership figures are meaningful. People may be considered—and consider themselves—members even if they pay only a few months' dues each year. The local, base of the union movement, still has no clear functions of contract administration or grievance handling and thus lacks effective arguments for eliciting union membership. There are no closed or union shops or union hiring halls to enforce union membership.¹

To gauge the relative influence of the

¹ The CGT printers' union has had a closed shop in some newspaper printing plants. A 1956 law declared the closed shop illegal, but it remains to be seen whether the law will be effective.

three workers' confederations, in the absence of membership figures, we can best look to the elections of the workers' representatives on the boards of directors of the semiautonomous social security system. All workers may vote, choosing from among the rival union and other (minor) slates. In the 1955 elections, out of 6.7 million votes, the CGT received 2.9 million, or 43 per cent of the total vote; the CFTC, 1.4 million, or 21 per cent; FO, 1.1 million, or 16 per cent.²

EMPLOYER ORGANIZATION

The employers too regrouped after the war. Industry and area associations linked up in the astutely managed new French National Employers Council (CNPF, Conseil National du Patronat Français), successor to the prewar General Confederation of French Employers. The industry and area groups developed a membership coverage and a cohesion they had never had before the war. Employers recovered public standing and the power so shattered at the liberation. With the political swing to the right, they regained political influence and access to government.

BURDENS OF RECONSTRUCTION

The economy had come out of the war and occupation depleted and devastated by bombings, German takings, and resistance sabotage. By 1948 industrial production had recovered to the immediate prewar level of 1938. (But 1938 had been a mediocre year, 25 per cent below the best prewar year, 1929.) For all the postliberation social reforms, workers and pensioners were

² Another 1.3 million votes (20 per cent of the total) went to minor unions, mutual aid societies, and "family associations." These results do not include the special social security systems of the mines and the railroads, where the CGT shows even greater strength.

bearing most of the burdens of reconstruction and inflation. Income per capita was only about one third of that in the United States, and its distribution was glaringly unequal. Real wage-earner income from all sources was still below prewar, on the average.

Averages were more than ordinarily misleading, because of the upheavals in the structure of wages. Skill differentials and differentials between women's and men's rates had been narrowed; so had those between the provinces and the Paris region. Most important, the expansion of health insurance and family allowances had been achieved, it appeared, only at the expense of direct wage rates. It had shifted income from the healthy to the sick, and from single workers to heads of families with two or more children. Thus real hourly wage rates by 1950 were still only 63 per cent of prewar.

This was the situation when collective bargaining finally resumed, after ten years of government fixing—not just control—of wages. With price and rationing controls finally lifted, Parliament in 1950 voted a law³ setting the framework for what was hopefully announced as a new era of labor-management negotiations.

BARGAINING PATTERNS

Bargaining occurs, typically, between a well-organized district, regional, or national employers' association, or a public corporation, and two, three, or more unions. Union pluralism is inevitable; the religious and political cast of the unions does not permit majority rule and an exclusive bargaining agency. The rival unions most often do not concert their demands and tactics. On the union side, therefore, bargaining is competitive, uneasy, and often irrespon-

³ Law No. 50-205 of February 11, 1950, *Journal officiel*, February 12, 1950, with rectifications February 22 and March 14, 1950.

sible. It is distorted by the political gymnastics of the CGT, which alternately is pushed by the Communist party into political agitation and then veers back toward economic action. The unions have hardly any research staffs to back up their negotiators. The disparity of power, information, self-assurance, and cohesion between the bargaining parties is evident.

The content of agreements is often skimpy. The law spells out in detail what it terms a full-fledged "collective agreement," in contrast with a mere "wage settlement." But it does not oblige either party to bargain in good faith. Employers have often negotiated wage settlements with a few skeletal clauses or with the slightly embroidered repetitions of legal obligations. Area-wide or national industry agreements sometimes specify wage rates, sometimes not. Where they do, they provide only for minimum rates. These are usually set low enough to meet the requirements, real or fancied, of the least efficient members of the employers' association. Effective rates, including a maze of bonuses and incentive pay rates, are then set by each plant, sometimes by agreement with the unions or the plant committees, often by unilateral management decision.

Agreements may provide improvements over the fringe and social security benefits required by law or over the rather low overtime penalty rates that the law imposes. Seniority provisions are rare, nor are they generally asked for by the unions. Contracts seldom spell out grievance procedures beyond what the shop steward legislation requires. Only a few contracts provide binding arbitration either of unresolved grievances or disputes over contract interpretation.

Workers and unions, and fair employers, may get a further advantage from a full-fledged "collective agree-

ment." Such an agreement the government may "extend," that is, decree its application to the employees of all firms in the area and industry concerned, regardless of whether they were represented by the contract's signatories. This makes the private agreement a part of public regulation, subject to labor ministry inspection and enforcement like other public law.

ROLE OF THE STATE

Modern democratic governments all intervene in labor relations, but the French more than most. It is a weak government, but ubiquitous in economic life. It is almost torn apart by the pressure groups, including unions and employers, which are in principle all contemptuous of government intervention and are in practice all busy seeking it from Parliament, cabinet, and civil service.

The state employs—in the administration and in nationalized enterprises—more than one fourth of France's civilian nonagricultural wage earners. Its action as an employer often sets off wage movements throughout private industry. So do its determinations of the national minimum wage, for, in the nation's low wage economy, changes in the minimum immediately stir ripples of adjustment upward through the occupational wage hierarchy. The government's determination of family allowance and social insurance levels and fringe benefits removes perhaps a third of workers' remuneration from the realm of private bargaining.

By shop steward and plant committee laws, the state sets the basic conditions of worker representation in the shop. (Collective bargaining may improve on them.) By deciding what unions are "representative," it determines what unions may offer candidates in shop elections and what unions shall be convoked for government-sponsored

collective bargaining. (The bargaining sessions need not be convoked by government officials, but they often are.) So far the government has considered the CGT, CFTC, and FO all nationally "representative" for all categories of workers, and the CGC "representative" for supervisory employees.

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

Strikes still have more the air of episodes of class conflict than of tests of economic strength between bargaining partners. Oddly for a government which regulates so much, the Fourth Republic has enacted almost no regulation of the right to strike, even in government administration or public-service type industries. The nationalized coal mines and railroads, in fact, have felt the worst strikes since the war; the CGT has made them a chief target, hitting at the government and at the vitals of the economy.

In some public utility strikes the government has stretched its powers under the 1938 National Service Act to "requisition" workers, that is, order them to stay on their regular jobs as civilian workers. But this weapon, intended originally only for wartime and national emergencies, does not command enough public support to be decisive. In fact, the government has not dared expose its own weakness by using it in the severest of the postwar strikes.

The government tried, in its draft of the 1950 collective bargaining law, to restore the prewar compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. In the face of both employer and union opposition, it had to give way. The law merely provides for what is erroneously called "compulsory" conciliation, by joint union-management panels under government chairmen. The panels have had little success in averting strikes, and a modest amount of success in helping settle them once they broke out. An

alternative and more flexible procedure was made available by a 1955 decree. In wage disputes in private industry, the government may appoint a single mediator, with powers of fact finding and recommendation. In a year's experience (1955–56), such mediators had already proved their usefulness. Perhaps most important are the old practices of *ad hoc* mediation and pressure by government officials at every level: Ministry of Labor officials,⁴ mayors, subprefects and prefects,⁵ cabinet officials, and occasionally prime ministers.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Not all is frustration and refusal of responsibility. Not all unions are looking to present government or future political upheaval for the solution of their problem; not all employers are authoritarian or shortsighted. Some new methods are being tried, some signs of a new spirit are in the air.

One innovation came from the hardest hit of all French industries. In 1953 the national employers' association of the textile industry negotiated an agreement of general principle with the non-Communist unions to make a joint effort for greater productivity while easing the impact of layoffs and dismissals on workers. The association's earnestness has been attested to, and sweetened, by a series of wage raises and supplementary pensions.⁶

In the summer of 1955, strikes and lockouts and angry blasts of old class hatreds shook the ports of St. Nazaire

and Nantes. Suddenly caving in, and making up for over-long lags behind Paris wages, St. Nazaire shipbuilders yielded a tremendous wage increase. This gave the signal for widespread strikes in many areas, even in industries which had recently negotiated contracts. Then, before the strikes hit Paris, Renault signed a contract which marks a milestone.

RENAULT AGREEMENT

The Renault contract incorporated many tangible improvements over the fringe and welfare benefits required by law: paid vacations for three weeks (instead of two weeks) after a year's service, supplementary pay to hourly-rated personnel for days lost by sickness or work accidents, more generous maternity leaves, added death benefits, and supplementary pensions to long-service personnel. It reaffirmed a 1950 guarantee of cost-of-living adjustments in wages. It added an "improvement factor" increase: an assured wage raise of at least 4 per cent each year for the contract's two years. A clause requiring consultation before any strike or lockout sought to protect management from the "quickly" strikes, so common a weapon of the weak French unions.⁷

At first only FO, the CGC, and an independent workers' union signed the agreement. The CFTC hesitated, then added its signature.⁸ The CGT, strongest union by far among Renault production workers, raged at its rivals' "sellout"—and then, in one of the greatest humiliations of its Communist leadership, heeded rank-and-file opinion and offered to sign—but with a qualification

⁴ There is no specialized body of government mediators, although many Ministry of Labor officials have experience in mediation.

⁵ The prefects are the powerful nationally appointed officials who administer the ninety departments into which Metropolitan France is divided.

⁶ Despite unemployment and short time, the textile industry increased wage rates between 1946 and 1954 more (percentagewise) than any other industry.

⁷ For the text of the agreement, see *Année politique, 1955* (Paris, 1956), pp. 621–25. Some of the contract's advantages had already been in effect, by management decision; these now became contractual.

⁸ An agreement remains open (by law) to later signature by organizations which did not sign when it was negotiated.

"reserving all its rights." Renault insisted on an unqualified signature or none at all, and there the matter remained.

The wave of strikes broke at the gates of the nation's capital and subsided, in large part as a result of the spectacular Renault agreement, which had been gained without a strike and on the company's initiative. In a few months a number of large private employers and several public enterprises negotiated "Renault-type" contracts. The hot arguments in union circles over two of the typical clauses throw a lurid light on the labor relations scene. One was the so-called no-strike clause. It was denounced by the CGT, which claims the right to strike at any time and for any purpose, without warning. Even many free trade unionists wondered whether they were sacrificing the basic "right to strike" in giving up the tactical weapon of surprise strikes.

Similar debate took place over the "productivity clause." This was a simple declaration recognizing, in the words of the Peugeot automobile agreement, "the solidarity which exists between the possibilities of prosperity of the firm and those of its personnel." This platonic affirmation, which would be banal in most other industrial countries, worried some of the free unionists, and naturally agitated the CGT leadership most. For the CGT argues that productivity increases in a capitalist society can come only out of the worker's hide.

INNOVATION BY BARGAINING

The "Renault-type" contracts were important not so much for their specific clauses on wages or fringe benefits, or even for their no-strike clauses and declarations of joint interest in productivity, as for the fact that, for the first time in France, innovation had been

made by collective bargaining, rather than by the government's imposing reforms on unwilling but temporarily powerless employers.⁹

These agreements showed the possibilities of shifting the locus of bargaining from the employers' association to the individual employer. The unions might now try to take their standards from the successful firm, not the marginal enterprise. The pressures of higher wages might help force greater efficiency—or shutdowns—on some of the inefficient firms which have so often set the pace, from the rear, for the economic and social procession. Contracts at the plant level could reinforce the unions, and especially the democratic unions, at the point where their structure is weakest, the shop. Such bargaining and its corollary of real contract administration might help workers and unions look at management and society more realistically. They might begin to shake themselves free of the oversimplified fixed imagery of a class warfare which, whatever its rationale in the nineteenth century, does not correspond to the complex realities of the mid-twentieth century.

Contracts like that at Renault place the CGT in the dilemma of any organization of revolutionary aims operating in the trade union world. The CGT claims that the capitalist system cannot give improvements to its workers, but must constantly pauperize them more and more. On the other hand it claims that gains such as those of the Renault contract were won by the workers' "unity of action"; but that other unions, which sign when the CGT does not sign, have sold out the workers and "played the game of the reactionary employers and the government."

⁹ In 1956, however, a law generalized one of the Renault advantages. It made the three weeks' paid vacation the legal requirement in all employment.

SOURCES OF CHANGE

In the present inequality of power between unions and employers, the greater responsibility for social progress remains with the employers. Some new influences are at work among them. Several *avant-garde* employer organizations have helped bring together the managerial elite from both private and public enterprise, to overcome old suspicions and spread new ideas. The first steps in a practical sort of management training are being taken here and there. The renewal of Catholic zeal and social doctrine since the war has caused many employers to question the old ways of doing things, which some now hold largely responsible for the alienation of the working class and France's teetering on the edge of a social and political abyss.

Greater contact with the outside world has been a factor of change; new horizons have been opened by exchange visits with other free European nations and the United States. The liberalization of imports (from other countries of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation), hesitant and limited as it has been, has let in a few wholesome breezes of competition and fresh ideas. The accelerated tempo of technological change and economic growth in the last few years is itself generating more rapid change and making people more receptive to change. By mid-1956 industrial output reached levels 90 per cent above 1938 (and about 50 per cent above the prewar peak of 1929), and real wage rates averaged almost 40 per cent above 1938. Workers were tasting some of the benefits of an expanding economy, and envisioning more,¹⁰ after three years of

¹⁰ Characteristically, however, most workers seemed genuinely unaware of how much their real wages had gone up. In a 1955 survey,

the greatest increase in productivity and in production, with stable prices, in French history.

It is too soon to let oneself go in the sort of cheery predictions which French history has often blown into dust. Collective bargaining determines wages and working conditions less than do government action and management fiat. Employers' associations oppose individual firm bargaining and wage leads by progressive firms. Employer resistance to any sharing of authority in the plant is great, and Communist unionism seems to give it a species of moral justification. Many managements value "business secrets" more than employee confidence. Paternalism mars many efforts at improving workers' conditions.

A number of the small and medium-sized firms so important in France do not live up to the modest contractual or even legal minimum wages. Union activists still get inadequate protection against discriminatory dismissals.

Workers have continued to support the CGT and the Communist party, with their votes if not their membership, by reason of a lack of vigor in the non-Communist alternatives and out of fear of clericalism in the CFTC. A few good contracts cannot overnight dispel deep-seated class hostilities and sentimental allegiances.¹¹ The CGT may be shut out of important contract negotiations, but it is unsatisfactory to have to shut out the representatives of unions for which a majority of the

75 out of 100 unskilled laborers (a group whose purchasing power had gone up on the average at least 35 per cent in the period) said that they had experienced no improvement in the past five years.

¹¹ Despite the success of the Renault contract, the elections of plant committee members at Renault a few months later found the CGT still pulling 17,212 votes among production and office employees, as against only 5,844 for a coalition of the CFTC, FO, and the independent union.

workers in shop elections regularly vote.

Old ideas weigh down the free unions, and old quarrels separate them from each other, while internally each tries to reconcile discordant factions. The unorganized majority of workers have turned from hopes in collective action to a "privatization" of their lives. If this denies the Communists solid control of labor, it also denies the hopes of the free unions.

The economy, even in recent good years, has navigated between the rocks of inflation and the shoals of stagnation. Workers and unions are fearful of innovations which might cause layoffs and dismissals, and tend to accept lower wages for fear of shutdowns and unemployment. Although unemployment has been slight (except in textiles and leather goods) since the war, there is no unemployment compensation, only a scant unemployment assistance. An acute housing shortage further discourages movement. The economy and the polity are vulnerable to possible international conflict and to the immediate consequences of continued warfare in Algeria. Too many demands converge all at once on a people lacerated by two great wars on their own soil in a single generation.

If the changes we see cannot be taken as the sure dawn of a new day, however, it would be equally wrong not to see that change is at work. Of that

change, collective bargaining is one sign and one method. It may yet help to bring mutual tolerance and fair play into labor relations, to add a spur to economic growth, and to win back the working class for democratic social politics.¹²

¹² For a more detailed study of collective bargaining, as well as of union history, structure, functioning, and political ties, see Val R. Lorwin, *The French Labor Movement* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). For the prewar period, see David J. Saposs, *The Labor Movement in Post-War France* (New York, 1931); Joel Colton, *Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes in France, 1936-1939* (New York, 1951); and Henry W. Ehrmann, *French Labor: from Popular Front to Liberation* (New York, 1947). On wages, see Lloyd G. Reynolds and Cynthia Taft, *The Evolution of Wage Structures* (New Haven, Conn., 1956), Chap. VIII; John T. Dunlop and Melvin Rothbaum, "International Comparisons of Wage Structures," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (April 1955); and Adolf Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," in Adolf Sturmthal (Ed.), *Contemporary Collective Bargaining in Seven Countries* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1957). On employers' associations, see *Organized Business in France*, by Henry W. Ehrmann (forthcoming), and on the role of government, a forthcoming book by Warren C. Baum. To these should be added the third volume, dealing with union-management relations, of Paul Durand (in collaboration with André Vitu), *Traité du Droit du Travail* (Paris, 1956).

For other works in French, see critical bibliography in my *French Labor Movement*.

The Italian Labor Movement in 1956: The Structure of Crisis

By MAURICE F. NEUFELD

Abstract: The development of a democratic, anti-Communist, and effective labor movement in Italy is rendered difficult by several things: the lack of political unity and a single economic ideology of the large national federations, the top-heavy administrative structure, and the well-rooted system of highly centralized control. Industry-wide bargaining has proved ineffective in getting the greatest benefits to labor in various sections of the country. Factory unions are being looked upon now as the answer; they have begun to be established but have not yet become effective instruments. What is needed is a new type of leadership which can build the labor movement from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Young labor leaders are now being trained, and in their hands lies the key to the future of the Italian labor movement.—Ed.

THE Italian labor movement has always lived from hand to mouth and from crisis to crisis. In today's crisis, as in the past, labor unions are still divided by political rancor into separate and competing confederations (see below, Outline of the Three Main Italian Confederations of Labor and the Principal Independent Unions, 1956). Most employers, like their predecessors, have remained recalcitrant in their attitude toward developments in industrial relations which are generally accepted in other advanced Western societies. Union members, dissatisfied with the meager gains collective bargaining has brought to them, have become discouraged and indifferent; union membership has declined; and large segments of workers are either unorganized or grouped into independent unions (see Outline). As a consequence, CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori), and UIL

(Unione Italiana del Lavoro), the three principal confederations of labor, are experiencing grave financial difficulties.¹ To give the crisis further edge, the Italian economy is still stalked, despite remarkable improvements, by unemployment ranging from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 human beings. Underemployment is estimated to harass a like number.

¹ Three sensational articles on the membership and financial crisis in the Italian labor movement, written by Giancarlo Galli, appeared in the Milan newspaper, *Il Giorno*, on July 17, 18, and 20, 1956. Galli estimated that the present membership of all unions was 6,000,000, as compared with a total of 9,000,000 in 1948. These figures were repeated without comment or objection in an article in *L'Unità* on October 4, 1956, written by Luca Pavolini. In discussing the financial emergency, Galli estimated that the three main confederations of labor had been able to collect only between 30 per cent and 40 per cent of the dues owed to them in 1956. Galli's estimates should be considered with caution as wide-ranging, rather than narrowly pointing, indicators.

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OUTLINE OF THE THREE MAIN ITALIAN CONFEDERATIONS OF LABOR AND THE
PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT UNIONS, 1956

CGIL

CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) is the largest union confederation in Italy. Membership estimates run from the 4,040,000 claimed by CGIL itself and accepted by *L'Unità*, the official newspaper of the Italian Communist party, to as low as 2,800,000.

In order to support its claim of being the most representative organization as well, it recognizes at least eight political currents within its ranks:

1. Communists, the largest single political group and the controlling one.
2. Nenni Socialists, the second largest group.
3. Social Democrats, a small group, since the largest number of Social Democrats are in UIL and CISL.
4. Unitary Christians, who are alleged to be members of the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI) as well. Most Catholic workers, however, are affiliated with CISL.
5. Anarchists who have joined in order to defend labor unions.
6. Independents and some Liberal party and Radical party members.
7. Popular Unity, adherents of the tiny party of Ferruccio Parri, leader of the resistance and former Premier of Italy.
8. Republicans, especially those who remain faithful to the "true" principles of Mazzini (who fought both Marx and Bakunin). Most Republican party workers are in UIL and CISL.

For further details, see Lietta Tornabuoni, "Le Correnti," *Lavoro*, March 18, 1956, pp. 7-9.

CISL

CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori) took its present name in 1950. In October 1948 the Christian Democratic labor leaders in CGIL withdrew and formed the Free Italian General Confederation of Workers (LCGIL). In the summer of 1949, labor leaders of the right-wing Socialist and of the Republican party persuasions left CGIL to form the Italian

Labor Federation (FIL). In April 1950, under the amicable pressure from anti-Communist labor leaders in the United States, the leaders of FIL were convinced that they should join with LCGIL. The name of the united organization was then changed to CISL. Membership estimates run from 1,100,000 to 2,140,000.

UIL

UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro) was constituted in 1950. To form UIL, labor leaders faithful to the third Socialist party in existence at that moment, the Unitary Socialist party, who had left CGIL in 1949, joined forces with Republican party labor leaders and right-wing Socialists who could not find it possible to enter what they considered the Catholic-dominated CISL. Membership estimates, for the most part, run from 125,000 to 730,000.

PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT UNIONS

1. Italian Confederation of National Workers Unions (Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Nazionali dei Lavoratori—CISNAL) is generally thought to be under the influence of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MIS) and of corporative ideology.
2. Italian Confederation of Company Executives (Confederazione Italiana Dirigenti di Azienda—CIDA) is made up of five union federations which cover establishments in industry, commerce, credit and finance, insurance, and agriculture.
3. General Confederation of Executives in Public Employment (Confederazione Dirigenti Statali—DIRSTAT), which joins together four federations with jurisdiction over national administrative offices, the state-owned railroads, communal and provincial secretaries, and heads of state institutions.
4. The National Federation of Autonomous Unions (Unione Nazionale Sindacati Autonomi—UNSA) of which the National Autonomous Union of Elementary School Teachers, listed below, forms the principal part.
5. The Community Movement is limited

to certain plants in Piedmont and Lombardy. It was recently organized and is directed by the highly esteemed, imaginative, socialistic, and somewhat erratic head of the efficient, prosperous, and humane Olivetti enterprises.

6. Of the large number of independent railway workers unions, the following four are the most important:

- a) Union of Locomotive Engineers, Assistant Engineers, and Heads of Repair Depots (Sindacato Macchinisti, Aiuto-Macchinisti, e Capideposito—SMAC).
- b) Union of Administrative and Technical Employees of the State Railways (Sindacato Funzionari Amministrativi e Tecnici delle FF.SS., Gruppo B—SIFAT).
- c) National Union of Railroad Workers, Group C (Sindacato Nazionale Ferrovieri, Gruppo C—SNFGC).
- d) Union of State Railway Technician Heads and Workers (Sindacato Capi Tecnici, Operai delle Ferrovie dello Stato—SCOFS).

7. Of the large group of independent school and university teachers unions, the following five are considered most important:

- a) National Union of High School Teachers (Sindacato Nazionale Scuola Media—SNSM).

These features of crisis have culminated in the contemporary inability of the labor confederations to satisfy the modest demands of their members through the centralized, industry-wide bargaining process prevalent in Italy. But out of this defeat has come an entirely new element which offers a faint possibility of long-needed beneficent reform. In February 1953, CISL began to question the wisdom of industry-wide collective bargaining as the sole approach to wage formulation. It recognized the fact that industry-wide contracts, far from ensuring adequate

- b) National Autonomous Union of High School Teachers (Sindacato Autonomo Scuola Media Italiana—SASMI), a group which broke away from SNSM.
- c) National Autonomous Union of Elementary School Teachers (Sindacato Nazionale Autonomo Scuola Elementare—SNASE).
- d) National Union of Art Teachers (Sindacato Nazionale Istruzione Artistica—SNIA).
- e) Union of Tenure Professors and Department Heads (Sindacato Presidi e Professori di Ruolo—SPPR).

8. A multitude of unions in the banking and insurance field.

9. The National Confederation of Independent Farmers (Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti), while confining most of its activities to the organization of working farmers who own their own land, has also taken into its fold a substantial number of sharecroppers, thus arousing the ire of the sharecroppers unions of the three labor confederations, CGIL, CISL, and UIL.

For further details concerning some of the independent organizations listed, as well as others, see "La Indipendenza delle organizzazioni sindacali," *Rassegna del Lavoro*, November 1955, pp. 1633-66. The standard directory for the names and addresses of organizations of all kinds, including labor unions and management associations, is *Guida Monici*.

wages, hours, and working conditions, served merely to set basic standard rates which met the needs of the less efficient and marginal firms, ensuring, at the same time, high profits for well-organized and technically progressive companies. CISL drew from this realistic appraisal the fundamental doctrine of its new wage policy. It would no longer accept the interpretation of the employers that the contracts established maximum rates and conditions. Instead, CISL insisted that they merely established minimum rates and conditions. Therefore improvements would

be sought not at the national level of bargaining, where failure had occurred, but at the plant level.²

But plant bargaining required a union organization at the factory level. Unfortunately, none existed. To remedy this lack, CISL began a campaign within its own organization to create factory unions. It elicited the immediate opposition of the Communist-led CGIL, which continued its counterpropaganda for three years. In early 1956, however, CGIL reversed itself, so preoccupied by the stresses within that confederation become. Factory unions were approved and the constitution of CGIL was amended to confer official status upon them.³

²For a description of the industry-wide collective bargaining process, see Luisa Riva Sanseverino, "Collective Bargaining in Italy," in Adolf Sturmthal (Ed.), *Contemporary Collective Bargaining*, Ithaca, New York, 1957. For an analysis of the consequences of industry-wide bargaining and the possibilities of plant bargaining, see Gino Giugni, "Esperienze corporative e post-corporative nei rapporti collettivi di lavoro in Italia," *Il Mulino*, Nos. 51-52 (January-February 1956), pp. 3-17; "Contrattazione aziendale e democrazia industriale," *Il Mulino*, No. 54 (April 1956), pp. 195-206; "The Structure of Collective Bargaining in Italy," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 10 (April 1957). For discussions by CISL of its new wage policy, see "Il Sindacato e l'organizzazione di fabbrica," *Quaderni di studi e documentazione*, No. 1, 1955, and "La Politica salariale della CISL," *Bolletino di Studi e Statistiche*, No. 11 (November), 1955, pp. 1-22 (405-426).

³The crisis within CGIL is composed of many factors. Since 1953, its majority within the various internal commissions (similar to American grievance committees) has suffered an over-all percentage loss of 14.1. In the important plants of the Fiat complex its adherents on the internal commissions were reduced to minority status. See Maurice F. Neufeld, "Appunti sul funzionamento delle commissioni interne," *Il Diritto del Lavoro*, No. 6 (November-December), 1956. The revelations which followed in the wake of the desanctification of Stalin created serious discontent and disaffection in the ranks of the Italian Communist party which spread to the

The concept of factory unions seems like an ingenious one, for it appears to combine practical needs with the ideals of local democracy, initiative, and responsibility. But the actual creation of these basic units has proved difficult and time consuming, notwithstanding CISL's enthusiasm and good will and CGIL's superior resources. The reason for this very limited success lies at the heart of an essential weakness of the Italian labor movement: its top-heavy administrative structure.

ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN

A step-by-step analysis of the structure of Italian unionism brings to the surface this central defect of a labor movement destined throughout its his-

rank and file of CGIL. The crisis took material shape in the membership losses and financial difficulties described in detail in the articles in *Il Giorno* mentioned in footnote 1. CGIL's crisis was further deepened during the summer, fall, and winter of 1956 by the attempts at unification of the Social Democratic party (PSDI) and the Socialist party of Pietro Nenni (PSI). A successful agreement between the two Socialist parties could have profound effects upon the Italian labor movement and especially upon CGIL. These effects might be of various kinds, but true eventual unification would undoubtedly isolate the Communists in their own labor confederation, since the Nenni Socialists would be forced to withdraw upon the creation of a strong Socialist confederation of labor. Such an eventuality would leave CISL, in all probability, as the organization primarily of Catholic workers. To the threat of possible isolation, CGIL responded by making concessions to the Nenni Socialists within its ranks, by redoubling its propaganda campaign for unity of labor action (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) at all levels of activity, and by proclaiming its purely labor union character. In Italy, especially at the local levels, the unity-of-action doctrine might have wide appeal. CGIL, in desperation, is hoping that a successful unity-of-action campaign might lead to ultimate unity of organization. In the midst of this campaign, in October and November 1956, the revolutionary events in Poland and Hungary burst upon the consciousness of Italian workers and intensified still more the stresses within CGIL.

tory to be organized from the top downward under horizontal rather than vertical leadership.⁴ For all territorial and category units within a confederation, a common pattern of institutions (congresses, councils, committees, and secretariats) exists. The composition, number, elective powers, duties, and responsibilities of these institutions, in all units from the top confederation down to the factory union, are detailed in a large synoptic chart, especially prepared for this article and available for the first time in either Italian or English. However, limitations of space have prevented its publication here.⁵ The nature and functions of these institutions will first be described and then the various units in the confederal hierarchies will be defined and their effectiveness appraised.

The following institutions compose the common pattern:

⁴"Horizontal" organizations are defined as the top national confederations, the provincial chambers of labor, and the communal chambers of labor. "Vertical" organizations are defined as the industrial, trade, white-collar, and agricultural unions known as *sindacati di categoria* and therefore referred to in this essay as "category unions."

⁵The synoptic chart of "The Administrative Structure of the Principal Italian Confederations of Labor in 1956" and one of the "System of Dues Payments and Methods of Collection in the Principal Italian Confederations of Labor" are available to interested readers on request to Distribution Center, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

The constitutions (*statuti*) of the three confederations and of the national category unions do not furnish specific enough details concerning their actual modes of operation. Constitutional provisions were therefore supplemented by observations in the field and by frequent interviews with officials in the three confederations. Warm thanks must be given to Dott. Bruno Trentin and Dott. Alieto Cortesi of CGIL, to Dott. Giuseppe Jelmini of CISL, and to Dott. Vincenzo Berteletti of UIL for information imparted with great patience.

1. The assembly, congress, or convention legislates policy, approves estimated and final budgets, and elects members of specified committees and councils.

2. The general council is the chief deliberative body. It is composed of the directive committee (described below) and a wide representation of pertinent territorial and category organizations.

3. The directive committee interprets the policy decisions and directives of the assembly or congress and has the ultimate responsibility of seeing that they are carried out.

4. The executive committee aids the secretariat (described below) in carrying out the decisions of the directive committee and the congress.

5. The secretariat, which forms part of the body from which it has been elected, is headed by a secretary-general, responsible secretary, or secretary. It carries out, from day to day, the policies set by the congress and the decisions taken by the directive committee.

The secretary-general is aided in his co-ordinating task by a varying number of secretaries and vice-secretaries. This is true for the larger territorial and category bodies. These secretaries are made responsible for specific activities. The full range of these activities, present only at the confederal level, three or four national category union headquarters, and the larger provincial chambers of labor, is as follows: organizing activities; union controversies and technical aspects of collective bargaining; research; education; social insurance and assistance; press and propaganda; youth programs; special services for women workers; and internal administration—purchase, supply, and financial control.

6. The college of honest men (*probi-viri*) settles controversies between indi-

vidual union members and between constituent organizations. It also acts in cases of a disciplinary nature. The college of auditors is responsible for ensuring financial regularity and efficiency. The quasi-independent institutes of social welfare and insurance help union members to process claims for various types of social insurance and assistance. These institutes are financially supported by government subvention based upon the number of cases handled. The quasi-independent institutes of vocational training are also subsidized through government funds which are granted in proportion to the number of union workers trained in the classes organized by the institutes.

All of the institutions described have regularly established times of meetings, as well as special meetings which may be called under constitutionally provided circumstances and methods. These institutions are present in the different organizational units in varying measures of completion, becoming fuller as the level of the units advances from that of the factory unions to that of the national confederation.

PROSPECTS FOR FACTORY UNIONS

With time, patience, skill, money, and more good fortune than is now foreseeable, the basic element in Italian unionism may become the factory union in which CISL has placed so much present hope for plant bargaining.⁶ At the present time, however, the prospects of success are less than fair since two conditions must be fulfilled: the factory unions must be organized and kept alive; in addition, they must function effectively. During field interviews, local officials of the confederal offices and of the category unions have admitted

⁶ Factory unions are called *sezioni sindacali di fabbrica* in CGIL, *sezioni aziendali sindacali* in CISL, and when they exist at all in UIL *nuclei di fabbrica*.

that most of the factory unions claimed by CGIL and CISL (CGIL, 6,525; CISL, 1,500; UIL, virtually none) are little more than paper organizations, still in an embryonic stage of development.

But presupposing that they were actually functioning, under what circumstances could they be effective? Given the chief premise of CISL's new wage policy, successful bargaining at the plant level can take place only in those companies where the profit margin is large enough to warrant concessions above the rates established in the national contract. In Italy, this limits considerably the number of factories where CISL may pursue its policy. Of even more importance is the fact that in most plants CISL cannot hope to press its case alone. Its factory unions would need the aid of CGIL's factory unions. Yet such co-operation would assure success to CGIL's propagandistic efforts for unity of action among all workers and would prove very embarrassing indeed to the top leadership of CISL. Therefore, in all likelihood, CISL is presently limited to the achievement of favorable plant contracts in those firms where the employers are sufficiently anti-Communist and sufficiently friendly to CISL to be willing to present the prestige of a contractual victory to a minority union group in their plants.⁷

⁷ On May 22, 1956, the management of the huge Fiat complex at Turin signed a history-making local agreement reducing the hours of work for its employees, without loss of pay, to the lowest level in Italian factories. Ironically enough, Fiat's management concluded this pioneering agreement not with CISL's and UIL's factory unions, which do not exist in the Fiat plants, nor, in the absence of factory unions, with CISL's and UIL's provincial category unions, but with the representatives of CISL and UIL on the internal commissions, where these confederations control a majority of the seats, thus isolating CGIL. The internal commissions, which resemble

COMMUNAL CATEGORY UNIONS

At this point it should be recalled that union officials do not even pretend that factory unions exist in most plants. Since they must still be formed, the question naturally arises, Where may factory workers look for guidance in the creation and sustaining of factory unions? The answer might seem to lie in the direction of the communal category unions or the communal chambers of labor. There are 7,906 communes in Italy. In each commune, whenever a sufficient number of workers in the same industry or trade has been organized, a communal category union is formed.⁸ CGIL claims 16,006 communal category unions; CISL, 15,000; and UIL, an estimated 15,000. Direct observation has shown that communal category unions are either pitifully weak, manned by a lone volunteer after working hours, or nonexistent. Even in the industrial north, they are effective only in large

American grievance committees, are elected in each plant by all workers, whether union or nonunion. Although there is some question whether, under the terms of the accord on internal commissions signed by the three labor confederations and Confindustria, they have the right to negotiate contracts in contrast to the clear right to supervise the administration of contracts, the Fiat contract on reduction of hours was hailed by both CISL and UIL as a landmark victory for the democratic unions. There is no doubt that the victory was a resounding one, but not for the concept of factory unions and local agreements signed by them.

⁸ These communal category organizations are known as unions or leagues. The latter term is usually applied to communal groups of agricultural and building trades workers. At times, when not enough members of the same category exist in one commune, a district or zonal category union (*sindacato mandamentale o zonale di categoria*) is set up. Conversely, in a few very large cities, when workers are too numerous in certain categories to make communal category meetings manageable, ward category unions (*sindacati rionali di categoria*) have been created.

cities like Milan, Turin, and Genoa. Clearly, help and guidance for the factory unions cannot be expected from communal category unions which need help and guidance themselves.

COMMUNAL CHAMBERS OF LABOR

Nor is the prospect of aid from the communal chambers of labor much brighter.⁹ In theory, they encourage, aid, and co-ordinate the local labor movement, since they unite all members of all category unions in the commune. Again, except in the larger cities, they exist mostly on paper, despite CGIL's claims of 2,210 communal chambers of labor, CISL's 6,973 communal and 744 district chambers of labor, and UIL's estimated 3,000 communal and 600 district chambers of labor. Again, the affairs of the local chamber, miserably housed, are handled by a volunteer who appears in the late afternoon, having already put in a full day's work at the plant or shop. These chambers are so poverty-ridden, starved for personnel, and isolated that they are largely ineffective. Factory unions must look elsewhere for help and comfort.

PROVINCIAL CATEGORY UNIONS

The communes of Italy are grouped into ninety-two provinces. The provincial category union has been designed to co-ordinate and direct the activities of all local unions of a given industry, trade, or profession within the province. These union groups might certainly seem like the logical organizers and advisers of the factory unions. The claimed number of provincial category unions (CGIL, 2,867; CISL, 3,892; and UIL, an estimated 3,000), like the claimed number of communal category unions and communal chambers of labor, should

⁹ Communal chambers of labor are called *camere del lavoro comunali* in CGIL, *uffici comunali* in CISL, and *camere sindacali comunali* in UIL.

not arouse hope. Even the best of the national category unions—the metalworkers, the chemical workers, and the textile workers—are able to maintain but few provincial category unions of their own. Usually, they assign one or two full-time officials to the provincial chambers of labor in the larger cities. All too often, the salaries of even these officials must be supplemented by grants from the provincial chambers and the parent confederations. Since this arrangement holds true for some of the larger national category unions, the state of the provincial unions of the other categories can easily be imagined. If it were not for the monthly subsidies of the parent confederations, both to the weaker national categories and to their provincial units, they would be reduced to virtual ineffectiveness.

PROVINCIAL CHAMBERS OF LABOR

The provincial chambers of labor are the traditional centers of the Italian labor movement away from Rome.¹⁰ They have always occupied a unique position in the affections and needs of Italian workers. Before fascism, they had served as employment centers and co-ordinators of the movements of unskilled and semiskilled workers who, through necessity, had to shift from one kind of plant to another and, hence, from one category union to another—services which the category unions were never well enough organized to perform. Moreover, as collective bargaining and strikes spread beyond the limits of the single large city or community, the chambers took a major part in the formulation of contract demands and the direction of strike activities. They had also assumed the initiative in starting various kinds of workers' insurance and

¹⁰ Provincial chambers of labor are called *camere del lavoro provinciali* in CGIL, *unioni provinciali* in CISL, and *camere sindacali provinciali* in UIL.

self-help projects, more economically and efficiently performed on the larger territorial basis of the province rather than in the commune. Of great importance, too, in establishing the hegemony of the provincial chambers was the predominance of organized agricultural workers, even in North Italy, whose numbers established the center of gravity of the labor movement, at its beginnings at least. Wherever agricultural labor predominated, a provincial chamber, as a co-ordinating and directing body, was the only logical and effective method of organizing and communicating with widely scattered workers. Finally, the Italian labor movement, from its very inception, had been steeped in politics; this fact alone would have moved the organization of labor away from its communal base toward the important provincial level, even if the other factors described had not evolved.

Today, the chambers group all provincial category unions and all communal chambers of labor in the province within their co-ordinating and directive orbits. Because of the weakness or absence of the units already described, the chambers of labor must assume the duties and responsibilities better undertaken by communal and provincial category unions were they organized and equipped to do so. Officials in the average provincial chamber of labor—overworked, underpaid, perpetually short of payroll and office expense funds, beset by transportation difficulties and torn between the demands of the national headquarters in Rome and local exigencies—must organize and direct strikes, keep in touch with workers throughout the province, and supply technical knowledge to scores of groups ranging from those in agriculture, food processing, and the underemployed building trades to those in small metal-fabricating shops, textiles, banks, commercial establishments, and public em-

ployment. It is small wonder that one provincial chamber officer, when asked what was done to bring unorganized workers into the unions, replied: "Well, you know, within the larger plants there already is a natural spirit of unionism and the workers there tend to organize themselves. We just do not get at the smaller plants."

These limitations are further illustrated by the fact that of the full range of services listed in the description of the secretariat, only the offices of organizing activities, union controversies and collective bargaining, and social insurance and assistance function in the average provincial chamber of labor in CGIL. Only one third of the chambers are claimed to provide the full range of services with the exception of research.¹¹ Since CGIL is still the strongest of the confederations, both numerically and financially, the proportion of fully serviced provincial chambers in CISL would be somewhat less, and would dip considerably lower for UIL. Withal, these chambers are the only possible sources of encouragement and aid to the factory unions, so essential to the democratic progress of Italian unionism, now or in the near future.

NATIONAL CATEGORY UNIONS

The national category unions group all members of a given trade, industry,

¹¹ CGIL's estimate that about one third of its provincial chambers of labor provided the full range of secretariat services, except research, should be considered in the light of statistics cited in the articles of Galli referred to in note 1. According to Galli, the Milan Chamber of Labor, CGIL's most powerful, closed its books in 1955 with a deficit of almost \$15,000 (L. 9,285,596), a large amount for Italy. This figure did not include the deficits of the various provincial category unions. The Turin provincial Chamber of Labor, CGIL's second largest, closed its books in 1955 with rental debts of \$11,200 (L. 7,000,000) and unpaid social insurance contributions for its employees amounting to \$12,800 (L. 8,000,000).

or profession into a country-wide organization. There are 52 national category unions in CGIL, 33 in CISL, and 55 in UIL. Logically, they should be the dynamic centers of a labor movement. But in Italy, as a result of national and labor history, the greatest number of them are weak and dependent upon the parent confederations for their very existence. In CGIL, only five national category unions are sufficiently well organized to afford the full complement of secretariat services: the metalworkers, textile workers, chemical workers, agricultural day laborers, and sharecroppers. In CISL, this situation would hold true for only the first three categories mentioned, while in UIL perhaps only the chemical workers can maintain such full services.

Toward Rome, then, lead all union roads as well.

CONFEDERATION NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

The national headquarters of the three confederations exercise centralized control over most union activities which, in the United States, would be assumed by the national and international unions and their subordinate bodies. Whenever confederal control is weak, the cause may be sought less in the absence of will than in the lack of funds and personnel. Instead of rehearsing in detail the activities of each of the confederal offices in Rome, a simple listing of the accomplishments during a single month of one of the offices will suffice to illustrate the degree of centralization which exists.

Office of organizing activities

The office of organizing activities reported to its particular secretariat that it had organized congresses of agricultural workers in one of the important regions of the country; provided confederal speakers for more than three

score May Day meetings; acted as peacemaker between provincial chambers and category unions concerning the division of confederal dues and monthly category dues; aided in the formation of a new national category union; called meetings of provincial groups of activists to encourage the creation of factory unions; continued its special programs for women workers; arranged meetings and prepared printed materials as part of the plan for unionizing agricultural workers; and, as part of a vast program for extending the influence of the confederation in central and southern Italy, called conferences to identify the specific problems of particular provinces, arranged for courses adapted to the needs of the provinces, provided for visits of personnel from confederation headquarters to local groups, and taken action with public officials in behalf of the building trades unions to have contractors working on the reform projects fostered by the Fund for the South constrained to pay a union scale of wages. To ensure the efficacy of the special program for central and southern Italy, the office of organizing activities assigned personnel, specially trained and paid directly by confederal headquarters, to key provincial chambers of labor in order that new zonal offices might be adequately supervised.

Dues collection procedure

The daily tasks assumed by the confederal office of organizing activities are undoubtedly an impressive demonstration of centralized control. However, for its most dramatic symbol, analysis must turn to an appraisal of the kind of dues used by the Italian labor movement and the involved and almost incomprehensible arrangements made for their collection by the confederations. A synoptic table has been prepared as a guide through this tortuous procedure, since it has never been fully described

even in Italian studies. Unfortunately, limitations of space have prevented its publication.¹² A careful exploration of the dues collection procedure demonstrates that confederal headquarters and the provincial chambers of labor completely dominate the entire transaction.

The income of the confederations in Rome depends wholly upon the sale of confederal dues cards (*tessere*) in CISL and UIL, for while CISL headquarters is theoretically entitled to a share of national category union dues, it actually receives none; UIL headquarters make no attempt to share in the dues of the national category unions. On the other hand, CGIL attempts to collect 6 per cent of the national category dues. However, it must be remembered that in a large majority of instances, CGIL headquarters must subsidize the category unions. Thus, income from the confederal dues cards is vital to the existence of the central confederations. These cards are printed in Rome and then distributed to the various provincial chambers of labor. In CGIL and CISL, this distribution is effected by means of the central headquarters and provincial branches of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, a private institution which has no official connection with the Italian labor movement. In UIL, the distribution is made directly by the confederal offices in Rome to the provincial chambers. Consequently, each member of a given confederation, regardless of the category union to which he belongs, receives his dues book from the confederation, by way of the provincial chamber, and not from his category union. Since these dues cards do not indicate the category to which a worker belongs, emblems for each category must be printed, distributed to the provinces, and pasted on the dues cards when they are sold to individual mem-

¹² For the address from which this synoptic table may be secured see note 5 *supra*.

bers. In CGIL and CISL, the emblems are printed by the national category unions and then sent out to the provinces. In UIL, they are all printed centrally in Rome and distributed to the national category unions, which, in turn, make them available to the provincial chambers. Below the national confederal level, the constituent organizations must live on the proceeds from their share of the confederal dues (*tessere*) and from their share of the monthly category dues (*contributi*). The monthly category dues are collected through the sale of stamps (*bolli*). These stamps, in various colors and denominations, are printed by CGIL and CISL headquarters in Rome and then distributed to the appropriate organizations. Only UIL allows the provincial chambers to print the monthly category dues stamps, thus losing one means of ensuring uniformity and control.

The confederations themselves are fully aware that this centralized system of confederally printed and distributed dues books and monthly dues stamps is cumbersome, complicated, time consuming, and deficient in securing adequate collection. But they cannot devise methods of simplification in which they might place confidence. The national category unions and even the provincial chambers, poverty-stricken as they are, cannot be relied upon to do the job of dues collection efficiently and to remit to the confederations their proper share of the proceeds. Consequently, the confederations cannot allow themselves to become dependent upon their dependent subsidiary adherents. Thus, weakness and poverty spin the plot. The only solution which might ensure decentralization involves adequate resources and strong category unions. Both of these presuppositions are impossibilities now and for the immediate future.

CENTRALIZED, BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL

The hegemony of the national confederations in the Italian labor hierarchy may well be an inescapable manifestation, for it derives its strength from a persistent combination of certain national characteristics and the tragedies of history. No one familiar with the Italian scene can fail to observe a native tendency toward centralized, bureaucratic control, even if inefficient; the elaboration of plans inflated beyond any normal hope of realization; and the preference for impressive organizational façade at the expense of sound structure.

But a more significant key to understanding is the heritage of history. Weakness, poverty, and politics forced confederal dominance upon the pre-Fascist labor movement. Fascism substituted for the free unions even more centrally controlled labor organizations. With the fall of Mussolini, the surviving non-Fascist labor leaders had to proceed in urgent haste, from headquarters in Rome, upon their mission of creating an entirely new labor movement, not from the ground up, which was impossible, but from the top down. After 1948, when the non-Communist labor leaders and their followers broke away from CGIL, this process of creation from above had to be repeated. At that time, the emergency was so compelling that the democratic labor leaders could not await a slow evolution of anti-Communist labor unions at the local level, for the fight against communism at the polls had to be reinforced at once by the national voice of free labor. Today, while CGIL's sponsorship of factory unions and talk of 'democracy at the base may be looked upon with justified skepticism, there can be little doubt that CISL's leadership is sincere in its campaign for the creation of factory unions as a concomitant of a demo-

cratic and efficient labor movement. But neither wishing nor unlimited funds, even were they available, could accomplish these ends.

TRAINING PROGRAMS A HOPE FOR THE FUTURE

A democratic and efficient labor movement must be founded upon collective bargaining, mutually beneficial to both labor and management and conducted in good faith by both sides of the table. Otherwise, Italian workers will continue to turn, in desperation, toward Parliament for succor, thus ensuring the paramountcy of politics in union affairs. Management, on the other hand, to protect itself against politically inspired demands, will reinforce its policy of rendering unions weak and ineffective, especially at the plant and local levels from which a sound labor movement must draw its strength. Under such circumstances, the pattern of nationally bargained contracts will remain unaltered and uninspired by the realities of local demands. The substantive defects of these contracts and their difficulties of enforcement will continue to plague the relationship between unions and management in Italy.

To avoid this kind of future development, which would be catastrophic to the democratic life of the nation, a vast training program must be initiated by both management and labor. Competent personnel directors and industrial relations experts, not to mention qualified industrial engineers and technicians, are almost totally absent from the factory scene. No Italian university of stature is willing to support instruction in industrial relations or busi-

ness administration, since such vital knowledge is deemed beneath the humanistic dignity of an institution of truly higher learning. As a consequence, the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), the governmental agency which resembles the American Reconstruction Finance Corporation and which controls large segments of Italian industry through its stock holdings, has been forced to embark upon a program of training personnel directors and industrial relations experts in classes of its own. This pioneering program is based upon IRI's newly formulated concept that competent industrial leadership is essential if true collective bargaining is ever to start upon a constructive course in Italy.

The free trade unions, like CISL, also realize that young labor leaders, filled with the spirit of democratic unionism, must first be trained, for fascism wiped out an entire generation of democratically motivated union officials and staff members. In addition, the new leaders of the future, at all levels of the labor movement, must receive technical instruction as well, else workers at provincial, communal, and factory pivotal points cannot hope for proper guidance toward the eventual goal of constructive contract making and contract administration. This evolutionary process has indeed begun, directed with great patience and wisdom by CISL's leaders. At Florence, on the Via della Piazzuola of the famous villas, stands the Study Center of CISL. It is the only assurance in a world of chance that democratic decentralization may some day become the way of life for the Italian labor movement.

Wage Movements and Wage Policy in Postwar Britain

By ALLAN FLANDERS

Abstract: Since 1945 there has been a constant upward movement of the indices of wage rates in Britain, average weekly earnings (only slightly affected by shifts in the employment distribution of wage earners), and retail prices. The margin between rates and earnings has progressively widened, to a considerable degree owing to overtime pay. Wage rates and retail prices have shown parallel rises on the whole. The various factors involved in these movements are analyzed, including the policies of the Labour and the Conservative governments.—Ed.

TWO indices are available for measuring the general movement of wages in Great Britain, one for rates and another for earnings. The rates index records changes in a representative selection of time rates (and some standard piece rates) settled nationally by collective agreement or statutory order.¹ As agreements and orders usually fix minimum rather than standard rates of pay, and payment above the minimum has become common practice, this index does not adequately reflect changes in the actual rates paid by individual firms to their workmen. The index for average weekly earnings, while taking into account payments above the national rates, also includes changes in take-home pay due to the working of overtime or short time and variations in systems of payment by results. Moreover, unlike the rates index, which is based on a constant pattern of employment, it is affected by shifts in the employment distribution of wage earners, according to age, sex, occupation, or industry.²

¹Wages Councils and Wages Boards have been set up to regulate wages by statutory orders in those industries where voluntary arrangements are inadequate.

²In another respect the two indices are not strictly comparable. While the rates index is

The postwar movement of these two wage indices together with the index of retail prices (designed to measure changes in the wage earners' cost of living) is shown in the accompanying diagram. For the sake of comparison the war years are included as well. It will be seen that since 1945 there has been (1) a constant upward movement of all three indices; (2) little divergence in the movement of rates and prices; and (3) a more rapid rise in earnings than in rates.

What the diagram further serves to illustrate is the difference in the movement of the rates index, and in the relative movement of all three indices, during four postwar periods: 1945-48, 1948-50, 1950-52, and 1952-55. The

designed to be representative of all wage earners, the earnings index relates only to certain industries employing some ten million, or 60 per cent of all wage earners. Among the excluded industries are agriculture, coal mining, shipping, docks, distribution, and catering. A comparison of the increase in the national wage bill with that of average weekly earnings from 1948 to 1955 shows only a slight divergence between them. Allowing for the increase in the total number of wage earners employed, the movement of earnings in the industries not covered by the index was roughly the same as that in the industries on which it is based.

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


DIAGRAM SHOWING PERCENTAGE INCREASE ON 1938 OF WAGE RATES, WEEKLY EARNINGS, AND RETAIL PRICES, 1940-1955

contrasts are brought out more sharply in Table 1. This particular division of the postwar years has a political significance, for the second and fourth periods correspond with attempts under Labour and Conservative governments to curb the upward movement of wage rates.

During the first period, 1945-48, negotiations between trade unions and employers were centered on immediate postwar readjustments. Towards the end of the war, for obvious reasons, earnings had stopped rising. In seeking compensation wage earners managed to

secure a greater increase in weekly rates in 1946 than in any of the war years. The increase in hourly rates was even greater: over a substantial part of industry the normal working week was reduced from 47-48 to 44-45 hours, without loss of pay, during 1946 and 1947.³ A sharp rise in retail prices between mid-1947 and mid-1948 provoked

³ During the war the Trades Union Congress started a campaign for the introduction of a forty-hour week as a part of its postwar reconstruction program. Eventually it was decided that this could best be brought about in two stages. The reductions secured in 1946-47 were intended to be the first stage.

fresh wage demands, especially as a new price index was introduced at this time which gave a truer reflection of the wage earners' cost of living. Thus over the whole period there was a slightly greater average annual increase in all three indices than during the war years.

The second period, 1948-50, was the time when the policy known as "wage restraint" met with some success. The movement of the indices for rates and prices was slowed down to about one half of their annual average increase over the three previous years. Earnings were less affected, and the gap between rates and earnings widened appreciably. As the story of the Labour government's experiment in wage policy has already been told several times⁴ it will suffice to state some of its more salient features.

LABOUR'S EXPERIMENT IN RESTRAINT

Contrary to established practice, the *Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices*, which in February 1948 initiated the policy of restraint, was issued without prior consultation with the trade unions and the employers, probably in the knowledge that their agreement would not have been obtained for its recommendations. Apart from emphasizing that there was "no justification for any general increase of individual money incomes" it said little more than that "each claim for an increase in wages or salaries must be considered on its national merits." This might have been the preliminary to a national wage policy if "national merits" had in some way been defined, but only one example was given—"the national

⁴ See my chapter on "Collective Bargaining" in Allan Flanders and H. A. Clegg (Eds.), *The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 307-12; and Barbara Wootton, *The Social Foundations of Wage Policy* (London, 1955), Chap. IV.

TABLE 1—AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN WAGE AND PRICE INDICES, 1938-1955
(1938 = 100)

PERIOD	WEEKLY WAGE RATES	AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS	RETAIL PRICES
1938-45.....	7.3	11.4	6.9
1945-48.....	8.7	13.3	9.0
1948-50.....	4.5	10.0	5.0
1950-52.....	16.0	22.5	18.0
1952-55.....	12.0	22.0	7.0

Sources: For weekly wage rates and retail prices, *Times Review of Industry* (London and Cambridge Bulletin), March 1956; for average weekly earnings, *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, March 1956 and October 1948.

interest to man up a particular undermanned industry."

Faced with the publication of the White Paper as an accomplished fact the General Council of the Trades Union Congress felt that it could hardly condemn the action of a Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer and gave it their reluctant support on certain conditions. The first was that dividends should be limited. The second, that the government should pursue a policy not only to stabilize but to reduce prices and profits. The third amounted to substantial modifications in the policy proposed by the White Paper: the General Council listed five reasons which in their view would justify wage increases, broad enough to provide support for any claim. Having left the door wide open in theory, they then proceeded to try and close it in practice by urging their affiliated unions to exercise restraint.⁵

⁵ Restraint was applied not only by the unions. The analysis made by A. T. Peacock and W. J. L. Ryan ("Wage Claims and the Pace of Inflation," *Economic Journal*, June 1953) of a sample of 430 wage claims from 1948 to 1951 suggests that an increasing time lag and a decreasing proportion of the settle-

All the same, devaluation could not be avoided. When this step was taken in September 1949 Sir Stafford Cripps as Chancellor used the shock it administered to try and secure a more stringent restraint. After prolonged negotiations he managed to get the support of the TUC General Council for a formula which, if it had been successfully applied, would have meant a temporary wage freeze. It was undoubtedly the boldest, if not the wisest, decision the General Council has taken since the war. But it ran into various difficulties. For some unions the formula meant their giving up the automatic wage increases to which they were entitled under cost-of-living sliding scale agreements, and this most of those concerned refused to do. When recommended to a special conference of trade union executives it was accepted by so small a majority that there was little hope of making it effective.

The existing policy of voluntary restraint was already leading to growing tensions within and among the unions. It had been imposed from above and met with relatively little understanding, beyond a vague feeling of loyalty to the Labour government, among the active rank and file. A number of union executives found their decision to support the new wage-freeze policy changed by ballot or reversed by delegates at annual conference. There were, too, growing complaints against the inequity of restraint among trade unions, not only because some were exercising more restraint than others, but also because

ment to the claim helped to slow down wage increases. In round figures their average results for all claims were:

TIME LAG (months)	AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT (per cent of claim)
1948..... 4	50
1949..... 4½	40
1950 (first half) . . . 4	{ 70
1950 (second half) 3	
1951 (9 months) . . . 3	70

union members who were paid standard time rates had not the opportunity of increasing their earnings open to others on payment by results.

1950 Trades Union Congress

In view of this situation, further aggravated by a more rapid rise in the price index, the TUC General Council thought it expedient to issue a statement prior to their Congress in September 1950. They admitted "that there must be greater flexibility of wage movements in future," adding that they were "firmly convinced that there is no formula which can be devised as to how this flexibility can operate."⁶ Even this did not save them from defeat at Congress, although there was doubt in the minds of some delegates whether they were voting against all restraint or against the more recent proposal for a wage freeze, which had in fact been dropped. The 1950 Congress was the effective end of the experiment in voluntary restraint. There were signs that the Labour government had not abandoned hope of trying to revive it,⁷ but the mood of the General Council could now be summed up as "once bitten, twice shy."

Rising prices, 1950-52

Many factors, not least a growing confusion as to what it implied, contributed to the breakdown of the policy of restraint. Whatever significance may be attributed to each of them, we can now see in retrospect that it could hardly have survived the sharp rise in prices which took place during the pe-

⁶ Trades Union Congress, *82nd Annual Report*, 1950, p. 269.

⁷ See Mr. Gaitskell's speech to the 1951 Trades Union Congress. The Labour government pledged itself to introduce a temporary legal limitation of dividends and stronger price controls. It also indicated its readiness to consider some increase in subsidies if this would help to stabilize wages.

riod 1950-52. Devaluation had caused the sterling prices of imports to rise, but this was strongly reinforced by the increase in world market prices for raw materials brought about by the Korean War; Britain's import prices rose by 40 per cent between 1949 and 1952.⁸ Although there was a slight recession in production in 1952, the index for wages and salaries per unit of industrial output rose from 98 in 1950 to 118 in 1952 (1948 = 100).⁹

CONSERVATIVES TRY BUT FAIL

The Conservative government came into office in October 1951. It was not long before it had taken up the problem of wage policy. In May 1952 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. R. A. Butler, presented a statement to a specially convened meeting of the National Joint Advisory Council.¹⁰ After emphasizing, as previous Chancellors had done, that "it would be foreign to our ideas and practice to curb wages and salaries by central direction and administrative fiat" he asked both sides of industry "to establish conditions under which the national wage bill will advance in step with national production, but not outstrip it, without destroying the flexibility of relative wages which is needed in a progressive economy." The Council, he suggested, should appoint a committee to examine "the possibility of devising methods of relating wages more closely to productivity and of modifying the existing wage struc-

⁸ *Bulletin for Industry* (A Monthly Review of the Economic Situation Prepared by the Information Division of the Treasury), No. 84 (May 1956).

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 77 (August 1955).

¹⁰ The National Joint Advisory Council to the Minister of Labour advises the Minister "on all matters in which employers and workers have a common interest." It is composed of representatives of the Trades Union Congress, the British Employers' Confederation, and the nationalized industries.

ture of many of our industries with this end in view." The proposal was accepted by the British Employers' Confederation and the representatives of the nationalized industries, but rejected by the TUC.

Prior to the meeting and following upon Mr. Butler's first budget, the TUC General Council had already told the government what kind of measures they expected it to adopt to diminish inflationary pressure:

... food subsidies should be moderately increased, income tax and surtax should be increased on the larger incomes, particularly unearned incomes, profits tax should be increased on both distributed and undistributed profits; a capital gains tax should be introduced; and dividends should be limited by statute.¹¹

A tall order of redistributive measures, which a Conservative government had no intention of fulfilling.

Back-door approaches

Having failed in a frontal attack on the problem, the government appears to have thought that it might be approached through the back door. At least there followed a series of events which suggest this conclusion. The first was the action of the Minister of Labour in July 1952, when he referred back for reconsideration in the light of the Chancellor's statement the proposals for wage increases by a dozen Wages Councils. A strong protest was made by the TUC and by Labour members in the House of Commons. All the Councils resubmitted their proposals unamended and by September the Minister had issued Orders to give effect to them. This did not save him from further trade union complaints about delay, and in 1954 he was having to reassure the TUC General Council that

¹¹ Trades Union Congress, *84th Annual Report*, 1952, p. 281.

TABLE 2—METHOD OF SETTLEMENT OF WAGE INCREASES, 1945-1955

YEAR	TOTAL AMOUNT SECURED IN WEEKLY WAGE INCREASES, IN £ MILLIONS	NUMBER OF WORKERS AFFECTED, IN MILLIONS ^a	PERCENTAGE ATTRIBUTED TO			
			Voluntary negotiations	Sliding scales	Statutory bodies	Arbitration and mediation
1945 ^b	1.8	7.3	59	3	10	28
1946 ^b	2.9	8.0	85	1	10	4
1947 ^b	1.7	5.0	56	1	30	13
1948.....	1.9	7.8	82	6	9	3
1949.....	1.1	5.2	43	11	33	13
1950.....	2.0	7.4	65	8	19	8
1951.....	6.6	12.3	72	6	17	5
1952.....	4.5	11.5	53	15	19	13
1953.....	2.4	9.0	25	19	36	20
1954.....	3.5	10.1	72	8	8	12
1955.....	5.1	11.9	74	6	15	5

^a Of about 17 million wage earners, roughly 13 million are employed under collective agreements (with 2 million covered by sliding-scale agreements) and another 4 million under statutory regulations.

^b Particulars relating to employees in government establishments and to shop assistants were first introduced in 1948, so that 1945 to 1947 are not strictly comparable with subsequent years.

Source: *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, January issues, various years.

since the beginning of that year on an average only 8.3 days elapsed between the Wages Council's making proposals and the issuing of statutory orders.¹²

Next it was noticeable that towards the end of 1952 a number of important wage claims were rejected by arbitration tribunals. This coincided with a stiffening of the employers' resistance in negotiations, so that more claims were being referred to arbitration. During 1953 the awards of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal on wage claims were so similar in character and so small in amount (running at about four shillings a week) that trade unionists accused it of following a wage policy. The large Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions failed altogether to secure a wage increase; the settlement of its claim was, in fact, delayed until April 1954. The effect of the new re-

¹² *Trades Union Congress Report 1954*, p. 192. Under the Wages Councils Act, 1945, the Minister is required to make an Order to give effect to proposals submitted by a Wages Council, but he is empowered to refer back their proposals for reconsideration.

straint exercised by employers and arbitration tribunals can be seen in Table 2 both in the relatively small amount of wage increases in 1953 and, still more, in the unprecedented low proportion resulting from voluntary negotiation.

Influence of railway unions

The attitude of the railway unions played a decisive part in breaking down the use of arbitration to check wage increases. The engineering unions, it is true, refused to submit their claim to arbitration and called a one-day strike in December 1953, the first official national strike in a major industry for twenty years, but this yielded no immediate results. The National Union of Railwaymen went further and, after having rejected a four-shillings award by the railway arbitration tribunal, threatened a Christmas strike. After government intervention the strike was averted by the British Transport Commission's conceding increases ranging upwards from seven shillings a week, which immediately became the pattern

for the settlement of claims in other industries. A year later the NUR again threatened to use strike action in support of a demand for higher wages, although this time there was the complication of its rivalry with another railway union, the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen. The stoppage was again averted by government intervention, which helped, however, to precipitate an actual strike by ASLEF a few months later. In January 1956 the Transport Commission thought it expedient to give an increase of 7 per cent for all railwaymen without putting up any struggle at all.

The financial position of the railways goes a long way to explain why they should have become the scene of the most active resistance to wage restraint imposed by arbitration. The inability of the Transport Commission (or earlier the Railway Executive) to secure a revenue adequate to cover its expenditure placed the railway unions at a disadvantage in obtaining wage increases for their members. Moreover, railwaymen have few opportunities, apart from working overtime, of increasing their earnings above their rates. The other consequence of the railways' deficit was to subject them to a greater degree of informal government control than any of the other nationalized industries. The Commission could hardly enlarge its deficit by wage concessions without government approval.

Courts of Inquiry proposal

Two other developments in 1954 have to be mentioned to round off the picture of the Conservative government's efforts to do something about wages. In February of that year the Courts of Inquiry set up to deal with wage disputes in the engineering and shipbuilding industries declared their concern about the "wider problems affecting the national economy" raised by the dis-

putes, and proposed that an "authoritative and impartial body" should be appointed to consider these problems and "give advice and guidance as to broad policy and possible action."¹³ No one knew quite what the Courts of Inquiry had in mind, but the government took up the proposal with the National Joint Advisory Council, only to find the TUC adamant in its opposition.

The General Council were unanimously of the opinion [they stated in their annual report] that whatever needed to be said to the Trade Union Movement on the present economic situation could most appropriately be said by themselves . . . the suggestion of the Courts of Inquiry should not be agreed to in any form.¹⁴

Ince Plan

The "Ince Plan" met with the same fate. Early in the year Sir Godfrey Ince, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour, had suggested in a public address that all industries should make provision for the use of arbitration in their collective bargaining procedure as the final step in the settlement of disputes.¹⁵ In view of the unions' recent experience with arbitration this suggestion could hardly have come

¹³ Cmd. 9084. The significance of wage settlements in the engineering and allied industries (including shipbuilding) can be gauged from the fact that some 3.75 million workers are likely to be affected. In the period 1949-55 these industries accounted for 21 per cent of the total increase in weekly rates of wages recorded by the Ministry of Labour.

¹⁴ *Trades Union Congress Report 1954*, p. 290.

¹⁵ According to a statement made at the time by the Minister of Labour to the TUC, of 152 industries (excluding those with statutory wage-fixing machinery and those where the central government is the employer), 75 included provisions for arbitration. In 51 of these the parties had agreed in advance that unresolved disputes shall be referred to arbitration, while in 24 the agreements provided that disputes might be referred. See *Trades Union Congress Report 1954*, p. 239.

at a less appropriate time. The TUC General Council rejected the government's subsequent proposal that the Minister of Labour should write to the trade unions and employers in those industries without binding commitments to resort to arbitration urging them to adopt this course. The British Employers' Confederation took a similar view.

Rise in real wage rates, 1952-55

None of these indirect attempts to curb the upward movement of wages having come to anything, rates forged ahead of prices during the fourth period, 1952-55. The movement of wages seemed to have acquired a momentum of its own which was not appreciably diminished by the fact that prices no longer continued to rise as rapidly as in 1950-52. If in the previous period wages had been chasing prices, prices were now chasing wages. For the first time since 1946 there was an annual rise in real wage rates. As the margin between rates and earnings was also increasing between 1952 and 1955, the increase in real weekly earnings was even greater and amounted in all to over 15 per cent. Another feature of wage movements in the period, not revealed by the general indices, was an increasing preference for percentage over flat-rate increases. This checking of the previously well-established trend towards a narrowing of the relative skill differential appears to be related to the reassertion of the use of the strike in collective bargaining. The evidence lies in a series of disputes and stoppages over wage differentials.

British Employers' Confederation

In dealing with the action taken by Labour and Conservative governments to influence the movement of wages, the reactions of the trade union movement have been described. Little has been said, however, about the attitude

of employers' organizations. During the period of wage restraint their role, when compared with that of the trade unions, was largely a passive one. They used the arguments of the White Paper in opposing wage claims, but the British Employers' Confederation, their central body for labor questions, did not try to influence the conduct of its affiliated organizations or make any public pronouncements. Under the Conservative government the BEC has not only had more to say in private circulars to its members: in September 1955 it also published a statement of its views on "the existing inflationary situation" with the title *Britain's Industrial Future*. The main reference to wage policy was contained in the following passage:

In conditions of shortage of particular classes of labour, individual employers may seek to attract essential workers by offering superior wages and working conditions. It is natural that individual workers should take advantage of this situation. Where such employers and workers are members of employers' organisations and trade unions which have negotiated collective agreements on their behalf they are, however, under a moral obligation not to subvert those agreements by extravagant bidding up in this way. Incentive schemes, moreover, must be devised so as to provide real incentives to effort; otherwise they may be merely a disguised method in present conditions of attracting labour from one employer to another. On a larger scale, employers' organisations and trade unions must themselves avoid engaging in a competitive race between industries which would frustrate any attempt to halt inflation.

One is tempted to draw a parallel. Just as the TUC had earlier sought to use its moral influence to persuade trade unions to moderate their wage claims in support of a Labour government, so the BEC was now asking employers not to bid up wages beyond the agreed rates when a Conservative gov-

ernment was pursuing financial and economic policies of which it approved. The common denominator in the attitude of employers' associations and trade unions throughout the postwar years has been the maintenance of their traditional opposition to any form of government interference in wage determination. The principle of "industrial autonomy" has been firmly upheld on both sides of industry, and no government has dared openly to challenge it.

FULL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE STRUCTURE

The postwar interest of British governments in wage policy has been aroused by the wage-price spiral, and especially its adverse effects on the country's balance of payments. But, if that has been one of the consequences of continued full employment, there has been another consequence which has claimed less attention and aroused less concern—its impact on wage structure. The term "wage structure" is sometimes used to describe any relationship which may be found to exist among comparative rates and earnings. In this sense there are as many structures as the observer cares to discover, since they depend only on the classifications which he employs to summarize his data.¹⁶ To the subjective notion of wage structure can be opposed a more limited and an objective one, namely, that of an *organized* relationship among wages, a relationship which is the outcome of their deliberate regulation replacing the interplay of the market. Wage structure thus defined is one of the achievements of collective bargain-

¹⁶ See Lloyd G. Reynolds and Cynthia H. Taft, *The Evolution of Wage Structure* (New Haven, Conn., 1956), p. 9. "One is forced by the sheer mass of the material to summarize. It is this process of summarizing which gives rise, in a sense artificially, to the 'wage structures' and 'wage differentials' which are analyzed by statisticians and economists."

ing, although legislation and custom are, of course, alternative instruments of regulation to the collective agreement.

What, then, has been the impact of full employment on wage structure in its objective sense? The answer lies in the widening of the gap between rates and earnings. We can separate the quantitative effect of some of the factors, other than changes in national rates, which have influenced the movement of average weekly earnings. Allowances can be made for the effect of (1) changes in the employment distribution of wage earners according to sex, age, and industry and (2) overtime and short-time working. This leaves an "unexplained residue" made up of upgrading within industry, changes in shift working, extension or improvement of income yields from systems of payment by results, and, finally, payments above the national rates. Table 3 gives the results of such calculations. It permits the following broad conclusions:

1. The effect on average earnings of shifts in the employment distribution of wage earners has been slight since 1948.
2. A very substantial part of the increase in the margin between rates and earnings after 1948 can be attributed to overtime.
3. The main increase in the "unexplained residue" occurred between 1948 and 1950, although there has also been a further increase since 1952.

It is known that the increase in the "unexplained residue" during the period of wage restraint coincided with an extension of payment by results and with local increases above national rates in many industries. We can therefore assert with some confidence that from about 1948 onwards the growing divergence between rates and earnings has been due largely to three factors, all of which imply some weakening in the collective regulation of wages. This

TABLE 3—PERCENTAGE MARGIN BETWEEN RATES AND EARNINGS

MONTH AND YEAR	EXCESS OF WEEKLY EARNINGS INDEX OVER WAGE RATES INDEX <i>a</i>	DUE TO EFFECT OF CHANGES IN		UNEXPLAINED RESIDUE <i>a - (b + c)</i>
		Sex, age, and industrial distribution <i>b</i>	Overtime and short time <i>c</i>	
	(1938 = 100)			
1945 (July).....	26	6.5	5	14.5
1948 (Oct.).....	28	8.5	5.5	14
1950 (Oct.).....	36	8.5	8.5	18.5
	(1948 = 100)			
1950 (Oct.).....	6	0	2.5	3.5
1952 (Oct.).....	5.25	0.5	2.25	2.75
1955 (Apr.).....	9.5	-0.75	6	4.25

Sources: G. Penrice, "Earnings and Wage Rates since 1938," *Times Review of Industry (London and Cambridge Bulletin)*, September 1952, and "Earnings and Wage Rates, 1948-1955," *ibid.*, December 1955.

is obvious enough in the case of payments above the rate. What of overtime and payment by results?

Overtime

The point about overtime is its systematic character; it has become in fact an accepted method of increasing the weekly pay packet of adult male workers. The average number of hours worked by men has risen fairly steadily from 46.3 in April 1947 to 48.8 in October 1955; the figure for October 1938 is 47.7.¹⁷ Thus, although the agreed working week is generally some three hours shorter than before the war, the actual working week is an hour longer. Not all overtime is systematic, but in some industries the figures are too high and too consistent to suggest anything else. About 30 per cent of the operatives in manufacturing industries covered by the Ministry of Labour's returns were working an average of eight hours overtime in one week during November 1955.¹⁸ Jobs have frequently been advertised with the inducement

¹⁷ Ministry of Labour Gazette, March 1956.

¹⁸ Ministry of Labour Gazette, January 1956.

"plenty of overtime." One of the troubles about systematic overtime, as the *Times* Labour Correspondent has remarked, is that it is "self-perpetuating."

Once it is accepted, employers can too easily fall into the rut of aiming at higher production by increasing hours rather than increasing productivity, while workers may insist that it shall be maintained so as to keep up their earnings, or even make sure that work is not completed during normal working hours.¹⁹

The clauses in collective agreements settling the length of the normal working week and stipulating higher rates of pay for extra hours were originally intended to keep this from happening. Their regulative purpose has been seriously undermined by the postwar practice of British industry.

Payment by results

Payment by results is a more complicated issue. Its extension as an alleged method of raising productivity has been strongly advocated on all sides since the war. The main increase in the proportion of workers covered by systems of

¹⁹ "The Canker of Overtime," *Times* (London), October 26, 1954.

payment by results took place between 1947 and 1951 (see Table 4), and may have been due in part to a belief shared by employers and trade unions that they were making a contribution to the productivity drive. The government told them so and, on occasions, used its influence to get them to comply.²⁰ But one of the attractions of payment by results schemes to employers and to workers has been the opportunity they provide of increasing wages above the national rates. The extent of this practice is tacitly recognized by the British Employers' Confederation in the passage already quoted from *Britain's Industrial Future*. Payment by results can never be as effectively regulated by collective agreement as payment by time. Its extension in postwar Britain has certainly been responsible for a further weakening in collective wage regulation.

Wage competition from below

Payments above the rate, systematic overtime, and payment by results have all been used by employers to attract labor by offering more money in the pay packet. Under the pressures of this wage competition from below, many of the existing wage structures have been distorted and weakened. Naturally in industries, like engineering, where a wage structure can hardly be said to exist, the pressures, unrestrained by administrative control, have had full play and wage relationships have become more and more chaotic.²¹ The ensuing

²⁰ When the wartime Essential Work Order, enforcing a system of payment by results in the building industry, was abolished in 1947, the government took the initiative in inducing both sides to agree to the reintroduction of a new scheme for incentive payments.

²¹ See T. P. Hill and K. G. J. C. Knowles, "The Variability of Engineering Earnings," *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics*, May 1956. An extreme illustration.

TABLE 4—PERCENTAGE OF WAGE EARNERS ON PAYMENT BY RESULTS, IN OCTOBER OF 1938 AND OF ALTERNATE YEARS 1947-1955

YEAR	ALL INDUSTRIES		MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES	
	All workers	Men	All workers	Men
1938.....	25	18	33	29
1947.....	28	24	37	36
1949.....	29	25	38	36
1951.....	32	28	40	38
1953.....	32	29	40	38
1955.....	32	29	40	38

Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette, April 1956

inequities and anomalies help to build up the demand for further increases in national rates to compensate those workers who have been least fortunate in the lottery for extra earnings.²²

Nationalized coal mining—the exception

Nationalized coal mining is the one outstanding postwar example of an industry which has tried to bring more order into its wage relationships. The National Coal Board inherited an extremely complicated wage system which had been built up locally at each colliery, with many adjustments superimposed at district and national level. In 1955, with the co-operation of the Na-

taken from their scatter diagram on page 120, shows that in one firm the average earnings of timeworking laborers as a percentage of the earnings of timeworking fitters was more than 140 per cent, while in another firm within the same region it was less than 60 per cent in May 1952.

²² This theme is developed at length by H. A. Turner in "Wages, Industry Rates, Workplace Rates and the Wage-Drift," *The Manchester School*, May 1956. "Workplace margins rise," he writes, "and workers who do not benefit demand 'industry' increases in compensation. But parallel advances in 'industry' rates are demanded and conceded to the recipients of 'workplace margins' who regard the latter as established minimal additions to the former."

tional Union of Mineworkers, it succeeded in introducing a national wage structure for about 400,000 day wage men. At the start there seemed to be about 6,500 different jobs in the industry, but many of them were local variations in names for describing the same work. By eliminating duplicates and grouping similar jobs they reduced the number to about 400 "real" jobs and classified these in thirteen grades of "equal work value." They found "a substantial overlapping of rates from the lowest to the highest grades and the variations in wage rates for a given job far exceeded the differences between average rates for jobs of different kinds."²³ The final agreement provided that no man should have his wage rate reduced and about 95 per cent should have their rates increased from one shilling to six shillings a shift. As a result 70 per cent of the day wage men are now being paid national standard rates and about 30 per cent are on personal rates (that is, above standard rate); these they retain only as long as they remain in their present jobs. There remain the 300,000

²³ National Coal Board, *Report and Accounts for 1955*, Vol. I, p. 39.

pieceworkers and taskworkers. They have been graded, but the grading applies only to a fall-back wage. The standardization of piecework prices is, of course, a much more complicated reform and is still the subject of negotiations.

SPIRALS WITHIN SPIRALS

It would be foolish to hang any weighty conclusions on so summary an account of wage movements and wage policy in postwar Britain, but one final observation may be worth making. The familiar problem of the wage-price spiral under full employment is rather like a set of Chinese boxes. It contains within it the problem of the wage-wage spiral, which in turn contains the problem of the rates-earnings spiral. Any attempt to solve one of these problems while ignoring the others is not likely to succeed. Granted that wages cannot be stabilized unless prices are stabilized, can wage rates be stabilized while unions are competing with each other for successes, the wage-wage spiral? Or while employers are competing for labor by bidding up earnings above agreed rates, the rates-earnings spiral?

Swedish Wages and Wage Policies

By GÖSTA REHN

Abstract: A review of 1939-56 wage developments and policies shows the willingness of trade unions to exercise self-restraint. Inflationary pressures, however, caused an uncontrollable and distorting "wage drift." Wage-price explosions resulted: repeatedly it appeared necessary to reshape the wage structure on the basis of rank-and-file psychology and market developments as well as long-term principles ("solidaristic wage policy"). At times centralized master agreements were used. All this is the background of a recurrent discussion as to how to solve the dilemma of wage policy in full employment without destroying the self-determination of the organizations. The institutional background is shown by implication.—Ed.

THE movement of hourly earnings from 1940 to 1956 for male workers in manufacturing is shown in Table 1. In addition to the basic series, namely, hourly earnings (money and real) and the cost of living, Table 1 also shows the yearly percentage increases in wages resulting from the central agreements between the Swedish Trade Union Federation (LO) and the Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF), other collective agreements between national unions and employers, and the remainder, or "wage drift," that is, those increases in earnings not accounted for by wage increases negotiated in collective bargaining.

Comparative figures for some of the important groups of wage and salary earners are presented in Table 2. This table demonstrates some of the reductions in income differentials which occurred during World War II and, to a lesser extent, after the war. This trend concerned all types of differences—skill, sex, cost-of-living zone, and branch of industry. Among the various branches of manufacturing, the range order was radically changed. In particular, workers in the sheltered "home-market"

branches such as food and printing (where trade unions had been strong at an early stage) lost their once favorable relative position to those in heavier industries. Consequently, in recent years the former revised their previously negative attitudes toward incentive wage systems. (In 1939, 50 per cent of all hours worked in manufacturing industries generally were compensated through some incentive wage system—usually on a simple piece-rate basis, individual or group. By 1955, the corresponding figure had risen to 61 per cent.)

To a considerable extent, the narrowing of differentials may be viewed as a result of the greatly strengthened bargaining position of agriculture during the periods of war and full employment. In 1947 the Swedish Parliament declared that the rural population gradually should be given an economic status comparable to that of the rest of the population. This decision was made feasible in an economic sense by migration from rural areas to urban centers induced by full employment. Another force behind the leveling development has been the trade union movement's "solidaristic" wage policy, proclaimed

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TABLE 1—INCREASES OF HOURLY EARNINGS OVER 1939, AND THEIR COMPONENTS, FOR MALE WORKERS IN SWEDISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1940-1956

INDEXES AND PERCENTAGE INCREASES	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
<i>Index series (1939 = 100):</i>																	
1. Hourly earnings, money	109	117	128	133	137	142	153	175	190	196	204	246	293	307	320	346	374
2. Hourly earnings, real	96	92	92	95	97	101	108	116	124	125	129	131	141	148	155	162	167
3. Cost of living (incl. taxes) ^a	113	128	139	140	141	141	142	150	153	156	158	188	207	208	207	213	223
<i>Yearly percentage increases:</i>																	
4. Total ^b	7.5	8.2	8.9	4.6	2.5	4.7	8.0	14.1	8.3	3.0	3.9	20.6	18.2	3.6	4.4	8.5	(8.0)
Made up as follows:																	
5. Central agreements ("index" etc.) ^c	3.5	5.9	6.7	1.5	—	—	—	2.1	0.9	—	—	—	(9)	—	—	—	3.8
6. Other collective agreements ^d	2.5	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.9	3.2	3.2	7.6	3.6	0.2	—	14.3	(2.6)	1.1	1.5	4.3	(0.5)
7. "Wage drift" ^e	1.4	1.7	1.7	2.9	1.6	1.5	4.7	4.0	3.6	2.8	3.9	5.5	5.9	2.5	2.9	4.0	3.5

^a The cost-of-living index includes the effect of direct taxation on families with approximately the income pattern given in line 1.

^b The data used for line 1 were here corrected for the following biases: overtime, extended coverage of statistics (approximately¹), effects of changes in the law on paid vacations.

^c Effects of sliding-scale regulations (the so-called "index agreements"), the wage freezes of 1949 and 1950, and the Central Agreements of 1952 and 1956.

^d Around fifty industry-wide agreements covering most of the workers concerned.

^e The remainder, calculated to show the increase in earnings attained individually and locally during the year, irrespective of the national agreements. (It should be noted that the "difference" between a total increase of 20 per cent and agreed increase of 10 per cent is about 9 per cent, not 10!)

Sources: Lines 1-3, official figures of the Social Welfare Board (Socialstyrelsen); line 6, data from the Trade Union Research Department.

TABLE 2—WAGE DEVELOPMENTS FOR CERTAIN MAIN GROUPS IN SWEDEN, 1939-1955

YEAR	ANNUAL SALARIES OF WHITE-COLLAR EMPLOYEES				MANUAL WORKERS					COST OF LIVING
					Hourly earnings		Annual	Daily		
	Manufacturing industries				Manufacturing industries		Building con- struction	Agri- culture	Lumber- ing	
Engineers	Fore- men	Clerks		Men	Women	Men	Men	Men		
Men	Women									
1939.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
1945.....	135	135	141	146	142	150	127	184	181	
1950.....	186	188	200	216	204	229	178	290	257	
1951.....	210	220	231	250	246	275	221	332	323	
1952.....	245	264	272	300	293	325	269	406	462	
1953.....	250	265	282	310	307	338	287	412	434	
1954.....	260	276	298	321	320	352	301	426	462	
1955.....	285	295	323	356	346	382	313	485	491	
1945-50 ..	(+38)	(+39)	(+42)	(+48)	+44	+53	+40	+58	+42	
1950-55 ..	+53	+57	+62	+65	+70	+67	+76	+67	+91	

Sources: Official wage statistics from the Social Welfare Board (Socialstyrelsen). Noncomparable and noncontinuous wage data for salaried employees up to 1946 and beyond have been put together with the assistance of the statistics of the organizations for 1946-47.¹ A fuller picture of wages in Sweden (1939-52) is given in Lloyd G. Reynolds and Cynthia E. Taft, *The Evolution of Wage Structure* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), Chap. IX.

in the late thirties after long discussions at several LO conventions and aimed at eliminating wage inequities through traditional union methods and with the help of government economic policy.

The leveling of the wage structure came to a standstill at the end of the 1940's, at least with regard to manual workers. In some of the later years, there has actually been some regression involving an increase in certain differentials. This has been the result, in part, of an economic setback in low-wage industries, but in certain cases of skill differentials it has been the result of conscious union and employer policy.

THE WAGE DRIFT

The desire to pursue a balanced and noninflationary wage policy, which is basically common to the organizations of employers and workers and the Swed-

ish Labor government,¹ has been repeatedly frustrated by the uncontrollable development of earnings called "the wage drift."² This wage drift has been a very important feature in wage movements, especially with regard to manual workers in most of the manufacturing industries (see Table 1). It is being regarded more and more as a crucial problem in a full-employment economy. Depending on one's ideas about its character and causes, one can draw the most disparate conclusions

¹ The Labor party (Social Democrats) has been in government virtually since 1932, either alone or as the most important partner in coalitions, mostly with the Agrarian party. The trade unions of manual workers are strongly Social Democratic. Most other unions are neutral.

² We use this translation for the Swedish word "löneglidning" because the expressions "wage slide" and "wage gliding" have provoked misunderstandings.

concerning "the proper wage demands" of various groups of wage and salary earners after a period when the wage drift has altered ("distorted" or "corrected") the previous wage structure. Is the wage drift a just and equitable result of an ever increasing intensity of work among wage earners on incentive rates or—and just the opposite—is it an inflationary occurrence benefiting groups with a flexible wage system?

It is quite evident that the wage drift is largely a result of the shortage of labor prevailing in most industries and trades since the war.³ But this does not exclude the possibility that a voluntary speed-up—and not merely and simply loose piece rates and individual additions to wages and salaries—is precisely one of the results of this shortage of labor, giving the worker improved security against being deprived of the fruits of his efforts through piece-rate reductions and thus eliminating the former restraints on the production pace of piecework. Furthermore it is evident that differences in the "propensity to drift" inherent in the various wage systems partially explain the annoying differences in the rate of the drift for different groups of wage and salary earners. Deplorably, however, we cannot make the quantitative statements on these questions which the wage policy makers ask for.

³ Excluding seasonal unemployment in the building industries, the unemployment funds of the trade unions since 1945 have shown only 2 to 3 per cent unemployed (annual averages). The connection between the rate of wage drift and excess demand for labor has been established by detailed correlation studies. See B. Hansen and G. Rehn, "On Wage Drift," in *Twenty-five Economic Essays in Honor of Eric Lindahl*, Stockholm, 1956. The statements in this paragraph are also based on inquiries among some hundreds of employers and local union leaders and statistical studies of wage dispersion among piece-rate workers, partly conducted by a joint group of LO and SAF research workers.

CHRONOLOGY OF POSTWAR WAGE POLICIES

The development of attitudes and institutional customs can best be depicted by a year-by-year description of postwar developments in wage policy.⁴

The voluntary wartime wage freeze gradually thawed out, as did the wage restraints based on frustrated hopes for postwar price reductions. The disappointing results of a five months' strike⁵ in the engineering industry in 1945 did not appreciably hamper wage develop-

⁴ Organizations referred to in this paper are the following:

SAF (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen), the Swedish Employers' Confederation. SAF has 43 affiliated associations with 15,000 members and 700,000 workers in manufacturing and construction industries. Several other organizations, covering the remaining industries, cooperate with the SAF. An affiliated association cannot sign an agreement without SAF confirmation.

LO (Landsorganisationen), the Swedish Trade Union Federation. LO has 44 affiliated national unions, mostly industrial in structure, with 1,400,000 members, that is, nearly all manual workers and some groups of white-collar workers. Collective agreements are generally made industry by industry on a nationwide basis, in the first months of each calendar year. Any contemplated strike of any importance has to be submitted for approval to the LO Secretariat; LO then pays a certain part of the strike benefits which are regularly paid out by the unions. But the final decision in questions regarding wage disputes and agreements lies with the governing bodies of the national unions; LO directives as well as member ballots are only advisory.

TCO (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation), the Central Organization of White-Collar Workers. TCO has 42 affiliated unions with 350,000 members. TCO is less centralized than LO, with which it maintains friendly relations. Besides TCO, there are a few other organizations, some of which compete with TCO among high-salaried employees.

⁵ This strike was conditioned by the temporary rise of Communist influence in the years at the end of the war. The Communists never seized the majority in any important union. Now they have lost the majority even in their local strongholds, with rare exceptions.

ments in the postwar boom. Substantial money wage increases were a part of the inflationary wave of 1946-47. In its customary wage policy resolution in the fall of 1947, the Representative Body of LO, after discussions with the Minister of Finance Wigforss, recommended "strong wage restraints" for 1948. This appeal, however, failed, and the government was forced to introduce excise taxes so as to curb excessive consumer demand. From this, the trade unions drew two conclusions: a wage rise nullified by tax and price increases was not much to strive for; and a wage freeze had to be total and complete in order to be possible at all.⁶

LO, therefore, asked all its affiliated unions to extend for another year their collective agreements expiring in the next twelve months. A few unions, requesting minor exceptions, were persuaded to withdraw their requests by the argument that any exception would defeat the entire anti-inflationary action. TCO followed LO's lead in the wage freeze.

For many union members the wage freeze meant a not inconsiderable wage drift, plus a government guarantee of stable prices together with some measures against excess profits. It was, therefore, not too difficult for the new Minister of Finance, Sköld, to persuade the unions of the need for another extension of collective agreements for 1950. The anticipated effects on the cost of living of the 30 per cent devaluation of the Swedish currency in September 1949 were to be counteracted by subsidies during the first year in order to make the wage freeze feasible. In this way, cost and price levels

⁶ As will be seen below, these conclusions were revised in later policy discussions. A wage increase, "nullified" by an anti-inflationary tax, brings about a change in the wage-profit division of income to the benefit of wages.

were to be kept low in order to improve Sweden's competitive position in world markets.

Large wage and price increases in 1951

During the two-year wage freeze such great discrepancies developed in the wage structure as a result of the wage drift that a "wage explosion" became inevitable, even though its noise was drowned out by the thunder of the Korean War and the resulting price hysteria in world markets. The government now decided that a one-time inflation, estimated at 10 or 12 per cent, would be better than going against the world current. Consequently, the "free" wage round of 1951 provided for rather substantial increases. Some groups whose wages had lagged particularly far behind subsequently benefited, relatively, from the fact that the actual price increases were much higher than originally expected. These groups brought up the rear in the chronology of collective contract negotiations, timed in line with SAF policy of avoiding, if possible, high settlements at the start of the bargaining period. The result, of course, led to uneasiness among the groups which had already signed.

Master agreement for wage increases in 1952

On an average, wages in 1951 rose only about as much as prices in spite of a substantial rise in the real national income. Labor felt itself a loser, something that strongly conditioned union behavior in the next wage round. Therefore, in the fall of 1951, LO asked SAF that a reopener (index) clause be included in all the forthcoming 1952 agreements. It explained that otherwise the wage claims of the various unions would again be very high. The SAF replied that it could only disregard its principle of barring index escalators in peacetime on condition that all agree-

ments under SAF-LO jurisdiction be centralized into one general negotiation, thus keeping wage-rate increases within reasonable limits. LO then countered that such a high degree of centralization was precisely what it could not persuade its affiliates to accept. The government issued a recommendation that the increase in money earnings, including the wage drift, should be kept below 5 per cent, since this appeared to be the margin available for a general increase in incomes. In Parliament, the president of LO, Axel Strand, replied that this would be quite impossible since the proposed wage policy agreed neither with the economic nor the psychological situation in the labor market.

Eventually, LO and SAF concluded a central agreement providing for a general wage increase of 8 per cent for men and 10 per cent for women (or 25 öre per hour if that was more, so as to pacify unions representing workers in industries with low wages). Groups with less than a 20 per cent rise in earnings during the preceding year were to be entitled to additional increases to compensate for the lag. In some cases, even older types of lags or inequities were to be accepted as good cause for additional increases. The estimated rise in the price level resulting from the wage increase itself was placed at 3 per cent. If prices rose a minimum of 3 per cent above this anticipated level, unions would be entitled, under a reopening clause, to bargain for full wage compensation for the excess price rise. (Actually, the reopening clause was of only theoretical importance.)

Permissible wage increases beyond the general 8 and 10 per cent were subject to bargaining between the various LO and SAF affiliates. This enabled the parties to show a certain amount of tacit understanding for each other's problems. Nevertheless, in some cases the negotiating committees washed their

hands of the central agreement, thus compelling the executive committee of their union to sign an agreement against its will and against a probable or manifest (by ballot) majority of union members. The greatest difficulty was experienced in the Paper Workers Union, since profits in this export industry were extraordinarily high. In this instance, LO had to use its strongest statutory weapons, threatening to withhold all moral and financial support in case of strike.⁷

Economic policy and world economic developments in 1952 created a sizable reduction in employment in some industries. Severe unemployment was avoided (and held to an increase of less than one per cent among LO members) owing to a rapid movement of workers to other industries and government contracts for the most heavily affected industry, textiles.

Restrictive wage policy for 1953-54

The wage policy recommendation issued by the Representative Body of LO in September 1952 stated that the prevailing situation did not permit any major wage increase for 1953. Instead of demanding general increases, unions were advised to concentrate on improvements limited to special cases and groups, as for example women workers, night-shift workers, and so on. A restrictive wage policy, the statement continued, would strengthen hopes for price reductions. It was also felt that foreign trade should not be impeded through increases in labor costs.

The general LO recommendation this time was in accordance with the pre-

⁷ The normal weekly LO contribution to a striking union—now 18 kronor—amounted in 1952-56 to 12 kronor per member involved, or about one fourth of the usual strike benefits paid out, these in turn running around one fourth of the ordinary 48-hour earnings (220 kronor in 1956) of a male worker in manufacturing industry.

vailing situation in the labor market and was thus generally followed by member unions. Only in the food-processing industries, where relative wages had decreased very rapidly, was there a one-month strike, supported by LO in spite of its general recommendation, and as a result 25,000 workers received a 3 per cent increase.

Wage restraints were continued in 1954 on recommendation of LO, although less sharply than in 1953. In the course of the year, inflationary pressures intensified, while at the same time wage disparities, which had had two years to grow, made themselves noticeable. These factors created a situation ripe for another "wage explosion." The government, therefore, expressly recommended to the unions that wage increases be kept within the narrow limits provided by the economic forecast and budgetary estimates for the ensuing year, and "threatened" to recoup excessive wage increases in one way or another. Just as in 1952, LO explained in Parliament through its president that it was psychologically impossible to follow the government's recommendation; the unions had been held back for two years and now had to have a round of "freer" bargaining.

Wage settlements in 1955: uneven high increases

The SAF sought to use the government's recommendation as a bargaining weapon to bolster its "line of defense" for the year: no wage increase in excess of 3 per cent. Some unions, for example the Metalworkers with their rapid wage drift, accepted new agreements on this basis. But the Paper Workers Union, with lagging wages, huge profits, and unpleasant memories of 1952, threatened to strike for much higher wages. The SAF countered with a warning of a lockout to affect practically all manufacturing industries, including those in

which new contracts had already been signed. Its strategy was apparently based on the hope that these other unions would put pressure on the Paper Workers to bring about a settlement.⁸ After the government convened a special conciliation commission, the facilities of the normal conciliation machinery of course having already been exhausted, the parties accepted an extension of the legal one-week cooling-off period. Subsequently, a new agreement providing for a 7 per cent increase was signed. Meanwhile, the 3 per cent defense line had been breached in several other cases. It is possible, as some observers have held, that the risk of a major shutdown of Swedish industry in the final analysis put more pressure on employers than on the workers.

In most industries, wages of white-collar workers are usually set in negotiations on a firm-by-firm basis, with representatives of the national employer and TCO organizations participating. Ordinarily, these negotiations, steered in some cases by a centrally negotiated recommendation, have been secondary in importance to the patterns set by the unions affiliated with LO. In 1955, TCO unions, however, obtained a general wage increase of at least 7 per cent in several leading firms and thereby set the floor or minimum pattern for white-collar workers in all industry.

Maintaining that the wage increase had been "too high," the Minister of Finance prepared legislation for forced savings to reduce consumer demand by 2 per cent. LO supported the legislative proposal, although the LO Secretariat expressed the view that a purchase tax would have been a wiser measure. But because strong political opposition developed, with even the Labor party's coalition partner in the gov-

⁸ Swedish law permits sympathy strikes and lockouts, although other work stoppages are forbidden while a valid agreement is in force.

ernment, the Agrarian party, dissenting, the government decided instead to raise the tax on business profits, intensify credit restrictions, and increase the interest rate.

Master agreement for 1956

These measures, however, could not check the boom rapidly enough. The shortage of labor and the wage drift continued undiminished. It was feared, therefore, especially in view of the unevenness of the 1955 wage settlements, including the relatively high wage increase for white-collar workers, that a general wage race between all groups would develop in 1956. To avoid such a race, the LO, TCO, and SAF together negotiated virtually one collective agreement for the entire economy, providing an increase of 3.7 per cent (or 16 öre per hour, whichever was higher) for all groups of manual workers. This increase was calculated to average out at 4 per cent—a figure which was applied to the TCO unions since they do not adhere to the "solidaristic" wage policy.

The parties did not provide for adjustments in the interindustry wage structure; only internal adjustments within the groups and industries covered by the various ordinary collective agreements were permitted. Interindustry distortions were thus left to grow.

THE DISCUSSION OVER WAGE POLICY

The dilemma of wage policy under full employment conditions, illustrated in this survey of postwar trends in Sweden, was clearly stated in a report to the 1951 Convention of LO.⁹ If we abolish the inflationary level of effec-

⁹ Swedish Trade Union Federation, *Trade Unions and Full Employment* (English edition 1953). This report was prepared by a committee appointed by the Secretariat of LO (following demands expressed at the LO Convention in 1946) in co-operation with the LO Research Department.

tive demand, private enterprise will not automatically create full employment everywhere. Islands of unemployment will tend to appear. If, however, the inflationary pressure is not reduced, then all sorts of distortions will appear in the economy (because of the uneven possibilities of control), and wages will be forced upwards despite trade union wage restraint and responsibility. The wage drift in some sectors, together with high entrepreneurial profits, will soon provoke a wage race which, in turn, will develop into a destructive race between wages and prices.

The report indicated a solution of the dilemma. Excessive demand must be substantially reduced by general monetary and preferably fiscal means. The tendencies toward unemployment, which are to be expected in a balanced economy, should be combated not by restoring the general level of demand but instead by strictly local measures. First and foremost, these should stimulate a voluntary reallocation of labor, entrepreneurship, and production in a way that would eliminate the islands of unemployment very rapidly—preferably before they appear as real deviations from full employment.

In this more deflationary type of full employment, the report continued, trade unions would not be forced into an inflationary wage policy; this is, however, no guarantee that trade unions will refrain from exerting an inflationary influence. The unions have their own responsibility, as well. On the basis of the principle of solidarity, wage differentials should reflect as much as possible the differences in the content of the job, not the differences in business conditions between various industries. An equitable wage structure is just as necessary a precondition to noninflationary wage movements as a reasonable, nonprovocative division of the national income between wages and profits. (The

report realized that the ultimate proof of the equitableness of a wage structure is the possibility of obtaining workers willing to fill the available jobs—provided that there is free entry into all trades and that effective measures are taken to facilitate labor mobility.)

To promote these aims, according to the report, a greater degree of co-ordination in wage policy is needed. In Sweden, such co-ordination should be based essentially on LO's moral authority and guidance and on the allocation of LO's economic resources so as to benefit the groups most in need of support. The report recommended the establishment of a central Wage Policy Council responsible for annually investigating wage problems and advising the LO Secretariat. The Secretariat supported this recommendation and the 1951 LO Convention decided accordingly.

Recent attitudes of the labor market organizations

However, the LO Secretariat and its Wage Policy Council, composed of a few leaders of affiliated unions and high LO officials, have proceeded very cautiously. Far-reaching measures like the Dutch general system of job evaluation were already rejected in the original report in 1951. The terms of master wage agreements have been kept rather simple. On the other hand, LO representatives participating in the various negotiations of affiliated unions have continued to exert an important influence which is not always apparent on the surface. Compromises between prevailing market forces (economic and psychological) and the "solidaristic" wage ideals have been preferred to detailed applications of rigid principles.

The experience with the very crude type of co-ordinated wage policy used in 1956 has caused top union leaders, including Arne Geijer, newly elected

LO president, to stress that co-ordination of wage policy, though necessary, should also be more differentiated. This position was endorsed by the 1956 LO Convention.¹⁰

In TCO circles the opinion has grown that white-collar workers have been falling behind because of their acceptance of a policy of wage restraints, since such a policy is in most instances more effectively implemented for them than for manual workers. Currently (October 1956), TCO has gone on record against any wage co-ordination for the following year. Leaders of TCO have frequently stressed the need for a more restrictive economic policy as a condition for wage stability.

Leaders of the employers' associations often speak out against what they re-

¹⁰ In November 1956, the Representative Body of LO recommended to the unions that they concentrate their efforts on low-wage and lagging groups (women in particular were mentioned) because the margin for an increase of real wages in 1957 would be very limited. It was indicated that LO Secretariat should influence the initial wage demands of the unions, so as to prevent competitive bargaining, which could nullify the recommendation, as happened in 1948. In a meeting with the presidents of the affiliated unions, the LO president advised them, therefore, that wage proposals for 1957 should not exceed, on the average, 5 per cent or 25 öre (which in effect would mean 7 per cent for women). Except in a few special cases the unions have shown a high degree of compliance with this advice. One big exception, supported by LO, is the case of state employees, where wage drift is negligible. Because of their lagging wage level they negotiated an agreement with the government (in December) giving them adjustments amounting to an average of 7 per cent plus a promise that they would be granted an additional increase similar to the wage increases forthcoming in the present wage round of private industry. Here the outcome is as yet unknown. After a long initial deadlock some sort of new centralization of negotiations seems inevitable. Whether this will result in a settlement of a rigid or flexible, a simple or differentiated, type cannot be foreseen as this article goes to press (end of January 1957).

gard as a too simplified application of the unions' "solidaristic" demands for wage leveling. They are apt to stress either the need for more attention to prevailing business conditions from case to case or else the need for a greater and more systematic differentiation of wages. Full employment seems to have stimulated interest in more refined methods of wage payments (motion-time measurement and job evaluation), thus promoting the aim of differentiation and at the same time creating greater stability and resistance against the wage drift.

Preventing inflation under full employment: whose responsibility?

During the entire period here surveyed there has been a running discussion between union economists and the successive Ministers of Finance in the government, with union leaders often occupying an intermediary position, over the allocation and division of responsibility in accomplishing the difficult task of preventing inflation under full employment. Already in the 1940's, the LO Research Department warned against wage-price explosions to be expected if too heavy reliance were placed on wage restraints and wage freezing. The government gradually but explicitly has been changing its policy in the direction of the anti-inflationary measures recommended in the 1951 LO Report. In recent debates the idea has been advanced that workers would accept the reinvestment of a greater part of the revenues of production (in place of

higher cash wages) if unions were to receive some form of "codetermination" over this capital. However, this proposal does not contribute very much to a solution of the stability problem, since it really deals more with the question—important as it is—of capital accumulation and expansion. Current preparations for an improvement of the old-age security system (implying anti-inflationary savings in the form of huge insurance funds in the hands of the government, the employers, or the labor market organizations), investigations into methods for operating a possible sales tax, and numerous proposals with regard to forced saving or stimulation of voluntary saving suggest alternative lines for attaining both economic stability and more room for capital investments.

All parties involved in wage policy share one common view: wage policy should remain a matter for the organizations concerned, to be settled in a not-too-centralized fashion. The state should confine itself to advising the top organizations of employers and labor and to creating the best possible economic environment for a noninflationary wage policy. Since dissenting groups are placed in a very difficult bargaining position, the central employer and labor bodies will probably be at least as capable in the future as they have been in the past of exerting a strong influence on the policies of their affiliated organizations to attain the not easily defined objectives of a rational wage structure and rational wage development.

Postwar Wage Determination in the Netherlands

By JOHN P. WINDMULLER *

Abstract: Out of the confusion of the occupation period, a bipartite body, the Foundation of Labor, was constituted with representatives of top employers' associations and trade union federations. Wage questions are dealt with by a board, created by a government decree of 1945; the Foundation acts in an advisory capacity and has great influence on policy. The author discusses the organization and powers of these agencies, their relation to the government, the objectives of trade union policy, and wage factors and wage movements. The stability of the wage structure in the Netherlands is credited in large measure to the great restraint and sense of responsibility shown by the unions.—Ed.

THE liberation of the Netherlands in May 1945 from five years of Draconian German rule and occupation marked the end of one of the most destructive periods in the modern history of the Dutch nation. Railroads, canals, dikes, roads, factories, mines, and other necessities of a twentieth-century economy were left in a state which in most cases required complete rebuilding. The shortage of capital and skilled labor, the disruption of the means of transportation and communications, the plunder of capital and of consumer goods, the scarcity of the most essential foodstuffs, the large national debt, and the inflated currency required the establishment of tight economic controls over prices, wages, rents, and the labor market.¹

* I am grateful to Professor M. G. Levenbach of the University of Amsterdam and to my colleague, Professor Robert Raimon, for reading the manuscript and for a number of important suggestions.

¹ For a summary of economic and social conditions in the Netherlands during and immediately after the German occupation see N. W. Posthumus (Ed.), *The Netherlands During German Occupation*, THE ANNALS, Vol. 245 (May 1946).

THE FOUNDATION OF LABOR

In full awareness of the chaotic situation that would exist after liberation, the Netherlands government in exile in London and the underground employer and trade union groups had set to work long before the German capitulation to draft the measures that were to govern the process of social and economic reconstruction. Employers' associations and trade unions had been dissolved one after another in the course of the German occupation, but consultations between them proceeded clandestinely in an atmosphere more cordial and harmonious than had prevailed in the years of freedom before the war. In part, this new relationship of trust and good will, which later also characterized much of the postwar period, developed out of common privation and hardship. In part, also, it was the direct outcome of the refusal by the employers' associations to deal with the "Labor Front" established by the occupation authorities to replace the dissolved bona fide labor organizations. Because of their stand, the employers' associations were also declared illegal,

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and gained great respect in the eyes of underground union leaders.²

The secret labor-management discussions resulted in a decision to establish as soon as the invader had departed a bipartite body, the Foundation of Labor, in which the country's major employer and labor groups were to be represented. The principal purposes of the Foundation, as then envisaged, consisted of (a) improving labor-management relations through organized co-operation between employers and workers, (b) representing industry's viewpoint in governmental bodies and before the public, (c) promoting the development of collective bargaining, and (d) furthering the adoption of standard economic and working conditions in industry. The Foundation began its work in May 1945, having been constituted at that time by the top employer associations in industry, commerce, and agriculture, and by the three bona fide trade union federations. Its activities, especially in the field of wage policy, will be reviewed below.³

THE TRADE UNION STRUCTURE

The traditional division of all facets of Dutch society along ideological and denominational lines was only slightly affected by the upheaval of the war. There are three major trade union federations (or four, if one includes, the Communist Eenheidsvakcentrale which is recognized neither by government, nor the employer associations, nor the other labor federations): the nondenominational Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV, Nederlands Ver-

bond van Vakverenigingen), the Catholic Workers Movement (KAB, Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging), and the Protestant Labor Federation (CNV, Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond).

In the early years of the rise of the trade union movement, anarchists, syndicalists, and various Socialist groups fought for control of the nondenominational unions. Out of these internal struggles that wing of socialism emerged victorious which talked the language of radicalism but in reality supported reform measures through parliamentary political action. As a Socialist-dominated and anticlerical organization, the NVV, created in 1906, could gain acceptance neither from the Roman Catholic Church, centered mainly in the South of the Netherlands, nor from the Calvinist Protestants of the North. *Rerum Novarum* (1891), the encyclical of Leo XIII on labor questions, provided the initial impetus, first for the Catholics and then for the Protestants, to establish denominational trade unions which over the years grew into viable, firmly established federations. The NVV, however, consistently remained the largest federation. In 1956, its membership approached 500,000 with the KAB counting about 350,000, and the CNV some 200,000.⁴

In the 1930's, the NVV and the Social Democratic Labor party (later simply Labor party) began to shed their official Marxist tenets in the hope of broadening the base of the party. This undertaking continued into the war and early postwar years with the objective of making the Labor party (and the NVV) acceptable to individual Catholics and Protestants. A real effort to merge the trade union federations, similar to that which developed in Italy,

⁴ Data on membership are from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Omvang der Vakbeweging in Nederland*, various dates.

Austria, and Germany after the war, was not seriously attempted. A Pastoral Letter promulgated by the Netherlands Catholic bishops in 1946 prohibited Catholic workers from joining the NVV on the ground that, despite programmatic changes, the NVV and its affiliated unions still remained Socialist and materialistic organizations. This edict was reaffirmed in 1954, and the Protestant trade union federation recorded its agreement with the stand of the Catholic Church. Consequently, interunion harmony was somewhat impaired after 1954, yet the co-operation between the three federations on economic issues continued substantially unchanged. It may seem paradoxical that the effort to break through religious lines turned out to be somewhat more successful on the political than on the trade union side. A number of Catholics are now occupying positions of responsibility in the Labor party, including some seats in Parliament, while membership in the NVV, which unquestionably maintains close ties with the Labor party, may be assumed only at the risk of refusal of the Holy Sacraments.

EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS

Confronting the three trade union federations are three employer associations, also organized along ideological and sectarian lines. In contrast, however, to the trade union side, where the combined membership of the two denominational federations exceeds that of the NVV—a matter occasionally of no slight importance—the two denominational employer associations are actually quite small. The Protestant association especially has a very small membership, probably under 5 per cent of all employers, but it serves a purpose beyond representing Protestant patronal interests: it preserves the symmetry of

triangular employer representation vis-à-vis the three trade union groups. There is some duplication of membership, but most employers, about 80 per cent, belong to the liberal nondenominational association (CSWV, Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond), which consequently can speak for Dutch employers more authoritatively than the NVV can speak for the trade union movement.

LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF WAGE CONTROLS

The basic law which has furnished the legal foundation for the controlled wage policy of the postwar period is the Extraordinary Decree on Labor Relations (BBA, Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen) of October 1945.⁵ This law, passed as an emergency measure ostensibly for a limited time, is still in effect at this time (November 1956).⁶ Its provisions restored the prewar standard work week of forty-eight hours for most industry, and required government approval of worker dismissals and voluntary quits.

Board of Government Conciliators

Most importantly, the law framed a scheme for wage controls and established a Board of Government Conciliators (which should more properly be called a Wage Stabilization Board)⁷

⁵ The 1945 law superseded a 1944 decree promulgated for the southern part of the country, which was liberated several months before the northern part.

⁶ An English translation of this document is contained in International Labor Office, Legislative Series 1945, Netherlands 1, *Decree to Issue the Extraordinary Employment Relations Decree, 1945*, Geneva, October–December 1946.

⁷ The Labor Relations Law of 1923 first established the office of "Rijksbemiddelaar" (government conciliator), a part-time office for the purpose of mediating industrial disputes. Under the German occupation, the function of administering strict wage and

² E. Kupers, "Labor and Employer Organizations [in the Netherlands]," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 245 (May 1946), pp. 62–69.

³ For a description of the activities of the Foundation see C. Westrate, "Industrial Peace in the Netherlands," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (October 1952), pp. 88–93.

with power to (1) establish principles and rules of wage determination, (2) set specific wage rates, (3) approve, disapprove, or modify the terms of collective agreements, which are not valid without the Board's approval, (4) extend the provisions of collective agreements to parties "outside the bargaining unit," (5) grant exceptions to established wage rates, and (6) obtain compliance with its regulations through court action.

Limitations of the Board's powers

The powers of the Board, while comprehensive, are limited in two important respects. In the first place, it operates within the framework of basic policy decisions taken by the Minister of Social Affairs. This limitation has meant much more than a desire for administrative tidiness. As a member of the cabinet, the Minister is responsible to Parliament for matters within his jurisdiction, so that democratic checks exist at least potentially on arbitrary and capricious administration of wage controls. In actual practice, the origination of policy decisions has depended on the importance of the question. Various levels of government—the cabinet as a whole, the Minister of Social Affairs by himself, a sub-cabinet group (the Interdepartmental Committee on Wage and Price

price controls was initially given to the government conciliators (as a board), partly because of a lack of other qualified individuals and partly because of fear that the alternative would be a German-controlled agency. Subsequently, the Germans set up their own scheme anyway. After liberation, the Board of Government Conciliators again became the administrative body supervising the system of wage controls. See M. G. Levenbach, "Collective Bargaining and Government Wage Regulation in the Netherlands," *Modern Law Review*, October 1953, pp. 453–55; R. J. Erdbrink, "30 Jaren Rijksbemiddelaars," *Economisch-Statistische Berichten*, No. 1936 (July 14, 1954).

Policy), and the Board of Government Conciliators—participate at various times in the process of policy making. Administration of policy has been entrusted entirely to the Board, so that in matters of implementation and interpretation the Board has frequently served as a buffer for the government, as Professor Levenbach, a member of the Board, has pointed out.⁸

The Board's discretion is limited in the second place by the statutory requirement that it must obtain the advice and opinion of the Foundation of Labor "concerning matters of more general importance." Conceivably this provision could have been handled as a mere formality, but in fact it has been taken so seriously that the Foundation has become "the heart of the system."⁹ In its own environment, the system of unilateral government authority, tempered by the advisory power of a top labor-management group, has proven a highly effective alternative to the tripartite situation developed in the United States during World War II and the Korean conflict. Among its features is the establishment of a series of buffers, or lines of defense, against inevitable and predictable attempts by industry and labor to push through established wage ceilings in a tight labor market. Under the customary procedure, for example, requests by the management and labor representatives of an enterprise for an exception from a prescribed wage rate or for greater flexibility are first scrutinized by representatives of labor and employers in the industry concerned. In the same or perhaps in already whittled-down form, the request is then brought before the Wage Committee of the Foundation of Labor,

⁸ Levenbach, *op. cit.* (note 7 *supra*), p. 457.

⁹ Bert Zoetewij, "National Wage Policy: the Experience of the Netherlands," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (February 1955), p. 152.

where representatives of the top employer and trade union groups consider it, conciliate existing differences, if any, and pass it on to the Board with a recommendation based on the national interest as a whole. While the Board and the Foundation have tended to apply similar standards and criteria, the Board has been further removed from the direct pressures of industry and labor than the Foundation.

Balance of power

In case of serious conflict over important questions between Board and Foundation, the Foundation can, if need be, bypass the Board and attempt to deal directly with the top levels of government. Moreover, the Foundation consists of the most powerful economic blocs in the country, and each of its constituent groups maintains close relations with one or another of the major political parties.¹⁰

¹⁰ The direct influence of the Foundation as an advisory body to government was somewhat reduced by the creation of the Netherlands Social-Economic Council under the Industrial Organization Act of 1950. The Council is a tripartite body with fifteen representatives each from industry and labor plus fifteen independent experts, appointed by the Crown. It differs from the Foundation not only in its tripartite character but also in being a public, not a private, body, created by law for the express purpose of advising the government on broad and long-term questions of social and economic policy. Its establishment caused certain "jurisdictional" problems, notably between the Council and the Foundation of Labor. For a time, in fact, the continued existence of the Foundation was in question, but it now appears that the essentially private nature of the Foundation, its usefulness as a meeting ground for management and labor, and the desire of the parties to retain it, all point toward a continuing, though perhaps somewhat diminished, role. Concerning the future administration of wage policy, a recent official recommendation by the Social-Economic Council favored the disestablishment of the Board of Government Conciliators and the creation, in its place, of a Tripartite Wage Board (*Loonraad*) which would function as

But this does not mean that the Board has ever been a figurehead. Quite the contrary; the personal prestige of the individual Board members is very high, Board membership is carefully allocated to ensure representation from the major political and religious groups, and the Board itself maintains close relations with the cabinet, especially with the Minister of Social Affairs. Aside from a few crises, as in 1953, such an admirable balance of power between the key groups has been achieved that nobody would willingly assume the responsibility of upsetting the system by seriously threatening to withhold co-operation. If basic changes come about, they are likely to be the result of general agreement, not of economic force and coercion.

OBJECTIVES OF UNION WAGE POLICY

Among the three trade union federations there has been general agreement on the major objectives of postwar wage policy: full employment, price stability, uninterrupted production, and a rational wage structure. Certain differences over the most efficacious methods to reach the objectives have from time to time arisen, but they have been of a minor character, at least until recently. These key objectives, of course, have been shared by government and employers, although not without occasional divergencies in view over ways and priorities.

Full employment

Trade unions have seen their foremost objective as the attainment and maintenance of a full-employment economy.

a standing committee of the Council. A substantial minority of the Council, however, took exception to this recommendation, and the disposition of the issue is still uncertain. See Sociaal-Economische Raad, *Advies inzake het vraagstuk van de toekomstige loonpolitiek*, Publikaties van der SER, No. 4 (1955), especially pp. 17–34.

To achieve it, they have been willing to accept stringent controls over wage bargaining and the wage structure—controls in whose establishment and administration they have been accorded an important role. Part of the reason for the unions' single-minded concern with full employment must be sought in the experience of the prewar period. For example, by 1936 physical production in the Netherlands had decreased by 72 per cent from 1929, while unemployment had risen by 411 per cent. In 1936, also, fully one third of the membership of the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions was totally unemployed, while a substantial percentage was only partially employed.¹¹ An aggressive wage policy in the postwar period, the unions feared, might contribute to a repetition of the economic situation of the 1930's. In any case, the unions have had no desire to assume responsibility for raising the price level beyond the point which enables Dutch industry to compete successfully in international markets, especially in hard-currency countries, with consequent adverse effects on employment.

Furthermore, because of a rapidly increasing population, Dutch trade unions have been forced to contend with a steadily rising labor force for which jobs must be found. This ever more serious problem of overpopulation is a result of possibly the highest birth rate in Western Europe (22.4 per 1,000) and of perhaps the world's lowest death rate (under 8 per 1,000). Planned programs of increased industrialization, vast land reclamation projects, and government sponsored emigration have been organized to cope with overpopulation, but there is no question that wage policy has also been enlisted in the struggle.

Under all these circumstances, the

¹¹ Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen, *Information Bulletin*, No. 19 (October 1952), p. 11.

striving for full employment has been decidedly successful. Despite a rapid increase in the number of people gainfully employed, unemployment since 1948 has exceeded 3 per cent in only one year, 1952, and has remained below 2 per cent since 1954.¹² This is one of the best records in Western Europe.

Low price level

To achieve and maintain full employment in an economy which depends as heavily on international trade as the Netherlands, the preservation of a low price level has been deemed imperative. Dutch unions, more than their counterparts in most other countries, have been forced to recognize the relevance of the balance of payments to wage settlements, and they have generally refrained from making demands which according to their economic advisers and those of the government would lead to price increases and consequent decreases in exports. A stable price level has also eased the burden on trade union leaders to keep in check rank-and-file pressure for higher wages based on cost-of-living arguments. On balance, Dutch unions have seen no net advantage in opposing or even retarding measures to increase productivity, provided that the government possessed, and if necessary would exercise, powers to remedy any unemployment effects of higher productivity, and provided also that increased per capita output would be reflected in a rising standard of living.

The objective of low price levels has had to be balanced against the goal of economic co-operation and eventual economic union with the other two partners in Benelux whose price and wage levels

¹² *International Labour Review*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (September 1956), Statistical Supplement, p. 83.

in the postwar period have exceeded those of the Netherlands quite consistently. In this connection it is significant that Belgian demands for higher Dutch price and wage levels have been received far more sympathetically by the employers than by the trade unions. Employers have seen in the pressures from across the southern border a welcome opportunity for loosening the restrictive ties of economic controls, especially on prices. The unions, on the other hand, especially the NVV, have been less willing to trade the system of centralized wage controls for selective wage increases in favorably situated industries.¹³

Freedom from strikes

Among the factors which at the end of the war led to the establishment of the Foundation of Labor was the belief, shared by employers and trade unions, that economic recovery could proceed only under conditions of industrial peace and stability. A centralized wage policy, capable of assuring a social minimum wage and of removing wage inequities, was therefore considered by the trade unions a sine qua non of a strike-free labor-management relationship.

¹³ Commenting on the slowly decreasing wage differentials within Benelux, Michael Hoffman wrote in the *New York Times* on June 17, 1956: "The last major obstacle to full economic union among Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands has been overcome. This is, or was, the difference in wages, which are high in Belgium and low in the Netherlands. . . . As recently as 1952, Dutch wages in industry were little more than half those in Belgium, when converted at the current rate of exchange. Now they are somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters, depending on how the calculation is made. . . . Somewhere between the relative levels of 1952 and 1956, an invisible and incalculable line was crossed and wage disparities ceased to be a cause of disequilibrium between the two economies."

The achievements have been impressive. Although the Netherlands was not a strike-prone country before the war, the postwar record is possibly unique. With the exception of 1946, which was in many respects anything but normal, not a single postwar year has witnessed more than 300,000 man-days of work lost because of labor disputes. In 1951, according to estimates of the Central Bureau of Statistics, man-days lost because of strikes, as a percentage of man-days worked, amounted to 0.01. In 1952, this percentage was cut in half, 0.005, an amazingly low figure for a democratic country which, despite severe economic problems, has taken pride in maintaining the right to strike.¹⁴

While a substantial share of the credit for this accomplishment must go to the system of institutionalized labor-management consultation and co-operation within the Foundation of Labor and to the introduction of a centralized wage policy, it should be recalled that about half of the organized workers in the Netherlands belong to Catholic and Protestant trade unions which have historically followed a policy of striking only in extreme circumstances. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that, on the nondenominational side of the trade union movement, the increasing tendency toward centralization in decision

¹⁴ Data from Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Statistiek der Werkstakingen en Uitsluitingen*, 1952. Up-to-date comparable figures for other countries in Western Europe were not available. See, however, Arthur M. Ross and Donald Irwin, "Strike Experience in Five Countries, 1927-1957: An Interpretation," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (April 1951), especially Table V. If the data are comparable, which is doubtful, United States figures are much higher. For 1950 and 1951, U. S. percentages were 0.44 and 0.23, respectively, that is, about forty times as high.—U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (June 1956), p. 761.

making and authority at the federation level has also contributed to the low strike frequency.

Rational wage structure

Finally, trade union wage policy has striven for the attainment of a rational wage structure based, at the bottom, on a social minimum wage and supporting differentials principally by reference to differences in skills, living costs, and individual output. The meaning of these factors is discussed below. Here it should be pointed out that the really striking aspect of the content of union wage policy lies in those factors which are either omitted or considered secondary to the wage structure, to wit, profits and ability to pay of the industry (or firm), historical differentials (industry, area, or occupational), productivity of the industry (or firm), and changes in the demand for and supply of labor to the industry (or firm). This does not mean that these elements have been considered entirely irrelevant by the Foundation of Labor and the Board of Government Conciliators. It would be impossible completely to ignore them in determining the national wage structure. But they have certainly not been of primary importance—a fact attributable partly to union efforts to eliminate the irrationalities of the prewar period, partly to centralized collective bargaining, and partly to equalitarian tendencies.

WAGE FACTORS AND MOVEMENTS

In September 1945, the Central Bureau of Statistics calculated a minimum weekly budget sufficient to enable an unskilled worker to support a family of four in a large city. It included the cost of food (not difficult to compute since practically all basic food items were rationed), rent, taxes, and other essential components. This very modest budget of f 34.52, raised to f 35.00

so as to provide a margin of safety, became the basic weekly wage of unskilled workers in large cities.¹⁵ In the standard forty-eight-hour week, its hourly equivalent was 73 Dutch cents.¹⁶ This concept of the social minimum wage was held to be a living concept and as such had to be capable of reflecting changes in living costs and national output.

Space permits only a brief review of major wage movements in the postwar period, but it is clear that changes in consumer prices have been the principal cause of national wage changes. National wage increases occurred in November 1947, December 1949, and September 1950, each time as a result of price increases. The price rise preceding the wage increase of September 1950 followed on the heels of the outbreak of the Korean War. Continuing pressures on the Dutch economy in the winter of 1950–51 led to the "consumption cut" of March 1951, when workers accepted a 5 per cent wage increase in full knowledge that the government would be forced to let prices rise by 10 per cent. This proposed cut in real wages presented the trade unions with an especially difficult problem, for they felt that they could not officially sanction a predetermined decrease of an already low standard of living. They extricated themselves by verbally protesting the government's proposal at the discussion stage, after which they proceeded to persuade their members to make the

¹⁵ P. S. Pels, *De Ontwikkeling van de Loonvorming*, 2d ed. (Alpen a. d. Rijn: Samson, 1952), pp. 21 ff.

¹⁶ In 1945 the Dutch guilder (f) corresponded to about 37½ American cents. Allowance should be made for differences in purchasing power and living standards, but a simple arithmetical conversion of the social minimum wage results in approximately \$13.00 per week. Following the currency devaluation of 1949, the guilder reached its present level of about 26¼ cents.

sacrifice. Subsequently, the unions succeeded in obtaining a small one-time payment because the real wage cut had turned out to be slightly higher than 5 per cent (November 1951). Restoration of the former wage-price ratio had to wait until January 1954, all in all a remarkable demonstration of the Dutch worker's willingness to lower his standard of living and even his share in the national income for almost three years.

Generally favorable economic progress has led the unions in the past few years to shift the emphasis in the argumentation for wage increases from cost of living to rising productivity and to the steady increase in the national income. In September 1954, they succeeded in obtaining a 6 per cent wage increase based principally on the "rising prosperity" argument. In the fall of 1955 an increase of 3 per cent of the wage bill was permitted for the purpose of providing more fringe benefits, particularly more paid holidays. Subsequently, in March 1956, a 3 per cent retroactive payment on 1955 wages was allowed, plus an additional increase of up to 6 per cent, depending on an industry's ability to absorb higher wages within the confines of a maximum 3 per cent price increase. This latest wage round also marked a departure from past wage movements by permitting differential increases between industries. It was the outcome of a partially successful offensive by the denominational trade unions, together with the employers' associations, for greater flexibility of wages between various industries—a trend which the NVV was unable to halt.

Wage zones

Wage determination in the Netherlands has taken cognizance not only of changes in living costs over time but also of differences in living costs from place to place. Before the war, sub-

stantial wage differences existed from community to community. During the war, the German-supervised system of wage controls lessened and rationalized these differentials according to size of the community and corresponding variations in consumer prices. On the assumption that variations in consumer prices continued to exist in the postwar period, chiefly in the rent component, postwar wage determination adapted the wartime scheme in somewhat simplified and modified form. Five classes of communities, or wage zones, were established, ranging from the largest industrial and commercial metropolitan areas, like Amsterdam and Rotterdam (Wage Zone I), to the rural towns in the predominantly agricultural provinces (Wage Zone V). On an hourly basis, differences from zone to zone have generally ranged from 2 to 3 cents, so that the maximum difference in standard rates between the highest and the lowest wage zone has generally not exceeded 12 cents per hour. In recent years, efforts have mounted to abandon the geographical differentials in the face of growing equalization in the cost of housing, which used to be chiefly responsible for cost-of-living differences. It is likely that these pressures will eventually result in the abandonment of the five-zone system.

Skill differentials

A further modification of the equalitarian wage system has consisted of skill differentials. Prewar differentials between skilled and unskilled workers averaged, roughly, 25 per cent. In the immediate postwar period, agreement was reached in the Foundation of Labor to reduce the differential to 20 per cent as an "acceptable and reasonable" figure, with half, or 10 per cent, for semiskilled workers.¹⁷ Fear that wages

¹⁷ P. S. Pels, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 22.

in export industries would otherwise rise too high, and ethical and social considerations, specifically the equalitarian objectives of the trade union federations, seem to have weighed most heavily in the decision to narrow the differential.

By 1946 it had become clear that wage controls could not be operated effectively with the relatively crude system of categories of skills. Under the auspices of the Foundation, and with the strong support of the Board of Government Conciliators, a national survey of job classification and job evaluation was undertaken, which subsequently resulted in the introduction of a standardized method of job evaluation.¹⁸ Whatever initial hesitation and opposition to the scheme existed within the ranks of the trade union movement—and unquestionably there was some—was overcome by the central trade union federations, which realized the potential importance of universal job evaluation in removing interindustry and intra-industry inequities, facilitating the adoption of wage incentive systems, potentially increasing the wages of certain highly skilled workers beyond the 20 per cent limit, and, last but by no means least, furnishing the Foundation of Labor and the Board of Government Conciliators with an improved yardstick for administering a national wage policy. It is likely that more than 75 per cent of all industrial

¹⁸ For a description of the system see Hoofddirectie voor de Normalisatie in Nederland, *Standardized Method of Job Evaluation*, Vols. 3,000 and 3,001 (The Hague, 1953). See also Adriaan Vermeulen, *Job Evaluation in the Netherlands*, European Productivity Agency, Union Study No. 5. The concluding chapter of Lloyd G. Reynolds' book on *The Structure of Labor Markets* (New York, 1951) contains a strong recommendation for the "extension of job evaluation techniques across industry lines to provide a comprehensive ranking of jobs throughout the economy" (pp. 261 ff.).

jobs are now included in the standardized method of job evaluation.¹⁹

Equal pay for equal work

While job evaluation has had the objective of promoting equal wage rates for comparable jobs, regardless of the industry, firm, area, or other possible modifying factors, it has not yet gone so far as to eliminate differentials based on sex. A discussion in the Social-Economic Council, the Netherlands top advisory group on major social and economic problems, over the advisability of ratifying the International Labor Organization's Equal Pay for Equal Work Convention brought out that "the NVV representatives . . . and the other members of the Social-Economic Council unanimously agreed that the principle of equal pay for equal work should be applied gradually and after international consultation, in order to prevent disequilibrium in international competition."²⁰ However, the views of the denominational trade unions on the importance of home and family and on the role of woman as wife and mother make it unlikely that the concept of equal pay for equal work will be extended in the foreseeable future to include the elimination of sex differentials.

Incentive schemes

Almost concurrently with the introduction of job evaluation, incentive pay schemes came to the fore in the early postwar years. While job evaluation sought to rationalize and equalize the wage structure, incentive systems had the objective of stimulating production by rewarding special effort with differential earnings. Because of a history

¹⁹ In connection with this point and with the general subject of Netherlands wage policy, see Bert Zoetewij, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*).

²⁰ Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen, *Information Bulletin*, No. 32 (May 1955), pp. 2-3.

of abuse in the prewar period, the introduction of incentives was surrounded by various safeguards, including a ceiling on extra earnings. Trade union participation in rate setting has aided in removing most workers' suspicion of incentive schemes, while the opportunity for income beyond standard wage rates and the development of skill in rate setting have led to the removal of the ceiling and to increasing use of various group and individual incentive programs.

SOME MAJOR RESULTS

The Netherlands wage structure has been one of the most stable in the world since the end of World War II. This stability of wage relationships, predetermined at the conference table, has prevailed in respect to various types of differentials. For example, the ratio of skilled to unskilled standard (that is, prescribed or government-ordered) hourly wage rates in November 1945 was fixed at 120, meaning that hourly wage rates of skilled workers were to exceed those of unskilled workers by 20 percentage points. Nine years later, in October 1954, this ratio, then at 122, was still practically the same.²¹ There was no significant difference in the ratios as between the five wage zones. Moreover, the most recent available figures on average hourly *earnings* showed that the skilled-unskilled ratio for the country as a whole stood at 119, thus showing practically no difference from standard hourly rates.²² Or, taking still

²¹ For detailed data on standard hourly rates see P. S. Pels, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 31, and the more recent figures in Dr. Pels's essay, "The Development of Collective Employment Agreements in the Netherlands," in Adolf Sturmthal (Ed.), *Contemporary Collective Bargaining in Seven Countries*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1957.

²² Earnings data collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics appeared in Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *De Onderneming*, Vol. 6, No. 19 (September 15, 1956), pp. 730-31.

another measure, standard hourly wage rates of skilled workers in large cities (Wage Zone I) rose by 69.8 per cent (from f 0.88 to f 1.26) from November 1945 to October 1954, while standard hourly wage rates of unskilled workers in the same zone rose by 70.9 per cent (from f 0.73 to f 1.03) over the same period—a difference of less than two percentage points.²³ As the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* summarized the Dutch experience:

The purely historical differences between high- and low-wage sectors have been largely eliminated; differentials have generally narrowed and, at the same time, a more subtly differentiated structure based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has been introduced within [and between] each industry.²⁴

Toward greater flexibility

What some call the virtue of stability, others would term the evil of rigidity. While centralized wage determination was accepted by all parties concerned in the early postwar years as a precondition to economic recovery—and viewed by some of the parties as a desirable system in itself—the return of more ordered economic circumstances has since about 1953 fostered demands for progressive "decontrols." What employers' associations and denominational trade unions have demanded above all is the introduction of more wage flexibility between industries. Their combined pressure to include differences between industries as to profits, ability to pay, and productivity

²³ The possible objection that these figures are national averages, concealing larger differences within the various industries, cannot be rejected out of hand, but scattered data on this point do not support the objection. See Economic Commission for Europe (UN), *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* (Geneva), pp. 154-55.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

in the roster of wage criteria has been gaining ground, as the most recent round of wage increases demonstrated. It would be erroneous to conclude, however, that the objective of these groups is the return of free collective bargaining and the removal of government from the sphere of wage determination. This may be true of some employers, but most proponents of greater flexibility concede the need for continued government supervision of the wage structure and wage trends. Their objective is the limited one of greater autonomy for the different industries, and one of their main arguments cites the need for bringing about a closer relationship than exists at present between output and earnings. Their position rests on the two concepts of equity and incentive—"equity" in the sense that workers are entitled to share more directly in higher productivity on an industry-by-industry basis, and "incentive" in terms of their belief that a closer relationship between output, profits, and wages will, in turn, stimulate still higher productivity. The non-denominational NVV has thus far remained unconvinced. It maintains that the concept of "equal pay for equal work" is a socially more desirable objective and in addition that, given the economic circumstances of the Netherlands, the government cannot be expected to maintain full employment without the instruments of centralized wage control. Until the outbreak of the Suez crisis, the trend was in the direction of more flexibility, favored by conditions of very full employment and a rising national income.

Centralization

A further result of the postwar system of wage determination has been the high degree of centralization of decision making in the central trade union fed-

erations and, to a somewhat lesser degree perhaps, in the central employer associations. This development is a direct result of a system which has accorded the labor federations a key role in a key institution, the Foundation of Labor. The Foundation has been the scene of centralized wage bargaining, with results subject of course to government sanction. At the same time it has had a powerful advisory role in the adjudication of the wage claims of the various industries over requests for wage rates below or above the national pattern, fringe benefits, incentive systems and rates, and so forth. It would lead too far afield here to appraise the effects of centralization on relations between the federations and the national unions and between the national unions and the individual worker, but the following speculative observations may be offered.²⁵ (1) Skillful distribution of seats on the governing bodies of the federations has mitigated internal tensions, although on the whole, as one would expect, the strong unions in profitable industries have been more inclined toward greater industrial autonomy than the weak unions in less profitable industries. (2) National unions have had fewer opportunities than in the prewar period to demonstrate to their members the ability and power to obtain wage increases and other economic benefits through collective bargaining because major wage settlements are made centrally and are nationwide in application. Moreover, the prewar trade union benefit programs have been largely incorporated into the postwar social insurance system. Unions have therefore been forced to expand their noneconomic programs, especially if we

²⁵ Local unions in the Netherlands, like local unions in most Western European countries, are structurally and functionally different from and less important than local unions in the United States.

include in this the limited form of codetermination gradually being introduced. (3) While it is true that total membership has steadily increased, it is believed that the total figures hide a substantial turnover. This inflow-outflow movement appears to have affected the NVV more than the denominational unions. It is, however, hardly surprising that such problems have arisen under centralized wage controls. What is more important, and from the American point of view more interesting, is the willingness of trade unions to support a centrally directed wage policy.

Union restraint and responsibility

Unquestionably, the Dutch unions have demonstrated a degree of restraint and responsibility in the postwar period for which there is no parallel in their previous history. In this, they have not stood alone, for the union movements of other Western European countries, always excluding of course the Communist-dominated federations in France and Italy, have generally shown an equal or almost equal sense of wage restraint.²⁶ Some of the underlying factors have already been reviewed. The labor-management rapprochement during the occupation, the abandonment of the "class struggle," the exigencies of economic recovery, and the institutional forum for the discussion of controversial questions provided by the Foundation of Labor have been of cardinal importance.

Furthermore, the political parties which have in coalition governed the Netherlands since 1945 have all maintained more or less close ties with the

trade union movement. This has been true not only of the Labor party, which finds much of its political support in the NVV, but also of the denominational political parties whose "left" wings have been composed of adherents or supporters of the denominational trade union federations. The trade unions have thus acquired a stake in government transcending anything in the prewar period. To preserve the stability of "their" government, they have been willing to enter into unwritten understandings that they will conduct a reasonable wage policy in return for effective government control over consumer prices, rents, and profits. There is a pervasive trade union confidence in the willingness of government to support a fair tax structure, to provide honest price and wage statistics, and to include the trade unions in consultations on every major and most minor economic problems.

Participation in economic planning has had the further effect of making trade unions more conscious than ever before of wage-price relationships. It is something of a paradox that on occasion the trade unions have been far more concerned than the employers over the effect of a wage increase on the general price level, and that the trade unions, far more than the employers, have been the defenders of a centralized system of wage controls. But their attitude becomes understandable in the light of the overriding concern with full employment—at the expense, if necessary, of wage maximization.

Even then, of course, trade unions have not had an easy existence. A tremendous and largely successful educational effort has had to be made to persuade workers of the need for wage restraints, higher productivity, incentive wages, job evaluation, and decreased differentials. Full employment and a

²⁶ For a discussion of factors underlying general wage restraint in Western Europe since 1945 see Leonora L. Stettner, "Wage Pressures and Inflation Controls in Western Europe," *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (June 1956), pp. 664-70.

gradually rising real wage have been the pillars of national wage controls. Without them—aside from temporary setbacks like the consumption cut of 1951—it is doubtful that Dutch workers would have accepted continuing controls over such an extended period. Yet it now seems as though full employment and a rising living standard are themselves generating pressures that promise to lead to a decrease in central wage guidance and a corresponding increase

in industrial self-regulation. Conceivably, after twelve years of controls which have also been twelve years of economic progress, the sense of national emergency is beginning to fade. If so, only a major turn of events, such as the threat of rapid inflation or sudden severe unemployment or a prolongation of the adverse economic effects of the unsettled situation in the Middle East, would be capable of reversing the present trend toward decentralization.

Economic Growth and Government Wage Regulation: The Australian Problem

By MARK PERLMAN

Abstract: Australian industrial relations present peculiar features, owing to the fact that the Constitution of the country permits extensive federal intervention in this field. The result has been the creation of a system of governmental agencies and regulations which have had a checkered career and undergone many changes in the last fifty years. The latest reorganization occurred in 1956, when a statute was passed dividing responsibility and functions among three agencies, a Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and an Industrial Court. The major problems facing these bodies are discussed.—Ed.

THERE are several features of the long Australian experience with governmental regulation of industrial conditions which interest foreign observers. Principally they include (1) how the system tries to prevent strikes and lockouts; (2) how the system erects a wage structure for Australian industry and trade; and (3) whether the system can successfully countervail inflationary changes in prices.

This paper refers briefly to these usual queries, but on the whole is concerned with post-World War II developments. In it we trace the recent evolution of the arbitration law and summarize the reasons for its changes. We also refer to the overwhelming post-World War II problem of inflation, which even more than industrial warfare¹ has plagued Australia. We con-

clude by putting both the problems of industrial dispute regulation and inflation in the context of what we regard as the major current issue, namely, the economic development and growth of Australia.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REGULATION

Originally the major purpose of federal intervention in the industrial relations field was to prevent or settle strikes and lockouts. This goal was to be accomplished by expert determination of "fair and equitable" standards of wages and working conditions.

To understand the course of the Australian experience, however, it is necessary to consider four separate factors: (1) the basic enabling clause of the Australian Constitution which permits

¹ For analyses of strikes and strike statistics see James W. Kuhn, "Grievance Machinery and Strikes in Australia," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 8 (January 1955), pp. 169-76; Mark Perlman, "An Industrial Problem: Australia's Longshoremen," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 4 (July 1953), pp. 462-73, and *Judges in Industry: A Study of Labour Arbitration in Australia* (Melbourne: Mel-

bourne University Press, 1954); Arthur M. Ross and Donald M. Irwin, "Strike Experience in Five Countries, 1927-1947: An Interpretation," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 4 (April 1951), pp. 323-42, Vol. 6 (April 1953), pp. 395-98. For reasons of brevity we must omit discussion of this interesting and important feature of postwar events.

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federal intervention in the industrial relations field, (2) the nature and the scope of the program undertaken by the arbitration authorities, (3) the reaction of the Australian High Court toward the constitutionality of the program of the arbitration authorities, and (4) what the litigants themselves seemed to want, and how they attempted to give the arbitration authorities "guidance."

Australian experience with direct governmental regulation of wages and working conditions actually antedates Federation (1901). Arbitration was discussed at the two Constitutional Conventions (1891 and 1897-98), where it was decided that it would be wiser to put the governmental power not in the hands of a politics-minded Parliament but in the hands of an expert commission which presumably would be free of political party pressure. Thus Section 51 (XXXV) of the Constitution authorizes Parliament to legislate for interstate trade in the industrial relations field only to the extent of creating a tribunal to conciliate and arbitrate labor disputes. Unlike the American Congress, the Australian Parliament, itself, may not pass laws dealing directly with wages, hours, or working conditions. In 1904 the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration came into existence, for the purpose of preventing and settling industrial disputes. To facilitate its mission it encouraged the formation of unions and employers' associations, with whose cooperation it tried to function.

Henry Bournes Higgins and the Arbitration System

The architect of the Arbitration System was Henry Bournes Higgins. He drew up the original constitutional clause, framed the original Arbitration Act (1904), and was from 1906 until shortly after World War I President of

the Arbitration Court. His views about industrial arbitration are beautifully expressed in a series of court decisions, in a series of articles published under the title, *A New Province for Law and Order*,² and finally in a little pamphlet privately printed after he had left the Arbitration Court.³

Justice Higgins sought to regulate all aspects of industrial relations by promulgating expertly determined *Common Rules*. These *Common Rules* set forth the minimum standards for wages and working conditions for each interstate industry, and would inevitably tend to serve as guides for the state arbitration authorities in their determination of relevant state policies. Thus Higgins tried to establish a rational approach to industrial relations; it is from his early decisions that the present system developed.

The Basic Wage

He set a minimum wage in 1907 which he believed sufficient to cover the bare necessities for a married man with family. Called the Basic Wage, the amount was to be the minimum paid to any workman regardless of his skill or productivity. Added to this Basic Wage were differentials (called "margins") for skill and other reasons, including productivity. Thus, in practice, the wage rate for a particular occupation was determined by adding an appropriate "margin" to the Basic Wage. The size of the margin depended upon the ability of the industry to pay, as well as whatever other factors the Court thought relevant.

The Basic Wage and the margins together constituted the actual wage

² Sydney: Workers' Education Association, 1922.

³ *The [Australian] Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration*. London: Privately printed, 1925.

structure for all crafts and skills, because there was a historical tendency for employers to pay no more than the legally prescribed minima.

After 1913 the Basic Wage was varied (first yearly, then quarterly by geographic area) to adjust for changes in retail prices (cost of living). And from time to time the Basic Wage, itself, was recomputed to compensate for generally increased (and during the Depression generally decreased) living standards. The "margins" were not adjusted automatically and consequently tended to be dwarfed when the Basic Wage rose.⁴

Besides developing a rational wage structure, Higgins sought to incorporate into the national system all the details of maximum hours provisions, provisions for amenities, occupational classifications, and the like. He saw his role as that of an *administrator* of industrial relations, with the primary duty of defining standards. While, of course, he listened to the demands of the litigants and to their proposals, he did not feel bound by their views. His was the ultimate responsibility and he promulgated what he thought wise. In my study, *Judges in Industry*,⁵ I call his approach the "administrative" one; it represents one philosophy of arbitration. It was particularly liked by those employers who feared "destructive" competition from others in the industry and found in his awards uniform standards ap-

plying to everyone. It was also liked by weak unions who saw him as a protector.

High Court decisions

The High Court did not permit Higgins to develop this program effectively. The High Court held, for instance, that the *Common Rule* principle could not be used and that only the actual parties to a dispute could be bound by the award, which, incidentally, had to fall within the boundaries set by the litigants. Moreover the High Court in a series of decisions held that the arbitration authority as originally constituted was not, in spite of its courtlike title and appearance, a court in the legal meaning of the word. Hence the Arbitration Court could not, without amendment to the Arbitration Act, interpret the meaning of its awards or enforce them nor could it punish people for contempt. In one decision after another the High Court clipped the wings of Higgins' Arbitration System and forced it to go to Parliament for aid. Thus Parliament was given repeated opportunities to influence Arbitration Court policy, because each time that the Court had to seek enlargement of its powers, it had to listen to the desires and advice of the Members of Parliament. A description of the critical High Court decisions and the resulting amendments to the original Arbitration Act can be found in Orwell de R. Foenander's works.⁶

⁶ *Towards Industrial Peace in Australia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1937); *Solving Labour Problems in Australia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1941); *Wartime Labour Developments in Australia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1943); *Industrial Regulation in Australia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1947); *Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1952).

⁴ For a discussion of Basic Wage changes see J. E. Isaac, "The Basic Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry in Australia," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 69 (June 1954), pp. 570-93; Mark Perlman, "Wage Regulation in Australia," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 4 (January 1953), pp. 25-30; Kingsley Laffer, "Cost of Living Adjustments in Australian Wage Determination," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 7 (January 1954), pp. 278-87; D. W. Oxnam, "Industrial Arbitration in Australia: Its Effects on Wages and Unions," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 9 (July 1956), pp. 610-28.

⁵ Cited note 1 *supra*.

Autonomous approach to arbitration

Higgins' administrative approach to arbitration was, as noted above, well liked by poorly organized employers or weak unions. As time was to demonstrate, however, strong employers' federations and strong unions definitely did not like having the Court "meddle in their affairs." While they accepted the principle of governmental intervention, they wanted that intervention to be strictly limited in scope to the questions they themselves raised. This second approach to arbitration stressed a restricted role for the Arbitration System, which I term the "autonomous" approach. Its evolution is discussed in detail in my *Judges in Industry*⁷ and in Walker's more recent study.⁸

By World War II the Court, although oriented to the practice of administrative arbitration, was beginning to utilize the autonomous approach in some industries. During World War II Australia underwent a dramatic change. Her geographic isolation brought her to the brink of defeat, and the eclipse of British naval power with the consequent disruption of commerce made her realize how important development of local industry was. To defend herself and later to aid in an Allied victory, her manufacturing industries were greatly expanded. Significantly, it was these industries, where the employers did not fear competition and where the unions were strong, which expanded; consequently the demand for the autonomous approach to arbitration increased. In addition the war brought full employment to Australia, and there was general pressure on the Court by both employers and unions to raise wages more and more.

⁷ Cited note 1 *supra*.

⁸ Kenneth F. Walker, *Industrial Relations in Australia*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956.

General dissatisfaction

There also developed a general sense of dissatisfaction with a court of law form in the handling of labor relations. A belief developed that the elimination of lawyers as well as more direct dealings between the litigants would expedite settlement. And when in 1946-47 the *Forty Hours Case*, involving the shortening of the standard work week from forty-four hours, took over a year to hear, it became evident that the judges could not possibly handle the postwar load if the Court were to function as before. In addition, many Australians were of the opinion that too great reliance was being placed on arbitration and not enough on conciliation.

REVISIONS OF THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN 1947

Thus in 1947 Parliament, led by a Labor government, reorganized the whole system. It split the functions between a judge-manned Arbitration Court and a layman-manned Conciliation Commissioner service. The Court was principally to perform the following functions: (1) determine the Basic Wage, (2) determine the length of the general work week, (3) determine the length of long-service vacations with pay, and (4) determine the "Basic Wage" for females (the Basic Wage applies only to men). Each of the Conciliation Commissioners, on the other hand, was to be in charge of an industry or group of industries. They were to prevent strikes, if possible, and were to use their good offices to conciliate differences. Failing success through persuasion, they were empowered to issue arbitral, binding awards on such issues as "margins," piece rates, annual vacations, and working conditions. Consequently, the adjective "Conciliation" notwithstanding, the

Commissioners were in practice arbitrators.

However, if any question arose regarding the meaning of a Commissioner's award, he was not, under basic Australian constitutional law, empowered to clarify the meaning of his words. That duty was reserved for the Arbitration Court. Thus the closest the judges came to fashioning awards for particular industries (except the coal and stevedoring industries, which were handled otherwise) was through interposition via interpretation.

In effect the 1947 revision made each of the Conciliation Commissioners a final "tribunal" for one or more specified industries. As might have been foreseen (but evidently was not), great disparity between the terms of individual awards developed; some Commissioners being "softer," others "harder." The Commissioners were for the most part not legally trained; indeed several of them came out of "career positions" in the trade union movement. The heterogeneity of their personal backgrounds plus the many guises in which the same or similar issues came to them, individually, resulted in a proliferation of dissimilar awards. To complicate matters further, some of the Commissioners were adamant in refusing to incorporate into their awards any recognition of the policies being worked out by fellow Commissioners. In some industries the awards provided for greater benefits; in others for less. Thus distortions in wage relationships between industries appeared.

The Arbitration Court, itself, did not confine its operation to the four enumerated questions, although most of its time was occupied with repeated hearings on the adequacy of the Basic Wage, which it raised by 20 shillings in 1950, and in 1954 it eliminated the quarterly cost-of-living adjustment. What the Court began to consider with increasing

frequency was a series of politically inspired strikes, the worst of which occurred in the coal industry in 1949. This concern led the Court to pay increasing attention to the internal administration of left-wing unions. On several occasions the Court intervened and set aside election results when fraud was alleged to have occurred. In addition, the Court became increasingly bold in ordering compliance with its orders reinforcing the Commissioners' awards, on pain of contempt citation and conviction. Parliament agreed with the wisdom of the Court's new policies and passed enabling legislation. Some of this legislation was temporary and was repealed or expired when the immediate crisis passed; other legislation was incorporated into more or less permanent practice. At one time the Arbitration Court even had eight leaders of the stevedoring, miners', and ironworkers' unions in jail on contempt citations.

1952 amendment

In 1952 Parliament amended the 1947 act to allow permissive review of a Commissioner's award if it appeared to the Court or to the Commissioner to be in conflict with some other Commissioner's award or awards. This amendment seemed to have met at least one of the major objections to the lack of control resulting from the 1947 legislation. Nevertheless there was general disappointment with the 1947 system and particular dissatisfaction with the Commissioners. In more and more instances parties tended to stay away from the system, and to "settle" their own differences as best they could on a catch-as-catch-can basis. It was a relatively prosperous period, and employers were generally willing to pay more than the award rates. No one was satisfied, but few were actively rebellious against the system. (Exceptions were the stevedoring and mining unions—both of which

had remained under the influence of pro-Communist, if not actively Communist, leadership. The ironworkers' union had been "purged" of its "red" leadership as a result of Court supervision of union elections.)

THE BOILERMAKERS' CASE

Finally, in May 1955, the uneasy institutional situation came to a head when the Arbitration Court ordered the Boilermakers' Union to comply with the terms of an award. The union persisted in its willful disregard of the Court's order, whereupon it was indicted, convicted, and fined A£500 (\$1,125). The union then appealed to the High Court of Australia for relief, submitting that the Arbitration Court was, in effect, trying to perform both legislative (award-making) and judicial (award-enforcing) functions and that according to Australian constitutional theory both functions could not be vested in one agency. In effect, the Boilermakers' Union, which had the support of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, asked that the Arbitration Court be enjoined from employing the prerogatives of a court—particularly those permitting it to fine and punish parties in contempt.

The High Court delayed delivery of its judgment until Parliament was again sitting; on March 2, 1956, by a vote of 4 to 3, the High Court held the Arbitration Act of 1904-52 to be *ultra vires* (unconstitutional), saying in effect that Parliament cannot locate at one and the same time and in one and the same agency both legislative and judicial powers, except that a court is empowered to make procedural rules pertaining strictly to its judicial functioning.

Whether the High Court's decision was wise or not remains a moot question (one dissenter, Mr. Justice Williams, wrote a vigorous and particularly clear rejection of the majority's view).

The decision has now been appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, where it will probably be adjudicated in 1957.

RECASTING OF ARBITRATION PROCESS IN 1956 ACT

In the meantime Parliament recast the whole federal arbitration process with the intent of (1) overcoming the specific objections stipulated in the *Boilermakers' Case 1955-56*, (2) providing for continued state intervention in union affairs, (3) providing for continued administrative arbitration where applicable, (4) providing for further development of autonomous arbitration and its concomitant, bipartite collective bargaining, and (5) providing for effective enforcement of awards.

The 1956 act provides that there shall be three bodies entrusted with different parts of the general program of federal intervention in industrial relations. To replace the amorphous corps of Conciliation Commissioners, there will be a Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission consisting of at least three legally trained and qualified judges (the President and two Deputy-Presidents), one Senior Commissioner, and at least five Commissioners. The Commissioners, as before, need not have legal training and do not enjoy the lifetime career advantages of the "presidential" members. But the Commissioners, unlike those in the 1947 system, are to have their work co-ordinated both by the Senior Commissioner and by the President of the Commission. The former is to handle personnel assignments within the Commission; the latter is to arrange for co-ordination of policy. Each Commissioner is, as before, to try to prevent or, if necessary, to settle most types of industrial disputes in a particular industry or group of industries. If he cannot get agreement, he *may with the permission of the Presi-*

dent of the Commission issue an order. That order is of a compulsive character and may incorporate penalties for non-compliance. Appeal against it does exist, in most instances through a special session of the "full Commission" (meaning three members, at least two of which are presidential members, that is, judges).

Only a "full Commission," where two of the three members are presidential members, can issue awards that (1) alter the standard hours of work in an industry, (2) alter the Basic Wage, (3) make provision for long-service vacations with pay, or (4) determine or alter the "Basic Wage for adult females." Thus the legislative duties of the 1947 Arbitration Court, although still kept in the hands of judges, are now technically part not of a court's powers but of a legislative commission's duties.

Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration

The old Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is retained, primarily in order to make the appeal to the Privy Council legally possible, but it has been given a very limited set of purely judicial functions. Of these, interpreting the meaning of a Commission award is the most important. No appeal on substantive grounds is allowed from this Court's interpretations.

Commonwealth Industrial Court

A new Commonwealth Industrial Court now exists. It consists of not less than two nor more than three legally trained and qualified judges. This Industrial Court, presided over by a single judge, will handle all anti-union member discrimination cases (which carry, incidentally, penalties), interpret its own awards, and perform some procedural functions like granting the right to appeal against union certification orders.

The full court, consisting of at least two judges, can (1) order compliance with any award, particularly those made under the powers of the Industrial Commission after it finds that the award has been disregarded, (2) enjoin and punish for contempt any party who threatens to or has willfully contravened this act or an award made under it, and (3) perform all the functions permitted a single judge as noted above.

An experiment to be watched

These are the main provisions. Brevity requires the omission of many details. Whether the new act will succeed where the others failed is in our opinion quite doubtful, unless the technical ability of the newly appointed personnel is vastly greater than has been characteristic of many previous appointments. Nevertheless this new experiment should be watched closely; it is a new chapter in the division of the responsibility of state intervention in industrial relations.

PRICE INFLATION

One of the greatest problems facing Australia since 1947 has been retail price inflation. The following index indicates its magnitude:

INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES, 1945-1955 (1939 = 100)

1945 = 122.4	1951 = 204.7
1946 = 124.5	1952 = 238.9
1947 = 129.2	1953 = 250.3
1948 = 140.8	1954 = 252.9
1949 = 153.9	1955 = 258.6
1950 = 164.7	

Source: Based on the "C Series," Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics.

While there are obviously many causes for this price inflation, we are concerned primarily with the question of how extensive a role the Arbitration System has played in it.

In the first place we must realize that

virtually the entire period 1945-56 has been one of full employment and often of "over-full employment" in Australia. Thus actual Arbitration System policy has been influenced by the knowledge that in many instances both management and workers have negotiated private, over-award, rates. Consequently there have been effective limits on the system's actual ability to come to grips with the problem, particularly in the areas where the autonomous approach existed.

In 1946-47 the Court held hearings resulting in a 10 per cent reduction of the standard work week without any change in weekly wage rates. This 40 *Hours Case* had originally been postponed during the war, and although the judges procrastinated, when they had to make an award the least that they "could" give was to increase minimum pay for the usual forty-four hour week by 15 per cent (including overtime). If the decision had not been forthcoming, there would have been continual work stoppages, which would possibly have been even more inflationary. In

INDEX OF WAGES IN AUSTRALIAN
INDUSTRY, 1945-1955
(1939 = 100)

YEAR	WAGES IN ALL INDUSTRIES	
	Nominal	Real
1945.....	126.7	103.4
1946.....	130.0	104.3
1947.....	140.7	108.8
1948.....	157.9	112.1
1949.....	173.9	112.9
1950.....	194.8	114.7
1951.....	243.5	118.8
1952.....	283.9	118.7
1953.....	300.1	119.7
1954.....	305.1	120.5
1955.....	311.3	120.4

Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics.

any event the effect of the award was inflationary.

In 1949-50 the Court held hearings on the Basic Wage. In December 1950 through a "fluke" award, the Basic Wage was increased by one Australian pound.⁹ This again was probably inflationary in consequence, although in many instances employers were already paying over-award rates and the new order may have merely absorbed part of that difference.

Some of the Conciliation Commissioners, notably J. M. Galvin in the metal trades, tried to hold the line after 1950. In 1952 he refused an increase in engineers' (machinists') margins, arguing that such a pay increase would be inflationary. Regardless of any merit in his opinion, most employers effectively met the union demand and paid more. It is not clear whether Galvin's award was noninflationary. In so far as it was not observed, it cannot be held responsible for any subsequent inflationary effects. In the long run, however, a relatively great increase in the margins of the most highly skilled and those holding the most responsible jobs might have been deflationary. Of this we shall say more in the next section.

In 1952-53 the Arbitration Court again held hearings on the Basic Wage. In the end, they decided neither to raise nor to lower the going Basic Wage and ordered suspension of quarterly cost-of-living adjustments to it. Thus in effect they froze the Basic Wage. As such the decision was a deflationary effort.

To what extent has the wage-earning population suffered as a result of the inflation—in other words, have real wages fallen? The *Commonwealth Statistician* publishes a nominal (money) wage index which can be compared with

⁹ O. de R. Foenander, *Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1952); Mark Perlman, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*).

the "C Series" retail price index to which we have already referred. Both series, it must be noted, may not adequately reflect changes. There is difficulty in getting satisfactory figures for wages paid, and for part of the time, at least, the price index reflected official, not black market, prices. Since goods were for the most part not easily procurable through legitimate channels, the index was at least a little distorted.

On the whole real wages have increased, it would appear, 20 per cent since 1939 and about 17 per cent since the end of World War II. Recently the increase amounts to 1 per cent per year. All things considered, that is not a staggeringly great amount!

A major part of the explanation for the small change rests upon the marked efforts Australia has made since 1940 to divert resources from immediate consumer goods into producer goods channels. The next section deals in part with one aspect of this investment program—that is, investment in "human resources," through immigration and an expanded educational program. Here it suffices to note that prices have more than doubled since 1939—and real wages have risen only slightly.

TODAY'S MAJOR PROBLEM

The specific problem of inflation and the general question of controlling industrial relations should be seen in the light of Australia's need to increase its rate of economic growth. Of course, there are many factors influencing national economic growth, but of these, three stand out as being connected in an important sense with industrial relations.

First, Australia needs a larger reservoir of human skills. These are obtainable by increasing the population and by giving better training to those in the labor force. Government policy since 1946 has been to encourage large-

scale immigration from Britain and from Europe. Intensive efforts have been made to acculturate the newcomers—to provide homes, the "necessities" of a high living standard, general education, and job skills. It is noted, incidentally, that an inevitable side effect of the immigration during this period has been to increase the inflationary pressures. In this respect, as in the expected flow of future goods, this immigration represents investment.

Second, Australia needs vast amounts of capital investment in both the governmental and the private sector of the economy. One way to encourage this development is by maintenance of industrial peace and efficient adjudication of labor disputes. Here the Arbitration System can make a positive contribution.

Increased productivity

Third, Australia very much needs increased industrial productivity, from both labor and management. Like the maintenance of industrial peace, increased productivity will also encourage capital investment.

As we see the Australian record, we are overwhelmed by the acceptance in all quarters of a belief that high wage rates must mean increased labor costs. Quite the contrary: labor paid at high rates may be most economical if it is not used wastefully or allowed to dissipate its working time on tasks requiring only a small fraction of its skill.

Traditionally, economic egalitarianism has been an unwritten Australian policy. We hold that the new Industrial Commission should abandon it if Australian economic growth is to be accelerated.

Increased labor productivity essentially means more economic use of the resources within the labor force. It generally requires higher levels of job skills and increased willingness to un-

dertake greater job responsibilities. By enlarging margins for skill and the acceptance of job responsibility the arbitration authorities can play an important role in providing motivation for ambitious workers to train for and hold more important positions. In earlier decades the system considered this point, but it was politically unpopular.

Increased labor productivity is also directly affected by the level of managerial efficiency. And managerial efficiency is a topic which the Arbitration System would do well to consider at all times. By and large there is a crying need for increased use of industrial engineering techniques in all sectors of the Australian economy. It is not always new equipment that is needed; often simple work rationalization and improvements in work flow patterns will suffice. The Arbitration System can encourage developments in this direction by basing its awards on the ability to pay of fairly progressive firms rather than on the ability of those which are not competitive with overseas suppliers and which have hidden behind tariff barriers. A transitional period would be required—when firms would have to rethink their production decisions. Making management really manage would result in putting pressures on unions to co-operate by eliminating economically undesirable practices.

Besides stressing recent scientific contributions to production, the system should seek to encourage Australian management to rely more heavily on

well-trained first-line supervisors. Raising weekly rates for supervisors might cause employers to pay more attention to selecting those who are ready and able to increase production following rational least-cost economic principles. As yet this is a generally unexplored avenue.

CHALLENGE TO THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM

In sum, the challenges offered the Arbitration authorities, if limited, are also important. The system cannot single-handedly really check the present inflation; that is a task for those handling fiscal, monetary, and import controls. But it can do much more than it has done to accelerate and shape the development of Australian industry. So long as it has some measure of control over wage rates, it must do whatever it can to encourage increases in the reservoir of human skills and in the long run to augment production. At the turn of the century Justice Higgins had faith in the performance of disinterested experts at least somewhat removed from political life. The authorities, we feel, must now become economically more sophisticated. If they do, it is possible that non-Australians in the future will add a fourth question to the three posed at the outset of this article: How has the system, organized originally to prevent industrial strife, been able to adjust its role so that it has stimulated the rate of Australian economic growth?

This is the challenge.

Labor Relations in Ghana

By R. B. DAVISON

Abstract: Labor relations in the Gold Coast (Ghana), or aspects thereof, such as collective bargaining, free trade unions, and arbitration, cannot be discussed as though a free market economy existed there or on the assumption that it will develop as in Europe and in America. The state is the dominant employer of labor and the principal source of capital; without its initiative the economy would not have developed. So long as this persists an effective free trade union movement will be difficult to secure, and it is as yet too early to attempt to predict how the trade union movement will develop. To a considerable degree the direction of African thought may depend on the understanding shown by the West of the magnitude and complexity of the economic and political problems facing the new statesmen in Ghana.—Ed.

ON March 6, 1957, a new sovereign state—Ghana—will emerge upon the world stage. For the past eighty years Ghana (previously known as the Gold Coast) has been a British colonial territory, one of the four British West African tropical dependencies, and its emergence into complete independence marks an important landmark in the onward march of the awakening continent of Africa. For some time the Gold Coast has had an all-African government with an African Prime Minister (Dr. Kwame Nkrumah) and complete autonomy in its internal affairs. After March 6, 1957, this government, which was re-elected last year by a substantial majority in an election conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage, will assume responsibility for the country's defense and external relations. Ghana's relationship with Britain will be analogous to that of India, which is also a sovereign state within the British Commonwealth.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF GHANA

The development of Ghana will be watched with considerable interest in

all parts of the world. The country has chosen to remain a member of the British Commonwealth, and indications are that it will also, at least for the time being, remain in the sterling area. The Gold Coast, incidentally, has been one of the few countries in the sterling area which regularly earn a comfortable surplus on their dollar accounts. Already, it is an outstanding example of economic development in tropical Africa. A recent United Nations study¹ reported that in tropical Africa south of the Sahara 40 per cent of the adult male population in 1950 were engaged in "commercialized production" (that is, the production of goods for sale rather than for domestic consumption); the remaining 60 per cent were engaged in subsistence agriculture. In the Gold Coast, by way of contrast, 79 per cent of the adult males were engaged in "commercialized production," by far the highest proportion recorded. Next was the Belgian Congo, with 59 per cent of adult males producing for

¹ United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa* (New York, 1954), Table 6.

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the market. At the other end of the scale, French West Africa, geographically contiguous to the Gold Coast, recorded 23 per cent so engaged.

Not only is Ghana politically and economically well in the lead of tropical Africa; there are great opportunities for future expansion. For many years there has been under consideration a proposal to dam the river Volta to generate electric power, to be employed primarily in the manufacture of aluminum, using the bauxite deposits which are fairly plentiful in the interior. The surplus electricity would be available for industrial development. The Volta River project has been the subject of an exhaustive inquiry by a commission, which has estimated the capital cost as between £230 and £300 million at current prices. Originally the scheme, which is of vast proportions for a country the size of Ghana, was to have been financed through a tripartite arrangement involving the Ghana government, the United Kingdom government, and a consortium of private aluminum companies associated with the Aluminum Company of America. It cannot be said that there is agreement on this issue now, and it is perhaps significant that the Volta River project has been referred for consideration to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Whatever may happen to the Volta River project, the fact remains that Ghana is at a significant stage of economic as well as political development. Her progress—or lack of it—will be noted by many eyes, not only in the rest of Africa but throughout the underdeveloped regions of the world. The issues involved are fundamental and important. The politically uncommitted nations are going to judge the present battle of ideologies between East and West not in terms of slogans or propaganda, but in the light of economic

growth. In Russia and China, the problem of underdevelopment is being attacked by political methods which not only repudiate the sovereignty of the market in economic affairs but also regard individual liberty as a secondary consideration. If, however, they can demonstrate with each passing decade substantial improvements in their rate of economic growth, no amount of persuasion or military action by the West, unless accompanied by clear demonstration of the superiority of its economic systems, will prevent countries like Ghana and others in Africa at present in the Western sphere from turning to political systems that in American and British eyes are repugnant. This is the issue and the challenge, and it is against this wider background that the question of labor relations in Ghana must be viewed.

PROJECTION OF WESTERN IDEOLOGIES

As R. H. Tawney has pointed out,² "The most significant differences distinguishing different societies from each other are not different forms of constitution and government but different types of economic and social structure." It is important to keep this proposition in mind in any analysis of the contemporary development of Africa. There is an understandable tendency on the part of American and British observers commenting on the economic and social problems of a country like Ghana to start with the assumption that the issues they are considering are fundamentally similar to the ones they are used to dealing with "back home." When faced with particular problems, such as the regulation of labor relations, Europeans and Americans are initially inclined to think in terms of "free" trade unions, collective bargaining, arbitration procedures.

² R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (4th edition; London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), p. 94.

wage incentive schemes, and the like. This is the way progress has been made in the capitalistic economies of America and Western Europe, and at first sight it seems reasonable to assume that these institutions should work equally well in Africa. This assumption has underlain British colonial policy in the labor field from the beginning and motivates the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, with its strong American component, today. In particular, from the inception of the Gold Coast Labor Department in 1938, under some pressure from the Labour party in Britain, it has been tacitly assumed that projection into the African context of British trade unionism with its superstructure of collective bargaining is the obvious and right way to bring about an improvement in labor relations. There is, however, no a priori justification for assuming that what is right in one country at a given stage of its development is necessarily right, with or without modification, in another, or that what has worked well "back home" must (unless the local people are incorrigibly stupid) necessarily work well "out here." Colonial administrators tend to try to create, if not people, then societies in their own image.

One of the greatest dangers facing the student of labor relations in an underdeveloped area is that of allowing himself to be blinded by a political ideology to such an extent that he loses sight of economic reality. He may be so intent on upholding principles he regards as fundamental in his own society that he projects them without close scrutiny into a situation where they cannot possibly apply. At the same time, the practical administrator, preoccupied with day-to-day problems of government, sets about creating and trying to stimulate institutions which, in their familiar form, are not at all suitable as instruments for coping with

the actual situation. Has this happened in the Gold Coast of today? What lessons have yet to be learned in the Ghana of tomorrow?

HAS GHANA A FREE MARKET ECONOMY?

Let us begin by declaring explicitly that, given a free market economy, even if it shows marked tendencies towards oligopoly, the machinery of collective bargaining with its concomitant apparatus of governmental conciliation and arbitration, resting on the firm base of a free trade union movement, has demonstrated its value beyond question in those countries where, by devoted efforts and sacrifices, the machinery has been created. But what happens if there is no free market economy? When we have to deal with a situation in which, by virtue of historical rather than ideological necessity, there is immense concentration of economic power in the hands of the state or of private (expatriate) firms, how are labor relations to be regulated? This is the dilemma which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved in the underdeveloped territories, and it is instructive to look at the economy of Ghana to see to what extent, if at all, we find conditions which may fairly be described as "free market" conditions.

Agriculture

We should logically begin with agriculture, inasmuch as Ghana is, and is likely to remain, predominantly an agricultural country. For present purposes we can ignore the sector of the economy which is concerned with purely subsistence agriculture. There are no problems of "labor relations" here, because production is largely carried on within the family group. We must concentrate on the export and local-market crops, for it is the sale of the crop that brings in the cash with which any

hired labor is paid. Only one export crop matters—cocoa—since this crop accounts for about 70 per cent of the value of agricultural exports. Is there a “free market” in the Gold Coast in cocoa? Emphatically not. Since the war a body known as the Cocoa Marketing Board, originally conceived as a producers’ organization, has been turned into a monopolistic state purchasing agency which, by manipulating the internal cocoa price, has accumulated a large reserve of over 100 million pounds. Furthermore, by the operation of a loans section of a subsidiary company, a start has been made on what amounts to a collectivization of agriculture by the pawning or pledging of farms to the state-created organization. The process has not gone far, and the word “collectivization” would be indignantly repudiated by the local politicians, but there is no point in ignoring the fact that the more farms become pledged to the state, or its agency, the greater becomes the likelihood that individual farmers, as independent entrepreneurs, will disappear and become, in effect, hired labor of the state. Because of the state’s complete control over the marketing of the major crop and because of the chronic indebtedness of most of the small farmers, the absorption of small farms into larger units (and consequently, the creation of a rural proletariat in place of small independent farmers) is likely to proceed apace after the achievement of political independence. The British colonial administration never dared to attempt such a program of “collectivization” (call it by another name if this one is objectionable), but local political leaders, once firmly in power, will not for long fail to see its potentialities.

Let there be no indignation about this. It is as essential a development, if the economy is to avoid stagnation, as was the Enclosure Movement in Britain in the eighteenth century, and pow-

erful arguments may be advanced in support of the view that a reorganization of agricultural holdings, with its inevitable modification of the system of land tenure, is unavoidable if agricultural productivity is to rise. If the next Ghana government shrinks from the task (which will be politically difficult, but need not necessarily be inhumane), not improbably a new government will arise which may well tackle the problem in the same way that Mao Tse-tung is dealing with his agrarian problem in China. The creation of a problem of labor relations in the agricultural sector is the inevitable consequence of agricultural reorganization. Furthermore, there is little evidence in the history of the past thirty years that small, scattered farms can hope to result in any material improvement in the level of productivity per acre or per man.

Mining

Agriculture is dominant, but mining is also an important industry in Ghana. Does a “free market” exist here? Gold, diamonds, and manganese are the important products, and most mining operations are carried on by large firms, usually British expatriate companies. In the diamond industry there has recently grown up an African alluvial diamond digging sector, but although there are hundreds of independent diggers working under license from the government, all diamonds must be sold either through a single bank or through licensed government purchasers. There is, therefore, nothing approaching a “free market” even with alluvial diamonds. In the other sectors of the mining industry, from the point of view of the African miner, there are no competing firms. Many are interlocked in London, and all are associated with the local Chamber of Mines, which lays down wage rates for all the mines, with or without

prior consultation with the Mines Employees Union. This union, which has not yet succeeded in securing the right of collective bargaining, as all decisions have to be referred to London for ratification, has just emerged severely shaken from a seven-weeks’ strike. The strike resulted not in any classical adjustment of wages to supply and demand but in an alteration in government policy on taxation and subsidies for the mines. What happened, in effect, was that a strike in a private industry was solved by political action. It would take the ingenuity of a mediaeval sophist to explain these events within the framework of any economic theory postulated on a “free market economy.”

Government the dominant employer and principal source of capital

Outside the mining districts there are urban areas, some of which are developing rapidly both in quantity and diversity of paid employment. There is, however, one striking fact which cannot be avoided: the government is the largest single employer of labor, both clerical and artisan. The railways, the roads (but not the trucks running on them), electricity, broadcasting, harbors, and other public utilities are owned by the government and are subject to Treasury control in the payment of wages. In the building industry the government dominates the scene. A new state agency, a Housing Corporation, has now entered the field to expand the work already done in the provision of houses by the Housing Department. Schools, hospitals, public buildings, roads, bridges, and new harbors are all controlled by the government, which therefore directly and through its contractors (whose power to determine wage rates is severely demarcated by contract) is the dominating factor in this important sector of a rapidly developing economy. Broadly

speaking, outside the agricultural and mining industries, over half the employed persons are directly employed by the government, with wages and conditions ultimately determined by the Legislative Assembly. A large proportion of the remainder are employed by firms which are executing government contracts and are bound by the terms of the contract to pay neither more nor less than the prevailing government rate for any particular grade of employee.

This sketchy analysis, which cannot avoid being somewhat sweeping because of its enforced brevity, is an attempt to illustrate—though it does not claim to have proved—the proposition that we deceive ourselves if we try to discuss labor relations in Ghana today (and probably in the rest of tropical Africa also) on the unspoken assumption that the “free market” and “competition” is the normal state of affairs. We cannot assume that the prevalent power groupings are temporary and regrettable deviations from free market conditions. Nor can we assume that Africa will necessarily need to adopt a form of economic structure based upon Western capitalism if she is to accelerate her rate of economic growth. The state is the dominant employer of labor as well as the principal source of capital. It must be emphasized that this situation has come about not on account of any predisposition towards “socialism” by colonial administrators (who are rarely radical in their views!) but because they were faced with the fact that if the state did not take the initiative the economy would probably not have developed at all. The fundamental economic question facing Ghana on the threshold of independence is whether to decentralize economic power and rely upon private initiative to sponsor further development or to continue to rely primarily on state enterprise. This issue

cannot be further discussed here; for immediate purposes it is significant in its impact on the future of labor relations. So long as the state retains its predominant position in the economic life of the country it is difficult to see how any system of collective bargaining in any way analogous to that in Western countries can be created. Apart from the mining companies, who are powerful enough to pursue to some extent an independent line, all urban employers of labor closely follow the government lead in wages and working conditions. Within the government service, the decisions in this field are ultimately made as an integral part of over-all economic policy. Collective bargaining can therefore concern itself only with minutiae and it has little direct effect on government policy. A strike in government service, if at all widespread, would be regarded as an attempt to "coerce the government" and would be declared illegal. There is no arbitration machinery in the Civil Service, and it is difficult to see on what basis such machinery could operate, as it has no independent labor market to which it could refer.

THE UNIONS AND POLITICS

As the ultimate decisions are political ones, it is hardly a matter of surprise that the trade unions have, from the beginning, tended to concentrate on political activity to an extent which, to many Western observers, is undesirable. To the political activities of the trade union movement we must therefore pay some attention. With the end of the war there came an upsurge of African nationalism in the Gold Coast which had as its primary objective the attainment of independence and the removal of British political authority. At first, discontent tended to center in the veterans' organization. These men, many of whom had served in Southeast Asia,

were grossly dissatisfied with their prospects upon demobilization. Many had been trained in the services as artisans and were understandably reluctant to return to civilian life as unskilled urban laborers or farm workers. The discontent flamed into violence in 1948, when a few demonstrators were killed as police opened fire on a procession converging on the Governor's residence in defiance of the regulations. The agitation was taken up by the newly formed Convention People's Party (CPP), led by Kwame Nkrumah, who had recently returned from the United States and Britain declaring "self-government now" as his aim. He caught the popular imagination, and soon a fairly elaborate political party was organized.

Meanwhile prices were rising, wage rates, as always, were sluggish, and there was a growing discontent among the workers, who were in many cases former servicemen in civilian clothes. The discontent found expression in the trade union movement, which had been actively encouraged and assisted by the government Labor Department since the early 1940's. Early in 1950 the railways were the spearhead of a strike of a few days' duration; though the miners stood aloof, it was widespread. The trade unions were largely shattered by this impact with the state; the shaky Trades Union Congress (TUC) disappeared temporarily, and Nkrumah and some of his followers went to prison.

In 1951 a general election was held under a new constitution, as a result of which Nkrumah underwent the most dramatic metamorphosis that a politician can experience. He was brought from his prison cell and installed as the Leader of Government Business in the new Legislative Assembly in which his CPP was overwhelmingly dominant. The adherents of the CPP began deliberately to infiltrate the trade union movement. They were resisted at first

by the established union leaders, who, trained by British labor officers and academics in the doctrine of "free" trade unionism, wanted to steer clear of any political affiliations. A fierce struggle took place within the Gold Coast TUC which ended in a victory for the CPP element. Up to this point the CPP spokesmen had been vituperative in their abuse of the TUC for linking up with the ICFTU, which was opening an office in Accra about this time. Within a few weeks of obtaining power within the trade union movement, the CPP showed a complete reversal of policy: the ICFTU ceased to be vilified in the party press as the "yellow imperialist international" and the TUC under its new leadership renewed its ICFTU affiliation. Since 1952 the Gold Coast TUC has witnessed a series of splits, secessions, schisms, and explosions, but by the end of 1956 even the unions whose leaders first opposed the CPP so strongly had decided to co-operate with what appeared to be inevitable.

By January 1957 the wheel had turned the full circle. In that month the ICFTU convened its first all-African trade union conference with the full approval of the Gold Coast government, in Accra, and the assembled delegates were addressed by Dr. Nkrumah. He expressed the view that

... it would be a mistake if trade unionists were to consider that their duties in regard to Africa consisted merely in helping to establish trade unions. It is essential that trade union movements throughout the world understand and take into account the political and economic developments which are taking place in Africa. ... The trade union movement has a great part to play and a far wider task to perform than merely the safeguarding of the conditions and wages of its members. ...

He called upon trade unions to play an "active part" in the struggle against co-

lonialism, thus working for the ultimate political freedom and emancipation of their territories. Unfortunately Dr. Nkrumah did not make clear what role trade unions are expected to play after independence has been obtained. Apparently many of the delegates present agreed with him, for they adopted a manifesto which, *inter alia*, declared that "African labor movements must unite and form the spearhead of the struggle for emancipation of the African peoples from colonialism and dictatorship."

This, in broad outline, appears to be the position on the labor front as Ghana enters the world stage as an independent power. Nkrumah with his CPP controls the government and is thus in control of the largest employing agency, which in turn dominates the labor situation in the country generally. At the same time, his followers control the TUC, though by no means all of its constituent unions. To Western eyes this may not appear to be a particularly healthy situation. It could easily lead to a form of totalitarianism, and it may yet do so. Indeed, among the Gold Coast Africans there is a powerful opposition to Nkrumah and the CPP, centered around the traditional chief of the Ashanti, which openly accuses Nkrumah of dictatorial tendencies and corruption, alleging that he is unwilling to tolerate any genuine opposition. The Ashanti are pressing for a federal form of government, and they resent Nkrumah's control over the cocoa funds, half of which are derived from Ashanti farms. The trade union movement has now again split upon this issue.

CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES

It is clearly too soon to attempt a prediction as to how the trade union movement in Ghana will develop. Apart from the fundamental issues in eco-

conomic and political affairs, to which reference has already been made, the trade unions have many problems to overcome in the internal organization of the movement. Many of them are fragmented, internally split, and often inefficiently administered. The railway union appears to be disintegrating into segments based upon the various grades of the railway service—traffic, locomotive, and clerical. The mineworkers' union (numerically by far the most important) has been thoroughly shaken by its recent clash with the mining companies, but appears to have retained its organization intact, though much weakened. On the other hand new unions, particularly among government servants such as teachers, local government employees, and hospital workers, are showing signs of rising activity.

SOME STATISTICS

Official statistics are always tardy in making their appearance in Africa, and are not always readily accessible. However, to round off the present sketchy review, some information collected by the writer relating to the position of the trade unions in 1953 might be of interest.³ By the end of 1952, 97 trade unions had been registered by the official registrar of trade unions. Of these, 8 had amalgamated with others, in 9 cases the registration had been canceled, and 21 were defunct, inactive, or in process of splitting up. Of the remaining 59, 18 were described as "active" or "fairly active" by the government Labor Department in its annual report, and no comment was passed on the remainder. Three of the "unions" were not organizations consisting solely, or even mainly, of employed persons. Two

³ For more detailed information on Gold Coast trade union development see also an article by the present writer which appeared in the *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1954), pp. 593-604.

were gold- and silversmiths' associations (defunct by 1952), and the third was the Gold Coast Motor Union, which was, and still is, a transport association of trucking-company owners and self-employed owner/drivers, as well as employed persons.

Excluding the unions which have amalgamated with others, become defunct, or had their certificates canceled but including those described as "inactive," the trade unions in the Gold Coast are classified by size in the accompanying table.

GOLD COAST UNIONS IN 1953

MEMBERSHIP	NUMBER OF UNIONS
Under 50.....	9
50-249.....	30
250-999.....	12
1,000-4,999.....	7
Over 5,000.....	1
Total.....	59

The total paid-up membership of these unions in March 1953 was reported to be 34,960. Of this number, approximately 40 per cent were enrolled in the single Mines Employees Union.

The degree of trade union organization varies from industry to industry. The writer has unofficially estimated that in 1953 the average degree of organization in urban employment (that is, excluding agriculture) was about 15 per cent. The highest strength of trade union organization was apparent in the mines, where 34 per cent of the labor force appears to be organized. Transport comes next, with 18 per cent in the trade unions. Organization is weakest in the construction and building industry (where migrant labor is widely employed) with probably less than 5 per cent organized. These estimates are, it must be stressed, very rough and ready; without careful scrutiny, too much reliance cannot be placed on them.

AFRICA AND THE WEST

Ghana may, or may not, be typical of other "underdeveloped" areas. Indeed, perhaps the use of such phrases as "underdeveloped," "backward," and "politically uncommitted" in relation to the new nations of Africa and Asia is a source of confusion. Be that as it may, this paper has attempted to argue that it is a cardinal error to discuss labor relations in general, or particular aspects of them such as collective bargaining, free trade unions, and arbitration, as if we were talking about a political and economic situation which will inevitably follow Europe and America

in developing the market as its dominant economic instrument on the one hand and liberalism as its political creed on the other. Nor must we assume that Marxism will necessarily provide the answer. In Ghana, from now on, the Africans will make the decisions and take the responsibility. Western institutions will be subjected to searching and critical scrutiny. It may well be, however, that a material factor in the development of African thought will be the understanding shown by the West of the magnitude and complexity of the economic and political problems facing the new statesmen in countries like Ghana.

Trade Unions in Malaya

By J. NORMAN PARMER

Abstract: The young trade union movement in Malaya has been subjected to many stresses that have limited its effectiveness either as a political force or as a means of achieving the goals of labor. Communist-dominated up to the time of Communist party armed rebellion against the British colonial and protectorate governments, since 1948 the movement has under British influence been developing slowly along liberal lines. A plural society, a lopsided representation in existing unions, and poor organization and financing have continued to attenuate the movement, while the growth of a new militant left wing has split it at a time, shortly before Malayan independence, when it needs all the strength it can muster.—Ed.

WESTERN trade unionists visiting the British Crown Colony of Singapore and the British-protected Federation of Malaya have remarked that the Malayan trade union movement is one of the strongest and most democratic in Asia. If the appraisal is correct, the achievement is made more impressive when one realizes that the present trade union movement has emerged only since 1948. Malaya's first trade union movement appeared at the end of World War II but collapsed with the outbreak of the Communist rebellion, styled "the Emergency," in June 1948.

Trade union movements in Malaya are postwar phenomena but prewar roots are traceable. Chinese journeymen's organizations date from the 1920's.¹ Unions of unskilled Chinese rubber-plantation, tin-mine, and factory workers and of seamen appeared in the early 1930's. Another prewar root was associations of government employees. The British co-

¹ Journeymen's organizations and syndicates of skilled workers were preceded by Chinese guilds, some of which were founded in Malaya in the nineteenth century.

lonial and protectorate governments gave unenthusiastic recognition to the organizations of journeymen and public employees but suppressed the unions of unskilled workers on the ground that they were Communist dominated. Strikes in 1937 in support of wage demands involving thousands of unskilled workers caused the government and forward-looking European employers to try to place labor relations on a more satisfactory footing. Basic trade union and industrial relations legislation was enacted in 1940, and the appointment of an officer to advise and to instruct trade unions was discussed. The new legislation was not implemented before the Japanese invasion in December 1941.

For five decades before World War II, Malaya's labor force was composed mostly of immigrant South Indian and Chinese laborers.² The indigenous Ma-

² For a history of labor in pre-World War II Malaya, see the author's "Colonial Labor Policy and Administration: A History of Labor in the Plantation Rubber Industry in Malaya, 1910-1941," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1957.

lay people, many of whom were actually immigrants from nearby Indonesia, were farmers and fishermen and were not attracted to wage employment. Migrations to Malaya of several hundred thousands of persons from China and India occurred annually. The colonial and protectorate administrations regarded the immigrant laborers as sojourners and made no attempt to assimilate them. But these immigrant laborers or their children are now permanently domiciled in Malaya, although culturally unassimilated and perhaps unassimilable. The Federation of Malaya has a total population of about 6,300,000—consisting of approximately 3,000,000 Malays, 2,400,000 Chinese, and 750,000 Indians. The Colony of Singapore has a population of 1,200,000, of which more than 80 per cent are Chinese. A plural society thus exists, enormously complicating attempts to resolve the country's social, economic, and political problems.

POSTWAR COMMUNISM

The trade union movement of 1945-48 was largely under Communist control. The Malayan Communist party, whose members are mostly Chinese, used the Japanese occupation years to train cadres for intensive postwar organization in all sectors of society. The fall of 1945 and the early months of 1946 witnessed the rapid formation of trade unions. The party's efforts were assisted by widespread economic distress and the psychological impact that the war and the occupation had had on the people. An ill-defined expectancy of political and social change pervaded most people's thinking, and organizations of all kinds were formed to serve as vehicles of expression. After unsuccessful attempts at political general strikes early in 1946, the unions eschewed overt political activity and resorted to economic action. Hundreds of costly

but often successful strikes for higher wages occurred in 1946 and 1947. Trade union policy of the returning British authorities was a resumption of the prewar policy of legislative control and official guidance. The policy was not, however, suited to the circumstances, because a large and vigorous trade union movement was now in being.

The Malayan Communist party's decision to undertake armed rebellion against the British colonial and protectorate governments in June 1948 resulted in the disappearance of many key union officers with union funds into the Malayan jungle and caused the collapse of most trade unions. Only then was the government able to implement its policy of regulating and guiding the trade union movement. With the help of a British trade union adviser, the present movement has gradually been established since 1948. The Communist rebellion is still in progress; it has failed to obtain widespread popular support and cannot be regarded as a nationalist revolt against an imperialist power. Present Communist policy is to de-emphasize rebellion and concentrate on subversion through a "united front" policy.³

ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

The trade union movement today has a total membership of perhaps 250,000.⁴ Approximately 170,000 members in 240 unions are in the Federation of Malaya, where the largest union is the National Union of Plantation Workers with a total reported membership of 110,000. Other strong unions in the Federation are those of railway workers and civilian employees of the armed services and

³ See *New York Times*, January 6, 1956, p. 4, for a report on the Malayan Communist party's policy.

⁴ As compared with approximately 290,000 members in 425 unions in 1945-48.

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certain unions of government employees. Workers in the construction, factory, mining, and transport industries have had little or poor organization, although since mid-1955 some important gains in membership have been claimed by the National Union of Factory and General Workers, the National Union of Transport Workers, and the Malayan Mining Employees' Union. In Singapore, the strongest of some 140 unions are those of the civilian workers of the armed services, which have a total membership of about 25,000. Approximately 18 per cent of Singapore's gainfully employed are organized.⁵

The characteristic form of organization is the local union organized according to the district, occupation, educational level, or ethnic community of its members. Thus at one time more than two dozen unions of schoolteachers functioned in the Federation and some fifteen unions of harbor workers existed in Singapore. The Trade Union Adviser has urged the merging of local and regional unions into national unions. Amalgamation has been hindered by the ethnic divisions in the labor force, a parochial outlook, and the reluctance of local officers to sacrifice their personal interests.

The membership of Malayan trade unions is ethnically lopsided. Of the three communities in the Federation, the Chinese predominate in the labor force. Yet 65 or 70 per cent of trade union members are Indians. The Malays, who are numerically insignificant among wage earners, are approximately equal to the Chinese in union membership. The absence of the Chinese in the present trade union movement is disturbing, since they took the lead in the 1945-48 movement. Chinese reluctance

⁵ Approximately 500,000 persons are gainfully employed in the Colony of Singapore. Comparable figures are not available for the Federation of Malaya.

to join the unions is usually ascribed to apathy, fear of Communist retaliation, and disillusionment with trade unionism. We may add that the Chinese laborer is inclined to regard the present movement as government controlled and Indian dominated. Chinese now in the unions are mostly English-educated and from white-collar occupations.

Union leadership has in a few instances been outstanding. But as might be expected in a trade union movement encouraged by a colonial government, some trade unionists are more dependent on official backing than on members' support for their positions. Moreover, opportunists have used the unions as a means to government favor. The most serious problem of leadership is that most union officers are English-educated salaried or professional people who lack intimate contacts among the non-English-speaking, often illiterate, wage workers.

The financial resources of most unions are meager. One union, the Penang Municipal Services Union, has the check-off and is comparatively wealthy. Other unions have sought the checkoff without success. Some unions have been aided by British and American trade unions, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has recently helped the plantation workers' unions to obtain financial assistance. Improvidence on the part of union officers is disappearing.

National and international groupings

National trade union centers exist in the Malayan Trade Union Council in the Federation and the Singapore Trade Union Congress. The MTUC and the STUC lack strong powers in respect to member unions, and their chief function is to represent labor on issues of general public interest. They have been handicapped by financial stringency and lack of support by the unions, not all

of which have affiliated. Since mid-1955, a new organization, the Trade Union Working Committee, has appeared in Singapore to challenge the STUC as Singapore's trade union center. The TUWC is a militant left group supported by the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union and the Singapore Bus Workers' Union. Its leaders include persons prominent in the 1945-48 movement.⁶

Both the MTUC and the STUC are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Relations with the ICFTU have been poor because of the latter's preoccupation in Asia with cold war politics and also because of the paternal and gratuitous advice given by some ICFTU representatives. In 1956, MTUC officers voted in favor of withdrawal from the ICFTU. At the same time, an invitation was received from Sohyo, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, to participate in the formation of an Asian international trade union organization.⁷ No public action has been taken. If the Malayan unions do leave the ICFTU, the step will probably not be taken before national independence is obtained. The Singapore Trade Union Working Committee has no known international ties but is uncompromisingly critical of the ICFTU and has recently exchanged fraternal greetings with trade unions in the People's Republic of China.

Employers' associations

Employers' associations, particularly those of European employers, are better financed than the unions. Aside from the government, which is a major employer, the most important employers'

organization is the Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, followed closely by the Malayan Mining Employers' Association. These associations maintain close liaison with one another and with United Kingdom employers' organizations.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The formation of trade unions is regulated by law, and all unions are required to register and to provide information as to their membership and financial resources. The government may refuse to register a union, and an unregistered union is an unlawful association. The registered union obtains rights and immunities, for example, freedom from charges of conspiracy in restraint of trade.⁸ Strikes and "peaceful" picketing are legal. The law also provides for the settlement of disputes through a government-appointed industrial court, courts of inquiry, or arbitration. Arbitration requires the consent of both parties. In industries where union representation is absent or inadequate, the government may appoint wages councils. The government is ordinarily reluctant to intervene in disputes, and the policy has been to encourage independent negotiation between employers and workers' representatives. Employers and unions have been urged to establish permanent consultative or negotiating bodies, and the government has set the example by establishing such councils with its own employees.⁹ A Labour Department has functioned since 1911 and the conciliation of industrial disputes has been one of its principal responsibilities.

⁸ For a comparison of Malayan trade union and industrial relations legislation with that of Great Britain, see Charles Gamba, *Labour Law in Malaya*, Singapore, 1955.

⁹ Modified Whitley Council machinery has been established in both the Federation and Singapore.

⁶ Most of these persons were imprisoned without trial in 1948 or afterwards under the government's Emergency Regulations. In recent years, they have been gradually set free.

⁷ A similar invitation was received from trade unions in Burma in 1955.

The largest plantations, mines, and factories are European owned and managed. European employers have usually recognized, though somewhat reluctantly, unions among their workers. The largest local employers, who are mostly Chinese and Indian, have treated the unions similarly. But small and medium-sized local employers vigorously oppose recognition of unions and often equate unionism with communism. They have fought the unions with every weapon available, including Chinese secret society thugs. Because of this opposition unions are more often found in European than in Malayan places of work. Union leaders have occasionally urged that employers be compelled by law to recognize and negotiate with unions. The government has refused to legislate on this subject, although government officers have sometimes strongly advised employers to recognize unions.

Collective bargaining

Collective bargaining is now fairly well established between the unions and European employers, and Malaya today may have proportionately more workers under collective agreement than any other Southeast Asian country. The days when union officers began wage negotiations with a lightning strike or a press release attacking the employer have to a large extent passed. Nevertheless, difficult problems remain. Cultural differences between employers and union representatives, a paternalistic tradition, and the association of the employer with the colonial power in the minds of union officers and members have made bargaining difficult. Bargaining is usually done on a regional or national level, in spite of the multiplicity of local unions in the same industry. Local grievances are resolved locally although a national union officer often assists in the settlement. Wage demands have been the chief subject for

negotiation. The right to bargain exclusively has not been a vigorously sought object of the unions. But in April 1956, the National Union of Railwaymen demanded and obtained exclusive bargaining rights for cargo handlers at Port Swettenham, the chief Federation port.

The rubber plantations

Industrial relations in the rubber plantation industry deserve special comment because of the overwhelming importance of the industry in the Malayan economy and because the majority of organized workers in the Federation are in the plantation workers' unions. Numerous wage disputes have occurred and arbitration has been frequent. The unions have seen difficult times. A low point was reached at the end of 1954, when the unions proved incapable of halting a decline in wages, which by agreement are scaled to rubber prices. Since 1954 the unions have shown a remarkable recovery, as a result of improved rubber prices, able leadership, the formation of the National Union of Plantation Workers, and financial and organizational help from abroad. Industry-wide economic action in support of demands was not attempted until May 1956, when the NUPW called upon all plantation workers to go slow in their work. The action was effective in winning wage increases and vacation and overtime benefits. A consultative council has been established, and union leaders have promised co-operation with the employers in the industry's struggle to compete with American-made synthetic rubber. Relations in the industry may now be called good.

Strikes

Constitutional reforms introducing a substantial measure of self-rule in both the Colony and the Federation in 1955 have been accompanied by numerous

strikes. In part the strikes have been due to the workers' demand for a higher real income. Some strikes have been a by-product of the relaxation of colonial rule. In Singapore, however, strikes have been undertaken for specific political purposes.

TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICS¹⁰

Sympathetic Malayan observers have hoped that the trade union movement might serve several political ends: to help resolve the plural-society problem by dividing the population on class rather than ethnic lines; to exert a liberal influence in a society top-heavy with conservative elements; and to serve as a training ground for political democracy. The unions have had little success in reshaping society on class lines. Class consciousness exists among Indian and Chinese workers but communal consciousness is stronger. Communal barriers between unions have disappeared only at the top level of leadership and even there somewhat uncertainly. Representatives of the unions have often voiced a liberal viewpoint but have lacked the popular support to command respect. Only as an exercise in parliamentary practice have the unions fully realized a political role.

Trade unionists have had little doubt that labor should participate in politics. But they have differed rather sharply on *when* the unions should attempt to play a political role. One view has been that even under the best-intentioned colonial government—which some union leaders do not believe they now have—unions are limited in the economic action they can take. Political action is therefore necessary to achieve economic

objectives. This view is buttressed in the minds of some unionists by the belief that economic action alone, particularly in respect to the local employer, will not ameliorate oppressive conditions quickly enough. The other view has been that, before engaging in politics, better trade union organization is necessary in order to provide a firmer foundation for political action. To enter politics prematurely might result in divisive influences, exploitation by political adventurers, and ultimately the ruin of the unions.

The labor parties

While debate continues, many trade unionists as individuals have engaged in politics. The present popularly elected coalition government of Singapore is led by the Labour Front party and the Chief Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lim Yew Hock, is a former officer of the Singapore Trade Union Congress. The Labour Front is led and supported by professional persons and trade unionists. The People's Action party, among the opposition parties in Singapore, is similarly supported. In the Federation, the Labour party of Malaya, led mainly by trade unionists, has had some successes in local elections, but it failed to win any seat in the important Federal elections held for the first time in July 1955. Labor political parties have been handicapped by lack of funds and factionalism. Neither in Singapore nor in the Federation do formal ties exist between the unions and the labor political parties. Partly because of legal restraints and partly out of choice, the trade unions have not supported the labor political parties. Pressure on the unions to take part in politics is increasing as independence approaches.

The labor political parties, preoccupied with obtaining national independence, have seldom detailed their social and economic programs. Broadly,

¹⁰ For the background to recent political developments in Malaya, see various articles by F. G. Carnell in *Pacific Affairs*, 1953 to date, and the author's "Trade Unions and Politics in Malaya," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (March 1955), pp. 33-39.

their leaders profess democratic socialism and want higher living standards with adequate housing, medical care, and education for all. With qualifications, they favor public ownership of important industries. The Labour party in the Federation and the Labour Front in Singapore have been advocates of moderate socialization and a comparatively gradual approach to resolving social and economic problems. The People's Action party on the other hand has championed a more vigorous approach and has adopted aggressive tactics. The PAP, being an opposition party, has been able to play on popular feelings without having to bear the responsibility of satisfying popular demands.

Unions, students, and PAP in Singapore

An exception to the absence of trade union support for labor political parties is found in Singapore. The Trade Union Working Committee together with the Factory and Shop Workers' Union and the Singapore Bus Workers' Union has received aid and encouragement from the People's Action party, for which it has become a kind of labor wing. These unions have called strikes for the purpose of embarrassing the Labour Front government. Their officers have looked upon themselves as the successors to the trade union movement of 1945-48 and even of the suppressed prewar unions of unskilled workers.

Intimately associated with the PAP and with the unions are the youths in Singapore's Chinese schools. Traditionally these schools have served as centers for political indoctrination and currently they serve as covers for Communist activity. The students possess a tremendous pride in being Chinese and have a strong admiration for the People's Republic of China. They have supported the PAP and striking workers, and in turn have been defended by

the PAP. Undoubtedly PAP leaders have accepted, if not actually sought, Communist support for the purpose of building an organization with as wide a popular base as possible.

In mid-1956, the Labour Front government began a campaign to suppress Communist or near-Communist elements in Singapore. In October, matters reached a crisis. While the PAP called for the resignation of the Labour Front and new elections, clashes occurred between students and workers on the one hand and police supported by troops on the other. Several hundred arrests were made, including most of the officers of the Factory and Shop Workers' Union and the Singapore Bus Workers' Union. One of the PAP's elected representatives in the Singapore Legislative Assembly, who is also an officer of the FSWU, was among those arrested. Under Singapore's public security legislation, these persons may be detained without trial.

On the British model

By way of conclusion we may observe that the object of British trade union policy in Malaya has been to encourage the development of a trade union movement based upon Western, and particularly British, experience in the belief that such a movement would contribute to social and economic stability and be a bulwark against communism. The policy has had to overcome many difficulties in implementation, not least of which has been the need to yield occasionally to contradictory policies with a higher priority. Moreover, the British authorities have been in the dilemma of trying to encourage democratic trade unionism while at the same time having to guard against political subversion and to suppress Communist terrorism. The difficulty of this task has been surpassed only by the difficulties met by union leaders in attempting to organize

under such conditions. The British do not expect that all the principles and institutional forms which they have introduced will remain unaltered. Undoubtedly the extent to which industrial relations on the British model prevail will depend in large measure on the extent to which the unions find the British experience workable in dealing with employers. But whatever the future, the effort has been a laudable one, and with the help of able Malayan trade unionists it has been accompanied by a measure of solid achievement.

PROBLEMS AND PROGNOSIS

Malayan unions are still faced with several problems which will vitally affect their future development. The most serious problem is to bring Chinese plantation, mine, and factory workers, who are still alien in outlook, into the unions. These workers are prone to support Communist or militant trade unionism, and if they cannot be induced to accept the moderate leadership of the present trade union movement, dual and antagonistic trade union movements are a strong probability. In a struggle between moderate and militant (that is, Socialist and Communist) labor movements, the moderates would probably succumb either to the attacks of the militant unions or to the repressive measures of a Malayan government less inclined to discriminate between union ideologies than the British authorities.

The failure of past efforts to bring the Chinese into the unions suggests that the task may be impossible. In Singapore, this question has been resolved, for after seven years of quiescence many thousands of workers have again declared in favor of militant trade union leadership. Moreover, the moderate trade union leaders rather than the British colonial authorities now bear the burden of responsibility for the

suppression of militant trade unionism. Yet there seems to be no alternative to suppression, aside from social and economic reforms which would necessarily extend over many years. In the meantime, there is danger that genuine liberal forces may also be suppressed. In the Federation, Chinese workers may yet be brought into the moderate trade unions, although there are indications that a militant left trade union movement will emerge within a year or eighteen months.

Aside from the problem of the allegiance of the unorganized workers, which is actually a manifestation of Malaya's plural-society problem in the trade union movement, the trade unions are concerned with questions involving the Malayan economy.¹¹ With a population which may double in twenty-five years, Malaya requires an expanding economy if present relatively high living standards are to be maintained, and if demands for higher standards are to be met. Further expansion of Malaya's basic rubber and tin industries seems unlikely; the outlook for plantation rubber is especially uncertain in view of the steady development of the United States synthetic rubber industry. Nevertheless, Malaya is probably the most highly industrialized nation in Southeast Asia, and prospects for continued industrialization are on the whole good. Labor strife, Communist subversion, and doubts about future political stability, chiefly in Singapore, have resulted in some flight of capital. The present popularly elected governments have asked employers and unions for industrial peace in the interest of retaining and attracting investment capital.

The trade union movement alone cannot find the solutions to Malaya's eco-

¹¹ See The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Malaya*, Baltimore, 1955.

nomic and social problems, especially not the plural-society problem. Some of the problems will be resolved by events outside Malaya. But the trade union movement may be able significantly to influence the policies chosen by Malaysians in the direction of liberality and moderation. The target date for political independence for the Federation of Malaya is August 1957. Once independence is achieved, social and economic problems as well as the plural-

society problem will come into sharper focus. The trade union movement will have to be united and strong if it is to weather the political storms of the first years of independence. With this in mind, union leaders are continuing to improve their organization, conserve their financial resources, and extend their membership. With determination and luck, the trade unions may in time play a decisive and constructive role in Malaya's public affairs.

Problems of Indian Trade Unionism

By OSCAR A. ORNATI

Abstract: In India, labor had joined in the struggle for an independent state and was in sympathy with the aims of the new government. Soon, the deterioration of economic conditions led labor to employ traditional tactics to secure the goals of better wages and working conditions. The government was forced to consider whether these tactics were consistent with national needs of maximum production and self-sufficiency. A choice had to be made between free collective bargaining and state-controlled bargaining. India chose the latter as the best means of helping to bring about a socialist state. The political character of the major trade union federations has facilitated the operation of the system.—Ed.

INDIAN trade unions enjoyed in pre-independence days a crucial role in the country's political life. National independence and the victory of the Congress party brought about a series of new economic and social goals—now embodied in the governmental Five Year Plans—in which trade unions have no important independent functions. Current institutional arrangements for handling labor relations make unions subservient to the state. The labor movement is seeking new directions. Unless it can acquire a sense of economic and political identity, with sinews to match, it may be headed for atrophy.

The study of the role and impact of any labor movement, and particularly of labor movements in underdeveloped economies, requires raising the question of who participates in the establishing of rule-making relationships in the area of industrial labor, and how. Here this question is examined through a description and evaluation of the relationship evolving between the state and trade unions in the search for forms of labor relations viable in the Indian economic and political situation and con-

sistent with the structural characteristics of industrial management and of the labor movement.

AFTER INDEPENDENCE

All sectors of Indian opinion participated in the fight for independence. Organized labor was among the most vociferous.¹ Although Indian ideas as to the constitution of the new state were on the whole inchoate, there existed throughout a desire for some kind of socialist state. With this, too, labor went along enthusiastically. When independence came, there existed therefore broad areas of labor-government agreement. The unresolved core of the

¹ In a different context I have characterized Indian trade unionism as "nationalism with the union label." Cf. O. A. Ornati, "Organized Labor's Impact on Indian Industrialization" in Robert L. Aronson and John P. Windmuller (Eds.), *Labor, Management, and Economic Growth* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University, 1954), p. 149. For an analysis of labor's contribution to independence, see also S. D. Puneekar, *Trade Unionism in India* (Bombay: New Book Co., 1948) and O. A. Ornati, *Jobs and Workers in India* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University, 1955).

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problem rested in the meshing of the needs and aspirations of organized labor with the broader needs of all India.

The fall in real wages, decreasing employment possibilities, demands for sharing, through "bonus payments," in the employers' wartime profits, and the extensive layoffs of 1947-49 and 1950 led to a deterioration of industrial relations and served to focus the issue.

For labor and government the central questions were: To what extent are labor's traditional goals and tactics, with concomitant strikes and losses of production, consistent with national needs for maximum production and economic self-sufficiency? How far can government permit or assist labor to shift the "internal terms of trade" to favor industrial workers?

The answers to these questions required, first of all, clarification of government and trade union policy on collective bargaining by choosing between free collective bargaining and state-controlled (tripartite) negotiations.

In facing the problem, organized labor, as usual, claimed to speak for all labor. Yet organized labor, three and a half million strong, represents only a minority of the economically active population, is unevenly organized, and is split among four competing confederations with differing structures and attitudes.

Structure and organization

Of the four major confederations that claim the allegiance of organized labor the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) is by far the largest, the most active, and the best organized. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), and the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) follow in order. The labor movement acquired its four-faced character in the period between 1947 and 1949 when, in the heady atmosphere

of political independence, each political group tried to capture the allegiance of the industrial proletariat. At present each confederation is linked to a political party and can be said to express the party's views in the field of labor. The INTUC, with about 1,400,000 workers, is the offspring of the National Congress party; the HMS, with about 800,000 members, is sponsored by the Praja-Socialist party; the AITUC is dominated by the Communist party of India (CPI); and the UTUC is tied to various Trotskyite refugee splinters of the CPI.

Worker organization, in spite of the fact that it is made up of about 35 per cent of the nonagricultural work force, is limited and uneven in its penetration.

Indian workers are, in most cases, attached to trade unions only during periods of strife. If aroused to action they follow the leader or the union which presents the most attractive program. They continue to pay dues only if immediate improvements are obtained. A union's strength is generally measured by the number of people it attracts to a rally or a strike.²

Among the states, workers in Bengal, followed by Bombay and Bihar, are the best organized. Among industries, textiles, where unionism has the longest history, have the largest percentage of organized workers. The majority of railroad workers are also organized, as are many of the workers in the mines and in transport. Confederation-wise, although the INTUC is the largest, it represents a plurality of organized workers only in Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, and Madhya Bharat; on an industry basis it enjoys a strong position only in non-jute textiles and among plantation workers.

² E. E. Bacon (Ed.), *India: A Sociological Background*, Vol. II, Subcontractor's Monograph HRAF 44 (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1956), p. 561.

Legal framework of collective bargaining

Postindependence India's legislative framework in industrial relations reflected British wartime legislation, which prohibited strikes almost entirely. The situation has not changed substantially since 1947.

The Indian government's representative at the 1955 International Labor Conference presented his country's policy on labor relations in the following words:

In an economy where development is planned to achieve a definite target under regulation of the State it would obviously be impracticable to leave the vital field of labor-management relations entirely to chance. . . . We have come to the conclusion that, though every encouragement should be given to collective bargaining and voluntary settlement of disputes, the State should be prepared to intervene whenever the voluntary machine fails to work. We believe that the best way of resolving labor-management differences which are not solved by mutual negotiations is not a trial of strength by strikes and lockouts but by an award of an impartial body. Besides during the Plan period, our country cannot afford loss of production consequent on labor-management disputes which can be solved by other methods. That is why the law on the subject in my country provides for compulsory adjudication when the process of negotiation, conciliation and voluntary arbitration fails.³

Implementation of the government's policy takes place through a variety of agencies operating on many levels. The government, either federal or state, may refer disputes to conciliation boards, boards of inquiry, industrial tribunals,

or other instrumentalities whose awards are binding for a fixed period. Such intervention may or may not be linked to an actual or threatening strike. Union participation in the settlement process may depend on whether it is or is not "recognized" by government as "representative." Present-day labor standards are essentially those set forth in a series of awards handed down between 1947 and 1950. To achieve uniformity in conditions a Labour Appellate Tribunal (LAT) was established in 1950. Since that date the Tribunal has handled a very large number of disputes and has been increasingly drawn into the process of determining working conditions.

In addition, to handle broader labor problems on a national level, the government of India built up the already existing tripartite consultative machinery. The Indian Labor Conference and the Standing Labor Committee, as well as several tripartite industrial committees, are the forums in which the parties discuss labor problems and in which the main lines of labor policy are determined.⁴

Evaluation of the system's efficiency is extremely difficult. Along with the recent record of relative industrial peace, one must also note staggering and frustrating delays in adjudication proceedings as well as conflicting decisions. In addition, the implementation of decisions is not easy, as all the parties involved try to use the existing machinery, whenever possible, to their own advantage.

The bank dispute

Some cases bring the governmental machinery into motion at all levels. The so-called bank dispute, for example,

³ "Speech on the Director-General's Report at the International Labor Conference, June 10, 1955," International Labor Conference, 38th Session, *Record of Proceedings* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1955), p. 143.

⁴ For a more complete description see O. A. Ornati, *Jobs and Workers in India* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University, 1955), pp. 157-77 and *passim*.

involved, over an eight-year period, the following: voluntary negotiations; conciliation; a strike; the award of an Industrial Tribunal (the Sen award); the award of another Industrial Tribunal (the Sastry award); a LAT decision; Parliament setting aside the LAT's decision; the resignation of the Minister of Labor, V. V. Giri; workers' demonstrations; the appointment of a special commission, the Gajendragadkar Bank Inquiry Commission; the partial restoration of the LAT's award; and finally an abortive strike.

The bank dispute is reported here—even though only in its barest outline—as an illustration of the interrelationship of labor problems with those of India's economic development. Indeed, when the federal government intervened to modify the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision it argued that the implementation of this decision would impair banking in the rural areas in view of the additional wage burden imposed. Vigorous growth of rural banking, the government contended, was a necessary prerequisite for the development envisaged by the Five Year Plan.

To note the effect of this system on unions, suffice it to say that the INTUC approved seriatim the bank workers' demands, the Sen award, the Sastry award, the LAT, the government decision setting aside the LAT decision (although it grumbled editorially about the wisdom of interfering with the existing machinery), and the Gajendragadkar Commission, and ended by fulminating against the bank workers and alleged Communist intervention.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROS AND CONS

Three strands of thought have to be distinguished in explaining India's attitudes towards industrial relations. The first, which favors free collective bargaining and pure and simple trade unionism, is essentially British in origin.

Its advocates are the Western-trained intellectuals that are found scattered throughout the labor movement. Their views carry weight with many HMS leaders and influence the avowed policy of the UTUC. These are the men nurtured on the Webbs and spurred on by the roving ambassadors of the American labor movement and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). They find support in the unions of some strategically located industries, such as the railroads; they are occasionally hampered by too outspoken support of their views on the part of unnecessarily progressive employers. V. V. Giri, a devotee of labor unity and formerly a successful negotiator for the railroad workers, was their rallying point. Respected for his long record of trade unionism and for the forcefulness with which he had advocated free collective bargaining, his downfall weakened advocates of collective bargaining.

A second strand of thought, which favors collective bargaining without necessarily rejecting conciliatory and persuasive government intervention, stems directly from the basic faith of Indians in the reasonableness of men and in the ultimate power of the "right cause." There exists in India an ancient and deeply held belief that almost anything can be achieved by an "act of truth," *satya*. *Satyagraha*, "holding on to the truth," achieved India's independence, and many argue that the same approach will help bring the millennium in labor relations. Gandhi's views of labor relations—general though these may have been—are their strongest bargaining arguments. The Ahmadabad Textile Labor Association speaks for this group in clear and emphatic terms.

The third strand of thought speaks of the objective complexity of the issues, delights in macroeconomics, and concludes that India cannot afford to let

the forces of the market operate freely. In this group one finds a large variety of planners. Dedicated to the implementation of the "Socialist pattern," they argue among themselves as to who is more socialistic. They include most of the leadership of the INTUC and some of the theorists of the HMS.

The "Giri approach"

Immediately after independence, free collective bargaining was on the upswing. Forces favoring it appeared strengthened by the postwar increase in trade union membership and, for a while, it seemed that Indian industrial relations would take on a pattern similar to that of the United States and England. The "Giri approach" soon became popular. After his appointment as Minister of Labor, Giri spoke loudly and consistently of the advantages of mutual negotiations. Employers, in particular, seemed to support his approach.⁵ At the Labor Conference of 1952, official spokesmen for HMS, AITUC, and UTUC favored collective bargaining for an even wider area than did Giri himself. Even INTUC went along, declaring that "a stage has arrived when legislation should allow increasingly greater scope for voluntary agreements in preference to constant recourse to Tribunals. . . ."⁶

Giri found support in reasons other than ideological. Among non-INTUC unions there was resentment against government intervention, which appeared biased. Not only was INTUC the creation of the Congress party and thus to be viewed skeptically, but also the sight of the high echelons of government filled with former INTUC offi-

⁵ See, for example, speech by S. P. Jain of the All-India Organization of Industrial Employers at the Twelfth Indian Labor Conference, *Proceedings* (n. p., n. d.), p. 41.

⁶ INTUC, *Annual Report*, October 1951-52, p. 17.

cials added to the impression of government partiality. If the advantages of government support were to go only to INTUC unions, collective bargaining with all its limitations, so argued HMS and AITUC, was to be preferred, and arbitration was to be used only if mutual negotiations failed. Employers, long frustrated by bureaucratic inconsistencies, welcomed greater independence and felt that the removal of governmental interference would favor their position.

But early enthusiasm for free collective bargaining as well as union membership increases soon faltered, and Minister of Labor Giri's resignation in the bank dispute sounded the death knell of free collective bargaining. Opposition to Giri had developed in many quarters. At the highest level, the government was concerned with the implications collective bargaining might have for the economy. The alleged plight of category D banks—the rural banks—exemplified the way in which wage developments might affect the fulfillment of the plan. The Congress party objected to Giri for not being a Congress party member. The state Labor Ministers saw in collective bargaining a challenge to their power and influence in the states.

The greatest opposition to Giri came from labor. Unable to identify specific gains, labor abandoned the Giri approach. Indeed the very structure and orientation of the labor movement, as will be made clear below, limits the movement to giving only lip service to the ideal of free collective bargaining.

Trade union rejection of free collective bargaining

Indian organized labor views collective bargaining as a desirable future goal rather than a presently applicable policy. The causes of this attitude are two: in the first place, the unions are

primarily a labor *movement* dedicated to the establishment of a new society; in the second place, organized labor in India is very weak.

With rare exceptions, Indian trade unions do not accept the society surrounding them. They are engaged in a major effort to change it. In the past, change meant getting rid of the English; now it means bringing about a Socialist state. Indian trade unions are primarily interested in shaping the future; they bother less about pay and present-day working conditions. Trade unions represent the working classes, the broad society, rather than their own membership; consequently they are prone to consider social problems in a broader setting than trade unions in some other countries. The policies of the INTUC on collective bargaining exemplify this attitude most clearly. INTUC feels that compulsory arbitration need not necessarily stifle the effectiveness of trade unions or of the process of collective bargaining. Particularly in disputes in industries vital to the nation's growth and security and in disputes concerned with work force reductions government intervention is viewed favorably.

The same concern with the broader aspects of the problem leads INTUC not to oppose rationalization with great vigor.⁷ Similarly, INTUC favors a less inclusive program of implementation of the minimum wage legislation and, when necessary for the development of an in-

⁷ See the INTUC memorandum to the Planning Commission reported in the *Indian Worker*, July 2, 1955. INTUC's pronouncements on rationalization have, throughout the last five years, remained essentially schizoid. Against the milder form of the official memorandum one must also recall the more blunt pronouncements of some of its leaders, for example, S. R. Vasavada, who refer to the need to see that the "craze for machines should not be permitted to cause starvation among human beings." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

dustry, it is ready to support exceptions to implementation of minimum wage legislation.

The views of HMS, UTUC, and AITUC are of similar breadth. Their programs vary with their party allegiance. HMS and UTUC demand larger investments in the government sector of the economy, more nationalization of industry, more employment, and higher wages. On the other hand they are less concerned with stimulating worker participation in the government-sponsored Five Year Plan. The essential policy of the AITUC rests on the proposition that all wage labor is exploited labor. Consequently, it has little good to say about any government action short of its ultimate goal.

The breadth of trade union interests and demands diverts and limits their interest in bargaining at the plant or industry level. In addition, one of the most important limitations to successful collective bargaining lies in the fact that the employer cannot give the union what it wants, even were he willing to do so. It is because their needs transcend what the employer can contribute that the unions seek worker support in political as well as in economic action. No employer and no group of employers can, alone, give the Indian labor force the employment, the housing, and the higher standard of living it seeks and needs.

Limitations on the unions' bargaining power

The legal framework of collective bargaining provides, as has been seen, for governmental intervention without preempting the possibility of negotiating agreements without government. A few such agreements have been recently negotiated. Outstanding are the agreements in Bombay State Transport and at Tata Steel which provide for exclusive recognition, establish grievance ma-

chinery, checkoff, and job evaluation, and are of a fixed duration.⁸

Although more research is needed in this area, such developments appear to indicate that whenever unions and management reach agreement without government intervention they are able to do so because the economic position of the industry gives the unions greater bargaining power than is normally the case.⁹

Approval of agreements arrived at independently of government is not unmixed. The HMS, for example, criticizes collective agreements arrived at in Ahmadabad as weakening the competitive position of other textile industry employers and unions.¹⁰ In this criticism the HMS focuses on the lack of union bargaining power and, implicitly, underlines why unions are forced to rely on government.

Many factors limit the bargaining power of the unions. Union recognition is one of the most important. All four

⁸ For partial texts of the contracts see *Indian Labour Gazette*, Vol. 13, No. 8 (February 1956), pp. 605-7 and the *Indian Worker*, June 18, 1956.

⁹ Professor Myers' discussion of the relative ease with which rationalization is introduced in some areas seems to substantiate this point. See Charles A. Myers, "Labour Problems of Rationalization: The Experience of India," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 73, No. 5 (May 1956), pp. 431-50.

¹⁰ Frequent references in Indian and American literature dealing with the exceptionally fortunate pattern of labor relations of Ahmadabad fail to underline to what extent these are a result of what could well be called "tri-partite collusive agreements." In any analysis of the Ahmadabad situation it must be remembered that the Ahmadabad millowners are the beneficiaries of the government's lifting of the import ban on Egyptian cotton in those varieties in which it is the biggest consumer. The fact that in their indirect labor costs they do not have to calculate contributions to the Employees State Insurance Fund, which was not extended to Ahmadabad, is another example of how their competitive position is bolstered by government aid.

confederations are conscious of it. Their advocacy of legislation to compel union recognition varies with the hold they have over a given industry or area, since "recognition" or "representativeness," as presently interpreted, may lead to excluding competing unions from the industry or area. The INTUC, which approaches majority status in more situations than any of its competitors, is continually advocating such legislation. "The government should encourage trade unions . . . by recognizing only one union in one center, in an industry, on the basis of numerical strength . . . [with] the sole right to negotiate and settle with employers. . . ." ¹¹

Much more important than norecognition and plural unionism in limiting union bargaining power are the increasing number of unemployed, the dismal poverty of the masses, and employer opposition to unions. To achieve impact at the national level, collective bargaining requires much greater economic development and industrial specialization and a greater economic staying power among the workers, as well as the existence of employer personnel practices, if not "the presence of an enlightened outlook on the part of employer elements." ¹²

The most constant criticism of free collective bargaining appears to be voiced by the leadership of the HMS (although some union groups within this confederation, such as the railroad work-

¹¹ INTUC memorandum to the Planning Commission quoted in the *Indian Worker*, September 12, 1955.

¹² In the 1955 official presentation of the policy on collective bargaining at the International Labor Conference the Indian government delegate argued: "The success of voluntary negotiations and collective bargaining presupposes the existence of a united trade union movement and an enlightened outlook on the part of employer elements, which it has taken the advanced countries of the West long years to develop." See International Labor Conference, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 143.

ers, do not go along with it). It has noted the futility of employer-employee negotiations until the government grants unions freedom to strike and picket, and related rights. The situation was recently summarized by saying that "the private machinery of voluntary negotiation and arbitration is *irrelevant in the context of the situation of industrial relations in our country.*"¹³

POLITICAL WARFARE AND RELATIVE INDUSTRIAL PEACE

The unions' rejection of collective bargaining and the yielding of initiative in wage matters were made less difficult for them by government and party action. The government favored the workers through many decisions that satisfied some of their immediate short-range needs as well as many of the broader goals. Much was said about the exalted position of labor in the future of India. Some labor leaders were given social recognition and placed in important government positions. Such governmental activities helped assuage union demands and, at least in part, contributed to the relative stability in industrial relations of the last four years.¹⁴

Trade union gains and unfulfilled requests

Government did a good deal to satisfy trade union demands. "Safeguards" that unions demanded in connection with rationalization were introduced by legislation requiring employers to pay layoff compensation and regulating rehiring.

Industrial tribunals helped clarify areas of controversy with decisions that,

more often than not, satisfied labor. To provide a bonus—important in many disputes—was declared a permanent employer responsibility and understood to be the supplement by which minimum wages were brought up to the level of the "living wage." Much of the dispute legislation has been interpreted to permit unions to forestall unfavorable decisions. Skillful use of existing machinery thus is a form of economic pressure. In addition, to balance the union's inability to strike, the Labour Appellate Tribunal forbids employers to shut down—even for a single day falling between two holidays—while a dispute is pending.

Labor unions are exerting their influence also through the tripartite consultative machinery. Such efforts are often successful through the co-operation of the government representatives; for example, in the dispute following the 1953 crisis in the tea industry, labor received several concessions, in spite of the rigid opposition of the employers, through the "conciliatory" efforts of the government representatives.

Government intervention favoring trade union demands is also apparent in specific acts partially unrelated to trade union pressures. In one case, import licenses for new textile machinery were denied in order to avoid the unrest which threatened if employment were curtailed.

Yet unions do not meet with success in all their ventures, and they do not hesitate to be critical of government action. The unions' most concentrated fire was recently directed against the Labour Appellate Tribunal, with many of whose decisions the unions have been dissatisfied, and against the government's failure to pass legislation strengthening unions.

The LAT is viewed as incompetent in labor matters, as overly concerned with industry's needs for capital ploughbacks, and as displaying "... a consistent

tendency . . . to be anti-labour."¹⁵ In spite of mounting trade union pressures that it be abolished and government promises to do so, the tribunal is still going strong.

In their criticism of government action or inaction unions do not hesitate to remind the government of their own political strength. Even INTUC, generally committed to government support, likes to remind the state and the central government of its dependence on the vote of the industrial workers:

... on the revision of minimum wages . . . [the INTUC Assam Branch] considers the government notification as an instance of abject surrender to the industry by the Government at the cost of labour, whose vote alone contributed not less than 48 members to the Congress Party in the Assembly in a House of 108 members. . . .¹⁶

Other confederations highlight other government failings. HMS notices government failures in the field of housing; it notes how, in spite of continual demands, the cost-of-living allowance has not been integrated with the basic wage. In evaluating the tripartite machinery, the Socialists call it deadlocked and argue that "the pressures to break this deadlock must obviously be generated from the side of labour."¹⁷

The Socialist pattern of society

The essential payoff for union quiescence in demands for wage increases was in government action to help unions achieve their broader goals. The national impetus behind industrialization and commitment to the "Socialist

pattern of society" permits the government to substantiate its claim of working for the welfare of the masses. That the Indian economy has moved "off dead center"—indeed since 1951 a remarkable acceleration in the rate of growth has taken place so that total output has grown substantially faster than population—and that the second Five Year Plan leans heavily upon industrial development can be interpreted as another sign of interest in, and achievement favorable to, the industrial masses.

Nationalization of life insurance, steeper taxes on dividends, a new statement on the nationalization of mining, creation of a ministry of steel to control steel production, trade pacts with Communist countries—"so that our industrial and economic policies might reflect the philosophy of coexistence"—and taxation on bonds were all reported at the 1956 INTUC Congress as helping the lot of the worker. If non-INTUC unions are less prone to see labor's gain in all government action, they nevertheless recognize that government is moving in a direction consistent with the labor movement's avowed ends. The debate between the government and the trade unions in general and that between the INTUC and other confederations thus boils down to one about timing and methods rather than about goals and ends.

Worker participation in management

Potentially the most important gain of the Indian trade unions has been government encouragement of worker participation in management.

As was the case in Germany, "coparticipation" is hailed as industrial democracy's victorious climax. What "coparticipation" in India will mean is, as yet, unclear. It has been presented as meaning the "inclusion of workers' representatives in the management, i.e.,

¹³ R. Kulkarni, "Repercussions of Ahmadabad Bonus Agreement," *Janata*, July 10, 1955. (Italics mine.)

¹⁴ See "An Index of Industrial Relations," *Indian Labour Gazette*, Vol. 13, Nos. 7 and 8 (January and February 1956), pp. 483-90, 566-68.

¹⁵ *Indian Worker*, July 9 and September 12, 1955; *Janata*, February 6, 1955.

¹⁶ Cachar Cha-Sramik Union, Resolution of February 20, 1953, quoted in S. K. Bose, *Capital and Labour in the Indian Tea Industry* (Bombay: All-India Trade Union Congress, 1954), pp. 140-44.

¹⁷ *Janata*, May 22, 1955.

the Board of Directors, in all concerns," or as meaning that "workers are to acquire and hold shares in the establishment. . . ." It has also been understood to require that "workers be given proper training in the techniques of production . . . and administration of the industry." Other references, particularly a euphoric description of a plant in which "coparticipation" is already a fact, make it appear as no more than a multistep grievance procedure, topped by a meeting between the managing director and the union leader. Whatever form it will take, it is bound to contribute to the development of organization at the plant level where so little has been done and so much is needed.¹⁸

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Two central considerations emerge from this brief survey: First, it appears clear that the unions are not going to "go it alone" in the sense of independently setting, or trying to set, the rules regulating the labor-management-government relationship. Second, the government-trade union duologue is far from ended.

It is improbable that employers will in the near future have a greater influence than at present in setting the rules regulating industrial relationships. The wide acceptance of the Socialist ideology militates against the acceptance of the "employer ideology" at the broad national level. In addition, the fact that managerial practices in the area of personnel are so undeveloped handicaps management in initiating, at the plant level, policies which might both improve working conditions and lead to greater managerial influence in the rule-setting process.

¹⁸ On the limited role of the union in the plant see Van Dusen Kennedy, "The Role of the Union in the Plant in India," Industrial Relations Research Association, *Proceedings*, 1955 (Madison, Wis., 1956), pp. 249-64.

The last years have seen considerable improvements in the Indian industrial worker's standard of living. Indeed, real wages have increased, and comparisons of Indian average per capita income with that of industrial workers show the latter to be over three and a half times that of the former. Thus, industrial labor is rapidly becoming a privileged class.

To what extent improvement in the standard of life of the industrial worker is due to trade union action cannot easily be determined. That the pressures of organized labor have contributed is beyond discussion.

The strategy the labor movement has been forced to adopt is a difficult one. It requires continual development and implementation of the movement's broader aims as well as concern and recognition of current worker needs. It is here that one finds the essential dilemma of the Indian labor movement. On the one hand, unions have continually and persistently to cajole government and party to be aware of labor's needs. If this is to be effective, the unions must conduct extensive, continual, and repetitive ideological education in depth. On the other hand, workers are more responsive to action which will satisfy immediate shop level needs. To achieve the movement's broader aims, the unions must satisfy the more immediate needs. Structurally, the labor movement is better adapted to fulfill the first than the second half of its dual role.

The non-INTUC unions have a less difficult role in play. Not being saddled with the responsibility of ensuring worker co-operation for government schemes and with a thin, yet well-distributed membership, AITUC, HMS, and UTUC harass the INTUC unions continually by appeals to the workers designed to highlight contradictions between over-all and immediate member interest. By concentrating, literally, on

the quality of the cup of tea provided by the employer, the competing confederations capitalize on the perennial debate of how best to improve the workers' lot.

The problems of trade unions in the Socialist state thus do not appear to vary with the level of economic development. Either in economically advanced or in underdeveloped economies the task of the Socialist trade union is said to be "to awaken democratic consciousness among the workers and to ensure that the toiling masses get an equitable share of the new wealth that will be created." In trying to fulfill the first of these two tasks, unions closely connected with the dominant party run the risk of becoming pliant and subservient; their success in fulfilling the second task depends upon labor's bargaining power.

Interlocking of government, Congress party, and INTUC

This analysis has implicitly posited government and trade unions as separate and juxtaposed in their competition for a greater say in shaping the future framework of Indian industrial relations. Yet the fact that the crucial decisions in the area of industrial relations are made by a relatively small group of men who appear to manage the whole system of socioeconomic relations suggests the advisability of research in terms of alternative analytical frameworks. Indeed, the precise manner in which government policy is implemented through the multiple chains of command is not known. One is struck by the fact that the Congress party, the INTUC-

associated trade unions, and the government operate in close connection, and by the fact that key positions at all levels in the governmental structures are held by members or sympathizers of the Congress party. The technique by which responsibility is split among these chains of command is not clear. The fact that cabinet ministers participate in the discussions of the executive council of the INTUC beclouds the issue and underlines the risks of trade union subservience to party discussed above.

Lest this be misunderstood, it must be made clear that there is no reason whatsoever to assume that the small group of men who manage India's labor policy do so for obvious selfish interests. The exact opposite is the case. The formal aspects of democratic procedures are fully respected at all levels of party, government, and trade union. That the reality of democratic processes is absent in differing degrees is due not to a lack of desire on the part of the leaders but rather to the always reported, but never overemphasized, lack of preparation of the workers and to the pervasiveness of social and class distinctions.

In this context the fact that the Indian labor movement is divided among competing federations is a blessing in disguise. AITUC, HMS, and UTUC are the gadfly that prevents INTUC from becoming a passive labor-front type of organization and the check—strongly reinforced by India's commitment to constitutional democracy—to possible excessive government and party zeal.

Labor and Nationalism in the British Caribbean

By GEORGE T. DANIEL *

Abstract: In the British Caribbean territories, the labor movement and trade unionism have been vehicles for nationalist and home-rule sentiments. The first trade unions appeared after World War I, but their efforts to raise wages and living standards by legislation largely failed, owing to lack of adequate political representation. The depression of the thirties worsened the situation of the workers and led to widespread disturbances in 1937. As a result of recommendations by a Royal Commission in 1939, universal suffrage was introduced and good labor laws enacted. Since then labor leaders have gained political offices, and the labor movement has become increasingly respectable and effective.—Ed.

LIKE most underdeveloped areas today, the economic and social pattern of the British Caribbean territories is changing at a quickening pace. Among the factors affecting this change, the labor movement is the most dynamic. In countries where poverty is a chronic ailment, "freedom from want" shares top priority with "freedom to govern." Accordingly, the mass movement in the British Caribbean, as in some countries elsewhere, is pincerlike. Political control or sovereignty represent one arm, and economic sufficiency or independence the other. The demand for self-government can scarcely be separated from demands for higher living standards.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The economy of the eleven islands and two mainland territories constituting the British Caribbean is almost entirely dependent upon agriculture. Crops for ex-

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations Trusteeship Secretariat.

port, chiefly sugar, requiring an abundance of low-cost labor, dominate the economy. Even where minerals exist, like oil in Trinidad or bauxite in British Guiana and Jamaica, most of the inhabitants are dependent directly or indirectly upon agriculture for their livelihood.

Following the tradition of African slave and East Indian indentured labor, large plantations or estates, utilizing the better land, still prevail. Landless laborers and small peasant farmers endeavor to exist on the remaining land, which is generally poor and distributed in family holdings uneconomic in size; their agricultural methods are invariably primitive. In consequence, the basic economic needs of the population are not met.

Socially, there are three classes. At the top there is an official and planter-merchant class, usually white and foreign. Next there is a less well-defined middle class, mainly professionals and mulattoes. Finally, a broad base is made up of the so-called working class of African and East Indian descent. As

a rule the upper classes live a life somewhat apart from the rest of the community, confining their role mainly to direction and supervision. Absentee landlords are not uncommon. However, the landowning class or their representatives (foreign or native) are identified with the government and the British colonial officials—the assumption being that the prime purpose of Crown Colony government is to protect and enhance British colonial investments.

Concerning allegiance to "King and country," all sections of the community are united in their loyalty to the throne, there being only one throne. But as regards country, there is some conflict. To the upper class "country" means Great Britain, in the middle class there is uncertainty, with opinions divided between the mother country and the territory, whereas to the working classes, by and large, the territory is the only country they know. Low wages, inadequate housing, malnutrition, the ravages of energy-sapping diseases, aggravated by the typical hierarchical pattern of decision making and dictation from the top and by remote control from London, all contribute to the urge for real democratic self-government at the local level. It was under these adverse circumstances that the labor movement in the British Caribbean was born and developed.

RISE OF TRADE UNIONISM

The labor movement received its start at the close of World War I, following the return of the British West Indian Regiment. To be exact, it was on January 11, 1919, that Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow, who has been called the father of the British Caribbean labor movement, organized the British Guiana Labor Union, the first labor union in the area. It was one of the first labor unions to be organized in the British

colonial empire. In 1920, the Trinidad Workingmen's Association, based on a previous "workmen's friendly society" founded in 1906, was reorganized under the leadership of Captain Andrew Arthur Cipriani and registered under the Companies Ordinance.

LABOR LEGISLATION

Until 1930, the only legislation in British colonies which gave a legal basis for trade union activity existed in British Guiana, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Malaya, and Northern Rhodesia.¹ The first pieces of labor legislation to be introduced in the Caribbean were Trade Union Law No. 37 of 1919 in Jamaica and Trade Union Law No. 17 of 1921 in British Guiana. Several years elapsed before the enactment (in 1933) of a comparable law in any other territory.

These laws, providing for the establishment of trade unions and defining their functions, powers, and responsibilities, were drafted on lines of sections 2 and 3 of the United Kingdom Trade Union Act of 1871. They were simple. They required the registration of every trade union, and the submission of annual accounts and balance sheets to the Registrar of Trade Unions. With respect to raising funds for political purposes, specified rules and the British method of "contracting in" were applied. However, the laws were seriously limited since they did not provide for peaceful picketing or protect union funds from liability arising from tortious acts. Trade unions, in consequence, were merely declared lawful for civil purposes. Strike action, the buttress of union bargaining power, was still paralyzed. The labor leaders strongly resented this and the leader of the Trinidad Workingmen's Association, Captain

¹ Walter Bowen, *Colonial Trade Unions*, Fabian Colonial Bureau Pamphlet (London: Fabian Publications Ltd., October 1954), p. 4.

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Cipriani, refused to register his organization under the Trinidad Trade Union Ordinance of 1933. Instead, he dissolved it and formed the Trinidad Labour party, the first political party to be established in the British Caribbean.

The obvious weakness of the early trade union laws, the fact that "employers and managers generally were strongly, and in some cases, even bitterly, opposed to trade unions . . .,"² and the fact that "the government also . . . adopted, to say the least, a cautious and ultra-conservative attitude . . .,"³ left labor leaders no alternative but to exploit to the full the British parliamentary processes in order to secure legislative solutions for their economic problems. Yet, with the limited representation at their disposal, even this approach proved painfully slow and frustrating.

DISTURBANCES OF THE 1930's

Meanwhile the world depression of the 1930's had knocked the bottom out of the "sugar basket" in which all the economic eggs of the area rested. Unemployment became rife and was increased by the return of many migrant workers from adjacent lands, such as the Panama Canal Zone and the United States. The steady natural growth in population worsened the situation. The pressures were cumulative. In the words of Major Orde Browne, "This severe trial was imposed upon a society ill-designed to withstand it; discontent and unrest culminating in disorder were the inevitable concomitants."⁴ Norman Manley, leader of the People's National

party of Jamaica, summed up the situation graphically:

. . . in this historical process of the Caribbean people, the common man, alive to these conditions, would no longer endure them and was prepared—and rightly so—to raise hell in his own way to call attention to his wrong.⁵

The following calendar of events⁶ involving considerable damage to property and loss of life indicates how drastic and widespread the revolt became:

May-June 1934	Disturbances on sugar estates in Trinidad
Jan. 1935	Disturbances in St. Kitts
May 1935	Strike of wharf labor at Falmouth, Jamaica, followed by disturbances
Sept.-Oct. 1935	Disturbances on various estates on British Guiana
Oct. 1935	Rioting in Kingstown and Campden Park, St. Vincent
June 1937	General disturbances in Trinidad (including strikes and riots in the oil fields and in sugar estates)
May 1938	Disturbances on Frome estate, Jamaica
Feb. 1939	Disturbances at Leonora plantation and neighboring areas in British Guiana

THE 1939 ROYAL COMMISSION

As a consequence, His Majesty's government in London in 1939 appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the widespread disturbances and to make recommendations. Included in the Com-

² F. W. Dalley, *Report on Trade Union Organisation and Industrial Relations, 1947*, Colonial No. 215 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Granville Orde Browne, *Labour Conditions in the West Indies*, Cmd. 6070 (London: HMSO, 1939), p. 13.

⁵ *Report of Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies*, Part II, Montego Bay, 1947, Colonial 218 (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 139.

⁶ *Report of the West India Royal Commission* (Chairman: Lord Moyne), Cmd. 6607 (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 196.

mission was Sir Walter Citrine, then the general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress.

Among its principal recommendations the Commission advocated (1) constitutional reform and (2) progressive trade union legislation. Reform, the Commission held, would ensure "that the elected element in the Legislative Councils shall be as truly representative as possible." Accordingly, it urged universal adult suffrage.

With constitutional advance and the advent of universal adult suffrage, the working masses came into the political picture for the first time in an effective way, especially as they were now reinforced by an increasing number of the "black intelligentsia." This popular emergence needed leadership, which the hitherto marginal mulattoes were willing to provide, as they had no choice but to ally themselves with the movement. The rising tide of nationalism thus tended to attenuate color and class differences within the British Caribbean community.⁷

In this social revolution, the labor movement played a major role. Concurrently with constitutional change came legislative provisions enabling trade unions to engage in peaceful picketing and exempting them from torts. The Commission had pointed out that "the Trinidad disturbances must be traced to the more or less general sense of dissatisfaction for which there was no adequate means of articulation through recognized machinery of collective bargaining."⁸ Labor Departments headed by British trade unionists were therefore quickly set up in most territories to foster trade union development and

establish collective bargaining machinery as a means of settling industrial disputes.

TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

Until 1938, labor fought for the proper establishment and legal recognition of trade unions. The era following the disturbances saw the rise of the trade union movement. There was a rush to join a union regardless of worker classification or even the aims of unions. Instead of fear or indifference to union membership, it now became fashionable for workers to belong. By 1939, about sixty-five trade unions with an estimated membership of 62,500 had been formed, of which fifty-nine were registered under the law.⁹

The names of such trade unions as The British Guiana Manpower Citizens Association, The Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Trade Union, The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, The National Workers Trade Union of Jamaica, and the British Empire Workers', Peasants' and Ratepayers' Union of Trinidad indicate the all-inclusive nature of the membership and the political and nationalist character of the movement.

The introduction of legal provisions in support of trade unions resulted in an immediate and spectacular rise in the number and membership of trade unions throughout the British Caribbean, as Table 1 indicates.

However, membership figures of British Caribbean trade unions, like most statistics in underdeveloped areas, are open to question, particularly since the definition of trade union membership is still subject to a variety of interpretations. "Once a member, always a member" is applicable in some instances; in

⁷ See Eric Williams, *Education in the British West Indies* (Trinidad: Trinidad Guardian Commercial Printing, 1951), pp. 6-8.

⁸ *Report of the Forster Commission on the Trinidad Disturbances 1937*, Cmd. 5641 (London: HMSO, 1938), p. 81.

⁹ *Report of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 1943-44* (Barbados: Hastings House), p. 71.

TABLE 1—LABOR UNION ORGANIZATIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN, 1946, 1950, 1954

TERRITORY	NUMBER OF TRADE UNIONS			MEMBERSHIP		
	1946	1950	1954	1946	1950	1954
Barbados.....	4	3	3	5,600	12,500	8,751 ^a
British Guiana.....	34	38	36	14,349 ^b	22,317 ^c	13,220 ^d
British Honduras.....	3	6	5	820	3,643	11,782
Jamaica.....	24	12	14	46,000	78,117	94,437 ^e
Leeward Islands.....	3	4	3	—	—	20,720 ^d
Trinidad-Tobago.....	16	32	45	—	20,000	—
Windward Islands.....	—	10	19	—	13,937	21,208 ^f

^a Membership in one union only.

^b Membership in 18 unions only for the year 1948.

^c Membership in 26 unions only.

^d For the year 1953.

^e Membership in 11 unions only.

^f For the year 1952.

Sources: *Special Study on Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories*, ST/TRI/SER.A/10 (New York: United Nations, 1956); *Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summaries and Analyses of Information Transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Year 1954* (New York: United Nations).

others, supporters of the union, although not workers in the customary sense of the word, are considered members. Being in "good financial standing" is not a strict requirement in most unions for membership or even, in some cases, for the exercise of voting rights. This does not necessarily imply "padding the roll" but rather expresses a local identification of fellowship with membership, a probable carry-over of the extended family system. This phenomenon is not peculiar to trade unions. With increasing understanding of trade union practices, the trend is toward the acceptance of membership as a duty with rights, responsibilities, and benefits.

Because of the historical antecedents of the British Caribbean working class, it is understandable that there should be a universal need for protection and that workers should see the trade union as the means for providing it. Workers believe that the purpose of the union is not only to protect them from want by providing a job but also to protect them in the job, and even to protect them

against any problems arising outside the job. The union becomes an organization for protection anywhere and everywhere. To many workers, the union is also a protest organization, and union meetings become a sort of "grippers' concert." Frequently even nonworkers join unions to secure protection and to protest grievances.

World War II increased and regularized employment throughout the area. In addition, construction of United States Army and Navy bases in some of the larger territories provided employment at higher than accustomed wages and induced migration from the more depressed smaller islands. This measure of prosperity gave workers a sense of satisfaction with, and obligation to, trade union leaders, especially those who had played a prominent role in the disturbances of the 1930's and had suffered imprisonment. When constitutional reform allowed for a wider measure of representation, the workers made the "martyrs" of the disturbances the "heroes" of the ballot box.

LABOR LEADERS

In this way men like Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica and Uriah Buz Butler of Trinidad came to the fore in the British Caribbean labor movement. They provided the spark which set the revolt in motion and paid for it with imprisonment. This act of sacrifice made them heroes in the sight of their devoted followers. In the eyes of the workers, these men could do no wrong, and nothing that could be done for them was too much. The leaders capitalized on this allegiance and never failed to dramatize themselves in order to maintain their position.

Both Bustamante and Butler displayed qualities of the flamboyant demagogue, almost hypnotic in their influence over an illiterate following. Generally astute, they displayed at times exceptional religious fervor; extensive quotation from the Bible in support of their actions appealed strongly to followers whose only contact with literature was, at most, the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer. Instead of reasoning things out with their members, they preferred to determine the issues as if by Divine Right. Their words and deeds showed them no less committed to nationalism than their predecessors in the labor movement. Whatever may be said of Bustamante, he was first and foremost a Jamaican and wanted the best for Jamaica. His often expressed wish to be governor in his own country is evidence of this strong nationalist viewpoint.

Typical of the labor leadership actively engaged in the process of quickening this national consciousness, over some twenty-five years or so, was Captain Cipriani, President General of the Trinidad Workingmen's Association (later the Trinidad Labour party). Cipriani, a Corsican by birth, was educated in Trinidad and lived there most of his life. A man of intense national-

ism, he infused his sentiments into the working-class movement of Trinidad. The following extract, which is typical of his speeches in the Trinidad Legislative Council, exemplifies his nationalist feelings:

I am not concerned with what the Secretary of State's opinion is as to matters concerning my country; and whether it be Lord Milner or plain Jimmy Thomas, to me, they are only ordinary mortals and strike no fear in my soul.

But the oil in this country belongs to us; the whole of this country belongs to us, it is God-given; and it is for us to get the best and the most fair and reasonable share of the wealth of our own country. That, Sir, is only the natural aim and aspiration of honest and right thinking people, and if I have learned one lesson from the Englishman, and a lesson which will serve all in good stead, it is that "The Englishman's home is his castle," and in the same way and by the same process of reasoning and argument, my home, which is Trinidad, is my castle, and I look forward through that teaching and through that sentiment to the day when the British Government will say to us, and I know they will say it, no matter how difficult and no matter how long the trail, no matter how deep the sand or how steep the hill, one day, they will say to us yes, we agree you must hold and control the administration of your own country and we will give you what we have given to the other parts of the great Empire, a full measure of Dominion status. Until that time comes, we, like true, loyal, honest, and devoted members of the Great Commonwealth of Nations, must fight on and struggle on for the things that are ours, for the right to live in our own country and for the right to hold and control its own administration.¹⁰

In 1926, when elected representatives were admitted to the Legislative Council in Trinidad for the first time, Cipriani was chosen by an overwhelm-

¹⁰ *Trinidad Hansard, 1937* (Port of Spain: Government Printing Office), pp. 268-69.

ing majority; he held his seat in the Council until his death seventeen years later. The extent of his popularity may be gauged by the fact that he was seven times elected mayor of the city of Port of Spain. During his term of office as mayor he led to a successful conclusion the fight to have the municipality take over from a private foreign company the management and control of the production of electric power and the tramway service. As the mouthpiece of the "working man" he advocated self-government for Trinidad and West Indian Federation with Dominion status.

Like Cipriani, such labor leaders as Hubert Critchlow in British Guiana and T. Albert Marryshow in Grenada advocated self-government for their respective territories and West Indian Federation for the area. As early as January 1926, British Caribbean labor leaders met in British Guiana and established the British Guiana and British West Indian Labour Federation to co-ordinate their efforts. This organization, renamed the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in 1945, developed into so powerful a regional organization that at the 1947 Closer Association Conference at Montego Bay, Jamaica, the President, Grantley Adams, could tell Mr. Creech Jones, then Secretary of State for the Colonies:

... it was a realization of the hopes and aspirations of the people of these colonies which has found its form in and has as its mouthpiece the Caribbean Labour Congress ... you hear the authoritative voice of the Caribbean when you hear the voice of the Caribbean Labour Congress.¹¹

This organization, comprising trade union representatives from nearly every British Caribbean territory, drew up a plan for West Indian Federation entitled "Charter for Caribbean Freedom."

¹¹ *Report of* ... (cited note 5 *supra*), pp. 37-38.

OTHER INFLUENCES ON NATIONALISM

It may be well to mention here two other factors not generally recognized as instrumental in the development of nationalism in the British Caribbean. The first was Marcus Garvey (himself a West Indian) and his Universal Negro Improvement Association; the second was the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy in 1935.

Marcus Garvey and his "Back to Africa" movement exploited the racial disabilities of American Negroes and the disillusionment of peoples of African descent, especially in the West Indies, following World War I, in which they too had fought "to make the world safe for democracy." By 1923 he had succeeded in organizing one of the biggest protest mass movements ever to sweep the New World. Though short-lived, it had made a great impact upon the West Indian working classes, who were mainly black. Branch organizations were established in the various territories to arouse the Negro to an awareness of his position, to take pride in self and country, and to demand his citizen's rights. Garveyism made a strong appeal to the working masses of the West Indies and sowed the first seeds of racial consciousness, which labor leaders were later to utilize as an incentive to nationalism. Democracy, in its Western context, had provided territorial labor leaders with the concept of majority rule and given them the idea of exploiting the voting power of the working-class majority for self-government, in the hope of securing ultimately a more equitable distribution of the wealth of the territories. Thus the labor movement became strongly identified with, and considered itself, the political expression of nationalist aspirations.

The Abyssinian war in 1935 institutionalized this sentiment. The failure of the League of Nations to apply effective

sanctions against Italy for its attack upon Ethiopia, symbol of black sovereignty, was widely interpreted in the West Indies as white indifference to black interests. When the Pope blessed the Italian troops on the eve of invasion, the Church too, Episcopalian as well as Roman Catholic, became identified with this indifference. The rise of many of the religious sects and indigenous groups and organizations now in existence in the British Caribbean may be traced back to this period. This new attitude reflected a growing indifference, if not resentment, toward the so-called "white" institutions and a growing interest in the indigenous culture. The result was the creation of new social institutions and the assumption of responsibility for their destiny.

TRADE UNION AND THE POLITICAL PARTY

To fill the role expected of it, the trade union has become in fact "union cum political party."¹² Differences in nationality and race provide an emotional element in the relationship between employers and workers that furthers the desire for mutual protection. Union leaders, often smarting under handicaps of race, color, and class, feel a strong sense of identity with their members. Frequently they exploit these handicaps not only to do something for the members but also for their own personal advantage, especially the enhancement of their social status and the attainment of political power. Consequently the leader very often becomes the embodiment of the union.

By 1946, universal adult suffrage was effective in Jamaica and Trinidad, and the franchise qualifications were lowered in Barbados, British Guiana, and the

smaller territories. Recognizing that the main body of voters was the working-class population, most political parties attached themselves to trade unions. Some trade unions submitted their own candidates where there was no party affiliation. Whether it was the opportunity that trade unions provided for the political advancement of the "middle class liberals," or whether this new type of leader was truly interested in the workers and the trade union movement as such, the fact remains that the trade union movement saw an influx of leaders from the middle classes. While there were those who made the trade union their exclusive business, many used the trade unions merely as a means of attaining political power.

Evidence of the emphasis placed on politics was furnished by the composition of the 1947 CLC Conference in Jamaica; most of the delegates were members of territorial legislatures and served also as delegates to the Montego Bay Conference on Closer Association, as representatives of the legislatures.

The attainment of political office has enhanced the social status of trade union leaders and provided them with additional power. Grantley Adams in his address to the Second World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1951 stated:

In Barbados I am proud to say that we have gone so far as actually to have captured the government. Our trade union (The Barbados Workers Union) has a political branch (The Barbados Labor Party) and matters that we have not succeeded in attaining through bargaining we have had passed into law in our Parliament.¹³

The movement also has gained in respectability, but its solidarity has been

¹² See Simon Rottenberg, "Labor Relations in an Underdeveloped Economy," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1952), pp. 250-60.

¹³ *Report of the Second World Congress (ICFTU) held at Milan, 4-12 July, 1951*, p. 215.

affected by the political rivalry of its leaders. Some opportunists have exploited the movement for personal political advancement, while others have been guilty of defection. When trade union loyalty and political expediency conflict, trade union leaders invariably do what is expedient. Furthermore, "in taking over the government," trade union leaders can overreach themselves, as in British Guiana, with disastrous results to the labor movement.

INTERUNION AND INTERTERRITORIAL CO-OPERATION

The development of associations or affiliations of trade unions in British Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad, which started in 1939, took the form of Colony Trade Union Councils. At the outset these went well, but their development was retarded by the personal rivalries and political jealousies of trade union leaders seeking political office. Within the territories, especially the larger ones, trade union leaders were trapped in a vicious struggle for political power. In promoting their own personal political ambitions, they failed to ensure the more significant and desirable objective, namely, the advancement of trade unionism as a powerful economic and social institution.

Significantly enough, political action, which split the leaders of the trade union movement in the individual territories, did not affect the movement adversely on a regional level. On the contrary, it did so much to strengthen its collective force that it became the official mouthpiece of labor in the British Caribbean.

In spite of these difficulties and inconsistencies, the intimate connection between trade unions and politics is strongly defended. Grantley Adams declares:

While it is true that some trade unions may take a wrong turning, . . . it is almost impossible in a colonial territory to dissociate trade unionism from political democratic socialism. We in the West Indies, for good or ill—and I am not absolutely convinced for good—whenever we have started a working-class union (in recent years at any rate) find that most of its followers and practically all its leaders are members of a democratic socialist parliamentary party.¹⁴

If the trade union movement has benefited only indirectly from this connection with politics, trade union leaders have reaped direct benefits. Since World War II, they have been receiving some of the highest honors in the land. An impressive honors list is headed by Sir Alexander Bustamante, president of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union and leader of the Jamaica Labour party, who was appointed the first Chief Minister of Jamaica in 1944; in 1955, he had the distinction of being the first trade union leader to receive a knighthood. Next in line is Grantley Adams, president of the Barbados Workers' Union and head of the Barbados Labour party, who became the first Prime Minister in the British Caribbean and was made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (C.M.G.). Then there is Albert Gomes, a Trinidadian of Portuguese descent, who came to power as president of the Federated Workers Trade Union and until recently was the Trinidad Minister of Labour, Commerce and Industry; he also has been made C.M.G. Hubert Critchlow of British Guiana, V. C. Bird of Antigua, and F. L. Walcott of Barbados are Officers of the Order of the British Empire (O.B.E.). These honors are symbols of status and prestige highly prized by most British citizens.

Political honors have brought with them additional responsibility. The in-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

troductio of the ministerial system has meant full-time duties at handsome salaries for elected representatives. Yet trade union leaders elected to political office have continued to hold on to their trade union posts. This dual role poses a problem not only for trade union leaders but for the movement as well. Nevertheless, no other force has contributed more than the labor movement to realize the dream of British Caribbean Federation.

SUMMARY

An attempt has been made here to show that the labor movement and trade unionism in the British Caribbean territories are avenues through which nationalist sentiments and the urge for "self-determination" find expression. This is not unique to the British Caribbean but is symptomatic of a movement among the peoples of non-self-governing territories the world over.

The beginnings of this development in the British Caribbean became evident following World War I. The first leaders of the labor movement were men of strong character whose influence on the movement was considerable. For a number of reasons, especially those arising from economic and social conditions, an early tendency to secure improvements in the wages and living conditions of workers by legislative means was inevitable. However, the inadequacy of legislative representation made for painfully slow progress in economic improvements. One result was the general disturbances of 1937.

The Royal Commission of 1939 made important recommendations leading to the enactment of labor laws and to constitutional reform. The former not only made trade unions legal but also more effective in securing their demands, while the latter enfranchised the working classes and provided an opportunity for a more equitable representation. Subsequently, trade union leaders were voted into political office, and self-government found expression in and through the trade union movement.

Trade unions in the British Caribbean now enjoy general recognition. In nearly every local government body, municipal or borough council, and territorial legislature, trade union leaders hold prominent positions. Consequently, the influence of the movement has become far-reaching. This growing respectability will tend to strengthen labor's position at the bargaining table.

The point must be emphasized that the close alliance of the democratic legislative process with the rapid and aggressive development of the trade union movement was largely determined by the philosophy and stature of the pioneer labor leaders. These men were instrumental in creating among the peoples native to the territories an attitude of mind which made them respectful but not servile, aggressive yet not revolutionary. When it is remembered that the history of development is frequently a record of violent revolutions, this British Caribbean mobilization of democratic institutions (the trade union and the political party) for peaceful penetration of the barriers to national aspirations assumes increasing significance.

The Israeli Labor Movement

By NADAV HALEVI

Abstract: Labor in Israel is mostly organized into the General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel (Histadrut), a general union in membership and functions. It includes all kinds of workers and their families and has trade union functions, mutual aid and social functions, and economic activities. It tries to satisfy all physical, cultural, and spiritual needs of its members. Its ideology is a synthesis of Zionist nationalism and socialism. The author describes the structure and organization of the Histadrut and considers what appear to be the basic problems facing the federation in its future development, problems arising from the very size and complex nature of the organization.—Ed.

ISRAELI labor, for the most part, is organized in the General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel, commonly referred to by the first word in its Hebrew title—the Histadrut. The Histadrut is a general union in the widest sense of the word. It is general in its membership and in its functions. As to membership, the Histadrut embraces workers and their families: agricultural and industrial workers, manual laborers and intellectuals, wage earners and self-employed and members of co-operatives. Its functions may be grouped under three headings: trade union functions, similar to those performed by most unions elsewhere; mutual aid and social functions, ranging from comprehensive medical care to sports organizations and trade schools; and economic activities. Throughout its thirty-six-year history, the Histadrut has striven to concern itself with and satisfy all the physical, cultural, and spiritual needs of its members.

A second aspect of the Israeli labor movement is its ideological foundation,

which is a synthesis of Zionist nationalism and socialism. The nationalism called for a re-creation of a nation, the resettlement of Jews in Palestine, and the renewal of Jewish national life. The socialism, though not as clearly defined and widely accepted as the nationalism which it was supposed to serve, aimed not at overthrowing an existing social order, but at the creation of a new society of free workers where no sizable society existed at all.

A short article cannot hope to do justice to so complex a phenomenon as the Histadrut.¹ The following pages attempt rather briefly to describe the development and present structure and operation of this organization and to consider some of what appear to be basic problems facing the Histadrut in its future development, problems which arise from the very size and complex nature of the Histadrut.

¹ For this reason we must also abstain from any detailed consideration of Israel's labor parties, an equally important aspect of Israel's labor movement.

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ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HISTADRUT²

The development of the Jewish labor movement may be divided into three broad periods: up to the founding of the Histadrut, from 1921 until the creation of the state in May 1948, and from this date on. Although the history of practical Zionism, and consequently of the Jewish labor movement, begins with the First Immigration to Palestine (1882-1903), the more successful phase starts in 1904 with the Second Immigration, made up of Russian Jews steeped in Zionist and Socialist thought. These settlers, coming to a barren, sparsely populated land, faced the double task of turning themselves into workers and of competing for jobs with cheap Arab labor. Resolved to create a Jewish working class which would evolve into a nation, they attempted new forms of organization and communal living to "conquer labor."

The settlers first turned to agriculture. Work corps, labor exchanges, and collective settlements were formed to solve the problem of finding work, and mutual aid organizations, such as the Sick Fund, were organized to make the difficult life more bearable. These new functions were at first performed by political parties; later, unions common to the parties were set up. The first of these were agricultural workers' unions. However, party strife split the unions, and led to two party-unions and duplication of activities. In December 1920, the less than five thousand Jewish workers called a convention to remedy this situation. The Histadrut was organized to concentrate activity towards the goals accepted by the entire labor community.

² A survey of Histadrut development and structure available in English is Samuel Kurland, *Cooperative Palestine*, New York: Sharon Books, 1947. The figures are now dated.

Once founded, the Histadrut developed rapidly, undertaking new social and economic activities. Its object was to find work, absorb new immigrants, and build up itself and the working community. In co-operation with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, it directed the inflow of contributions from world Jewry towards the rebuilding of the Jewish national home. As immigration increased and urban centers grew, a Jewish urban proletariat developed and intensified the Histadrut's union functions. Large-scale strikes during the 1920's and 1930's won union recognition for the Histadrut. After a concentrated war effort during World War II, during which its economic activities flourished, the Histadrut turned once more to strengthening the working class and placing it in the forefront of the fight for national independence.

Membership

After the establishment of the state and the War of Liberation, the Histadrut found itself able to grow much more rapidly, primarily because of the large-scale immigration. As the Jewish population grew, so did the Histadrut, both absolutely and relatively. By the end of 1948, total membership was about 250,000, some 33 per cent of the Jewish population. By January 1956, it had risen to over 865,000, more than 50 per cent of the Jewish population. This total membership is composed of some 380,000 active members, 15,000 working youth, 170,000 members' wives, and 300,000 members' children.³ The total number of wage earners in the Histadrut was some 250,000 in 1955.⁴

³ Figures are taken from Histadrut Executive Committee, Statistics and Information Department, *Bulletin of Statistics and Occupational Information* (Tel Aviv; in Hebrew), No. 20 (August 1956), p. 10.

⁴ Histadrut Executive Committee, *Report for the Years 1954/55* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, December 1955), p. 392.

close to 75 per cent of all Jewish wage earners.⁵ Adding members of co-operatives and self-employed to the number of wage earners, the Histadrut percentage of this total was almost 80 per cent by 1956.⁶

Changes and uncertainties

The Histadrut accepted the task of absorbing new immigrants and leading the economic development of the country; these tasks, and aid in undertaking them, were given to it by a labor-controlled government. However, new problems emerged which called for curtailing certain Histadrut functions, such as the Histadrut's network of schools which were turned over to the government. Moreover, once the great unifying goal had been reached, non-Histadrut parties gained in strength, and even in the Histadrut the question of the form which the new state should take and the Histadrut's role in it were widely debated. This period of change and development is still in its early stages.

HISTADRUT STRUCTURE AND OPERATION

Membership in the Histadrut is open to anyone who works and "does not exploit the labor of others" and who is willing to accept the authority of the Histadrut. Membership is direct, but it actually involves up to four different memberships: on a plant level, in a local union, in a local labor council, and general membership.

⁵ Computed from unpublished figures of the Government's Labor Force Surveys in June 1954 and November 1955.

⁶ Based on Labor Force Survey unpublished figures and Histadrut *Bulletin* (cited note 3 *supra*), p. 3. This *Bulletin* gives a higher ratio of Histadrut members (excluding wives) to total Jewish workers. However, the definition of "workers" appears not to be consistent for the numerator and the denominator of the ratio.

Workers' committee

The basic stage is a workers' committee at the place of employment, elected directly by all the workers. This committee handles daily matters of labor-management relations.

Local trade union

The next link is the local trade union, whose official functions are to set working conditions, observe contracts, and fulfill the tasks given to it by the local labor council. The workers' committee is under the authority of the local union whenever the employees of a particular establishment are all members of one trade union. Elections to local unions are sporadic and union secretaries are usually appointed functionaries.

Local labor council

The third aspect of membership is the local labor council, which is elected by all local Histadrut members from party lists on a basis of proportional representation. The local unions are under its authority, as are (theoretically, at least) all local Histadrut institutions. The labor councils allocate funds, which they receive from the Executive Committee.

National associations

Most of the local unions are organized in national unions and associations, many of which are industrial in form. These are generally run by officials appointed by the Histadrut executive bodies. Their funds are also received from the executive bodies. These federations are not an aspect of direct Histadrut membership. The national associations together with the Trade Union Department of the Executive Committee negotiate national collective labor agreements and decide on industry-wide strikes. All are more or

less under the control of the Executive Committee.

General Convention

The final and most important stage of Histadrut organization is the General Convention to which delegates are elected by the entire Histadrut membership, to part of whom the trade union aspects of membership may not be applicable (for example, wives of members and members of collective settlements). Here, too, voting is for party lists and on a basis of proportional representation. The Convention, elected once every few years, elects a General Council which is the supreme body between Conventions. The Council, in turn, chooses an Executive Committee, whose plenary sessions decide upon questions of principle. The functions of the Executive Committee are suggested by its departments: Trade Union, Education and Culture, Mutual Aid, Vocational Training, Organization, Legal, Statistics and Research, Municipal, and Tourist. There are the central administrative organs of the Histadrut.

Political parties and the Histadrut

Because the two most important functional organs of the Histadrut—the local labor councils and the General Conventions—are elected by the general membership, the Histadrut retains its "general" nature. For though a trade union member may feel that a particular party represents his own interests, neither his vote nor the party list are specifically related to a particular union. The parties' appeals concern ideological and general Histadrut policy. For many years the Histadrut has been dominated by MAPAI, which is more or less middle of the road for a labor party. Of the remaining parties, only two—MAPAM, much farther left than MAPAI, and Achdut Ha'avoda Poale Zion—somewhere between the other two

—are of significant size.⁷ Of the smaller parties, several consist of Histadrut members who in general elections are affiliated to nonlabor parties.

In addition to all these executive bodies, the Histadrut has local and central Supervisory Committees and Members' Tribunals to exercise supervision and arbitration in the fields of finance and membership, respectively.

Trade union activities and achievements

The Histadrut has managed to be recognized as the workers' sole bargaining agent in all significant enterprises and in a large proportion of smaller ones. Organizing difficulties have been felt particularly in the small crafts and industrial firms and among hired agricultural workers. Collective agreements, written or oral, are arrived at by means of negotiations at various levels: some are reached between individual firms and the local union and labor council; some, on an industry-wide basis, are between relevant national union (of course with the approval and the direction of the Trade Union Department of the Executive Committee) and national producers' associations. Finally, there are top-level agreements between the Trade Union Department and the Manufacturers' Association, such as the agreement for an automatic wage bonus tied to movements in the cost-of-living index.⁸

One basic provision of Histadrut con-

⁷ The new Executive Committee elected as a result of the General Convention held in March 1956 divided its 91 members as follows: MAPAI, 53; Achdut Ha'avoda Poale Zion, 13; MAPAM, 11; Haoved Ha'zioni, 6; Association of General Zionist Workers, 1; Israel Communist party, 4; Religious Workers, 2; Independent, 1.—*Davar*, March 29, 1956.

⁸ An interesting aspect of this latter agreement is that the government stands by until these two organizations come to terms and then agrees to grant similar terms to government employees.

tracts is that all hiring (except of higher grades) be done through the Labor Exchanges, which are operated jointly by the Histadrut and the independent labor organizations under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor. Their task is to find and distribute work according to a graded waiting list. The Labor Exchanges serve union members but do not require membership in a union. Thus, the workers hired through the Labor Exchange are not always organized or necessarily Histadrut members; nor are an employer's previously employed workers required to join the union.

The Histadrut attempts to increase its membership among nonorganized workers in organized plants by including in the contract "organization" dues to be paid by unorganized labor of about 2.5 per cent of the wage. It then becomes profitable to pay the extra 2 per cent or so required for Histadrut membership and enjoy the full benefits offered by the Histadrut, particularly membership in the Sick Fund. In addition, the Histadrut has succeeded in arranging for an automatic dues checkoff in the place of employment for close to 200,000 workers, that is, some 70 per cent of Histadrut dues payers.⁹

The main tool which the Histadrut uses in collective bargaining is the threat of the strike. Local strikes are called by the local trade unions with the consent of the local labor councils; larger strikes, called by national unions, require the consent of not only the relevant labor councils but also of the Executive Committee. Wildcat strikes occasionally break out without the approval of the official Histadrut executive bodies, but they frequently find the Histadrut arrayed against them. The Histadrut accepts mediation in labor

disputes, but it has always opposed compulsory arbitration.

The Histadrut has to a very wide extent succeeded in winning for its membership on eight-hour day and forty-seven-hour week; paid annual holidays, sick leave, and maternity leave; employer contribution to the workers' provident funds and Sick Fund; union consultation in firing and severance payments. Fringe benefits frequently amount to 30 per cent of wages. Although the Histadrut firmly upholds the idea of "equal pay for equal work," in many cases it has not succeeded in actual application of the principle. Thus, wages paid to female workers are consistently lower than payments to men in similar jobs.

The general standard of living of the Israeli worker compares favorably with that in many more amply endowed economies. In fact, a subject for recurrent arguments is the claim that the Histadrut has given the worker a standard of living much higher than his productivity and the present stage of Israel's economic development warrant.

Since the establishment of the state, the Histadrut has been successful in obtaining protective labor legislation. Also, Israel has ratified seventeen International Labor Conventions. Among the main measures of labor legislation are laws limiting hours of work and setting rates for overtime, requiring paid annual leave, and regulating conditions of employment for women and young workers under eighteen, and a national insurance law providing for accident and maternity insurance and old-age and survivors' pensions. Considering the power of the Histadrut, legislation for unemployment insurance is conspicuous by its absence. In fact, throughout its history the Histadrut has tackled the problems of unemployment not by paying insurance to the unemployed, but by encouraging make-work projects through

its own economic enterprises and public institutions and by setting up special funds which lend money to stimulate employment.¹⁰

The Histadrut economy

Perhaps the most unusual of the Histadrut's many functions is the development of a "workers' economy." The "Histadrut economy" is an extremely complicated and heterogeneous phenomenon. Its parts fall into two categories: a co-operative sector and a Histadrut sector in a narrower sense. The growth of both sectors is primarily due to the availability of external sources of finance.

The Histadrut plays a major role in fostering the formation of co-operatives, though a significant number of co-operatives are outside the Histadrut. Functionally, Israeli co-operatives can be classified as agricultural (marketing, processing, supply, and water); credit; housing; producers'; service and transportation; consumers'; provident and pension funds; audit unions; co-operative agricultural settlements; and a miscellaneous group.¹¹ Of particular interest are the agricultural co-operatives, which range from small-holders' villages based on co-operative marketing, purchasing, and social services to collective settlements where co-operation extends to production and even to consumption. The co-operative agricultural settlements supply some 70 per cent of Israel's agricultural produce and play a role in Israel's ideological and political life far out of proportion to their numerical importance. In addition, they

serve as the country's first line of military defense.

The legal garb of the Histadrut in its economic activities is *Hevrat Ovdim* ("Workers' Society, or Commonwealth"). Registered as a co-operative society, *Hevrat Ovdim* is made up of the entire Histadrut membership. Its executive bodies are almost identical with those of the Histadrut and it operates the economic enterprises which belong to the Histadrut as a whole. These enterprises are of many kinds, including a network of factories, construction contractors, financial organs, and central co-operatives. *Hevrat Ovdim* has representation in, and different measures of control over, the various co-operatives. Besides outright ownership of economic enterprises, *Hevrat Ovdim* has entered into partnership with private capital, public institutions, and co-operatives in operating numerous enterprises.

The economic enterprises actually controlled by *Hevrat Ovdim* accounted for about 8 per cent of Israel's net domestic product in 1953.¹² *Hevrat Ovdim*'s share of the value added in the "productive industries" (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, transportation, communication, and utilities) amounted to over 10 per cent of the national total. Together with the co-operative sector, the total share of the collective economy¹³ in the national product in 1953 amounted to almost 22 per cent, and was over 35 per cent of the "productive industries." The fact that the government sector accounted

¹² These and the following figures on the Histadrut's share in Israel's national income are adapted from Daniel Creamer, *National Income of Israel, 1952-1954* (Jerusalem: Falk Project for Economic Research, forthcoming), Table 15.

¹³ This includes the agricultural co-operative settlements and the non-Histadrut co-operative but excludes enterprises in which *Hevrat Ovdim* has no more than 50 per cent control.

⁹ Histadrut Executive Committee Report (cited note 3 *supra*), p. 138.

¹⁰ There are some selected insurance funds which do provide some unemployment insurance benefits.

¹¹ A survey of Israeli co-operatives available in English is H. Viteles, "The Cooperative Movement in the Holy Land," *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, Vol. II (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1956), pp. 53-97.

for 25 per cent of the national product accentuates the importance of the Histadrut's role in the economy.

Other services

The social service activities of the Histadrut are of two types: mutual aid organizations and cultural, social, and educational organizations. The most important mutual aid organization, perhaps the proudest achievement of the Israeli labor movement, is the Sick Fund (*Kupat Holim*), which provides medical facilities for almost two thirds of Israel's population on a basis of need without regard to amounts paid. Every active Histadrut member is automatically a member of the Sick Fund, and for a slight additional monthly fee the members of his family are included. Some non-Histadrut members, such as members of a religious workers' union (by special arrangement), Arab members of the trade unions, and policemen, also enjoy the benefits of the Sick Fund.

The cultural, educational, and social organizations include a Working Youth Organization and a Working Women's Council (both affiliated directly with the Histadrut), daily and weekly newspapers and periodicals, a sports organization, theater groups, a network of trade schools, and similar institutions. The cultural activities among new immigrants are particularly important.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The Histadrut has come a long way in a relatively short period. During the process of growth, functions changed and organizational forms took shape. The influx of many thousands of new members, a substantial number of which were foreign to the ideology and principles of the Histadrut, and expansion in all fields, particularly economic, have brought about the development of a highly centralized, largely bureaucratic organization. The present organization

bears little resemblance to the movement of the 1920's, which was characterized by a close feeling of kinship, co-operation, and mutual responsibility of all members. Whereas a small, highly idealistic group could then raise the banner of common high purpose and solidify its ranks, the large union, and certainly the multipurpose labor organization, cannot now easily and indefinitely ignore serious internal friction and sectionalism.

*Intra-union friction*¹⁴

Within a particular Histadrut union, friction arises between various factions, for example, between skilled and unskilled workers. Elsewhere clashes of interest may lead either to compromise or to disintegration of the union, but the Histadrut is strong enough to minimize the possibility of the latter solution and impose some compromise. There are two aspects to this problem. The first relates to union democracy, the selection of union leadership which actually represents rank-and-file interests; this problem exists in Israel as it does in unions elsewhere. The second aspect relates to the amount of control over union policies taken out of the hands of the *directly* elected union leadership. Where basic questions, such as wage policy, are settled on the highest levels, after taking into account the various internal and external pressures, the results are likely to be neither understood nor welcomed by the rank and file.¹⁵ Pressures of this kind were not too important when the fundamental problems of the Histadrut and the individual member consisted of getting

¹⁴ Because it is a general union, the Histadrut's intra-union frictions include also what elsewhere would be regarded as interunion frictions.

¹⁵ For a specific example and discussion of intra-union revolt arising from this situation, see Nadav Halevi, "Israel's Wage Dilemma," *Midstream* (New York), Autumn 1956.

and keeping work, and of national issues. They are a relatively recent phenomenon.

Interenterprise friction

The economic activities of the Histadrut give evidence of deficiencies in central control and supervision. This is surprising in view of the structure of Hevrat Ovdim, which appears to give it considerable, if unequal, control over all Histadrut economic enterprises, including the co-operative sector. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of lack of co-ordination between Histadrut institutions and of overlapping and competition in functions among economic enterprises. Several Histadrut Conventions have decried the independence from Histadrut control of various co-operatives and the lack of planning by Hevrat Ovdim. Resolutions have been repeatedly adopted, but the very recurrence of these resolutions bears witness to the meagerness of remedial steps taken.

It must be stressed that despite frequent friction between Histadrut enterprises, the Histadrut presents a generally united front against external enterprises. Thus, for example, a new Histadrut enterprise is assured of receiving aid and preference over non-Histadrut concerns from the various purchasing, marketing, and financial instruments of the Histadrut. This is the essence of Histadrut economic expansion.

Economic enterprises vs. the union

The Histadrut employs a significant percentage of Israel's workers; about half of the Histadrut active membership is employed in the two sectors of the Histadrut economy. There is a resulting clash of Histadrut functions, at least in those enterprises where hired labor is employed. There is a sharp distinction between the co-operative sec-

tor and the Histadrut-owned sector as regards employer-employee relations. It is quite possible that a dispute between a co-operative and its employed workers may lead to a strike if the Histadrut arbitration apparatus has failed to find a solution satisfactory to both the union and the co-operative. The less the co-operative is willing to accept Histadrut control, the greater is the possibility of such a development. In a Hevrat Ovdim-owned plant, on the other hand, a strike is almost unthinkable (though occasional "wildcat" strikes do take place). The Histadrut can settle disputes within its own plants by arbitration; it need not authorize a strike. Though the Histadrut can rightly boast that its workers enjoy equal if not better terms than do those in other plants, not all Histadrut workers will agree that since "exploitation" of the worker in a "noncapitalist" plant is precluded by definition, the basis for employee-employer disputes has been eliminated. The director of a Histadrut firm is to them like any other boss, and, as elsewhere, paternalism towards a company union is not appreciated by all the workers.

Relations between employer and employee and among the various echelons in the plant are similar in Histadrut and non-Histadrut plants. This was not always so. Originally, a close personal relationship existed in Histadrut institutions, a feeling of common sharing of a great task. In this sense there was little difference between managerial and other workers. This equality was exemplified by a system whereby wages were paid according to a family rather than a function scale: the size of the family rather than the work performed determined wages. Exceptions to this system developed, first by the acceptance of special professional pay rates and social bonuses, then by dropping the system entirely in the economic en-

terprises. Recently, all Histadrut institutions transferred to a professional wage scale.¹⁶ The breakdown of the family wage scale was a natural consequence of the growth of institutions, the bureaucratization of organizations, and the shift away from operation according to ideological principles.¹⁷

The problem of worker participation in management has not been satisfactorily solved either in Histadrut enterprises or in government industries. Committees have been appointed to work out ways of increasing workers' share in management, but the solution is yet to be found. Joint management-worker productivity boards have been set up, but the fact that these exist in non-Histadrut as well as Histadrut-owned plants suggests that they are limited to promoting *co-operation with management* rather than *sharing in management*. It is significant that whereas the present Histadrut tendency seems to be expansion by means of Hevrat Ovdim companies rather than through co-operatives, it is the co-operatives which present the greater degree of workers' control.

Producer vs. consumer interest

Almost half the consumers in the country are Histadrut members; consequently, the Histadrut producer interests must clash with consumer interests. The consumer co-operative movement has always been a cornerstone of the Histadrut, but there is considerable evidence to suggest that when consumer and producer interests clash, the former comes off second best. Though the Histadrut denies that its firms are

members of cartels, many undoubtedly employ monopolistic, oligopolistic, and monopsonistic techniques. Sharing of the market, price leadership, and price discrimination are commonplace practices not only between Histadrut firms but also between Histadrut and other firms. Furthermore, in bargaining for contracts, the Histadrut firm has a strong asset in its ability to promise smooth labor relations. The result of all this is undoubtedly higher prices to the consumer.

Evidence of monopolistic practice is not necessary to point out the clash between producer and consumer interests. Profits of Hevrat Ovdim-owned firms are reinvested; they cannot be distributed to the Histadrut membership. The existence of profits (unless they are fortuitous) presupposes that strengthening and expanding the enterprises—that is, producer interests—have been given preference over cheaper sales and better service—that is, consumer interests.¹⁸

Of course, all these frictions and clashes of interests can be rationalized out of existence by arguing that the given, apparently preferential, decisions will ultimately serve all interests.

THE FUTURE STILL TO BE PLANNED

The future development of the Histadrut will depend, to a great extent, on the relationship between it and the state. This relationship is complex, indirect, and not clearly defined. The political parties in the Histadrut are also active in general politics; in fact, MAPAI has been the dominant party in Israel since long before the establishment of the state. The Histadrut official who is also in the government is subject to party discipline in both institutions. Should he feel that what

¹⁸ One could of course argue that reinvestment will eventually lead to productivity and lower future prices.

is good for the Histadrut is good for the country, he will not be condemned by his colleagues as having perverted values, for the Histadrut has always been essentially a nationalist movement above all else, dedicated to what it believes to be national interests. The state has aided Histadrut development in several ways: by the awarding of contracts, by leaving the responsibility for the immediate medical care of new immigrants to the Sick Funds, and above all, by financial aid via the government budgets.

On the other hand, the state has taken over some functions previously performed by the Histadrut, such as the Histadrut nonvocational schools. The future responsibility for medical care is still a bone of contention. For while Socialist principles and visions of a new classless working society are basic to Histadrut ideology, there is no clear and accepted concept of exactly what kind of Socialist state is envisioned, exactly how it should be achieved, and what the relationship between the Histadrut and the state should be. Israel now has a mixed economy: nationalized industries, the many-faceted Histadrut economy, and private enterprise. Whether this pluralistic economy will continue in its present form, or whether it will become more socialized and, if so, how, are subjects on which there is disagreement among and even within the various Histadrut parties. Although the leftist elements may decry the pragmatic approach adopted by the majority party and the divergence from standard Socialist dogma, one cannot but feel that there is a wide basis of agreement among most Histadrut parties that the solid establishment of the state is the fundamental task, and any combination of Socialist-type developments is more or less acceptable, at least temporarily, if it serves this basic goal. Undoubt-

edly this pluralistic pragmatic approach must receive a great measure of the credit for the Histadrut's many solid achievements.

Histadrut solidarity

It remains to be seen how long this acceptance of a common immediate goal will continue to postpone more serious internal frictions. Clashes of interests, which are of more recent origin, are constantly mounting. One possible explanation of why no eruption has as yet taken place is that as long as Israel continues to receive large unilateral transfers of funds (for example, German reparations, contributions of world Jewry, United States grants-in-aid), and is thus able to invest in economic development without forgoing standards of living incompatible with its present productive capacities, all sectional interests can be served. Wages can be raised, even if they limit exports; subsidies can obviate the necessity of firing redundant workers and compensate for poor economic planning; rising incomes can compensate for rising prices. Another explanation is that Histadrut solidarity is the result of the belief that the common goal is still of greater importance than sectional differences. Furthermore, while the Histadrut's divergence from standard trade union form may make it appear to be unstable, it actually is a reasonable phenomenon within the context of Israeli society. The correctness of these explanations will probably be demonstrated in the not too distant future. The internal pressures will have to be relieved by some reform and reorganization of the Histadrut if breakaways are to be avoided. Many observers of social and economic development will watch with interest to see if the Histadrut can retain its unique nature and maintain an original course.

¹⁶ Elected Histadrut officials still retain the family scale, plus special function payments.

¹⁷ This development in Histadrut institutions is traced and analyzed in *Studies of Social and Occupational Mobility*, a forthcoming report of the Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, supervised and edited by S. N. Eisenstadt.

Appendix

The United States and the International Labor Organization

A REPORT

IN May 1956 a committee was appointed by the United States Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor to advise them concerning the attitude which the United States should adopt with respect to its future relationships with the International Labor Organization, a question regarding the usefulness of that agency having been raised by the National Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. The Committee was composed of Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Howard C. Petersen, President of the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company; Professor Robert D. Gray, California Institute of Technology; Professor Frederick H. Harbison, Princeton University; and Professor Charles A. Myers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Committee interviewed many persons and has now presented a report which is being studied by the Departments which requested it.

In the following pages the specific recommendations of the Committee are reproduced. These recommendations are based on certain assumptions and general conclusions. The Committee assumed that the United States policy toward and participation in ILO must be considered primarily in terms of the goals of United States foreign policy. The Committee arrived at three general conclusions:

1. The rationale and the purposes embodied in the Preamble to the Constitution of the ILO written in 1919 and clarified in 1944 are consistent with

and expressive of American philosophy and ideals, and the promotion of these aims is in the national interest.

2. Employer dissatisfaction with ILO is due to the failure of the United States government to formulate a clear policy with respect to the Organization, to certain defects in the operation of the ILO machinery which have been to some degree magnified by critics with limited experience with international organizations, and to the quick turnover in the last decade of employer delegates and advisers from the United States.

3. The ILO is of great value to the United States. While it is not of great direct importance to the well-being of most American workers or for the improvement of the conditions of labor or for the promotion of good industrial relations in domestic industries, it does have a positive value to the United States in its foreign relations. To the extent that the ILO contributes to the raising of labor standards abroad, it improves the competitive position of American industry and serves the interest of American labor. Its promotion of industrial democracy and efficiency also advances American interests. It provides a means for showing the world the character and achievements of our labor-management relations. It can be an instrument in the ideological contest. All told, it is worth much more to the United States than the monetary contributions made by the government toward its support. Withdrawal from the ILO would cause severe damage to American interests in the larger sense, but continued participation must be

buttressed by the conviction of the United States government that the International Labor Organization is important.

Specific Recommendations

The Committee, convinced that the International Labor Organization can play an important and useful part in furthering United States foreign policy goals, and believing that United States participation in the ILO should be viewed as an integral part of our membership in international organizations, recommends continued but more effective and vigorous participation in the ILO, and to that end makes the following specific Recommendations:

1. *The Committee recommends that the Department of State, as the principal agency under the President responsible for United States foreign policy, take the leadership, in collaboration with the Departments of Labor and Commerce, in a clarification and elaboration of the place of United States participation in the International Labor Organization in furthering our broad foreign policy objectives.*

Many persons whom we interviewed were frank in stating that they did not fully understand the reasons for United States participation in the ILO. Some thought our Government probably had good reasons for wanting to continue in the Organization, even if such reasons had not been disclosed. Others, who held the view that the United States should withdraw, indicated that they might change their position if it could be demonstrated that our national interest would be served by continued participation. Nearly all the persons who appeared before the Committee were in agreement that most United States employers and the vast majority of American citizens were unfamiliar with the Organization and the work of the ILO and hence had very little interest in it.

For many years, United States participation in ILO was the concern primarily of the Department of Labor. Today, the Department of State and also the Department of Commerce have vital interests in the Organization. As we have stressed earlier in this report, the function and significance

of ILO have changed markedly during the last few years. The ILO is now a political forum as well as a technical body. It operates technical assistance programs and provides extensive consultation services particularly to economically underdeveloped countries. As a consequence of these and other developments, it has become a battleground in the cold war between the democratic and totalitarian regimes.

In the view of the Committee, it will be very difficult to persuade top-level persons to serve as United States delegates to the ILO unless the Government clearly indicates to American employers, workers, and the general public the reasons why continued and effective participation by our country is in the national interest. Unless it is made clear, as we are convinced can be done, the purposes to be served by continued United States participation in the Organization, then participation and interest will dwindle, and membership in the Organization might even become damaging.

2. *The Committee recommends that the appropriate agencies of the Government establish formal machinery for periodic discussion and development by government officers, employers and labor, of policy objectives for United States participation in ILO.*

Nearly all of the persons who appeared before the Committee indicated that there was a serious lack of coordination and communication between the interested government agencies, as well as between these agencies and employer and worker delegates, in the formulation of positions to be taken in ILO meetings. The Committee was gratified to learn, however, that some progress toward better integration was made in 1956. In a statement, issued by the three interested Departments on May 4, the following were proposed as objectives for United States participation in ILO:

- a. To develop and maintain United States leadership in advancing United States interests and those of the free world.
- b. To practice international cooperation and make the maximum use of the unique tripartite structure, the subject matter considered, and the forum ILO provides to pursue United States

- foreign relations objectives of international cooperation and world peace.
- c. To convince other governments, workers and employers of the values and benefits inherent in the American economic, social and political system and to make clear the functions of United States employer and worker organizations in meeting the social and economic needs of workers and of the Nation.
 - d. To develop friendly and cooperative relations with those countries with which the United States is allied and to strengthen relations with other non-communist countries.
 - e. To have included in ILO decisions and programs provisions which are acceptable and usable by Free Nations who look to ILO for help and guidance and which do not detract from the basic free society concepts and view of the United States.
 - f. To assist, through the International Labor Organization, in increasing the dignity and freedom of workers and in improving the welfare of workers throughout the world as a political, economic and humanitarian policy.
 - g. To encourage employers, workers and government representatives to take action in their countries which will contribute to a substantial increase of productivity as a means of accelerating rising levels of living and which will make democracy meaningful to workers.
 - h. To encourage, through the ILO, actions in member nations which will bring about, within the realities of their economic and social conditions, an increasing responsibility for labor and management to handle labor-management relations and working conditions problems and to keep government intervention at a minimum.
 - i. To make available to workers and employers throughout the world the technical and practical experience of the United States employers and workers on matters relating to industrial relations, productivity and the welfare of workers.

- j. To achieve economic benefits for United States workers and employers
 - (1) by creating markets for United States goods through raising standards of living in other countries; and
 - (2) by the elimination of sub-standard conditions that may be a factor in unfair competition in international trade.
- k. To strengthen the ILO to enable it to carry out programs and to achieve objectives which are consistent with United Nations principles.

Certainly the formulation of these objectives is a start in the right direction. But, there is need for further discussion, refinement and elaboration of policy objectives of this kind.

We feel that present informal arrangements for cooperation between the government and employer and worker groups should be supplemented by the establishment of an advisory policy committee composed of government, employer and worker representatives to review and appraise periodically long-range policy as well as to discuss the various positions to be taken in the committees and conferences of the ILO. Moreover, one of the functions of this policy committee should be to consider measures for better communication of information about ILO to United States employers, workers and the general public, so that there may be more widespread understanding of and interest in the activities of the organization.

3. The Committee recommends that the United States Government take urgently specific measures to improve the organization and staff responsible for United States participation in the ILO.

Three separable but related problems must be tackled.

- a. There must be continuous high-level United States governmental representation at Geneva. The Senior United States representative in Geneva should be an individual especially qualified to deal with international organizations, particularly in the economic and social fields, should be accorded ministerial rank, and should be re-

sponsible for United States relations with all intergovernmental organizations in Geneva, including the International Labor Organization. He should have a highly qualified staff to carry on the detailed and routine work under his direction.

With specific regard to the ILO, this representative should be responsible for year-round liaison with the International Labor Office, and with other representatives in Geneva concerned with ILO matters. He should, of course, report regularly to Washington, not only on matters of interest to government agencies, but for the benefit of employer and worker groups as well.

This representative might be one of the two governmental delegates to ILO General Conferences, but should in any case be a senior adviser to the delegation, and his office should be in a position to advise delegations to all ILO meetings in Geneva and elsewhere.

b. Delegations to ILO General Conference, to the Governing Body meetings and to various committees and other ILO gatherings work under high pressure over relatively short periods of time. If United States participation in these sessions is to be effective, account must be taken of four requirements,—the quality of the delegates and their advisers, continuity in representation, adequate staffing and thorough preparation.

Given the importance that the Committee believes ILO has for the United States, it is obvious that delegates must be competent, interested, high-ranking and skillful in working in international organizations in general and the ILO in particular. Our Committee has been impressed by the evidence presented to it of the effectiveness of representatives (both governmental and non-governmental) from other countries who have served for a number of years; we therefore emphasize the element of continuity most strongly.

The staffs of delegations should be chosen with a view not only to including persons with the needed technical competence in the subjects on the agenda, but also to providing staff members qualified to deal with the political aspect of ILO meetings; this is especially important with respect to the

General Conferences and sessions of the Governing Body. The delegations should, moreover, be large enough to cover all aspects of a meeting thoroughly, particularly the working committee sessions at which many of the important decisions of General Conferences are in fact made.

As for preparation, United States delegations to international conferences should be like a team, each member knowing his assignment and his fellows. While some steps have been taken in recent years to improve the briefing of delegations, both governmental and non-governmental, to ILO General Conferences, there is still a long way to go before the United States shows signs of taking these important international conferences as seriously as a mediocre football coach takes an early season game. To prepare delegates both governmental and non-governmental to the ILO as deeply and as broadly for what they will encounter at ILO meetings, representatives of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor should meet early and often with these delegates. We hope and believe there will be great improvement on this score.

c. The third problem is that of adequate and efficient organization and staffing in Washington. ILO meetings are short, but the preparation for them takes time, and the follow up is vital, particularly in view of the way the ILO works. The recent establishment of the Interdepartmental Committee on International Labor Policy, an important step in itself, is not enough. The Departments of State, Labor and Commerce especially, and perhaps other agencies as well, must have larger staffs and adequate budgets for them. In the last six months of 1956 alone, the ILO conducted no less than 15 meetings of various kinds. Without larger staffs our delegations must be ill-prepared, and our national interest ill-served.

Of course, it would be well if the employer and labor organizations that nominate delegations increased the permanent staff dealing with ILO matters; but the primary responsibility for improved staff work rests with the government.

4. The Committee recommends

a. *that the United States continue to work for decreased emphasis on the use of Conventions and Recommendations; but*

b. *that when, nevertheless, Conventions or Recommendations are under consideration by the General Conference, it should be United States policy to support or oppose them on their substantive merits, and not to oppose a proposal with which the United States is in agreement on principle simply because the measure is in Convention form or is thought not to be properly a subject of legislation under the American system.*

Although the United States has many laws in the labor-management area, in our more mature economy much less reliance is placed on law to effect social or economic improvement than is the case in the less developed countries of the world or countries with socialist concepts of government. Within the framework of our basic laws relating to labor and management, substantial reliance for improving labor conditions is placed on the collective bargaining process, a process which is non-existent or little developed in many countries of the world. Moreover, greatly increased productivity has been brought about in American industry through vigorous competition and the joint efforts of management and labor. Under our Constitution with the Federal Government possessing only delegated authority, many areas of legislation are not within the Federal domain but are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the several states.

The ILO has from the outset concerned itself to a preponderant degree with the preparation and adoption of Conventions and Recommendations. This so-called legislative process of the ILO has raised serious problems with respect to the application of ILO proposals to the United States.

At times our governmental delegates have felt constrained in the ILO to support Conventions which, however worthy their purpose, were not thought to be properly the subject of legislation under our system. This same constraint has been in evidence where the Conventions dealt with a subject over which our Federal Government

has no jurisdiction. Moreover, many employer delegates and organizations have condemned the practice of an international body "legislating" with respect to internal domestic affairs. In our judgment, much of this confusion and lack of consistent direction has resulted from concentrating too largely on matters of form and not on real substance.

Whether the actions of the ILO take the form of Conventions or Recommendations, even though the process may superficially resemble the legislative process, the instrument cannot accurately be compared to true legislation because no action taken by the ILO is binding on a member state without its assent thereto in accordance with its own constitutional processes. The use of the word "legislation," and the publication of ILO Conventions and Recommendations under the title "International Labor Code" have been unfortunately misleading in this respect. ILO Conventions adopted by the General Conference become draft multilateral treaties. But they differ from most other such draft treaties, such as was in 1945 the Charter of the United Nations, in that the United States Government members of ILO Delegations do not have plenary powers and do not sign the Conventions. While in the strict legal sense this difference may not be significant, there is a moral obligation on the part of the President to submit draft treaties duly signed by representatives with plenary powers to the Senate for its advice and consent, but there is not even a moral obligation to treat ILO Conventions in the same manner. Realistically, therefore, all of ILO's actions can be treated by the United States as no more than recommendatory resolutions, whether they are called Conventions or Recommendations, and most of them have been so treated. They recommend to the member states for their consideration and determination in their sole and absolute discretion adoption in accordance with their own constitutional processes. The Convention is a higher form of resolution than a Recommendation because the member state is obligated to transmit it to the appropriate national or state authorities for their consideration as to ratification or enactment of implementing legis-

lation. But, there is no obligation under the ILO charter even to recommend ratification of the Convention as a treaty or the enactment of domestic legislation.

Of the 104 Conventions passed by the ILO, seven have been ratified by the United States; most of the remaining ones were not proposed for ratification. Six of the seven relate to maritime labor, but not all of them are binding on the United States because ratification by a sufficient number of member states has not yet been effected. The Constitution of the ILO clearly provides that a federal state such as ours may treat Conventions that are not properly within the federal jurisdiction as Recommendations only. We are of the opinion that the ILO process, coupled with the provisions of our own Constitution, affords complete protection to the United States and reserves completely our power to act on all Conventions or Recommendations as our appropriate legislative authorities shall determine to be in our own best interests.

When the ILO Conventions and Recommendations are regarded as resolutions of an international body recommending legislative action to its member states, as we believe they may properly be regarded by the United States, and not as international laws, it is possible to approach less emotionally United States participation in the process of arriving at Conventions and Recommendations in the ILO. One can contend with great merit that it is improper for an international body to legislate on internal domestic affairs. If, however, as is the case, the so-called legislation is not in fact legislation because it has no binding effect on the member states without their assent under their own constitutional processes, the prop on which the argument is based falls. Given the condition of participation in the international body, there is little force to an argument that it is improper for such a body to recommend action to its members on internal domestic affairs.

Some of the difficulties incident to this area will recede with time for there are strong indications that ILO is shifting away from the emphasis on Conventions and Recommendations toward a program

of technical assistance and research. We heartily support this shift. But, the point cannot be made too strongly that this re-orientation will take time and that the United States cannot make the changes by itself. During the process of change, the United States must support ILO in its new direction and at the same time continue to work as effectively as possible within the framework of the existing ILO procedure. This we can do best if we determine our position on the basis solely of the substantive merits of ILO Conventions and Recommendations. We can never effectively participate in the ILO if we continue to become enmeshed in highly formalistic exercises in which we appear to the world to oppose high principles because of an unwarranted concern about the effect of ILO on our own legislative processes.

The Committee urges the United States Department of State to re-examine and recast its policy on deciding whether to support or oppose proposed Conventions. It is proper for the United States to urge that ILO action take the form of a Recommendation if the Executive Branch determines not to urge ratification if adopted by the ILO. If, however, the United States position on this is not sustained and the Convention form results, the United States Government delegates, making their position clear as to the action the Executive intends to take with its own legislative authorities, should support the Convention if the principles embodied therein are those which warrant our support. In this connection it should be borne in mind that such obligations as the United States has in relation to an ILO Convention or Recommendation stem from our ratification of the ILO Constitution, and are not affected by the way we vote on the adoption of the proposal.

To take a position other than that proposed here will result in the embarrassing, in fact almost impossible, situation which the United States is currently in on the draft Convention on Forced Labor. At this year's General Conference our Government took the view that it was immoral to support a proposal that the President had no intention of submitting for ratification. As a result, instead of the United States

leading the fight for a Convention against Forced Labor, an issue over which we fought a bloody war, we hedged ourselves around with reservations and amendments and gave the appearance in the propaganda outlets of the world of opposing the Convention. Moreover, our intractable stand against Conventions, in this case as in others, reduces our ability to negotiate a document more satisfactory to us.

The Committee recognizes the difficult problems posed for the United States Government by the Forced Labor Convention. On the one hand, the dominant belief in our Government seems to be that this Convention in its present form, if ratified by the United States, would run counter to the dictates of our Constitution. On the other hand, this country stands to suffer a major setback in terms of world public opinion if it opposes the measure on forced labor. It seems to us that the Convention on Forced Labor differs from other Conventions in its significance for the United States. For one thing, it appears to us as laymen that the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution banning involuntary servitude places the forced labor issue within the realm of federal jurisdiction, and therefore not subject to the federal-state disability. Also, this whole issue arose primarily as the result of action taken by the United States in the UN. It was we who took the lead in bringing the problem before the world, and, even though it later took the form of an ILO draft Convention, we cannot without damage to our prestige ignore that fact.

The Committee believes that the United States should continue to work for re-drafting of this Convention so that it will not conflict with United States law. But if we are unsuccessful in this effort, we should nevertheless strongly champion it, making it clear that because of our own constitutional processes, and for that reason alone, we will be unable to ratify it.

Other proposals for Conventions are in prospect. Unless a new policy toward the Convention problem is developed, the United States may find itself, for example, flatly opposing a proposal to outlaw discrimination in employment simply because this issue came before the floor of the ILO

in the form of a Convention and despite the fact that our Government, and both our political parties, favor an anti-discrimination policy.

To recapitulate, the Committee believes that this country should decide to support or oppose this and like issues solely on their merits. The United States should not oppose a principle with which it is in basic agreement simply because the measure appears in the form of a Convention. The ILO Constitution affords us full protection for our constitutional processes. Our moral dilemma, if any, can readily be resolved by announcing that although the United States supports the issue involved, this country will treat the Convention, if passed, as a Recommendation in accordance with the provision in the ILO Constitution. The United States should also continue to urge in these cases that the measure be passed as a Recommendation instead of a Convention.

5. *The Committee recommends that the United States direct its most careful attention to the technical assistance programs, the field services, and the research and informational operations of the ILO, and that United States delegations take leadership in proposing positive suggestions for the improvement, better integration and possible expansion of these activities.*

As we have pointed out above, the ILO has become increasingly concerned with the problems of economically underdeveloped countries. The standard of living in these countries cannot be raised merely by passing Recommendations and Conventions. Their economic and social development will be more tangibly promoted by increasing their output and their productivity. In the area of competence of the ILO, this calls for the development of skills through vocational schools, on-the-job training, safety instructions, supervisory training and management development and worker education. It requires assistance to governments in the development of systems for the collection of labor statistics, employment services, labor departments, and social security programs, appropriately geared in each case to the differing stages of economic development in the respective countries. In some cases, it may call for

the study within a country of appropriate machinery for settlement of grievances and for building of cooperation between representatives of workers and management. In all of these areas, programs need to be designed to meet the *specific and often unique needs* of a particular country.

To perform effectively in these areas, the ILO needs to increase its fund of knowledge through its own research activities and through analysis of the rapidly increasing volume of research done elsewhere. It should be able to provide competent consultants to help the countries requesting assistance, and above all it should be in a position to recruit highly qualified people as members of the technical assistance missions.

From our interviews, we had the impression that the United States worker, employer and government delegates were not always fully aware of the extent, nature, problems and particular contributions of ILO technical assistance programs, for example, in Egypt, India, Pakistan, Turkey and many other countries. Nor did they appear to have opinions based upon full information on the extent to which these programs supplemented, duplicated, or conflicted with the related United States activities of technical assistance and similar programs operated directly by other countries. There has been little appraisal, moreover, of the kinds of closely related technical services which may be provided by private organizations, such as industrial companies, consulting firms, and labor union federations in various countries and how they related to the ILO sponsored activities.

The ILO now operates on behalf of the United Nations most of the multilateral technical assistance programs in the area of management and labor. If the United Nations continues to provide multilateral technical assistance, and the Committee believes that it should do so, the ILO will probably expand its fast-growing, and in many cases, highly successful programs in the managerial and labor area. The United States employer delegates, in particular, should be in a position to offer constructive suggestions for operation of supervisory and on-the-job training centers which

the ILO is presently operating. Here American management has perhaps greater experience and broader knowledge than any other group.

It has been apparent for some time that the major energies and interest of the ILO are shifting away from "legislative" concern to operational services of this kind. The Committee feels that this trend is most commendable. Therefore, it strongly urges that the United States delegations press for improvement and expansion of these services, and in particular that they take the leadership in developing plans for better integration and coordination of these services with other activities, both private and public, designed to increase output, improve productivity, and raise the dignity, worth and value of the individual in the industrializing countries.

In this connection the Committee commends the initiative taken by the ILO in exploring the possibilities of increased and more effective activities in the area of labor-management relations and human relations. We have in mind specifically the report prepared by Mr. David L. Cole in 1955 at the request of the Director-General, and the follow-up on that report by a committee of experts at Geneva in 1956. We believe the suggestions of Mr. Cole and the committee deserve the most careful examination by the United States.

The Committee suggests further, that when United States delegates find it necessary to oppose the adoption of Conventions or the promulgation of broad, sweeping Recommendations, they advance at the same time, wherever possible, well-formulated, specific suggestions for coping with the problems raised, through technical assistance, field service, and objective studies.

The Committee further suggests that the Departments of State, Commerce and Labor make available to all United States delegates information pertaining to non-ILO technical assistance and field service activities so that they may better appraise the present and potential contribution which the ILO can make in the field.

It is in the area of technical assistance and field services that the ILO can probably make its most tangible and constructive contribution to economic and social

development of the member countries, and it is here that we propose that the United States concentrate its major effort in formulating and promoting measures for positive action.

6. *The Committee recommends that the United States support maintenance of the tripartite structure of the International Labor Organization and utilize this structure to demonstrate the advantages resulting from the activities of free employers and free workers.*

The term tripartite, as it is used here, refers to the unique feature of ILO whereby not only governments, but "the employers and the work-people of each of the members" actively participate through delegates in the Organization's meetings. The Committee has studied carefully the operation and impact of the tripartite system of ILO in the light of the criticisms directed against it and the arguments advanced in its defense.

Although a strong undercurrent of opposition to the tripartite system existed prior to the re-entry of Russia and the entry of the Byelorussian and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republics into ILO in 1954, that event sharpened criticism of tripartitism and gave this opposition a focal point. Russian membership in ILO raised in acute form important questions about the freedom from government control enjoyed by worker and employer representatives. The cornerstone of ILO tripartitism is the power to vote possessed by governmental and non-governmental delegates alike. In its conception, this system assumed that the worker and employer delegates would vote and act in the interests of their respective groups, thus insuring that each segment of society involved would have the chance to register its opinion. However, the freedom of Communist employer and worker delegates to act in any interest but that of the government was challenged. These delegates, it was charged, are merely extensions of the Russian government delegation.

The issue was brought to its present acute stage by American employer delegates. Some of them had already manifested a general dislike of ILO's tripartitism, stemming from experience with tri-

partite agencies in the United States during World War II, from frustrations caused by the need to act as representatives rather than as individuals, and from a feeling that this procedure tends to emphasize class distinctions between employers and workers. To this was now added an intense opposition to the very thought that men from Soviet Russia should be classed as employers, and particularly that Communist employers should be admitted to the councils of free employers. A strong—and understandable—emotional element was thus added both to distaste for tripartitism and to intellectual conviction that employer and worker representatives from Communist countries are not free or even truly non-governmental.

The discussion and disputes that arose from American employer attack led to the appointment by ILO of a special committee of jurists, under the chairmanship of Lord McNair, to inquire into the degrees of freedom of the non-governmental delegates from member nations. We are encouraged by the fact that the Governing Body, after considering the McNair report in November, 1956, decided to request the Director-General to submit to its next session "a report on the desirability and the practicability

(a) of establishing continuing machinery which would establish the facts relating to the freedom of association in member states of the International Labour Organisation and would report to the Governing Body and to the International Labour Conference;

(b) of improving the practical methods of working of the conference, including the committees of the conference."

We hope the Governing Body will see fit to install this machinery and will make sure that it is allowed to function freely.

But realistically we must recognize that this alone will not solve the problem. The preamble to the ILO Constitution proclaims the need for "recognition of the principle of freedom of association," and Article 3, Section 5, provides that the representatives of employers and workers shall be "*non-Government* delegates and advisers" (emphasis added). Unfortunately, however, there is no specific requirement that these

delegates and advisers be representative of *free* workers or of *free* employers.¹ Furthermore, while Article 4 guarantees that "every delegate shall be entitled to vote individually," there is no guaranty that this *individual* vote will be *independent*.

The Committee shares the view of American delegates, governmental and worker as well as employer, that the appointment of representatives of state-controlled labor associations and of state industries as non-governmental delegates and advisers violates the *spirit* of the ILO Constitution, but we are not convinced that the *letter* of the Constitution is so clearly violated that these representatives can on constitutional grounds be denied seats.

What is to be done?

As a practical matter, tripartitism is established in the ILO Constitution and any change in this principle at the present time is unlikely. Even if this change were possible, we believe that ILO's effectiveness would be decreased by abolition of the tripartite principle.

Tripartitism, an unique feature of ILO among international organizations, imparts to ILO an almost unique amount of pragmatism in its approach to the accomplishment of its objectives. The problems discussed by ILO have direct effects upon employers and workers. It seems consistent with American principles and philosophies to permit and encourage those who are directly affected to participate in the development of solutions which will be better because of the knowledge and experience contributed by these groups.

The problems raised by tripartitism are especially acute in connection with Conventions and Recommendations accompanied by the heavy emphasis on the voting rights of delegates. If, as we hope, Conventions and Recommendations come to play a minor role compared with the research and technical assistance function, many of these

¹ Article 3, Section 5, of the ILO Constitution provides: "The Members undertake to nominate non-Government delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers or work-people, as the case may be, in their respective countries."

problems will be reduced. In fact, it will be valuable to free nations to have representatives of their employer and worker groups take an active part in ILO activities along these new lines.

Since ILO seems likely, in any event, to continue to use the tripartite system, it is essential that the United States utilize this structure to the best of its ability. This cannot be accomplished by the withdrawal, as has been suggested, of American employer participation. If such a withdrawal should take place, the American worker delegate, under the ILO Constitution, would be stripped of his right to vote, thus leaving the two American government representatives as our only two voting delegates. We do not favor representation in ILO solely by governments, either for this country's delegation or as a principle to be adopted by ILO for all countries. We have stressed the need for participation by workers and employers in the solution of their problems. Of even more importance, perhaps, is our conclusion that representation only by governments would result in a loss to the United States. It does not seem likely that outstanding business or labor leaders would participate in ILO activities if they were limited to advisory roles. In addition, the United States would lose the opportunity of demonstrating before the world the fact that, under our economic and political system, it is possible for either or both the employer delegate and the worker delegate to disagree with the government, as they frequently have done in voting on ILO matters.

It is in the light of these considerations that we have examined the problem of the so-called employer and worker delegates from Communist countries.

One proposal which we have studied with great sympathy is to give each group in the ILO more autonomy to conduct its own affairs at the General Conference. Currently, the Standing Orders of the ILO provide that a delegate may appeal to the Conference if he is denied a seat on a Conference committee. This means that, if he wins his appeal, he may be seated as a worker or employer delegate over the opposition of the majority of other workers or employers who consider him not truly

representative. It has been proposed that this rule be replaced by that formerly in force, which allowed the employer and worker groups each to pass on the eligibility of its own members without appeal, as is done in the two Houses of the American Congress.

Ideally, this would be a very satisfactory solution. It would avoid in a clear-cut manner the problems that arise when free employers and free workers are forced to admit into their midst delegates adhering to doctrines that preach the overthrow of everything free men believe, and would help to make sure that the delegates seated in Conference committees were truly representative of employers and workers.

We believe, therefore, that it should be United States policy to advocate such a change *at the proper time*. But the timing is of vital importance and must be determined in the light of the probable propaganda impact. It would be most unfortunate, for example, if either the attempt to make the change, or the result of the change if made, were to give the Russians a new handle for propaganda appeals to the uncommitted workers, or to those who are already suspicious of the United States or critical of capitalism.

Pending such change, the United States delegations should challenge the credentials of employer and worker delegates from Communist nations, emphasizing repeatedly that to seat such delegates violates the spirit of the ILO, and utilizing every challenge to cast in a sharp light the contrast between freedom and oppression. We believe that, even though Communist employer delegates may, despite American objections, continue to be seated in the Conference and given deputy membership (without voting rights) on committees, the impact of relentless American attacks will be felt. In any case we are convinced, for reasons set forth above, that, unsatisfactory as it certainly is, this is from the viewpoint of American national interests a less deplorable state of affairs than would result from the withdrawal of the United States or the refusal of American employers to participate in the ILO.

With specific regard to the problem posed by participation of Communist em-

ployer delegates in meetings of the employer group, we believe ingenuity and imagination can find ways to circumvent many of the difficulties this presents.

We hope that, given a clear lead by the United States Government, American employers will participate vigorously, even enthusiastically, in the ILO. Its tripartite system, despite its weaknesses, presents a great opportunity—almost unparalleled in any other international organization—for continuously and vigorously challenging the Communist economic and political ideology. In ILO today, non-governmental delegates from a majority of nations can determine their own courses of action with little or no government interference. Certainly, this is not the case with the delegations from Communist countries.

Tripartitism makes possible constant and eloquent testimony to the fact that freedom, as it is enjoyed in most of the Western World, is not to be found in countries controlled by Communists.

7. *The Committee recommends that the United States work for a shift in the emphasis of ILO Industrial Committees away from deliberations leading to a vote on final action, toward an approach based on discussion and exchange of expert information; that the United States press for a policy calling for formation of Industrial Committees to meet specific problems rather than the present practice of perpetuating committees.*

We have heard confusing and conflicting testimony regarding Industrial Committees. However, emerging clearly from this testimony is the belief that committees functioning along the lines of the ILO Maritime Commission would be more beneficial to the participants than the existing method employed by the Industrial Committees. Since the maritime body meetings are attended by experts and have more the atmosphere of informational exchanges, this commission has won much greater approval from attending Americans than have the other committees.

We are encouraged that ILO's Governing Body is currently in the process of re-studying the operation of the Industrial Committees. In this connection, we believe that the effectiveness of these bodies

would improve if the Governing Body, in acting upon proposed agenda for committee meetings, endeavored to limit the agenda to problems peculiar to the industry involved.

We believe that Industrial Committees would gain favor in the eyes of American delegates if these committees were formed to meet special problems as they might arise. *Ad hoc* committees stand to gain much greater support from American employers, without losing the backing of worker delegates, than is now given the existing committees which, once created, continue to survive even though no pressing problems may confront them. Permanent committees have excluded from participation many important industries.

Also, the present method of reporting the results of committee voting often obscures real and substantial opposition to the majority decision. Present practice calls for the simple recording of the fact that a measure was carried or was defeated. This procedure tends to surround every winning issue with the aura of unanimity that, in fact, may be completely lacking. In order to correct this impression, we suggest that the United States seek a rule change that would provide for the recording and reporting out of the vote for and against each motion, along with the results of the final vote. We believe also that there would be a more healthy situation with regard to Industrial Committees, if the practice of having the Organization pay the costs of attendance at meetings were abolished.

8. *The Committee recommends that the United States work to improve the International Labor Office staff and to promote the highest degree of objectivity and competence of staff work.*

While serious charges of bias have been leveled at the staff of the International Labor Office, the Committee has no firsthand knowledge or experience that these charges are either true or false. We have heard testimony regarding a few specific instances which would indicate that members of the staff had acted in a manner that could scarcely be described as impartial.

However, we have the distinct impres-

sion from testimony we have heard, that, with few exceptions, such bias as may exist among members of the Office staff springs not from malice or malevolent design but, rather, results from the different backgrounds and environments from where the staff people come. A large share of the personnel is drawn from Europe, so may be prone to follow the lines of action common in that area, such as belief in a strong central government and the use of legislation as a balm for social ills. This approach runs counter to basic American beliefs, particularly to those held by American employers.

This predisposition toward a certain course of behavior is, of course, a bias, albeit an honest one. Given the present nature of the world, the make-up of the Office staff and whatever innate bias may be present are likely to remain substantially unchanged. But if Americans are forewarned of the existence of this inclination to a point of view and are familiar with its origin, they can view ILO papers and studies with these thoughts in mind. Also, ILO officials can be urged to take measures to prevent these predilections from creeping into ILO studies that should be absolutely impartial. Recognizing the extreme importance to an international organization of an objective secretariat, we believe that if American delegates are armed with an understanding of the situation and that if ILO officials strive to keep prejudice out of the Organization's work, the effect of whatever bias may exist on the Office staff can be greatly diminished.

If the American viewpoints are not adequately presented for inclusion in ILO studies and reports, the results may very well appear to reflect a bias running counter to American views. Implementation of our Recommendations No. 2 and No. 3 above should improve staff work in our Government to prevent this. Since much of ILO's research on current practices, proposed actions, and other studies is done with questionnaires, a country must answer the questions presented thoroughly and expertly if it is to have its position correctly stated in the final report. Sometimes in the past, the United States has failed to do an adequate job in this respect

with the result that several ILO reports have not fully reflected the United States position on a question.

As a more general method of insuring a balanced presentation of material by the Office staff, we hope the United States will urge the Director-General to make sure that his staff always permits employers and workers, as well as governments, equal opportunity to present their viewpoints on any issue.

We are sure that the present Director-General, Mr. David A. Morse, whose integrity is above question and who is fully alert to the importance of building a highly competent and objective staff, will welcome constructive suggestions dealing with this problem.

9. *The Committee recommends that the United States Government take the leadership and enlist the cooperation of American employer and employee organizations in undertaking expeditiously to formulate and to work for the adoption of proposals designed to improve the work of the General Conference and its committees.*

The Committee believes that the General Conference and its committees are not now well organized to conduct the business of the International Labor Organization most effectively. This is particularly true in relation to the new trends in the ILO that have been noted frequently in this report and that the Committee strongly endorses (see Recommendation No. 5 above).

The Committee notes with satisfaction that this view, shared by others, was embodied in a resolution passed by the Governing Body at its meeting in November, 1956, and quoted in Recommendation No. 6 above. From our inquiries and examination of the documents we believe that the General Conference is not now as well equipped as it should be to give the fullest possible attention to the Organization's work in the fields of technical assistance and research, and we hope that the review contemplated by the recent resolution will take this into account.

It has appeared to the Committee that, as presently organized, the machinery of the General Conference is such as to favor emphasis upon the drafting of Conventions

and Recommendations, which the Committee believes should be very much reduced. Moreover, the present provisions and practice tend to put the emphasis on Conventions as against Recommendations. We believe that the decision as to whether a proposed instrument should be a Convention or a Recommendation is one that should be taken by the General Conference in plenary session only after the fullest consideration of all aspects of the questions. It may even be that such consideration will lead on occasion to a decision to adopt simple resolutions rather than either a Convention or Recommendation. Because this matter is in our view so important, we hope that it may be possible to provide that decisions to use the Convention form should only be taken by an affirmative vote of more than a simple majority. This should, however, be considered by the United States Government and employer and worker representatives as merely a suggestion that should be carefully scrutinized in the course of a detailed examination of all the present Standing Orders relevant to the review proposed in the recent Governing Body resolution.

10. *Finally, the Committee recommends that the United States Government make vigorous and sustained efforts to call the attention of the American people to the purposes, objectives, and activities of the International Labor Organization, emphasizing that it is the sole specialized agency of the United Nations devoted to improving management and labor standards throughout the world.*

This recommendation stems from the Committee's belief, frequently expressed in this report, that the ILO is an important organization of which the fullest possible use should be made in promoting human welfare, particularly in the so-called underdeveloped areas of the world. We are convinced that, in this democracy of ours, full and fruitful participation can occur in international organizations, including the United Nations itself, only to the extent that the purpose of the organization and the interest of the United States Government in working in it are understood by the widest possible number of citizens.

In submitting to Congress on 18 July 1956 the annual report on United States participation in the United Nations, President Eisenhower said:

It is up to us and the other member states to see that the United Nations serves with increasing effectiveness . . . its central purpose of maintaining the peace and fostering the well-being of all peoples. To this end the United Na-

tions and the Specialized Agencies associated with it *deserve, and should continue to receive, our honest, intelligent and wholehearted support* (emphasis added).

The Committee wholeheartedly endorses this declaration and urges the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce to take all possible steps to implement it, with respect to United States participation in the International Labor Organization.

Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1956

DURING the calendar year 1956, which is also our fiscal year, there were no significant changes in the organization and functioning of the Academy. The staff continued to strive to realize the objectives of our society and to broaden its impact.

BYLAWS

Our basic instrument of government was amended a year ago and has served our purposes well since that time. No further changes are presently contemplated.

OFFICE AND EQUIPMENT

Our headquarters building continues to be adequate. No important alterations or acquisitions were made during the year.

OFFICERS AND STAFF

Otto T. Mallery, a member of our Board since 1918, was killed by an automobile in December. Since the Board has not met since his death, his place has not been filled. Jerome J. Rothschild, a member since 1950, resigned from this and several other responsibilities in October, because of increasing claims upon his energy. James P. Warburg, of New York City, long a friend and supporter of the Academy, was chosen by the Board for the interim, ending today.

Your President returned to his duties September 15, after a leave dating from January 1955, to serve as Secretary of Administration of Pennsylvania. During his leave, Dr. Thorsten Sellin served as Acting President as well as Editor. Our Assistant Editor, Dr. Richard D.

Lambert, went on leave in August, to conduct research for a year in India. Acting in his place is Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, like Dr. Lambert a member of the faculty of the Sociology Department of the University. E. Gordon Alderfer resigned as Executive Assistant and Assistant Secretary in October, to accept a more responsible position with CARE. His place as Executive Assistant was taken by Geneva Leach.

MEETINGS

The regular spring conference was held on April 20 and 21 at The Warwick Hotel in Philadelphia. The general theme was "Africa and the Western World." We are pleased to report that the attendance was very gratifying and that audience participation was well up to our standards.

Our next meeting, on April 5 and 6, 1957, at the same hotel, will have as its over-all subject "The Future of the Western Alliance." We expect to present at that time the same high standard of speakers as for 1956 and previous years.

We are continuing our policy of extending invitations to recognized cultural, educational, and civic organizations, in this country and abroad, to send delegates to the conference.

PUBLICATIONS

Volumes of *THE ANNALS* published during 1956 were:

January	<i>Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems</i>
March	<i>Racial Desegregation and Integration</i>
May	<i>Agrarian Societies in Transition</i>

July	<i>Africa and the Western World</i>
September	<i>The Office of the American Presidency</i>
November	<i>Japan Since Recovery of Independence</i>

Volumes for 1957 are:

January	<i>Disasters and Disaster Relief</i>
March	<i>Current Issues in International Labor Relations</i>
May	<i>American Indians and American Life</i>
July	<i>The Future of the Western Alliance</i>
September	<i>Recreation in the Automation Age</i>
November	<i>The American City and Its Future Problems</i>

Suggestions have been made from time to time to change the basic editorial policy of *THE ANNALS*, to provide a glamorous format and a mixed content. Your Editors and Executive Board have given these proposals the most careful consideration, but have decided to maintain the distinctive contribution of *THE ANNALS*. It is still our intention to provide a high-level journal for the informed adult reader, with each volume devoted to a single subject and with the range of successive subjects covering the whole field of the social sciences.

MEMBERSHIP

During 1956, 2,462 new members were added to Academy rolls, and 2,827 members died or resigned. Total membership and subscriptions at the end of the year were 13,562, of which 3,344 represented libraries in the United States, 717 libraries abroad, and 712 members abroad.

FINANCES

Since the members are likely to be interested in the financial aspects of our

week-to-week operations, we present below a summarized statement of income and outgo:

INCOME

Dues and subscriptions	\$65,270.91
Sales	11,652.59
Advertising	4,196.68
Interest on investments	9,976.77
Royalties and donations	775.19
	\$91,872.14

EXPENSES

General office	\$11,362.12
Meetings	7,329.08
Accounts	6,076.36
New membership	12,569.18
ANNALS	48,886.74
Member records	5,429.89
Sales	4,165.73
Advertising	2,817.00
	\$98,636.10

DEFICIT FROM OPERATIONS

		\$ 6,763.96
Ledger balance at end of month	\$ 4,605.84	
Outstanding checks	8,502.55	\$13,108.39
LESS outstanding collection items		36.00
Balance agreement with bank statement		\$13,072.39
Pro-rated insurance	\$ 428.52	
Pro-rated depreciation expense	4,583.16	
		\$ 5,011.68

Respectfully submitted,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

JOSEPH B. CASAGRANDE and THOMAS GLADWIN. *Some Uses of Anthropology: Theoretical and Applied*. Pp. vi, 120. Washington, D. C.: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1956. \$1.50.

This series of papers deals with the implications and applications of anthropology in education, medicine (psychiatry, public health, clinical medicine), administration of dependent peoples, law. The volume concludes with an essay by Margaret Mead in which she surveys the general position of applied anthropology as of 1955. As always with symposia, the various chapters are of uneven quality, but in this case the general level is quite high.

John Bennett provides an extremely provocative discussion of the learning process, psychological reactions, and acculturation of overseas students. George Devereux reviews some of the literature and presents some fresh ideas of his own on psychiatric anthropology. Benjamin Paul sharply states the case summed up in his final sentence: "While it may perhaps be our duty to help people help themselves to better health, it is not necessarily our duty to make them over in our own cultural image." Thomas Gladwin (basing his presentation largely on his own experience in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) urges that anthropologists engaged in administration should carry out as well as plan programs. William Kelly maintains that careful study of "the relationship between the purposes

and the actual results" of United States Government work among American Indians will lead to many new and constructive possibilities.

Adamson Hoebel makes an excellent case for the "invaluable contributions" that studies of law in culture can make to the understanding of law generally. W. Montague Cobb, with beautiful documentation, shows how much medicine and anthropology (both physical and cultural) have to give to each other. Margaret Mead comments upon the preceding papers and ties some threads together. (Indeed, to an unusual degree, all of the contributors link their papers to one or more of those given earlier.) Mead also considers the ethical problems involved in applied anthropology and inventories some of the areas in the applied field that were not treated in this particular series.

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

Harvard University

LEWIS A. COSER. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Pp. 188. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$3.50.

European influence upon early American sociologists is an accepted fact. In this thesis a European, George Simmel, is reincarnated. The introductory chapter reveals independent thinking. The others start with a "text" according to the Gospel of Simmel and meander through minutia calculated to validate Simmelian propositions pertaining to the role "conflict" plays in social interactions. Sixteen propositions are considered.

Acting both as prosecutor and defense attorney, the author exalts the cohesive against the disruptive value of the conflict process. The following major social functions of conflict, distilled from Simmel, are examined: that conflict preserves the group; serves as a safety-valve; sublimates hostile impulses; specifies the range of group structures; increases internal cohesion; maintains balance of power; and creates coalitions. In discharging these socially desirable functions, conflict forever searches for "enemies."

Conflict is defined as "struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, *injure* or *eliminate* (underlining mine) their rivals." Since the opponents are "enemies," the disruptive end result of conflict should not be so easily swept aside. Characterizing as "negativists" such writers as Talcott Parsons, George Lundberg, Elton Mayo, Lloyd Warner and Kurt Lewin, who have harped upon the disruptive role of conflict, Dr. Coser reiterates, in Mertonian vein, Simmel's dictum that "conflict is a form of socialization."

The verbal "negative-positive" battle is maggoty. Social interaction and social structure are inconceivable without nearness-distance relationships. And it is not paradoxical that the very same process of conflict serves both disruptive and cohesive masters. If the aim is to "injure" or to "eliminate" the rival, as the author claims, conflict becomes costly and disruptive; if it be the submission of the enemy—even temporarily—conflict performs a salutary mission by maintaining social equilibrium. In either instance these are value judgments and the appraisal depends upon the frame of reference. While conflict spells distance to the out-group, it construes intensified nearness in the in-group.

Perhaps it is regrettable that the term conflict is used by the author only in the generic sense. The application of Von Wiese's schematic classification of social processes would have given refined definitiveness to his concepts.

Dr. Coser's expository has practical value to controllers and distributors of status. Seekers of sustained or improved status

would gain much insight in formulating advantageous processes of conflict consistent with group solidarity.

The author's contribution is not merely the unfolding of the social functions of conflict. In his sporadic parenthetical observations on the manifestations of conflict are gleaned some rare insights. His scathing criticism of the current trend among sociologists who have shifted interest to "skills" and who are controlled by the dictates of their "clients" instead of choosing their own problems, fans an air of Veblenism. The "stability-minded administrators and bureaucrats" looking for "trouble-shooters" rather than for pure researchers may find Dr. Coser's observations of long-range value.

SAMUEL HAIG JAMESON

Los Angeles, Calif.

ROY G. FRANCIS and ROBERT C. STONE. *Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy: A Case Study*. Pp. vi, 201. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$4.00.

This monograph opens with a summary of the classical theory of bureaucracy developed by Weber and Merton. From their descriptions are selected two salient features: impersonality and rule-following. Do those traits actually characterize bureaucratic organizations?

To answer this question, the authors studied intensively a local branch of the Louisiana Division of Employment Security. They analyzed samples of the agency's formal rules, observed its interviewing and clerical operations, sampled employee attitudes toward their jobs and their co-workers, and surveyed client attitudes toward the agency.

Their findings do not entirely sustain the classical theory of bureaucracy. Neither impersonality nor rule-following is an exclusive principle of organization in office activities. Both are present. But each is significantly modified by other factors, especially by the professional ethic of "service to clients." Additional influences are employee skills, the agency's tasks and clients, its southern and urban setting, and personal relations among employees.

The authors summarize a dozen other

studies of bureaucracy, the findings of which are similar to their own. They conclude that the principle of professional service is as important in large-scale organization as the principle of bureaucratic co-ordination. Conceived as principles, professionalism and bureaucracy may be combined in different concrete organizations (for example: the hospital, factory, army, university) to produce varying patterns of impersonality, rule-following, and so on.

This is a significant work. Space precludes listing all its virtues—its insight into fieldwork problems, for example (Chapter III). Its theoretical perspective, however, is not entirely clear. The authors seem uncertain as to whether they are demolishing or simply refining Weber and Merton. The latter were well aware that their analyses of bureaucracy involved aspects, not wholes. Their theories are oversimplified by Francis and Stone. Yet this critical attitude toward Weber is a good omen, despite its somewhat misdirected application. A deflation of the Weber cult in America is overdue.

Occasionally this book suffers from an occupational disease of American sociology—a humorless scientism which mistakes jargonized tautology for profundity. "As an organization increases in size and complexity the potential for internal conflict among the members increases . . . as the potential for conflict increases, so the potential for communication barriers and for the preservation of special limited interests increases" (pp. 159–160). Does this tell us anything we did not already know?

ARTHUR K. DAVIS

University of Vermont

ROBERT H. TALBERT. *Cowtown Metropolis: Case Study of a City's Growth and Structure*. Pp. xvii, 274. Fort Worth: Leo Potishman Foundation, Texas Christian University, 1956. No price.

Cowtown Metropolis is a compendium of information concerning the past and present of Fort Worth, Texas. It should be a useful handbook for Texans who wish to know more about one of their largest cities. Doubtless it is of particular interest to business and industrial executives, city planners, community leaders, and

others who need a reliable reference book of facts. There are chapters concerning the historical development of the city, population trends, ecological patterns, the economy of the community, housing, organized health and welfare activities, government, and education, with a final chapter on "What Makes a City Good." Most of the data are obtained from historical records, newspapers, census reports, and documents in the files of numerous local organizations. The volume includes fifty charts and sixty-two tables. Many of the charts show comparisons with other American cities of about the same size as Fort Worth. This fact gives the book a somewhat wider appeal than it would have if all the illustrations applied only to the Texas city.

The author is neither boastful nor critical of the city or its institutions. He is not a promoter. Nor is he particularly concerned with sociological generalizations, although there is clear evidence that he is aware of the theoretical implications of some of his data. The book is a good example of a meticulous factual study and should not be considered in any other light. Sociological theorists will find in it little of interest except cold facts, but the facts themselves may be useful in the construction of theories concerning urban life.

NOEL P. GIST

University of Missouri

FLOYD HUNTER, RUTH C. SCHAFER, and CECIL G. SHEPS. *Community Organization: Action and Inaction*. Pp. xvii, 268. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. \$5.00.

This is one of the most interesting community studies in the literature. It reports the process by which Salem, Massachusetts, organized itself to survey its health problems. This substantive material is inherently important as a case study in community behavior. But the methodological aspects of the report are equally important. A team of social scientists—with a Southern background at that—were on the scene to observe the behavior. They sat in ringside seats; they were not participants; they were objective observers. They could, therefore, view the processes with-

out involvement. They could see, for example, the ludicrous "images of recall" by which people used ancestors to gain social prestige; they could describe the social organization of the community from the exclusive sewing circles to the formal political set-up, and especially the voluntary organizations. In many ways, the chapter on "Persons Who Influence Decisions" is the most valuable one in the book. Using simple but apparently adequate techniques, they seined out forty persons in policy-making positions. They analyzed the thirteen factors which were associated with the personnel occupying such positions, including membership in a recognized power clique, the will to exercise power and leadership, a moderate amount of wealth or property. Equally significant were the six factors associated with a down-rating in a scale of power, such as having a reputation of being someone else's follower rather than a man with opinions of his own, failure, membership in certain ethnic groups. In the final chapter there is an incisive contrast between verbalized values and functioning values, between "Unreality and Reality." The authors say openly what residents of Salem could never say, namely that self-interest was a dominant value in the community, but that it had to be dressed up in more acceptable terminology in order to be tolerated. The authors do not blame anyone; this is what they found and this is what they report. This study will take its place among the musts in reading lists dealing with community behavior.

JESSIE BERNARD

Pennsylvania State University

JOSEPH B. GITTLER (Ed.). *Understanding Minority Groups*. Pp. xii, 139. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1956. \$3.25.

This little volume is a compilation of popular lectures given in the fall of 1955 under the auspices of the center for the study of group relations of the University of Rochester. The six lecturers form a galaxy of outstanding specialists, each eminent in his own field, although the basis for the selection of the minority groups to

be treated is a little obscure. One readily understands the inclusion of the American Indian, Jew, Negro, Japanese, and Puerto Rican but why the Catholic? Why not the Methodist, Unitarian or Bahai? Perhaps the explanation lies not in the logic of the selection but in the eminence and availability of the lecturers. Father John La Farge, the associate editor of *America*, is one of the broadest minded and ablest apologists of dynamic Catholicism in the world. His presentation certainly fulfills the purpose of the series "to reduce inter-group misunderstandings and remove the sources of irrational conflict."

John Collier, for many years Commissioner of Indian Affairs, points out that the American Indians, popularly thought of as a vanishing race, are as numerous today as in 1492 and that their culture is as varied and extensive. The intrepid champion of Indian rights frankly bids for a reversal of the present trend in government policy which, he insists, "departing unashamedly from its historic role, defying its contractual obligations and ignoring prior experiences is seeking to disinherit the Indians, materially and culturally, and to force upon them the dubious boon of 'anomie'—of homelessness, grouplessness and guidelessness." This latter observation was too much for Mr. Haas, formerly Chief Counsel of the Bureau, who read the paper. Mr. Haas offers a 2,000 word rebuttal with page and line authoritativeness.

Harvard's history professor, Oscar Handlin, outlines Jewish history from the dispersion to the European Pogroms: the reapproachment of Jewish groups of diverse national origins and the rise of antisemitism in the United States. He traces the development of political Zionism since 1930 and the significance to Jews everywhere of the establishment of the state of Israel.

Ira De A. Reid in his lecture on the Negro points out that none of the crises through which the American Negro has passed has produced a single outstanding race leader. Hence he confines himself to a discussion of the Negro movements which have come out of the ten crises faced by the American Negro in the current century. These he regards as the direction taken by the Negro "in his search for peace, equality,

security and that indefinable-something more."

Dorothy Swaine Thomas in a highly documented survey of the position of the Japanese in the United States during prewar, war and postwar days treats of the restrictions on their work opportunities, their ineligibility to citizenship, their educational and assimilation patterns.

The Puerto Rican in the United States is discussed by Clarence Senior of Columbia University. He feels that this group provides a highly desirable migratory labor force for the industries, orchards, and farms along the eastern seaboard. A net immigration increase of 400,000 Puerto Ricans has been added to our population during the past ten years. Dr. Senior points out the difficulties of adjustment experienced by this marginal labor group: cultural, urban, familial, linguistic, and in the matter of Negro stereotype.

As might be expected of six lectures, each restricted to a minority group, there is so little continuity, sequence or synthesis that they can scarcely be called a series. Recognizing this, the editor in a 5,000 word summary does a magnificent job of tracing the pale pattern which he sees running through the series.

The publication does bring into awareness the fact that America's melting pot problem is still in process of solution.

CHARLES W. COULTER

Dade City, Fla.

ANDREW W. LIND (Ed.). *Race Relations in World Perspective*. Pp. xix, 462. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955. No price.

As a source of new ideas concerning race relations, as well as one which reviews existent data, this symposium is exceedingly valuable. These nineteen papers were prepared for the Conference on Race Relations in World Perspective held in Honolulu during July 1954. Financial support for this project was provided by the Ford Foundation and the McInerney Foundation.

No theory of race relations emerges from this book. Several of the writers, following H. Blumer's lead, think that only the formulation of "policy" theory in particular situations, but not "scientific" theory, is

possible. The reviewer is not convinced that it is impossible to develop a useful scientific theory of prejudice and discrimination, but this is not the place to elaborate such a point of view.

In these papers, a social conception of a race as a group of people who are regarded and who regard themselves as a race is followed. Changing definitions of race and hence of traditional racial orders are emphasized.

B. L. Hormann views the problem of race relations in demographic and ecological terms, that is, as one aspect of the transformation of the folk and peasant world to industrialized urban society. In his comparison of the racial groups of Hawaii and British Malaya, A. W. Lind points out that the native Hawaiian has penetrated to a far greater extent than the native Malayan virtually all occupational levels, and that the mixed Hawaiian has moved farther up the socio-economic scale than has the Eurasian. J. H. Boeke phrases his analyses of Indonesia and Uganda in terms of the competing values of precapitalism and capitalism, and the supplanting of the older colonialism by a new, indigenous colonialism. E. V. Hughes compares the problems of European national movements, for example, language, territory, boundaries, social structures, literature and art, with happenings in areas of the world where "new" peoples are arising (India and Israel). A. Hourani stresses the role of ethnic and religious differences in Near Eastern nationalism. G. Balandier sees the counter-racism of "negritude" in West and Central Africa as a reaction to colonialism.

J. A. Barnes, dealing with historical factors, concludes that South Africa is developing a social system "in which change will become as difficult and as dangerous as possible"; Absolom Vilakazi writes concerning theories, practices, proposals, and movements in the race relations field in the same country. According to W. J. Kolarz, the Communist policy of obliterating the national characteristics of the racial groups of the USSR may not succeed. J. S. Furnivall warns that some of the recent international agreements intended to promote welfare and improve racial relations may have contrary effects. C. E. Glick's paper deals with

the possibility of using the concepts of social roles and social types to illuminate the transformations taking place in racial-status systems. K. L. Little shows the importance of the relatively well-educated and well-to-do class, and of the new voluntary associations which have appeared in British West Africa, in the transition from the old to the new social orders of life. T. S. Simey compares the development and the functions of a cultural elite in Israel and in the West Indies.

E. F. Frazier indicates the changing economic, political, and social position of Negroes in the United States, and urges that more research be devoted to the relation of culture and personality. Yuzuru Okada describes the attitudes and policies of Japanese colonizers toward the Formosan Chinese and the Formosan aborigines. Maurice Freedman, using data from British Malaya, Indonesia, and Thailand to show the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese position in Southeast Asia, suggests that assimilation, acculturation, and amalgamation may occur independently of each other. Ralph L. Beals concludes that problems of social differentiation are of primary importance in Spanish America; race relations are said to be involved in such problems in varying degrees but are seen as diminishing in importance. In tracing the shift from racial to class distinctions from the colonial period to the present time in Portuguese America, Donald Pierson emphasizes the importance of extensive miscegenation and of increasing urbanization and industrialization.

This book is indispensable to those who have a special or a general interest in contemporary world race relations.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON

Oberlin College

ALLAN B. COLE. *Japanese Society and Politics: The Impact of Social Stratification and Mobility on Politics*. (Boston University Studies in Political Science, No. 1.) Pp. 158. Boston, Mass.: Boston University, 1956. \$1.50.

This first issue of the Boston University Studies in Political Science falls midway between advanced research and an introductory text. For scholars, the promise is rich

but the fruit does not mature; the findings, based upon Professor Cole's exhaustive studies in the field, are important and valuable but they neither vary significantly from those already available nor are they of much wider range. Undergraduates would reap great harvest did not he ruthlessly shoulder aside the brief and rugged word whenever he could find technical, and usually multiple, polysyllables.

As a Ford-Fulbright research professor at The Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Tokyo, Professor Cole, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, made full use of ample opportunities. He surveyed at first hand the effects of war, defeat, and reconstruction on the urban and rural populations of Japan. He interviewed innumerable labor leaders, bureaucrats, the newly risen managerial elite, and what was left of the formerly privileged nobility. He studied the effects of the military systems, both prewar Japanese and postwar American, to see their influence upon the new Japan. And, unique among most writers in the field, he checked his findings with the best Japanese social scientists. Unhappily for most American scholars, comparatively little has been published in English on the general subject in Japan, nor, apparently, much more in Japanese, but Professor Cole has drawn upon a stack of unpublished doctoral dissertations to reinforce his own investigations.

Now that foreigners, and what is more important, Japanese too, have outgrown the mystic idea that Japanese are somehow different from all other peoples, it is not surprising that Professor Cole discovers that the same forces which brought socio-economic changes in the West produced similar changes in the East. That older people tend to vote conservatively while the young clamor for reform, that woman suffrage fails to alter the ratio of political power, that wives and mothers dislike war, that financiers prefer the status quo, and that labor parties are unstable are, none of them, startling discoveries, nor is it surprising to be told that the old elites have been discredited.

It is no criticism of Professor Cole's labors nor of his analysis to say that he turns up no new material; he does a valued

service by aligning Japanese sociology with that of other areas. If one or two minor flaws, especially in reference to the Occupation policies, exist and if he be somewhat weak in treating of the educational, labor and, especially, the woman's realm, these may be pardoned in view of his strength and insight in studying the rising urban middle class.

The volume is compact and meaty and will be an aid to students who can concentrate.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

New School for Social Research

GUSTAV SARON and LOUIS HOTZ (Eds.). *The Jews in South Africa: A History*. Pp. xvii, 421. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. \$5.60.

Few countries in the world have so complicated a population structure as South Africa. Its non-European majority of some ten and a half million is divided between native Bantu or Africans, Colored (mixed blood), and Asians; its minority white population of nearly three million separates sharply between the Afrikaans-speaking, who are now not only numerically but also politically dominant, and the English-speaking. This work on *The Jews in South Africa*, edited skilfully by Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, examines important facets of the history of South Africa from the point of view of a small but significant segment of the white population, those of Jewish faith and descent, who even today, despite assimilationist trends, form a distinctive group within that country. In so doing, the work throws new light on the fascinating panorama of South African development, particularly in the period prior to South African union in 1910, as well as on the distinctive contribution to that development of this particular racial group.

The first Jews to come to South Africa were from England and Western Europe. By the 1880's, however, Russian Jewry, especially from Lithuania, began the steady migration to South Africa which not only accounts for some 80 per cent of the more than 110,000 Jews in the Union today, but has provided the characteristic cast of

South Africa Jewishness. The Lithuanian Jews had a deep and fervent consciousness of both their religion and of a particular way of life; their numbers were sufficient for them to embody this in a cohesive community within South Africa. But they also had energy, drive, ingenuity, and endurance. Thus they participated in or directed most of the major developments in South African economic life in the period before union: diamond mining, gold mining, and, more exotic, the ostrich farming industry.

The major part of this book deals with the period from 1880 to 1910; only the relatively brief epilogue skims the forty-five year period since union. For those seeking an analysis of political conflicts and racial tensions even in the earlier period, there is comparatively little direct material except in relation to Jewish struggles against the discrimination suffered under the old Transvaal Republic, or subsequently through immigration restrictions. Yet the accounts of the formative period of the separate Jewish communities in the four provinces, and the more general essays which deal with Jewish educational and economic advances, and with the struggles within the Jewish community itself for unity, form absorbing stories from the South African as well as Jewish point of view. The more one knows of South Africa, the more meaning they are likely to have because they supplement familiar material, and approach it from new angles. But even for those who do not know South Africa well, the well-written and comparatively well integrated contributions in this book bring out vividly what a relatively small but vigorous and cohesive community can accomplish in helping to open up a country whose complexity of problems is matched by the richness and variety of its resources. The greatest of these resources, one realizes again on reading such a work, are the individuals and groups which have contributed so wholeheartedly to the making of South Africa; the greatest of the problems are the barriers which persist (all too often because of deliberate governmental policy) between its vastly varied peoples.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

Smith College

HOSPITAL COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK. *Organized Home Medical Care in New York City: A Study of Nineteen Programs*. Pp. xvi, 538. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Commonwealth Fund, 1956. \$8.00.

Despite increasing reliance of the individual physician on an expanding team of specialists, technicians, and therapists created by scientific advances, medical care outside of hospitals has remained singularly unorganized (but not disorganized). This lack of organization has interfered with effective utilization of the various elements of medical care, especially by the ill person who is confined to his home.

During the past decade, however, a promising new development has been the establishment of a number of limited medical care programs which offer comprehensive services organized specifically for the patient at home. *Organized Home Medical Care in New York City* is a report of a study of nineteen such programs presently serving a daily average of over 5,000 patients. Each of these programs limits service to patients who do not have resources to purchase medical care.

The report contains a detailed description and evaluation of these plans, and includes statistics describing the patients, their home environments, and their utilization of the various services. This material has been assembled with care, and will be invaluable to community or professional groups who may be considering the establishment of such programs. Many will be surprised to learn, for example, that 57 per cent of the home care patients were totally ambulant and only 4 per cent were totally bedridden.

The report concludes that organized home medical care is an "extremely desirable addition to the scope of available medical services." It is recommended that such programs be based in a general hospital with an active outpatient department, directed by a physician with administrative experience, and staffed with no less than two additional physicians, two physical therapists, three social workers, and one occupational therapist for each 100 patients. Nursing service should be provided

by the community nursing agency, and hospitalization should be immediately available to each patient.

Organized home care costs are estimated to be \$3.58 per patient day, inclusive of physician services, but exclusive of expenses of the patient and his family.

Some readers may be disappointed that the report is so studiously limited to programs serving medically indigent patients. Only fleeting references are made to the desirability of serving private patients, and to the existence in other cities of programs organized for the private practitioner and his patient.

Organized home care will probably come of age only if offered, like private and semi-private hospital service, in conjunction with private practitioners who will be willing to adapt to the organized program, but who will insist on managing their own cases and on avoiding "corporate practice of medicine."

ROBERT M. SIGMOND

Hospital Council of
Western Pennsylvania

ODIN W. ANDERSON and JACOB J. FELDMAN. *Family Medical Costs and Voluntary Health Insurance: A Nationwide Survey*. Pp. xix, 251. New York: Blakiston Division, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. \$6.50.

With an estimated 110 million people currently enrolled in some form of voluntary health insurance, any exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of this phenomenon is manifestly important. In July 1953, the Health Information Foundation, utilizing the statistical and technical know-how of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, undertook a nationwide survey to seek an answer to the problem: "Given the present range of benefits offered by voluntary health insurance, what effects do such benefits have on spreading costs of personal health services and on the utilization of services?"

The first nationwide study of family medical costs to be done since 1933, its methodology reflects the tremendous advances in population sampling which have taken place in a brief score of years. (It

is since 1933, as well, that almost all the growth in voluntary insurance has taken place.) With modern techniques, a smaller sample, with resulting lesser cost, can yield more precise information from the standpoint of sampling than was obtainable twenty years ago. In the present study, a probability sample of 2,809 families was drawn from the general population, following the methods of the Bureau of the Census, and the families so drawn were subjected to a single interview covering, in addition to basic characteristics of the family, the extent of insurance, the utilization of medical services and the charges incurred, and the benefits received from insurance.

Only a few highlights can be given here. As all previous studies have shown, a relatively small proportion of all families bear a high proportion of total medical costs; here, 11 per cent incurred 43 per cent of the total charges for all families. Insured families found that their insurance covered 19 per cent of their charges for personal health services. Of the families incurring hospital charges and receiving insurance benefits, 59 per cent had 80 per cent or more thus covered. Some interesting contrasts appear between insured and noninsured families. To give one example, insured families incurred appreciably higher charges for uninsured services such as dentistry, indicating the presence of psychological and social factors as well as economic.

Implications for the need to expand both coverage of the population and the scope of benefits are clear. In terms of studies, we should like to know next the effect, if any, of insurance upon the general health; and we want to know more about the need for medical care and the extent to which that need is being met for both the insured and the noninsured.

ISIDORE ALTMAN

University of Pittsburgh

COMMISSION ON CHRONIC ILLNESS. *Care of the Long-Term Patient. Chronic Illness in the United States*, Vol. II. Pp. xv, 606. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Commonwealth Fund, 1956. \$8.50.

This is Volume II of a series of four to be published by the Commission on Chronic Illness established in 1949 by the American Hospital, Medical, Public Health, and Public Welfare Associations to study and assess the problems of chronic illness.

This book deals particularly with the needs of patients with long-term illness and with suggestions of how the community can better meet them, including ways of better financing medical and related services. The concluding chapter lists eighty conclusions and recommendations dealing with a wide variety of aspects of this complex, but urgent health problem.

In describing the magnitude of the problem, and what is being done (or not done) about it and by whom, the book is in illuminating detail. But in dealing with ways and means of organizing and administering community programs to meet the obvious needs of persons with long-term illness, discussions turn principally to platitudes that no one would question but few could translate into definitive lines of action. This is a reflection of the seemingly extreme complexity of the problem.

On the other hand, the book is highly informative and can be recommended to all persons with a serious interest in the problem. Its great value is in the persuasiveness with which it presents a few fundamental concepts.

First, it emphasizes the great number and variety of services and facilities required for the restoration of the long-term patient to social usefulness; and while much more is needed than medical and nursing skills, yet the problem of chronic disease is as inseparable from general medical care as is acute illness.

Second, this diversity of needed facilities and services is such that they are outside the competence of any single agency in a community to provide, and indeed are not readily amenable to effective co-ordination. The issue of co-ordination and integration would be simpler if these diverse facilities and services were all provided under institutional auspices.

But a third important concept persuasively developed is that while institutional facilities are important, most long-term patients can best be cared for at home and

greater emphasis must be placed on planning for their care in and around the home. This compounds the problem of co-ordination because it introduces the myriad of community agencies oriented to "non-institutionalized" types of service. To anyone familiar with the degree to which fractionation of health and welfare services exists in a typical community, there is little wonder that the book concludes that "the lack of coordination of services is a major obstacle to progress."

A fourth concept that merits emphasis is that of the enormous potential (fiscal and social) of sound and aggressive efforts in rehabilitation.

While embracing the philosophy that the basic approach to chronic disease must be preventive, there's scarcely a single broad aspect of the problem discussed without reference to either the lack of or broad gaps in our knowledge that serve as deterrents to this approach. The chapter on research offers many excellent suggestions concerning the broad fields of inquiry, the pursuance of which is urgently needed.

Though bold with generalities and timid with specifics, the book is an extremely valuable contribution to a better understanding of the most complex and urgent problem in public health today.

JAMES A. CRABTREE

University of Pittsburgh

ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT

C. N. VAKIL and P. R. BRAHMANAND. *Planning for an Expanding Economy: Accumulation, Employment, and Technical Progress in Underdeveloped Countries*. Pp. xxx, 404. Bombay: Vora and Company, 1956. (Distributed in the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.) \$4.50.

The first half of this volume is a basic and vigorous criticism of India's second Five Year Plan by one of India's outstanding economists; the second portion develops a significantly new theory of economic development applicable to underdeveloped countries.

For one interested in the broad prob-

lems of economic development, this book is a stimulating discovery. India's second Plan is criticized for placing too great an emphasis on heavy industrial investment, while neglecting the increase of consumer goods. Whereas the first Five Year Plan concentrated on increasing agricultural production, the second Plan now starting shifts the emphasis drastically to heavy industrial development. It is correctly pointed out that both the amount and nature of the investment activity will likely put too great a strain on resources and lead to inflation.

In the second portion of the volume the authors develop a new theory of economic growth for underdeveloped areas. The poverty of these areas is associated with unemployed labor and a scarcity of capital, whereas depression unemployment in advanced countries is associated with unemployed capital as well. Methods of raising income in a depression ridden advanced country are not applicable in underdeveloped countries with their lack of capital equipment. The problem is one of increasing capital available so as to employ usefully the large mass of disguised unemployed in rural areas. The unemployed labor force is a temporary drag on the economy, eating up potential savings and preventing needed investment. But these disguised unemployed are a potential source of productivity and wealth if only complementary capital can be created. Thus far most economists would agree with the authors. They proceed to analyze the bottleneck which prevents investment as a lack of consumer goods which in turn prevents employment of the idle labor force. Their formula for rapid growth would be to hire the unemployed to produce almost exclusively consumer goods until all the disguised unemployed have been absorbed. Only then would they shift to capital goods production.

The general idea is plausible enough. However, if one reads the central theoretical portions on a technical level many shortcomings are revealed. The language is distressingly imprecise and occasionally the simple mathematics faulty (pp. 262-63). It is fascinating yet exasperating reading as one feels he is being shifted between Keynes, Marshall, and Marx in turn.

The central model of the investment process developed in Chapter IX is deficient in that it neglects the necessity of creating capital equipment in order to draw the rural unemployed into industry. This is particularly strange since the whole discussion is directed toward capital accumulation.

WILLIS D. WEATHERFORD

Swarthmore College

RICHARD L. MEIER. *Science and Economic Development: New Patterns of Living*. Pp. xviii, 266. New York: Technology Press of M.I.T. and John Wiley and Sons, 1956. \$6.00.

This is a provocative, sensitive, and also able book. The author starts out boldly with the intention of recommending more sure and economical development programs than others. Nobody needs to agree with all his ideas to welcome this effort at joining the more recently developed resource technologies to current social goals in the more and less developed areas.

There are few places where Dr. Meier expressly says "Here is what Jones, Smith, and Brown offer, and by contrast here is what my contribution is, and here is why it is better." Consequently for a brief review it is probably best to sample some of his major thinking, skipping in that process much of his valuable work in measuring both needs and resources, as well as his consistently wide awareness of the difficulties that confront change in many cultures.

He foresees a world population of between 3 and 3¾ billions by the year 2000, not leveling off much until it reaches 5 billions. For the less developed areas he believes that there is little chance of adequate capital accumulation until low-cost ways of restraining population growth are found. For most of those areas, he believes rationing is necessary so that all incomes will cluster around a minimum adequate standard of living (MASL), put at about 330 dollars of the 1950 values. The required investment ranges between \$1,800 and \$3,500, Dr. Meier finds. An urbanization of 70 per cent or more of the population is considered desirable and necessary, with "urban villages" carefully planned in

advance, and with careful adjustment of agricultural immigrants to city ways. Not only new thinking about city planning but about housing and household equipment is held to be essential.

In addition new industrial complexes feeding on each others' waste products and centered around atomic energy plants are expected, at some distance from the cities, and also food producing and processing complexes centered around algae production pools.

The world food situation is expected to become critical in the 1960's or 1970's. Using as a landmark Salter's estimates of world food potential under present techniques of about 2.8 times prewar output, Dr. Meier foresees a protein expansion of food yeast, chlorella algae and blue green algae with costs per pound of protein respectively of 35 to 50 cents, 10 to 20 cents and 5 to 15 cents, comparable with the present cost of protein from pulses of 12 to 20 cents per pound. The investment requirements average respectively \$900, \$450 and \$450 per ton compared with \$1,500 for pulse-derived protein. Dr. Meier concludes that "a level of fat and protein production up to 50 times present levels is not at all unreasonable." Out of that 50 billion people could eat well, given high acceptance of new food forms.

The fuel and energy problems he takes as a much more serious limitation on the growth of human welfare than the food problems. He expects solar cooking in the tropics to develop fairly rapidly. Methane gas generated as a by-product of the photosynthetic production process of algae is counted on for some energy, also wind power, and tidal movement, but atomic energy at 1 to 2 cents per kwh is expected to take over a large part of the world's energy load. He foresees general steel production with hydrogen instead of coking coal. Since his figures show that 25 to 40 per cent of the world's energy is spent on moving materials and people around, he expects to see a considerable reorganization of work-centers in the future.

There is a great deal more to this book than can be indicated by a sampling of this sort. It is a conscientious effort to find what the new developments in the

physical sciences require by way of new social expression, and to measure both needs and the resources to meet them.

STEPHEN RAUSHENBUSH

Public Affairs Institute

JOE S. BAIN. *Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries*. Pp. x, 329. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$5.50.

In 1955, the *Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws* noted that "relative freedom of opportunity for entry of new rivals is a fundamental requisite for effective competition in the long run" (p. 326). Professor Bain's timely book reports on the nature and economic significance of entry conditions. The author seeks to determine the relation of this aspect of market structure to market performance and to measure the vitality of potential competition in a sample of twenty American manufacturing industries. Constant evidence of careful, thorough, and yet imaginative research appears throughout the book. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that carrying analysis of the relation of entry conditions to performance very far is rather difficult. Accordingly, this reviewer would agree with Bain that "the major contribution . . . may well be that of developing data on the character of the condition of entry and its determinants, with particular reference to manufacturing industries" (p. vii). Such agreement is not meant to deprecate the quite considerable value of Bain's achievement. It merely echoes the honest realism of the book which consistently emphasizes the inadequacy of basic data and the consequent difficulty of testing theoretical generalizations. Neither received theory nor previous empirical investigations have gone very far into systematic analysis of alternative entry conditions in oligopolistic industries and the effect of such conditions on seller conduct and industry performance. Bain makes substantial progress in filling this gap.

The book restates and amplifies received theory about entry conditions. It then pro-

ceeds to consider the importance of scale economies, product differentiation advantages, and absolute cost advantages as barriers to entry. Over-all barriers are then treated and the market performance of industries with different entry conditions is analyzed. Conclusions about the effect of entry conditions are quite properly stated in tentative terms. It is suggested that high excess profits and output restriction appear greater when entry barriers are high. Product differentiation is assigned first place as a cause of effective entry barriers.

Bain concludes this excellent book with a chapter on public policy that seems an anticlimax. This perhaps results from the fact that only rather general suggestions are made about ways in which policy might deal with entry barriers in order to improve and maintain effective competition. These proposals call for precise economic measurements and judgments that appear unlikely to be implemented by the judicial process of antitrust enforcement. Additional research would be a prerequisite to development of adequate legislative standards on this subject. This reaction may only express a wish that Bain had done more than he set out to accomplish.

Barriers to New Competition should be widely read; it is a book that, in the words of an Advent Collect, one should "read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest."

ARTHUR D. LYNN, JR.

Ohio State University

PHILIP C. NEWMAN. *Public Control of Business: An International Approach*. Pp. iv, ii, 500. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$14.00.

"The reason for the appearance of the second part of a two-volume book first calls for some explanation," says Dr. Newman in his Preface. The reason is simple enough: the documents were collected but the treatise concerning them was taking a long time to write. The decision to publish the documents separately was sensible and the result is a very useful volume.

Except for brief introductory notes, this book comprises nothing but documents relevant to a study of the public control of

cartels, monopoly, and restrictive practices. United States materials run to some 200 pages—the basic legislation, major court decisions, a collection of consent decrees, and some Federal Trade Commission material—while about 300 pages are devoted to foreign and international documents. There are seven sections. First, as examples of international agreements based on patents we have the prewar arrangements between Dupont and Imperial Chemical Industries, Krupp and General Electric, and Standard Oil and I. G. Farben. The second section includes the international steel cartel agreement of 1926, the French-German potash arrangement, an interesting report on negotiations between Canadian and Scandinavian newsprint producers, documents concerning the International Air Transport Association, and prewar agreements on sulphur, steel rails, copper, and oil. International commodity agreements occupy the third section with texts on wheat, tin, tea, and rubber. The fourth section, dealing with national legislation, provides texts from Sweden, Britain, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, and the United States. The next two sections, on judicial interpretation and enforcement techniques, are made up principally of American documents, with a few from Britain. The book closes with three international texts: the relevant sections of the Schuman Plan Treaty and the proposed Charter of the International Trade Organization, and, in a different vein, the March 1939 agreement between the Federation of British Industries and the Reichsgruppe Industrie.

Some of these documents were already easily available. Others would have been much harder to find. A few have apparently been translated for the first time. So far as I know, this is the first time so substantial and representative a collection has been put between two covers. Many people should be grateful to Dr. Newman when they use it for ready reference, comparative study, or in courses. The brief notes would have been more helpful if they had told more of the setting in which each document is to be read. Not all sources are cited. There are a number of minor

typographical errors. But these are small blemishes in a very useful book.

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.

Council on Foreign Relations
New York, N. Y.

SYLVIA KPALS SELEKMAN and BENJAMIN M. SELEKMAN. *Power and Morality in a Business Society*. Pp. ix, 192. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. \$4.00.

Concentrated economic power is per se immoral and irresponsible; it contradicts our basic ethos and engenders within our society a fatal malaise. Can such power, by any practicable and democratic means, be brought under social control, made moral and responsible, and directed toward socially desirable ends? The Selekmans, drawing on their extensive experience in labor and industrial relations, think it can be. In general they follow the negotiational model developed by the late John R. Commons—a case by case process of bargaining, compromise, accommodation and adjustment under a regime of constitutionalism. "Negotiation," they affirm, "constitutes the characteristic American activity for realizing this objective."

Economic power is defined functionally as "organized force or energy"—"those energies of forces harnessed to human capacity as a way of rendering more effective man's activities in the promotion of his purposes." This productive power "constitutes an essential of human life in society"—"an inescapable prerequisite of effective performance." There is, it is held, a "compelling drift in the technical instruments of industry toward large-scale organization." This technological determinism creates a serious dilemma—a conflict between the technical "must" and the ethical "ought." The moral crisis in American society stems from our failure to reconcile these two imperatives.

Various means are available to tame economic power, curb its destructive propensities, and direct it into useful channels. Reason, conscience, ethics, tradition, aesthetics, and countervailing power may all exercise some minor, but admittedly

inadequate, restraint. Principal reliance, however, should be placed on negotiation—a continuous integrative process by which conflicting powers and interests are neutralized and harmonized. This is the built-in principle of gradualism in negotiatory, or democratic, society. Governmental control should be eschewed, for political power is ultimately coercive and potentially more dangerous than limited economic power.

Negotiation is obviously valuable, even indispensable, at the *operational* level, as in ordinary business transactions and industrial relations, but it provides no solution whatever for the *structural* problem of concentrated economic power. The possessors of overweening power do not negotiate; they dictate. Hence, if their power is immoral and irresponsible, as the authors concede, it can never be transformed by negotiation. The true remedy lies in the systematic decentralization and diffusion of economic power. But the authors are precluded from this line of inquiry by their twin assumptions that concentration is technologically determined and that governmental control is inherently dangerous. On these premises no real solution is possible; one can only rationalize acceptance of the status quo or hope that some adventitious expedient, such as negotiation, will transmute evil into good.

HORACE M. GRAY

University of Illinois

JOAN ROBINSON. *The Accumulation of Capital*. Pp. xvi, 440. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1956. \$6.00.

This volume is an exercise in model building, by an outstanding model builder, for the purpose of throwing light on the causes and consequences of changes in the rate of capital accumulation. Book I, of 60 pages, covers introductory definitions, but the heart of the discussion is in Book II, of 115 pages, which is devoted to accumulation in the long run. The remainder of the volume contains six additional books, totaling 210 pages, which consider, in order: "The Short Period," "Finance," "The Rentier," "Land," "Relative Prices," and "International Trade." A final 50 pages are devoted to "Notes on Various Topics."

The basic analysis is conducted with the aid of drastic simplifying assumptions: there is no index number problem, workers are uniform and work for the same money wage, technical progress is such that the composite commodity representing the output of consumption goods is left unchanged, the stock of all sorts of capital goods needed to produce a given output is rigidly determined by the technique in operation, the economy is "tranquil" in the sense that future expectations are being fulfilled, land is unlimited, there are only two classes (workers who do not save and entrepreneurs who do not consume), strict laissez faire prevails, there are no economies of scale, and the economy is a closed system. The "chief concern is with the [long-run] relation between wages and profits, and the argument is conducted in terms of the relations of the stock of capital to the available labour force, the influence of competition, and the technique of production" (p. 70). The results obtained are neatly summarized in the twenty propositions which make up the four pages of Chapter XVIII.

No book which involves an extended exercise in theoretical reasoning is easy to appraise; the full implications take time to digest. Throughout, Mrs. Robinson handles her constructions with her usual skill and provides stimulating comments on important problems, especially in the second half when the implications of the simplifying assumptions are discussed. In fact, there can be no doubt that the mere listing of the assumptions required to permit easy theorizing is itself highly useful. The volume can, therefore, be recommended to professional economists without reservation. But if one asks for more than this—if one asks for the new and sudden "insight into the behaviour of the actual, complicated, economy" (p. 64) that sometimes results from theoretical work—I would have to confess that the core twenty propositions did not provide such insight for me. But then it may well be that I did not extract from Mrs. Robinson's mine all the riches that she has uncovered.

HENRY H. VILLARD

City College of New York

RICHARD N. GARDNER. *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade*. Pp. xxii, 423. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy is an excellent history and analysis of the issues of Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the period from the Atlantic Conference of August 1941 to the dramatic end, in December 1950, to the prospects of the International Trade Organization as an approved instrument of multilateralism in world trade. The Atlantic Charter had provided the first broad definition of Anglo-American postwar economic objectives; the ITO, conceived as the final of three international instruments for the reconstruction of multilateral trade, was stillborn and, unlike the Fund and the Bank, never had a chance for survival. The period represented "an era during which the United Nations embarked under Anglo-American leadership on the most ambitious programme in intergovernmental cooperation ever undertaken in the economic field."

Influenced by the costly lessons of peace-making after World War I, the United States policymakers, under the strong influence of Secretary Hull, set the goal of a postwar world in which the reconstruction of multilateralism and nondiscrimination in international trade would assure peace and economic well-being for all nations. The views, pro and con, on multilateralism threaded their way through all the debates on vital postwar issues. The historic negotiations on Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement; the dramatic debates over plans for financial collaboration the intensity of which was at times all the more marked by personality clashes between the ambitious Harry White and the proud Lord Keynes; the gains and losses for multilateralism at Bretton Woods; the loan agreement of 1945 and the final overthrow of its objectives; the misunderstandings born of the abrupt postwar termination of Lend-Lease; the British convertibility crisis of 1947—all were parts of the shaky framework within which the goals of freer postwar trade, through institutional devices of international scope, were sought

by negotiators often in agreement on economic principles but frustrated by the political realities of national interest. The controversial issues implicit in tariff preferences, quantitative restrictions, transitional exchange problems, and external aspects of domestic full employment policies, assumed a more troublesome character as they reflected the changes which, during recent decades, the two countries had undergone in their respective balance-of-payments positions as well as in the economic influence each was able to wield in world affairs.

The book is a scholarly and objective treatment of a story as fascinating as it is important. The author's access to documents not utilized before and his balanced analysis, supplemented by an exhaustive bibliography, assure the book a unique place in the historical and economic literature on Anglo-American relations during an eventful period. The concluding chapter reflects a degree of pessimism which may yet appear unwarranted, especially if the lessons of the decade are not lost in possible future crises that may call for real statesmanship and economic collaboration by the two great English-speaking nations.

AMOS E. TAYLOR

Pan American Union
Washington, D. C.

WILFRED OWEN. *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem*. Pp. x, 301. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1956. \$4.50.

The difficulties faced by American cities arising from the almost unbelievable increase in automobile use are the despair of the authorities who struggle with the problem and of the millions who suffer from the cost, inconvenience, discomfort, and delay which have been forced upon them. Although these problems have been discussed in the literature dealing with city planning, highway development, the transit industry, and urban real estate, Owen's little volume fills a need in analyzing the over-all problem, bringing together diverse views, and discussing proposed remedies. The problem is that of too many people

swarming in and out of the congested industrial and commercial areas of our large cities, a large proportion of them insisting on using private automobiles for which streets, highways, and parking spaces are wholly inadequate.

The author recognizes that a basic question is "the relative roles that should be assumed by the automobile and by public carrier transportation." He concludes that in the downtown areas of most large cities, "land use is so intensive that the attempt to accommodate private transportation under all circumstances is not feasible," hence mass transport systems are required. In the low-density areas of the suburbs, however, public transportation cannot be expected to pay its way.

The worsening financial position of public transport in most cities and the deterioration of service are noted. Although recognizing that public transportation is necessary, and that there is a conflict "between the interest of the carriers in economic survival and the interest of the community in the availability of service," the author is unfavorably disposed toward the subsidization of transport operations. Various suggestions are made for improving the pricing of transport services, some of which might require further examination for possible repercussions on other parts of the total problem. The author recommends that a larger share of motor-vehicle revenues be used for urban streets and highways. Toll-financed expressways are advocated, and the author even suggests pooling of all transportation revenues from urban transport in an area to provide needed facilities and to support mass transport operations. Would this or would this not be subsidizing mass transport? Even so, it may be desirable.

To reduce the demand for urban transport the author suggests redevelopment of existing urban areas; changing zoning laws to permit modernized industrial, commercial and residential development in the same areas; and directing more urban growth to new towns and to the smaller towns.

D. PHILIP LOCKLIN
University of Illinois

STEPHEN WHEATCROFT. *The Economics of European Air Transport*. Pp. xxii, 358. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

A commendable addition to the literature on air transportation has been made by Mr. Wheatcroft in this volume. The author has drawn not only upon his knowledge of economic principles, but also upon wide experience in the long-range planning as well as the day-to-day problems of European airlines.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the European airline industry, its pattern of traffic, economics, fare structure, and prospects. The second attacks the problem of competition and regulation. The third outlines his requirements for progress.

It is in the third section that the most controversial ideas are set forth, including a "fairly extensive and perhaps rather complex" (an understatement) organizational framework for the economic regulation of air transportation in Europe. The author also claims that his program of regulation "has the possibility of being developed into a full system of supra-national control and yet, at the same time, may operate effectively in the present conditions in which the States jealously guard their sovereign rights in air transport affairs." This is a good trick if it can be transformed from theory to practice.

The volume is stimulating and provocative. It is required reading for persons interested in the economics and regulation of air transportation.

CLAUDE E. PUFFER
University of Buffalo

REINHARD BENDIX. *Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization*. Pp. xxii, 466. New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1956. \$7.50.

All industrial organizations have a common requirement—the establishment and preservation of industrial discipline. Each faces the perennial conflict between individual drives and collective demands. Purposive activity requires delegation of au-

thority; leadership and followership are the concomitants of a pattern of superordinate-subordinate relationships, and the problems arising from these relations constitute some of the most stubborn and persistent difficulties within the entire range of human activity.

Reinhard Bendix has analyzed these authority relationships both in the historical perspective of industrialization and in the contrasting social structures of East and West. He examines authority relations in England, the United States, Russia, and East Germany. The first three draw on previously collected material, but the last introduces information never before so collected. Bendix finds more or less distinct ideologies, traces their historical course, and examines the social consequences. Special attention is given to the analysis of Anglo-Saxon and Russian patterns of industrialization. These are said to be distinguished in the sense that English industrialization resulted principally from the struggle of a rising entrepreneurial class while in Russia industrialization was continually subject to autocratic intervention and government controls. The development of the industrial way of life has transformed this initial setting of entrepreneurial activity in Russia as well as in the West. The industrial way of life has become accepted, and there has been a change from entrepreneurial to managerial ideologies. The increasing size and complexity of industry have transformed the authority relationships between managers and workers, and the internal organization of industry. In modern industrial management the technical, financial, and marketing aspects of the enterprise have been supplemented by new demands arising from labor problems and organizational planning and control. As the delegation of authority and technical specialization have become more important, management has had to make sure of the good faith of its employees. In the West authority in industry is justified explicitly on the grounds that the employers' authority as well as their earnings and privileges are earned. For the people at large such similar rewards are held out as promises for them in the future if they but earn them. In Soviet Russia, success

is regarded as a collective accomplishment in which managers and workers alike have the right and duty to participate but which is attributed primarily to the leadership of the party. Only one goal is offered to the worker as a reward for increasing his efforts: that he perform out of loyalty to the cause.

These are the main themes of the book, and they are documented by historical materials, field observations and study by the author while in Germany in 1953-54, and some original research studies of "entrepreneurs, heirs, and bureaucrats."

To the social scientist seeking some pervasive uniformities there is an especially interesting section entitled *Industrialization and Entrepreneurial Ideologies in Sociological Perspective* (pp. 13-21).

Bendix tells us that the purpose of the present study is to contribute to a better *understanding* of what is generally known about work and authority in industry, and that he proposes to do this by exploring the historical and social preconditions which distinguish authority relations in industrial organization. The writer has succeeded in this aim, and the reader will secure an excellent historical background. But he will not find any scientific experiments or field studies focusing upon individual plants. He will not know how the different authority relations affect morale and productivity within given work organizations. In the United States varieties of "class" and "bureaucratic" ideologies exist in various work plants. The social scientist has an opportunity to examine these on his home ground. Laboratory experimentation is also possible. Bendix was so little concerned about the research studies dealing with authority relations that he failed to include any mention of Kurt Lewin's classic experiments on the social effects of authoritative, laissez faire, and democratic leadership. There is no mention of the extensive research on leadership conducted by Rensis Likert and associates of Michigan or of Carroll Shartle and associates at Ohio State. Bendix has held his discussion largely to historical cases. Hypotheses for research may be drawn from this study, but the reader must find them. For example, there is an excellent description of the "activist"

in Russian plants. Testing such a role is a challenging possibility for small group study.

DELBERT C. MILLER

University of Washington

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, MARTIN A. TROW, and JAMES S. COLEMAN. *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union*. Pp. xxviii, 455. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$7.50.

This excellent study brings together a number of related topics: union politics, union structure, the relationships between union members and union leaders, and methodology in the social sciences. The central theme is the development, functioning, preservation, and social effects of the two-party system in the International Typographical Union, but with this main topic runs another of general significance; that is, may the two-party system as developed in the ITU have normative values for the entire system of union organization? The authors believe that there are these normative values in the two-party system; but they give due weight in this evaluation to the special circumstances surrounding the printer, such as the social behavior of the printer as a member of a specific industrial community, the development of leadership in the union, and the attitudes of the political groups toward one another when they are in and out of the administration.

The methods used to develop the study and the uses of the material are worthy of special attention. A lengthy interview questionnaire, supplemented with on-the-spot investigations, historical information, and follow-up mail questionnaires are the principal sources of information. The interview questionnaires is remarkable for its detailed questions and for the excellence of the responses. From these sources, the authors develop indexes of political attitudes, and measurements of the knowledge of members about political issues, and the degree of participation by members in political activities and in social groups. Many charts, tables, and diagrams supplement the text.

The development of oligarchic types of

union administration since 1900 has become a matter of public concern. Few would deny many of its undesirable effects: the autocratic powers of the higher officers, the subservient attitude of the lower officers, and the apathy of the members. It is a sad thing to see the idealism of youth crushed between the upper and nether millstones of administrative orders and the demand that these orders receive quiet acceptance. The older men have, at least, the inspiring remembrances of participating in building the union, but the young people, first entering the union, feel the lack of active participation in important matters and suffer the pangs of constant frustration.

The International Typographical Union is evidence that this apathy and these frustrations can be avoided. It is, however, a special case. Perhaps it should be considered as a model, and in its operations should be sought those activities and instrumentalities that are helpful toward the attainment of union democracy, and that may be adopted by other unions, even though their industrial structures differ from those of the printers. Few industrial structures have the homogeneity of the printers; few have the close social relationships that exist in that craft; few have an occupation that has a tradition of educational values associated with it as in the case of the printers. Nevertheless, many unions could make greater use of the referendum; many could make their journals organs of information for the members rather than for the dissemination of the ideas of the chief officers; more autonomy could be given to local unions; many more efforts could be made to cultivate and protect internal democracy in unions. It must be recognized, however, that these are the very measures that are likely to be fought tooth and nail by union leaders seeking to retain power. Perhaps, as the authors suggest, democracy may be forced upon the unions by national and international events which may break the rigid restrictions of business unionism, and which may bring within the orbit of the unions those vital issues that divide men everywhere.

FREDERICK L. RYAN

San Diego State College

A. A. ROGOW with the assistance of PETER SHORE. *The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945-1951*. Pp. vii, 196. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955. \$3.00.

This book begins with the word "revolution" and ends with "evolution." This is because British Labour in the earlier years of the present century thought in terms of a violent fight against capitalism, whereas the leaders in the last two decades have come to realize that they must direct their campaign for reform against a leftward moving mixed economy. While some of the old war cries are still heard, the party objectives have been changed.

The study at hand is an analysis of the nature of the changes in objectives, not so much from announcements of policy as from achievements and failures of the Labour Government during the years of its control after the recent war. The author says that a pragmatic test of Labour's planning success shows that this planning was done with a view to maintaining the free enterprise economy, to bring about changes by evolutionary means, to furnish labor-industry development councils to regulate the private sector of industry, and to nationalize only certain basic industries such as those in the areas of fuel and power, inland transport, and in iron and steel. Some mention had been made by Labour planners of sugar, cement, chemicals, water, meat, and insurance; but these were not given high priorities.

In labor-management relations little of significance was achieved; in forming development councils in even those industries most ready for them success was limited; in its public relations there was notable weakness; and in the nationalization of iron and steel results were limited and brief in duration.

Despite these shortcomings, the author thinks that the Labour Government did demonstrate that economic planning could be carried on by government action in a mixed economy. He notes that Labour did get a degree of co-operation from the vested power groups—although he warns that the chances of recapturing this goodwill are reduced. Conservatives draw a fine line between the Welfare State and

Socialism, and while they will accept certain aspects of the former, they are in no mood to accept any further advances toward the latter. In fact, the indication is that the very success of the Welfare State has become a block to any movement toward socialism or communism in Britain. In view of this condition, Labour is faced with the necessity of again rethinking its objectives. It is within the realm of possibility that any future attempt to nationalize industry might create such a violent reaction as to endanger the very democratic basis of the economy. The danger is heightened by the tendency of the economic power interests increasingly to enter the political arena. For the time being, the power interests seem to be not wholly dissatisfied with the adjustments that have been reached as a result of the Labour Government's efforts between 1945 and 1951. As for Labor, it, too, is only partially satisfied, and the leaders surely realize that the gap between socialistic politics and socialistic theory has been made clear. This leaves them in a quandary as to next moves.

The reviewer finds the study well done and not out of line with the *New Fabian Essays* nor with the thinking of the writers of the Socialist Union Group.

W. HENRY COOKE

Claremont Graduate School
Claremont, Calif.

N. V. SOVANI, D. P. APTE, AND R. G. PENDSE. *Poona: A Resurvey*. (Publication No. 34.) Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1956. Pp. xx, 555. \$3.50.

The Poona Resurvey is a welcome addition to a long and impressive list of surveys conducted by the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics. Poona is a city of half-a-million population 119 miles southeast of Bombay city. It has long been an educational, intellectual, military, and administrative center. Except for a large government-operated munition works, its industries are mostly single-factory concerns engaged in light manufacture. In 1937 the Institute undertook an extensive survey of the economic and social life of

the city. Since that time the population of the city has almost doubled. Under a grant from the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission, the Institute resurveyed the city in the spring of 1954 to determine the nature of the migration and its effects upon the economic condition of the Poona area.

The over-all picture is one of a deteriorating economic situation, or rather employment and earning levels not keeping pace with heavy in-migration and spiraling prices. In 1937 the Poverty Line was put at an annual income per adult equivalent to Rs. 150 (about \$46). A moderate estimate of inflation in food prices puts the level at Rs. 600 (about \$128) in 1954. Upon this basis in 1937, 65 per cent of the families fell below the poverty line and by 1954 more than three-fourths of the families were so listed. Setting a destitution line at Rs. 225 per annum (about \$48), one-fourth of all the families in Poona now fall below this level. The administrative and clerical jobs, particularly those associated with Government, are the only ones to show major increases. Overcrowding has increased as housing has not kept pace with population growth.

With the great mass of descriptive data which a survey provides, the authors must elect to emphasize some data and underplay others. Here the major emphasis is upon employment and earnings, and the data are presented in the form of two-way or three-way frequency distributions divided by occupation, city wards, and social groups. There are more specialized analyses of unemployment and the government-operated Employment Exchange, and of inter-generational occupational mobility. A final chapter draws attention to the significant contrasts between the 1937 and the 1954 survey.

At each stage of the presentation there are careful statements of the limitations of the data and precise descriptions of the nature of each dilemma and its resolution in the process of analyzing the data. The description of the difficulties of the household sample of the 1937 survey and the ration card sample of the 1954 survey are treated in detail. The book is a model for the student interested in problems of col-

lection and classification in survey methodology. The study should be of great interest to sociologists and economists at large as well as those whose primary interest is India.

RICHARD D. LAMBERT

University of Pennsylvania

RAYMOND ARON and DANIEL LERNER (Eds.). *La Querelle de la C.E.D.: Essais d'analyse sociologique*. Pp. xv, 216. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1956. No price.

Politics and partisanship did not motivate the authors of this dynamic little book. But in the French National Assembly politics and partisanship were the very life pulse of the French multiparty system, playing with domestic and foreign policy, at a price France could hardly afford and risk.

The milieu in which French partisan politics had their all overshadowing play in Parliament revealed events, vital for France, leading to the proposal of M. René Pleven, President of the *Conseil*, for CED, Communauté européenne de Défense, European Defense Community.

The Preface presents a brief, lucid background of CED and the conflicting attitudes of French parliamentary opinions, delaying acceptance of CED during political party wrangling from June 1950 to the end of 1954.

An itemized chronology cites twenty-two dates registering the bitter party struggle during five years of ups and downs for CED—chief items are: the conference between "New York and Washington," resulting in a proposal for a European defense community, introduced by M. Pleven, in September 1950. In October the French Assembly accepted the eventuality of a European army, rejecting an autonomous army for West Germany. In December 1951 the Assembly approved the "institution of the European community," and in February 1952, the CED, with numerous reservations. In May M. Pinay, President of the *Conseil*, signed the treaty of CED. In April 1954 Marshal Juin, opposing CED, was released of his commands. In the same month, manifestants, upholding the

Marshal, caused the fall of M. Plevin. In June M. Mendès-France called for compromise, and on December 20, agreement for CED was reached in the Assembly.

There are eight trenchant chapters by nine authors: "Historical Study of a Grand Ideological Squabble," by Raymond Aron; "Birth and Death of a Treaty," by Jacques Fauvet; "Funeral Orations," by Stanley Hoffmann; "Search for a French-German Policy," by Alfred Grosser; "French Economy Prior to C.E.D.," by Jacques Vernant; "Public Opinion Preceding C.E.D.," by Alain Girard and Jean Stoetzel; "Tableau of the Press," by J. J. Marchand; "Reflections of a Stranger," by Daniel Lerner.

The bitter parliamentary struggle resulted from natural apprehensions of the rebirth of a sovereign West Germany with membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a NATO-sanctioned potential German army. The situation might have become explosive, if viewed by past experiences. But a Franco-German solution was found in reciprocal concessions, each recognizing the other's vulnerability in the European heartland and yielding in intelligent compromise to gain mutual security.

JOHANNES MATTERN

Johns Hopkins University

M. GARDNER CLARK. *The Economics of Soviet Steel*. Pp. xiv, 400. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

This is one of the most informative books on the Soviet economy that has ever appeared. It contains a considerable amount of factual data on the industry which is the cornerstone of modern political and economic power for the world's second largest steel-producing nation. But Professor Clark has written much more than a compendium of Soviet steel facts, useful as that might have been. He has woven together resource, technological, locational, and other facts into a fascinating account of an extremely important phase of economic growth.

The tremendous expansion of Soviet steel output within a relatively short period of

time was made possible by a single-minded concentration upon this industry, which stemmed in part from an ideological conviction that this was the only road to the advancement of communism. Many costly errors were made, for which the Russian people are still paying, but in the end, the Soviet Union was transformed from an underdeveloped area into an industrial nation. This example, one may be sure, is not lost upon the great countries of Asia which are today seeking their places in the sun.

According to Professor Clark, the principal error of the Soviet planners lay in their failure to give sufficient consideration to transportation in locating new facilities, particularly the grandiose Urals-Kuznetsk combine. The furnaces at Magnitogorsk had to be fired by coal from the Kuzbas, some 2,300 kilometers away, in the face of an inadequate railway system. It is almost as though great steel-making facilities were constructed somewhere in Colorado, dependent upon Pennsylvania coal, with only a single track connecting them. The inevitable result was a huge bottleneck, necessitating the expenditure of large capital sums for railway construction and the development of secondary, and not particularly satisfactory, coal supplies. An interesting chapter is devoted to a convincing demonstration that this locational pattern was not dictated in any substantial degree by military considerations, contrary to the assertions of Soviet apologists *ex post*.

What are the potentialities for further growth of the Soviet steel industry? Clark foresees many obstacles, among them the lack of good coking coal outside the Donets Basin and the depletion, by about 1978, at current consumption rates, of what was once believed to be inexhaustible iron ore reserves at Magnitogorsk. He concludes that "continued expansion of Soviet steel production at the current rate of three or four million tons a year is possible only by means of immense capital investments."

The Economics of Soviet Steel is a must for everyone who is seriously interested in the problems of economic development.

WALTER GALENSON

University of California
Berkeley

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*. Pp. xii, 497. New York: Random House, 1956. \$9.00 trade, \$6.75 text.

This is really an excellent book.

It views international organization pragmatically as a political process—a complex of national policy decisions reacting upon each other. It penetratingly challenges the quality of many of these decisions, using as a broad criterion whether or not they have contributed to the maintenance of peace and the growth of world community. The analytical approach which characterizes the whole treatise effectively blends historical, political, constitutional, and theoretical considerations. A vigorous, terse, at times epigrammatic style makes the book interesting reading.

The author is refreshingly free of dogma, whether of the utopian or *realpolitik* variety. In particular, he does not take all his cues from the State Department in determining what is correct conduct for and within international organization.

Contrary to prevailing shibboleth, Mr. Claude insists that the NATO-type of arrangement does not provide collective security but at the most *selective* security. NATO fails to meet a basic requirement of a comprehensive security system, namely the renunciation of national decision-making in regard to the use of force, in favor of international authorization and international supervision. American policy has thoroughly confused the concept of collective security by accepting its terminology, but rejecting its substantive meaning.

Appraisal of the constitutional problems of international organization is equally clearheaded. Claude believes that a sound resolution of such issues as membership, the veto, regionalism, and the role and competence of the General Assembly must recognize the essentially voluntaristic character of international institutions, creatures as they are of self-willed states.

The exclusion of important states from the councils of the United Nations for

whatever political, moral or other reasons, frustrates the intended functions of the organization to provide "a common meeting-ground, a common conference table, a common workshop, to which nations should bring their hostilities, conflicts, problems and aspirations."

On the other hand, the veto is not such an insuperable obstacle to the effective functioning of the institution. Granted that it is a "deformity," it can usually be circumvented by creative adaptation of the Charter. Where it cannot, as in putting armaments under international control, it merely expresses the political-military realities which dictate that no action will be effective unless the strong powers all agree upon it.

Regional association offers no real escape from the requirement of common consent for international action involving significant limitations of sovereignty. Claude is convinced that "if the road toward world order lies through the acceptance of majority voting, the creation of international executive authorities and administrative competencies, the submission of states to collective jurisdictions and the assumption by states of explicit responsibilities, the pioneers have more often been general than regional organizations."

The expanding role of the General Assembly is a case in point. In one decade, it has displaced the Security Council as the unrivaled principal organ of the United Nations.

Mr. Claude is cautiously optimistic about the future of international organization. The possibilities are "set by political forces operative within and among member states" and "structural apparatus cannot generate its own supply of political decency, discretion, wisdom, and moderation." But he feels that the world is demonstrably beginning to recognize that global problems require global solutions and international organization as an historical process represents "a secular trend toward . . . an enterprising quest for political means of making the world safe for human habitation."

PHILIP E. JACOB

University of Pennsylvania

SIR W. IVOR JENNINGS. *The Approach to Self-Government*. Pp. viii, 204. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. \$3.00.

In a broad sense the volume before us is an answer to Jeremy Bentham's somewhat naive belief that he could draw up in London a constitution for any country without the need of personal contact with its people, provided he was furnished with a minimum of information about its existing social, political, and economic conditions. The author, a jurist and a diplomat, shows us that it just cannot be done that way; that a constitution cannot be framed according to abstract principles, but that it must take into account the history of a people, its customs, the characteristics of its population, its economic and social development.

The successive chapter titles, ranging through the technical details of government, elections, bill of rights, legislature, administration, and executive department, might suggest a dry textbook treatment of the subject. But the volume is far from that. It is, in fact, an entertaining description of the practical problems in the making of a constitution; and the author's experience as advisor to the Governments of Ceylon and of Pakistan gives to his observations a concrete and authoritative character. Comparisons with conditions in the West are made on almost every page, and amusing illustrations are given to show why institutions that work in the West might not work in the East. So pleasant is the manner of presenting a technical subject and so wise the philosophy of government woven into the comments of the author that the reader finds himself well rewarded, even though constitution-making may be remote from his immediate interest.

Would that our numerous texts on government could be written with such a combination of scholarship and good humor!

C. G. FENWICK

Pan-American Union

RICHARD P. STEBBINS. *The United States in World Affairs, 1954*. Pp. xii, 498. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. \$6.00.

PAUL E. ZINNER (Ed.). *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*. Pp. xxiv, 487. New York: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. \$6.00.

The appearance of these annual volumes, always a welcome event for the student of international affairs, has become doubly so since the co-ordination of both under the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council has continued the World Peace Foundation's documents series since 1952 and has introduced uniformity of organization in the two publications, facilitating cross-reference by both author and reader. Each thus supplements the other, the result being two authoritative series for current study and for later reference which are indispensable in the true meaning of an abused word.

As a constant user of both, the reviewer can only commend these additions as maintaining in every way the high quality of their predecessors. The new scholar or teacher in the field, who alone may not already know them, may rejoice that he can start his working library with such excellent tools.

Partly due to the greatly increased role of the United States in world politics, and partly thanks to the imaginative scope Stebbins and Zinner have given their tasks, these works have become with the years an American equivalent of the two comparable series published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Moreover their usefulness is greater because of the fact that they appear with less delay, thanks to the excellent staff of the Council and the prodigious effort of Richard Stebbins.

In both volumes the plan of presentation begins with general lines of American foreign policy, and continues topically with material on Europe (both West and East), the Far East, the Middle East and Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and the United Nations. The footnote apparatus is especially useful. The documents volume cites the most authoritative available source for each text, besides supplying references to related texts not included and much incidental information which would otherwise be hard to come by—the vote on United Nations resolutions, for example.

The Stebbins survey cites to last year's documents volume where pertinent, but is generous in other documentation as well, of both primary and secondary works. The Stebbins volume also appends a twenty-three page chronology, usefully arranged by topics.

A minor criticism is in order of the index of the documents volume. It is short, listing chiefly the persons connected with major documents. With only a brief expansion it could supply full names of all persons involved, especially where full names do not occur in the texts, with an enhanced value to the reference user.

It may seem a disadvantage that the books appear a year apart, and so cover different periods. Actually there is the compensation of seeing two years whole at once, one through the carefully chosen documents supplied by Zinner and the other through the lucid analysis which Stebbins always brings to his formidable task. This is the more emphatically true of the two years here covered, including as they do such major scenes of the postwar drama as the Indochina settlement, the creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, the Quemoy crisis, the Austrian treaty, the Bandung Conference, and the Summit meeting. If a single theme could be set, it might be that of the general realization by the major governments of nuclear stalemate in 1954, and in 1955 the first groping responses to the new pattern of politics resulting. One sees clearly, in the retrospect here afforded, what Stebbins calls the "re-cuperative power of free societies," which now as in the two years reported still permits hope, even though it is not in the nature of such works as these to supply a happy ending.

OLIVER BENSON

University of Texas

JOHN A. HOUSTON. *Latin America in the United Nations*. Pp. 345. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. \$2.75.

This is an analysis of the Latin American contribution to the United Nations during its first decade. For specialists in Latin American studies it provides a survey comparable to Warren Kelchner's *Latin Ameri-*

can Relations with the League of Nations (1930), and students of international relations can find here a careful study of twenty regionally conscious nations in the United Nations. Its author, John A. Houston, is a recognized scholar in the field and is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Knox College.

The book's five chapters deal with Latin America's participation in the San Francisco Conference, and in four significant areas of United Nations activities: peace and security, dependent peoples, higher standards of living, and human rights. Latin American initiative and support for what internationalists have called the "loop-holes" in the charter—that is, Part 7, Article II, and Article 51, together with their small-power enthusiasm for the veto-free General Assembly and the International Court of Justice was in part justified historically by the Russian abuse of the veto, the development of regional military pacts, and the United Nations for Peace Resolution. While their votes strengthened the United States position in the cold war, their implementation of enforcement procedures of the United Nations was less encouraging. Mr. Houston concludes, "Latin American states have demonstrated neither the ability nor the will to provide the means necessary to implement decisions in any degree proportionate to the voting power they can bring to bear in reaching those conclusions" (p. 147).

The Latin record on dependent peoples is an anomalous one; their Latin sympathy for the Italian and French colonial powers often moderates their enthusiasm for the emerging states. Likewise, their position on economic problems is characteristic of underdeveloped nationalistic areas; their demands for international assistance are not always balanced by a similar regard for their own economic responsibilities. The dichotomy between their strong endorsement of human rights and their frequent violation of these rights is also noticed.

Mr. Houston has undertaken a most ambitious task in tracing the record of twenty such individualistic countries; the result is a most successful delineation of the important Latin behavior patterns in

the United Nations. The author has not, perhaps could not, explore the Latin policy-making institutions which have determined their United Nations policies, and which might well influence future decisions. Are policy makers, for example, becoming more dependent upon a nationalistic public opinion, as their governments use persuasion rather than coercion and outside support from the United States to maintain themselves in power? Are the United Nations delegates from democratic governments like Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Mexico, less likely to succumb to "arm twisting" by the United States mission, and less given to "high flying" speeches without reference to their foreign offices, than are the delegates of dictatorial regimes in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, or Nicaragua? Will the new United Nations membership, which gives a twenty-six vote veto in the General Assembly to the African-Asian members, significantly lessen the strategic advantage Latin America has held during the past decade? It is to be hoped that Mr. Houston will explore the second decade of Latin American participation in the United Nations with the same objective impartiality he has used in this volume.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

Stanford University

WILLIAM E. WARNE. *Mission For Peace: Point 4 in Iran*. Pp. 320. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1956. \$4.00.

Mr. William E. Warne's book *Mission for Peace: Point 4 in Iran* is the fourth in a series written by Americans who have struggled with the problem of aiding Iran. The first was Morgan Shuster's *The Strangling of Persia*, then came two books by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh (published in 1929 and 1946). This fourth study is written against a background similar in some ways to the others—three factors being most prominent: the Russian-Communist drive to capture Iran, the seeming lack of sufficient dynamism within Iranian society to generate and harness its own latent energies, and the desire on the part of the United States to stimulate those capabilities inherent in Iranian life.

Mr. Warne's book is a personal narrative in twenty-one chapters, describing the pur-

poses of the United States Mission, its organization, and operations. It is a story of optimism. Mr. Warne gives warm praise to his Iranian hosts and to the members of his staff. He indicates some of the difficulties of working with Dr. Mossadegh, and there is a very interesting description of the day of the latter's fall from power on August 19, 1953. He describes incidents connected with various ones of the joint programs such as live stock improvement, public health, rural education, agriculture, redistribution of the Royal estates, the malaria campaign, and co-operation with other missions. His two interviews with the now infamous Mollah Kashani, who was then President of Parliament, indicate what strange forces operate in Iranian society. The rise of this charlatan to power is a Hajji Baba of Isfahan story. Anyone reading Mr. Warne's book will then get a broad glimpse of Iranian life as it existed in 1951-55. Mr. Warne breathes encouragement. Communism seems to have been defeated in Iran, standards of sanitation, productivity, and efficiency have been raised, and Iranians have shown great appreciation and co-operation. During the period covered by the book, Mr. Warne must have dispensed with a figure of nearly two hundred million dollars.

That the "crash" program of 1951-55 did produce temporary results cannot be gainsaid, but anyone long acquainted with Iran will retain a degree of skepticism as to how deep the changes go. Herodotus remarked that the Persians adapted to foreign ideas most rapidly—but remained Persians. The long Arsacid dynasty (180 B.C.-227 A.D.) always called themselves Philhellenes while they gradually eradicated most of the vestiges of Hellenism. Mr. Warne gives the impression that most of the criticism of Point Four came from the Soviet Union, but Iranians and Americans also contributed their fair share. Furthermore the book never touches on one of the most sensitive of problems—how American technicians without knowledge of the Persian language, living in the equivalent of the highest of Iranian luxury brackets, are able to really communicate ideas to the average Iranian who lives on a subsistence level of \$150.00 a year income.

Mr. Warne's book is an excellent summary of the activities carried on by the Point Four Mission. But no one will be able to assess what it really accomplished till another ten years have rolled by.

EDWIN M. WRIGHT

School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

J. S. FURNIVALL. *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*. Pp. xii, 568. New York: New York University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

In the words of the author, this book is the result of "a request from the Government of Burma at the end of 1942 for my views on reconstruction, with particular reference to features of colonial rule in Netherlands India that might suitably be adopted in Burma." Completed early in 1945, the work was published in England in 1948 and now appears for the first time in an American reprint. The author was eminently qualified for the task set him. More than twenty-five years in Burma in the civil service, in business and banking, and more recently in educational labors, had given him a sympathetic understanding of Burma and the Burmese which has enabled him to write with a deep appreciation of their needs and problems. If any man may claim with justice to be known as the grand old man of Burma, it is he. Although less well acquainted by experience with Netherlands India, it is evident that his studies of Dutch policy and practice were both thorough and constructive. The book provides a rich source of useful information concerning Dutch and English methods of colonial operation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, up to about 1940. This concentration on a limited period has led to some repetitions in the text and is in a way unfortunate, since the foundations of Dutch and British policy were laid long before the opening of the nineteenth century and must be appreciated in order to understand later developments. The Dutch culture system of the nineteenth century, for instance, was a natural outgrowth of the much earlier system of forced deliveries, and both Dutch and English practices have been profoundly affected by the widely con-

trasting basic principles of indirect rule on the one hand and direct rule on the other which have marked their domination from the beginning. It must be remembered however that Mr. Furnivall was asked to do a particular job. This he has accomplished with conspicuous ability. It is to be hoped that he may be persuaded to draw further on his unique background and to write of the war years and the present decade, with perhaps even a look to the future. The result could not fail to have great value.

PHILIP W. THAYER

School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK (Ed.). *Target: The World; Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955*. Pp. xxiv, 362. New York: Macmillan Company, 1956. \$5.00.

Congressmen and columnists have been warning us all along that the Kremlin was operating a world-wide propaganda system, but it remained to the great scholarship of Evron M. Kirkpatrick and his staff to present the documented case in persuasive, dispassionate language. Too much that has gone before has been emotional invective against the Communists with little factual support. Here now is an area by area report on the objectives, themes, tactics, organizations, and media employed by Moscow's agents in winning humanity to the Communist cause.

Editor Kirkpatrick is himself a powerful propagandist and freely admits that the purpose of the survey is to awaken the free world to its task of combating communism. If this exposé could be translated into fifty foreign languages and shipped to libraries and information centers around the world it would be the best "word weapon" we have yet devised to defeat Red propaganda.

The material on objectives, themes, and tactics is so meticulously organized that the reader fears Communist "Agitprop" leaders may use it as a handbook in their trade. For example, in the sections on the Far East, objectives are listed: to strengthen Communist base area, for example, USSR, Mongolia, China, North Korea, and Viet Minh; to eliminate United States power in free areas, for example, Japan and the SEATO countries; to maximize Communist

power in these and neutral areas, for example, India and Indonesia; and, finally, to shift from military to essentially political tactics.

To accomplish these aims in Asia certain Communist propaganda themes are repeated endlessly:

The United States has no fitting role in the economic growth of the new Asian countries. Instead, Asians have a tradition of common hostility to the West which stands for imperialist exploitation.

American alliances in Asia are a threat to the security of most Asian countries, but USSR, China, and India are the three stabilizing friends.

The five principles of peaceful coexistence pronounced by neutralists Chou En-lai and Nehru dovetail with Soviet socialist philosophy, providing the answer to internal and external problems.

Dr. Kirkpatrick provides with great detail the themes of Kremlin propaganda on every continent and major area of the world. Charts and graphs show Communist party organization and mass media employed. The most impressive information explains the great network of "front" organizations, particularly in the ranks of labor and "cultural" people, which do the bidding of the hard core of Communist leaders, painting black white and white black.

The West would not hope to imitate Moscow's ruthless machine, but in the face of such an avalanche of books, films, and broadcasts a vast and radical counterattack seems urgently needed.

D. LINCOLN HARTER
University of Pennsylvania

GERHART NIEMEYER, with the assistance of JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. *An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality*. Pp. 113. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$2.75.

In this brief study, Gerhart Niemeyer sets out to determine "whether the Soviets are reasonable in the sense that they pursue rational political ends, and whether they maintain a proportionality between their ends and the cost of attaining them which we can understand and share." After an examination of the Soviet doctrine, regime, and policy, he concludes that "there is, in

Soviet foreign relations, no intellectual or emotional basis for reasonableness, as non-Soviet countries understand it." He finds no reason to believe that the Soviet government is prepared to compromise any of the doctrinaire aims of communism, or that it would shrink at the cost of a global war in a situation where the doctrine indicated an ultimate Soviet success. Hence, American policies are likely to meet with disaster if they assume a careful Soviet calculation of costs and risks. The author believes that the gap between Soviet and Western thinking is so deep, that any policy of understanding or "peaceful coexistence" is bound to fail. Only if the West is prepared to attack the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism itself, and seeks to undermine the ideological basis of Soviet policy, can it break through the barriers that prevent understanding.

The value of this approach is that it instills a note of sober caution into the study of Soviet policy, at a time when many tend to assume that a rapid change is taking place in the mental processes of the Soviet government. There are nevertheless a number of limitations to the argument which weaken its impact. The term "rationality" is often used, but not always with sufficient precision or consistency. The influence of Marxism-Leninism on Soviet policy is touched on frequently, but the discussion of this important relationship is not sufficiently coherent to clarify the underlying problems. On the one hand, much is made of the freedom of Soviet policy from considerations of doctrine; on the other, the destruction of the doctrinal core is proposed as a major Western objective. These two positions are perhaps not irreconcilable, but they are not reconciled in this text. Most important of all, no attempt is made to see Soviet developments in a world perspective. The narrow concentration on Soviet-Western differences, sacrifices the insights which might be gained from a comparison of the Soviet with other non-Western approaches.

An Appendix by Reshetar draws on recent Soviet writings, and particularly the several editions of the *Short Philosophical Dictionary*, to illustrate the peculiarities of the Soviet ideology. He shows clearly the

flexibility of policy permitted by the planned contradictions of the dialectical method, and the extent to which Soviet policy still uses the messianic aspects of Marxism.

C. E. BLACK

Princeton University

JANE DEGRAS (Ed.). *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents*. Pp. xvi, 463. Vol. I, 1919-1922. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$8.80.

The reviewer can have only the highest praise for the editor and others concerned with the publication of this volume. This is a collection of material indispensable to all students of contemporary international relations, particularly to those specializing in the study of Soviet Russia and international communism. Documents of four congresses of the Communist International, as well as of its executive committee, valuable bibliographical references, and a careful index make this publication an exceptionally useful research tool. The useful notes which precede each document deserve special mention. Based on a search of much material, some of it highly inaccessible, they contain a mass of fascinating data. The notes serve to remind the reader that this was a period when there were still differences of opinion and even some freedom of discussion among Communists. They relate the documents to the complicated, tempestuous era of revolution, chaos, and attempts at reconstruction of international order during which the Soviet-led world communist movement was born.

Specialists on particular questions might criticize individual notes, or the selection of documents, in particular cases. For example, the note preceding extracts from a manifesto of the executive committee of the Comintern on the Kapp putsch in Germany, dated 25 March, 1920, seems to fail to bring out fully either the ineffectiveness of German communist leadership in the first stage of this affair, or the complexity of the situation which followed it in Germany, and of the Russian reaction. Again, some readers might feel that a greater effort should have been made to arrange the documents in topical, as well as in chronological, order. Finally, it is possible that

the value of the collection might be enhanced by including a certain amount of noncommunist material.

However, it should be emphasized that any reader with a serious interest in the problems of 1956 cannot fail to benefit by acquainting himself with the material in this collection. Even today, too many students of international affairs depend on secondary sources for their information. One cannot understand the extremely important elements both of continuity and of change which link our own disturbed period with that which followed World War I without studying the documents and notes contained in this book. This is a publication of immense importance both to specialists and to the general reader.

Although this material cannot be fully understood without access to the basic sources reflecting policy within Soviet Russia itself, such as stenographic reports of congresses and conferences of the Russian Communist party, there is enough here to bring out some of the major characteristics and paradoxes of communism. Communism had, and to a lesser degree still has, its doctrinaire idealism and wild optimism. But there is also blind fanaticism and savage hatred. It would be interesting for a psychiatrically oriented social scientist to study the images which occur in these documents. One reads here about the "octopus" of British imperialism, about the efforts of the "imperialists" to "strangle" the revolution, about "cannibals," and so forth. Interesting is the ambiguity displayed toward the "working class." This "class" is destined to quickly create a bold new world, but the reader finds indications that the communists were exasperated by the inability of the workers to understand and appreciate what the party allegedly was doing for them.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

Yale University

HENRY WEI. *China and Soviet Russia*. Pp. xvi, 379. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956. \$7.75.

As the title suggests, the basic content of this study is a survey, principally in the diplomatic field, of Sino-Soviet relations from 1917 to the early 1950's. The field

itself is one in which the scope of the subject matter, the limited availability of reliable sources, and some rather well established presuppositions of partisanship have conspired to preclude definitive treatment. The present study though based principally on Western sources does use considerable Chinese material which, like the Western sources, are of very uneven value, a point recognized frankly by the author (see p. x). Within these limitations, Dr. Wei's survey is a useful one. It provides a convenient reference to a wide variety of subjects in the broad story of developing Sino-Soviet relations.

Beyond the telling of the bare diplomatic story, the study is concerned with presenting a number of interpretative theses which seek to explain the situation of 1956 in which "Soviet influence is paramount in China" (p. ix). Principal among these theses is the proposition that "the salvation of Soviet Russia can be traced directly to the Sian incident" (p. 319). If there had been no Sian incident, the argument runs, the Anti-Comintern Pact would not have been shattered, Japan would have continued to threaten Siberia, "Hitler might have taken Moscow," and Chiang K'ai-shek "would very likely have crushed the Communists." Since interpretations of this kind are based on an assumed sequence of events which did not happen, their significance in the evaluation of what did happen is perhaps open to some question. Moreover, while they fail to provide realistic answers to questions which confront the historian, they raise new problems of a wholly speculative character entirely beyond the range of history.

Where Dr. Wei deals with the realities of what did happen, he supplements our historical knowledge more successfully. While much of the story he tells is not new, he clarifies many details and fills in areas of the subject that have been neglected such, for example, as the complex Sino-Russian relationships in Sinkiang. His over-all thesis would appear to be that Russian policy and diplomacy was the most significant factor in determining the outcome of events in China.

Whatever the merits of this thesis may ultimately prove to be, its presentation in

this study is subject to serious limitations. No comparative evaluation is given of Russian policy as against the policies of the Western democracies or of Japan during these same years. In addition there is no basic evaluation of the twentieth century Chinese revolution itself or evaluation of its exploitation by either the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communists.

PAUL H. CLYDE

Duke University

ALEXANDER CRETZIANU (Ed.). *Captive Rumania: A Decade of Soviet Rule*. Pp. xvi, 424. New York: Praeger, 1956. \$6.00.

This impressive volume is a symposium of thirteen separate and connected essays ("studies") by a panel of experts who are Rumanian political exiles and contributors or editors of the newspaper *La Nation Roumaine* (Paris), attempting to give as thorough and as faithful a picture as possible of the impact of communism on Rumania during the last decade.

In the background chapter is given a brief outline of the long Rumanian history, starting from the second millennium B.C. The remotest forefathers of the Rumanians were the Daco-Getae, a branch of the ancient Thracians, who had established a powerful kingdom of Dacia which was subjugated by the Romans in the second century A.D. and thus were stamped with Latin character. Later a number of barbarian tribes invaded and plundered the country. "The Slavs, arriving in the seventh century, left deep influence upon the inhabitants" (p. 5). In the fifteenth century the Rumanian people fell under Turkish political domination (the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia becoming vassals of the Ottoman sultans) as well as under the cultural and spiritual domination of the so-called Phanariot Greeks.

Yet under the powerful influence of the French Revolution, the Latin character of the Rumanian people was re-emphasized. In 1862 the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united in one Principality of Rumania, its independence being later recognized by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. Elevated to the status of a constitutional kingdom in 1881, Rumania made

a steady progress under the enlightened rule of a German dynasty until 1938, when King Carol II suspended the liberal constitution and established his "personal dictatorship" which was later superseded by the dictatorship of Marshal Antonescu and which, in turn, was overthrown by the *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944. The Soviet armies chased the German divisions out of the country; on December 30, 1947, King Mihai was forced to abdicate; and the country was renamed "Rumanian People's Republic" (RPR).

In the subsequent chapters or essays the various authors are painstakingly attempting to describe and analyze in detail all the available information concerning the economic field, financial policy, cultural life, religious life, education, press and radio, the constitution, the judiciary, foreign relations, the armed forces, labor, and the pattern of power of the Rumanian "people's democracy." Their belief is that "in presenting the most salient lessons to the Western readers" they are "contributing to an understanding of Soviet policies and perhaps helping to stimulate the defensive reflexes of the countries that are still free" (p. xii) and that "powerful as the weight of the Soviet subjugation assuredly is, the resistance thereto in the conscience and will of the Rumanian people is equally powerful" (p. xv). In addition there is a bibliography and an index.

THEODORE I. GESHKOFF

New York, N. Y.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ (Ed.). *The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy*. Pp. xii, 463. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956. \$6.25.

In his Introduction to the present volume the editor makes the pertinent point that serious evaluations of the past and present of East Central Europe should be of great help in the framing of a workable American diplomatic policy. A considerable part of this objective has been achieved in this volume. Parts of the book deal with the way the Soviet empire was created, the course of American policy, the economic framework, and relations between east and west. Other chapters deal with Finland,

Austria and Yugoslavia, on the Soviet empire's peripheries.

In view of recent events in Hungary, the chapter on that country, written by Professor Stephen D. Kertesz, may evoke special interest. He recalls that non-Communist Hungarian political groups attempted to sound out the Western allies shortly after World War II as to how much help they would extend in the implementation of the Yalta commitments to set up democracies in the liberated regions. In Hungary it was Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty himself who approached the American Minister with this question and received the reply that no interference in the internal affairs of other nations was America's traditional policy. In the author's opinion, American diplomatic caution in this instance may have been merely the refuge of impotence, since decisive factors in Hungary at the time were the Soviets' leadership in the Allied Control Commission, the Red Army, and the key position of the Communists.

Turning to the influence of the Communists "cradle to grave" indoctrination in Hungary, the author seems to have foreseen the future: "... one must conclude that, thus far, Russification and Sovietization have had no significant impact on Hungarian society." The worst enemy of communism was, in his view, Russia itself, with its colonial policies, and also the behavior of the Red Army, suppression of freedom, forced industrialization and the neglect of consumer goods. Hungary had special reasons to dislike the Soviets. It was the only satellite country to have experienced a previous Red regime after World War I. Also, the Hungarians are neither Slav nor Orthodox, and their language and way of thinking are obstacles rather than means of communication in Russo-Hungarian relations.

A thoughtful chapter by Robert F. Byrnes traces the bewildering vagaries of American foreign policy: "Containment? Liberation? Coexistence?" The author attempts to untangle the new version of the containment policy as pivoted upon diplomacy, and the special endeavor to break up the tight relationship between Moscow and the satellites. He holds to the view that American

policy toward East Central Europe since 1947 has been courageous, generous, and as effective as American power and the world situation allowed.

Discussing the economic consequences of a divided world, Professor Gottfried Haberler reaches the conclusion that the free world need have no fear of Soviet economic aggression, and even if the present volume of East-West trade tripled in the next years there is little danger of political blackmail as long as no severe depression is allowed to develop in the West and the channels of trade within it are not blocked by protectionist policies.

Some of the chapters about the countries themselves have been written by highly effective writers as Professor Robert Lee Wolff. On the whole, however, it would have been desirable to place more emphasis on the economic factors in several chapters. After a while, the description of how the Communists grabbed power in one country after another becomes monotonous. Also, we ought to know more how such things as land reforms, collectivization and industrialization have affected the social structures of the East Central European nations.

EMIL LENGVEL

New York University

STAVRO SKENDI (Ed.). *Albania*. Pp. xiv, 389. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1956. \$7.50.

Since Albania is probably the least known of all European countries, and truly hidden "behind the Iron Curtain," this symposium, the only systematic summary in English of the available information on that country, is most welcome. The editor, with the assistance of four other specialists, has produced a survey of the historical background, the land and the people of Albania, the political and economic system, and cultural and social developments. They have also included an appendix composed of biographical sketches of leading figures of the Communist regime, a brief chronology (1944-55), and a list of agreements signed by the pro-Communist Tirana regime with the "people's democ-

racies." Of value is also the table of translations and equivalent values.

Much of the criticism which could be directed against the product is fortunately weakened by the frank admission of Robert F. Byrnes in his Foreword that the completion of the volume was hard going. To quote him: "this material is often fragmentary," and "each volume contains quantities of useful information, but lacks generally the kind of analysis one would find in studies of areas where American research has had a longer and richer tradition" (p. vi). One could also add that there are not so "few secondary studies available" as he claims, that the sections dealing briefly with the pre-Communist Albania are often out of focus, that some pre-war studies covering Albania during that period are obviously unknown to the authors, and that the total effect is not too refreshing since the encyclopaedic and legalistic approach offers no penetrating analytical approach.

In fact, as Byrnes admits, one can picture the editor harried by the press of events, striving to get his ideas quickly on paper lest the morning cables prove them wrong. Thus the book is not profound, but the editor cannot be blamed wholly for that. The work is a fairly valuable reference book which will be a good point of departure for further investigation and a wider and more profound social analysis. Above all, it is a volume which treats factually what communism has been doing to such a profoundly anti-communistically inclined country.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

University of Bridgeport

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY

HENRY S. LUCAS. *Netherlanders in America: Dutch Immigration to the United States and Canada, 1789-1950*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1955. \$10.00.

Every American schoolchild learns something of the *Mayflower*, but few ever come to know that there were dozens of *May-*

flowers—dozens of ships, that is, that carried a pioneer group of immigrants from each of the various countries of Europe. This is a chronicle of the bark *Southerner*, in which a band of 110 dissenting Calvinists sailed from Rotterdam to New York in the fall of 1846, of their subsequent trials and successes in the Michigan colony, and of those who later followed their courageous lead. The story is told with loving care, and no detail of this saga has escaped Mr. Lucas's painstaking research.

After an introductory chapter on "Dutch Immigration before 1846" in which New Amsterdam is passed over in a few pages, we begin the real story.

Every *Mayflower* story has its portion of myth, and this one is no exception. Like the English Puritans, these Dutch Separatists were persecuted at home, and they left in order to be able to worship God in their own fashion. Mr. Lucas relates the persecutions in appropriate detail, but he does not mention that they largely abated after 1848, when a new Liberal constitution was adopted in Holland; nor that the fresh upsurge of Dutch emigration in the 1880's, far from being induced by new persecutions, coincided with the establishment in Holland of the first Calvinist-Catholic cabinet. Mr. Lucas repeatedly acquaints us with "the fact that, excepting the Dutch Catholics, almost all Dutch immigrants" were Separatists (p. 472), and he deals with the contrary evidence (for example, Wabeke, pp. 89-90; Van Hinte, I, 195) in the simplest possible fashion—by ignoring it. Statistics in general are not his strong point. He accepts as given the notoriously inaccurate American immigration figures, which he neither attempts to correct himself nor amends with the help of such prior works as those of Willcox-Ferenczi or, for the specific Dutch case, Hofstee. He tells us that United States "census enumerators frequently failed to distinguish between Americans and those Hollanders whose grandparents and great-grandparents were of Dutch birth" (p. 328), apparently unaware that this practice was not only frequent but invariable.

Mr. Lucas has the love of a third-generation American for the Dutch language,

and he sprinkles his pages with Dutch words and phrases, all of which he has of course to translate immediately. The book ends with a discussion of Dutch as it is spoken in the Middle West, and of several novels about Dutch-Americans. Viewed as indices of acculturation, these would have been interesting topics; but Mr. Lucas saw them rather as occasions to take a stand for linguistic and moral purity. He has little sympathy with those who interpret the ultra-orthodox Calvinists that settled in Michigan and Iowa as a narrow, dull, and unlovable group; and he invites the reader to wonder why in each of the novels of Arnold Mulder, for example, "an important character had to be portrayed as a violator of the commandment against adultery."

WILLIAM PETERSEN

University of Colorado

FOSTER RHEA DULLES. *The Imperial Years*. Pp. ix, 340. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956. \$5.00.

The jacket of Mr. Dulles' volume carries a phrase that might well appear as a subtitle on the title page: "The history of America's brief moment of imperial fervor." The "imperial years" were those extending from the opening of Grover Cleveland's first presidential term to the close of Theodore Roosevelt's second, 1881 to 1909. These were the years in which the United States abandoned its traditional policy of avoiding overseas commitments and territorial acquisitions and embarked upon a career of empire building in the Caribbean and the Pacific and of limited participation in the international politics of Asia and Europe. Here we find retold the story of rivalry with Germany in Samoa, the annexation of Hawaii, the war with Spain, the conquest of the Philippines, the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone, the initiation of the open door policy in China, Theodore Roosevelt's relations with Japan, the beginning of protectorates in the Caribbean, and American participation in the Algeiras Conference on the Moroccan question. The "imperial fervor" that supported these policies was, as Mr. Dulles sees the matter, short lived. Whatever enthusiasm the general public may have felt

for the "imperialism" of 1898 it soon evaporated. Mr. Dulles notes the fact that many Americans hailed John Hay's open door policy of 1899-1900 as an exemplification of anti-imperialist principles. Even President Roosevelt, one of the ardent expansionists of 1898, was hoping by 1901 that "the trend of events" would speedily justify the United States in leaving the Philippines. Yet Roosevelt, if he ceased to be an imperialist, was aware that the United States had become a world power and could not escape the responsibilities of its new position. In this he was far ahead of public opinion, which continued to view the power politics of Europe and Asia as if they had been phenomena of another planet. "It was the tragedy of the world as well as the tragedy of America," concludes Mr. Dulles, "that the immense power of the United States—physical and spiritual—could not somehow have been more effectively marshaled in defense of peace of liberty, without mankind having first to undergo all the savagery and cruelty of total war."

Scholars will find little that is new in Mr. Dulles' narrative. To the specialist the most interesting features of the book are the frequent citations of contemporary opinion and the analyses of the thinking of such intellectuals as Brooks and Henry Adams, Captain Mahan, and Roosevelt himself. That the book is designed for the layman rather than the scholar is indicated by the absence of footnotes and the selective bibliography. If the layman is inquisitive, he will not always find it easy to identify the monographs and articles representing the spadework on which Mr. Dulles' lively and interesting story largely rests.

JULIUS W. PRATT

University of Buffalo

H. DUNCAN HALL and C. C. WRIGLEY. *Studies of Overseas Supply: History of the Second World War. (Civil Series.)* Pp. xi, 537. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Co., 1956. (Distributed by British Information Services, New York.) \$6.75 trade; \$5.40 library.

Overseas supply may become more than of academic interest if world events con-

tinue in their present pattern. This reviewer examined *Studies of Overseas Supply* in mid-December, when troops are being withdrawn from the Suez Canal area; when repression exists in Hungary; when the USSR satellites are increasingly restive; when NATO is in process of re-appraisal; and when large military concentrations are reported all along the eastern Asiatic coastline. All these events point up the timeliness of the present volume, which is in part a history, but likewise, a series of studies concerned with various facets of Great Britain's overseas supply system for munitions during World War II.

It is trite to say that: "the past is prologue," but in military matters and particularly in military supply matters, it often happens that: "the past is past." The lessons of history may well lie fallow for want of insight to take cognizance of both past mistakes and past achievements. Hence, for those who have insight, here is a book which can be most helpful, particularly should another serious overseas supply problem arise. Not because history will repeat itself, but because many situations, problems, and policies would be analogous.

This is a carefully written book of 537 pages, well-indexed and annotated, which deals with nine principal problems: North American munitions, problems of cash procurement in the United States, lend-lease procurement, allocations and programs, the combined boards, the combined raw materials board, British war organization in the United States, scientific collaboration between the United Kingdom and North America, and the Eastern hemisphere.

The book is one of the "War Production Series, United Kingdom Civil Series, History of the Second World War" and is complementary to Mr. H. Duncan Hall's *North American Supply*. A comparative treatment is to be found in certain volumes or portions thereof in: *United States Army in World War II*, particularly those which concern the supply services, transportation, and logistics.

One is struck with the teamwork displayed between the two countries so far as North American munitions supply is concerned. This is an important matter when

NATO is in process of re-appraisal. The book recounts many instances of such teamwork and thus gives us hope for the future. The book is not illustrated, nor need it be.

GEORGE P. BUSH

American University

ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR. *The Civilian and the Military*. Pp. xi, 340. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$6.50.

It is ironic that Professor Ekirch, the first historian of the idea of progress in America, should have published in the last two years two gloomy estimates of our national future. Last year's account of *The Decline of American Liberalism* now has a companion in *The Civilian and the Military*, a history of our fading antimilitarist tradition. The theme in each case is the theme of paradise lost.

The author develops the story of anti-militarism concretely, not only in terms of periodic wars, but also in terms of peacetime debates over military appropriations, the size and nature of the armed forces, and the role of the military in civil affairs. He traces the preference for civil supremacy to England, shows how it was reinforced by colonial experience, and how it became part of the fundamental law of the land. So far so good. But from the time of the War of 1812, as Professor Ekirch sees it, the advocates of militarism had a downhill run, through the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and the three wars of the twentieth century. In our day the line between the civilian and the military has been completely obliterated; militarism is everywhere, in government, industry, education, even in scientific research. We now have a garrison state with the entire population either directly or indirectly enrolled in some military capacity. To Professor Ekirch this heralds the end of our free society, for he agrees with David Starr Jordan that "as militarism grows democracy must die."

This is a provocative thesis, ably stated, and supported by substantial but inconclusive scholarly evidence. *The Civilian and the Military* suffers not from lack of

evidence, but from lack of perspective. Though he does not say so directly, the author proceeds on the assumption that militarism is a devouring evil, war the ultimate madness, and that neither is defensible under any circumstances. He does not differentiate between the militarism that frees the slaves and the militarism that crushes a strike, between the militarism that conquers the Philippines and the militarism that defeats Hitler. By assuming that there is no moral alternative to peace he relieves himself of the necessity of facing the complexities of the war-peace issue. By implication, at least, he even seems to say that there has never been any real threat to our national security. His story, therefore, is the story of a people "driven by a series of irrational fears into the delusive security of militarism."

Even those who disagree with Professor Ekirch will commend him for calling attention to the problem of civilian-military relations, and for reminding us at this juncture of our history of the democratic implications of our antimilitarist tradition.

IRVIN G. WYLLIE

University of Missouri

EDMOND VERMEIL. *Germany in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Cultural History of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich*. Pp. 288. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$5.50.

Edmond Vermeil is France's leading student of German history and thought, and any work of his in this field automatically commands respect and insures advance interest. *Germany in the Twentieth Century* is a brief survey of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. The major complaint is that the survey is much too brief. No other historian could have written a better short account of this fateful period of German history, but even Professor Vermeil is no magician, and as a result, the treatment leaves the reader under the impression that many issues are touched upon, but no more.

The Weimar Republic was Germany's first real try at democracy, and in the whole history of democracy there is perhaps no greater failure. The author pro-

vides us with the essential facts and data of the story, but the answer to the deeper causes of that failure remains largely unanswered. The diplomatic, political, and economic facts of the period of the Weimar Republic are generally known. In his last section on that period, the author brilliantly deals with neo-nationalism, existentialist philosophy, and literature—here we get a taste of what Professor Vermeil could have done if he had treated his theme in the breadth and depth which it deserves. But even in these short surveys he provides a great deal of information of German thought in the 1920's which even the specialist in German history and politics will read with considerable interest.

The Nazi regime occupies the second half of the book. Mountains of volumes have piled up on this subject in the last twenty years, and yet we do not seem to make much progress as to a true understanding of Nazism. It has no parallel in the history of modern barbarism, and perhaps in the history of any barbarism, ancient or modern. The conventional approaches of history, politics, and philosophy do not supply an adequate answer to the question of how all this could happen in the middle of the twentieth century in the heart of Europe; and other approaches (particularly that of social psychology and psychopathology) are perhaps not advanced enough to give us the answers we look for. Professor Vermeil is most interesting in his analysis of the background of the Nazi doctrine, based on his unusually intimate knowledge of German thought since Martin Luther. In his conclusion (pp. 260–78) the author summarizes his findings, and briefly discusses the prospects of present-day Germany. On the whole he is moderately hopeful, provided Germany's "eternal romanticism" (p. 278) does not induce her to plunge herself, and all of Europe, into new adventures leading to ruin and disaster.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN
Princeton University

LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON. *The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities with the Enlarged Empire, 1763–1766. The British Empire Before the American*

Revolution, Vol. IX. Pp. xxxix, 345, xlv. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. \$7.50.

Recent volumes of the author's penetrating studies of the older British Empire have concentrated on the period and problems of the French and Indian War. Here, once again, laborious application by Professor Gipson pays off in scholarly dividends. This volume of his series chiefly concerns the governing of the far-flung territories acquired in 1763.

Great Britain sought, so this detailed analysis well demonstrates, to give each new colony the government best suited to its location and circumstances. The general needs of the empire had to be considered also. In North America, the years 1763 to 1766 saw the recolonization of Nova Scotia and the creation of new governments for Quebec and the Floridas. To the West Indies came self-supporting British governments for Grenada, Dominica, St. Vincent, Tobago. In India, the East India Company increasingly involved itself in the affairs of Bengal and elsewhere.

Those primarily interested in the background of the American Revolution will find in this volume little aid and comfort, except by indirection: the new colonies depict the motives and spirit of the ministers, Parliament, and the governors for all British colonies of the time. Thereby a clearer view may be had of the relations of Great Britain with its older colonies.

The author's lines of inquiry may be illustrated, for general aspects, by his handling of the highly complicated governmental problems presented from the sudden and immense territorial expansion. For specific approaches an example would be his recounting that Britons in London, in a controversy over the acquisitions, debated whether to retain Canada or Guadeloupe. Consideration is given the recommendations and actions of the colonial governors who, because of isolated situations, often had to proceed upon their own initiative.

The Proclamation of 1763 is analyzed, the author turning for background to the Cherokee uprising of 1759–61 (considered as an episode of the moving American frontier) and the great Northwest Indian

uprising of 1763. That proclamation comes out rather well from this recent re-examination. Admittedly, the Proclamation of 1763 had defects and antagonized British colonials who wished to move farther west. But it created the promised Indian reservation, established new provinces (including Quebec), realigned the boundaries between Nova Scotia and Quebec, set what became the controversial boundary of East Florida, and altered the boundary of West Florida. In the ceded islands assemblies were established in accordance with it. Trade was opened up everywhere and, in certain areas, settlement was encouraged. The objectionable line that separated the Atlantic seaboard colonies from the Indian country was intended to be temporary.

VERNON J. PURYEAR

University of California
Davis

ERIC VOEGELIN. *Israel and Revelation: Order and History*, Vol. I. Pp. xxv, 533. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1956. \$7.50.

Israel and Revelation is the first in a series of six volumes, entitled *Order and History*, to be published within the next three years. The series is described as "a comprehensive study of the order of human existence in society and history, ranging in times from the Egyptian and Mesopotamian empires of the Ancient Near East to the modern national states and the contemporary conflict of civilizations."

[It is quite evident from the heavy German style of writing, which is carried over into the English, that Dr. Voegelin expected that this volume on *Israel and Revelation* would be read only by highly intellectual and erudite persons. But it denies to any number of general readers the advantages of becoming acquainted with the author's political philosophy concerning *Order and History*. It is assumed that the other five volumes will be written in the same style. Possibly "this monumental work" will later be deemed worthy of abridgment to be of service to a wider reading public.]

On page ten of the Preface, the plan or purpose of the book is stated as follows:

"The first volume, the present one on 'Israel and Revelation,' will explore not only the form of cosmological and historical order, but also the emergence of the Chosen People from the ambiance of cosmological empires. A truth about the order of being seen only dimly through the compact symbols of Mesopotamian, Canaanite and Egyptian societies, becomes articulate, in the formation of Israel, to the point of clarity where the world-transcendent God reveals himself as the original and ultimate source of order in world and man, society and history, that is, in all world-immanent being. Under this aspect of the dynamics of history, the otherwise autonomous study of cosmological order acquires the character of background for the emergence of history, as the form of existence in response to Revelation gained by Israel's exodus from civilization in cosmological form." This passage leads the present reviewer to observe that it has always been difficult for him to understand just who chose the Chosen People, in the commonly accepted sense of the term, and for our present-day cosmos. Of special value is the author's interpretation of Moses and the Prophets in Chapters XII and XIII.

Dr. Voegelin has done a remarkable piece of research on this volume, and has included not only a General Table of Contents, but also an excellent Analytical Table of Contents in the beginning of the book. The abundance of material is divided into an Introduction, The Symbolism of Order, and four parts, the titles of which are: Part I, The Cosmological Order of the Ancient Near East; Part II, The Historical Order of Israel; Part III, The History and the Trail of Symbols; and Part IV, Moses and the Prophets. Following the text there is a listing of Biblical References according to the Books of the Bible, a List of Modern Authors used, and a Subjects and Names Index. These aids to the reader in using *Israel and Revelation* are of course to be expected in the work of an able German-trained scholar. This volume should be of special interest to all serious students of Religion and the other social studies.

EDGAR J. FISHER

Amherst, Va.

DONALD E. WORCESTER and WENDELL G. SCHAEFFER. *The Growth and Culture of Latin America*. Pp. xvii, 963. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

This readable volume treating the history of the twenty Latin American nations is developed on a plan different from previous works on the subject. The slightly more than four and a half centuries are divided into seven periods, each given approximately the same space (120 to 145 pages). The suggestive titles for the periods are: 1. Genesis of Empire (16th century), 2. Consolidation of Empire (17th century), 3. Maturity of Empire (18th century), 4. The Revolutionary Era (1800-22), 5. The Struggle for Political Stability (1822-60), 6. The Few and the Many (1860-1930), and 7. The Contest for Hegemony and the Rise of Indigenous Nationalism (1930-55).

The treatment of each period begins with a survey chapter, pointing out the highlights and significant phases of the development. Then follow chapters which consider the outstanding aspects in various countries as they are indicated in their titles. For the early colonial periods, the various areas are taken up in the order of occupation by the Spaniards, with Brazil coming last. The last colonial period begins with New Spain, proceeds southward and concludes with Brazil; while the revolutionary period starts with the south, continues northward and finishes with Brazil.

In the parts devoted to the national periods, the various countries are not treated individually, but, after the introductory chapter, are arranged in varying groups according to the way they fit under the chapter headings. In the discussion any one country may appear in several places in the chapter and many of the countries receive only slight mention.

The organization of the parts, indicating the assignment of the countries to chapters, is as follows: Part V contains: II, "The Stability of Moderation—Chile, Brazil and Paraguay"; III, "Tyranny and Confusion—Argentina"; IV, "Caudillismo and Anarchy—Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia"; and V, "The Age of Santa Ana—Mexico, with a little on Central America

and the Caribbean Islands." Part VI has: II, "Southern South America—Argentina, Uruguay and Chile"; III, "Indo-America—Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay"; IV, "Caribbean Borderlands—Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Central America and the Islands"; and V, "Brazil." Part VII comprises: II, "Mexico, a Study in Dynamics"; III, "Restless Caribbean—Central America, Colombia, Venezuela and the Islands"; IV, "Brazil, Destiny Not Quite Manifest"; V, "Argentina, Uruguay and Chile"; and VI, "Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador—Indo-America."

The authors have presented an interesting picture of Latin American growth and culture, under a new approach to an intriguing subject. No doubt many will criticize the lack of emphasis on all individual countries in the national period, nevertheless, it will be admitted that this plan has certain merits.

ROSCOE R. HILL

Washington, D. C.

R. F. LESLIE. *Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830*. Pp. xii, 307. London: University of London, Athlone Press; New York: John de Graff, 1956. \$7.50.

This is the third volume in the series of Historical Studies being sponsored by the University of London. In origin a doctor of philosophy thesis, it is built almost completely on Polish sources. The author, now Lecturer in History at Queen Mary College, University of London, was able to spend two terms in Poland where he "was granted free access to Polish archives and libraries."

The book is far more than an account of the Revolution of 1830. About a third of the study is devoted to the economic and social background of that struggle, and here the author ranges back and forth over events of the previous centuries. The analysis of the Polish *szlachta*, its division into greater and petty "nobility," the condition of serfs, and the slow growth of an industrial class is perhaps the best section of the book. The essentially conservative character of the Duchy of Warsaw is defined; here, as well as in the government of the

Congress Kingdom, the aristocracy continued to dominate.

With the outbreak of the revolt in November 1830 the account picks up detail, and the attempts of certain leaders to prevent a direct break with Russia is tortuously narrated. Emphasis is given to the internal bickering among the leaders, the indifference of the Polish serfs to the revolt, and the failure of the six governments which Poland had within ten months, to enact any basic land reforms. "The revolution . . . [was] the work of the Warsaw intellectuals and army officers of *szlachta* origin, a local insurrection at the seat of administration unaccompanied by widespread disturbances in the countryside or provincial towns" (p. 172). ". . . the mass of the population lacked both the means and the spirit to make any substantial contribution to the success of the national movement" (p. 177). The author sets the number of emigrés between 5,000 and 6,000 and describes briefly their centers of activity in exile, while deprecating the influence of these men on Polish affairs. More needs to be said on Russian-Polish policy after the Revolution, and this the author has reserved for a future volume.

This is not a book for the general reader, and even the well-intentioned professor will hardly find it stimulating. This may be due to a method which tends to reduce the events in 1830 in Poland to a series of incidents, full of details and replete with names of individuals. Even the author fails to list in his index all the names with which the text is cluttered. There is an excellent bibliography and an interesting note on the pronunciation of Polish words and names.

E. C. HELMREICH

Bowdoin College

WILLIAM KLUBACK. *Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History*. Pp. 118. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$3.00.

Wilhelm Dilthey is not regarded as being among the really first-ranking philosophers of the nineteenth century. Consequently it has been customary, among English-speaking philosophers anyway, to refer to

him as a neglected genius—and then to continue to neglect him.

Dilthey himself has been at least partially responsible for this. His writings are unsystematic, and his ideas are suggested rather than completely developed. However, for breadth of outlook and catholicity of interest he was unsurpassed, certainly in his own time. He deserves better at our hands.

Professor Kluback's survey, published in the Columbia University Studies in the Social Sciences, will help remedy this neglect. While it is much slighter in size than H. A. Hodges' *Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (Routledge, 1952), it packs a surprising wealth of solid material within its compass. For Dilthey, historical understanding is the key to the understanding of all human experience and of all philosophical systems. Therefore, Professor Kluback's title gives him an excellent opportunity to deal with the whole of his subject's thought.

It was Dilthey's aim to write a great critique of historical reason, which would save history from the positivistic historians of the nineteenth century, just as Kant had aimed at saving the natural sciences from the positivism of Hume. While this intention was never carried out, and while Dilthey did not himself succeed in escaping positivism completely, he did succeed in getting extraordinarily close to the heart of the philosophical problem of history.

Professor Kluback is especially thorough in his examination of the diverse roots of Dilthey's thought. His emphasis on the influence of Schleiermacher in particular, and of philosophical idealism and the romantic movement in general, is well placed.

On the debit side, Dilthey's own unsystematic presentation is reflected in the present work. To a certain extent, of course, this may be unavoidable. To oversystematize the unsystematized is to misrepresent it. However, a clearer organization of material here would have been of great help.

Finally, a publisher's advertising blurb to the contrary, the author does *not* show how Dilthey affected all later thought in the fields of history, literature, and culture. Philosophers such as Croce and Ortega y

Gassett, who derived much of their thought from Dilthey, are not mentioned. In the case of a more narrowly defined monograph this objection would be captious. But in the instance of a general introduction it is much more valid. The single final page Professor Kluback devotes to indicating something of Dilthey's influence is not enough.

CARL Y. EHRHART

Lebanon Valley College

ARTHUR HOLLY COMPTON. *Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative*. Pp. xix, 370. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Atomic Quest is the story of the atomic bomb project from the discovery of fission through the bombing of Japan and a little beyond, as it was lived, and to a considerable extent guided, by Dr. Arthur Holly Compton. Dr. Compton's part in the development of atomic energy began very soon after the discovery of the fission of uranium in 1939. He was at that time one of a small group of scientists who became personally convinced that fission had enormous military potential and who were willing to put aside all else in order to try to get its development started in this country as fast as possible. He continued to occupy a central position in the program as it moved from the experimental to the production phase and later into the area of international strategy. He was of course a party to the making of the important policy decisions. This inside knowledge of the bomb project, added to the personal knowledge of the scientists involved which Dr. Compton has as a result of a long and active career in physics, gives him an authority and penetration in writing the story of the bomb that few other writers could possibly have.

The book is nontechnical. Nowhere does it attempt to explain how a bomb works. It contains mainly information and anecdotes about the organizational and human problems of getting the atomic bomb project started and of carrying it through on an extremely tight time schedule. The last few chapters deal with the strategic and moral problems that had to be faced as the

new weapon neared completion and with the reactions of the Japanese leaders and people after its use. A large portion of the material comes from Dr. Compton's vivid memory. It is evident that he also had the privilege of drawing from official records, copies of correspondence, and transcripts of conversations and testimony where needed. The present-day classification of information relating to atomic bombs does not seem to have been a handicap, probably because the book deals primarily with the human struggles and foibles of accomplishing the job, rather than with technical methods of making fissionable materials and bombs.

The spirit of adventure and the feeling of the great importance and urgency of the task are well conveyed. Besides being a unique and valuable addition to the documentary material on the development of atomic energy, the story is one that moves at a lively pace. It is recommended to anyone who is interested in the birth of the Atomic Age.

H. R. CRANE

University of Michigan

GEORGE WOODCOCK. *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon*. Pp. 292. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. \$5.75.

In France and on the Continent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's continuing actuality is shown by the many and notable authors, from Karl Marx to Daniel Halévy, who have written books about him. In Britain and the United States, Proudhon is familiar only to scholars, Marxist intellectuals who have dutifully studied *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and the comparatively few readers of a book on Proudhon written by Professor D. W. Brogan before he found his presently ample audience.

George Woodcock, a Canadian-born, English-bred poet and man of letters, himself a professed libertarian, has added to earlier studies of William Godwin and Peter Kropotkin a competent, readable biography of Proudhon. Mr. Woodcock has dovetailed a discerning chronological analysis of Proudhon's works with a perceptive, sympathetic narrative of his life. He believes Proudhon to be the dominant ancestor of the liber-

tarian, as opposed to Marx' and Lenin's authoritarian, tendency in modern radicalism: not only of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism, but of the anticentralist, co-operative, "mutualist" side of socialism. Proudhon "remains among the small group of nineteenth-century social thinkers whose work still has meaning and relevance in our own age, when we are reaping the evil harvest of the very centralization and nationalism against which he made his loud-est protests."

The biographer fails (if he tries) to demonstrate much intrinsic worth, scientific or philosophical, in his subject's ideas. These are more persuasive at the level of slogan ("Property is theft," "God is evil," "Marx is the tapeworm of socialism") than of rational argument. But the outmoded vagaries of his ideas do not lessen the historical and human interest of the peasant-sprung Besançon printer. Proudhon was accurate in at least the second half of his remark to Charles Weiss, the scholarly librarian who was his first patron: "In my eyes you are the last incarnation of the eighteenth century. May you understand one day that I, for my part, am one of the incarnations of the nineteenth." And what he incarnated, in spite of all his protests against it, in spite of his sexual timidity, ponderous philosophizing, and social reforming, was a wild, wonderfully picturesque offshoot of the Romantic sensibility: a Chateaubriand in sabots, a peasant Harold in Italy. Who but a supreme Romantic could have got himself a wife by stopping an unknown girl on the street and asking her to marry him?

It is all condensed in the marvelous portrait by his friend Courbet, which Mr. Woodcock reproduces as his frontispiece.

JAMES BURNHAM

Kent, Conn.

FRANK FREIDEL. *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph*. Pp. 433. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. \$6.00.

This third volume of Frank Freidel's monumental biography of Franklin Roosevelt is essentially an account of his record as Governor from 1929 to 1933 and as presidential candidate in 1932. There is a

natural crescendo in the Roosevelt story as it unfolds with each successive volume, increasing in interest, insight, and significance. If volume one and two may be described as prologue, volume three is a magnificent first act to the Roosevelt drama. Under the skillful hand of Professor Freidel, Franklin Roosevelt begins here to emerge as something more than an amiable member of the Hudson River squirearchy with an amateurish interest in politics—to become a formidable political leader of no mean dimensions. Henceforth his career becomes for all practical purposes synonymous with the political history of the United States during more than twelve crisis-packed years. This distinguished biography will be indispensable to those who seek to understand the emergence of America both as a mature social democracy and as leader of the free world. One cannot read this exciting record without again reflecting on the relation between great men and great events. To what extent were the tumultuous events of these years directed by the genius of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and to what extent was he but the instrument of forces beyond his control or comprehension? Freidel wisely avoids this question, viewing it no doubt as on a par with the question as to whether the area of a triangle depends more on its base than its altitude.

In presenting Franklin Roosevelt to the critical gaze of his readers, he indulges in neither dithyrambs nor diatribes but, like the honest craftsman he is, offers a full-length portrait of the man—"moles and all." Franklin Roosevelt's idolators will not like to be reminded of the coy but ardent presidential aspirant denouncing Hoover for his extravagance and playing ducks and drakes with all manner of men and measures. Nor will the professional "Roosevelt haters" derive much comfort from the clear image that appears in this volume of a courageous, perceptive, and inspired statesman who out-thought, out-manuevered, and out-fought his enemies and his rivals to become not only a truly great governor but, as later events were to prove, a great president and a great man. How far wrong some of his contemporaries were in their estimate of his calibre and

character is painfully illustrated by Walter Lippmann's comment early in 1932 that "Franklin Roosevelt is no crusader. He is no tribune of the people. He is no enemy of entrenched privilege. He is a pleasant man who, without any important qualifications for the office, would very much like to be President." In retrospect it is hard to believe that so wise and experienced an observer as Lippmann could be so blind. For, even as he wrote, Franklin Roosevelt was proving, as Governor of New York, that he was a crusader, he was a tribune of the people, he was an enemy of entrenched privilege, and he had in abundance the qualities of leadership which have characterized all great presidents. No one can read this volume and come to any other conclusion. His first message as Governor foreshadowed policies later to be incorporated in both federal and state legislation as the "New Deal." His Old Age Commission in 1929, his passionate concern for the conservation of New York's natural resources, his courageous and head-on battle with the power trust, his fight for measures to extend and improve public education, public health, and welfare, are but a few items in a gubernatorial record that belies the belittling language of Lippmann. Moreover, his superb qualities as politician are revealed in the skill with which he outflanked the reactionary Raskob-Shouse-Michelson cabal within his own party and managed to grow in political stature as his quondam hero, Al Smith, declined. There is something sad and even a bit pathetic in the rift between Smith and Roosevelt, but anyone watching Smith's melancholy departure from Albany in January, 1929, should not have been surprised. The transformation of the "happy warrior" into the unhappy, unglamorous, and often mean critic of Roosevelt policies—policies for which Smith himself had once fought—does not make for pleasant reading. Yet under most trying circumstances and torn by sharply conflicting emotions on the sad and often scurvy affair, Roosevelt displayed rare qualities of personal loyalty and magnanimity.

By all means read this volume. It is a veritable pageant of American politics in which Franklin Roosevelt plays the leading

and dual role so felicitously described by James Burns as the "lion and the fox."

PETER H. ODEGARD

University of California
Berkeley

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

EMILE DURKHEIM. *Education and Sociology*. Pp. 163. Translated by Sherwood D. Fox. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$3.50.

As Talcott Parsons points out in the Foreword, the concepts of Durkheim have genuine significance in modern sociology and in education today. For example, Durkheim emphasized the internalization of cultural norms and pointed out that conflicts are aroused within the individual as a result of the inconsistency of the cultural norms of groups with which he identifies himself. The present writer, in a forthcoming book, emphasizes this same point of view but carries it a step further by pointing out that conflicts within the individual are dependent upon two factors: the degree of inconsistency of cultural norms and the extent to which the individual identifies himself with groups with differing value-norms.

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was Professor of Sociology at the University of Bordeaux and Paris. For many years he gave a weekly lecture on "pedagogy." This book is a translation of four of his essays: *Education, Its Nature and Its Role*; *The Nature and Methods of Pedagogy*; *Pedagogy and Sociology*; and *The Evolution and Role of Secondary Education in France*.

Throughout all of the essays, Durkheim stresses the fact, now increasingly accepted, that education directly reflects the culture of the community. It is the product of the interaction of the school and the various cultural groups which comprise the environment which the school serves. Specifically, he states, "Education is the influence exercised by the adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual, and moral states as

a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined."

In spite of the fact that a half century and more has passed since these essays were written, sociologists and educators will find in them stimulating food for thought. Certainly some of our modern concepts had their beginnings in the work of Durkheim and others of his contemporaries.

FRANCIS J. BROWN

American Council on Education

JOHN WALKER POWELL. *Learning Comes of Age*. Pp. xiv, 235. New York: Association Press, 1956. \$3.00.

This is a careful and comprehensive survey of the present extent of adult education in the United States of America made possible by the collaboration of the Adult Education Association and the Ford Fund for Adult Education and the able authorship of Dr. John Walker Powell. Mr. Powell has a background of experience and training that gives him a good framework from which to survey and evaluate present-day adult education activities. This personal responsibility for the contents of the book grows out of the agreement between him and the sponsors of the project. He was to survey the "present state and future prospects of adult education in this country," but was to be entirely free to write what he saw and thought. He was to write as he believed, and his sponsors would print it or not as they pleased. Since it has been printed it brings an endorsement by professionals in the field as well as by the Fund for Adult Education.

Mr. Powell limits the meaning of adult education as consisting of "planned and purposive adult learning occasions regularly provided under some organized scheme of guidance."

These adult learning occasions he breaks into two categories, those that relate to the acquisition of facts, skills, and so forth, and those that build or create "intelligence." By intelligence he does not mean a collection of skills or knowledge, but the individual passing judgment upon or relating his skills and knowledge to the further development of personality. Nowhere does the author define what maturity or "coming of age" in the field of education is but this

reviewer believes he means that in those situations where intelligence is born or improved adult education has "come of age."

Because the agencies now active in offering adult education were all created, staffed, and exist "for a primary purpose other than the education of adults," Mr. Powell does not believe that the present pattern for adult education can achieve the mature adult education for which they may strive. He further thinks the present pattern is a very insecure basis in times of financial stress. He calls for "an agency uniquely adult, independent of other concerns, staffed by its own professors and financed purely for what it is and does." He does not minimize anywhere in the book problems inherent in an education for maturity and refers more than once to the "long step" between what is and what might and should be.

JEROME BENTLEY

Aurora, N. Y.

A Design for Democracy. An abridgement of a report of The Adult Education Committee of The British Ministry of Reconstruction commonly called *The 1919 Report*. Pp. 222. New York: Association Press, 1956. \$3.50.

It is doubtless a commonplace to affirm that we are rapidly becoming an age or a period in which ever-larger numbers of our population are senior citizens. However, much of the concern of educators appears focused too exclusively upon the needs of youth. And yet, this reviewer is impressed by the transparent lack of genuine concern of educators for the imaginative quality of education, the adventure with ideas where young students struggle to forge concepts meaningful to their expanding frame of reference. Much of contemporary education is hardly differentiated from sheer indoctrination, the passive acquiescence of students in the preachments of educators, the lethargic waiting for the pronouncements of authority.

Institutionalized adult education, for the most part, is of the same stripe or is excessively vocational. Centers for adult education which were sufficiently courageous to enter the arena of political conflict either on the local or national level have

fares rather badly at the hands of self-appointed custodians of the commonweal. There are exceptions. One recalls the outstanding work in adult education by the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.

A Design for Democracy endeavors to come to grips with a deeper concept of adult education. There is much sageness in its pages, and although authored almost forty years ago, the document has both relevance and insight for us at mid-twentieth century. To be sure, some of the material is dated. Between the completion of the report in 1919 and the present, there have occurred dramatic and notable changes—historical and political—which have affected the course of education at all levels. The authors of the report reach for the moon in almost reckless abandon so far as a realistic appraisal of the potentialities of education are concerned. Notwithstanding, anyone who is seriously concerned with the fundamental problems of adult education might well ponder the fresh wisdom of their utterance. Last but not least, there is a lucid and straightforward style of writing which puts to shame many contemporary books in the field of professional education.

FREDERICK E. ELLIS

University of Minnesota

W. KENNETH RICHMOND. *Education in the U.S.A.: A Comparative Study*. Pp. 227. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$4.50.

In his *Democracy in America*, the perceptive De Tocqueville gave Americans an effective tool for both analyzing the American *ethos* and reshaping their thinking and acting as citizens of the new democracy. The fresh insights of De Tocqueville with respect to the values and risks of the democratic way of life are as relevant for our own day as when they appeared in print in the 1840's. Now as well as then we have much to learn from our friendly critics, in fact far more than we could ever hope to learn from our uncritical friends.

Contemporary American education has been subjected to the discerning eye of W. Kenneth Richmond, Lecturer in Education

at the University of Glasgow. As a "foreign" observer, Mr. Richmond will find himself open to charges of indulging in snap judgments, of attempting to support insupportable generalizations, in short, of grossly distorting and misinterpreting the American educational scene. To a degree these charges will be valid. Nevertheless, Mr. Richmond presents the reader with what is in the main a restrained, balanced though not always carefully controlled portrait of his subject. He has attempted too much in too short a compass. The book is concerned with problems such as: education in Americanism; the place of the teacher in American democracy; the American high school; and, finally, higher (and lower) learning in the United States.

The book has sufficient strengths to warrant its author *not* being decried as a "Cassandra" or his book heaped with question-begging epithets.

FREDERICK E. ELLIS

University of Minnesota

EDWARDS DUFF, S.J. *The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches*. Pp. xii, 339. New York: Association Press, 1956. \$7.50.

This is a study by a Jesuit scholar of the social thought of the ecumenical movement which has found its chief institutional expression in the World Council of Churches. Father Duff spent two years in Geneva and was given access to the records of the World Council. He was a very popular figure there and had an unusual opportunity through much conversation to fill in gaps in the written records.

As one who has been very close to the developments which Father Duff has studied I am glad to testify that he has had astonishing success in understanding the thought and the spirit of this movement which is largely Protestant in its inspiration and entirely non-Roman Catholic. He is able to understand this emerging pluralistic Christian community which has no organs of authority, which enables more than 160 denominations of the most diverse backgrounds to co-operate and to think together. He understands, as from inside, the difficulties of this religious movement that is

so different in structure from his own Church and he has great respect for what has been achieved in spite of these difficulties. There is not one word in this volume that is unfair to Protestant thought. Sometimes he is critical but he would usually find many Protestants who would agree with his criticisms. It should be said that he has written about those aspects of Protestant thought in which there is a good deal of common ground with the thought of many Roman Catholics.

Father Duff summarizes and interprets the social teachings which have come from the great conferences at Stockholm (1925) and at Oxford (1937) and from the first and second assemblies of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam (1948) and at Evanston (1954). Since Oxford there has developed what may be called a broad ecumenical consensus on economic and social and international problems. There is no other book that gathers together this material so usefully. Father Duff is sometimes impatient that this consensus does not settle some of the most difficult questions, especially in regard to economic institutions. This is partly Catholic impatience with the refusal of Protestants to use natural law conceptions in solving these problems. One value of this whole ecumenical process is not sufficiently emphasized; it helps to deliver the Christians of each nation or culture from the forms of bias which are most natural to them. In this way it stimulates their minds and consciences even if it does not give them decisive answers.

JOHN C. BENNETT

Union Theological Seminary

KISHIMOTO HIDEO (Ed.). *Japanese Religion in the Meiji Era*. Translated by John F. Howes. Pp. xix, 377. Tokyo: Ōbunsha, 1956. 1,800 Yen.

Here is as good a comprehensive survey of the religions of Japan in the Meiji period as is to be found in English. One of the "Centenary Culture Council Series," of which another number, *Japanese Literature in the Meiji Era*, appeared in 1955, it is part of an ambitious effort, financed by the Japanese Government, to portray the de-

velopment of modern Japan. To it several experts have contributed chapters. The book was designed for Japanese readers, but the translator has had in mind undergraduate and graduate students having no knowledge of the Japanese language and only a general knowledge of Japan. Working with the authors, he has reduced the dimensions of the original by about 40 per cent and has omitted footnotes.

The volume begins with an excellent survey of Japanese religion under the preceding period, that of the Tokugawa Shogunate. It then goes on to sections on Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity. The section on Shinto rehearses the disestablishment of Buddhism, and disentanglement of Shinto from Buddhism, the effort, relatively brief, to make Shinto the state religion, the achievement of religious liberty, and the growth of sect Shinto. The section on Buddhism covers the sharp decline in the status of that religion early in the Meiji period and its revival in the later decades of that era. Established by the Tokugawa, its inner vitality had suffered from an association which had led many to enter the priesthood as an easy livelihood and had undercut religious conviction. In the first reaction under the Meiji, with its disestablishment and separation from Shinto, more radical groups and officials sought to rid the country entirely of Buddhism. Many temples and shrines were destroyed and the lands through which they were supported were diverted to other purposes. Then came a renewal which made Buddhism more inwardly alive than it had been for several centuries. The longest chapter, nearly half the volume, is on Christianity. Unfortunately it is not as good as the others. It is confined primarily to Protestantism with only slight coverage of Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Christianity, although these together were almost as strong numerically as was Protestantism. The account of Protestantism is mostly what is available in other books in English: its chief value is the delineation of the background from which early converts came and the bearing of that background on their conceptions of Christianity.

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

Yale University

MATTHEW SPINKA. *The Church in Soviet Russia*. Pp. xi, 179. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$3.25.

This compact, solidly written study provides a useful historical perspective in the light of which recent firsthand reports of a growing "religious revival" in the Soviet Union may be evaluated. Professor Spinka's account is factual and objective, although he pauses at appropriate points to criticize or condemn an individual or policy of the Church or government. In successive chapters, he traces the careers of the three Patriarchs who have headed the Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet period—Tikhon, Sergei, and the present Patriarch Alexei, showing how their (at first) reluctant and piecemeal concessions eventually led to a situation in which "the Russian Church is subjugated to the state and exploited as a tool for the latter's . . . policies" (p. 153).

The author reminds us of the antireligious campaigns of the late 1920's and early 1930's. (For example, in May 1932 the Association of Militant Atheists had more than 5½ million members, and by 1933 at least half of the churches had been closed.) He goes on to review the reversal of government policy which followed (and was at least in part a result of) the Church's massive support of the Soviet war effort—expressed in such concrete gestures as the voluntary contribution of 150 million rubles to government coffers.

The period after 1943 was marked by substantial concessions: theological schools were reopened, ecclesiastical journals resumed publication, the militantly antireligious organs were suppressed, limited religious instruction was permitted. At the same time, Church leaders began to take an active part in furthering such political and propagandistic aims of the Soviet Government, as the "peace campaign" of the early 1950's. In the Mid-Eastern "pilgrimage" of Patriarch Alexei (1945) and the Church's condemnation of the Vatican and the World Council of Churches (1948), Professor Spinka also detects political overtones. While concurring with his analysis, one may ask whether he has not exaggerated

the importance of such political activities, at least in so far as they enter into the lives of ordinary Russian Orthodox believers. For, as he himself notes, the latter have been traditionally indifferent to politics, whether Tsarist or Soviet.

Professor Spinka cites statistics for 1914 which place the number of functioning parish churches in Russia at more than 40,000 and the number of monasteries and convents at slightly over 1,000. The comparative Soviet statistics which he offers are fragmentary and range in date from 1946 to 1953 (pp. 119 f). More recent figures (given me in Moscow in August 1956 by Nikolai Kolchitski, Chairman of the Educational Council of the Moscow Patriarchate) place the number of churches in the Soviet Union at "more than 25,000" and the number of monasteries and convents at 69. I cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of these figures, but my own (unsystematic) observations in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Tula and their environs, including certain of the larger monasteries, give me no reason to suspect the statistics of being unduly high.

A minor objection might be raised concerning the title of this book, which suggests that it deals with churches generally, rather than with the Russian Orthodox Church exclusively, as it in fact does. One cannot quarrel with Professor Spinka's decision to exclude consideration of Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Mohammedan groups. But one might wish he had made clearer to his readers the extent to which the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys a special and privileged position (though by no means a wholly enviable one), as compared to the non-Orthodox confessions, including the schismatic Old Believers. An indication of this position is afforded by the administrative structure of the Soviet government, which provides an entire Section for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (headed by Minister G. G. Karpov) and only one Section to deal with the affairs of all other religious groups in the Soviet Union.

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AMERICAN INDIANS AND AMERICAN LIFE

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FOREWORD

White Americans seem continually to be rediscovering the Indians. In the last few years, a growing Indian population on a limited land base, a vigorous national controversy over desegregation, a turn in the Indian policy of the federal government, and world-wide attention to questions of colonialism and minorities have been among the forces renewing America's interest in her Indian citizens.

The student of Indian affairs recognizes that to some degree the status of Indians in American society is similar to the status of other minorities. To a significant degree, however, Indian experience has been different, for unlike any other minority group in the nation, they were here, living in unified societies, when the European settlers came. Their response to invasion may have as much in common with the minorities in Eastern Europe as with the willing and unwilling migrants to America, torn as they were from their cultural roots.

There is scarcely a major issue of policy in the United States that has not been involved in the relationships of Indians and whites. Questions of universal citizenship and franchise; of land use and conservation; of the "melting pot" versus pluralism; of prejudice, discrimination, and segregation; of colonialism; of the separation of church and state; of private property and communal property; and of the extent and nature of government responsibility for education—to mention several basic issues—have all involved policy questions concerning Indians.

We need scarcely stress the importance and value of a study of the place of American Indians in American life. To the social scientist, it offers a valuable field for the testing of theories of social and cultural change, of acculturation, of personality development, and the like. To the policy maker, "the Indian question" is a key test of democracy with which our society has struggled for generations. To the student of international affairs, it offers experience—much of it negative, of course—and an important testing ground for the study of the results of culture contact between highly industrialized and "underdeveloped" societies. And in its own right, as a problem with difficult questions of justice and equality involving a large group of human beings, the analysis of the status of American Indians challenges us all.

Clearly the authors of this volume do not agree on all aspects of the question of the place of American Indians in American life. There are some disagreements in interpretation of facts, in method, and even in objective. While we have not sought to have all possible points of view represented—for our aim has been a scholarly review of several aspects of Indian life today, not a policy debate—we nevertheless welcome the several points of view that naturally appeared as the various authors explored their subjects. Each author writes from a wealth of experience. The interaction of their views can bring us to a more adequate understanding of American Indians and toward a resolution of the difficult questions still before us in establishing full equality and freedom for Indians.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON
J. MILTON YINGER

Indian and European: Indian-White Relations from Discovery to 1887

By D'ARCY McNICKLE

Abstract: When the American continent was settled by Europeans, they saw as a mission the conversion of the natives into Europeans. Needing their friendship and aid they treated them as free men, true owners of the land, but failed to understand their concept of land use and tenure. A policy of fair dealing soon faced the inexorable facts of a rapidly growing white population eager for land. The westward movement pushed the Indian farther and farther away from the Atlantic shore. Their land boundaries were no longer inviolate and with the Dawes Act of 1887, the final invasion of Indian homelands began.—Ed.

IT is a source of continuing surprise that the American Indians have not adjusted their lives to the national life, that their special problems persist, and that their ethnic identity does not dissolve. This surprise is not limited to the uninformed person who rarely has occasion to concern himself about such matters, but is particularly experienced by individuals who have an occupational interest in the fate of the American Indian: administrative officials, educators, legislators, missionary workers, and the like.

A review of the historical relations between the first inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere and the later coming Europeans may have an uncommon importance in our day, if in reconstructing this past we can identify and describe not the events alone but the attitudes and passions and judgments which lay behind the events. The value would consist in helping us to see ourselves as other people have seen us, and from our own performance—especially its failures—learn to improve our methods in the field of human relations. The pres-

ent review must be brief, but it can be suggestive.

THE PERIOD OF DISCOVERY

It was a fateful concurrence that the New World should be discovered at a time when Europe was awakening from its long medieval sleep and moving in many directions simultaneously to assert the mastery of Western man. In a single lifetime (1450–1520) spanning Columbus' momentous voyages, the printing press came into use in Europe, making it possible, in time to come, to spread knowledge to the masses; seafaring men overcame their fear of unknown land and water and pushed exploration westward into the Atlantic and southward along the coast of Africa; humanist scholars were translating the lost literature of classical Rome and Greece; and the Protestant Reformation was in full motion. In such events, and in others that preceded and followed, were the makings of the modern world.

What was beginning to emerge and

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would be more clearly defined in the years during which discovery and settlement progressed in the Americas, was a European society—varying in detail from country to country, but intrinsically similar—based on a belief in the perfectability of man. Exploration, invention, and discovery, working to reinforce each other, and to refute and confound an older society of static values, opened European minds to the idea of progress along an upward curve of goodness and happiness. It was a new idea in the world, a sharp departure from an earlier notion that man had been perfect in the past, in the Garden of Eden, and had fallen from grace; or from the still earlier belief that man moved through a series of descending phases from a golden age to barbarity, and back again.

In time the new belief would be vulgarized by equating progress with increased material conveniences and comforts, but in its beginnings it grew from a concern for the moral improvement of mankind, a seeking after heaven on earth, or (in the Calvinist interpretation) a seeking to be among the elected few who would find heaven hereafter. And it was more than an emotional out-reaching, for it had behind it the solid thinking of men like Francis Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Locke: men who demonstrated the uses of reason in examining and explaining the physical world. "It was reason that would lead man to understand nature and by understanding nature to mold his conduct in accordance with nature."¹

MEN WITH A MISSION

Thus, the men who came out of Europe into what they pleased to call the New World were men with a mission.

¹ Crane Brinton, *The Shaping of the Modern Mind* (New York: New American Library, 1953), p. 121.

The mission might be secondary to their immediate needs of security, but it was never wholly absent and at times it was of dominating interest in the actions of individual settlers. The nature of the mission was variously phrased, but essentially it amounted to an unremitting effort to make Europeans out of the New World inhabitants, in social practices and in value concepts.

One of the first orders of the Spanish monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand, to Ovando, first governor of The Indies (1501), was to require the Indians to be brought together in towns. "Each Indian was to be given a house of his own for his family and a farm for cultivation and cattle raising. . . . The Indians were to be persuaded to go about dressed, like 'reasonable' men. . . . The Indians were to be persuaded to abandon their ancient evil ways, 'and they are not to bathe as frequently as hitherto, as we are informed that it does them much harm.'"²

The mission theme is clearly stated by the Englishman, Robert Gray, in his *A Good Speed to Virginia* (1609): ". . . It is not the nature of men, but the education of men, which makes them barbarous and uncivil, and therefore change the education of men, and you shall see that their nature will be greatly rectified and corrected; seeing therefore men by nature so easily yield to discipline and government upon any reasonable shew of bettering their fortunes, it is every man's duty to travel both by sea and land, and to venture either with his person or with his purse, to bring the barbarous and savage people to a civil and Christian kinde of government, under which they may learn how to live holily, justly, and soberly in this world, and to apprehend the

² Lesley B. Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain, Forced Native Labor in the Spanish Colonies, 1492-1550* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929), pp. 28-29.

meanes to save their soules in the world to come. . . ."³

IMPACT ON THE INDIANS

Wherever Europeans settled in the Indian world changes occurred, in living habits, in the use of tools and weapons, and in some nonmaterial practices. In the northern regions hunting tribes were induced to change from a subsistence to a commercial type of hunting, even though, with the greater killing power of the weapons they obtained from European traders, they threatened their own basis of livelihood. When beaver disappeared from northern New York and the Iroquois nations faced a total loss of a rich trade and the political power to which they were accustomed before the arrival of the Europeans, they turned to violence as a means of compelling the tribes farther west to bring their furs into Iroquois country rather than to Canada. "The great role of the Iroquois was that of middlemen between the 'far Indians' and the English, a role which enabled them not only to obtain material benefits, but to retain that position of superiority over the Indians of the eastern half of the United States which they . . . could no longer hope to hold by mere force alone, since their fighting men had so diminished in numbers and their enemies had obtained weapons as good as their own."⁴ Thus the long effort of the Iroquois people to build a League of Peace was destroyed in competition for the material goods which were part of

³ Quoted in: Roy Harvey Pearce, *The Savages of America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), p. 10.

⁴ Peter Wraaxall, *Wraaxall Abridgment of the New York Indian Records, 1768-1751* edited by Charles H. McIlwain. Harvard Historical Studies, No. 21 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), p. xlii. See also George T. Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).

the cultural baggage of the incoming white man.

EUROPEANS' MISUNDERSTANDING OF INDIAN WAYS

The efforts by Europeans to modify Indian practices with respect to land use and tenure profoundly influenced the relationship between the two races. Attitudes toward Indian rights of occupancy often reflected either total lack of knowledge or erroneous understanding of Indian custom. A common assumption was that the Indians were too primitive to have developed a property system. Thus, the Reverend Richard Hakluyt described them as "more brutish than the beasts they hunt, more wild and unmanly than that unmanned wild country, which they range rather than inhabit."⁵

Even more common was the notion that the Indians were hunters to the exclusion of all other occupations, a notion that gave comfort to those settlers who regarded agriculture as a higher use of land and so justified themselves when they encroached upon Indian lands. Some of the first settlements were located in areas of such low fertility that as a practical matter they might have been reserved for hunting only; yet wherever soil, moisture, and growing season permitted, the Indian inhabitants planted fields of corn, beans, squash, and tobacco. The passengers who went ashore from the *Mayflower* to settle on the Massachusetts coast found the Indians fertilizing the ground with the fish (alewives) that ran so plentifully in the early spring: "You may see in one township a hundred acres together set with these fish, every acre taking a thousand of them; and an acre thus dressed will produce and yield so much corn as three acres without

⁵ Quoted in Pearce, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 7.

fish."⁶ The place they chose for settlement was "a high ground, where there is a great deal of land cleared, and hath been planted with corn three or four years ago . . . and on the further side of the river also much corn ground [has been] cleared."⁷

Agriculture, like hunting, was for subsistence, hence operations were planned to meet the needs of consumption and to provide reserves against a lean year; but they were not on a scale to provide surpluses for commercial exchange or foreign export.

When European settlers encountered the Indians and dealt with them as if they were members of European political communities, they did so, in part, under the moral persuasion of their times. This moral concept was variously phrased, and in Spain it took the form of advice which Francisco de Vitoria prepared for the Emperor Charles V: That the Indians, though "unbelievers," were the true owners of their land; were entitled to their own customs and government; and might not be enslaved or despoiled of their property unless they should be so inconsiderate as to war against the Spaniard.⁸

THE BIBLE AS GUIDE

In the English-speaking countries, no individual spoke out so clearly and so specifically on the rights of the Indians, yet sentiments like those expressed by Vitoria were current by the beginning of the seventeenth century. An English phrasing of the moral principle might be taken from the first letter of

instructions from the Massachusetts Bay Company to Captain John Endecott (1629), in charge of the colonizing group sent out by the company: "Above all, we pray you to be careful that there be none in our precincts permitted to do any injury, in the least kind, to the heathen people; and if any offend in that way, let them receive due correction . . . if any of the savages pretend right of inheritance to all or any part of the lands granted in our patent, we pray you endeavor to purchase their title, that we may avoid the least scruple of intrusion."⁹ On occasion, the Bible itself was cited as authority for policy in dealing with the Indians, as in the case of a Virginia statute (1633) quoting Genesis, Chapter I, verse 28 ("And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it"), also Psalm CXV, verse 16 ("The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's: but the earth hath he given to the children of men"). This Virginia statute then provided that "what lands any of the Indians in this jurisdiction have possessed and improved, by subduing the same, they have just right unto"; while grants made to Englishmen, according to the act, were also based on the authority of Genesis, and on "invitation of the Indians." The last phrase would suggest that the Bible alone was not deemed a sufficient warrant for Englishmen to assume possession of Indian lands, unless there was Indian consent.¹⁰

Practices varied in the English colonies, but generally the first settlers negotiated with the Indians and, though there may not have been a meeting of

minds, a friendly exchange took place. The Europeans thought they were "purchasing" a title, the Indians as certainly thought they were performing their duty toward a stranger by sharing hospitality with him.

There were other considerations involved in these transactions. European law-ways required a man to have a piece of paper to show ownership; it was as important that this piece of paper change hands as it was that the real property pass from one to another. Even in the case of venturing companies to which grants of territory had been made by ruling heads of government (as in the case of Lord Baltimore and William Penn), the Europeans took the precaution of paying the Indians for the land, thus acquiring documentary title which other Europeans would recognize.

The consideration which probably overshadowed all of these, in determining the behavior of the first Europeans toward the Indians, was the very practical one of winning and keeping the good will of the tribes. It was a consideration which dominated much of the policy of individual colonies, and it continued to have critical importance in the policy of the United States until at least through the War of 1812.

BEGINNINGS OF A POLICY

The evolution of a policy which would meet at once the various needs and demands of the Indians as well as the requirements of the several colonies, was never completed by the British government, although the elements of such a policy had been under discussion for more than twenty years prior to the American Revolution. From the early days of settlement until the middle of the eighteenth century, each colony was allowed to deal directly with the Indians within its borders. Most of the colonies indeed had adopted measures

designed to regulate trade and land purchases. But practices between the colonies varied so greatly and the administration of their own rules was often so inadequate that Indians complained of their treatment and either threatened or actually resorted to armed resistance. In addition to these proper grievances, the French in Canada and in the West lost no opportunity to aggravate the fears of the Indians by insisting that the English would not be satisfied until they had completely removed the Indians. The French had not been colonizers, but had been satisfied to trade and to build fortified posts to thwart competition. Hence, they could assure the Indians that they were not competing with them for the land.

MEETINGS AND DECISIONS

One of the first efforts of the British to effect a consolidated policy for the American colonies was the calling of the Albany Congress in June 1754. The conference was attended by the governors of New York, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, under instructions of the British Board of Trade. Specifically, the colonies were directed to complete an agreement for a joint management of Indian affairs. Instead of working out such a plan, the representatives of the several colonies drafted a plan of union providing for a representative council or legislature, and an executive to be appointed by the Crown. The plan was rejected by the several colonial assemblies and rejected even more firmly by the home government, which then proceeded to appoint two officials, one for the northern tribes and one for the southern, and placed in their hands authority to exercise political control in Indian matters, leaving the control of trade in the separate colonies. The defeat of General Braddock (July 1755), recently appointed

⁶ "Letter of Edward Winslow," *Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers of the Colony of Plymouth From 1602 to 1625* edited by Alexander Young (Boston: Little, 1841), footnote, p. 231.

⁷ "Bradford's and Winslow's Journal," *ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

⁸ Simpson, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 148-50.

⁹ Alexander Young (Ed.), *Chronicles of the First Planters of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1623-1636* (Boston: Little, 1846), p. 159.

¹⁰ Charles C. Royce, "Indian Land Cessions in the United States," *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, Part 2 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 602.

Commander in Chief of colonial troops, spurred the British to further efforts to bring order and responsibility in Indian affairs. Even more disturbing to the British ministers was Pontiac's success in achieving an alliance of the tribes in the Great Lakes-Ohio River Valley and the capture of the line of forts leading into the Northwest.

The growing crisis resulted in the issuance of the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763. The proclamation dealt with a number of questions, but of chief interest are its declarations on the relations of Europeans and Indians in the New World. These may be summarized as: (1) The Indians have a right to be protected in the peaceful possession of their lands, (2) Definite boundaries should be established and recognized, beyond which no settlement should occur except by mutual consent of the Indians and the King's representatives, and (3) Persons settled upon Indian lands the title to which had not been ceded by the Indians were ordered to be removed.

Even before the issuance of the proclamation negotiations with the Indians south of the Ohio River had established a boundary line between Indian holdings and the colonial settlements; negotiations were now entered into with the northern tribes, and by October 1768 a line had been agreed upon running from the eastern end of Lake Ontario all the way to the Gulf of Mexico in northwest Florida. This boundary, by agreement with all the tribes affected (some twenty-five or thirty in number) and representatives of the several colonies, was offered as a barrier against any further settlement westward except as the tribes might consent.

FAILURE OF PLAN

What the British did not succeed in achieving was the means of enforcing these agreements. Having failed to es-

tablish centralized control over Indian affairs and having no funds to pay the costs of such a centralized agency, the government had to fall back upon the several colonies to provide police power. By December 1773 it was reported that not less than sixty thousand people had settled between Pittsburgh and the mouth of the Ohio River, and the Iroquois complained bitterly that "the provinces have done nothing and the trade has been thrown into utter confusion by the traders being left to their own will and pleasure and pursuit of gain, following our people to their hunting grounds with goods and liquor."¹¹

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITIES

United States policy in its beginnings had the same problems to meet as those which the British had faced and failed to solve. Generally, these were problems of understanding, or the lack of it; they stemmed from the inflexible habit of expecting Indians to act like Europeans.

The moral law, or natural law, which Europeans cited as the basis of Indian rights in the land, was itself the creation of European minds. The formal procedure of negotiated purchase had a legal meaning for Europeans which had no counterpart in Indian society. Land was not merchantable, in the European sense, among any of the North American tribes. Individual right of occupancy and use was recognized and protected, and under given conditions trespass could be punished; boundary lines

¹¹ "The Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763," *Historical Collections, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society*, Vol. XXXVI (Lansing: Wyncoop Hallenbeck Crawford Company, 1908), pp. 20-52; George Lewis Beer, *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907); Walter H. Mohr, *Federal Indian Relations, 1774-1788* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933); and Helen Louise Shaw, "British Administration of the Southern Indians, 1756-1783," a dissertation presented to the faculty of Bryn Mawr College, 1931.

were respected, as between tribes, and between clans or other groupings within a tribe.¹² Such concepts were the cultural results of experiences which differed from the experiences of European men, concepts that were designed to serve a different kind of social purpose. They explain why it was that, in effort after effort, the early Indians tried to drive the settlers off land which previously they had "sold"; why tribes sometimes turned upon certain of their own headmen and destroyed them for giving away what belonged to the whole group; and they explain what lay behind the appeal of the Ohio River tribes, writing to the government at Washington in the winter of 1786: "Brothers: We are still of the opinion . . . that all treaties carried on with the United States, on our parts, should be with the general voice of the whole Confederacy (of tribes). . . . Any cession of our lands should be made in the most public manner, and by the united voice of the Confederacy. . . . Brothers: Let us pursue reasonable steps; let us meet halfway . . . we beg that you will prevent your surveyors and other people from coming upon our side of the Ohio River."¹³

THE INDIAN POSITION

If the Indians were to maintain their cultural integrity, and that was what they were demanding (the British had promised to protect this right on the eve of the Revolutionary War, and as a result of that promise Joseph Brant led his Mohawk people to the side of the British), it was essential that a boundary line be maintained. The At-

¹² Indian practices regarding land use and ownership are presented in numerous ethnological studies, particularly those of John M. Cooper, Loren C. Eiseley, Eleanor Leacock, Julius Lips, and Frank G. Speck.

¹³ *American State Papers*, Class II, Indian Affairs, Vol. I (Washington: Gayles and Seaton, 1831), pp. 8-9.

lantic coast had been such a boundary, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, between Europe and the Indian world. That barrier had been breached in a series of transactions which held certain meanings and served certain purposes for the European settlers; the same transactions carried quite different meanings for the Indian people and, for them, served no useful purposes. The result, after seven generations, was that the Indians found themselves in a position where they had to insist on fending off the incoming white man. Their continued existence, they thought, depended on it.

THE NEW MASTER

At the outset, the United States government tried with some firmness to adhere to the policy promulgated by the British government: a policy of recognizing Indian boundaries and providing legal machinery for the peaceful liquidation of those boundaries. Henry Knox, first Secretary of War under the Constitution and the first federal official in charge of Indian affairs, stated the position on June 15, 1789: "By having recourse to the several Indian treaties, made by the authority of Congress, since the conclusion of the war with Great Britain, it would appear that Congress were of the opinion, that the treaty of peace of 1783 absolutely invested them with the fee of all the Indian lands within the limits of the United States; that they had the right to assign, or retain such portions as they should judge proper.

"But it is manifest, from the representations of the confederated Indians at the Huron Village, in December 1786, that they entertained a different opinion, and that they were the only rightful proprietors of the soil; and it appears by the Resolve of the second of July 1788, that Congress so far conformed to the idea, as to appropriate a

sum of money solely to the purpose of extinguishing the Indian claims to lands they had ceded to the United States, and for obtaining regular conveyances of same. . . .

"The principle of the Indian rights to the lands they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and interest of the nation will be advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of justice towards the Indian tribes."¹⁴

A CHANGING WORLD

In the colonial period, it had been taken for granted that Indians would accept European ways and incorporate them into their own lives. They needed only the opportunity; and missionaries, educators, and statesmen labored mightily to make this opportunity clear and visible to the Indian people. Many strong souls, rapt in their vision of the beatitude of European institutions, accepted martyrdom at the hands of what seemed callous and unworthy savages (actually, men who valued life in their own way, who pursued quite different objectives) to bring Europe into the New World. As the colonial period closed, the mood changed. Possibly there were still as many men who believed Indians could be educated—that is, civilized—but their numbers were swallowed up in the waves of population that rolled westward after independence had been won. Moving westward, meant progress, growth, greatness.

A recent writer summarizes the changing situation: "The American solution [to the problem of the savage] was worked out as an element in an idea of progress, American progress. Cultures are good . . . as they allow for full realization of man's essential and absolute moral nature; and man realizes this nature as he progresses historically from a lesser to a greater good, from the sim-

ple to the complex, from savagism to civilization. . . . The Indian was the remnant of a savage past away from which civilized men had struggled to grow. To study him was to study the past. To civilize him was to triumph over the past. To kill him was to kill the past."¹⁵

Evidence for the manner in which these ideas came into American thinking will be found, for example, in the oration of John Quincy Adams before the Sons of the Pilgrims, December 12, 1802: "There are moralists who have questioned the right of the Europeans to intrude upon the possessions of the aborigines in any case and under any limitations whatsoever. But have they maturely considered the whole subject? The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greatest part of the country, upon a questionable foundation. Their cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever they had annexed to themselves by personal labor, was undoubtedly by the law of nature theirs. But what is the right of a huntsman to the forest of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey? Shall the liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man be monopolized by one of ten thousand for whom they were created? . . . Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a world? . . . No, generous philanthropist!"¹⁶

METHODS AND DEVICES

In the forty-odd years between the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Andrew Jackson's Second Annual Message, delivered December

¹⁵ Pearce, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 48-49.

¹⁶ Royce, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*), p. 536.

6th, 1830, the United States moved away from the potential which was inherent in colonial attitudes, of allowing the Indian people a chance to maintain their integrity as a people. Boundaries could be in the minds of a people; they might not hold the Appalachian watershed, but they could still hold to a system of values they understood. They did not ask to remain static, but to grow into new conditions, as they became ready, while retaining their dignity in their own eyes. From the latter date onward, it became a question of how soon, and by what devices, the extinguishment of the Indian past would be effected.

In its Indian provisions, the Northwest Ordinance read: "Article III. . . . The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them and for preserving peace and friendship with them."

Here, once again, was the promise of fair dealing which Europeans since Francisco de Vitoria had urged as policy, which the British actually adopted but could not enforce; and now the United States had accepted it, and in its turn would discover that it had not the means of carrying it into force. The reasons it could not carry it into force are the real subject matter of President Jackson's Second Annual Message, though he appears to talk about other considerations. He said: "Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by

one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. . . . But true Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers. What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than twelve million happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?"¹⁷

Some months previously (May 28, 1830), President Jackson had signed the Indian Removal Act, which placed in the hands of the President authority to remove all Indians west of the Mississippi River. The proposal had been under discussion and indeed had been hotly debated for several years. Passage of the measure was precipitated finally by actions taken by the state of Georgia.

The state had insisted since its establishment that the United States purchase the lands occupied by Indian tribes (Creeks and Cherokees) within her borders. Some purchases had been made, but the time came when these Indians refused to sell any more of their land, on the grounds that they needed it for their own existence. Georgia retaliated against the Cherokees by enacting legislation which extended her laws over the Cherokee nation. The Cherokees challenged the right of Georgia to assume such jurisdiction, and in two famous cases (*Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia* and *Worcester vs. Georgia*) tested the ability and the willingness of the United States to protect an Indian tribe in its efforts at self-determination.

¹⁷ James D. Richardson (Ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, Vol. 2 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 520-21.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

The Cherokees lost, not because their cause was wrong, but because of a defect in the American system of government. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Marshall writing the opinion, held that the State of Georgia had no authority to extend its law over the Cherokees and therefore its action was a nullity. Georgia chose not to recognize the opinion, and the President of the United States refused to be disturbed by Georgia's position.¹⁸

The Removal Act of 1830 was a discretionary act, authorizing the president (not directing him) to negotiate treaties with the eastern Indians, the treaties to provide the following: lands would be offered west of the Mississippi; payment would be made for lands and improvements relinquished in the east; title to the new lands would be guaranteed in perpetuity, or so long as the tribe should exist; the right of self-government would be respected. The removal was to be based on agreement, but when the Cherokees and the Seminoles attempted to exercise the choice of remaining, they were answered with the United States Army; forced removal followed.

After 1830, Indian tribes continued to be moved, some of them three or four times, like inanimate pieces on the checkerboard of the nation's destiny. A writer has observed: "For a time the scheme of moving the Indians to lands west of the Mississippi seemed to offer a practical solution to their problem. Jedidiah Morse believed that the Indians possessed the capacity for making progress in the arts of civilized life if only they were given government aid and an education. . . . However, in most of the arguments for the removal

of the Indian tribes . . . the emphasis was placed on the advantages to the white man which would result from the displacement of the noble savage, and the idea of progress was invoked . . . to give a rationalization of inevitable justice to the forced migration."¹⁹

The decision by Congress in 1871, in the form of a rider to an appropriation act, that "Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by trading," followed logically on the events that have been reviewed here. It was the recognition of a reality, that Indian friendship and support were no longer needed by the nation.

THE UNKINDEST CUT

It is fitting to close this brief review with mention of the General Allotment Act, also called the Dawes Act, of February 8, 1887. Here, again, was permissive legislation authorizing the President of the United States, in his discretion, to divide an Indian reservation into individual holdings, assign a parcel of land to each man, woman and child, and declare all remaining land surplus to the needs of the Indians. The "surplus" lands were then opened for homesteading and paid for at \$2.50 per acre, as and when the lands were taken up by homesteaders. By this and other devices contained in the Act, the Indians were relieved of some ninety million acres, or almost two-thirds of their land base, between the years 1887 and 1930. Without cost to itself, the federal government thus transferred large acreages from Indian to white ownership, even requiring the tribes to pay the costs of surveying and allotting. In every case

¹⁸ The events in Georgia are carefully detailed in U. B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1901, Vol. 2 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office).

¹⁹ Arthur A. Ekirch, *The Idea of Progress in America, 1815-1860* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 41.

where allotment was carried out, the Indian tribe objected; and in most cases the lands were covered by treaties in which the United States obligated itself to protect the tribe in its right of possession.

In the speeches in support of the bill while it was pending in Congress, are echoes of that sense of urgent mission which Europeans carried with them into the new world; which moved Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand to insist that the Indians be persuaded to dress up and to bathe less frequently, and led Robert Gray in 1609 to believe that the right education was all that was needed to make a European out of an Indian.

Now, in the 1880's, arguing for the legislation which would become the General Allotment Act, Senator Pendleton of Ohio declared: "They must either change their mode of life or they must die. We may regret it, we may wish it were otherwise, our sentiments of humanity may be shocked by the alterna-

tive, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that that is the alternative, and that these Indians must either change their modes of life or they will be exterminated. . . . In order that they may change their modes of life, we must change our policy. . . . We must stimulate within them to the very largest degree, the idea of home, of family, and of property. These are the very anchorages of civilization; the commencement of the dawning of these ideas in the mind is the commencement of the civilization of any race, and these Indians are no exception."²⁰

In the heat of such a discussion, it would not have occurred to any of the debaters to inquire of the Indians what ideas they had of home, of family, and of property. It would have been assumed, in any case, that the ideas, whatever they were, were without merit since they were Indian.

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 11 (Forty-sixth Congress, Third Session, 1881).

The Legal Aspects of Indian Affairs from 1887 to 1957

By THEODORE H. HAAS

Abstract: As the westward movement of the population proceeded, the demand for the Indians' land increased. Cultural assimilation became the slogan. "Americanized" Indians would be transformed from hunters and fishermen to farmers and cattlemen, communal ownership would yield to individual ownership, plenty of the tribal lands would be freed for white settlement. The culmination of this policy was the General Allotment Act of 1887. Another step toward integration was the Citizenship Act of 1924. The character and the effects of these policies are detailed by the author.—Ed.

HUNGER for Indian land and other resources has been the most important cause of many early conflicts between Indians and whites and federal and state governments.¹ Congress enacted the Indian Removal Act of 1830² under pressure from the states and with the active support of Andrew Jackson, the first President elected by popular vote and the first from the West. The removal policy was justified on the grounds that segregation would end the conflict between the races and that land would be provided for white settlement in the East. In exchange the Indians would be provided with land in the western territory where they would not be disturbed.

The land hunger was appeased but not satiated. As the settlement and development of the West gathered mo-

¹ "From the first discovery of America to the present time, one master passion common to all mankind, that of acquiring land, has driven, in ceaseless succession, the white man on the Indian." Statement by James Barbour, Secretary of War in 1826, to Chairman, House Committee on Indian Affairs (Nineteenth Congress, First Session (1825)), H. Doc. 102, p. 5.

² Act of May 28, 1830, 4 Stat. 411.

mentum in the 1880's, the remaining Indian lands were demanded. They consisted in 1887 of some 139,000,000 acres of land west of the Mississippi River, where virtually all Indian tribes under the Government's protection lived on some diminished areas called "reservations."³

As with the removal policy, ethical justification was soon found for the enactment of laws which would reduce the Indian land holdings and also achieve the new objective of the rapid assimilation of the Indian. A popular theme, the white man's burden to uplift native people, was given a theoretical base by interpretations of Darwin's view of the evolution of man and Spencer's of the evolution of society. Soon additional arguments would come from the advocacy of the submersion of the varied cultures of immigrants into an American way of life. To attain this conformity, it was, of course, necessary to destroy Indian cultures, which rested not only on different religions and lan-

³ Indian lands reached a peak of 150,000,000 acres in 1873. Oliver La Farge, *As Long as the Grass Shall Grow* (New York: Alliance Book Company, 1940), p. 30.

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guages, but also on tribal organizations with their indigenous systems of communal ownership of land. All that was necessary to assimilate and make self-supporting quickly the slightly more than a quarter of a million Indians was to transform them from hunters and fishermen into farmers and cattlemen. By dividing the tribal estate among the members, they could gain the benefits of private or individual property.⁴ Since the new way of life would not require the use of as much land as the savage economy did, unneeded or surplus land would be available for white purchase and occupancy.

THE DAWES ACT

The policy found its expression in the General Allotment Act of 1887,⁵ sometimes called the Dawes Act, which became the keystone of federal Indian policy until the 1920's.⁶ Its momentum was largely lost by 1922 as a result of two unsuccessful attempts to expedite the fragmentation and alienation of Indian lands.⁷ The first was a campaign launched in 1917 to force the fee patenting of allotments, a method which was declared illegal by the courts. The second was an attempt of the Secretary of the Interior to secure the enactment of the Bursum Pueblo Bill which would transfer the Pueblo land titles to white squatters, and of the Indian Omnibus

⁴ Thus the Indian like the successful homesteader would attain economic independence and the ideal of a family farm.

⁵ Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388. For the Act's background see Felix S. Cohen, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 206 ff.

⁶ Laurence F. Schmeckebier, *The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities and Organization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 78-90. Some tribes were excepted from the Dawes Act, but most of them were covered by similar special laws.

⁷ Joseph B. Gittler (Ed.), *Understanding Minority Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), pp. 42-43.

Bill of 1923, which would provide for the loss of all Indian property with a special status.

The Dawes Act authorized the individualization of the reservation lands to the tribal members whenever the President believed that the land might be utilized advantageously for agricultural and grazing purposes. The head of a family was to be allotted 80 acres of agricultural land or 160 acres of grazing land; and a single person over eighteen or an orphan child under eighteen, one-half of this amount. The United States retained title to the land until the expiration of a trust period of twenty-five years, or longer, if the President deemed an extension desirable. Then, the allottee was to secure a patent in fee; to be able to dispose of the land as he wished; and to be subject to the laws of the state or territory where he resided. The proceeds of the sale of surplus or land not needed for allotment were to be covered into the United States Treasury for the sole use of the tribe which had owned the land, and, together with interest at 3 per cent per annum, were to be subject to appropriation by Congress for the education and civilization of the membership.

Citizenship was granted to any Indian who had voluntarily taken up residence within the territorial limits of the United States apart from his tribe and adopted the habits of civilized life and to an allottee as soon as he received a paper, improperly called a patent, showing that at a future time he would secure a regular patent conveying the fee or full title.⁸ Among the various amendments which were subsequently made to the Dawes Act were the following: citizenship was deferred until the expiration of the trust period; provisions were made for the lease, sale, and condemnation of allot-

⁸ See *United States v. Rickert*, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); *Monson v. Simonson*, 231 U. S. 341, 345 (1913).

ments under administrative supervision; for the issuance by the Secretary of the Interior of a certificate of competency to an Indian which would permit him to dispose of trust or restricted property; and for the protection of allotted lands from any charge or encumbrance because of any debt of the allottee. Supplementary legislation provided for the apportionment of tribal funds among the members.

TAXATION

The General Allotment Act also had a marked effect on taxation. The original tribal land was exempt from state property taxation, and allotted land became subject to such tax when the patent in fee was granted. As in all other important questions of Indian law, much litigation has been necessary to interpret treaty and statutory provisions related to taxes. In 1956 a decision of the Supreme Court held that income derived from the sale by the federal government of standing timber on allotted lands was exempt from the federal capital-gains tax.⁹ Chief Justice Warren stated that the purpose of the allotment was to protect the Indians' interest and to prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body politic, and to this end it is necessary to preserve the trust land and income derived directly therefrom. The Chief Justice concluded that it would be unreasonable to infer that Congress intended by enacting the income tax law to destroy the tax exemption afforded by the General Allotment Act, since such action would be a sorry breach of faith with the Indians. The importance of this decision is demonstrated by the fact that there are more than 100,000 tracts of individually owned Indian land totaling about 13,000,000 acres held in trust by the government,

⁹ *Squire v. Capoeman*, 351 U. S. 1 (1956).

most of which were allotted under the 1887 statute.

The widespread belief that Indians pay no taxes is one of the many myths concerning Indians.¹⁰ The area of Indian tax exemption has been confined by legislation and litigation to a narrow range. With a few exceptions Indians are now subject to the same taxes as non-Indians. The most important exception is the exemption from real property taxes of Indian land, which is protected by an express exemption in a federal treaty or statute, or by the taking of legal title to the land in the United States, as in the case of allotted land.¹¹

The members of certain tribes, including the Five Civilized Tribes, which were excluded from the General Allotment Act, were granted title to much of their lands in fee simple, subject to a restriction on alienation without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. The purpose of keeping the land in a restricted status was the same as the retention in trust of lands divided under the General Allotment Act—the protection of the Indian from the loss or unwise use of his property. The sale or lease of these lands was also restricted. The Indians and the government officials concerned thought that these purchased tracts had the same status as Indian lands in which title remained in the federal government, and that tax exemption always accompanied restricted property, but the Supreme Court held the land and its income taxable because of the absence of an express tax exemption.¹²

One of the two references to Indians

¹⁰ The status of being an Indian does not create an immunity from the levy of the federal income tax. *Choteau v. Burnet*, 283 U. S. 691 (1931).

¹¹ Land subsequently purchased by the tribe which is not taken by the United States in trust is taxable.

¹² *Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States*, 319 U. S. 598 (1943).

in the Constitution has become obsolete. Article 1, section 2, requires the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from the decennial population count used in apportioning the number of representatives for a state. Beginning in 1940, the Census Bureau no longer follows its prior hoary custom, at least sixty years old, of computing by guesswork or divination the "Indians not taxed."

Allotment process

Reservations were allotted in Oklahoma, the Lake states, the Plains states, the Pacific Coast states, in fact in varying degrees almost all Indian reservations were allotted, except those in Alaska and most of those in the Southwest. Yet, despite its protective features the General Allotment Act did not fulfill the expectations of sponsors who considered the welfare of Indians. Indian men of many tribes, such as the Sioux, considered farming to be woman's work. The original acreage was usually insufficient for an economic unit, and fractionalization, due to division after the death of the allottee, usually to heirs intestate, added to the difficulty. As Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado, a former Secretary of the Interior (1882–85), its leading opponent, predicted, most allottees soon lost their lands at bargain prices. By 1933, 91,000,000 acres or two-thirds of the Indian land base of 1887, and generally the most productive, was lost and some 90,000 Indians were landless.¹³ In the words of the task force investigating Indians for the first "Hoover" Commission,¹⁴ "If the ninety million acres lost

¹³ "Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs," *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1933* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 68.

¹⁴ "Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government," Charles J. Rhodes, John R. Nichols, Gilbert Darlington, George A. Graham, Chairman, October 1948 (unpublished manuscript), pp. 15–16.

through the [allotment] process had remained in Indian ownership, the problem of poverty among most tribes could be solved with less difficulty and with more certainty today; and assimilation would take place at a satisfactory level with a minimum of public expense." The report also refers to

... the mistaken belief that the destruction of tribal organization and culture would bring about or at least hasten the acquisition of white "civilization." . . . People move from one base to another, and move slowly. The loss of an existing base before the new base has been consolidated means simply frustration and degeneration. The destruction of Indian tribal government, the liquidation of tribal organization and tribal property, and the hostility to all Indian ways and culture that characterized so much of Government policy now appear to have been a mistake which defeated rather than furthered the Government's ultimate objectives.

Effects of General Allotment Act

The significance of the General Allotment Act extends beyond its impact on Indian land. The law was passed over the strenuous objections of most Indians. Hence, it disregarded the principle of bilateralism or mutual agreement which had been followed in treaty making until 1871, and subsequently in the formulation of statutes. Moreover, prior laws had considered cultural differences among the numerous Indian groups, but the Dawes Act set an important precedent by imposing a uniform legal pattern for Indians generally.¹⁵ Following the new pattern of some provisions of a few prior treaties and statutes, the government henceforth bypassed to a large extent tribal organi-

¹⁵ In the 1880's a few other uniform laws of less importance were passed. While some important Indian groups, such as the Five Civilized Tribes, were excluded from the Dawes Act, most of them were soon subjected to somewhat similar laws.

zations and Indian leaders and dealt directly with individual Indians. To fill the vacuum caused by the law's weakening of the tribal governments, the authority of federal administrators over Indians was greatly expanded. This growth is evidenced by the multiplication of laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs. By 1949, Indian statutes exceeded 4,000, and by 1957 climbed toward 6,000 in number. Regulations and manual or letter instructions grew proportionately. Another effect of the law was graphically described by Theodore Roosevelt in his Presidential message to Congress of December 3, 1901. He characterized the law as "a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass" whereby "some sixty thousand Indians have already become citizens of the United States."¹⁶

CITIZENSHIP

While prior to the Citizenship Act of 1924,¹⁷ the Dawes Act was the most important method of acquiring citizenship, there are several other general or special statutes and treaties which naturalized Indians. Indian women marrying citizens became citizens by an 1888 law,¹⁸ and a few Indian veterans in World War I were granted citizenship under a 1919 law.¹⁹ Some 125,000 native-born Indians who had not become citizens previously were made citizens in 1924. Although the contrary view was once held, it is now well settled that citizenship does not affect the authority of the government over the Indian.²⁰

¹⁶ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 35, Part 1, p. 90 (Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, 1901).

¹⁷ Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253.

¹⁸ Sec. 2, Act of August 9, 1888, 25 Stat. 392.

¹⁹ Act of November 6, 1919, 41 Stat. 350.

²⁰ *United States v. Nice*, 241 U. S. 591, 598 (1916) which overruled *Matter of Heff*, 197 U. S. 488 (1905).

As a consequence of attaining national citizenship, the Indians automatically become citizens of the state where they reside. Yet, a 1938 survey by the Department of the Interior disclosed that seven states refused to let Indians vote. By 1947, largely through the efforts of the federal government, the attorneys general of several states, and the Indians themselves, all the states with large Indian populations conceded the right of Indians to suffrage on the same basis as non-Indians, except the states of Arizona and New Mexico. In 1948, as a result of judicial decisions, these states withdrew their prohibition on Indian voting.²¹ In 1950, the Indians of Maine were denied the franchise, but this problem was corrected by legislation. In the Presidential election of 1956, the Indians of Utah living on reservations were denied the franchise by a ruling of the state Attorney General. The problem as of this writing is pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.

REPEAL OF DISCRIMINATORY LAWS

The enactment of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 ended one discrimination against Indian groups, which originated almost a century earlier when the Act permitting the government to be sued on certain claims did not permit suits by Indian tribes.²² Unfair dealings in lands is the main source of such claims. Generally, judicial decisions have continued to strengthen early

²¹ *Harrison v. Laveen*, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948); *Trujillo v. Garley*, D. Ct. New Mexico (1948), unreported. The Department of Justice filed briefs as *amicus curiae* in these suits. United States attorneys are required to render certain legal services to Indians by the Act of March 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 612, 631, 25 U.S.C. 175.

²² For further discussion see "Indian Claims Commission Act" in this issue of *THE ANNALS* by Nancy Oestreich Lurie.

recognition of Indian land title by virtue of aboriginal occupancy.²³

It is now well established that individual Indians may sue and be sued, make contracts, and enjoy all the civil liberties guaranteed to their fellow citizens. There is one exception to this general principle; namely, for the protection of this dependent people, Congress can and has imposed limitations on their disposal of trust or restricted property. Administrative or Congressional approval is required for the alienation of such property or the expenditure of certain trust funds. Moreover, until fairly recently, many discriminatory federal laws hampered freedom of speech and sanctioned various measures of military and civil control within the reservation boundaries. Most of these laws were repealed by the Act of May 21, 1934.²⁴ The most important and one of the oldest such laws was the Indian liquor Law, the first prohibition law of our nation. Many terms popular in the prohibition era, such as "bootlegger" and "whisky runner," originated in the illegal trade with Indians. President Thomas Jefferson, acting in response to a verbal plea by the Indian Chief, Little Turtle, recommended this law to Congress in 1802, which forthwith authorized the President to regulate the selling and distribution of spirituous liquors among the Indian tribes.²⁵ Frequent amendments to this act broadened its scope and made its enforcement easier. The most important of these

²³ Felix S. Cohen, "Original Indian Title," *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 32 (December 1947), p. 28.

²⁴ 48 Stat. 787. An old law prohibiting the selling of firearms to Indians was repealed by the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590. In almost all respects and places discriminatory practices with respect to the granting of social security benefits have ended. One exception is the crippled children's program in Arizona.

²⁵ Act of March 3, 1802, section 21, 2 Stat. 139. Cohen, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 352.

measures was the Act of July 23, 1892, as amended in 1938, which prohibited the sale or gift of intoxicants to Indians and their introduction into Indian country.²⁶ In 1918, the possession of intoxicants in the Indian country was made a separate offense,²⁷ but a 1948 law allowed the introduction in Indian country of intoxicants for mechanical, scientific, and medicinal purposes.²⁸

The Supreme Court several times upheld the validity of the Indian liquor law as a measure to protect Indians under the power of Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.²⁹ In 1953, however, Indians were placed in the same status as non-Indians with respect to intoxicants when off the reservation, except in states which had an Indian liquor law, and the Indians were granted the right of local option with respect to their reservations.³⁰

STATE LAWS

Generally, an Indian while off the reservation is subject to state laws to the same extent as non-Indians. The United States, however, has plenary or full, though not absolute, authority over Indian affairs and has passed special laws, such as the Indian liquor law, applicable to Indians while off the reservation. Furthermore, state laws are not enforceable within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians unless and until the federal government

²⁶ 27 Stat. 260, as amended by Act of June 15, 1938, 52 Stat. 696.

²⁷ Act of May 25, 1918, 40 Stat. 561, 563.

²⁸ Act of June 25, 1948, section 1154, 62 Stat. 683, 758.

²⁹ *United States v. Sandoval*, 231 U. S. 28 (1913), and cases cited therein.

³⁰ Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 586. By June 30, 1956, thirty tribes had adopted resolutions for the purpose of legalizing intoxicants on the reservation. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs," *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1956* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 215.

consents thereto or unless the state law aids in effectuating federal law and policy.

Since 1887, there has been a steady increase in the areas to which the Congress has granted its consent to the application of state laws to Indians. The first field in which state laws have been applied generally to Indians is inheritance. The General Allotment Act provided that after patents are issued to lands allotted to Indians, the lands shall be inherited by the heirs of a deceased Indian according to the laws of the state or territory where the land is located. State law was applied to such inheritance until 1910 when the Secretary of the Interior was granted full power to determine heirs and partition allotments, to administer the estates of the allottees, and to sell heirship lands. In 1913, the law was amended to permit an Indian to dispose of trust property, real and personal, by will or contract, approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Hence, a will, if approved by the Secretary, need not conform to state law.

By Congressional statutes the states of New York, Kansas, and Iowa have acquired jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against Indians on Indian reservations. North Dakota acquired the same power over one reservation. In 1953, a law granted similar jurisdiction to California, Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Spring Reservation), Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation), and Wisconsin (except the Menominee Reservation) and authorized the various other states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over crimes and transactions involving Indians on Indian land whenever such states wished.³¹

The federal jurisdiction over ten major crimes committed by Indians against Indians on Indian reservations, further complicates the administration of criminal law. The punishment of seven ma-

ior crimes was assumed by the federal government two years after the Supreme Court held in *Ex Parte Crow Dog* that in the absence of federal legislation granting jurisdiction to the federal courts, they could not try and punish an Indian for the murder of another Indian on an Indian reservation. The tribal governments alone had this authority.³² Three other crimes were subsequently added to the original seven crimes.³³

State laws are very important for Indians in the criminal field. In 1898, the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act made offenses by non-Indians against Indians or their property, or vice versa, punishable by the federal courts in accordance with state laws then in effect. Two of the major crimes, rape and burglary, committed by an Indian against another Indian on an Indian reservation are defined and punished in accordance with state laws. Eight other major crimes are subject to the same laws and penalties as if the offense were committed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

FEDERAL-STATE CO-OPERATION

The federal government has authorized the enforcement of the following state laws on Indian reservations: (1) sanitary and quarantine laws, under rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior;³⁴ and (2) compulsory school laws, with tribal consent.³⁵ Federal laws have applied also a wide variety of state laws to particular tribes and areas. For example, Oklahoma has been authorized to tax oil and gas production from Indian lands and mineral pro-

³² 109 U. S. 556 (1883).

³³ Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 362, 385; amended by Act of March 4, 1909, sec. 328, 35 Stat. 1088, 1151; Act of June 28, 1932, 47 Stat. 336, 337.

³⁴ Act of February 15, 1929, 45 Stat. 1185.

³⁵ Act of August 9, 1946, 60 Stat. 962.

duction from the Five Civilized Tribal lands.³⁶

The most important law which provides for federal-state co-operation in Indian affairs is the so-called Johnson-O'Malley Act of April 16, 1934.³⁷ This law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts with states, territories and private institutions "... for the education, medical attention, agricultural assistance, and social welfare, including relief of distress of Indians in each State or Territory, through the qualified agencies of each State or Territory." With the increase of attendance of Indians at public schools, the federal grants have increased considerably. State contracts for extension and social welfare services are also becoming more important. The Indian Bureau is in the process of transferring its extension work to the states and the Department of Agriculture. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to which were transferred, effective July 1, 1955, the federal government's Indian health services including authority previously exercised by the Department of the Interior,³⁸ has made several contracts with states and universities for medical attention, including health education. A 1952 law, which authorizes the transfer, with tribal consent, of federal hospital patients to state and local Indian hospitals, illustrates the increasing importance of federal and state co-operation in the rendering of Indian health services.³⁹ Contracts with universities for various research projects have been made by the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare and of Interior.

The most significant research project on Indian affairs was made by a private organization. In 1926, the Department

of the Interior invited the Institute for Government Research to make a survey of the social and economic conditions of the Indians. The report of this study, which was published in 1928,⁴⁰ helped to inaugurate a new era in Indian administration. On December 4, 1929, President Herbert Hoover took steps to implement the report by stating in his first message to Congress that the government had an obligation to raise the standard of living of Indians, to provide adequately for their health and education, and to advance their opportunity for profitable employment. There soon followed a substantial increase in appropriations for the Indian Bureau.

INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT

Toward the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt Administration there was enacted the Indian Reorganization Act,⁴¹ the most comprehensive law relating to Indians since the General Allotment Act. The IRA, as it is sometimes called, laid the foundation for a new Indian policy and has been hailed as a landmark in social science "because it brought to Indian affairs and to the United States Government for the first time, an explicit use of social science principles."⁴² The IRA became operative through the majority vote by members of a tribe at a formal election.⁴³ It ended the al-

⁴⁰ Lewis Meriam and Associates, *Problem of Indian Administration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928).

⁴¹ Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, which with minor modifications was extended to Alaska by the Act of May 1, 1936, 49 Stat. 1250, and Oklahoma by the Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. 1967.

⁴² Clyde Kluckhohn and Robert Hackenberg, "Social Science Principles and the Indian Reorganization Act," *Indian Affairs and the Indian Reorganization Act: The Twenty Year Record*, edited by William H. Kelly (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1954), p. 35.

⁴³ 181 tribes accepted the act, 77 rejected it, and 14 came under it because of failure to vote. Alaskan and Oklahoma groups were covered into the act without a vote.

³¹ Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588.

³⁶ See Cohen, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), pp. 118-19.

³⁷ 48 Stat. 596.

³⁸ Act of August 5, 1954, 68 Stat. 674.

³⁹ Act of April 3, 1952, 66 Stat. 935.

lotting of tribal lands and the process of terminating trust periods or periods of restricted alienability, after a fixed period of years. It also placed severe limitations on the operation of allotment in other respects.⁴⁴ It recognized the inadequacy of the Indian land base, authorized the appropriation of \$2,000,000 a year for the purchase of lands for tribes, and generally limited the disposition of restricted land to Indian tribes and their members. It also empowered tribes incorporated under the Act to make consolidations of fractionated lands, with the owner's consent, and provided for the purchase and restoration of land to Indians.

During the ensuing ten years Indian land was increased from about fifty-two million acres to more than fifty-six million acres by governmental and tribal land purchases and by the restoration of land to Indians under the Act and by supplementary legislation.

Another important feature of the IRA is that it directed the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate conservation regulations to prevent the erosion, deforestation and overgrazing of Indian lands.

Since 1948, however, there has been a resumption of the prior downward trend, accelerated by the issuance of patents in fee under the Act of May 4, 1948,⁴⁵ which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell individual Indian lands, and by special enabling acts.

The Act of August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 539) greatly increased the term for which Indian-owned land may be leased.

The IRA sought to reinvigorate and stabilize the powers and organization of Indian tribes. It gave the official gov-

ernments standing by providing for the approval of constitutions and also of charters, if desired for business purposes. It vested also in tribes which adopted such constitutions the following new powers: approval or veto over the disposition of all tribal assets; the right to spend certain funds; to negotiate with the federal, state, and local governments; to employ legal counsel, only the choice of counsel and the fixing of fees being subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; and to see appropriation estimates for the tribe's benefit prior to their submission to the Budget Bureau and Congress. Some of these powers were subject to various degrees of supervision by the Secretary of the Interior.

The constitutions add to, but do not detract from, the powers of an Indian tribe. The laws, customs, and decisions of tribal government control large areas of civil and criminal law, including questions of tribal membership, property, taxation, the conservation, development and use of tribal resources, social welfare, domestic relations, health, housing, inheritance, and the form of tribal government. The courts have fairly consistently upheld the Indians' right to home rule. One of the most recent decisions in this field sustained the right of the Oglala Sioux Tribe to pass an ordinance taxing a non-Indian lessee of a grazing allotment and a criminal ordinance covering offenses by Indians against Indians and enforced by the tribal court.⁴⁶

Program

The IRA authorized the establishment of a revolving credit fund which has enabled thousands of Indians to become rehabilitated by providing the means for them to apply modern technology in the

⁴⁶ *Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation*, 231 F. 2d 89, 8th Cir. (1956).

use and development of their land and other resources. For the purpose of borrowing and lending money, many tribes adopted federal corporate business charters under the Act which enabled them to make contracts, to sue and be sued, and to relend to individual members.⁴⁷ Loans were also made to Indian credit associations and to individual Indians. While most loans have been made for agricultural, livestock, or fishing purposes, a variety of projects have been financed, including stores, salmon canneries, motels, and arts- and crafts-producing and selling organizations. In recent years, the number and amount of loans have decreased due in part to an increased availability of private credit.

The Act of March 29, 1956 (70 Stat. 62) authorized the execution of mortgages and deeds of trusts on individually owned trust or restricted land in order to stimulate an increase in such credit.

The IRA also authorized annual appropriations not exceeding \$250,000 for educational loans and directed the creation of an Indian civil service under which qualified Indians shall have the preference to appointment of vacancies in any position in the Indian Office.

The IRA encouraged cultural diversity, a part of the essence of democracy, in lieu of a pattern of Indian administration emphasizing undeviating conformity, the essence of the philosophy of communism. Each Indian group was able to administer its own assets, by leasing and conserving its land and spending some of its moneys, and to pass laws for local public services. As leases for oil, gas, uranium, and for other purposes have vastly increased the income of some tribes, several tribal councils have established revolving credit

funds with their own moneys and set up trust funds to provide college scholarships for their younger members. The total amount of tribal funds used for credit purposes now exceed the amount of federal funds so used.

Some of these functions have been performed in co-operation with federal, state, and local governments. The Indian civil and criminal laws have been influenced by federal and state laws; and their courts have granted bail, parole, probation, and suspended sentences and applied other features of modern laws. The Indians have gained experience in a transitional legal system between their unwritten laws and customs and the white man's more formalized system of justice. They have learned also of legislative and administrative procedures; written constitutions and laws; majority rule; budgets; accounting; public relations; and lobbying in the Congress, Indian Bureau, and Interior Department. They discovered too that despite differences in customs, histories, and organizations, many of the problems of one tribe are similar to those of other tribes, and that national, state, and local organizations are as necessary for Indians as for non-Indians. They gained some experience also in business organizations and methods by forming and dealing with corporations, co-operatives, and credit operations. They have been provided with stepping-stones toward more economic and governmental responsibilities through their own or other local governments.

The IRA demonstrated anew that local groups' activities help fulfill the individual's need for creativity and a feeling of worth, and that democratic methods offer the soundest way to bring people into the economic and political life of our nation of many diverse cultures and peoples. Some of the soundest ingredients of the IRA program have become a part of our foreign-aid pro-

⁴⁷ The benefits of the revolving credit fund have been extended to groups which did not adopt the IRA.

⁴⁴ Cohen, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 217.

⁴⁵ 62 Stat. 236. The General Services Administration in 1957 estimated that 53,100,000 acres of land was held in trust for Indians by the federal government. The Association on American Indian Affairs estimates that some 1,600,000 acres of Indian land have passed from Indian control in the last four years.

gram for underdeveloped areas. From Iran and Israel to India, Latin America, and the Philippines, former officials of the Indian Bureau are helping the people to achieve scientific and locally controlled programs. Exported technicians are thus working in some countries through IRA methods—not from the top down by bureaucratic coercion or paternalistic charity—but by a partnership with people, thus giving natives a sense of purpose, community co-operation, and human dignity.

A related law should be mentioned in passing—the Act of August 27, 1935,⁴⁸ which established an Indian Arts and Crafts Board composed of five Commissioners appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. The Board's main function is to promote the economic welfare of Indians through developing arts and crafts.

TERMINATION

It is well established that Congress has the authority to determine when the federal government shall terminate its special relationship with an Indian group⁴⁹ and when to extinguish Indian title to land.⁵⁰ A demand for expediting the termination process, which has often been linked with a demand for the liquidation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was especially strong in some periods of history such as the last decade of the nineteenth century and the years 1917–18 and 1922–24. Sometimes, the beneficiaries of federal services to Indians have been limited. For example, the Appropriation Act of May 25, 1918 and subsequent laws in general restricted attendance at federal schools to Indians of one-fourth or more Indian blood.⁵¹

⁴⁸ 49 Stat. 891; 25 United States Code, 1952 ed., sec. 305 ff.

⁴⁹ *Tiger v. Western Investment Co.*, 221 U. S. 286 (1911).

⁵⁰ *United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co.*, 314 U. S. 339, 347 (1941).

⁵¹ 40 Stat. 561, 564.

The most recent expression of this policy was the passage in 1953 of House Concurrent Resolution 108,⁵² which declared that federal supervision should be ended as speedily as possible for the Indians of five named states and seven specified tribes located elsewhere. Subsequently, termination laws were enacted for two of these tribes, the Menominees of Wisconsin⁵³ and the Klamaths of Oregon,⁵⁴ the mixed-blood members of the Ute Tribe of Utah,⁵⁵ and a few other groups.

Contrariwise, Congress provided additional help for some Indian tribes. By the Navaho-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950,⁵⁶ the appropriation of \$88,570,000 was authorized for a program to improve the educational and economic opportunities of these Indians, including relocation and resettlement, an activity which was subsequently extended to all Indians. While intensified or new functions may be assumed for tribes previously recognized, it is unlikely that new tribes will be recognized for the purposes of the federal government rendering services to them.⁵⁷

It is now apparent that since Indian groups differ widely in the degrees of their acculturation and educational, health, and economic conditions, it would be folly for the government to attempt to fit them into an identical pattern by a general law applicable to all Indian groups.

⁵² Eighty-third Congress, First Session

⁵³ Act of June 17, 1954, 68 Stat. 250; Act of July 14, 1956, 70 Stat. 544; Act of July 14, 1956, 70 Stat. 549.

⁵⁴ Act of August 13, 1954, 68 Stat. 718.

⁵⁵ Act of August 27, 1954, 68 Stat. 868.

⁵⁶ Act of April 19, 1950, 64 Stat. 44. Several rehabilitation bills for other groups failed to pass.

⁵⁷ Compare the limited recognition of the Lumbee Indians of North Carolina by the Act of June 7, 1956, 70 Stat. 254, with prior recognition for the Catawaba Indians of South Carolina by appropriations for federal services during a period exceeding the last decade.

The Demography of the American Indians

By J. NIXON HADLEY

Abstract: Various estimates of the size of the aboriginal Indian population of North America exist, but there is agreement on a figure of less than a million and perhaps less than 750,000. By 1850, disease, dissipation, starvation, massacre, and maladaptation had reduced the population to a quarter million. This figure remained until 1900, but has since risen to about 400,000. Now the Indian net natural increase is higher than that for the total population of the country. The Indian population has a much higher proportion of persons under 25 years of age, which with other factors suggests that by 1975 there will be over 700,000 Indians in our country.—Ed.

A DISCUSSION of the demography of the American Indians is handicapped by the difficulties in defining who is an American Indian. To a certain extent this is a problem with any group of racially mixed ancestry and varying degrees of acculturation. The legal recognition of the American Indian as a group with special rights deriving from their aboriginal status, without the development of an over-all legal definition, makes for additional complications. Some analysis of the different totals involved under the varying definitions now used is given later, while a more detailed consideration of the problems involved in such variations has been treated elsewhere.¹ Throughout this chapter the term "Indian" unless otherwise specified will include all persons normally considering themselves a part of the Indian community, including both members of tribes not federally recognized and some persons not included in Census tallies.

¹ J. Nixon Hadley, "Problems in Determining the Indian Population of the United States," Paper presented at the Third Inter-American Indian Conference (La Paz, Bolivia, 1954).

ABORIGINAL POPULATION

The most widely quoted estimate of the aboriginal population of the United States is Mooney's figure of 849,000.² The figure is generally considered high, but except for Kroeber's lower estimate for California,³ no specific corrections have been proposed. Mooney's estimate is actually based on populations at the time of first contact with Europeans, so that data for various areas are not of the same time, but of dates varying from 1600 in New England to 1845 in the area of the upper Columbia and Snake Rivers. It is assumed that pre-Columbian population was about the same as at this period of first contact with Europeans; however, this is an unverifiable hypothesis. Certainly, the aboriginal population was less than one million

² James Mooney, "The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico," *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections*, Vol. 80, No. 7 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1928).

³ A. L. Kroeber, "Native American Population," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January-March 1934), pp. 1–25.

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people and may well have been less than 750,000.

Distribution

Using Mooney's figures except in California, Kroeber has made fairly detailed analyses of the density of the aboriginal population;⁴ the greatest concentrations of Indians were located along the Pacific Coast. He finds the area of the lower Columbia to have supported a population of 63.7 persons per 100 sq. km. and California to have had an average of 43.3. No other major geographical areas were so densely settled, although the Pueblo area is listed at 75.7 persons per sq. km., but the Apache-Navaho country surrounding them included only 2.3 persons. Other hunting areas had similar low densities: the Great Basin 2.5 and the northern Plains 2.6 persons. In the eastern United States densities were somewhat higher: the Southeast had 14.7 persons, and the Middle Atlantic 25.6 persons per sq. km.

HISTORY

The concept of the American Indian as a dying race was generally correct until the beginning of this century. By 1800 the aboriginal population, originally estimated by Kroeber at 720,000, was down to about 600,000.⁵ Fifty years later it was about 250,000.

The major causes of the decline are listed by Mooney⁶ as diseases, whiskey and attendant dissipation, removals,

⁴ *Idem*, *Cultural and Natural Areas of North America*, "University of California Publications in American Archeology and Ethnology," Vol. 38 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939).

⁵ "In Fifty Years There May Be as Many Indians as Before the White Man's Arrival," *Indians at Work*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Bureau of Indian Affairs [Washington, 1943]), pp. 25-28.

⁶ James Mooney, "Population," *Handbook of the American Indian*, Vol. 2 (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 30 [Washington, 1910]), p. 286.

starvation, and the adverse effects of unaccustomed conditions. Effects of war were minor and subsidiary to all of these.

The two major diseases affecting Indian population trends have been smallpox and tuberculosis, of which smallpox has the more dramatic historical record. For example, Schoolcraft⁷ reports that in the smallpox epidemic of 1837 the Mandan were reduced in numbers from 1,600 to 31, the Assiniboin lost whole villages, the Crow one-third of their population, while the total deaths among Plains tribes amounted to not less than 10,000 persons in a few weeks. Similar outbreaks are reported as early as 1633 for the Narraganset and as late as 1870-71 for the Assiniboin and Blackfeet.⁸ Tuberculosis has not exhibited such dramatic intensities but probably was of equal importance. Unlike smallpox, it still remains one of the major causes of death among Indians.

Other factors listed by Mooney can also be illustrated from the records. The virtual extinction of the Delawares is ascribed⁹ to their use of spirituous liquors and general dissipation. The reduction of the Indian population of California from a quarter of a million to 20,000 is chiefly ascribed to wholesale massacres perpetrated by miners and early settlers.¹⁰ The removal of the Cherokees to Oklahoma caused the death of one-fourth of the entire tribe.¹¹

For the period 1850-1900 the Indian population remained in the vicinity of 250,000. Shortly after the turn of the

⁷ Henry R. Schoolcraft, *Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, and Company, 1851).

⁸ Mooney, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Mooney, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*).

¹¹ John R. Swanton, *The Indian Tribes of North America* (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 145 [Washington, 1952]).

century it began to rise. A number of factors were involved: the amelioration of Indian health conditions had begun; the period of first settlement on reservations and the major problems of first adjustment were over; the Indian wars were over. The result of all such factors was that the Indian population increased from about 250,000 in 1900 to a current total somewhere above 400,000.

CURRENT POPULATION

As was stated earlier, the major problem in arriving at the total number of Indians is to determine who is to be included. There are three federal agencies involved in Indian demographic statistics—the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of the Census, and the Public Health Service. The inclusion of persons under the category "Indian" varies with the particular interest of these agencies.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs has the primary responsibility for the Indian problem as it affects the executive branch of the federal government. Its population statistics go back in a fragmentary form into the early 1800's when the Bureau was in the War Department. These early figures are usually estimates rather than actual counts. At all times the figures include only those persons entitled to services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, that is, members of those tribes having treaty relations with the federal government.

Inclusion of those persons entitled to services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs results in occasional changes, mirroring shifts in policy. A résumé of the history of population statistics of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma illustrates this. Early population reports on this group normally included intermarried whites who had been formally adopted as members of the tribes. During the Reconstruction period ex-slaves

of tribal members given membership rights by Act of Congress were also added to the rolls and population count. Other additions were made during the preparation of final rolls used in distributing tribal land resources. Any person who could establish descent from a member of one of the Five Tribes was eligible for enrollment without stipulation as to minimum degree of Indian blood or place of birth. As a result, the final rolls as established in 1906 included a large number of persons of minimal Indian ancestry and some of no Indian ancestry. Each enrollee received an allotment from tribal lands, although those of half or more Indian blood were given restricted titles and remained in a wardship status. Since this was a final roll, the number of enrollees was used for the next twenty years by the Indian Bureau as the total population. However, no adjustment was made for births or deaths nor for the fact that allottees of less than one-fourth Indian blood were receiving no services from the Bureau. In 1930 an adjustment was made to arrive at an estimated total number of living persons of one-fourth or more Indian blood, and all subsequent figures have followed the same pattern. This history of the Five Tribes census is an extreme example, but not unique.

Indian Bureau counts

Indian Bureau counts have varied from time to time and from tribe to tribe to correspond with changes in definitions. Specific rolls made up for distribution of assets in land or money represent the most scrupulous efforts of bonded disbursing officers to attain accuracy, but comparison of any two such rolls must wait on an assurance that they were prepared in accordance with the same definitions. Under such circumstances, the Bureau currently lays little emphasis on routine reporting of

the total population under the Bureau's jurisdiction, although such reports were prepared on requests from Congress in 1950 and 1952. In theory there should be a listing of persons meeting standard requirements for special community services through Bureau channels, such as education or general welfare assistance. These requirements are tribal enrollment, residence on tax-exempt land, and possession of one-fourth or more Indian blood. However, to maintain such a listing on a current basis requires more clerical time than is usually available in an Indian agency; and on most reservations, the community is small enough and stable enough that the facts are routinely known for any applicant without need for verification by a specially prepared list of eligibles.

Bureau of the Census counts

The Bureau of the Census is interested in Indians as one of the minor races to be reported at decennial intervals. Previous to 1890 it did not include reservation Indians in its totals. From 1890 on, Census totals should include more than those reported by the Bureau of Indian Affairs since they purport to list any "person of mixed white and Indian blood . . . , if enrolled in an Indian agency or reservation roll, or if not so enrolled, if the proportion of Indian blood is one-fourth or more, or if the person is regarded as an Indian in the community where he lives." In practice, the enumerator usually determines race by inspection without asking a specific question, and many quarter-bloods, or enrollees of still lesser blood quantum, are not so recognized. This is particularly true in nonreservation areas. As a result, Census Bureau counts including Indians not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs have been lower in each Census from 1900 to 1950 than the Indian Bu-

reau's count of the same year of Indians under its jurisdiction.

A more detailed inspection of Census Bureau statistics on Indians shows a discrepancy from one decennial census to the next. Indian populations reported for 1900, 1920, and 1940 are apparently of a lower order than those for 1910 and 1930. For the latter two Censuses a special census was taken of all Indians, with the result that persons were included in the Indian total who presumably were not so counted on the intervening censuses. The 1950 Census is a special case. In terms of past patterns this should have been another special coverage of all Indians, but instead the special Indian schedule was employed only for residents of major reservations, the areas where the enumerator was least likely to miss enrollees of minor blood-quantums from his total. At the same time it was administratively determined that certain persons of mixed racial origin who had been included in the Indian count in previous censuses would be arbitrarily transferred to a residual category "all other nonwhites"; this transferral cancels out about three-fourths of the net increase which would otherwise have been reported between 1940 and 1950.

Public Health Service

The Public Health Service has a dual interest in Indian demography: the specific administrative concern of its Division of Indian Health and a more general concern of the National Office of Vital Statistics for one of the racial components of the United States. In the administration of the Indian health program the needs of the Public Health Service parallel those of the Bureau of Indian Affairs—the Public Health Service is dependent on Bureau records for determination of such basic facts of eligibility as tribal membership and

TABLE 1—COUNTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION, 1950

SOURCE	TOTAL NO. OF INDIANS	NO. OF INDIANS ON B.I.A. ROLLS	NO. OF INDIANS NOT ON B.I.A. ROLLS
Census.....	345,000	330,000	15,000
Self-identification.....	75,000	45,000	30,000
Others.....	25,000	25,000	—
Totals.....	445,000	400,000	45,000

place of residence. In an effective way, this interest is limited to the service area of the Public Health Service's Indian health facilities. Recognition is given, however, to the possibility of return to the service area of tribal members living in other parts of the country.

In the field of vital statistics the interest is broader. Reports on births and deaths include all persons who normally report themselves as Indians. This includes members of tribes not under federal jurisdiction and persons from the mixed-blood groups excluded from the 1950 Census tally, but does not include all enrolled tribal members with minor amounts of Indian blood.

Distribution

No exact determination can be made of the number of persons in each of the categories indicated above, but some broad indications of 1950 distributions are possible.

The 1950 Census reported approximately 345,000 Indians, at least 15,000 of whom can be identified from their place of residence as members of tribes not under federal jurisdiction. An additional 75,000 persons would normally report themselves as Indians on such documents as birth and death certificates, including about 30,000 of the mixed-blood groups excluded from the 1950 Census. Most of the remaining 45,000 are enrollees in federally recognized tribes. In addition, there are at least 25,000 more persons entitled to legal recognition as members of tribes

with federal treaties who do not usually report themselves as Indians.

Most of these latter estimates are minimal. The mixed-blood groups excluded from the 1950 Census are counted in terms of Beale's report¹² that 32,856 such persons were listed as Indians in the original schedules for 1950 before editorial revision. The standard authority for these groups¹³ gave an estimate of 75,000 to 100,000 persons in 1930. The estimate of 25,000 enrollees in federal tribes not usually reporting themselves as Indians is based on the incomplete reports readily available to the Indian Bureau. Inclusion of all descendants of persons on the final rolls of the Five Tribes would greatly increase this.

Under any of the varying definitions, the states with the greatest number of Indians are Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico (see Figure 1). They have held this rank for over forty years. During the period 1910–50 the Indian population of Oklahoma has decreased, according to the Census Bureau, from about 75,000 to about 54,000. During the same period the Indian populations of Arizona and New Mexico have in-

¹² Calvin L. Beale, "The Enumeration of Mixed-Blood Racial Groups of the Eastern United States in the Census of 1950," Paper presented to the Population Association of America (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1953).

¹³ William H. Gilbert, "Surviving Indian Groups of the Eastern United States," *Smithsonian Institution Annual Report, 1948* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 407–38.




FIG. 1. INDIAN POPULATION OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1950
Each figure represents 1,000 Indians (U. S. Census data adjusted for underenumeration)

creased from 29,000 to 66,000 and from 21,000 to 42,000 respectively. These increases are primarily increases in Navaho population. For reservation areas other than the Navaho in Arizona and New Mexico as well as other states, little increase is noted in resident population, and in some areas, as in Oklahoma, there are decreases. The increasing Indian population has been accommodated away from the reservation. During the decade 1940-50 the total Indian population increased by about 20 per cent, from about 360,000 to 420,000 (Division of Indian Health figures). The twenty-four states without federal reservations had an increase in Indian population of nearly 90 per cent. The greatest proportionate increases in the decade were in Virginia, Ohio, Alabama, and New Jersey.

Characteristics of the population

The Indian population is a young population. Half of the Indians are less than 20 years of age in contrast to the total population where only one-third of the people are under twenty.¹⁴ This age distribution reflects a high birth rate—32.1 per 1,000 population during the period 1949-53 inclusive compared with 24.5 for the total population in 1951—however this high birth rate is offset by a high death rate in childhood and early maturity. The result is a distribution differing markedly from the United States average; Indians have higher proportions at all age groups under 25 and lower proportions than the United States average at ages above 25. The deficiencies over age 25 are more marked among females than males.

Data on the amount of racial admixture in 1950 are available only for residents of major Indian reservations, excluding those in Oklahoma. Fairly de-

tailed discussions of this material have been presented elsewhere.^{15, 16} Tribes reporting the smallest proportions of mixed bloods were the Navaho, Pima-Papago, and most of the Pueblos. At the other extreme, the greatest proportion of persons listed as less than one-fourth Indian were found at the White Earth and Flathead Reservations, each having about 25 per cent in this category. No direct comparisons can be made with data for 1910 or 1930, when all Indians were included in the count, although it appears that while the proportion of mixed-bloods is increasing in each tribe, the large increase in full-blood Navahos may reverse this trend for the total Indian population.

FUTURE TRENDS

During the period 1900 to 1950 the Indian population increased by about 70 per cent, while the total population of the United States increased by about 100 per cent during the same period. The difference is partially accountable for by immigration, which has markedly increased the total population, but had little effect on the Indian population. At present the net natural increase for Indians is considerably higher than for the total population. For the period 1951-53 the Indian rate is given¹⁷ as 22 per 1,000 population, without correction for underregistration of births, compared with a United States rate in 1951 of 15 per 1,000. Correction of the Indian rate would undoubtedly be less than the 15 per cent of birth certificates not matched in the 1950 Birth Registration Test,¹⁸ but would still be an ap-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ "Indian Population of Continental United States, 1950" (Vital Statistics Section, Branch of Health, Bureau of Indian Affairs [Washington, D. C., 1954]).

¹⁷ *Op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*).

¹⁸ Sam Shapiro and Joseph Schachter, "Birth Registration Completeness in the United States

¹⁴ *Health Services for the American Indian* (Washington: United States Public Health Service, 1957).

preciable amount, increasing the difference with the national average.

It may be reasonably assumed that current preventive health and medical care programs will reduce the present excessive Indian death rates in the lower age groups. While this will have the immediate effect of lowering the death rate at all ages, the increasing proportion of persons in the older age groups will presumably tend to level the crude death rate and, over a longer time span,

and Geographic Areas, 1950," *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Washington: U. S. Public Health Service, 1954).

to decrease the birth rate. The most recent estimate of Indian population trends¹⁰ has given consideration to such factors and made the rather conservative assumption that a net rate of increase of 23 per 1,000 population in 1955 would gradually decrease to 20 per 1,000 by 1974, which would give an Indian population of about 720,000 in 1975. This constitutes an increase of over 50 per cent for the next twenty years for the Indians compared with an increase of less than 40 per cent for the general population of the United States.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*).

The Role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Since 1933

By WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN, JR.

Abstract: A new and dynamic administration took charge of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1933. In 1934 the Indian Reorganization Act was passed. The Act survived all attacks and remained the foundation of the policy of the Bureau at least until 1950. The sale of Indian land was halted, a loan fund created, a movement away from reservation schools to public schools started, and so forth. After 1950, policies have been followed which aim at a special social integration of the Indian and the termination of federal control or supervision as quickly as possible; but there are signs that Congress is giving a second look at these policies, which in many instances have proved detrimental rather than helpful.—Ed.

HAROLD L. Ickes became Secretary of the Interior and John Collier Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the new administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The new administration sounded a fresh note. The Commissioner was confronted, so he said, by a situation which was one of continuing drift of Indian physical assets and Indian life. This was due to no malice on the part of the government, but to a policy which took for granted the extinction of the Indian. Policies of a rigid institutionalized Bureau resulted in the alienation of Indian land, disintegration of Indian tribal and cultural life, and economic decline of Indians as groups and as individuals.

Even after twenty-four years it is still easy to relive the first months of the new administration. There were endless meetings, inside and outside of working hours. In the evenings we sometimes met at Collier's apartment, which was so sparsely furnished that some would sit on the floor. On a bright Sunday morning the meeting might be on a grassy point in Potomac Park. There was zest and fun in those

meetings, but also always a sense of urgency, of fighting time, of doing things now, before it should be too late; but there was always a feeling of accomplishment.

Very soon a new voice was strongly heard in Indian meetings. Felix Cohen did not come to Washington to make himself the foremost student and exponent of Indian law; he became that almost by accident. Yet he was soon heard not only on legal problems, as in drafting the original Wheeler-Howard bill, but also on the countless issues which involved both law and policy. Day after day, month after month, his thoughts and his voice kept the bureaucrats in line. Never were they allowed to lose sight of the ultimate objectives.

Another powerful stimulus was Harold Ickes. In those first months before the tentacles of bureaucracy took hold, it was almost a daily routine for Mr. Collier and the Assistant Commissioner, each morning before nine, to dash up two flights of stairs to the Secretary's office and tell him quickly about the newest problems or get an answer to a

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vexing question. By the time Mr. Ickes became adequately insulated, the new bureaucrats, too, knew more about protocol and procedure; but they lost the fresh, friendly, informality.

What were the innovations or the reversals of policies and conditions for which the Collier administration deserves credit? As Mr. Collier saw them at the end of his first four years, they were five:

(1) The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, with its Alaska and Oklahoma supplements of 1936.

(2) The attack on problems of physical conservation: of land, soil, water, and vegetation.

(3) An over-all endeavor to cause Indians to go to work.

(4) Stoppage of Indian land losses and restoration of some of the lands which had been lost. Also, the development of a credit system based on the principles of a credit union which would make possible the full utilization of all Indian lands.

(5) A shift in educational goals from white-collar to agrarian ideals, from routine grammar school to community school ideals, from a ban on native Indian culture to its encouragement and utilization. At the same time a new emphasis was put on technical and professional training.

WHEELER-HOWARD BILL

The original Wheeler-Howard bill was undoubtedly the most comprehensive single Indian bill ever introduced in Congress. Even so, it was only one of a number of acts to place a new foundation under the American Indians. The Johnson-O'Malley Act of 1934, the Indian Arts and Crafts Board of the same year, the extension of the Reorganization Act to Alaska and Oklahoma in 1936, and finally the Indian Claims Commission Act, which was not passed until 1946, were all in the new program.

While the Wheeler-Howard bill in particular expressed the philosophy of the administration, it was clear from the outset that many people, including many Indians, opposed it. In an effort to bring understanding to the Indians, a series of regional meetings was held at which the Commissioner and members of his staff explained the provisions of the bill, first in large public sessions and then in small discussion groups. Indians and their tribal attorneys laboriously studied the complicated proposals. After the bill became a law, the Indians again had to consider it, for the law provided that it should not apply to any reservation unless the Indians voted to accept it. The whole history of the legislation is another example of what John Collier has called the "bi-lateral, mutually consenting, contractual nature" of the government-Indian relationship.

To this relationship, the Eisenhower administration, by its adherence to "consultation" and its denial of the right of consent, has been oblivious. Recently Commissioner Emmons, in a statement to the Indian delegates at one of the regional meetings which he has been holding, advanced an extraordinary argument against this mutuality—namely, that consent is "insidious" and too costly. After stating the three essentials of consultation and after commending the Indians for sending as delegates such "fine men capable of leadership," Mr. Emmons went on:

I don't think the Indian people have a more sympathetic champion than I to your problems. Of course, we have to sift a lot of suggestions that are made as a number of them are not in good faith. Sometimes it can be a very insidious proposal that looks beautiful, but when you analyze it, it is the worst thing for the Indian people. I refer to the word 'consent.' . . . That word consent—I wonder if you know what that would involve. In any action taken regard-

ing Indian affairs, the council of the Indian people would be required to be there every time. Can you see what that would involve? You can see, too, the amount of money that would involve. The U. S. Government can't afford to pay that, and I doubt if the tribes in America could afford to pay this every week.

Although Mr. Emmons' remarks are here taken out of the 1956 context, they could have been said as appropriately in 1934; and they illustrate one of the basic disagreements between Indians and administrators—the difference between letting the Indians make decisions and having the bureaucrats, no matter how sympathetic they may be, decide what is best for the Indians.

INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT

As an administrative vehicle, the Indian Reorganization Act was calculated to confirm in the tribes certain rights to decide and to act; it was also designed to restrain or curtail the Bureau's authority. When the constitutions and charters were drafted, still too many tribal actions were made subject to Departmental approval. On the other hand, most of the charters contained provisions for the termination of the various Secretarial authorities after a term of years and after a vote by the tribe. This was still another example of the right of the Indians not merely to advise and consult, but themselves to decide.

When the Indian Reorganization Act was finally approved it was very different from the original bill. Unfortunately there was still much confusion. Many Indians thought that they were voting on the original bill. Some tribes were influenced by their superintendents and other agency employees who saw threats to their security. Others voted against it either because they were distrustful, having in mind a long series of unsatisfactory dealings with the govern-

ment, or because they saw no quick way in which the Act would help them.

Almost immediately after the Act became law agitation began for its repeal. Yet the Act survived all attacks, and until 1950 it was certainly the foundation of policies formulated by the Bureau and the Department. At the risk of making a sweeping generalization to which everybody can take exception, I should conclude that the policy was beneficial to the Indians. Certain results can be documented. The sale of Indian land was halted, at least temporarily. Substantial additions to the Indian land base were made as the result of outright purchases, exchanges, and restoration of ceded lands. Other sources of money, notably appropriations to the Emergency Relief Administration and its successors, were tapped for the purchase of "submarginal lands"—mostly lands which had been farmed and ought to be restored to grass. Also carrying out the IRA policy of adding to the Indians' land, the Congress in four years added 1,200,000 acres by legislation.

One of the urgent needs of the Indians was capital and credit. The loan fund created by the Act and subsequently enlarged by the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act was fully as important as the land fund. An outsider's appraisal of this activity in 1952 summarizes its success: "From June 30, 1936, to June 30, 1952, all types of loans by the Bureau totaled \$30,911,060, of which \$22,797,722 has been repaid, and \$91,268 has been charged off. Thus from 1936 to 1952, losses due to charge off amounted to 0.22 per cent. This is an excellent record when operational difficulties, types of loans, and quality of credit bases are considered."¹

¹ W. A. Schoenfeld, "A General Review of Credit Policies and Procedures of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," A Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (January 3, 1953).

More land and more credit soon meant more extension work, more cattle, and more Indians farming. The control of grazing which had begun in the Rhoads administration was made more effective. For the first time a mass attack was made on soil wastage and bad land use. When the Soil Erosion Service, later Soil Conservation Service, was established in the Department of the Interior its first major operations were on Navaho and other Indian lands.

Conservation of forest resources began in 1911; it received new support from the language of the IRA directing "the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained yield management." In this field of resource conservation, great service was rendered by the Civilian Conservation Corps with its separate Indian unit and by the Public Works Administration. Public works money also made possible a rapid improvement in the medical and educational plants. Some twenty hospitals were repaired or enlarged and at least nine new ones were built.

In education the shift from boarding schools to public or federal day schools followed the recommendations of the Meriam report. The first state contracts for Indian education in public schools were with California and Washington for the fiscal year 1935. Contracts with Minnesota came a year later. New buildings and a new curriculum also appeared. Emphasis was placed on vocational training and on arts and crafts as a factor in Indian life and economy. The Arts and Crafts Board, working closely with the Education staff, labored to raise standards, to increase production and improve marketing; it also started many new enterprises. In the Eisenhower administration many of these programs have been shut down or abandoned, and Bureau

support and guidance have been withdrawn.

In March 1944, in presenting his last budget to the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Commissioner Collier, responding in effect to an attack on him by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Partial Report 310), made what turned out to be a valedictory:

... We have tried to energize the individual Indian and the group, and to equip individual and group with knowledge and skills to enable them to go into the white world successfully if they want to or to hold their own and make their way where they are if they want to. That is the meaning of the Indian Reorganization Act and of all other major things we have been working at. . . . In brief, we have quit thinking about assimilation and segregation as opposite poles and as matters of "all or nothing." They are over-simplifications of thinking which do not connect themselves with the dynamic realities. Indians are more themselves than they have been for a long time, and they certainly are more assimilated than they ever were.

APPROPRIATIONS

In a different key, Mr. Collier made reference to the decline in appropriations for the Indian Bureau. The total for 1944, including both federal and tribal funds, was \$28,843,902 compared to \$30,445,092 for 1932. It was apparent in 1941 that the forward momentum of the Collier regime was slowing down. This was due to many causes. There was antagonism between the Commissioner and some members of the Congress. Most important, however, was the war, which compelled a reappraisal of policies involving expenditures and exiled the Indian Bureau to Chicago for five years. Although Mr. Collier remained in Washington, with a small liaison staff, administration became more difficult. There was the further loss in dealing with Congress. Staff members when they came to Wash-

ington were usually busy with advance appointments or with committee hearings. Certainly there was less Congressional understanding and interest as the war went on. One of the casualties of this period was the placement or employment unit. Congress said that every able-bodied Indian could now find a job and eliminated the appropriation.

When the next appropriation hearings were held a year later, Mr. Collier had been succeeded by William A. Brophy, Collier's own choice to succeed himself. Unfortunately, ill health kept Mr. Brophy away on leave through much of his tenure, which ended in June, 1948. Then came John R. Nichols who remained less than two years. It is no disrespect to these men to say that they did not significantly change the course of Indian affairs. Each made some changes in organization and personnel, but they were not in office long enough to alter policies materially.

NEW DIRECTION UNDER MYER

With the accession of Dillon S. Myer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in May 1950, the Bureau began a new epoch. Mr. Myer was not informed about Indians, but he had experience with the Japanese as Director of the War Relocation Authority. He had his own ideas about the administration of the Bureau. There was never a question of Mr. Myer's integrity and ability as an administrator. He was responsible for a general "tightening up" in administration.

According to the Commissioner, his first year saw "a great change in the basic organization of the Bureau." The result of this change was a further delegation of authority to area directors and an increase in their authority over superintendents. Superintendents have become the servants or errand boys of

the area directors, for they have no control over funds or personnel.

New emphasis was placed on plans and programs. In particular, first steps were taken to start the Navaho rehabilitation program, which the Congress had approved before Mr. Myer became Commissioner. Other rehabilitation programs, such as the Papago, on which the tribal council had worked for several years, were not pushed. In connection with the Navaho education program, perhaps for the first time there appeared a flat statement by a Commissioner of Indian Affairs that "the Federal off-reservation education of Navahos is directed entirely toward the preparation of these children for permanent off-reservation employment." It is noteworthy that the utilization of the largest of the off-reservation schools, Intermountain School at Brigham City, Utah, was preceded by approval of the Navaho Tribal Council.

In the field of resources Commissioner Myer's own appraisal of his program read as follows:

Development of the latent physical resources of the Indians throughout the Country is being hastened. Indian land is being brought under irrigation to protect their water rights, as well as to increase yields and convert large blocks of grazing land into productive crops. They are being provided with increased economic opportunities through industrial and agricultural development of their resources and adequate training programs to fit them for employment in skilled occupations off the reservations. There is opportunity for a wide expansion of cattle herds, establishment of small businesses, initiation of sawmill enterprises to market Indian timber, and many other methods of increasing Indian income.

Mr. Myer also made one comment which deserves quotation here: "The Indians have demonstrated the progress they can make when financing and

technical and supervisory assistance are made available to them."

Under Commissioner Myer came a change in credit policy, which was extended under Mr. Emmons. Intensive efforts were made, Mr. Myer reported in 1952, in his last annual report, to obtain loans for Indians from banks and other types of credit institutions rather than from the Bureau. As a part of this new policy, the Bureau issued regulations permitting Indians to mortgage trust or restricted land, thus reversing both policy and legal opinion which had prevailed since allotment began.

Several years later, some insurance companies expressed doubt as to the legality of this regulation. The Bureau then supported legislation to validate mortgages already made and leave no doubt as to future transactions. If the Bureau follows the same easy policy on mortgages that it has followed recently on land sales and patents in fee, the mortgage will become just one more easy road to land alienation.

TERMINATION

The Bureau was also giving much attention to termination or withdrawal. Bills for the Indians of California and of western Oregon were presented to Congress, but were not enacted. Discussions were carried on about Klamath, Menominee, Osage, and other tribes. As to the Klamath and Menominee, Commissioner Myer's summary may stand as a model of understatement:

Although both tribes indicated some initial reluctance to contemplate the prospect of Bureau withdrawal, a number of consultations were held with them during the fiscal year and efforts were being continued to elicit their active cooperation in the development of constructive programs.

In 1952, in a letter to the Chairman of the Osage Tribal Council, Commis-

sioner Myer made three points about termination, the third of which has been subsequently ignored. As to tribes which desire to assume some of the responsibilities which the Bureau now carries, he was prepared, he wrote, "to work with such tribes in the development of an appropriate agreement, *without termination of the trusteeship relationship.*"

This was in effect a return to the plan proposed in 1947 by the present writer, who was then acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, when he testified before the Senate Committee on Civil Service headed by Senator Langer. That testimony has since been repeatedly misquoted and misinterpreted. The Committee's announced purpose was to reduce the number of federal employees. The Indian Bureau was only one of many agencies to appear. Testifying under subpoena and replying to a demand from the Committee, the witness said that Bureau services could be curtailed or eliminated as to certain tribes and reservations, by groups. He specified certain criteria which the Congress should consider in such reduction in services, and he indicated that these criteria did not apply uniformly. In fact all four could not be applied to any one tribe.

The witness also submitted drafts of a number of proposed bills whose enactment would permit reduction in Indian Bureau personnel. A bill for Klamath Indians proposed a federal corporation with a life of fifty years and provided that "none of the property of the corporation shall be subject to taxation until otherwise provided by Congress." The Menominee proposal also called for a federal corporation, and it specified that the tribal lands should remain in trust, non-taxable, and inalienable for fifty years.

These proposals were very different from the termination bills which the

Klamath and Menominee Indians were finally constrained to accept. It was clear then, as it is now, that these tribes cannot survive economically if their tribal property is taxed.

The current scene

Let us now examine the current situation with Glenn L. Emmons as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. It is not easy to evaluate the present, partly because the trees are so close that the forest's outlines are not clear, but also partly because at so many points the actions of the Bureau are impossible to reconcile with announced policies. There is also disagreement within many tribes, as much disagreement about policies and personalities as there is on the outside. Much of the disagreement is the inevitable result of the ferment of the last twenty-odd years. Indians are more articulate now, and both the majority and the minority speak, vote, and occasionally fight for their opinions. Many Indians believe that the Bureau, instead of going along with a tribal majority, sides with the minority when the minority supports Bureau policy.

Sometimes, too, there is a break in the communication system. A Secretarial letter to a Washington, D. C. attorney made a basic decision about Blackfeet election procedures, but a copy of the letter was not sent to the tribe nor to the tribal attorney. Again, in a controversy at Fort Berthold, after two years of argument, a Departmental decision made possible the holding of an election; but public notice of the decision was apparently not given. One of the tribal factions learned of the decision which called for tribal action within a stated time limit from a private citizen, not from the Bureau. It is easy to argue that such lapses are inadvertent, but it is hard to persuade Indians that they are not all part of a pattern.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

In two major fields, health and education, the Bureau has effected far-reaching changes since 1953.

First, in the field of health, on July 1, 1955, it completed the transfer of all medical work to the Public Health Service. The legislation requiring this transfer was sponsored by the Council of State and Territorial Health Officers and by numerous private organizations including the National Tuberculosis Association and the Association on American Indian Affairs. If any one person deserves major credit for this legislation it is the late Dr. A. J. Chesley, of Minnesota. The public record shows that it was initially opposed by the Department of the Interior and by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Not until it became almost certain that the bill would pass did the Department of the Interior reverse its position.

The first result of the transfer was a large increase in appropriations; they rose from \$21,000,000 in 1953 to \$38,000,000 in 1956. For 1958, the Public Health Service is asking more than \$50,000,000. There certainly has also been some marked improvement in medical services. More doctors are on duty, perhaps totaling 100, who are almost all young men subject to military draft. More patients are in hospitals, even though there are no additional nurses. After a year and a half in control the Public Health Service is still side-stepping two basic issues: which Indians are eligible for medical care and which ones, if any, should pay for services. In a letter written in January, 1957, the Public Health Service comments: "No Indian, either on the reservation or off, has a legal entitlement to medical service under the Indian health program." If the Public Health Service should take the position that medical

care for Indians is given as an act of grace, as may be here implied, it is certainly headed for trouble.

The Bureau under Commissioner Emmons claims and deserves credit for getting more children, especially Navahos, into school. In three years as a result of truly herculean efforts by the staff, especially employees on the Navaho reservation, the Navaho school attendance was increased by about 10,000 children. Most of these are in boarding schools at long distances from home. Many are in public schools in the "peripheral" towns of Gallup, Holbrook, Winslow, and others and are housed in Bureau-operated dormitories. The Bureau pays tuition for these children, and the federal government also pays for additional school capacity on the theory that these are "Federally impacted areas."

The Bureau in 1955 launched a pilot program in adult education designed to make five tribal groups literate in English, and it supported legislation for a program of vocational training. Yet, at the same time it has eliminated or curtailed many activities which seem to involve vocational training. Most of the school-cattle herds, beef and dairy, have been abolished or greatly reduced. School farms have been abandoned. The school farm at Flandreau, instead of being turned over to the local Indians, was declared surplus and offered for public sale. Arts and crafts projects have been shut down or left to shift for themselves. Bureau guidance and support have been stopped, as for example, for the Qualla Cooperative at Cherokee, North Carolina; the Sequoyah weaving project in Oklahoma; and the pottery and weaving project at Pine Ridge, South Dakota.

INDUSTRY AND RELOCATION

A new program, which may have important results, plans to bring industry

to the reservations.² About ten small factories are now either in operation or expected to begin operation before the end of 1957. Cheap, stable, labor supply is the lure; although in some places the attraction may be free land or a suitable building. The Navaho Tribe, for example, is paying for the construction of a building to house a children's furniture factory at Gallup. Again, however, a seeming inconsistency exists. Indian-owned enterprises are being liquidated. The Flandreau garment factory, which made a small profit during each year of its existence, was closed. Here was a small plant in a small Indian community whose average family income was less than \$1,000 a year. The factory had a pay roll of about \$28,000 last year, or an average of nearly \$500 per family. On a very different scale is the Alaska fishing industry. After a profitable period of ten or fifteen years, the community-owned, Bureau-financed canneries lost large sums. The Bureau takes no share of the blame for mismanagement, but now plans to lease these canneries to private operators at nominal rentals. Presumably the non-Indian lessee will make a profit.

Two other major aspects or questions of policy remain to be considered; they are the attrition of the land base and the increased emphasis on relocation. The policy in the 1930's assumed a continuing increase in the land base. A real start was made. But World War II and the changes in policy since 1950 put an end to the purchase program. Recently a member of Congress, not himself opposed to wholesale land sales, said to me that if the present policy continued for another five years there

² A bill, Senate 809, has been introduced in the current session by Senator Langer and about twenty other Senators; its aim is to encourage the development of industries on reservations.

would be no Indian reservations in his state, only Indians. In the past four years approximately 1,600,000 acres of Indian land have gone out of trust. This is roughly 12 per cent of the allotted lands. The present Bureau policy emphasizes the right of the competent Indian to take fee title to his allotment. It ignores the fact that the allotment was received because the individual owner was a member of the tribe, and that allotments were often made over tribal opposition. Even if the sale is detrimental to the neighbors or to the tribe, the sale goes through; the Commissioner, however, has said that he will hold key tracts. Even if the wholesale issuance of fee patents is defensible, there is greater doubt about the supervised sale of land belonging to incompetents. The Commissioner's reports disclose that more land has been sold by supervised sales than has been patented. Generally, such sales provide money for living expenses for a period of months, perhaps years; after it has spent this money the family goes on some form of relief, or leaves the reservation.

To many Indians there seems no alternative to leaving the reservation, either voluntarily as thousands have already gone, as migrants, or now officially as "relocatees" receiving financial and other help. It is now just fifty years since the Bureau first made an effort to find off-reservation employment for Indians. In those fifty years thousands of Indians have left their homes, mostly for urban areas. Rapid City has 4,000 Indians. Nobody knows how many are in Minneapolis; estimates run from 3,000 to 8,000 or more. Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, and Phoenix are centers of Indian migration. Smaller towns in many states have hundreds. Statistically there is no basis for saying that any certain percentage of migrant Indians will succeed. The same statisti-

cal lack exists for the officially relocated Indian. In the years when Dillon Myer was Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the placement service was revived under the new name; this was taken over from the War Relocation Service which concentrated Americans of Japanese ancestry in camps. Relocation in the present administration is being carried out on an increasing scale. Roughly, \$1,000,000 was appropriated in 1956 and \$3,500,000 in 1957 for carrying on this work. In 1955, 650 family groups and 800 single men and women were relocated, a total of 3,400 persons. Most of these required financial assistance. In 1957 approximately 10,000 persons will be relocated, of whom 80 per cent will need financial help. With increased appropriations, those who need help will receive larger, more nearly adequate sums: for transportation to the job, for a month's subsistence, for clothing, for furniture, and for a year's Blue Cross medical protection. Undoubtedly, some Indians are asking for relocation because they see no hope at home in the face of the current policies on land and credit. The Blackfeet to the contrary, as an example, recently advertised free sites to industries which would locate on the reservation and stated that 1,500 Indians available for work did not want to be relocated.

CONCLUSION

The history of government-Indian relations seems to be a succession of waves. One generation of Indian administrators seems to learn little from its predecessor. About thirty years passed, a generation, from the establishment of the Union to the beginning of the era of removal. About thirty years thereafter the planners and administrators began to argue for allotment. From 1857 to 1887 every Commissioner

of Indian Affairs, except one, urged allotment.

The General Allotment Act of 1887 set a national policy, which reached its high mark just thirty years later, in 1917. At that time, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane approved the policy of Commissioner Cato Sells of issuing "forced patents" to Indians who were competent in his judgment, even though the Indians had not asked for patents. Today, through an act passed by the Congress in 1956, the Secretary of the Interior has the same power over Indians of the Five Tribes in Oklahoma. The Lane-Sells policy stopped abruptly when Charles H. Burke became Commissioner in 1921. Although Burke had some understanding of the realities of Indian affairs as a result of his service in Congress as chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, he did not move far enough or fast enough to silence bitter critics of his administration. The Meriam Report of 1928, the policies of the Rhoads-Scattergood era, the Collier administration and the Indian Reorganization Act, all moved along the line of greater service, opportunity, and protection for the Indian.

This wave receded with the appointment of Dillon Myer as Commissioner in 1950. Gradually, Mr. Myer eliminated from the Bureau most of the top men who had been close to John Collier. Certainly there was a shift in policy. Since 1950 not one of the termination bills submitted by the Bureau includes a provision for federal incorporation as provided in the Indian Reorganization Act and as proposed by the Bureau in sample bills submitted in 1947. On the contrary, for any tribe organized under the IRA or the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, the Bureau's bills have called for revocation of tribal constitution and charter. The Bureau relies, of course, on the declaration of Congressional in-

tent expressed in House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the Eighty-third Congress. That resolution said that certain tribes and the Indians in certain States are to be "freed from Federal supervision and control." It also included general language to the effect that Indians should be subjected as rapidly as possible to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as other American citizens. The Eighty-fourth Congress gave some indication that it was not too sure about the Myer-Emmons wave. The only termination bills passed were at the request of tribes which specifically asked for the legislation. Not a single termination bill opposed by the tribe affected was passed.

At the beginning of the Eighty-fifth Congress, Senator Murray of Montana, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 3 (the same text he had introduced in the Eighty-fourth Congress as Senate Concurrent Resolution 85). Representative Lee Metcalf, also of Montana, introduced the same language in House Concurrent Resolution 155. If adopted, this resolution would restate Congressional policy, for it directs the Bureau of Indian Affairs to carry out a Point-Four program for Indians and specifies that this program shall be offered "without exacting termination of Federal protection of Indian property or of any other Indian rights as its price."

Until the Congress does act, it is not likely that the Bureau of Indian Affairs will change its present policies. It is distressing, but impossible to ignore the conclusion voiced by employees as they cluster in two's and three's in the long corridors of the Bureau in Washington. They talk about the present "liquidation program." Let us hope that they will be proved wrong.

Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American Indians

By OLIVER LA FARGE

Abstract: The problem of our Indian population is an old and continuing one. In this article the author outlines two alternative ways of dealing with it. One aims at quick and intensive attempts to break down the special status of Indians and integrate them into the mainstream of American life. These attempts are characterized as hasty, impatient, and often ill advised. The other alternative aims at maintaining Indian tribal integrity and special rights until such time as the Indians themselves are ready and willing to dispense with federal supervision and controls. The author pleads for the need to work calmly and thoughtfully toward a point where Indians are able to make a satisfactory adjustment to life in America without needing the prop of special status.—Ed.

FOR many years our Indians have been the subject of a continuing debate, an unusual one in that one side desires to exclude the Indians themselves from it—although in recent years this has ceased to be possible—and that both sides, whenever opportunity arises, will put their principles into effect by legislation or administrative action. The result has been a crazy quilt of conflicts, often producing confusion, sometimes disaster.

On one side, expressed or implicit, is the conviction that all Americans should be alike; that conformity to a somewhat imaginary American norm is the best thing for everyone; and that discrete communities having customs, legal rights, and restrictions not common to all Americans must be dissolved as rapidly as possible. In its starkest form, the argument is that Indians must be "assimilated" or "integrated" whether they like it or not and that nothing will speed up integration faster than to disintegrate their native communities. This thinking is usually reinforced by im-

patience with a large federal bureaucracy dealing with Indian affairs, which in 175 years has failed to integrate the Indians. The simple conclusion is that the Bureau of Indian Affairs' failure can best be solved by dissolving the Bureau.

On the other side is the belief that, since we have deprived the Indians of the excellent opportunity for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that they enjoyed before the Europeans came, we cannot, as Americans, rest content until we have restored that opportunity to them at least to the degree that other citizens have it. Further, we have more specific obligations to them derived from the very fact of our having conquered them. Proponents of this view above all oppose haste and unilateral action from above, either of which can destroy human beings, and insist on the inherent right of Indians, as of all Americans, to be different and to group themselves as they prefer.

As to special Indian rights, since being Indian is hereditary, the rights at

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first glance seem anomalous in a democracy; when we study them, however, the anomaly fades. They are part of a quid pro quo promised solemnly by us, in treaties, agreements, and laws and upheld over and again by our courts, in exchange for the whole area of the United States and for the ending of rightful independence by what Chief Justice Marshall called "irresistible power."¹

INDIAN STATUS

Indian special status consists mainly in the ownership of land—reservations and grants—and income therefrom held in trust for them and tax exempt. As in all trusts, the beneficiary is restricted in the use and disposal of the estate. Part and parcel of this ownership, and deriving from the original, lost, sovereignty, is home rule and exemption from state law within "Indian country." Secondary in origin but essential to our basic obligation is federal responsibility for what are usually local services such as education and health. That we have rendered these services stingily and stupidly is irrelevant. States, counties, and municipalities avowedly cannot administer them nor are their standard services suited to the needs of Indians striving, not for identity, but for equality.

Part of the argument against disintegration is that Indian special needs must be met until they have been eliminated and that elimination can be achieved through patience, respect for human rights and aspirations, and co-operation with the people concerned; not through authoritarian action upon those people. Indian status and the integrity of their groups are not only rights, but essential means of progress.

Those holding the opposing view claim that Indian status segregates them. Indians are dark-skinned. In

¹Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 519 (1832).

many parts of the United States they encounter in varying degrees the discrimination and segregation we apply to all dark-skinned people. It occurs even in Salt Lake City, center of Mormonism with its special doctrine concerning the origin of Indians. Given communities of their own within territories that they govern, Indians will tend to withdraw into them. Most people in this world also like to live in their homelands, near their kin, and among those who share their ways. The argument that Indian status segregates Indians could be extended indefinitely to almost any ownership of land plus home rule or self-government in the world.

Intermittently for some seventy-five years proponents of disintegration have applied their theories by various processes: ending tribal ownership of property and encouraging the breakup of solid blocks of Indian land into fragments accompanied by measures to weaken or destroy tribal governments, frustrate Indian leadership, and in the past either to cut young Indians off from their cultures and languages or to instill in them contempt for their elders and their tradition. The similarity of these procedures to those of communism is startling, and, as with Communists, we have enforced them for the people's "own good." We did not, however, make the subjects over into white men, mentally, morally, or physically; what we did was nearly to destroy the Indian economic base, reduce tens of thousands to landless beggary, and prepare the desolate mess that many now want to sweep under the rug by means of "termination."

One cannot "equalize" people by depriving them of their property and of the going communities of their own kind that are their source of strength. Trying to do so is deeply un-American. Shall we say of this Amish colony, this concentration of orthodox Jews, these

villages of Spanish-Americans that they must be broken up so that they will stop being different? Here, again, we see the basic principle of communism; yet these groups, unlike the Indians, are at home in our culture and of amply proven competence to deal with it.

INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST

It would be hard to find Indians more "different," more "Indian" than those living on tribal grants and reservations between the Grand Canyon and Santa Fe. Most of them still prefer their mother tongues, and the majority profess the native religions; sixteen of the eighteen New Mexico Pueblos are still governed by their ancient theocracies. Almost any student of Indian conditions will agree that, with all their problems, the present life of these Indians is happier, their economic status, although low, is better, and their future much clearer than they are for the more "advanced," partially disintegrated tribes.

Neighboring them is an unusual zone of non-Indian acceptance extending along the Rio Grande Valley from Taos to Albuquerque and including Los Alamos. Tribal Indians move freely about the zone to work and study, some settle in the towns, some commute. They are found in skilled and semiprofessional positions, and in businesses of their own. They and the communities are ready for intermingling without talk of "assimilation." As a result the Indians are no more segregated than is anyone having the choice of either living on the farm or going to the city.

This happy, positive example could be overbalanced by innumerable wretched, negative ones. Both serve to emphasize a principle that disintegrationists usually ignore—that if, in whatever way, Indians are to be urged to leave home, *both the communities that receive them and the Indians* must be ready for each other. This condition rarely exists.

"DISINTEGRATION"

Highly significant is the experience of officials of the relocation program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs under which Indians are helped to settle and find steady employment in a few large cities. The "primitive" Indians from the intact, unallotted reservations of the Southwest are internally secure. They are able to make the great, difficult adaptations that their new life requires; and they show good percentages of successful, permanent relocations. Indians from broken, allotted northern reservations occupied by relatively disintegrated tribes are insecure and in inward conflict. They have lived long cheek by jowl with whites, and it has not profited them. They lose jobs, they find adaptation difficult, and have high percentages of relocated people who have given up and gone home.²

It would be tiresome and superfluous to recite here all the unsuccessful experiences we have had in the past with programs for de-Indianizing Indians, dissolving their communities, or destroying their cultural heritage. None of our efforts in that direction have borne good fruit nor have they enabled us to accomplish the goal on which everyone agrees—to put the Indians on such a footing in health, education, understanding of our world and economic opportunity that they can make themselves happy lives without benefit of special status.

One of our howling errors is ignoring the fact that you cannot make a people over against their will and contrary to their aspirations. We all recognize this simple fact eagerly and emphasize it when it comes to Hungarians or Poles, but somehow we refuse to apply it to

²LaVerne Madigan, *The American Indian Relocation Program* (New York: Association on American Indian Affairs, 1956), table, p. 6 and p. 9.

American Indians. Rather fatuously, we expect Indians to have the same aspirations as all our other minorities, despite the fact that their history is obviously quite different. The disintegrationists manage to ignore entirely the extraordinary record of the Indians in retaining their communities and their existence as Indians in the face of what look like impossible pressures, sometimes extending over centuries.³

Termination

"Termination" approaches disintegration from a new angle. Previous systems worked piecemeal but applied to a great number of tribes, as in the allotment system, which is still operating, or to all, as in systems of education designed to destroy a rising generation's tribal memories. Termination applies to one tribe at a time, but affects that tribe totally.

In theory, there is a kind of termination which those who believe in Indian progress through Indian integrity do not oppose; it is, in fact, the ultimate goal. This is the termination of Indian status of a tribe when its members have reached a point of competence at which they find that they will do better on their own, with full freedom to handle or dispose of their assets, than under established protections and restrictions. This situation requires, among other things, that the tribe has reached a state of social and political competence and the county and state within which it lives such a state of moral advancement that the tribe can be sure it will receive equal treatment in all matters, from law enforcement to service in restaurants. This appears to be the situation reached

³ John Provinse and others, "Wenner-Gren Supper Conference: The American Indian in Transition," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56, no. 3 (June 1954), pp. 387-94.

Oliver La Farge, "Assimilation—the Indian View," *New Mexico Quarterly*, Vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring, 1956), pp. 5-15.

by the Wyandottes, Peorias, and Ottawas who were terminated at their own request by the Eighty-fourth Congress.

There is no reason why termination of this sort should be "bought" by sacrificing all rights. There is no reason why it should not be so devised as to facilitate, if the tribe desires, common ownership of property and continuing group existence through organization into a corporation or into a suitable, modern political unit. The method of such termination can only be worked out at leisure between the tribe, the federal government, and the state consulting as equals.

Termination legislation was first seriously introduced in the Eighty-third Congress, partly in accordance with House Joint Resolution 108 of the previous Congress, partly on individual initiatives. It led to a storm of protest from tribes all over the country that left no possible doubt of Indian opposition. This strength of Indian expression explains why disintegrationists want to exclude them from the debate.

Of the bills introduced under the Resolution, those to terminate the Flatheads, Turtle Mountain Chippewas, and Florida Seminoles were killed in committee. Opposition from the tribes concerned was strong and well presented; the states they lived in also opposed the bills; the legislation was obviously ill conceived. The Turtle Mountain Chippewas are strong contenders for the title of the most destitute Indians in the United States; the Florida Indians have only recently had universal schooling and retain a large group of members who speak no English. It is difficult to conceive on what basis these two tribes were ever marked for termination. Several other bills never received a hearing.

SPECIAL CASES

There were a number of special cases. It is impossible here to discuss the curi-

ous act terminating the "mixed-blood" portion of the Utes of Utah. The situation among the Utes is and was confused (for instance, most "mixed-bloods" have no non-Indian blood). What is clear is that none of the Indians understood what they were agreeing to and that all concerned are now unhappy. Apparently, their consent was obtained more by persuasion than by explanation.

The Alabama and Coushatta of Texas were also partially terminated, but at their own request. The state took their reservation in trust and assumed certain other responsibilities; a few items of federal Indian status will be retained. This was the only termination proposal in the big drive that came near meeting the conditions laid down above.

Another bill proposed termination for five bands of Paiutes and Shoshones in Utah. The Department of the Interior testified that these bands were ready for termination and desired it, although it admitted that over 10 per cent were illiterate and that all but a few lived entirely or partially on relief and straight charity. The record of testimony gives a feeling of haste and one-sidedness. When private agencies got in touch with the bands, the official testimony as to their desires proved incorrect. Two groups, comprising a majority, lodged protests strong enough to get themselves eliminated from the termination list. Another tribe was too late and its members are included among the 232 persons who are now becoming competent non-Indians by act of Congress.

A Department of the Interior argument, used here and in relation to other proposed terminations, was that the groups should be terminated because they were almost totally neglected. In full context this seems to mean that since local Indian service personnel are withdrawn to a distant, central agency on grounds of economy, the outlying

Indians are then neglected and accordingly should be terminated.

TERMINATION ACTS

The two most important termination acts, both deriving from the Resolution cited, affected the Klamaths of Oregon and the Menominees of Wisconsin, progressive tribes who, it happens, possess very valuable timber. The bills contained no adequate provisions for handling tribal property, required the rapid ending of tribal organization, and set a short time limit of five years for a most complex transaction.

Both tribes expressed formal consent to the principle of some form of termination, but had no opportunity to pass upon the bills actually enacted. Both tribes were told that if they did not accept the principle, they could not have a distribution of moneys that belonged to them and without which their members would suffer hardship. When Klamath delegates in Washington still hung back, the then Secretary of the Interior followed the strange procedure of using Klamath tribal funds to bring on a tribesman, of no official status, to work for the bill.

The Menominees and Wisconsin are thoroughly unhappy about the Menominee act and are working for major amendments. Oregon feeling about the outcome of the Klamath act is so strong that the present Secretary of the Interior has asked amendments in the present Congress. The Klamath act encourages rapid selling of the tribes' fabulous timber and distribution of the proceeds, which leads Oregonians to prophesy a brief, wild spending spree by the Indians followed by the dumping on the state of a mass of paupers. There is also uneasiness about the blanket act terminating the western Oregon tribes.

About these bills, enacted or not,

there is an atmosphere of haste, of jamming through, of bad drafting, misrepresentation, and pressure. This in itself should make us suspect them. Suspicion grows stronger when we note other attempts by the administration to tie acceptance of termination to unrelated legislation desired by other tribes and the sudden presentation to some tribes of drafts of termination bills with limits of two months or less for discussion.

We begin to see that for practical purposes the present debate is not about "termination" as such, but about a par-

ticular kind of termination, something characterized by hasty impatience, to be applied to tribes who do not want it. Termination in itself got lost from the discussion. What termination should imply, the conditions that should be met in order to reach it, have been very briefly sketched in this article. We badly need a calm, unhasty consideration of the subject. The goal, the obstacles to be overcome, and the benefits to be brought to fellow citizens in overcoming them, should be a challenge every American would want to take up.

Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions Over Indian Property and Person

By ARTHUR V. WATKINS

Abstract: Thinking constructively of the Indian as a fellow American we are now seeking to assure him of equality in the enjoyment and responsibilities of our national citizenship. Congress has called for termination of federal supervision over him as soon as possible. The proposed solutions vary in method. Seeking to be factual and informative rather than argumentative, the author discusses recent Congressional and related actions with a view as to what these establish for the present and portend for the future.—Ed.

VIRTUALLY since the first decade of our national life the Indian, as tribesman and individual, was accorded a status apart. Now, however, we think constructively and affirmatively of the Indian as a fellow American. We seek to assure that in health, education, and welfare, in social, political, economic, and cultural opportunity, he or she stands as one with us in the enjoyment and responsibilities of our national citizenship. It is particularly gratifying to know that recent years of united effort, mutual planning, and Indian self-appraisal truly have begun to bear increasing fruit.

One facet of this over-all development concerns the freeing of the Indians from special federal restrictions on the property and the person of the tribes and their members. This is not a novel development, but a natural outgrowth of our relationship with the Indians. Congress is fully agreed upon its accomplishment. By unanimous vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives termination of such special federal supervision has been called for as soon as possible. Of course, as with any such major social concern, methods vary in proposed solutions and emotions sometimes rise as to how the final goal

should best be reached. A clear understanding of principles and events is necessary. Here the author seeks more to be factual and informative rather than argumentative and dogmatic. This article is largely intended to note recent Congressional and related actions with a view as to what these portend for the future as well as establish for the present. After all, the matter of freeing the Indian from wardship status is not rightfully a subject to debate in academic fashion, with facts marshalled here and there to be maneuvered and counter-maneuvered in a vast battle of words and ideas. Much more I see this as an ideal or universal truth, to which all men subscribe, and concerning which they differ only in their opinion as to how the ideal may be attained and in what degree and during what period of time. In the course of this chapter, then, I shall be primarily concerned with the main object and the degree of understanding which has come to us regarding its attainability.

THE SITUATION IN DECEMBER 1956

A little more than two years ago—June 17, 1954—President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed a bill approved by

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the Eighty-third Congress that signified a landmark in Indian legislative history. By this measure's terms an Indian tribe and its members, the Menominee of Wisconsin, were assured that after a brief transition period they would at last have full control of their own affairs and would possess all of the attributes of complete American citizenship. This was a most worthy moment in our history. We should all dwell upon its deep meaning. Considering the lengthy span of our Indian relationship, the recency of this event is significant. Obviously, such affirmative action for the great majority of Indians has just begun. Moreover, it should be noted that the foundations laid are solid.

Philosophically speaking, the Indian wardship problem brings up basically the questionable merit of treating the Indian of today as an Indian, rather than as a fellow American citizen. Now, doing away with restrictive federal supervision over Indians, as such, does *not* affect the retention of those cultural and racial qualities which people of Indian descent would wish to retain; many of us are proud of our ancestral heritage, but that does not nor should it alter our status as American citizens. The distinction between abolishment of wardship and abandonment of the Indian heritage is vitally important. I wish to emphasize this point, because a few well-intentioned private organizations repeatedly seek to influence Congress to keep the Indian in a restricted status by urging legislation to retain him as an Indian ward and as a member of a caste with social status apart from others, not basically as what he is—a fellow American citizen.

These organizations have presented some proposals to Congress impossible of accomplishment, but likely to produce argumentation and thus to protract debate beyond reasonable limits. In this

manner they apparently seek to justify a continued role as presumable spokesmen for Indian tribes. Likewise, it should be noted that in legislative considerations various other private organizations and serious-minded periodicals have been used as devices propagandizing viewpoints based upon assertions known to Congress to be contrary to the facts upon Indian conditions. Special interests are of course involved in other ways; thus commercial companies having specific reservation leases may be reluctant to see terminal programs proceed, feeling that their own economic interests may be jeopardized. And again, state co-operation in the assumption of responsibilities for their Indian citizens has not always been consistent. Historically, however, the Congress, although perhaps more or less ineffectively until recent years, has sought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to free the Indian. A full study of Congressional actions will bear this out. Freedom for the Indian was the goal then; it is the goal now.

Unfortunately, the major and continuing Congressional movement toward full freedom was delayed for a time by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Wheeler-Howard Act. Amid the deep social concern of the depression years, Congress deviated from its accustomed policy under the concept of promoting the general Indian welfare. In the postdepression years Congress—realizing this change of policy—sought to return to the historic principles of much earlier decades. Indeed, one of the original authors of the Act was desirous of its repeal. We should recall, however, that war years soon followed in which Congress found itself engrossed in problems first of national defense and then of mutual security. As with many other major projects, action was thus delayed.

INDIAN FREEDOM

In 1947 significant facts were emphasized regarding the advisability of furthering Indian freedom during hearings of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee. The then Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William Zimmerman, Jr., testified that about 40,000 Indians were then ready for immediate freedom from further special federal control. Statements made by the Acting Commissioner vividly recalled Congressional attention to the fact that specific groups of Indians were then regarded as prepared for on-the-spot freedom from their wardship status. Later the same Mr. Zimmerman became an officer of one of the private groups interested in Indian affairs. This testimony at the 1947 hearings served as an effective stimulus toward renewed consideration of an end of wardship.

In the light of this background, the actions of the ensuing Eighty-third and Eighty-fourth Congresses offer profitable example and experience. As this federal policy is better understood, tribal and individual Indian interest in abolishment of special federal controls will continue to increase. Meanwhile we must be ever mindful that in broad terms and in many ways decontrol has already advanced for all Indians by and large. These federal restraints over Indians have been removed through related Congressional measures dealing with health, education, social welfare, economics, and kindred fields, the end result of which is to regard the Indians as any other American citizens.

The Indian freedom program will not be accomplished immediately in the case of more large and complex situations, but for most tribes it can be numbered in a few years. Emotional and practical concerns dictate careful but measurable progress toward the goal of complete

freedom. Complicated realty and other property problems, the careful clarification and protection of rights, these at times serve to make the process of decontrol lengthy. Meanwhile the Congress, through increased appropriations, is stressing the education of Indian children. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is expanding its adult education and vocational rehabilitation programs to help Indians earn a livelihood and to assume their responsibilities as citizens without special federal services. By action of the Eighty-third Congress Indian health concerns, previously in the Bureau's care, have been transferred to the Public Health Service. Simultaneously through the Bureau's relocation program increasing thousands of energetic, healthy, skilled Indians compete successfully in our cities, bring their families into new modern homes, and thus in effect remove many conditions of their earlier wardship. Where financial burdens of transition from guardianship to normal citizenship appear evident for a tribe, consideration is given; thus the Eighty-third Congress in precedent-setting legislation provided assurance of aid for the Menominee. When all factors are considered, numerous chain-reaction situations are evident which tend to stimulate the desire for freedom even more conclusively.

We may admit the it-takes-time view, but we should not allow it to lull us into inaction. Freedom of action for the Indian as a full-fledged citizen—that is the continuing aim. Toward this end Congress and the Administration, state and local governments, Indian tribes and members, interested private agencies, and individual Americans as responsible citizens should all be united and work constantly. The legislatively set target dates for Indian freedom serve as significant spurs to accomplishment. Congress steadily continues to

inform itself, to seek out, delimit, and assist those Indians most able to profit immediately by freedom from special supervision, and it acts primarily to speed the day for all Indian tribes and members to be relieved of their wardship status. A basic purpose of Congress in setting up the Indian Claims Commission was to clear the way toward complete freedom of the Indians by assuring a final settlement of all obligations—real or purported—of the federal government to the Indian tribes and other groups.

This picture we must keep in mind when considering the steps that will be taken during the Eighty-fifth and succeeding Congresses and in understanding the setting in which the Eighty-third and Eighty-fourth Congresses acted to directly further the freedom program.

Let us now briefly consider the work of these two recent Congresses.

Freedom program in the 83d Congress

In 1953 during the Eighty-third Congress the members of the Senate and the House unanimously endorsed a statement on Indian policy that has continued to be in its general terms the guiding course of Congress. This action taken in the first Session, designated as House Concurrent Resolution 108, should be carefully noted in full:

Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and

Whereas the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States should assume their full responsibilities as American citizens: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within the States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the following-named Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from Federal supervision and control and from the disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians: The Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the Potawatomi Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, and those members of the Chippewa Tribe who are on the Turtle Mountain Reservation, North Dakota. It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that, upon the release of such tribes and individual members thereof from such disabilities and limitations, all offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all other offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs whose primary purpose was to serve any Indian tribe or individual Indian freed from Federal supervision should be abolished. It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Interior should examine all existing legislation dealing with such Indians and treaties between the Government of the United States and each such tribe, and report to Congress at the earliest practicable date, but not later than January 1, 1954, his recommendations for such legislation, as in his judgment, may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this resolution.

Thereafter there were bills introduced and hearings held in 1954 on twelve Indian groups totaling 1,715 printed pages. As a result Congress enacted legislation providing for release of federal supervision over the property and individual members of the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas, the Klamath of Oregon (Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yakooskin Band of Snakes), the Tribes of Western Oregon (Grand Ronde, Siletz), the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, and certain tribes in Utah (Shiv-

wits, Kanosh, Koosharem and Indian Peaks Bands of Paiutes; the mixed-blood Uintah and Ouray [Utes]). All of the above except the Utah Indians were specified in House Concurrent Resolution 108.

Approximately ten thousand Indians were thus set on the road to complete citizenship rights and responsibilities.

Hearings were also conducted but no conclusive legislation was adopted by the Eighty-third Congress regarding freedom from special supervision of the following: the Kansas and Nebraska Tribes (Sac and Fox, Iowa, Potawatomi, Kickapoo), the Makah of Washington, the Flathead of Montana (Salish and Kootenai), the Seminole of Florida, the Turtle Mountain Chippewa of South Dakota, the Indians of California, the Nevada Indians (Ruby Valley, Shoshone, Yerington Paiute, Battle Mountain, Carson, Las Vegas, Lovelock, Reno Sparks and Yerington Colonies).

Completion of the Alabama-Coushatta program largely enabled the Bureau of Indian Affairs to wind up its activities in Texas, one of the goals expressed in the Resolution. Even before its adoption the Bureau had virtually concluded its activities in another state mentioned in the Resolution, that of New York.

Freedom program and the 84th Congress

During the Eighty-fourth Congress legislation resulted in approval of releasing federal control over the property and individual members of three tribes in Oklahoma—the Peoria, Ottawa, and Wyandotte. Each of these tribes voluntarily adopted a resolution requesting the introduction and enactment of terminal legislation.

Through action of the Eighty-fourth Congress the Council of the Confederated Tribes at Colville, Washington, will submit within five years to the Secretary of the Interior a proposed plan

providing for their decontrol. The Congress likewise adopted a special decontrol deadline in the case of the mixed-blood members of the Uintah and Ouray (Utes) in Utah. This provided a seven-year period or until fall, 1961, for completion of terminal proposals.

Secluded reservation life is a deterrent to the Indian, keeping him apart in ways far beyond the purely geographic. By way of preparation for future decontrol programs, the Eighty-fourth Congress also passed the Vocational Rehabilitation Act to assist Indians to adapt themselves more readily to off-reservation life. Self-reliance is basic to the whole Indian-freedom program. Through our national historic development the Indian was forced into a dependent position with the federal government more and more, as America advanced westward, tending to sublimate his natural qualities of self-reliance, courage, discipline, resourcefulness, confidence, and faith in the future. Congress has realized this, and has steadily acted more positively to restore to the Indian these qualities. But self-reliance demands opportunity to grow. The Indian must be given the conditions under which—and only under which—self-reliance can be wholeheartedly regenerated.

DECONTROL ACTIONS PRECEDENT TO THE 83D AND 84TH CONGRESSES

To further clarify understanding, certain actions taken earlier than these two Congresses should be noted. Long before the Eighty-third, of course, the matter of releasing Indians from federal controls had been an important concern for Congressional and Administration study and action.

During the early years of the century so-called "competency commissions" were intended to provide a means of determining the qualifications of Indians to manage their affairs independ-

ently of Bureau of Indian Affairs supervision.

A decisive step forward was the granting of legal citizenship in 1924 by Congress to all American Indians born in this country not hitherto made citizens. This clear indication of Congressional decision pointed toward the ideal of Indian freedom and complete citizenship.

The role of the Bureau itself in preparing the Indian for self-reliant status was emphatically phrased by the Institute for Government Research, The Brookings Foundation, in its major 1928 publication, *The Problem of Indian Administration*, commonly known as the Meriam Report. It stated:

The fundamental requirement is that the task of the Indian Service be recognized as primarily educational, in the broadest sense of that word, and that it be made an efficient educational agency, devoting its main energies to the social and economic advancement of the Indians, so that they may be absorbed into the prevailing civilization or be fitted to live in the presence of that civilization at least in accordance with a minimum standard of health and decency. . . .

Soon thereafter—from 1929 to 1934—a broad survey was conducted by a Senate subcommittee relating to the principles upon which Indian administration should be furthered.

The Meriam report had recommended the transfer of services performed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to other agencies, both public and quasi-public. This principle was observed in 1934 in the passage of the Johnson-O'Malley Act, which enabled the Bureau to transfer some of its previous services, particularly in the welfare and educational fields. By thus integrating the Indians into service channels open to the common citizenry the way toward freedom from special controls was fostered.

During the late 1940's when the matter of federal decontrol was considered

it was proposed in theory that an impartial scientific approach was the best means to handle the terminal program. Thus, for those tribes definitely showing the greatest degree of advancement in education and economic self-sufficiency it was proposed that federal control be withdrawn immediately. For others, a graduated scale of dates was proposed depending upon the rate of advance indicated. In 1947 the Bureau developed yardsticks and opinions on the relative degree of acculturation of various Indian tribes based on 1930 data. Since that time a continuing effort has been and is being made to refine similar data by tribes and other groups. Many of these data appeared in detail in House Report No. 2503, Second Session, Eighty-second Congress, and in House Report No. 2680 of the Eighty-third Congress. These reports and other survey work and recommendations were conducive to legislative action, particularly in the Eighty-third Congress.

By thus integrating the Indians into service channels open to the common citizenry the way toward freedom from special controls was fostered.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF 83D CONGRESS LEGISLATION

Experience developed in carrying out the legislation adopted by the Eighty-third Congress for freedom from special federal control over Indians will be a valuable guide in continuing to develop further freedom-program bills. Generally, this experience has shown that other factors being equal, the smaller and rather well assimilated tribes or other groups, having relatively minor and cohesive property or other value interests easily adjustable to individual shares, appear the more likely subjects for prompt release from federal controls. And conversely, rather unassimilated and/or large groups with quite ma-

jor or intricate property or other value interests require more time, patience, and mutual understanding in moving toward eventual freedom from their federal wardship status.

For example, in a case such as that of the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes in Texas, involving about 400 Indians, relatively few problems were involved. All administrative action under the measure signed August 23, 1954, is complete. In fact, federal supervision ended as of July 1, 1955, and responsibility for 3,100 acres of tribal lands has been transferred to the state of Texas. These Indian people continue to be eligible for admission to hospitals and schools, maintained by the federal government for Indians, on the same terms applicable to other Indians. However, only seven found it necessary to call upon Public Health Service hospitals for medical needs. During the fiscal year 1956 five Alabama and Coushatta students continued or completed their courses in Bureau schools.

Decontrol also proceeded smoothly with the so-called Western Oregon Tribes, including some 2,100 Indians, and was complete August 13, 1956. Here more than sixty tribes, bands, and communities in northwest Oregon were concerned. After its final membership roll was completed the Grande Ronde Tribe decided to dispose of the bulk of its tribal lands and such sales were initiated. A practical property settlement on the Siletz reservation was quickly effected and a per-capita distribution of \$500,000—\$400,000 of it from the sale of tribal lands—was made to the Siletz.

In December 1956 completion of decontrol arrangements for the Paiute bands in Utah was very near, assuring an additional 232 Indians freedom from any special controls by the federal government.

A practical solution of the full- vs. mixed-blood status of certain tribesmen

was effectively worked out in Utah in the case of 1,804 Indians—Utes of the Uintah and Ouray reservation. The Congressional Act of August 27, 1954 provided for the division of tribal assets between the full bloods (the Ute Indian Tribe of the reservation) and the mixed bloods (the Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah). The final roll published April 5, 1956, determined a membership of 1,314 full-blood Indians and 490 mixed-blood persons. On the basis of this last roll a ratio for the division of tribal lands was then worked out between full and mixed bloods. The mixed bloods have now adopted a constitution and by-laws approved by the Bureau, and a budget for fiscal year 1957 made provision for a \$4,500 per-capita distribution of assets of the Affiliated Ute Citizens. Meanwhile the full bloods have drawn up a long-range development program for their own property.

In the case of the Klamath the government has shown its willingness to review the program as a result of administrative problems that arose in applying freedom legislation. As a result of statements from both Indians and non-Indians who felt that enforcement of the act of August 13, 1954, might prove injurious to the valuable Klamath forestlands, the Secretary of the Interior has agreed to review the act with a view to possible amendment should it seem desirable. The act does not call for complete decontrol before August 13, 1958. However, other events moved forward auspiciously for the 2,118 Indians concerned. A proposed final roll for the Klamaths has been published, and plans have been proceeding for a suggested division of the tribal property as well as for management of tribal-held assets. A detailed case history of each tribal member is being obtained, and a special advisory service is open to those wishing its assistance.

Although the Menominee was the first decontrol act adopted by the Eighty-third Congress, on June 17, 1954, this act affecting the largest such group to date—3,225 Indians living in Wisconsin—provides for the longest transition period of those enacted by the Eighty-third Congress. In many ways the most interesting of the decontrol projects to date, it also marks a fine example of state and local interest and co-operation.

During the first year of the Menominee transitional program four steps were taken: To prepare for a final membership roll and to arrange distribution of \$4,885,500 among members; to set up a state-federal special educational program and to reorganize tribal and agency commercial activities with Menominee controls greatly augmented.

An enlarged tribal organization has taken over many service functions formerly performed locally by the agency personnel. The greatly reduced agency staff is now largely devoted to advisory and trust-management activities. For the balance of the transitional period it will be a "learn-by-doing" process for the Menominees with counseling and general trust supervision as the Bureau's interim role.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF 84TH CONGRESS LEGISLATION

Through their voluntary request more than 2,000 Indians in Oklahoma, members of the Peoria, Ottawa, and Wyandotte Tribes, were placed upon the road to final termination of special federal controls by the Eighty-fourth Congress. For each group a complete membership roll was to be prepared early in 1957, and it was expected that decontrol would be complete by August 1959 for each. No large administrative problems appear evident.

During October 1956 a delegation of the Confederated Tribe of the Colville, Washington reservation met with Bu-

reau officials in Washington to prepare a five-year decontrol program for 4,189 Indians. The Eighty-fourth Congress had provided that the tribe should submit proposed decontrol legislation by July 24, 1961.

VOLUNTARY INDIAN ACTIONS TOWARD FEDERAL DECONTROL

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Glenn L. Emmons, has noted that one of the most helpful and promising courses toward termination is by voluntary request of the Indian groups themselves. In an informal statement on January 31, 1956, at a House subcommittee hearing on appropriations Emmons remarked:

... In a number of areas, tribes have taken the initiative in exploring the means of programming their way toward eventual self-determination, that is, the, Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe in the Aberdeen (S. D.) area, the Makah and Colville Tribes in the State of Washington, several urban colonies in Nevada, the tribes in the Quapaw jurisdiction in eastern Oklahoma, . . .

... in order for projects to be meaningful to the tribal groups, they must be developed at the local level in consultation with the tribal groups affected, and there must be a continuous follow-through in the development and implementation of the program proposals.

On April 12, 1956, in a major memorandum to all of the Bureau area directors and superintendents, Commissioner Emmons again referred particularly to the value of voluntary Indian group action. He said in part:

A good program is one which results from the desires of and fits the needs of a particular group of Indians. In whole or in part the program should, if possible, be the work of the Indians themselves.

As to the question of legislation Emmons specifically noted that:

... In some cases, it may develop that special legislation will be necessary to forward a group's basic program. In other

cases the Indian group may feel that the group's cultural assimilation and integration into the community life about them has progressed to the point where they desire early congressional consideration of termination legislation. In either case, the Area Director should advise the Commissioner with a view to arranging for special guidance and assistance.

ROLE OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COM- MISSION IN DECONTROL

Completely within the historic policy of Congress in working toward the elimination of special controls over Indians is its concept of the role of the Indian Claims Commission. The Commission assures legal settlement of long-standing claims for redress against the federal government, which many Indians believe should be a necessary condition precedent to effective decontrol consideration. The Commission, set up in 1946, was then empowered to accept petitions until August 13, 1951 and was directed to conclude judgments on all claims by April 1957. Because of the large number of claims filed it had become necessary to extend the life of the Commission, and Congress—intent on providing judicial determination of all claims—passed legislation in 1956 to continue the Commission until the spring of 1962. However, the fact that all

claims are not settled does not forestall present decontrol planning.

ACTION OF SUCCEEDING CONGRESSES TOWARD DECONTROL

The basic principle enunciated so clearly and approved unanimously by the Senate and House in House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the Eighty-third Congress continues to be the over-all guiding policy of Congress in Indian affairs. In view of the historic policy of Congress favoring freedom for the Indians, we may well expect future Congresses to continue to indorse the principle that "as rapidly as possible" we should end the status of Indians as wards of the government and grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.

With the aim of "equality before the law" in mind our course should rightly be no other. Firm and constant consideration for those of Indian ancestry should lead us all to work diligently and carefully for the full realization of their national citizenship with all other Americans. Following in the footsteps of the Emancipation Proclamation of ninety-four years ago, I see the following words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of the Indians—*THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!*

The Indian Claims Commission Act

By NANCY OESTREICH LURIE

Abstract: Awareness of the specific need for solving problems of jurisdiction and finance in Indian litigation, a growing feeling that Indian claims should receive more speedy and just attention, and administrative expedience combined to cause Congress to adopt the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1942 and to extend it ten years later to 1962. The author describes the types of claims that arise and discusses some of the issues involved with special reference to the role of expert testimony by anthropologists, whose views have been sought in order to clarify such matters as the identification of tribes and the original boundaries of their lands.—Ed.

THE Indian Claims Commission Act embodies a number of remarkable legal features as a reflection of problems that have arisen in dealings between the United States and the various Indian tribes. The actual prosecution of suits in accordance with the terms of the Act has led in turn to certain interpretations and procedural aspects of special interest to social scientists. The following discussion will consider these historical and recent phases in the development and application of the Indian Claims Commission Act.¹

The Act, approved August 13, 1946, was to remain in effect for ten years;

¹ It must be noted that many of the claims discussed are still pending. Thus, my analyses, apart from specific points duly cited, are my own views based on personal observation, experience, and research as an expert witness and are not to be construed as the views of the Indian tribes or attorneys by whom I have been employed. While maintaining my personal responsibility for this article, I would like to thank the many colleagues whose stimulating discussions of a variety of Indian claims have suggested factual and theoretical insights. I would particularly like to thank Dr. Angie Debo who had begun research for this study and graciously forwarded her notes for my use.

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all claims had to be filed within five years from the date of approval. Due to the large number of cases that had not yet been heard or adjudicated by 1956, the Act was extended in all its details until April 10, 1962.² The Commission is presided over by a chief commissioner and two associate commissioners; Indian petitioners are represented by private attorneys; and the United States is defended against Indian claims by attorneys of the Department of Justice. The Commission has promulgated rules of procedure, but the rules of evidence applicable are comparable to any federal court.

The Act creating the Indian Claims Commission is of relatively recent date, but the need for such legislation had long been recognized for a variety of reasons. Primary among these was the problem of defining jurisdiction in Indian litigation. Although the United States Court of Claims was established in 1855 to permit suit to be brought against the government, by 1863 tribal claims based on treaties were excluded from the general jurisdiction of the

² C. 949, 60 Stat. 1049; 25 U.S.C. 70; P.L. 767, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session.

court.³ Like foreign nations, it was necessary for each tribe to obtain a special jurisdictional act from Congress in order to present its case in the United States Court of Claims. This arrangement was discriminatory in that tribes differed in the amount of political influence they could command and in having effective legislative spokesmen for their cases. It was also an expensive and time-consuming procedure, since each claim required a virtual trial in Congress whereby cause for granting a special act might be demonstrated. If such an act were granted, the provisions allowed the tribe as a basis of suit were frequently construed in such a narrow way that it was difficult to obtain a full consideration of tribal grievances in the Court of Claims. The result was that a majority of petitions was dismissed by the court.

PROBLEMS OF JURISDICTION AND FINANCE IN LITIGATIONS

A tabulation covering the years 1881–1950 revealed that of 118 claims presented by Indian tribes before the Court of Claims, only thirty-four were allowed recovery.⁴ Lawyers were understandably reluctant to represent Indian clients in light of the highly specialized na-

³ Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765.

⁴ "Tabulation Showing Highly Speculative Nature of Indian Tribal Suits," Court of Claims Nos. 45585, 46640, 47564, 47566; affidavit of Ernest L. Wilkinson Respecting in The Above Captioned Cases, pp. ii, appendix 2, 3. This information was compiled in connection with the celebrated claim of the Ute Indians of Colorado which resulted in a compromise judgment of just over \$31,000,000. It was the largest award ever made in an Indian claim and larger than the total of all other awards made in Indian claims in the Court of Claims. Despite these spectacular aspects, it was typical of Indian litigation in other respects. The attorneys' fees were set at less than 9 per cent of the final judgment, and the case covered eighteen years from the time contracts were signed until the final amount was settled (1932–1950).

ture of the litigation and the small likelihood of recovery. Furthermore, many attorneys recognized that Indian grievances often arose out of concepts of a cultural and social nature not covered by customary interpretations of American law, but that these grievances deserved special recognition. For example, the *Winnebago* case, Docket No. M-421 in the Court of Claims, was begun in 1928 and finally dismissed in 1942. This time lag as well as the negative outcome was typical of a category of cases connected with the removal of tribes from one place to another.

The tribe claimed restitution on the basis that they had been removed from a reservation in Minnesota to one in South Dakota without their consent. The consequent hardships involving the death of many Winnebago by starvation and exposure forced the rest to flee from South Dakota if they hoped to survive. Ultimately, a majority of these Indians settled among the Omaha where their present reservation was granted to them. Their efforts to become acculturated in Minnesota had been interrupted, many of their older leaders had died in the removal, and their social and cultural life was disrupted and disorganized by the shift in reservations. Although the characterization of the government as "generous" in the final dismissal of the case may sound ironic, it was proper in legal terms. The Court of Claims measured cause for recovery in regard to comparable land values, and the last reservation in question was equal to the first reservation, if not exceeding it in value. The fact that the Winnebago for many years actually resided in the small timbered area of the reservation, being unable to utilize the agricultural lands placed at their disposal in Nebraska, was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Likewise, the loss of the agricultural land through the machinations of vari-

ous white people could not be considered in the case. Situations of this nature illustrated that the real causes of Indian complaints were not being met in the Court of Claims.

Apart from the problem of jurisdiction was the matter of claims which were never pressed although they might have stood a good chance of recovery in the Court of Claims. These were the cases of tribes which had inadequate funds or no funds at all with which to prepare and prosecute their cases.

Along with the awareness of the specific need to solve the questions of jurisdiction and finance in Indian litigation, there gradually developed a public sentiment that justice was due the Indians which required attention. However, this component of conscience which led to the eventual passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act was underscored by two matters of administrative expediency. First, notwithstanding the discouraging statistics in regard to recovery in Indian claims, as Indians became increasingly cognizant of their rights before the law, Congress was petitioned with ever greater frequency for special jurisdictional acts. These cases exhibited certain common features that suggested the possibility of creating some general jurisdictional legislation, thereby saving time and money for both the government and the Indians.

Second, the unsettled claims were recognized as contributing to the difficulties attendant on the over-all administration of Indian affairs. As early as 1928 the situation was summarized succinctly in a special report dealing with Indian problems:

The benevolent desire of the United States government to educate and civilize the Indians cannot be realized with a tribe which has any considerable unsatisfied bona fide claim against the government. The expectation of large awards making all members of the tribe wealthy, the disturbing influ-

ence of outside agitators seeking personal emoluments, and the conviction in the Indian mind that justice is being denied, renders extremely difficult any cooperation between the government and its Indian wards. Besides these practical considerations, the simple canons of justice and morality demand that no Indian tribe should be denied the opportunity to present for adjustment before an appropriate tribunal the rights which the tribe claims under recognized principles of law and government.⁵

The insistence in the above report that legal steps of a judicial nature be taken points up another category of Indian claims besides those which could be dealt with in the Court of Claims if jurisdiction were granted by Congress. Cases in which Congress might grant direct relief will be given special consideration in the discussion of jurisdictional provisions in the Indian Claims Commission Act. It may be noted here, however, that such claims relied even more heavily on the caprice of Congress than did claims arising out of treaties.

FEATURES OF INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION ACT

As a result of the attempt to deal with the sundry issues raised in Indian litigation, the Indian Claims Commission Act contains several features unique in the history of American jurisprudence. It is important to study the Act in detail at this point since the interpretations and regularizations of procedure, which have grown out of the application of the law, are often mistaken for the law itself. Curiously, the general results of cases to date have tended toward a conservative interpretation of the substantive aspects. The procedure in the presentation of evidence and the evidence itself have taken a course that

⁵ Lewis Meriam and Associates, *The Problem of Indian Administration* (Baltimore: Institute for Government Research, 1928), p. 805.

was not within the scope of prediction or expectation of those responsible for the Act.

Apparently, the feature dealt with most easily was the financing of Indian cases. Section 15 of the Act sets forth in detail the arrangements regarding legal representation. Special reference to fees for Indians' attorneys points up two unusual matters. Where tribes are unable to invest in any expenses of litigation, and this is the usual situation, cases may be conducted on an entirely contingent basis. This provision is at sharp variance with ordinary regulations of legal practice. An attorney taking a case of this type risks losing his entire investment. Furthermore, any attorney winning a judgment in favor of his clients may receive no more than 10 per cent of the net judgment, aside from actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of the case. It should be noted that claims which do not involve Indians may result in attorneys' fees covering as much as 25 to 50 per cent of the final award. Despite these stringent regulations, Indians have apparently experienced little difficulty in finding attorneys to take their cases. This may be attributed in part to the huge land areas involved—conceivably the entire United States and a large portion of Alaska—so that even 10 per cent of a judgment appeared to be a sizable sum worth an attorney's efforts.⁶

⁶ Mention should also be made of those attorneys who for many years had been concerned about the discriminatory and complicated aspects involved in Indian claims cases. They greeted the Indian Claims Commission Act as a long needed legal measure and were ready to represent Indian clients under its provisions. No history of the Indian Claims Commission Act is complete without reference to the instrumental role of two attorneys. Ernest L. Wilkinson, as noted in note 4 above, was able to supply a full understanding of the difficulties to be overcome in dealing with Indian litigation, while the late Felix Cohen, Assistant Solicitor in the Department of the In-

Once cases began to be heard, the wording of the Act required interpretation, and, as a consequence, attention has centered on four primary problems. These are the identity of the petitioners, the grounds for suit, the presentation of specialized evidence, and the assessment of land values. The matter of evidence must be considered at the outset since it relates to the other problems. Section 13 (b) also of the Act states that the Commission shall establish an "Investigation Division" to search for evidence in the documents and records of the Court of Claims and the several government departments. Such information is to be submitted to the Commission and also to be made available to the Indians involved and to any interested federal agency. The division has never been established, presumably because it was not considered necessary, and funds were never allocated for this purpose. Section 13 (b) provides for the taking of depositions from aged Indians and other individuals having direct knowledge of claims to be presented.

However, it soon became obvious that evidence would consist of more than official documents or records and direct testimony of Indians or their neighbors. Such evidence required organization and interpretation by experts skilled in work of this type. Consequently, anthropological and historical analyses began to play an important part in claims litigation. Critical study of literature concerning given tribes was buttressed with ethnographic accounts. These offered more complete information and more accurate descriptions than the direct testimony of Indians taken according to the format of legal depositions. Archeological investigations provided information where documentary and ethnographic information was incomplete. Even the

terior at the time the Act was passed, concerned himself deeply with its provisions as a matter of federal duty.

assessment of land values required a background of historical understanding. Again, the Act makes no specific mention of anthropological or historical expertise, but the provisions of Section 18 regarding testimony and the Commission's rules of procedure are sufficiently broad to admit such testimony.⁷

ANTHROPOLOGICAL TESTIMONY

The Court of Claims had used anthropological testimony on only three occasions and no precedents in testimony had been established in this regard, so that the role of expert witness was a new one for archeologists, ethnologists, and ethnohistorians. When differing theoretical positions, analyses, and terminology began to loom significantly in the final outcome of the cases, anthropologists became upset and took little comfort from attorneys' assurances that even mathematicians and engineers differed in their expert testimony. Many anthropologists have suggested that the investigation division be activated and that it provide for the inclusion of testimony by anthropological consultants to deal with specialized information and interpretations. It has also been suggested that pretrial discussions be permitted between experts who felt that the differences in their testimony were more apparent than real and was due to the nature of questions put to them in a litigious situation. However, to date, standard legal procedure has been followed with both the Department of Justice and the Indians' attorneys examining their own experts and cross-examining their opponents' witnesses. The special problems usually considered by these witnesses then concern matters of

Indian identity and grounds for suit. Land values, which enter later into the proceedings, have been the special province of land assessors and historians and will be discussed in another connection.

Turning to the question of identity, Section 2 of the Act sets forth a description of the petitioners which is intended to include all likely claimants within the jurisdiction of the Commission: "any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska." Due to the reliance on anthropologists, these terms have given rise to unexpected semantic complications. One scholar's tribe is another scholar's band; some writers have used the terms synonymously; other anthropologists distinguish different types of tribes and bands depending on their historic origins. Thus, in the case of the Lower or Idaho Kootenai, the social identity of this populational entity was an initial point at issue. Docket 154 before the Indian Claims Commission describes the petitioner as the "Kootenai Tribe or Band of Indians of the State of Idaho," which is an admissible dual designation employed by attorneys to deal with the equivocal wording of the Act. Nevertheless, it was argued by the defense that perhaps the Idaho Kootenai had no right to bring a separate suit as a distinct social entity since the Kootenai in Docket 61 were already bringing suit in the claim of the "Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana." The similarity of names, and the fact that the area claimed was included in the treaty map which was the basis of the Montana tribes' claim, suggested that the Idaho Kootenai were but a geographic subdivision of a single Kootenai tribe. The Montana Kootenai recognized the separate tribal identity of the Idaho Kootenai and stipulated to that effect.

Documentary evidence along with ethnographic information indicated that only the historic accident of linguistic similarity accounted for the designation of the two tribes as "Upper Kootenai" and "Lower Kootenai" in a largely Salish-speaking area. Earlier literature indicated that completely different names were used for each tribe. The Idaho Kootenai had not only been absent from the treaty negotiations of 1855, but for many years were unaware that their lands had been included within the cession boundaries. Although specific definitions of groups must thus be adduced in each case on the basis of distinctive customs, genealogies, locations and the like, the question of a general definition is repeated over and over by attorneys for the petitioners and for the defense: "Now, Doctor, how would *you* define the word tribe? . . . In your opinion, do the petitioner Indians conform to this definition?"

DEFINITIONS OF INDIAN SOCIAL ENTITIES

The phrase "identifiable group of American Indians" appeals to anthropologists as having general utility in distinguishing a cohesive and recognizable social entity whereby the varied and special connotations of tribe and band might be bypassed. Unfortunately, this term has also been construed in different ways. It may have an ethnological and historical basis like tribes or bands. It may also have a legal basis in terms of groups derived as treaty entities or in terms of "statutory groups" created by Congress for administrative expediency, such as "The Indians of California."

The problem of identity goes deeper than simply defining a society, but implies factors of time and socio-cultural continuity. It is necessary to establish the historic relationship of Indians bringing suit as the rightful heirs to

recovery for claims originating one or more generations in the past. In a majority of cases the claims refer to a period from which there are no living survivors. Section 2 provides that all defenses except laches and statutes of limitations may be used by the United States, so that the time covered between the origin of a claim and the hearing regarding it may be a century or longer.

The complications arising in these instances are many and varied. A frequent historic accident was the geographic separation of what was once a single tribe, holding a common territory, into several smaller groups. Such is the case of the Sac and Fox, Ioway, Potawatomi, Winnebago, and many others. Another common situation is that of several tribes who signed a joint treaty and were located on a single reservation. These tribes now have a general tribal council which does not represent the component tribes. Thus, their separate histories must be disentangled, as in the cases of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes already mentioned, the Confederated tribes of the Colville reservation, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold reservation, and others.⁸

⁸ To the layman, the identity of petitioners' legal representatives becomes almost as complex as the identity of the petitioners themselves. According to section 10 of the Act, tribal organizations authorized by the Secretary of the Interior have the exclusive right to bring claims in behalf of their tribes. Where there is no such council, any member may bring a claim in behalf of his tribe. In some tribes different factions have retained different firms of attorneys who have had to make common cause in the Indians' interests. Sometimes a tribe has been divided into separate geographical enclaves, each having a council and its own attorneys who work together in bringing suit in a claim common to all of the branches of the tribes. Several firms may share the burden of preparing contingent cases with the understanding that all will share to an appropriate amount in any judgment which may be awarded.

⁷ Donald C. Gormley, "The Role of the Expert Witness," *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1955), pp. 326-46, discusses expertise generally and with special reference to anthropological testimony in connection with the Indian Claims Commission Act.

On the Northwest coast another type of confusion may be seen in the fact that in the 1850's the treaty commissioners were directed to combine little tribes into big tribes and locate as many as possible on single reservations. The Quileute of the Olympic Peninsula offer an example of this situation. These people lived at the mouth of the Quileute River and in a few villages located further upstream. The question arose as to whether the various villages brought together on a single Quileute reservation represented separate little tribes which ought each to bring suit, or whether all formed an original tribe. There seemed to be little question, at least in the minds of the petitioner Indians and their attorneys, that all of the people on the Quileute River belonged to one tribe as indicated by genealogies and other cultural data. However, other villages located on the neighboring Hoh River also spoke Quileute and seemed to be part of the same tribe on the basis of kinship and common customs. They had been reluctant to move to the Quileute reservation and were eventually given a tiny reservation on the Hoh River. Since the claim embraced the watersheds of the Hoh and Quileute Rivers as one large tract, the identity of the petitioners was assured in Docket 155 with the complicated designation of: "The Quileute Tribe of Indians, on its own behalf, Quileute Tribe of Indians, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Hoh Tribe or Band of Indians; Hoh Tribe or Band of Indians, on the relation of and represented by Scott Fisher, on its own Behalf."

In other cases the attempt at consolidation of claims as a single tribe has been unsuccessful. A number of Chippewa brought a common suit as the Chippewa nation since they had been so designated in various treaties. When the claim, Docket No. 126, was first brought to the Court of Claims, the

Chippewa nation was directed to reduce the matter into the separate claims of the component bands of the Chippewa nation. Chippewa claims later heard by the Commission were likewise set forth on the basis of separate bands. The Commission took a similar view concerning the *Ottawa* Case, Docket No. 2, where the Ottawa were interpreted as comprising several bands notwithstanding treaty terminology concerning the Ottawa nation.

CLAIMS CATEGORIES

Similar to the difficulties raised in the latitude of jurisdiction in the description of petitioners are those involved in the broad grounds for claims. The five categories of claims as set forth in Section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act will be discussed in the order given.

(1) Claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties of the United States and Executive Orders of the President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, including those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant would be entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any other ground cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as a result of treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by claimant without payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5) claims based on fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.

The first two clauses admit of easy interpretation according to ordinary legal tenets, but clauses three, four, and five bear special notice as being peculiar to Indian litigation and without precedent in American law. In regard to the third

clause, the Chief of the Indian Claims Section of the Department of Justice has noted:

Treaties between the United States and foreign nations have been freely construed by our courts, but never before has any court had any jurisdiction to "revise" a treaty. This has always been considered a political matter completely outside the scope of judicial inquiry. And technically this separation of powers has been preserved for you will notice that the Commission and the courts are not given authority to actually revise the treaty but only to grant relief "as if" the treaty were revised.⁹

Clause four was the subject of much legal debate until it was finally settled that the Indian Claims Commission has jurisdiction over claims based on "Indian title," that is, title derived from the simple use and occupancy of a given land. The Department of Justice made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to eliminate such aboriginal title claims from the Indian Claims Commission Act when the Act was under consideration for amendment to extend its tenure for five years beyond 1957. The question was settled on the outcome of two important cases which will be discussed. However, the historical circumstances underlying the legal reasoning in these cases must be reviewed.

The terms "time immemorial" and "Indian title" figure so prominently in discussions of Indian claims that it is surprising to note that neither phrase occurs anywhere in the Indian Claims Commission Act. Nor do the terms imply, as is often erroneously assumed, that Indian tribes must establish their claims as aboriginal holdings since "time immemorial." However, the theory of

⁹ Ralph Barney, "Legal Problems Peculiar to Indian Claims Litigation," *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1955), p. 316. The total article, pp. 315-25, notes, among other matters, further instances in the difficulties of designating the petitioner Indians.

immemorial possession is fundamental to Indian claims to land in general since the United States' dealings with the Indians rested on precedents established by earlier governments such as those of France and England; and these governments recognized Indians as the original occupants of the American continent. France entered into various agreements with different tribes whereby French sovereignty was extended over Indian country, but it was understood that the Indians would remain in possession of the soil and retain its use as was their customary wont. England, being more interested in actual colonization, declared that land acquired from Indians should be paid for, although English sovereignty was already established in a territory as a replacement of Indian sovereignty or that of another European nation. The crown also reserved the right to enter into such purchases and denied private citizens the authority to buy land directly from the Indians.¹⁰

UNITED STATES TREATIES WITH INDIANS

The United States followed this reasoning in entering into treaties with Indians as if they were foreign nations. The Treaty of Greenville in 1795 is an outstanding early example in this connection, since the Indians had been soundly defeated and United States sovereignty extended over the Ohio Valley on the basis of conquest. Neverthe-

¹⁰ "Important Western State Papers," *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, Vol. 11 (1888), pp. 26-63, reprints an interesting series of rare documents and cites others illustrating this sequence of French, English, and American philosophies of sovereignty in regard to the Old Northwest. In this connection, Section 12 of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802 (2 Stat. 139) also enunciates the doctrine that land negotiations with Indians must be made pursuant to the Constitution and are not the province of private citizens.

less, the tribes concerned were paid for the cession of territory east of the line designated in the treaty to separate white settlement from Indian lands.¹¹ However, in some instances land was simply appropriated by white settlers and the Indians dispersed without compensation before treaties could be negotiated. In other cases, Indians remained on certain land which was later secured to them by Acts of Congress or Executive Orders of the President. Finally, some lands were held under Indian title, that is, without special recognition and often for long periods of time. Usually this was done with the understanding that some official recognition would eventually be made. In the last category was the case of the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians of Alaska which raised many questions and a good deal of consternation among Indians' lawyers in terms of possible relationships to claims before the Commission. In 1951 these Indians filed a claim before the Court of Claims for compensation for timber taken by the United States. Recovery was not allowed, and the case was brought before the Supreme Court which

¹¹ The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, re-enacted and confirmed in 1789 (1 Stat. 50), underlay such provisions as are illustrated in the Treaty of Greenville:

"The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall, from time to time, be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them."

These features were in effect extended to the Louisiana Territory in 1804 by an Act of Congress (2 Stat. 283).

The status of Indian tribes as nations was not only implied in the fact that treaties were negotiated with them but in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in 1823 in *Johnson v. McIntosh*, 8 Wheat, U.S. 543.

affirmed the negative decision of the Court of Claims.

The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Reed, begins with the observation that:

This is not a case that is connected with any phase of the policy of Congress, continued throughout our history, to extinguish Indian title through negotiation rather than by force, and to grant payments from the public purse to needy descendants of exploited Indians.

Indian title was then discussed in terms of sovereignty held over such land by the United States through conquest. It was decided that Indian title is merely the right of occupancy, not property, and places the government under no obligation to compensate Indians for such lands. This type of title is "unrecognized" in comparison to "recognized title" deriving from treaties or Acts of Congress; only recognized title would be compensable. Since the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians based their claims on the Fifth Amendment, the opinion concludes that in affirming the decision of the Court of Claims, "it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle." It was also stated in the opinion that Congress has power to take or use Indian title without compensation, but makes provision for tribes to recover for wrongs, "as a matter of grace, not because of legal liability."¹²

Taken as whole, the decision might have implied that all cases of Indian title would have to be recognized by Congress before being submitted to judicial processes. Applied to claims pend-

¹² Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 273, 282, 291 (1955); the decision of the Court of Claims is reported in 128 Court of Claims 82 (1954).

ing before the Indian Claims Commission, it was questioned whether or not the decision might lead to exclusion of all cases of Indian title from the general jurisdiction of the Commission. A test was provided in 1953 when the *Otoe and Missouri* case, in which the Commission recognized the government liable under Indian title, was appealed to the Court of Claims.¹³

The Court of Claims sustained the decision of the Indian Claims Commission,¹⁴ and the Supreme Court declined to review the case.¹⁵ The phrase in clause four, "claims . . . as the result of treaty of cession or otherwise . . .," was finally clarified to include Indian title within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Congress, in passing a general jurisdictional act, had fulfilled provisions lacking in the *Tee-Hit-Ton* case which had reached the Supreme Court directly through the Court of Claims. The sigh of relief of Indian tribes and their attorneys was said to be audible for miles around.

JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE FIVE

The final jurisdictional clause concerning "fair and honorable dealings" has been the subject of much debate and has never been settled in the manner of Indian title. The government has argued consistently that it means moral claims and is not intended as an alternative method of securing relief in the event that a case is not proven under technical legal rules. However, in one case at least, the disparity between the price paid a claimant for lands and the then current market value of the lands was so great that the Commissioners entered a judgment for the difference on the basis of clause five. They stated that while there might not have been

sufficient basis for a claim on the grounds of unconscionable consideration, yet the evidence did demonstrate a lack of fair and honorable dealings with the *Otoe* and *Missouria* Indians on the part of the United States.¹⁶

Despite the broad jurisdictional provisions, especially in clause five, Indians' attorneys have found it expedient to base claims for restitution on tangible and measurable considerations. As a result, the majority of claims have centered in land to such an extent that the Commission is understandably, albeit erroneously, referred to as the "Indian Land Claims Commission." Although our courts have granted judgments for "mental anguish" and similar grounds, these have been individual claims and have thus apparently influenced the thinking of the Commissioners. One of the first claims decided by the Commission was that of the survivors of Geronimo's band of Apaches for unfair imprisonment, and it was dismissed as being based on individual claims whereas the jurisdiction of the Commission extends only to group or tribal claims.¹⁷

Nevertheless, within the framework of claims for land, the provisions of the Act allow inclusion of evidence which is peculiarly Indian in nature. As has been noted, the matter of treaty and nontreaty cases was finally settled, but further discussion is in order. Ostensibly, where the government outlined Indian holdings in treaties, the land in question would be more easily defined and accepted in any claim based on such treaty. Where no treaty was made, occupancy and use would have to be determined by historical and anthropological evidence. Actually, it is necessary to establish such use and occupancy whether or not boundaries were defined

¹⁶ *Otoe and Missouri Tribe v. United States*, 2 Indian Claims Commission, 335, 365 (1953).

¹⁷ *Fort Sill Apaches v. United States*, 1 Indian Claims Commission 137 (1949).

¹³ 2 Indian Claims Commission 335.

¹⁴ 131 Court of Claims 593.

¹⁵ 350 U.S. 848.

by treaty. According to clause three, it is noted that claims may arise out of negotiations in which fraud, duress, and mutual or unilateral mistake may have played a part. When it is recalled that in many instances treaties were discussed through interpreters involving several Indian languages and perhaps French or Spanish, the possibility of misrepresentation or misunderstanding is apparent. Furthermore, Indian parties to given treaties were usually non-literate and dependent on their unlettered interpreters for understanding of the document they signed with an X. Both from the point of view of the Department of Justice and from that of the Indians' attorneys, it is desirable to review the circumstances regarding a claim at the time it originated.

It is in this respect that anthropological testimony has come into particular use and is the basis of some disagreement among various scholars. Indian tribes differed in their concepts of territory. Some groups have reliably clear-cut ideas about boundaries while others know only their customary habits which the ethnologist must collate and locate in terms of mapping village areas, hunting grounds, and the like. Concern over the problems of use and occupancy have resulted in several major discussions at professional gatherings of anthropologists wherein the points at issue have at least been clarified if not settled to everyone's satisfaction.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cf. "Anthropology and Indian Claims Litigation: Papers Presented at A Symposium Held at Detroit, in December, 1954" [Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association], *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1955), pp. 287-375; Robert A. Manners, "The Land Claims Cases: Anthropologists in Conflict," *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1956), pp. 72-81; and Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "A Reply to 'The Land Claims Cases: Anthropologists in Conflict,'" *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1956), pp. 256-79. Discussion of Indian claims held at the Central States Meeting of the American Anthropological Society held at Bloomington,

TRIBAL BOUNDARIES

It is naturally to the interests of the Indians to claim as large an area as possible, whereas the Department of Justice is concerned with reducing or eliminating claims on the basis of evidence presented. Americanists have traditionally mapped tribal boundaries in terms of contiguous territories, and this concept has been generally accepted by Indians' attorneys with modifications of details of given lines suggested by more intensive study of specific tribes. The Department of Justice has questioned this approach insofar as different parts of a tribe's territory may have been used more intensively than others. This has given rise to a theory of land use and occupancy based on "nuclear areas" surrounded by vacuums of relatively little used and scarcely occupied land. A claim might be reduced significantly by this interpretation. As far as anthropologists are concerned, the question remains open whether the traditional techniques of tribal mapping are simply an established convention convenient for academic purposes, or whether such maps reflect the empirical conclusions of many independent researchers in regard to the proper designation of territoriality of human groups generally considered. This reassessment of tribal mapping suggests that neither system can be taken as *THE* theory of Indian use and occupancy, but that each case must be discussed in terms of the facts available.¹⁹

Indiana, in May 1955, as a follow-up of the Detroit Symposium is noted in the last two papers cited above.

¹⁹ Cf. Verne F. Ray, [a review of] Harold E. Driver, *et al.*, "Indian Tribes of North America" (Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics: Memoir 9, International Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 19, No. 3, Supplement, Baltimore, 1953), in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Part I, February 1955, pp. 145-46; and Harold E. Driver

The Department of Justice has tended to emphasize intensive economic utilization of land as the basis of use and occupancy, whereas attorneys for Indians have included in evidence both expert testimony and documentary information regarding seasonal and noneconomic factors. Game and plant life, it is argued, had to be allowed to multiply to assure a regular supply of food. Thus, given areas might be intensively used only for brief seasons. Or, certain areas of limited economic activities might have tremendous social significance for a group so that the loss of a particular tract of land worked a real hardship in the established life of the people. Thus, the gathering of certain plant foods such as berries in the Plateau area might not have meant economic necessity, but did represent an important seasonal activity which helped underscore an identifying characteristic of tribes in the area. It was also pointed out that in the Plateau given lands were prized simply because they were isolated and not intensively used, except in connection with the vision quest. For a group to exist in its customary manner, it was necessary for men to seek visions which required lonely retreats. Many tribes had areas that were considered dangerous or sacred and were thus seldom visited. These areas, however, held an important value in the ethos of such groups and caused a sense of loss in their desecration by white occupancy or by removal of the Indians from a familiar terrain.

Whether an interpretation of "bread alone" is to be made, or whether the broad jurisdictional provisions allowing of extraordinary claims will be interpreted to include loss in a total way of life, as real as the loss of the land, remains the province of the Commissioners. However, a certain selectivity of

[a reply to Verne F. Ray] in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58, No. 1, February 1956, pp. 184-85.

data in this regard is inevitable depending on which attorneys propound questions put to expert witnesses.

Various precedents have been adduced to insist that a claim must be based on exclusive use and occupancy by a particular tribe.²⁰ Generally, this would seem a reasonable demand. Temporary claims to disputed territories would lead to endless litigation, and, after all, the suits are brought against the United States, not between tribes. However, this circumstance has made attorneys reluctant to press any claims regarding shared lands. It is common knowledge among anthropologists that certain lands were known as neutral grounds, such as the immediate vicinity of given natural resources, or were areas reserved for intertribal games. Two or more tribes could conceivably hold an equity in such lands and derive a significant part of their sustenance or social identity therefrom. In other instances, the recognized owners of a given area permitted neighbors to visit and share in the local resources as occurred in the Celilo fisheries on the Columbia River. Sometimes, an apparent case of mutual land use cannot be taken at face value. The influence of such leaders as Tecumseh led to statements by Indians in treaty negotiations which are masterpieces of vagueness about tribal boundaries and an embarrassment to the speakers' descendants. The seeming obtuseness concerning boundaries or specific tribal areas was a ploy designed to hamper discussions that might lead to land cessions.²¹

²⁰ See *United States ex rel Walapai Tribe v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company*, 314 U.S. 339.

²¹ This is admittedly an interpretation with which the Commissioners may choose to disagree, but it has the virtue of being an independent conclusion reached by at least one other ethnologist who has reviewed the data on various tribes in the Great Lakes region—personal communication of Anthony C. Wal-

The astonishing complications possible in regard to the location of given tribes are well illustrated in the case of the *Ioway, Sac and Fox, and Omaha*, Docket 138. On August 19, 1825, these tribes along with some Sioux and Otoes signed a treaty at Prairie du Chien whereby a designated area in northern Missouri and western Iowa, known as the "Trust Lands," was secured by the Ioway, Sac and Fox, and Omaha. It was understood that at some future date the government would enter into another treaty establishing lines between the tribes. Such a treaty was never effected, and the petitioner Indians claim that they were misinformed concerning the next treaty signed at Prairie du Chien on July 15, 1830. This was construed by the government as a treaty of cession, whereas the Indians believed that if they relinquished their common right to the land, the government would then designate the specific tribal areas within the "Trust Lands." Meanwhile, in the intervening five years, the three tribes began to work out their own areas of use and occupancy.

Documentary evidence was presented showing that the Indians divided lands in practice and did not wander over them haphazardly. The Indians' witness blocked out the tribal lands as had been done frequently in nontreaty cases. Thus, it was with some surprise that the expert found the propriety of his action challenged by the defense. The curious upshot was that other experts were then called in to testify to the good faith, scholarly conventionality, and academic correctness of the first expert's opinion.

INDIAN CLAIMS

The question of tribal replacements in given territories during historic times is exceedingly complex in such areas as the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes region. A

shift in locations was set in motion by the Iroquois wars of the seventeenth century, and further disturbance was produced when England and the United States contested for ownership of the country. This situation prompted the Department of Justice to finance a center for ethnohistorical study at Indiana University to do research in approximately 100 claims in the Great Lakes region.²² Just how long a tribe had to be using and occupying an area exclusively before it was lost to the United States has never been determined precisely in making claims for restitution. Generally, however, the Commissioners have been interested in materials relating specifically to the time of origin of a claim rather than to the prehistoric past.

After a tribe has actually proven a case of use and occupancy, a second phase of historical analysis comes into play. The actual value of the land must be determined, and gratuities granted a tribe in the past must be assessed for possible offsets against the eventual judgment. A certain reluctance on the part of Indians' attorneys to discuss Indian claims in the public prints reflects anxiety over the possible size of the still undetermined figure of the total amount of Indian claims. It is believed that what public sympathy might be aroused in the interests of the Indians would be more than offset by the average taxpayer's fears about the drain on the public purse. These fears seem somewhat groundless on the basis of figures available through January 5, 1956. Of the 102 claims decided by the Commission by that date, the Indians have been allowed recovery in 21 cases. The amount of money has been reduced from at least \$890,000,000 claimed to

²² See *Bulletin* of the American Anthropological Association, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1954), p. 17 for announcement and description of the Center.

\$13,283,477.25 awarded.²³ This is a percentage of awards to claims of 1.5 per cent.

It should be noted that the early cases tended to be reduced to a striking degree since the size of claims was necessarily estimated somewhat provisionally. It was uncertain at the outset what sort of legal theory ought to underlie the attorneys' preparations, and thus, in some instances, a practice common in other types of claims was utilized. That is, an excessive amount was set forth with the tacit understanding that the attorneys for the petitioners and for the defense would engage in a sort of legal haggling and reduce it to about what the Indians' attorneys had hoped to obtain in the first place. As more anthropologists took part in these cases and became more sophisticated in the operations of the law, they realized that they could exercise some control over phases of the cases that antedated the period in which their services were requested. Consequently, where a witness feels that a petition does not conform to the facts as he knows them, the petition can be amended to form an accurate statement of the claim on the basis of available data. In other instances, claims may be enlarged as anthropological evidence indicates the propriety of such a course.

NUMBER OF CASES

It may be noted that many of the illustrations used in this article are merely reflections of the problems raised and the types of evidence used in Indian claims without reference to the final determination of the cases. This

²³ These figures are based on a compilation made by the Commission. Of the total of 102 claims decided, only 78 claimed specific amounts giving the total of \$890,000,000. No definite amount was claimed in the rest of the cases, but the Commission has advised that the amount claimed, as estimated, was between \$1,000,000,000 and \$1,200,000,000.

circumstance is related to the huge number of claims filed, approximately 852, and the necessarily slow process of dealing with them. Since so many cases are still pending, it is rather early to attempt any sort of general assessment of the Indian Claims Commission Act. Nevertheless, certain trends may be noted. First, these claims will simply not be settled when the Commission expires in 1962, even though all of the cases may be heard and adjudicated by the Commission. Cases can be, and generally are, appealed to the United States Court of Claims by either party. They can then be taken to the Supreme Court, or at least a petition may be filed for that Court to hear them. Thus far, the Supreme Court has declined to hear any such appeals. However, the frequent application to the Court of Claims alone offers a certain reasonable basis for the somewhat jocular estimates expressed by anthropologists that they look forward to twenty-five years of employment in Indian claims.

While the amount awarded may not come close to the amount claimed in Indian cases, there remains the possibility that some tribes will be put in possession of large amounts of money. No definite arrangements have been made for this eventuality, although carefully planned economic and social programs have been developed by tribes which have been awarded judgments in the past, such as the Menominee and the Ute. Concern has been expressed by both Indians and interested white people that the result may be similar to the unfortunate experiences of the famous "oil Indians." Even where awards are small, they might have enduring value if invested for tribal benefits rather than simply divided among the individual members of the group. However, the Indians are understandably concerned with personal payments, associating the management of their re-

sources with part of their general grievances against the government.

The chances are that even the tribes that actually win awards will not be completely satisfied. As far as some tribes are concerned, the idea that the Commission would settle Indian grievances once and for all has already fallen short of its goal. Although an occasional Indian will recognize an unfortunate and sometimes unwarranted tendency to self-pity on the part of his fellows, lost claims or unregulated recoveries may contribute further complications and grievances despite the benevolent intent of the Indian Claims Commission Act. It is useless, however, to argue that the Act should have never been put into effect. Obviously, the same process would take place, and with less satisfactory techniques and results, by the earlier means of Acts of Congress and recourse to the Court of Claims. Although the Indian Claims Commission Act contains revolutionary provisions in the light of American legal history, it remains a legal instrument and must be assessed as such. It cannot be expected to work as a cure-all

for Indian complaints of a socio-historical nature involving intangible factors beyond any possible legal interpretation.

Through the provisions of the Act itself, Indians were informed by their superintendents of the existence of the Commission and of their right to bring claims. This educational function might be extended to prepare programs for those Indians likely to receive awards. Where recoveries may be small or nothing will likely be gained from a claim, Indians should be informed of what the Act can do and cannot do, and why this is the case. Anyone familiar with Indians knows that these are not easy tasks to carry out since it was the generalized sense of Indian discontent itself that led to efforts to satisfy claims as a means of furthering effective administration of Indian affairs. Nevertheless, the cases are being settled slowly, and with the increasing economic sophistication of at least the younger Indians, there is yet time to develop policies to further implement the fundamental philosophy of the Indian Claims Commission Act.

The Economic Basis of Indian Life

By WILLIAM H. KELLY *

Abstract: Many Indians are solving their economic problems by turning to off-reservation wage work in industry and business. However, most Indians continue to live on reservations where, for a number of reasons, agricultural income must be supplemented with wages from seasonal and periodic off-reservation wage work. The result is an income for Indian families generally lower than among neighboring non-Indians, with some localities suffering severe economic depression. The Indian attachment to reservation life is strong and hinders the normal absorption of Indians into the general population. Federal assistance programs include both an effort to develop reservation resources and to encourage Indians to relocate in industrial centers.

AN Associated Press story, dated Window Rock, Arizona, February 16, 1957, announced the payment of 33 million dollars to the Navaho Indians last November for the lease of oil lands on their reservation. Other tribes in Oklahoma, Montana, Wyoming, and elsewhere have received similar publicity in the past with respect to their income from mineral resources. During fiscal year 1955-56 the total payment to all Indian tribes in return for oil leases was 41 million dollars.¹

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¹ Information not otherwise credited is from the files of the Bureau of Ethnic Research, University of Arizona, and was originally secured from reports and documents prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, state departments of public welfare, state offices of employment, tribal councils, and similar offices.

However fortunate some tribes and individuals may be, the economic condition of American Indians in general has not been affected. The economic basis of Indian life is income from wage work, largely periodic and seasonal, which is used to support an uneconomic system of land ownership and land utilization. This is true even for the Navaho, presently enjoying the largest tribal income in the country, because oil income is not being paid per capita to the 80,000 tribesmen, but is being used for educational and resources development purposes.

Under ordinary circumstances, low income from a combined farming-wage work type of economic adjustment would not be a matter for special understanding when found among members of a folk society in a rural environment. Interest and concern for the Indians stem from the fact that they are not moving into the American economic system in the same way or on equal terms with other citizens, despite the fact that they represent the one minority group in this country whose economic and social well-

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being has been the special responsibility of, and partly subsidized by, the federal government.

In 1887, about 240,000 Indians held 138,000,000 acres of land as tribal property. A federal plan adopted at that time called for the allotment of small farms and ranches to individual Indians, the disposal of the remaining lands to non-Indians, and the protection of Indian allotments under a trust arrangement to be continued for twenty-five years; at which time the Indians would be free to use or dispose of their land as they wished. Looking ahead, the federal government expected the Indian land base to provide the economic springboard by means of which the Indian could enter the American economy at a satisfactory level. It was expected that most would hold, or even expand, their farm and ranch properties while others, following the example of non-Indians, would gradually break their reservation ties and become assimilated into the general population.

As is now known, insofar as most American Indian groups are concerned, this expectation violated the basic principles of the relation of cultural systems to economics. If left undisturbed the outcome would have produced poverty and excessive hardship, through the rapid liquidation of Indian holdings, for the great majority of Indians.

Actually many reservations, particularly in the Southwest, were not allotted. On other reservations the period of twenty-five years during which Indian land was to be held in trust has been extended. Other efforts designed to assist and protect the Indians culminated, in 1934, in a new policy, the Indian Reorganization Act. The IRA called for the creation of tribal self-government, formation of tribal corporations, control of tribal financial resources, protection and development of Indian land, and the education and training of Indians

for eventual participation in the American economic system.

The new policy was effective in putting a temporary halt to the alienation of Indian landholdings but, as administered, created a serious dilemma. It attempted to train Indians for life in a competitive individualistic off-reservation society, but it failed to establish an Indian economic system on the reservation which would evolve toward the economic practices and institutions of such a society.

No one knows whether such evolution of tribal economics would have been possible, or might still be possible, in view of the relative inflexibility of federal management and the Indian interpretation of their own situation. Over and above their recognition of the obvious, immediate advantages in continuing Indian land in trust status, such as tax exemption and special services, Indians have sought to maintain a degree of social isolation and have made Indian land a symbol of Indian independence and group security.

Unlike immigrants, Indians have typically viewed the United States as a land of deprivation, and not as the land of opportunity. The original recognition of tribal sovereignty by the federal government—parts of which carry over into present federal-Indian relations—the tradition of “unjust” conquest, plus other similar factors, have operated to produce Indian resistance to the loss of tribal identity. Indians have fought against the tribal “death sentence” implicit in the concept of the melting pot, and they have resisted efforts to bring about their assimilation.

This brings us back to the general statement above. Indians identify themselves with Indian land and, if they are landless, they identify themselves with the land of relatives or fellow tribesmen. They prefer to live on Indian land and to attempt to make a living from the

land, even though this means economic hardship. The inevitable answer, given the Indian interests and experience, is a low income from a combination of agriculture and wage work, with wage work usually secured off the reservation on a periodic or seasonal basis.

INDIAN FAMILY INCOME

Indian families must support themselves, the same as non-Indians. For the United States as a whole, the 1950 Census reported a median family income of \$983 for reservation Indians.² This figure does not include the value of income “in kind,” such as food produced and consumed in the home (more than 10 per cent on some reservations), and free living quarters. Neither does it include the value of special economic advantages enjoyed by most Indians: freedom from property taxes and some income taxes, free medical care, free subsistence for children in boarding schools, and many free services found on some reservations such as water for livestock and domestic use.

The 1950 Census figure itself is probably low since enumerators, especially in the Indian case, could not be expected to secure knowledge of income from all sources. In any event, it is known that Indian income has risen, along with family incomes generally, during the past seven years. Recent estimates of income among Southwestern tribes suggest that those groups with extremely low incomes in 1949 have improved their position. The Navaho and Hopi are good examples. In both instances, the increased family income has come from new federal payrolls incident to a program of school, road, and similar construction on the reservation and to other wage work. In the Navaho case,

² U. S. Bureau of the Census, “Family Income of Reservation Indians by State Agency and Reservation.” Mimeographed. (Washington, 1953), p. 1.

there has also been new sources of wage income from mineral and oil development on the reservation. In 1949 the median family income, as reported by the Census, was \$526 for the Navaho and \$389 for the Hopi.³ In 1955 the Indian service calculation of the average family income among the Navaho was \$2,250, and among the Hopi, \$1,274, with some known sources of income among the Hopi not included.⁴

Other Southwestern tribes have had greatly increased incomes during recent years, but this has been due to per capita payments from tribal income derived from the settlement of claims cases and from oil and gas leases and bonuses. The Northern Ute on the Uintah and Ouray reservation in Utah, for example, had an average family income of \$4,400 in 1955 as opposed to a “normal” median family income of \$1,357 in 1949.⁵

Navaho family income is worth reporting in detail since it reveals an increased dependence upon off-reservation wage work. This dependence has marked the history of other reservation Indians when extreme isolation has broken down.

According to the above figures, Navaho family income from farming and stock raising, hitherto considered the principal source of Navaho income, is less than 12 per cent of the total. Since there is hardly a family on the reservation that does not have an interest in cattle or sheep, the Navaho reservation represents an extreme example of Indian dependence upon multiple sources of in-

³ U. S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 1, 5.

⁴ Robert W. Young, *The Navajo Yearbook of Planning in Action*, Report No. V, Calendar Year 1955 (Window Rock, Ariz.: Navaho Agency, 1956), p. 64. Average income is based upon an estimated 16,000 Navaho families who had a total income of more than \$35,000,000. Hopi information is from Agency records on 644 families who had a total known income of over \$800,000.

⁵ U. S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 5.

TABLE 1—ESTIMATED NAVAHO FAMILY INCOME, FISCAL YEAR 1955^a

EMPLOYMENT	INCOME
Seasonal off-reservation agricultural employment.....	\$2,000,000
Nonagricultural off-reservation employment.....	3,311,680
Self-placed off-reservation employment.....	1,000,000
Railroad employment off reservation.....	8,005,317
Railroad unemployment compensation.....	2,668,439
Federal employment off reservation.....	2,618,394
Federal employment on reservation.....	3,476,307
Tribal enterprises employment on reservation.....	1,399,731
Farming and stock raising on reservation.....	4,000,000
Private industry employment on reservation.....	1,772,560
Public assistance and other welfare.....	2,335,185
Old age and survivors benefits.....	256,436
Miscellaneous.....	2,530,000
Total.....	\$35,374,049

^a Young, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 65.

come, with Indian farming and stock raising representing the common single source. Some other percentages are: total wage income, 67 per cent; off-reservation wage income, 48 per cent; unearned income, 16 per cent.

Occupation groups

Figures on income are in keeping with information on Indian occupational groups. These figures show the heavy percentage of Indians in the United

TABLE 2—PERCENTAGES BY OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED UNITED STATES INDIAN MALES AND OF ALL UNITED STATES MALES

MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP	PER CENT OF INDIAN MALES ^a	PER CENT OF ALL MALES ^b
Professional, technical, and kindred workers.....	2.54	7.35
Farmers and farm managers.....	24.24	10.52
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm.....	1.96	10.66
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers.....	3.15	13.04
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers.....	11.00	18.85
Operatives and kindred workers.....	13.09	20.32
Private household workers.....	.25	.18
Service workers, except private household.....	3.63	5.94
Farm laborers, unpaid family workers.....	8.26	1.53
Farm laborers, except unpaid and farm foremen.....	14.10	3.40
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	17.78	8.21
	100.00	100.00

^a U. S. Bureau of the Census. *U. S. Census of Population: 1950*. Vol. IV, *Special Reports*, Part 3, Chapter B, "Nonwhite Population by Race." (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 32.

^b U. S. Bureau of the Census. *U. S. Census of Population: 1950*. Vol. IV, *Special Reports*, Part 1, Chapter B, "Occupational Characteristics." (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 15-22.

States in low income jobs and in types of work which permit periodic and seasonal employment. Information is from the 1950 Census which does not list multiple sources of income, but gives a single occupation determined by the source from which the principal income was received during the census week. Statistics for both groups are based upon civilian males fourteen years of age and older.

These figures illustrate and document the assertion that Indian earning power is concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled work. Almost 65 per cent of the Indian labor force is found in farming, farm labor, and unskilled industrial labor, as opposed to only 24 per cent of non-Indian civilian workers.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LABOR FORCE⁶

Wage work, in contrast with profit-earning enterprises where the Indian must accept non-Indian patterns and values, represents an acceptable mode of economic adjustment for all Indians. Indian interests and attitudes, however, stand in their way when there is an opportunity to step up to permanent skilled or semiskilled employment. One reason for this is that Indian values do not lead the individual to consider work, in itself, as a virtue or as a source of personal prestige. Wage work, in their eyes, is a means to an end; and the few things that an unacculturated Indian might buy have sufficient attraction to move him to seek a higher income by way of year-round jobs which call for an unbroken sequence of work days. Life for Indian men in aboriginal times

was often strenuous and periodically intense, but seldom routine.

Even wealth, as a symbol of success and prestige, which is so common in our society as a motive for economic activity, is not important to most Indians outside the north Pacific coast—in an extreme case, among southern California and southern Arizona tribes, wealth was, until quite recently, entirely meaningless. Indian Service administrators have spent much time and effort in an attempt to induce Indians to improve the appearance of their homes and farms. Where this is more symbolic than functional the Indians have not been interested.

Not all Indians, however, who would elect to improve their economic position are able to do so. Most reservations are isolated from industrial and trading centers. In Arizona, 66 per cent of the Indian population lives in counties containing 3.4 per cent of the non-Indian population. Under such conditions, relatively few Indian boys and girls have had the opportunity to secure training in the kinds of jobs which so frequently prepare other young men and women for skilled and semiskilled types of employment. Added to this is the general lack of education, formal and informal, in the skills and social patterns associated with permanent off-reservation employment.

Perhaps the greatest present deficiency in Indian training for permanent employment is the small number of students who receive an adequate formal education. During 1955-56 only 13 per cent of Indian children in Indian Service schools were in high school as compared with more than 23 per cent for the United States as a whole.⁷ Pres-

⁶ Indian tribes are no longer culturally homogeneous and for this reason behavior is not predictable on the basis of a knowledge of aboriginal patterns. The generalizations in this paper, however, are felt to hold true for the majority of Indians, especially on the larger reservations.

⁷ U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. *Statistics Concerning Indian Education, Fiscal Year 1956*. (Washington, 1956), p. 34. Figures on Indian students in public and mission schools are not available.

ent trends, however, indicate that there will be a considerable improvement in this situation in the next few years.

INADEQUATE RESERVATION RESOURCES

According to rough estimates by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, there are 20,534 "excess" families on Indian reservations.⁸ This is based upon an estimate of the number of families who, under present conditions, could earn their entire income on the reservation at a level comparable to the income of their non-Indian neighbors. The reason for this "overpopulation" is, of course, the inadequacy of reservation resources and the absence of industrial and business establishments. Another reason lies in the failure to increase the productivity of developed resources to their fullest potential. This traces to Indian work habits and to their lack of training and experience. Other factors are the lack of adequate capital and credit, the uneconomic system of land ownership, special limitations on individual Indian holdings, and other aspects of federal programs and the federal-Indian trust relationship.

This complicated system of interdependent factors is an outgrowth of Indian practices and the peculiar economics of trust management. On tribal land, Indians, unlike non-Indians, hold undivided economic as well as social and political rights on their reservations. The tendency in administration, therefore, has been to maintain an even dis-

⁸ House of Representatives, Report With Respect to the House Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Pursuant to House of Representatives 698, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session. Union Calendar No. 790, House Report No. 2503. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 110. Indian families referred to are "reservation" Indians. The count therefore includes Indians who supplement their income or earn their entire income from off-reservation employment.

tribution of property, of federal economic help, and educational and social services among all Indians. A constant effort is made, as in agricultural extension work, to continue to attempt to help all Indians, including those who cannot be helped. On some reservations where stock is grazed on tribal land there are ordinances limiting individual holdings to the level of subsistence. On reservations where individual allotments are held in trust, Indians cannot bargain directly with each other; and the purchase of land from one Indian by another must be at an appraised value and approved by a federal official.

Under the assumption—which has come to have almost legal force—that all Indians are entitled to anything which any Indian receives, efforts to help the Indians who need and can benefit from economic help are obstructed. When, for example, new land is subjugated under an irrigation system, many of the Indians who are given land are Indians who have become successful off the reservation and return to take advantage of a better opportunity.

On most allotted reservations a great deal of Indian farm land lies idle or is used with minimum efficiency because of the existence of "fractionated heirship land," the most amazing example of economic obstruction found in the administration of Indian affairs. When Indian lands were allotted after 1887 it was expected that, at the end of twenty-five years, fee-simple titles would be issued and the matter of land ownership among the heirs of the original allottees could become subject to their own determination. However, when the twenty-five year period was extended, Indian heirs, except in the rare case of Indians who determined the disposition of their property by will, multiplied with each generation. With multiple ownership, and without a system for dictating land use and control among the heirs, eco-

nomic units became so fractionated as to be worthless except in some instances where land could be leased to a single operator and the income distributed among the heirs.

Allotted Indian trust lands, according to a 1952 tabulation, totaled 115,130 individual tracts; this included land in excess of 14,000,000 acres in twenty-one states and Alaska. By ownership status, these 115,130 tracts were held as follows:⁹

By living original allottee	43,537
By other single owner	16,919
Jointly, 2 to 5 owners	31,212
Jointly, 6 or more owners	23,462

As an example of what has happened over the country, an Indian who held a double allotment of twenty acres on the Gila River Reservation in Arizona died in 1926. By 1936, his estate had gone through eight probate actions. The direct and indirect heirship shares from this man's allotment amounted to seventy-three. These seventy-three heirs were found in two generations of descendants. The number has, by now, been augmented by the addition of another generation, perhaps two. In 1936, eight of the seventy-three heirs were entitled to a share of the original allotments reckoned at 87/573,300. This is a plot of land eleven feet square. The largest shares received by any of the heirs to this estate went to five direct descendants who each received 1/10 of the estate, or one irrigable acre each. Many attempts have been made to correct this situation through Congressional action but, to date, none have been successful.

TRIBAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURES

In spite of the allotment system, almost all reservations in the United States

⁹ U. S. Department of the Interior. *Survey Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs*. (Washington, January 6, 1954), p. 19.

contain some tribally owned land and on a few reservations, all land is communally owned. In many instances tribal land is assigned rent free to Indian families, but where valuable resources exist, particularly timber or minerals, they are developed by a tribal corporation or, more commonly, leased to non-Indians. In addition, many tribes operate reservation stores, farms, ranches, packing plants, motels, and other tribal enterprises and derive revenue, in the form of taxes or fees, from industrial and business enterprises when operated by non-Indians on tribal land. Not all tribal enterprises show a profit, and none are conducted within the pattern of American business because of the restrictions imposed by the federal trust responsibility. Another serious hindrance to the development of tribal enterprises as an avenue for training in the American economic system has been tribal council control. This has resulted, in many instances, in operations that are dictated by Indian values and tribal politics. Where attempts have been made to operate enterprises along business lines, the council has most frequently employed non-Indian managers who, under instructions to show a profit, cannot spend the time and money necessary to train Indian successors.

In some instances, tribal income is passed along to members in the form of per capita payments, but in most cases it is used by the tribe for the support of tribal government, welfare programs, and for range improvement and other forms of resources development.

There are no published statistics on tribal income and expenditures. Attention has already been called to the tribal income from oil and gas resources. Reservations with the largest income from oil and gas leases are the Navaho in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah; Osage in Oklahoma; Jicarilla Apache in New Mexico; Ute Mountain and South-

ern Ute in Colorado; Fort Peck, Blackfeet, and Crow in Montana; Wind River in Wyoming; and the Uintah and Ouray in Utah. Revenue from this source has increased from \$13,000,000 in 1951 to \$28,000,000 in 1955, to \$41,000,000 in 1956.

The Navaho income from oil, even if some of the revenue were to be distributed in per capita payments, is not likely to produce individual wealth among a population of 80,000 tribesmen. The Navaho, unlike some other tribes, have so far elected to use their tribal income for purposes of education and of resources and industrial development which, as capital investments, are expected to pay greater returns to more people in the long run. A recently announced Navaho tribal budget for 1957-58 calls for five million dollars for a scholarship fund, three million dollars for water development, and smaller amounts for a number of reservation projects.

The uneven nature of income from tribal resources across the country is illustrated by the situation in the Southwest for the fiscal year 1956. The Hopi, Papago, and Salt River Pima have tribal incomes of less than \$10 per year per capita.¹⁰ The Gila River Pima, Navaho (1955) and Taos Pueblo have incomes of less than \$50 per year per capita. Other incomes are: San Carlos Apache, \$103 (1955); Mescalero Apache, \$280; Uintah and Ouray, \$316; Southern Ute, \$660; and the Ute Mountain Ute, \$970. The last three tribes are distributing income from the settlement of a claims case.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The Bureau of Indian Affairs expects to spend \$87,737,500 for the benefit of

¹⁰ Bureau of Ethnic Research files. The per capita income is an index of tribal economy and does not imply availability or distribution in the form of per capita payments.

Indians in the United States and Alaska during the fiscal year 1957. More than \$50,000,000 will be spent for education and welfare services, including an off-reservation relocation program. The balance will be spent for resources development and management and for the construction of roads, irrigation works, schools, and the like. The Public Health Service expects to spend \$38,125,000, and an additional \$8,762,000 has been appropriated for construction of Indian health facilities.

These are by far the largest expenditures ever authorized for the social and economic benefit of Indians and, when added to tribal expenditures for the same purposes, indicate that a substantial effort is now being made to bring the Indian population to an equal footing with non-Indians in matters of education, health, communication facilities, and, on some reservations, land subjugation and development.

In resources development, however, including the establishment of industrial enterprises on or near Indian land, much remains to be done. Indian Service and tribal officials are now preparing long-range plans for such purposes under a directive issued by Glenn Emons, Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The National Congress of American Indians has declared as its primary objective for Indians the creation, with federal help, of an Indian "Point Four Program." The program is aimed at developing all of the resources on Indian reservations and in securing credit funds for Indians who wish to acquire training and equipment in order to become self-supporting in their home communities. In line with these objectives, the Eighty-fourth Congress passed Public Law 959 which authorizes the appropriation of \$3,500,000 each year for vocational training of adult Indians, and Senator William Langer of North Dakota has introduced a bill (Senate 809)

in the first session of the Eighty-fifth Congress which calls for an appropriation of \$200,000,000 to be used as loan and grant funds for the development of industries on reservations.

In almost every Congress, during the past twenty years, bills have been introduced to consolidate Indian lands and to undo the damage created by the division of allotments among Indian heirs. An heirship lands bill (House of Representatives 2787), introduced in the first session of the Eighty-fifth Congress by Representative E. Y. Berry of South Dakota, provides for the exchange or sale of Indian trust land for the purpose of achieving a solution to the inheritance problem.

Relocation

A greatly stepped-up relocation program for Indians is now being carried forward by the Bureau of Indian Affairs under an appropriation of \$3,472,000, which is three times the amount of funds spent for the same purpose in fiscal year 1956.

The program provides for employment and screening services on the reservations and for employment and social services at city centers in Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, and St. Louis. There is also provision for financial help, including transportation and moving costs, living expenses until earnings commence, and assistance in the purchase of homes and furniture.

According to official statistics, 12,625 individuals, including members of the families of relocatees, have been moved to the cities mentioned above since the beginning of the program in 1952.¹¹

¹¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the relocation program, see La Verne Madigan, *The*

Compared with the number of Indians who are considered "excess" on reservations, this does not represent a substantial solution to the problem. On the other hand, in addition to the larger numbers who will be relocated this year under the program, the Bureau of Indian Affairs anticipates a "snowball" effect when the advantages of jobs in larger cities become known, and when there is a sufficient nucleus of employed Indians in the cities to attract other Indians who would otherwise hesitate to leave their reservation homes.

During recent years, Indian Service officials and tribal officers, working together, have been attempting to bring about the establishment of industrial plants on or near Indian reservations. During the past year a special office has been established in the Indian Service for this purpose. Also, during the past year, the Navaho Tribal Council has authorized the expenditure of \$600,000 of tribal money for the purpose of assisting industries which might decide to establish manufacturing facilities in the vicinity of the Navaho country.

These combined tribal and Indian Service programs are in recognition of the fact that reservations are overcrowded, that not all Indians desire to become farmers or ranchers, and that, wherever possible, industrial jobs for Indians should be provided near the source of Indian labor. According to the Indian Service, the program, still in its infancy, has been in part responsible for the establishment of new industries near the Navaho, Hualapai, Cherokee, Pima, and Papago reservations.

American Indian Relocation Program. (New York: Association on American Indian Affairs, 1956).

Patterns of Health and Disease Among the Navahos

By JOHN ADAIR, KURT DEUSCHLE, and WALSH McDERMOTT

Abstract: Community patterns of our Indian citizens range from ordinary American communities to ways of life more comparable with those seen in parts of Asia or South America. In each type the disease picture can be expected to be different and the ways of dealing with it must necessarily be somewhat different. The Navaho tribe is the largest Indian tribe, a group whose ways of life perhaps differ the most from the rest of the United States. The broad principles revealed in an analysis of Navaho health are applicable to other tribes, although the particular health situation of another tribe would depend on the circumstances of its tribal life.

IT has long been recognized that the particular pattern of a community determines in large measure the particular diseases to which it is most subject. The community patterns of the United States Indian citizens range all the way from communities essentially the same as the rest of the United States to ways of life more comparable with those seen in many parts of Asia or South America. In each of these different types of community the disease picture can be expected to be different and the ways of dealing with it must necessarily be somewhat different. It has seemed reasonable, therefore, in attempting the present discussion of Indian health problems, to select a single tribe for primary consideration. The tribe so selected—the Navaho—represents by far the largest single tribe and is a group whose ways of life perhaps differ the most from the rest of the United States. It is believed that the broad principles revealed in an analysis of Navaho health are equally applicable to the other tribes, but the particulars of the health situation of another tribe would depend on

the particular circumstances of the tribal life.

The Navaho Indians live in northern Arizona, New Mexico, and southern Utah on a reservation extending over 15,000,000 acres—an area as large as the state of West Virginia. In 1868, when the Navaho returned from their forced captivity at Fort Sumner in eastern New Mexico, it was estimated that the tribe numbered around 10,000. It has expanded very rapidly in the last century, and today the population exceeds 80,000.

Large as their reservation is, it is no longer able to support the tribe; severe erosion has denuded much of the land and thousands of Navahos have sought employment out of the area. They work as itinerant crop pickers, on the railroads all over the western states, and at other jobs, which for the most part require only unskilled labor.

The reservation is located on the southern edge of the Colorado Plateau at an altitude ranging from 4,500 feet to over 10,000 feet on the crest of the mountain range which roughly follows

the New Mexico-Arizona border. The climate of this region, in contrast to that of the southern Arizona lowland desert, is temperate in the summer and cold in the winter, with a great range in the daily temperature the year around. There is little precipitation—from up to seven inches at the lower altitude to around twenty inches in a few mountain areas. However, during the last seven years the whole Southwest has been in severe drought and there has been only a fraction of even the customary small rainfall.

The Navaho are a Southern-Athabaskan-speaking people closely related linguistically, but not culturally, to the Apache and more remotely to the Northern Athabaskan tribes of Alaska and Canada. Centuries ago the ancestors of the Navaho and the Apache migrated southward and reached the northern limit of their present range by the sixteenth century, or earlier. The newcomers were hunters and gatherers; these occupations reflected a primitive way of life compared to that of the Pueblo Indians who already inhabited the more fertile regions of this plateau country. Even in the fourteenth century the Navahos were highly eclectic and adopted that which was to their advantage and rejected that for which they felt no need. They took over agriculture, pottery making, weaving, and other technologies from the town-dwelling Indians. But they rejected village living and the socioreligious structure of Pueblo society. The traits of Pueblo religion which they did borrow became modified to support a religion primarily concerned with curing practices rather than the fertility and rain making goal of Pueblo ritual.

All of Navaho history has been a succession of judicious borrowing from other peoples with whom they came in contact. During the subsequent centuries they took over the idea of using

horses, sheep, and cattle from the Spanish-speaking colonists in New Spain. As a result, their economic base shifted from primary dependence on agriculture to livestock raising and the raiding of settlements in the Southwest.

This history has a relevance to the present-day health picture, for the Navaho are still a changing people. Now, as earlier, they pick and choose what seems to "fit" with their way of life and pass up what does not. This process extends to their present-day attitude and behavior towards Western medicine, as well as to other aspects of twentieth-century civilization.

NAVAHO CULTURE

One of the remarkable features of Navaho life today is that the central core of Navaho culture, their religion, is still a vigorous and going concern. The Christian missionaries have not made the inroads they have made among Indian tribes in other parts of the United States.

The Navaho have also clung to certain other traditional ways; given their physical environment, these have proven very practical. For example, housing on most of the reservation is but a modification of the type of structure their ancestors brought with them from the North centuries ago. The hogan, a one room log house (in some places built of stone) remains hemispherical in shape with a mud floor. Cradleboards are still used by most mothers as a convenient way of carrying their babies and providing a secure place for sleep. Sheep and goats are still their most prized material possession. The pastoral economy has shaped the land settlement pattern, determined the course of daily life within the family, and provided credit for the families at the trading posts. Today many families possess only a small number of sheep and fewer goats. This stands in contrast to the

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situation twenty years ago before the livestock reduction program was carried out by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in an attempt to conserve the markedly over-grazed and eroded land.

The Navahos have retained the use of their own language. Even in families in which both English and Navaho are spoken, the native tongue is apt to be the language of the home and the community and English is used only in talking with non-Navaho people. A high percentage of the adults have no working knowledge of English, either spoken or written. This has been a major problem in rendering a good medical service, because it forces the doctors and nurses to depend on interpreters for effective communication with their patients.

In 1945, 6,543 of the 20,435 school-age children were in school. In 1955 there were 24,560 and only about 8 per cent were receiving no schooling.¹ This stepping up of the elementary education will, of course, have a tremendous effect on the tribe and will speed up the acculturation process. In addition, at the present time 246 Navahos are in universities and colleges. This tremendous drive for education in "the white man's way" should bring about marked changes in medical attitudes as well as knowledge of good medical practice during the years to come.

The Navaho tribe consists of a series of matrilineal clans, some sixty in number. These are exogamous units which function primarily to regulate marriage because marriage within the clan is still considered incestuous. Residence is matrilineal—a husband goes to live with the family of his wife, but a separate household is established in a hogan not too distant from those of her mother and sisters.

¹ *Navaho Year Book of Planning in Action*, Report No. 4 (Window Rock, Ariz.: Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Department of the Interior, 1955).

The place of the woman in the Navaho family is central and remains so among most Navaho families. She has property rights—the sheep are usually passed down through the female line—and she has a great deal to say not only about family affairs but those of the community. Because the women tend to be retiring in public the government administrators (and non-Indians generally) have tended to bypass them, and many programs have suffered as a result. To be sure, the Navaho women do sit at the back of the room at public meetings and the men do most of the talking. But ultimately many decisions in Navaho society are made in the household, and there the men feel the force of their wives' opinions.

The trading post and the local school form a focus for community activity. Here too may be a chapter house, the community meeting place where local affairs are discussed by the Navaho from the surrounding area—a radius reaching out fifty or more miles on all sides. There duly elected officers preside, but the importance of the chapter organization and the frequency of meetings vary greatly from one community to the next.

CHANGES IN NAVAHO WAY OF LIFE

The social organization, especially the structure of the family, is undergoing rapid change. On the edge of the reservation—where contacts with the outside are much more frequent—and in areas immediately surrounding such communities as Ganado, Tuba City, or Chinle (where there have been many years of contact with the "white" world through government or mission channels) the extended family is no longer the principal functioning unit. In these areas, more and more the life revolves around the biologic family. Dependence on and reciprocal relations with collateral relatives—those of differing generations:

cousins, aunts, and uncles—are not as important as they once were. This means that the parents of the Navaho child, as in our society, have the sole responsibility for the family care of the younger generation; this pattern differs from the extended family system that used to be universal to all of Navaho society. Then there were many parent substitutes. Today there are not. The men are working off the reservation and far from home much of the time.

This change in parental pattern is causing strains within the family which are indicated by the growth of child neglect. This has become a problem in some of these most acculturated areas—by a greater incidence of drinking alcohol, and by other symptoms that may have a significant correlation with rapid culture change.

Problems of this sort would be classified in our society as those related to tension affecting mental health. But the Navaho traditionally makes no concrete distinction between his mental and his bodily health. He knows that he is ill and seeks the help of either his medicine man or the doctor. As somatic health may reflect such tensions, it is possible that the increased demand for medical service at hospitals and clinics may be related to this rapid series of changes in Navaho technology, social organization, and behavior.

In addition to the scattered local chapter organizations, the only other formal political groupings are on the tribal level. There is an elected Tribal Council, and an over-all legislative body, which was established as recently as 1923. For many years it remained a "puppet government" in the eyes of many Navahos, established to rubber-stamp the actions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This was especially true during the last half of the 1930's and early 1940's, when the government was enforcing the livestock reduction pro-

gram with which this body became identified in the eyes of its constituency.

This Council did not come into its own until after World War II and since that time has made rapid strides—perhaps the most outstanding example of development in self-government among any Indian group within the United States.

There are seventy-four councilmen chosen by the Navahos from that number of voting districts on the reservation. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Council are the presiding executive officers who are elected directly by the voters on the same secret ballot that is used in the case of the councilmen. Within the Council there is an Advisory Committee that meets once a month and proposes legislation, establishes tribal budget, and draws up the agenda for the quarterly meeting of the Council.

In recent years, as tribal responsibility for their own affairs has grown, a series of special committees from within the council has been established in such fields as law and order, administration, welfare, education, and health. The tribal health committee today takes an active part in meeting with United States Public Health Service, state and local health officers, as well as tuberculosis sanatorium administrators and physicians who advise them on the health needs of the Navaho people.

This rapid development in self-government has come about with the encouragement and the guidance of the Bureau of Indian Affairs administrators at Window Rock. The Navaho tribe has been fortunate in having a series of administrators who have placed first priority on encouraging the development of self-government, and who have worked very closely with the council on problems of tribal legislation, administration, and financial responsibility.

Today, unlike twenty years ago, there is a Navaho political structure that can help the federal government in its public health programing. The Tribal Council and the health committee, if present trends are projected into the future, will play an ever increasing role in designing an effective health service that meets the needs of their own people. There is still much to be done in the development of communications between the federal government (United States Public Health Service) and the tribe, but with time these may be expected to grow more effective.

HEALTH FACILITIES

The responsibility for providing medical services to the Navaho and the other United States Indian Tribes rested with the Bureau of Indian Affairs from its creation until July 1, 1955. On that date this responsibility was transferred to the United States Public Health Service as a result of congressional action.

In the decade from the close of World War II to the assumption of responsibility by the United States Public Health Service, the central hospital facility on the reservation consisted of a 115-bed general hospital and a 100-bed tuberculosis hospital at the "government town" of Fort Defiance, Arizona. In addition there were four 35-bed field hospitals situated respectively at Winslow and at Tuba City in Arizona, and at Shiprock and Crown Point in New Mexico. At Keams Canyon in the Hopi reservation (which lies within the Navaho reservation) there was another 35-bed hospital which in actuality served both tribes. In addition to these government hospitals there is the 88-bed general hospital of the Ganado Presbyterian Mission (Sage Memorial) approximately thirty-five miles from the government general hospital at Fort Defiance.

With two exceptions (Shiprock and Tuba City) these hospitals were of good

modern construction and were well equipped. The professional personnel varied from well-trained highly dedicated physicians and nurses to poorly trained indifferent misfits. Of far greater importance, however, was the fact that the full complement of staff was seldom if ever filled and the turnover was constantly high. Sometimes it was necessary to supply a different physician on a fortnightly or monthly basis to serve as the chief and sole physician at one of the field hospitals. The supply of physicians was improved in part by the "doctor draft" of the Korean War. For, under the draft, some young physicians could be commissioned in the United States Public Health Service and assigned to the Indian Medical Service of the Indian Bureau. Even with this additional "recruiting," however, the full complement of staff on the Navaho reservation was never filled. Some of these young men made the most of their opportunity and served their two years as perceptive, compassionate, and highly effective physicians. All too often, however, they were completely blind to the problems both of the government and the Navaho and rather quickly became embittered "time-servers."

This adequately equipped but chronically undermanned hospital system was connected together by roads which were frequently impassable. Indeed, a hard-surfaced road of entry was available only at Fort Defiance, Shiprock, and Winslow and the latter hospital was little used. As a consequence of the weather-induced impassability of the roads, a physician in his middle twenties might find himself marooned at one of the field hospitals, for example, Tuba City with a patient requiring some complicated surgical procedure far beyond his competence to perform. Even when the roads were not impassable, it was the common practice to transport such a seriously ill patient by ambulance over

a bumpy dirt road for the 160 miles from Tuba City to the Medical Center at Fort Defiance. Only in 1954 was an airplane type of patient transfer organized for emergency cases.

The frequently washed out roads in this semiarid land, played an even greater role in the usefulness of the hospital facilities to the sick Navaho. For example, in certain parts of the reservation, a patient with an acute pneumonia or meningitis might have to be carried as far as 100 miles by horse-drawn vehicle or pickup truck before he could be admitted to one of the field hospitals. The prospect of this journey together with the universal human tendency to try to "sweat out" a beginning illness at home led to many delays. Not infrequently such delays would result in deaths soon after hospital admission from diseases which can be easily controlled if they are treated promptly. A less critically ill patient might make a 50 or 100 mile trip to seek medical care and arrive at 6 P.M. on a Friday afternoon and receive word to report back on Monday.

Formidable barriers, both cultural and geographic, thus existed between twentieth-century Western medicine on the one hand, and the Navaho stricken with illness in his remote canyon, on the other hand.

The obvious answer to this problem—an adequate field health service—did not really exist. It was not possible to find enough nurses and physicians for the hospitals much less to find personnel for a field service. Nevertheless, there were always a few clinically frustrated but dedicated field health nurses who tried to maintain some sort of a program—which had to be principally localized to the young children in the schools. With these people—some government servants, some medical missionaries—it was possible to maintain a few field clinics serving a few small areas.

A field program for tuberculosis case finding was out of the question because as late as January 1952 there were an estimated 2,000 active cases of tuberculosis on the reservation, and there were exactly 100 beds which could be used for the care of tuberculosis patients.² As late as 1954, one of these Field Health Nurses had a district of 10,000 square miles with a population of approximately 10,000 persons.

This then is the situation as it existed in the decade immediately preceding the transfer of responsibility for Indian health to the United States Public Health Service. It is of the greatest importance to realize that no wicked man or collection of such men were responsible. On the contrary, the Indian Bureau officials on the Navaho reservation constantly labored long and hard to do what they could, but the sheer magnitude of the problem and its high degree of complexity required far greater resources than were ever made available.

Before considering what has happened in the less than two years that the Public Health Service program has been in operation, it is appropriate to review certain aspects of the Navaho culture from the standpoint of health.

NAVAHO CONCERN WITH HEALTH

The Navaho people are much concerned with their bodily health. In 1941 Drs. Alexander and Dorothea Leighton made a psycho-biological study of stresses and strains in Navaho life. They estimated from an analysis of their interviews with 6 per cent of a group of 600 Indians in the Ramah area, some 50 miles south of Gallup,

² In the fall of 1952, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was able to obtain the necessary funds to pay for the care of Navaho patients in tuberculosis sanatoriums located away from the reservation. Once this arrangement was set up, the lack of a case-finding program became the factors limiting adequate tuberculosis control.

N. M., that 60 per cent of the references "to overtly threatening events and situations" consisted of threats to bodily health including disease, accident, and injury. By contrast, only 21 per cent of the threats were concerned with subsistence.³

The Navaho conception of health is very different from ours. For him, health is symptomatic of a correct relationship between man and his environment: his supernatural "environment," the world around him, and his fellow man. Health is associated with good, blessing, and beauty—all that is positively valued in life. Illness, on the other hand, bears evidence that one has fallen out of this delicate balance; it is usually ascribed to the breaking of one of the taboos which guide the behavior of the Navahos, especially in the case of the conservative elders. Illness may also be due to contact with the ghosts of the dead, or even to the malevolence of another Navaho who has resorted to witchery.

In order to restore harmony with the environment, which results once evil is driven out from the body and good is restored, a *singer*, as he is known to the people in their own language, must perform an exactly prescribed ritual for the patient. Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn in his detailed study of religious behavior in the Ramah area estimated that in 1938 the Navaho men devoted from one-quarter to one-third of their time to such ceremonials, and the women only slightly less.⁴ The Navaho does not make the distinction between religion and medicine that we do; for him, they are aspects of the same thing. This is

³ Alexander and Dorothea Leighton, "Some Types of Uncasiness and Fear of a Navaho Community," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 44 (1942), pp. 199-209.

⁴ Clyde Kluckhohn, "Participation in Ceremonials in a Navaho Community," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 40 (1938), pp. 359-69.

an important cultural fact that many workers in the health field have failed to realize; as a result, many doctors and nurses have antagonized their patients.

Virtually all Navaho religious behavior is oriented towards curing an individual. The patient, once he feels ill, consults with his immediate family and they call in a diagnostician who by various techniques (the most common method is by *motion-in-the-hand*, an involuntary trembling of the diviner's hand and arm) discovers the cause of the present illness. Possibly when the patient was a child carried in his mother's womb she had looked at a forbidden sand painting; or possibly the patient had come in contact with a lightning-struck object, and an evil that must be exorcised had entered his body; or perhaps he had eaten a taboo food which brought on the illness. Any one of these, or hundreds of other causes, might have brought about the present illness which is manifested by bodily pain or mental anguish. Then in order to bring back the patient to the correct balance with nature a particular *sing* is performed. Evil is driven out and beauty and health restored.

The individual who is sick does not act on his own. The family is likely to take the matter into its own hands once its members know that one of their number is sick. After the diagnostician has indicated the root of the illness he suggests what *sing* should be performed; the family then goes off for a *singer* who knows the required ceremony, and they arrange with him what the fee for the *sing* shall be. No ceremonies are performed free of charge—a payment is essential for the efficacy of treatment.

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC EFFECTS OF SINGS

Furthermore, the family is all present while the *sing* is in progress; it may last from one to nine nights, depending on

the nature of the illness for which the *sing* is given, the economic position of the family, and other factors. Relatives and friends come to the ceremony and take part in the chants and prayers directed by the medicine man and his assistant. By association they too receive positive benefits from the cure, and in turn the presence of the family and friends is assuring to the patient who feels they are all working to restore his health. Alexander and Dorothea Leighton have written of the psychotherapeutic effects of Navaho ceremonials:

All these people are gathered, their attention focused on the patient, bringing their influence and expectations to bear on his illness, their very presence implying that powerful forces are working for his well-being. The Singer, as the mouthpiece of the Holy Beings, speaks in their voice and tells the patient that all is well. In the height of the ceremonial the patient himself becomes one of the Beings, puts his feet in their moccasins, breathes in the strength of the sun. He comes into complete harmony with the infinite, and as such must, of course, be free of all ills and evils.⁵

There is no doubt that these curing ceremonies, in which the Navaho people have so much faith, have a psychotherapeutic effect on the "patient." There is also good evidence that the sweat bath sedative and the body massage that is used in some ceremonies may act as beneficial physiotherapy.⁶ But while *sings* may be effective in curing disease of primarily a psychogenic order, such things have been less successful and often positively harmful in the treatment of contagious diseases, ap-

⁵ Alexander and Dorothea Leighton, *The Navaho Door* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 36.

⁶ Leland C. Wyman and Flora L. Bailey, "Two Examples of Navaho Physiotherapy," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1944), pp. 329-37.

pendicitis, and gall bladder attacks. The Navaho who has an acute case of such a disease may be sung over for many days—often if one *sing* does not cure the patient, he is taken to another *singer* for treatment—by the time the family decides to take him to the doctor, it is frequently too late for the physician's treatment to be effective.

Until the recent past, it was not always appreciated by the health workers that the *singer* is a respected man in the Navaho community, and often a leader. He may know only a few of the shorter *sings* or he may be one of those who have learned one of the nine night ceremonies, in which case he has considerable status in Navaho society. These men were traditionally the "intellectuals" of the tribe; it takes many years to learn the required set of songs, procedures, myths, and sand paintings that must all be exactly controlled, otherwise the *sing* will not be effective.

Again, we must couch all of this in terms of the dynamic change that is affecting the culture of the Navaho people. Today, unlike in the old days, very few men are learning these *sings*. The economic life of the people has changed because of population growth, denudation of the land, and other factors. Present-day cash economy and the values of the dominant society "compete" with these Navaho religious values for the time of every individual who may have an interest in becoming a *singer*. There are no longer months on end to concentrate on such learning of ceremonials.

This does not mean that Navaho ceremonial life, and the religious values that go with it, will change overnight. But it probably does mean that the ceremonies will become briefer; less time consuming to learn, perform, and attend; and that many of the less valued *sings* will no longer be handed down. The *blessing-way* and certain other im-

portant ceremonials may very well last for generations to come.

What is the meaning of all of this for modern medicine? For one thing, as Navaho *singers* grow fewer in number, the laity will increasingly depend on the medical services that our physicians and eventually physicians among their own tribesmen, as they develop such a professional group in the years to come, have to offer. Because of their cultural "predisposition" which places such a high value on health, the Navaho may demand an availability of service on a level not deemed necessary by less health-conscious Indians in the Southwest.

HEALTH PROBLEMS AMONG THE NAVAHOS

If one took into consideration only those physical factors which exist on the Navaho reservation, the disease pattern could be predicted whether it be a Navaho or a white population group. For example: the poor roads, and long distances from medical facilities being what they are, it follows that even a highly intelligent, well-educated non-Navaho would have his problems in this environment. The non-Navaho might come into a medical center with an advanced case of pneumonia or ruptured appendix or severely dehydrated from an acute diarrhea. The severe problems of transportation and delays mentioned previously might result in a more advanced state of disease regardless of whether the patient were Navaho or non-Navaho.

The fact that a Navaho might first seek attention from a medicine man and thus delay his treatment further might complicate the medical problem. Many of the Navahos have only meager health knowledge and are ill-informed as to the needs for early treatment in a clinic or hospital.

There is also the further problem of

the communication barrier due to the language difference. The medical history which the physician might obtain is distorted by an incompetent interpreter. This problem, of course, can be magnified in reverse if the interpreter cannot place into appropriate Navaho the English which is presented to him by the physician. The problem involved is not simply one of translation of words, but translation of the ideas and concepts of bodily health and disease which are expressed by the patient and by the physician.

The economy of the people must also be considered in summing up the various determinants of the pattern of disease on the Navaho. While it is true that the Navaho tribal organization has recently come into large sums of money through contracts for uranium, oil, gas, and lumber, the economy of the individual or family remains substandard, with the per capita income less than \$500.00 per year. Navaho housing, which is culturally valued, results in overcrowding and poor ventilation. Sanitary facilities and plumbing are not commonly available. Since water is scarce and must be hauled to the hogan long distances over bad roads, there is a major problem in personal and family sanitation. The problem is not that the water used for drinking or washing is contaminated—it is that there is so little of it.

In these crowded and unsanitary family surroundings, one would expect to have infections and communicable diseases as the outstanding medical problems; and indeed this is the case. It might be said that the disease pattern of the Navaho is comparable with that of the general United States population fifty to one hundred years ago.

What are the facts about the health status of the Navaho Indians? How reliable are the medical statistics which are available to the Bureau of Indian

TABLE 1—TEN LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH AMONG NAVAHOS AND COMPARATIVE U.S. GENERAL POPULATION RATES, 1954^a

CAUSES	RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION		PER CENT OF TOTAL DEATHS	
	Navahos	U.S. General	Navahos	U.S. General
1. Pneumonia	123.5	23.7	16.2	2.6
2. Gastritis, Duodenitis, Enteritis, Colitis	110.2	5.3	14.5	0.6
3. Certain Diseases of early infancy	102.3	39.4	13.4	4.3
4. Accidents—all	81.0	56.9	10.6	6.2
5. Tuberculosis—all forms	53.0	10.5	7.0	1.1
6. Heart Diseases	27.9	343.4	3.7	37.4
7. Malignant neoplasms	22.6	147.0	3.0	16.0
8. Nephritis and nephrosis	17.3	12.6	2.3	1.2
9. Congenital malformations	17.3	12.9	2.3	1.4
10. Vascular lesions affecting the central nervous system	14.6	103.6	1.9	11.3

^a Prepared by Statistics and Analysis Section, USPHS, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Affairs and the United States Public Health Service?

Obviously, the accuracy of health statistics is a direct reflection of adequate coverage among any particular population group. Despite the fact that tremendous progress has been made in increasing medical service among the Navaho people during recent years, there is still a tremendous lag between medical needs and medical service rendered. There are still many Navahos who, either of their own accord or because of the problems of getting to hospitals and clinics, are unable to have proper medical care. There is every reason to believe that deaths are occurring which are not recorded, particularly among the infants. Even if the deaths are recorded, however, the notation may not be reliable in terms of the specific cause of the disease.

Another factor which affects the health statistics is that the Navahos are not a record-conscious people. One must bear in mind that many are nonliterate and do not feel a need for keeping records. They feel no urgency about reporting a birth or death to the health personnel.

In a study on the completeness of birth registration records which was carried out by the statistical office in the United States Public Health Service several years ago, it was found that approximately 60 per cent of the births had been recorded; thus, 40 per cent were not officially registered. Statisticians working with the Navahos also became aware of the fact that there may not even be an accurate base-line census for the reservation. Considering all these difficulties it is possible that the Navaho morbidity and mortality statistical tables reflect only the accessible data and are not too precise an indication of the incidence of particular diseases.

Be that as it may, it is clear that all medical teams which have made a survey on the Navaho reservation, uniformly report that the Navahos have health standards far below those of the general United States population. It might be said that the health status of the Navahos is comparable with that of peoples in underdeveloped areas such as in the primitive regions of South America, Asia, or Africa. Certainly

their life expectancy figures and infant mortality figures are comparable.

The striking differences in the leading causes of death among the Navahos as compared with the general United States population are indicated in the preceding table.

HEALTH STATUS OF NAVAHOS AND OTHER AMERICANS

A popular method for comparing the health status of two population groups is the average life expectancy. The average life span of a Navaho is approximately 30 to 40 years, whereas the average United States citizen may expect to live 70 years.

The infant mortality rate (the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births) is a more precise yardstick for measuring the health conditions of a population group. This figure also bears out the general view on Navaho health, for the infant mortality rate on the Navaho reservation is four times greater than the national rate. (The 1954 Navaho rate is 108.6, compared with the general United States rate of 26.6.)

J. Nixon Hadley, Statistician with the Division of Indian Health, United States Public Health Service, summarized the problem of evaluating the Navaho health situation in a recent report:⁷

Measurement of health conditions among the Navahos is hampered by lack of complete data either on the base population involved or on deaths and illnesses. Even with this lack of specificity, however, it is obvious that mortality and morbidity rates for most of the major diseases are far in excess of the rates for the total United States population.

⁷ J. Nixon Hadley, "Health Conditions Among Navaho Indians," U. S. Public Health Reports, Vol. 70, No. 9 (Washington: U. S. Public Health Service, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, September 1955), pp. 831-36.

More than any other major disease, tuberculosis is the expression of the socioeconomic conditions in a community. Indeed it has been authoritatively described as a disease of gross social mismanagement both on the individual and the community level.⁸

The extent of tuberculosis among the Navahos has never been fully determined for the total reservation population. However, reference to the vital statistics tables shows that the tuberculosis death rate among the Navahos is about five times that of the general population (53 as compared with 10.5 per 100,000). Mobile roentgenographic surveys that have been conducted in scattered communities on the reservation since the fall of 1952 have revealed active pulmonary tuberculosis ranging from 1 to 3 per cent of these population samples. On the basis of the sample mobile roentgenographic surveys, it would appear that there are probably two thousand or more cases of active pulmonary tuberculosis on the Navaho reservation.

The Navaho people have eagerly cooperated in accepting hospital treatment for tuberculosis even though they were required in most instances to go off the reservation for sanatorium care. (Approximately 500 of the 600 available beds for tuberculosis are situated 100 to 500 miles from the reservation.) With the advent, in 1952, of effective chemotherapy for tuberculosis and the inauguration of the expanded hospitalization program, the death rate from tuberculosis has fallen rapidly. It has been recognized that the Navaho tuberculosis patient will respond to appropriate medical and surgical management of his disease in the same fashion as the non-Navaho patient.

It can be expected that when effective

⁸ R. J. Dubos and J. Dubos, *The White Plague: Tuberculosis, Man and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952).

antituberculosis treatment is fully developed, including ambulatory care, it may be possible to control the tuberculosis problem at a level now observed in non-Navaho United States society.

There are a host of factors which can influence the extent of tuberculosis among a group of people; the roles of hygiene, sanitation, housing, nutrition, and other factors are related to the severity of the tuberculosis problem.

Another major health problem among the Navaho has been the high infant death rate from gastroenteritis and diarrhea. Diarrhea is ten times more frequent among the Navaho than in the general United States population. There is as yet no conclusive scientific study which has pointed up any common etiologic agent for all cases of the severe diarrhea of infants. However, most observers believe that the diarrheas are probably related to sanitation and hygiene. To date the most common bacterial agent found to account for the disease has been bacillary dysentery. It is often complicated by progressive dehydration which if not corrected may result in death. Because of the delay which frequently occurs in getting the patient to a medical facility, the infant arrives too late for the physician to initiate successful treatment.

With present-day medical technology, the diarrheas could easily be controlled. However, because of the factors determined by the environment and way of life of the people, diarrhea persists as a scourge among the Navahos and there is a predictable season of "summer complaint" as there was throughout all of our country many years ago.

Other major health problems which are seen on the Navaho reservation are respiratory illness, particularly pneumonias and influenza, conjunctivitis, trachoma, and chronic ear infections, and gall bladder disease.

There is yet too little known about

diseases of the heart and blood vessels, cancer, hypersensitivity (that is, allergic disorders), high blood pressure, arthritic, metabolic, and mental diseases among the Navaho. Much more study is required before a statement can be made regarding the relative incidence of any of these disorders.

IMPROVEMENT OF CROSS-CULTURAL MEDICAL SERVICE

What has been the approach of the United States Public Health Service during the approximately eighteen month period since it became responsible for Indian health? At the outset, let it be emphasized that the career officers in the Public Health Service who have responsibility for the policy of the Indian health program are fully aware of the difficulties of attempting to introduce Western twentieth-century technology across a cultural barrier. Moreover, as individual officers, they had been sent to conduct the Indian Bureau's health program during the last year of its operations. Consequently, when the official interagency transfer of responsibility occurred, the men in charge of the new program were quite aware of the formidable nature of the task.

The basic approach followed consisted of: (1) expanding within budgetary limits the on-going program with special emphasis toward organizing an adequate field (that is, nonhospital) health program in the two largest areas, Alaska, and on the Navaho; (2) a general survey, principally by nongovernmental experts, of the health situation and needs of our Indian peoples with appropriate reference to their socioeconomic status; arrangement with university groups to conduct pilot research or demonstration programs on selected aspects of the total program.

On the Navaho reservation, the pre-existing hospital program has already been considerably expanded. At Tuba

City, where an outmoded 35-bed hospital had been caring for most of the Western Navaho, a modern 125-bed hospital had just been completed by the Indian Bureau and was opened a few months before the actual transfer. It has been possible to staff this hospital with four physicians, one of whom is a fully accredited surgeon. The old hospital supposedly had two physicians but more often than not, it had only one. In addition at this hospital, there are four Public Health Nurses where only one was available before and there is a full-time dentist.

For the reservation as a whole, in 1954, the government medical staff numbered 343 and by 1955 this was already increased to 436. In addition to the new hospital (constructed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs) at Tuba City, a new 200-bed general hospital is being constructed at Gallup, New Mexico, the business "capital" of the Navaho reservation.

The principal evidences of the organization of a proper field health program to date are the increasing number of Public Health Nurses which totaled twenty-four by the end of 1955. Moreover, at all of the field hospitals there is now a physician whose major responsibility is with field health problems. Within the eighteen-month period it has not been possible to organize anything approaching a fully operating directed field program but a start has been made. Moreover, the construction of a number of strategically located Field Health Clinics are in various stages of development.

While the Public Health Service has been increasing the instrument for delivering more and better medical care to the Navahos, they have also enlisted the assistance of several university groups to perform both a research and to some extent a service program in health among the Navahos. The University of California Medical College is providing

consultation, guidance, and personnel in a health education program. Cornell University Medical College has been chosen to conduct a pilot project in field health. This project has been centered at Many Farms, Arizona located in the geographic center of the reservation. It is the purpose of this field study to attempt to define the proper concerns of a health program among a people such as the Navahos and to attempt to develop, and determine the practicability by actual trial, of methods for the delivery of such health services as are found to be required. It is believed that the results of this study of the cross-cultural delivery of medical services will be a continuous source of information for the expanded Public Health Service program among the Navahos. It is also hoped that the observations made there will have generality for the health programs with the other Indian tribes and in so-called underdeveloped areas outside the United States.

To sum up this aspect of the discussion: it can be said that the increased health activities among the Navahos which have been set up by the Public Health Service within the past eighteen months, represent a very considerable achievement. The problem is such a complex one, however, and has been neglected for so many decades that it will be some time before a reasonably acceptable program can be in full operation. Without question, one of the most immediate obstacles to a proper program is the necessity for constructing suitable housing for health personnel. For, in many of the areas in greatest need of medical services on the Navaho reservation, absolutely no housing exists for even one physician or nurse who might be recruited to deliver the badly needed services. Formidable difficulties exist in obtaining funds for the construction of such housing. This is particularly the case as the argument that "the Public Health Service should be

able to do the job less expensively" was frequently voiced by well meaning non-governmental advocates seeking to persuade the Congress to legislate the transfer.

In the writers' opinion it seems clear that if a better cross-cultural medical service is to be rendered, it is necessary to discover the needs of the community and family, as well as that of the individual patient. To do this it is necessary to free ourselves from many ethnocentric and institution-bound ideas and practices and turn our attention to gaining knowledge of the way of life of the people we wish to treat.

What are some of the questions which must be answered before a reasonably adequate health program can be delivered to, and accepted by, the Navaho.

How does the patient feel about our medical service and how, from his point of view, could it be improved to meet his needs?

What are the causes of resistance to modern medicine when such resistance occurs?

How can a medical program that includes sanitation and health education learn to work effectively through community structure and leadership?

What are the basic factors which hinder effective medical interpretation and how can these be eliminated?

How can doctors and nurse's aides be recruited from among the Navahos and trained so that they can bridge the language barrier to the community and hogan?

We must seek answers to questions such as these on the level of the family and community.

The judicious borrowing from other cultures which typifies so much of Navaho behavior—as seen in time perspective—is also at work in his changing attitudes and responses to our Western medicine. New alternatives to the cures of the *singers* have been introduced; and when the medicine man has

failed, the family of the patient seeks out the doctor to see what he can do. Or, as seen from the point of view of the medicine man:

When I see that I am not getting anywhere with one of my patients I suggest that he go see the white doctor. But I always caution him first to come back and finish the ceremony that has been interrupted, or he will get sick again.

Two forces are at work here: First, there is the strong belief that once a ceremony has been started it must be finished; and second, the *singer* and the unacculturated Navaho generally speaking—as well as many highly acculturated ones—believes that even though the white doctor can rid the body of pain and "drive out the germs," still he cannot set the individual back in harmony with his environment. Anxiety is likely to be present upon discharge from the hospital—as it is with ourselves, but for different reasons—and this often persists until a *sing* has been held.

Changing attitudes of the *singers* are further documented by a speech that one of the tribal officers, himself a *singer*, made to an assembly of physicians at the Fort Defiance Hospital in 1955. He said:

As I see it, all the diseases which hurt the Navaho people may be divided into three kinds. There are those diseases that we medicine men have given up on. We know that you white doctors have better cures than we do. One of the diseases of that sort is tuberculosis. Then there is sickness which comes from getting too close to where lightning has struck. Right now there are probably some patients in this hospital who are sick from that illness and you doctors have no way of even finding out what is wrong with them—but we medicine men can, and we are able to cure such cases. A third type of illness is snake bite. You can cure that, and we Navaho also have our own medicines for that.

These changing attitudes and beliefs are also shared by the diagnosticians, including the *listeners* and the *star gazers*. In 1957 at Many Farms, Arizona, where a field clinic was recently inaugurated, four different *hand-tremblers* stated, upon questioning, that their hands "often shook towards the hospital," indicating that the patient's illness should be treated initially by the physician rather than the medicine man.

EFFECT OF ANTIBIOTICS ON NAVAHO

The Navaho's favorable outlook on our medicine has probably been accelerated in recent years by the "antibiotics" and other powerful drugs which have come into general use. Before these specific agents were developed, the physician was limited frequently to treating only the patients' symptoms and was unable to get at the underlying pathogenic causes. Treatment was often prolonged and not necessarily successful as in the case of tuberculosis and syphilis. Now the Navahos see positive cures in a shorter period of time for these and other diseases. They have been deeply impressed by the efficacy of this improved medical practice.

In 1940, when the Leightons wrote *The Navaho Door* they reported that many hospital beds were unused (although there was considerably more use of the hospital beds then as compared to the previous decade). Indeed, some hospitals were known as death traps—not unlike hospitals in our own culture less than a hundred years ago.

Hospitals became identified with death, and since death is contagious and the mere presence of a corpse in the same enclosure is contaminating in Navaho rationale, the hospitals were not utilized to the degree they are today.

These changes could be documented at greater length:

Whereas chest X-rays for tuberculosis case finding were resisted twenty years ago, today many Navaho patients

ask for X-rays to be taken if a pain of any sort is felt in the chest; vaccinations and "shots" have become routine in most community schools.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDICAL PEOPLE AND NAVAHO

The physicians and nurses who are tolerant of Navaho belief and who recognize the psychologic dependence on the *sings* are likely to have a better relationship with the Navaho patients than those who are intolerant of their ways and attempt to force our beliefs and the scientific basis of our medicine on them.

There is good evidence that in the last thirty years doctors on the Navaho reservation, on the whole, have become more tolerant of the Navaho way of life, including their religion, than was formerly the case. They have found that permissive treatment is more effective than an uncompromising and authoritarian attitude.

Doctors at the Fort Defiance Sanatorium in recent years report that when they have suggested that patients have *sings* before and after sanatorium treatment, there has been less absence without medical advice once treatment in the ward is underway. This, of course, is preferable to allowing the patient to go home for a *sing* once chemotherapy has been started. But even that is better, in most instances, than denying such a request because the patient is likely to leave anyway and not return, but the patient who has been given such permission will come back.

Without waiting for further acculturation it is entirely possible for the practitioner of Western medicine to mould his scientific approach into the cultural frame of the Navaho people. In this way modern medical services might not only be made acceptable to the Navahos, but could be taken over as something of positive value and integrated into their own way of life.

Education Among American Indians: Institutional Aspects

By HILDEGARD THOMPSON

Abstract: Although the educational needs of all Indians have never been fully met at any period, education has been one problem area to which the public historically has been most sensitive and most responsive. In 1956, 55.3 per cent of the appropriation made to the Bureau of Indian Affairs was earmarked for formal education. This article attempts to put the educational problems of today's Indians in historical perspective by highlighting what has transpired with respect to the establishment of schools, the major practices and policies governing their operation, and the relationship of policy to the adjustment of Indians to the dominant culture.

APPRAISAL of Indian education at any given period in history requires an understanding of the attitudes surrounding education at that time and a knowledge of the cultural and environmental conditions from which those attitudes stemmed.

Adequate insight into the problems of Indian education also requires understanding of the interrelationship of the various facets of the total Indian situation. The problems of land, credit, and housing; the problems of health, employment, and law enforcement; the attitudes of Indians and non-Indians toward one another; the levels of Indian attainment in accepting civic, political, and tax responsibilities of citizenship; the willingness of state officials and local citizens to make Indian lands a part of the political subdivisions of the state; the willingness of local school boards to assume the same responsibilities for the education of Indian children as of other children; these are all problem situations which have a close relationship to action programs in the field of Indian education.

Education properly used can perform, and has performed, an important

role in reconciling cultural differences and in developing mutual respect between Indians and their non-Indian neighbors. Cultural barriers have been removed for countless numbers of individual Indians through education and association with non-Indians. Education, of course, is not the only force behind the change, but unquestionably it is a powerful force.

MISSION SCHOOLS

Missionaries were the first educators. The missionaries who accompanied the French and Spanish explorers, and the ministers who came with the early English colonists, were interested in converting the Indians to Christianity. The first Indian school was established in 1568 at Havana, Cuba, by Jesuit missionaries for Florida Indians.¹

Established missions intensified and expanded their efforts in the eighteenth century, and new missions took up the task. Reverend Eleazer Wheelock conceived the idea of a boarding school to

¹ *Statistics Concerning Indian Education* (Washington: Branch of Education, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Department of the Interior, 1956).

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remove children from parental influence as a means supposedly of speeding up the process of civilization. His aim was to train teachers and preachers who could return to their people.

The Virginia colony, through its governing body, removed the friendly Indians living in that area to a reservation on the frontier as protection for themselves against the wilder enemy Indians and, as a part of the removal bargain, established a school for Indian children. Later the project was abandoned and the discouraged and desolate friendly Indians were left to the mercy of the frontier tribes.

The organized efforts of the missionary societies stirred the conscience of the federal government to action. The House Committee on Appropriations in 1818 reported:

In the present state of our country one of two things seems to be necessary. Either that those sons of the forest should be moralized or exterminated. . . . Put into the hands of their children the primer and the hoe, and they will naturally, in time, take hold of the plow. . . .²

The following year Congress appropriated \$10,000 for support of mission education. With federal aid, mission groups were able to expand educational opportunities for increasing numbers of Indians who were interested and willing to be educated in a different culture.

The general attitude developed throughout the country in the latter part of the nineteenth century with respect to separation of church and state finally dealt a death blow to federal appropriations for the support of mission education. The Act of March 2, 1917 (39 Stat. 988) made it illegal to use federal funds for instruction in sectarian schools.

² Senate Executive Document 95, Forty-ninth Congress, Second Session, p. 162.

ACHIEVEMENT OF MISSION EDUCATION

Much can be learned from the successes and failures of early mission education. The objectives, of course, were clear: namely, "to Christianize and civilize" the Indian. Mission education attempted to bring to Indians the knowledge and skills of a non-Indian culture. The girls were taught domestic science, and the boys were taught farming and blacksmithing. Indians accepted education when it made sense in their lives; rejected it when they saw little value in it. An Indian chief in reply to an offer to educate Indian youth said: ³

Several of our young people were formerly brought up at the colleges . . . they were instructed . . . but, when they came back to us . . . ignorant of every means of living in the woods . . . totally good for nothing. We are, however, . . . obliged by your kind offer, . . . and, to show our grateful sense of it, if the gentlemen of Virginia will send us a dozen of their sons, we will . . . instruct them in all we know, and make men of them.

By the end of the eighteenth century a few Indian individuals had shouldered their way above the crowd into history. Reverend Occom,⁴ a Mohegan and a pupil of Wheelock, preached in England and later returned to New England as a missionary among his own people. Joseph Brant, another of Wheelock's pupils, became an officer in the British army and later Chief of the Mohawks. There were others, of course, who profited in a general way from the limited education they received, but the recorded results of mission effort up to

³ *Orienting New Employees*, Branch of Education, U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (Chilocco, Oklahoma: Chilocco School Press, 1956), pp. 9, 10.

⁴ Alice C. Fletcher, *Indian Education and Civilization*, S. Ex. Doc. 95, Forty-eighth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 100-102.

the end of the eighteenth century show comparatively little impact on the total Indian population of that period. However, two ideas growing out of the mission work of that earlier time had much impact on Indian culture and influenced later educational efforts: first, the notion that education was the tool to use in "civilizing Indians" became established in the public mind; second, Wheelock's boarding school idea was translated into permanent policy as educational method.

Mission educators deserve the credit for being the first to interest themselves in the educational welfare of Indians.

FEDERAL SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED

The period from 1788 to 1871 is usually referred to as the treaty-making period. Indians were not United States citizens. The federal government in negotiating treaties with the various groups dealt with them as sovereign nations. In addition to land agreements, the treaties usually defined the types of goods and services that would be provided each group. For example, the Treaty of 1868⁵ between the federal government and the Navaho tribe promised a school house and a teacher for every thirty Navaho pupils who presented themselves to be educated. The federal government, therefore, in fulfilling treaty obligations or moral obligations voluntarily assumed, began to build federal schools. The first federal school was established in 1860. From that time on the number of federal schools increased each year, yet never fast enough to meet the need.

The central purpose of early federal education was to civilize the Indian. Federal school programs, following the pattern set by mission schools, provided

⁵ Charles Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties*, Vol. II: *Treaties* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 1,017.

instruction in domestic arts, farming, industrial arts, and the three R's.

Although several day schools were in operation, educators of that time preferred the boarding school pattern envisioned by Reverend Wheelock and for the same purpose—"to free the children from the language and habits of their untutored and often times savage parents."⁶

This period like those that followed was characterized by a struggle for funds and facilities to keep pace with the ever growing interest of Indians in education. In 1868 the Indian Commissioner wrote, "Many of the tribes have no schools."⁷

In 1883, the Secretary of the Interior stated,

If a sufficient number of manual labor schools can be established to give each youth the advantages of three to five years of schooling, the next generation will hear nothing of this difficult problem, and we may leave the Indian to himself.

The Secretary asked for a yearly appropriation of \$5,000,000 for five years. The Congress appropriated \$400,000.⁸

To alleviate the shortage of school facilities, the Act of July 31, 1882, authorized the conversion of abandoned army forts to school use, several of which are still in use in 1956; for example, Fort Totten in South Dakota, and Fort Wingate in New Mexico.

Public opinion and Indian education

Public opinion with respect to Indian education was divided at that time into two opposing camps: those who believed in the capability of the Indian to take his place in society if given the opportunities of education, and those

⁶ Annual Report of the Indian Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior, 1885, p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1868, p. 2.

⁸ Elaine Goodale Eastman, *The Red Man's Moses* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), p. 95.

who believed such efforts would be wasted. Pressures on the Congress came from both groups. Senator Ingalls from Kansas fought appropriations for Indian schools. He branded the educated Indian "an alien and an outcast of his own tribe."⁹ Senator Dawes of Massachusetts spoke in favor of educating the Indian and supported Colonel Pratt who proclaimed, "if one-tenth of the money we have spent in driving the Indians away from contacts with civilization had been used in kindly helping them—there would be many more prosperous Indians in the country."

The debates continued with each request for appropriations. Funds were never enough, and they were always too late.

Colonel Pratt spoke loudly throughout the country in favor of the boarding school idea. His particular educational program at the Carlisle Indian School set the educational pattern of half-work half-academic instruction that entrenched itself permanently in the early boarding schools. He stated that "a farm and a garden are to be connected with each school, and one half of the school time devoted to industrial training."¹⁰

Despite the efforts of Pratt and others of his day, school facilities never kept pace with the interest of Indians in education. Published statistics from an 1885 report show approximately one-half of the Indian population without school facilities. As late as 1953, half of the Navaho children of school age were not in school, primarily because of lack of facilities.

THE MERIAM SURVEY

The Bureau of Indian Affairs had come under considerable criticism pre-

ceding 1928, not so much with respect to its educational objectives, but with respect to the methods used in educating Indian youth. During the Hoover Administration, the Department of the Interior employed the Institute for Government Research to conduct a survey of Indian administration including education. The findings of the survey were published in a lengthy report in 1928. This report sparked a new point of view, which led to newer objectives, methods, and approaches. The importance of family security in the development of youth was recognized, and this turned attention to day schools versus boarding schools.¹¹

The purpose of education was more directly pointed toward helping Indians gain the scientific, technological, and civic skills to function in the world about them. Results of this newer emphasis expressed itself in many important ways. Day schools were extended to provide education within the home environment. Those off-reservation boarding schools which were retained changed their objectives; they further readjusted their programs to give emphasis to vocational training keyed to available employment opportunities in the skilled and semiskilled trades. Emphasis was given to the recruitment of better qualified teachers and in-service training of career teachers in the newer point of view. Revitalized Indian education played an important role in preparing Indians to meet the newer responsibilities of citizenship. The community school near the people deepened Indian interest in education.

Three basic ideas modified educational policy between 1925 and the present. The concept of the boarding school as a desirable education method of acculturation gave way to the idea that

¹¹ Lewis Meriam, *The Problems of Indian Administration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), pp. 346-429.

children should be educated within their local home environment. However, Wheelock's boarding school idea had by this time become entrenched so deeply in Indian thinking that it virtually had become a part of Indian culture.

The half-and-half school program of work and classroom instruction that evolved as a pattern was replaced with a policy of full-time instruction.

The use of the native language was no longer forbidden. Indian youth was encouraged to retain pride in its Indian heritage and to preserve its knowledge of the native language as a sound basis upon which to build a better way of life in an English-speaking culture.

SPECIAL IMPACTS ON INDIAN EDUCATION

The Act of June 2, 1924 (43 Stat. 253) commonly known as the Citizenship Act granted citizenship upon all Indian residents within the continental United States. This important legislation was full of meaning to Indians, to states, and to the federal government.

World War II retarded formal education of Indians. Indian youth of military age left school to enter the service. Others, especially girls, left school before graduation for employment in war industries. Consequently, high-school enrollments dropped. On the other hand, the war years which brought a greater number of Indian people than ever before in contact with non-Indians, forceably brought home to Indians their many disadvantages due to lack of education—disadvantages in employment, in opportunities for advancement in the armed services, and in social adjustment. These war experiences whetted Indian ambitions for more education for themselves, and especially for greater educational opportunities for their children.

A SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR NAVAHO ADOLESCENTS

Practically the only forward-looking educational activities during the war period were the postwar planning of a school-building program, much of which never materialized, and the launching of a specially planned education program to meet the specific needs of non-English-speaking adolescent Navahos. This program was designed to salvage adolescent Navahos from illiteracy and to give each a salable skill for employment in industry. The pilot project which started at Sherman Institute in 1945 for 245 pupils has since expanded to ten schools enrolling approximately 5,000 pupils in 1956. The success of the program has been proven by the high percentage of graduates who are now employed in good-paying jobs and who are maintaining good homes and rearing families in good communities.

PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION FOR INDIANS

Thousands of Indians have received their education in the public schools of this country. The first public school system in what is now Oklahoma was established by the Five Civilized Tribes with some of the funds which they received from the lands they ceded in the East previous to their removal to Indian territory. In 1890, tuition payments were made to certain public schools that enrolled Indian children. In 1900, the official reports indicate that 246 children were enrolled in public schools. In 1956, 71,956 were enrolled in the public schools of the United States and Alaska.¹²

Certain pertinent facts are directly related to the progress made by states in

¹² *Statistics Concerning Indian Education* (note 1 *supra*).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Regulations of the Indian Department, 1884, sec. 517, rules 5 and 6.

assuming responsibility for the education of citizen children of Indian blood. First, the reservation policy established by the federal government during the treaty period isolated culturally the Indian groups and removed them to areas where no public schools existed. Second, and more importantly, until 1924 Indians for the most part were not citizens; therefore, the states had no responsibility for providing education for Indian children. Third, the Citizenship Act in conferring citizenship upon Indians brought them within the same orbit of rights with respect to education as other citizens in the respective states. Nevertheless, this particular act in itself did not and could not remove the financial roadblock created by nontaxable Indian lands, which might deprive local school districts of tax resources to the point where it was impossible to assume educational responsibilities for Indian children.

FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION

With these three factors in mind, the federal government has moved in the direction of assisting states to assume their responsibility for Indians on the same basis as other citizens.

The Johnson-O'Malley Act (Act of April 16, 1934, 48 Stat. 596) provides the legal authority through which financial assistance is given. Federal policy provides assistance on the basis of financial hardship due to the tax-free status of Indian land. Consequently, Indians who live in school districts where tax-exempt land creates no economic hardship receive their education in the public schools without financial assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Approximately 45 per cent of the Indian children enrolled in public schools exclusive of Alaska in 1956 were in schools receiving no financial assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

The Act of September 23, 1950 (64

Stat. 967), Public Law 815 and the Act of September 30, 1950 (64 Stat. 1100), and Public Law 874 have, in addition to the Johnson-O'Malley Act, materially accelerated the ability of states to assume educational responsibility for Indians on the same basis as other citizens.

Language in Public Law 874 permits states to utilize the provisions of that act instead of the Johnson-O'Malley Act for financial assistance in the operation and maintenance of schools enrolling children from tax-free Indian lands, upon election by the Governor of the state to do so. The Governor of Florida made such election in 1953. Oregon has elected to receive aid under the provisions of Public Law 874 beginning with fiscal year 1958. California has agreed, beginning with fiscal year 1959, to assume exclusive responsibility for the education of all Indian citizens with residence in that state without financial help from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Tremendous progress has been made by states and local districts in assuming educational responsibility for Indian citizens. The federal government once operated schools in Michigan, Washington, Minnesota, Idaho, Nebraska, and Wyoming; today, all Indian children in those states are in public schools. The one school remaining in California is operated for Southwest Indians who still lack facilities in their own states, not for Indian residents of California. In 1958 Oregon will assume educational responsibility for all its Indian tribes except the Warm Springs group. One federal day school remains in operation in Florida and one in Utah. One federal vocational boarding school is operated in Utah, one in Kansas, and one in Nevada.

In my opinion, it can be conclusively stated that states are assuming their responsibility for the education of Indian children as rapidly as the major roadblocks are removed; that any resistance

on the part of state authorities and educational agencies toward acceptance of responsibility for the education of Indian children stems primarily from financial reasons and not from racial discrimination. The isolated individual resistance to Indians in the public schools is the exception, not the general attitude. The exceptions usually stem from individual attitudes which are historically based; primarily, the attitude that Indians properly are a federal and not a local responsibility. This attitude in turn is largely an unwillingness to accept a financial responsibility rather than an unwillingness to accept the Indian as a person. Therefore, federal policy is designed to move carefully and thoughtfully toward the removal of the remaining roadblocks to state assumption of responsibility for services to its Indian citizens. The policy simultaneously will guard against the following with federal services those Indians moving into the general flow of non-Indian life.

INDIAN EDUCATION TODAY

The failure from the very beginning to keep up with Indian needs for education had produced by 1952 a tremendous backlog of out-of-school Indian children. In 1952, this population in some of the larger Indian areas equaled the in-school population. These serious conditions, accumulations of the past, if permitted to continue would project illiteracy among certain groups—the Navaho, the Choctaw of Mississippi, and the Alaskan natives—another fifty to seventy-five years. The perennial out-of-school population has resulted in a lower educational level for Indians as compared to the general population—an estimated median of fifth grade for Indians as compared with approximately twice that level for the general population of the United States. Without adequate educational

tools which include a sufficient command of English to move into the dominant culture, many Indians today are chained against their will to an inadequate land base on their reservations. Standards of living depressed beyond the subsistence level on reservations have resulted in unemployment, poor health, poor housing, and relief loads. These conditions often manifest themselves in such misunderstood symptoms as hopelessness, apathy, alcoholism, and delinquency. These situations constitute unmistakable social roadblocks to acceptance of Indians.

The federal government under the present administration is striking hard at the heart of the Indian problem with a three-point program of adequate education, better health, and expanded economic opportunities for Indians in trusteeship status. The purpose of this positive program is to remove the social and economic hindrances to Indian advancement.

In 1953, Glenn L. Emmons, the newly appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs, at the instruction of the President of the United States visited most of the Indian tribes to discuss with them their problems and to acquaint himself firsthand with Indian needs. Upon his return, Commissioner Emmons outlined basic policy aimed at breaking down the cultural barriers between Indians and non-Indians. He then instructed his staff to develop specific and practical programs to implement the policy. On many occasions the Commissioner has publicly announced his general policy and program. His most recent statement on the matter follows:

Our present program, in essence, is to develop the Indian land resources as fully as possible so that they will provide maximum support for those who want to make a living directly from the land and to make new job opportunities and appropriate training available for those who prefer to make

their living in industry or some other line of work. To meet the needs of people in this second category we are fostering the growth of industry near the reservations and providing a broad range of relocation services for those who decide, on their own initiative, to seek employment in metropolitan areas. Education, of course, is vitally important in this whole undertaking—adequate education for all Indian children of normal school age, vocational training to improve the earning capacity and economic prospects of adults who lack basic job skills, literacy training for adults who have an inadequate command of the English language. The goal, in short, is to give the Indian people, at long last, the kind of opportunities which other American citizens traditionally enjoy—opportunity to choose the line of work they prefer and to make the most of the abundant talents and abilities which so many of them possess.

EDUCATIONAL GOALS OF NEW POLICY

Commissioner Emmons stated specific policy with respect to education as follows:

So as not to separate children from their parents at the tender or formative years, Indian children shall be educated, so far as possible, within their home environment and at least through the elementary grades. Educational opportunities are to be provided in public schools if they are available or can be made available for Indian children equally with other children. Federal schools will be required until such time as favorable conditions can be developed for enrollment of all Indian children in public schools.

This policy does not preclude the right of parents to choose on their own initiative private or mission school opportunities for their children. In keeping with this announced education policy, action programs have been developed to carry out the following specific educational goals:

1. Elimination of the out-of-school backlog as rapidly as possible.
2. Transfer of school operations to states as rapidly as conditions will per-

mit the achievement of permanent integration of Indians into the public school systems of their respective states.

3. Initiation of action programs to raise the educational level of Indians, both youths and adults, to that commensurate with the non-Indian population.

Because of the size and complexity of the problem, the Navaho education situation was attacked first. Commissioner Emmons, due to his long-time firsthand knowledge of the Navaho education problems, shortly after taking office in August of 1953 instructed his staff to develop and carry out plans to eliminate within two years the out-of-school backlog, which at that time numbered almost 14,000 children, or half of the school-age population. The Navaho Emergency Education Program quickly came into being, and Congress increased appropriations to meet the emergency. Under the emergency plans (a) boarding school facilities were expanded on the reservation, (b) additional children were crowded in existing facilities both on and off the reservation, (c) public school facilities were expanded and boarding dormitories provided in towns on the periphery of the reservation to permit attendance in public schools, (d) public schools were developed at certain locations on the reservation, (e) trailer schools were established at all points where population density would support a school on a day basis. As a result of the all-out effort and co-operation at all levels of government, the goal was accomplished; school seats were made available under emergency conditions within a two-year period for 13,000 additional Navaho children. The program had the full support and co-operation of the Navaho people, and this accounts in a large measure for the unbelievable achievement which far outstripped any previous efforts to solve the out-of-school Navaho problem.

The same problem existed and the

same efforts were put forth with equal success to reduce the out-of-school population among the Choctaw of Mississippi. Plans have been formulated and some steps have already been taken to strike hard at the Alaskan education problem.

LONG-RANGE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Now that backlogs have been or are rapidly being eliminated, long-range plans within over-all policy are being developed to keep abreast of the annual increase in school-age population, to relieve the serious overcrowding, and to replace unsafe and makeshift school structures. The same bold attack used to eliminate school backlogs is evident in the plans to prevent the development of new backlogs.

Outstanding progress has been made in developing public school opportunities for Indian children. The number of Indian children in the public schools in the continental United States and Alaska has increased from 52,960 in 1952 to approximately 71,956 in 1956.

Several active programs aimed at advancing the educational level of the total Indian population have been started within the past few years. In October of 1955, a pilot program of adult education was started on five reservations: the Papago, the Fort Hall, the Turtle Mountain, the Seminole of Florida, and the Rosebud reservations. This pilot program aims to provide educational opportunities for Indians who failed to get an education in their youth. The program has been well received by the Indians who want to learn to speak and read English and to enlarge their understanding of newer responsibilities they must assume. The program's aims are to orient Indians and their children to a time-conscious, acquisitive, and competitive world and at the same time to give them sufficient command of English to function in an English-speaking society.

The Act of August 3, 1956 (70 Stat. 986) provides for vocational training for adult Indians to equip them with skills needed to earn a livelihood in a competitive, industrial society either on, near, or away from their reservations.

Increasingly, greater emphasis is being placed on higher education as greater numbers of Indian youths complete high school. The Congress appropriated \$70,000 in 1957 to be used primarily for grants to students pursuing higher-education courses. Most tribes with the financial resources to do so provide either grants or loans or both for their youths. Some tribes have set aside sizable trust funds, the income from which will be used to aid their young people to advance themselves educationally. Some states, several universities and colleges, and many religious, fraternal, and civic groups also provide help for the higher education of Indians.¹³

As a result of the special emphasis and effort during the past four years, 127,492 Indian children of all ages in the United States and Alaska were enrolled in school as compared to 102,322 in 1952. Of those enrolled in school in 1956, 58.6 per cent attended public schools, 32.3 per cent attended federal schools, and 9.1 per cent attended mission and other schools. Children enrolled in federal schools attended 236 schools in the United States and 85 schools in Alaska. Over half (52.4 per cent) of the children in federal schools are enrolled in the primary and first four grades. *Eight out of every ten children* in federal schools (82.7 per cent) are full bloods, most of whom come from totally non-English-speaking backgrounds. These statistics help to point up the additional functions schools must assume in developing the language and social skills necessary for successful cultural adjustment.

¹³ *Higher Education Aids for Indian Young People* (Washington: U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1956).

EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUES FOR INDIANS

The Bureau of Indian Affairs and many public school systems through years of experience in educating Indians have developed and tested certain techniques for meeting the special needs of Indian pupils from unacculturated backgrounds. Both the federal and the public schools are faced today, however, with the problem of developing education programs that will effectively and quickly bridge the educational gap between Indians and non-Indians. The Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, enacted Public Law 702. This law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a comprehensive survey of Indian education for the purpose of recommending programs and techniques to improve the education of Indians. The history of the legislation shows the need for additional research with respect to the particular problems of those children who must, at the beginning of their school career, learn a second language. The purpose of the survey is to develop facts and make recommendations that will serve as a guide for the Congress, for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and for states concerned with the problem.

This is a timely step in the right direction. A recent joint study of the Education Policies Commission and the National Manpower Council points up the demands that newer technological developments will make on education. Automation is here; and education is charged with retraining and upgrading the labor force to prepare for newer type jobs at higher skill levels. It is without question that if the general population is undereducated at this time, unacculturated Indian groups must bridge an even greater educational and social gap. Schools must provide more intensive and carefully planned programs to prepare Indians for a place in a highly mechanized world.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The records show that an attempt has been made to use education as a tool to implement the policies of each period of Indian administration. As policies changed, the objectives of Indian education were accordingly modified. After more than three centuries, why then are Indians educationally disadvantaged? Why is there an Indian education problem? Has education been effectively used to transmit to Indians the values of the dominant culture?

In seeking the answer to these questions two basic facts must be kept in mind: first, in the past educational opportunities have been available to only a fraction of the Indian population; and second, many Indians did not want to be educated in the white man's tradition. Consequently, countless Indians neither wanted nor sought educational opportunities for their children.

On the other hand, for those who had educational opportunities and who took advantage of these opportunities, education has been an effective tool in reconciling cultural differences. Thousands of Americans of Indian blood function equally in today's society with non-Indians. They can be found side by side with other Americans in every walk of life.

The education problem today is with individuals and groups who for one reason or another have not had educational opportunities. For the first time in history, Indians see the need for education. All tribes are seeking greater educational opportunities for themselves and their youth. At last formal education has been accepted to the point where it is an important part of Indian values. Current policy with its special emphasis on education, together with Indian interest in education and continued support of the Congress, will, without doubt, advance the education of all Indians to that level which will enable them to function equally with others in this twentieth-century world.

Education Among American Indians: Individual and Cultural Aspects

By ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST

Abstract: The culture of the Indian child equips him well or poorly for education in American schools, depending on how well his culture matches that of the American society which surrounds him. Motivation for school achievement, for instance, is poor by white standards among children of Indian tribes whose culture is based on co-operation rather than on competition. Innately, Indian children have about the same mental equipment as have white children, but their cultural status and experiences cause them to rank lower on educational achievement tests, especially in high-school subjects.—Ed.

EDUCATION is as old as human society, and every human society has its own particular ways of making its children into full-fledged adult participants in its culture. The American Indian tribes having different cultures used different forms of education, but all were alike in giving education *informally* through parents, other relatives, the old people of the tribe, religious societies, hunting and war, and work parties.

TRADITIONAL INDIAN EDUCATION

As long as they preserved their cultures, the Indian tribes educated their children successfully in this informal way. A few tribes, all living in the American Southwest, have preserved their cultures well-nigh intact into the twentieth century and have continued to educate their children in the traditional ways. Among these, the Pueblo groups have succeeded remarkably well in maintaining the tribal cultures in the face of competition from the surrounding culture of white Americans. One of the Pueblo tribes is the Hopi whose members live in villages of close-packed

stone houses on the mesas of north central Arizona. A Hopi chief, now a man of about seventy, has given us in his autobiography an account of the education he received as a boy.¹ He says:

Learning to work was like play. We children tagged around with our elders and copied what they did. We followed our fathers to the fields and helped plant and weed. The old men took us for walks and taught us the uses of plants and how to collect them. We joined the women in gathering rabbitweed for baskets, and went with them to dig clay for pots. We would taste this clay as the women did to test it. We watched the fields to drive out the birds and rodents, helped pick peaches to dry in the sun, and gather melons to lug up the mesa. We rode the burros to harvest corn, gather fuel, or herd sheep. In house-building we helped a little by bringing dirt to cover the roofs. In this way we grew up doing things. All the old people said that it was a disgrace to be idle and that a lazy boy should be whipped.

This man, when he was six or seven years old, went through the first initia-

¹ Leo Simons (Ed.), *Sun Chief* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 51-52, 45.

Robert J. Havighurst is Professor of Education and member of the Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago. He participated in a study of Indian education in 1942-43 which investigated the lives of Indian children in the six Indian tribes mentioned in this article.

tion, in which all Hopi children learn the simplest of the religious mysteries. Before that he had received some of his early moral education through the visits of katchinas, villagers disguised as supernatural beings. Of this he says:

I saw some giantlike Katchinas stalking into the village with long black bills and big sawlike teeth. One carried a rope to lasso disobedient children. He stopped at a certain house and called for a boy. "You have been naughty" he scolded. "You fight with other children. You kill chickens. You pay no attention to the old people. We have come to get you and eat you." The boy cried and promised to behave better. The giant became angrier and threatened to tie him up and take him away. But the boy's parents begged for his life and offered fresh meat in his place. The giant reached out his hand as if to grab the boy but took the meat instead. Placing it in his basket, he warned the boy that he would get just one more chance to change his conduct. I was frightened and got out of sight. I heard that sometimes these giants captured boys and really ate them.

The education of a Hopi boy had much that was similar to that of a Zuni or Zia boy, since these were all Pueblo tribes, but there were great differences between the education of Hopi children and that of the Navahos, who dwelt in isolated family units and lived a seminomad life; and there were other differences characteristic of the plains-dwelling and buffalo-hunting Sioux; or the desert-dwelling Papago; or the salmon-fishing Yurok; or the maize-growing Pequots of New England. It is to be remembered that there were 500 different Indian languages in North America and more than that number of tribes, each with its own particular culture which it taught to its children.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century, those Indian tribes which were left settled down to a peaceful coexistence among themselves and with the

white man; and the latter felt some responsibility for educating their children. For some years from the end of the Indian wars until the 1920's, the American government Indian policy was to educate the Indian children into the white culture, and for this purpose there were established government schools, many of them boarding schools, to which Indian children of various tribes were sent.

The period of boarding schools had its heyday from about 1890 to 1920. In this period soldiers were sometimes sent out to round up Indian children and bring them into boarding schools. Several of the Indian schools became quite well-known for one feature or another. For example, the Carlisle School in Pennsylvania was made famous by the fact that Jim Thorpe, the great all-round athlete of the period between 1910 and 1920, got his athletic start there.

The boarding schools were changed a great deal after the Meriam Report made to the government in 1928 on *The Problems of Indian Administration*. Among other things this report called attention to the value of bringing up children in their home environment and asked that the boarding schools be "humanized" and used only for older children.

In this earlier time, Sun Chief, the Hopi whom we have quoted on his Indian education, attended boarding schools first on the edge of the Hopi country and later in California. He adjusted himself fairly well to the California school, until he was taken with a severe illness during which he was unconscious for a time and had a vision of his "Hopi Spirit Guide." During a long convalescence, he concluded that he should return to the ways of his fathers. He says:

As I lay on my blanket I thought about my school days and all that I had learned.

I could talk like a gentleman. read, write, and cipher. I could name all the states of the Union, with their capitals. repeat the names of all the books of the Bible. quote a hundred verses of scripture. sing more than two dozen Christian hymns and patriotic songs. debate. shout football yells. swing my partners in square dances. bake bread, sew well enough to make a pair of trousers, and tell "dirty stories" by the hour. It was important that I had learned how to get along with white men and earn money by helping them. But my death experience had taught me that I had a Hopi Spirit Guide whom I must follow if I wished to live. I wanted to become a real Hopi again, to sing the good old Katchina songs, and to feel free to make love without the fear of sin or a rawhide.²

Sun Chief's irony should not be taken as an adequate summary or evaluation of the education given in Indian boarding schools during the period 1890 to 1920, but nevertheless it is the reflection of the experience of an intelligent man who became a leader of his own tribe in his adult years.

THE INDIAN AS A MAN OF TWO CULTURES

Education is always a process of teaching a culture, and the education provided by the whites for the Indians has always been aimed at teaching the white culture, or at least some elements of it, to people who have been reared in another culture. In the period of "Americanization" of the Indians, the whites' education was more explicitly aimed at making "white men" out of Indians than it has been since 1930. Since then, it has been designed as a supplement to the tribal education rather than a rival or a replacement for the tribal education. Nevertheless, white education has represented a new and different culture to the Indian, even when planned as supplementary to tribal

education by teaching only certain white agricultural and home-making skills and the 3 R's and by leaving matters of religion, family life, and vocational choice to the traditional tribal processes. Therefore, the Indian who is subjected to white education becomes a man of two cultures. Sometimes the Indian culture predominates and sometimes the white culture wins. Generally, the individual makes his own combination of the two by adopting such white "ways" as are useful and pleasant to him including farming and home-making skills, artizan skills, and often a form of Christianity.

The existence in the Indian's experience of parallel but different cultures is illustrated by a study made in the early 1940's of Navaho Indian children having different degrees of contact with white culture in two different communities.³ The Shiprock community is located on a well-traveled highway and has substantial economic relations with neighboring white communities. This was probably the most acculturated of Navaho communities in the early 1940's. In contrast, the Navaho Mountain community was probably the least acculturated. Situated far away from any highway, in an area almost never visited by white men, many of the Navaho children had never seen a white person except the school teacher; and many of the children never attended school. A few of the older children attended a boarding school in Tuba City, which was on a secondary highway, but still relatively apart from the world of white Americans.

The Shiprock children were closer to the average of white American children on a number of tests of attitudes and abilities than were the Navaho Mountain children, but still the Shiprock

³ Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice L. Neugarten, *American Indian and White Children* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

children showed many significant differences from the white children, indicating the persistence of the Indian culture in their lives.

Attitude towards games

Among other things the Indian children were asked about the games they played, who had made the rules, and who could change the rules. These questions had been asked of Swiss children and of American white children at various ages. The following tribes were studied in this way. Pueblo (Hopi, Zuni, Zia), Sioux, Papago, and Navaho. The games mentioned by the children were all "white"—that is, part of the surrounding white culture—such as basketball, baseball, marbles, and "jacks." Concerning these "white" games the Indian children showed the same kind of change of attitude with age as is shown by white children. That is, the younger children said that rules were made by powerful people or people in authority, and that these rules could not be changed; while the older children said that rules are made by experts or by committees of players. However, the change to a more mature set of attitudes was generally slower in coming to the Indian children.

At Navaho Mountain, the isolated Navaho community, some of the children had never seen "white" games and gave answers concerning traditional Navaho games. This suggested to one of the researchers that she might ask systematically about Navaho games as well as about "white" games, and she was able to get information concerning attitudes toward the rules of games from thirty-eight boys and girls in the Navaho Mountain area, of whom twenty-four had had experience with both kinds of games.

Concerning the "white" games, they generally said that the rules were made by the coach, or the teacher, or some

person in authority, and that these rules would be changed by agreement among the people playing the game. This kind of answer is given by white children. But when asked about rules of traditional Navaho games, the Navaho Mountain youth said unanimously that the rules were first made by the "holy people," or by the "ancient ones," or by the "animals"—who in the ancient days possessed human characteristics—and that no human could change the rules.

For example, an 18-year-old Navaho boy had gone away to an Indian boarding school and had obtained a relatively large degree of contact with white culture. He spoke about football and said that "coaches or head people" get together and make or change the rules. But concerning Navaho games he said that the rules could not be changed "because the holy people taught us them. It's not right to change them."

Thus we see that these young people learn one kind of attitude toward rules of games that they see in the "white" culture, and probably toward rules of life in general; and they learn a different kind of attitude toward such rules that are part of the Navaho culture. Truly they are growing up to be people of two cultures, subject to two contrasting kinds of education; and they must make their own combination or synthesis of the two cultures and the two kinds of education.

The "white" education is part of the white American culture. The Indian child comes to this conditioned by the culture his family and community have taught him. Some Indian groups are now quite thoroughly acculturated to the white way of life—notably in Oklahoma. Their children learn little of the traditional Indian culture and take on the culture of the white school quite easily. Other Indian children, like those of Navaho Mountain, get very little experience of white society and learn very

little from the white school. Most Indians are between these two extremes. In general, we should expect the Indian child to do well in American schools by "white" standards only if he and his family are a part of the white culture.

EQUIPMENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN FOR EDUCATION

Thus the culture of the Indian child equips him well or poorly for education in American schools, depending on how well his culture matches that of the American society which surrounds him. Where his Indian community has been largely absorbed into the white community and the adjustment has been successful, as is true of the Oklahoma Indians, the Indian child may be expected to do as well as white children in the schools, unless he has some biological "racial" difference which gives him an advantage or a disadvantage over white children. There is no evidence that such a biological difference exists.

When his culture is quite different from that of the surrounding white community, as in the case of the Pueblo and Navaho Indians, or when his tribal culture has disintegrated and his group has not yet adjusted well to membership in the surrounding white culture, as was true in the 1940's of the Sioux, the Indian child may be expected to do rather poorly in schools that are run according to white standards.

In addition to this general statement about the equipment of Indian children for success in schools, there are two general questions whose answers throw some light on Indian experience with white schooling.

The first question is whether Indian children are well motivated for work in school. A form of motivation which is important in American education is the individual's desire to compete with and do better than his fellows. This is a notable aspect of the white American

culture, especially of the middle class. Consequently, school children are rewarded by parents and teachers for doing better than other children. Some Indian tribes are traditionally individualistic and competitive, but most of those that survive today are co-operative in their basic attitudes. They work and share together in large families and in neighborhood groups, and they value sharing and co-operation more than individual differences and competition. The Indians of the Southwest, and especially the Pueblo tribes, are notably co-operative. Consequently, if a teacher in a government school, who has been accustomed to assume that children are competitive, tries to appeal to this kind of motivation by using spelling contests or by encouraging children to call attention to the mistakes of other children, the teacher may be perplexed to find that such teaching methods do not work very well. The Indian children may not parade their knowledge before others nor try to appear better than their peers.

In a situation like this, the teacher would do well to discover other forms of motivation for school work, including the use of group procedures and the provision of activities which the Indian children enjoy in themselves. Drawing and painting and other crafts seem to have such an intrinsic appeal to Indian children.

Motivation for education is also poor, by white standards, when a tribe has lost its traditional culture and has not yet successfully fitted into the white culture. Such a situation is described by Macgregor in his study of two Sioux communities⁴ where the people were just beginning to be successful as cattle raisers, but many were eking out a poor existence as laborers in nearby white communities or were making a

⁴ Gordon Macgregor, *Warriors Without Weapons* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945).

bare living as farmers. The children of these communities were mixed in their attitudes toward schooling. Many of them started out well, and then in adolescence seemed to lose their drive for education.

Intelligence of Indian children

Studies of the intelligence of Indian children may be divided into two groups—those reported before and after 1935. The first group of studies tended to show that Indians were less intelligent than white children. The second group tended to show that there was no difference in average intelligence between Indian and white children, except for such differences as were explainable on the basis of cultural differences.

The following is a brief summary of the studies of the intelligence of Indian groups in particular, including the tests used and the results obtained. The earliest reported study dates back to 1914 when Rowe administered Stanford-Binet examinations to 268 Indians and found 94 per cent of them to be below the norm for whites on the basis of chronological age.⁵ Hunter and Sommermeier in 1921 gave the Otis Classification Test to 715 mixed- and full-blood Indians and found a correlation of .41 between degree of white blood and the intelligence quotient.⁶ Garth administered the National Intelligence Test to Indians of various tribes and localities as well as to Mexicans and other ethnic groups. His findings substantiate largely those of Hunter and Sommermeier. Garth found Mexicans to do better than full-blood Indians, but not as well as mixed-blood Indians. Garth

⁵ T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology: A Study of Racial Mental Differences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931), Chaps. IV, V.

⁶ W. S. Hunter, and E. Sommermeier, "The Relation of Degree of Indian Blood to Score on Otis Intelligence Test," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, Vol. 2 (1922), pp. 257-77.

and his associates⁷ also found public-school Indian students to be slightly superior to United States government school Indians and that there was a rise in IQ with school grade. The last finding led Garth to weigh heavily the factor of education in test performance. Haught⁸ administered the Pintner-Cunningham Mental Test to little children, the National Intelligence Test to children of intermediate age, and the Terman Group Test of Mental Ability to those in the upper-age levels. He concluded that "Indians make lower scores than whites because they are lower in native ability." The results heretofore described were obtained mainly with the use of paper-and-pencil tests of general intelligence in which the verbal component is quite prominent.

These studies of Indians using verbal intelligence tests give results rather similar to the well-known studies by Sherman, Gordon, and others on white children living in isolated mountain hollows in Virginia, on canalboats in England, and in isolated rural areas where there is very little schooling. These children tend to fall below the average of white children and to suffer a decrease in IQ as they grow older. Such findings suggest that the observed differences of intelligence may not be due to racial differences.

To determine the effect of language on test results, Jameson and Sandiford⁹ administered both nonlanguage and language tests of intelligence to 717 mixed-blood Indians and obtained a difference of 5 points in IQ in favor of the non-

⁷ T. R. Garth, "The Intelligence of Full-blood Indians," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 9 (1925), pp. 382-89.

⁸ B. F. Haught, "Mental Growth of the Southwestern Indian," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 18 (1934), pp. 137-42.

⁹ E. Jameson and F. Sandiford, "The Mental Capacity of Southern Ontario Indians," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 19 (1928), pp. 536-51.

language test. The more significant attempts to appraise the intelligence of Indians within the past ten to fifteen years have been made with the use of performance or relatively "culture-free" tests.

Klineberg¹⁰ administered the Pintner-Paterson series of six tests to Indian and white children on the Yakima Indian reservation and found (1) that Indian children took longer with form boards but made fewer errors, (2) that comparison of Indian and white groups in terms of total number of points obtained on the Pintner-Paterson Point Scale showed no differences between the two because the Indians made up in accuracy for their inferior speed, and (3) that correspondence of score with degree of white blood was lacking. Whereas preceding investigations pointed to the superiority of the whites over the Indians on tests of intelligence, Klineberg's study is among the first to offer contradictory evidence and to suggest that test performance may be affected by cultural factors.

A later study by Garth and Smith,¹¹ employing a nonlanguage and a language test with the same subjects, found (1) that Indian children consistently show a performance on the Pintner-Paterson test more nearly equal to white performance than they do on the verbal test, (2) that the IQ's on the performance test were 10 to 14 points higher than those on the verbal test.

Recent intelligence test studies

In more recent testings on Indian children, the general contention has been

¹⁰ Otto Klineberg, "An Experimental Study of Speed and Other Factors in 'Racial' Difference," *Archives of Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 93 (1928), p. 109.

¹¹ T. R. Garth and O. D. Smith, "The Performance of Full-blooded Indians on Language and Non-Language Intelligence Tests," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 32 (1937), pp. 376-81.

that the verbal component in tests of general intelligence handicaps the Indian child. Tests that are relatively culture free, of a performance variety, are considerably more appropriate than tests requiring facility with the English language.

An extensive testing program with Indian children was carried through by a University of Chicago group as part of the *Study of Indian Education*.¹² The Grace Arthur Point Performance Scale in a shortened form was used with 670 Indian children aged 6 through 15 in communities of the Navaho, Hopi, Zuni, Zia, Papago, and Sioux Indian tribes. The Arthur test consisted of a battery of nonverbal performance tests—The Porteus Maze, Mare and Foal, Seguin Form Board, Kohs Block Design, and Knox Cube tests. Nonverbal tests were used because it was thought that tests requiring oral or written work in English would penalize the Indian children, since most of them spoke an Indian language at home and very few of them were fluent in English.

Practically all of the children tested were full-blood Indians except the Sioux, where the sample of children conformed to the pattern of blood-mixture on the reservation. In most communities, either practically all children within the age range or a representative sample of them were tested.

On this test battery, most of the Indian groups gave almost exactly the same quality of performance that white children do. There were two Indian groups who fell substantially below the norms for white children—one Papago and one Navaho group—and these children also fell substantially below other groups from the same tribes. However,

¹² Robert J. Havighurst and Rhea R. Hilkevitch, "The Intelligence of Indian Children as Measured by a Performance Scale," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 39 (1944), pp. 419-33.

the Hopi groups performed definitely above the level of white children. The results of this study indicate that Indian children do about as well as white children on a performance test of intelligence, and that differences exist between tribes and among communities within a tribe—differences of the degree that are also found among white children in various types of communities.

The results of this test on the Sioux children are of special interest because they can be compared with the results of a Kuhlmann-Anderson (verbal) intelligence test which was administered to some of the same children shortly after they had taken the Arthur test. A total of thirty boys and girls took both tests. The average IQ of this group on the Kuhlmann-Anderson test was 82.5, with a standard deviation of 13.5. The average Arthur test IQ of this group was 102.8, with a standard deviation of 19.1. The product-moment correlation coefficient between the two sets of scores was $.53 \pm .09$. A group with an average IQ of 83 is generally supposed to be a very dull group, very few of whom are even average in intelligence when compared with a normal group. This conclusion might have been drawn concerning Sioux children from the verbal test. Yet, in the performance test of intelligence, the same group averaged 103, slightly above the average for white children.

In a study made on these same Indian children of five tribes, another non-verbal test of intelligence showed a considerable superiority of Indian children over white children. The test was the Goodenough Draw-A-Man Test. This requires the child to use a pencil to draw a figure of a man. The drawing is scored for accuracy in proportion and detail, and not for other esthetic qualities. Between the ages of 6 and 11 the scores on this test have been found to be closely related to other measures of

intelligence. The Draw-A-Man test has been used with various Indian groups since 1926, with a general finding of a minor degree of inferiority of Indian children compared with white children. However, a 1942 study by Rohrer¹³ compared Osage (Oklahoma) Indian children with white children in the same public school classrooms. The Osage Indians are well off economically and speak English in their homes. The mean IQ of the Indian children was 103.8; of the white children, 102.9.

When the test was given to the same groups who were tested with the Arthur Performance Test, the results showed the Indian children to be superior to white children.¹⁴ Average IQ's ranged from 117 (one of the Hopi groups) to 102 (one of the Sioux groups). This was not taken to mean that Indian children are actually superior in native intelligence to white children. The results are best explained as due to cultural differences between the Indian and white children and between the Indian groups. The Indian children, especially the boys, are stimulated culturally to take an active interest in the world of nature and are given much opportunity to form and express concepts of natural objects, including the human body, on the basis of their observations. Furthermore, drawing is done more commonly by adults in several of the Indian tribes than it is by white adults. The Hopi boys exceeded the girls very greatly on this test. This may be explained as due to the greater amount of stimulation received by boys than by girls in this culture to take an active interest in

¹³ J. H. Rohrer, "The Test Intelligence of Osage Indians," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 16 (1942), pp. 99-105.

¹⁴ Robert J. Havighurst, Minna Korol Gunther, and Inez Ellis Pratt, "Environment and the Draw-A-Man Test: The Performance of Indian Children," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 41 (1946), pp. 50-63.

the world of nature: in man, animals, clouds, and other natural phenomena.

The conclusion which is drawn by most social scientists from the data on Indian cultures and Indian intelligence is that the American Indians of today have about the same innate equipment for learning as have the white children of America. But in those Indian tribes which have preserved their traditional cultures to some extent, there is a limited motivation of children for a high level of performance in schools and colleges.

CURRENT TRENDS IN INDIAN EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

In 1928 the Meriam Report proposed major changes in Indian education, principally the following:

1. Keep education on the reservation as far as possible and keep it closely related to family and tribal life. Avoid sending children away from home as much as possible.
2. Make the day schools on the reservations into community centers which teach adults as well as children.
3. Humanize the boarding schools; limit them to older children.
4. Make Indian education fit the facts of postschool life for most Indians—stress vocational training in agriculture and handicrafts, health, homemaking, and so forth. Pay attention to occupational placement of graduates.
5. Provide high school and college opportunities for those who do well in school, through more secondary schools and through scholarship aid for able Indian students who wish to attend college.

These proposals have been generally followed in the years since 1928. However, Indian life has been changing, and the educational program of the Indian Service has been affected by the growing acculturation of the Indians and by

their growing tendency to leave the reservations and to live in centers of modern culture. For instance, the Navahos, who up to 1940 were generally not interested in schooling for their children and tended to keep to themselves, have recently been asking for more educational opportunities. They have sent many of their adolescent children to off-reservation boarding schools which have offered a special five-year program for adolescent youth who have had little or no prior schooling. By 1955, approximately 1,200 young men and women had graduated from this program and 50 per cent of these graduates were employed off the Navaho reservation, while only 7 per cent were employed on the reservation—the remainder being housewives, students, or unemployed.

Another example of movement away from the reservation is provided by the Sioux of the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota. In 1938-39 a study of graduates of the Pine Ridge schools showed that 98 per cent of them stayed on the reservation to make a living. In 1951 a study was made of 1,542 Pine Ridge boys and girls who had been enrolled in reservation schools between 1937 and 1947. Of this group, 54 per cent were still on the reservation. Most of the remainder were living in white communities near the reservation.¹⁵

Studies of educational achievement

There have been several studies of the educational achievement of Indian children since 1945 made with standardized tests which permit comparison among the various groups of Indian and white children.^{16, 17}

¹⁵ George A. Dale, *Education for Better Living: A Study of the Effectiveness of the Pine Ridge Educational Program* (Washington: Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Department of the Interior, 1955).

¹⁶ Kenneth E. Anderson, E. Gordon Collier, and Carl E. Ladd, *The Educational*

There were striking differences among Indian groups on the tests of school achievement in the areas of reading, vocabulary, spelling, arithmetic, health and safety, and natural resources. The groups with the greatest degree of contact with modern culture did best. Most of the Indian groups were below public-school white children who lived in the neighborhood of these Indians. On two tests the differences between white and Indian children were small. These had been prepared by Indian Service personnel to test knowledge of health and safety procedures and knowledge of the use of local natural resources of tools. For these two tests, the Indian children had about the same kind of practical background and school experience as the white children of neighboring communities. In the entire battery of tests, Indian children who live *off* an Indian reservation generally did better than Indian children who live *on* a reservation. Further, Indian pupils who live in towns achieved somewhat better than those who live in the open country.

When comparisons of Indian and white pupils are made at various grade levels, it is found that the Indian children compare more favorably with white children in elementary grades than in high school. This is probably due to the fact that the material taught in elementary grades is closer to the life experience of the Indian children—more practical—than is the more abstract teaching of the high school. Thus the home and community life of the Indian child tend to aid him in learning the simple mental skills taught in elementary school, but they contribute little toward helping him with high-school subjects.

Achievement of Indian Children (Washington: Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Department of the Interior, 1953).

¹⁷ L. Madison Coombs and others. "The Indian Child Goes to School" (in press), Chapter I.

Educational facilities

During recent years there has been an increase of provisions for secondary education by the Indian Service. For instance, in 1936 there were 13 high schools operated by the Indian Service, compared with 33 in 1951.¹⁸ The most rapid gains in school enrollment among Indian children have been in secondary schools. Very few high-school graduates go on to college, though even here there has been a relative gain. In 1936 about one out of fifty Indian high-school graduates found his way to college, while, in 1950, one in six of the 597 graduates of Indian Service high schools entered college. Still, this is a small number, and the total of Indians entering college, from all kinds of secondary schools, is in the neighborhood of 200. It appears that Indian youths are doing what white working-class youths also tend to do; increasingly they set their sights on high-school graduation, but relatively few of them go to college.

CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that, generally speaking, American Indian groups have not taken part in American education at the secondary and higher levels as have the European immigrant groups such as the Germans, Irish, Scandinavians, and Italians. Most Indian groups have clung to enough of their traditional cultures to prevent them from adopting fully the white American culture, including its attitudes toward education and its use of education as a means of social mobility and occupational achievement.

Those Indian groups who move into the stream of dominant American culture will gradually make more use of schooling and will perform better as

¹⁸ Willard W. Beatty, "Fifteen Years of Indian Education," *Indian Education*, No. 211 (Lawrence, Kansas: Haskell Institute Press, September 15, 1951).

scholars. This may take a long time. It seems that the Indian groups who do move into the American culture do so at the lower economic levels and require a generation or two to learn the ways of upward mobility, including the use of education for this purpose.

Individual Indians have done very well in the American educational sys-

tem by committing themselves to learning the dominant American culture and living in it. The number of such people is relatively small and gives evidence of the great holding power of many of the traditional Indian cultures upon their members, even in the face of pressure and temptation to seek the advantages of the American culture.

American Indian Political Participation

By HELEN L. PETERSON

Abstract: The legal right of American Indian tribes to self-government still exists in principle, but during the last hundred years, it has been ignored or infringed upon by regulation or local interpretation to such an extent, especially since the Civil War, that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 which meant to restore self-government in local affairs seemed unrealistic to many Indian tribes. Since 1950, government interference in tribal affairs has again increased, both at the national and state levels. The participation of Indians in political life is growing. Over 32,000 were in the armed services during the last World War. As citizens, since 1924 they are increasingly participating in local and national elections.—Ed.

AN EXAMINATION of the term "political participation" as applied to American Indians leads inevitably to consideration of the broader concept of citizenship. In general usage, citizenship involves membership in a political unit, participation in public decisions, and numerous obligations such as military service and the burden of taxation. In daily living, the process is as broad as one's relationship with his neighbor and as specific as voting in an election. Rights and obligations, privileges and duties become complementary functions and generally are inseparable.

Indians share in the process, but in addition, as citizen-members of their respective tribes, they have loyalties and obligations to political bodies not commonly understood. It is often argued that Indians have a dual citizenship; that their tribes represent nations within a nation; that somehow this is wrong and ought to be terminated. It is true that Indians are citizens of their tribes, and since 1924, they have also been citizens of the United States. But such duality of citizenship—in local and na-

tional government—is enjoyed by all citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.

That Indians can be effective citizens of the United States while at the same time sustaining membership in a tribe was recognized in an opinion by the Attorney General as long ago as 1855.¹

In referring to the assertion of incompatibility of American citizenship with Choctaw tribal jurisdiction, he stated that

... the error in all this consists in the idea that any man, citizen or not citizen, becomes divested of his allegiance to the United States, or throws off their jurisdiction or government, in the fact of becoming subject to any local jurisdiction whatever. This idea misconceives entirely the whole theory of the federal government, which theory is, that all the inhabitants of the country are, in regard to certain limited matters, subject to the federal jurisdiction, and in all others to the local jurisdiction, whether political or municipal. The citizen of Mississippi is also a citizen of the

¹ 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 176. See also Cohen, "Indian Rights and the Federal Courts," *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 24 (1940), p. 157-58.

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United States; and he owes allegiance to, and is subject to the laws of, both governments. So also an Indian, whether he be Choctaw or Chickasaw, and while subject to the local jurisdiction of the councils and courts of the [Indian] Nation, yet is not in any possible relation or sense divested of his allegiance and obligations to the Government and laws of the United States.

The problem has always been one of relating Indian political forms to the general governmental framework of the United States without arbitrarily interfering with prevailing customs and practices. Since the degree and quality of participation in any system depend to a large extent upon the attitude people hold for it, which in turn depends upon degree of understanding, protections guaranteed, and other factors that promote effective identification with the system, it may be helpful, before proceeding to a discussion of actual Indian participation today in both local and broader spheres of America's political life, to illustrate how participation has been affected in the past by an inconsistent and often nullifying approach to Indian self-government.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When European explorers first arrived in North America they found scores of independent sovereign nations or tribes of Indians with systems ranging from the theocracies of the Pueblos to the highly democratic government of the Iroquois who had developed a constitution that provided, among other things, for initiative, referendum and recall, and the right of suffrage for women as well as men. Regardless of the form of government, Indians understood the meaning of and practiced good citizenship in the context of their own politically sovereign societies.

The right of the tribes to carry on self-government was recognized first by European powers and later by the new

American republic. It was not something conferred upon the Indians. The first contacts between the United States and the original inhabitants of the land were resolved legally by treaties such as those made between any two independent nations. Despite the fact that treaties were replaced in 1871 by "agreements," ratified by both Houses of Congress, the right to internal political freedom was untouched legally by the new mechanism.

The Supreme Court has consistently upheld this right, beginning with the classic opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of *Worcester v. Georgia* in 1832:

The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed; and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others."

... the settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its right to self-government—by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state. . . .²

Except as the principle contained in this decision has been ignored or infringed by regulation or local interpretation, the right of a tribe to the exercise of self-government still exists. But over the years, as it became evident that it

² 6 Pet. U.S. 515 (1832), 8 L. Ed. 483, p. 559-60.

would be impossible to separate the affairs of Indians from those of non-Indians, governmental administration assumed a larger and larger role in the context of a rapidly developing nation, increasingly infringing upon tribal action.

Office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs

In 1832, Congress passed an act creating the office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and vested in that office the housekeeping job of "the management of all Indian affairs."

Following the war with Mexico, in 1849, the long-established distinction between internal and external affairs of the tribes was first abandoned in several treaties concluded with tribes residing in the newly acquired territory. The treaty-making period itself came to an end with the close of the Civil War and the acceleration of westward expansion. This, however, did not terminate tribal existence; it merely stated a policy, namely, that the United States would no longer make treaties with tribes.

In 1883, the murder of one Indian by another resulted in the conviction of the offender in a federal court. The decision was later reversed by the Supreme Court which ruled that in an area in which Congress had not legislated, tribal law prevailed. This decision—which seemed to the white American public to let murder run rampant—aroused such indignation that within two years Congress enacted a law which made murder and six other major crimes federal offenses when committed by one Indian against another on a reservation.³

³ *Ex parte Crow Dog*: 109 U.S. 556, 3 Sup. Ct. 396 (1883). Three other major crimes were added in 1932. 47 Stat. 336. This statute is generally known as "The Ten Crimes Act." An additional crime was added in 1956: "Embezzlement of tribal funds."

Perhaps more significant than specific legislation, which curbed internal rights but was at least subject to judicial review, was the establishment of Courts of Indian Offenses in 1884 by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in compliance with instructions from the Secretary of the Interior. These Courts soon placed reservation superintendents in the position of legislators, policemen, judges, and courts of appeal. The effect of the Department's action was to accelerate the decline of Indian incentive and ability to manage their own internal affairs. The Courts were used to prohibit freedom of Indian religion, the practice of Indian medicine men, and certain Indian marriage customs. Perhaps a low point was reached in the 1894 revision of the regulations which permitted a superintendent to restrict an Indian to a reservation area. Little change was effected in such regulations until extensive revisions were made as a result of the Reorganization Act of 1934.

Allotment Act of 1887

The liberty of participation in internal tribal affairs was further contravened by the Allotment Act of 1887 and the fee patenting of land which followed. This brought a third unit of government—the states—into the picture with resulting confusion in judicial thinking. Land within reservation boundaries which had been allotted to individuals, and thereafter was removed from trust status through granting of individual fee-simple title, appeared to have the status of ordinary taxable state land. In numerous cases during subsequent decades the question of legal authority on such land within reservation boundaries arose to plague Indian as well as federal and state courts.

Throughout the latter years of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the present one, the confusion in

the enactment, application, and interpretation of laws pertaining to Indians seriously obscured their fundamental rights. Federal courts, when called into play, carried out a dispassionate role as legal protectors. Lawmakers, however, frequently responded to power politics, and administrators were impatient of interference in their job of managing Indian affairs as the practicalities of the moment dictated.

In attempting to deal with increasingly complex problems, the greatest pressure brought to bear through the Indian Service was in the direction of assimilation. In 1885, for example, the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs contained this statement:

The Indian is the strangest compound of individualism and socialism run to seed. It is this being that we endeavor to make a member of a new social order . . . to this end we must recreate him, and make a new personality.

The Allotment Act of 1887 tried to accomplish the process of "re-creation" by attempting to change Indian social structure itself.

The implications for the Indians have been well stated by Felix Cohen:

The most basic of all Indian rights (the right of self-government) is the Indian's last defense against bureaucratic oppression, for in a realm where the states are powerless to govern and where Congress, occupied with more pressing national affairs, cannot govern wisely and well, there remains a large no-man's land in which government can emanate only from officials of the Indian Department or from the Indians themselves.⁴

That the vacuum was filled primarily by government authority at the expense of self-development in political acumen

⁴ Felix Cohen, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 122.

by Indians themselves is pointed out by D'Arcy McNickle:

The fact that almost no mention is made of tribal self-government in the Meriam Report (of 1928), and that it contains no recommendations on this subject, illustrates how completely Indian social organization had been forgotten. . . . Some reservation superintendents, according to Meriam, regarded [tribal] forms of organization half-contemptuously, and in some cases seemed to consider the council rather a nuisance because it served as a forum for agitators.⁵

The Indian Reorganization Act

The Meriam Report did call public attention to the low state into which Indian affairs had fallen during the previous half century. It also helped pave the way for administrative reform culminating in 1934 in the Indian Reorganization Act which carried with it a return to the philosophy of self-determination, the foundation of our democratic system.

The new regime tackled the Indian problem mainly on two fronts, natural resources and human resources, and it underlined the indivisibility of the two. On the one hand, it strove to protect the Indian land base and provide means whereby Indians could take full advantage of their resources and improve them. On the other, it sanctioned Indian tribal societies and their cultures through the encouragement and protection of democratic political institutions, native religions, traditional and contemporary Indian arts and crafts, and tribal organizations oriented toward the molding of rich, strong, free personalities. . . .⁶

The new policy, which sought to curb official interference in tribal functions, is described in the report of the Secretary of the Interior for 1936 with re-

⁵ D'Arcy McNickle, *They Came Here First* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1949), p. 292.

⁶ Laura Thompson, *Personality and Government* (Mexico, D. F.: Ediciones del Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1951), p. 8.

spect to the regulations pertaining specifically to law and order:

Under the new law and order regulations, Indian service officials are prohibited from controlling, obstructing or interfering with the functions of the Indian courts. The appointment and removal of Indian judges on these reservations where courts of Indian offenses are now maintained is made subject to confirmation by the Indians of the reservation. Indian defendants will hereafter have the benefit of formal charges, the power to summon witnesses, the privilege of bail, and the right to trial by jury. . . . In addition to this criminal jurisdiction, the Indian courts will, in the future, have authority to handle civil cases between tribal Indians.

This effort of the Indian "New Deal" to restore self-determination in local affairs found many tribes confused. They had been so long denied the right to operate their own systems of government freely and openly⁷ and to evolve new procedures out of the old, that again they were in the position of being asked to accept names and forms which had meaning to white men but were strange to them. Nevertheless, an impressive number of tribal councils have managed to operate successfully under the new policy; others have been less than effective, or ineffective during particular tribal administrations. A number of tribes voted not to accept IRA at all, preferring to continue under pre-existing patterns of organization, or under patterns which incorporated some of the aspects of IRA policies.

The great failure during the past twenty years has been that the intent

⁷ It is difficult to determine how much of the complex of domestic, civil, and criminal matters had been covertly regulated by tribal systems without official sanction during the earlier years. Very little research has been devoted to this aspect of Indian affairs. See David H. French, *Factionalism in Isleta Pueblo*, "Monograph of the American Ethnological Society," No. 14 (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1948).

of IRA has not had consistent and vigorous support. As a result, the major goals of adequately revitalizing Indian self-government, permitting it to adapt itself, and eventually bringing tribal systems into full participation in the political life of our democracy, have not been reached.

Recent policies of the Indian Bureau

In 1950, approximately fifteen years after the passage of IRA, a general reversal of philosophy, harking back to the days of the General Allotment Act, began to emerge in the policies and procedures of the Indian Bureau. This is clearly seen in recent efforts to reorient federal responsibility in several ways: by pressure toward complete termination of the federal relationship with Indian tribes; by transfer of jurisdiction and responsibility for former federal services to the states; by such administrative procedures as speeding up sales of Indian trust land and shutting off available federal credit; and by emphasis on relocation to urban centers at the expense of resource development on the reservations.

The most basic right of all self-government, the right to decide questions by vote of the people, has not escaped from administrative interference. For example, the Klamath Tribe, in 1954, protested to no avail when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs not only recognized an unauthorized delegate to Washington, but also forced the tribe to pay his travel expenses; this was done even though he had sought designation as an official tribal delegate and was defeated for that position in a regular tribal election. Similar complaints within the last few years with respect to interference in tribal elections have been registered by the Blackfeet, Yakima, and the Seminoles and Choctaws of Oklahoma.

When tribal and outside interests collide, the right to independent counsel

becomes crucial. This right came under attack in 1950, when a more stringent set of regulations governing tribal attorney contracts was proposed by the Indian Bureau. However, the opposition of the tribes, interested citizen groups, and the legal profession (including the American Bar Association) was so strong that the new regulations were dropped.

The current struggle of California and Arizona over water rights illustrates how conflicting the interests of Indians and non-Indians can become and points up the necessity of full right to independent counsel. In a suit brought by Arizona, the Attorney General of the United States intervened in behalf of all affected tribes in discharge of departmental duty to represent Indians. However, it immediately became apparent that a conflict of interest existed, as is demonstrated by the motion filed on behalf of the tribes with the Supreme Court (no. 10, October Term, 1956), wherein the attorneys for the tribes argued that:

The United States has intervened in this case and has placed the rights of petitioners in issue. As a result petitioners are precluded from asserting their rights in their own names and on their own behalf. They have no control over the course of the suit, no voice in its direction and no right or opportunity to participate in the formation or trial of the issues. It can waive or compromise their rights, fail to prosecute them in full or in part, allow them to go by default, or fail to assert essential contentions.

The franchise

Before turning to current participation in political affairs, one final aspect of the historical picture must be touched upon briefly—that of the right of Indians to the franchise.

Suffrage was not universally available to Indians until long after the Four-

teenth and Fifteenth Amendments had become part of the law of the land. Prior to 1924, when the Citizenship Act was passed, many Indians had acquired the right to vote by having accepted allotments, by special dispensation such as service in the armed forces, or by giving up tribal affiliations and entering the mainstream of American life.

In 1924, all native-born Indians were declared citizens, but those born outside the country still had no naturalization procedure open to them until the Nationality Act of 1940 provided for it. But due to the constitutional relationship between the states and the federal government, the right to vote derives from the several states, subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and guarantees in the Constitution. As late as 1938, seven states still refused to let Indians go to the polls.

The justification for this discrimination, contained in state statutes or constitutions, rested upon (1) Indian exemption from real estate taxes, (2) Indian maintenance of tribal affiliation, and (3) the mistaken notion that Indians were under guardianship by virtue of the fact that Indian lands were under federal trusteeship. In 1948, following court rulings in New Mexico and Arizona, it was considered settled everywhere that Indians, whether or not they live on reservations, whether or not they pay taxes on part or all of their land, are in exactly the same position with respect to voting as non-Indians. However, in 1956, to defend the denial of the ballot to a registered Indian voter, Utah revived a statute adopted in 1897 (par. 11, Sec. 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) which dealt with registration and voting. This statute states in part that:

Any person living upon any Indian or military reservation shall not be deemed a

resident of Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless such person had acquired a residence in some county in Utah prior to taking up his residence upon such Indian or military reservation.

In an opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of Utah in December 1956, the Court took great pains to establish that reservation Indians, as a group, occupy a status distinctly different from other residents of the state. The state's argument that all an Indian has to do to qualify to vote is to establish residence where his living is not supervised by the federal government, to assume his responsibility as a citizen by paying land taxes, and to overcome his "lack of interest" in the affairs of the state which surrounds him, is in direct contravention of the principle of self-government and the right to full political participation by a citizen. It asks Indians to break up their communities, where voting on local issues is a fundamental method of deciding group opinion in matters of common interest and concern.

Even as these words are written the Utah Legislature is deciding whether or not to revise its statutes. Pending the Legislature's action, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, taken by the Ute Indians and the National Congress of American Indians, is being held in abeyance.

The vigor and independence which characterized Indian societies prior to European settlement gave way under governmental administrative procedures to a state which has often been described as one of suspicion, apathy, and dependence. Despite this history Indians have made remarkable strides in the last decade. Participation in two world wars both in the armed services and in war work, experience under IRA, and the more favorable state of the nation's economy, which has provided increased job opportunities, are among the

factors which have combined to give Indians a new perspective. These factors have also revived Indians' courage to appreciate their own capabilities and needs to organize and to begin to act more effectively in their own behalf.

INDIAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TODAY

The foregoing has been offered to aid in understanding current Indian political life. Against this background let us consider how and to what extent Indians do share in national, state and local political matters.

The Armed Services

Indians have assumed without hesitation the natural obligation of a citizen to defend his country. So far as military duty is a mark of good citizenship, so Indians have excelled. In the case of many tribes, the stereotype of the Indian chief, or warrior, can here be taken seriously, since war service was an established pattern of culture.

The high proportion of enlistments as against draftees has been noteworthy during both World Wars. A newspaper article appearing in the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* on September 29, 1918, reported that of the Indian population of 336,000, less than ten per cent of whom were male Indians of military age, "more than 6,000 were in the United States Army, of whom 85 per cent volunteered for service. There are some hundreds more in the United States Navy."⁸ Altogether, over 17,000 Indians saw service in that war.⁹

Indian participation in World War II was even more extensive and ranged far

⁸ Quoted in *Indians at Work*, Vol. 9, No. 7 (Washington: U. S. Department of the Interior, March 1942), p. 31. The article also pointed out that of all Indians, only 30 per cent could read and write English and less than half were citizens.

⁹ Cohen, *Ibid.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 161.

beyond service in the fighting forces. Over 30,000 engaged in war work at home and far from home, while the purchase of bonds was as established a practice among Indians as it was among the public at large.

The Indian Bureau reported in the Spring of 1945 that approximately 22,000 Indians were in the Army, 2,000 in the Navy, 120 in the Coast Guard and 730 in the Marine Corps.¹⁰ Their valor in battle fronts from Iwo Jima to Salerno earned for them seventy-one Air Medals, fifty-one Silver Stars, forty-seven Bronze Stars, thirty-four Distinguished Flying Crosses, and two Congressional Medals of Honor.¹¹

The principle that tribal and national political participation by Indians can be coexistent was illustrated during the war in the experience of a small group of Papagos residing in the extreme southern part of their Arizona reservation. Although nearly all of the Papagos registered under the Selective Service Act, this group decided that the far-off war was not its concern and forcibly ejected the federal marshal who came to investigate. Instead of prosecuting the aged chief, government officials took him to the West Coast as a guest of the Army in order that he might see something of the war effort of his white co-citizens. As a result of this effort to improve understanding, the Indian leader thereafter enthusiastically supported the enforcement of the Selective Service Law.¹²

Still another example of the willingness of Indians to be part of America's future occurred in the same tribe, which sacrificed 400,000 of the best acres of

its homeland to the Army Air Force in 1942.

"If the Army thinks it will help to win the war," said the tribal chairman speaking to the Air Force representatives, "it can have it. It can have whatever our tribe owns, if that is necessary."

When the officers brought up terms of compensation, the Chairman put the matter to his council and the response was instantaneous: "We ask nothing. Whatever the Army wants to pay will be satisfactory."¹³

Voting

In recent years, Indians have made great strides toward fuller awareness of their own best interests and the clear and forceful defense of them.

One expression of this can be seen in the voting record of Indians in the 1952 and 1956 general elections. Although it has been impossible to obtain a complete picture, scattered returns available show an unmistakable trend.

In 1952, nine of the nineteen pueblos in New Mexico had no registered voters. Rumor had been spread among the Indians that their lands would be taxed if they voted and that punishment threatened any man who made an error in marking his ballot. But in 1956, after a voter education program, only two pueblos still clung to their traditionally conservative attitude toward voting, while three achieved 100 per cent registration. A comparison of registration among the pueblos for the two years reveals the following:

Eligible voters registered (per cent)	Number of pueblos	
	1952	1956
0-10	14	7
11-50	2	7
over 50	3	5

¹³ From *Indians at Work*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Washington: U. S. Department of the Interior, Nov.-Dec. 1943), p. 17.

¹⁰ The total number represents slightly more than $\frac{1}{3}$ of the reported number of able-bodied Indian men from 18 to 50. The figures do not include officers, for whom no statistics are available. (From data provided in a letter, Bureau of Indian Affairs, January 18, 1957.)

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Theodore Haas, "Indian Uprising—New Style," *The Survey*, Feb. 1949.

The per cent of all voters registered increased from less than 8 per cent to more than 24 per cent in the two voting years.¹⁴

Between 1952 and 1956, there was an average increase in voting from 31 to 37 per cent for one Montana tribe, one South Dakota tribe and two Washington tribes.¹⁵

In 1952, approximately 3,000 Navahos of voting age in both Arizona and New Mexico were registered to vote, while 4,606 Navahos actually voted in 1956. It is worth noting that 3,730, or 81 per cent, of the Navahos who did vote resided in New Mexico whereas only about 40 per cent of the tribe are inhabitants of that state. This comparatively high vote, relative to population, derives partially from the encouragement extended to potential voters by the state, from the establishment of additional voting precincts, and the assistance rendered by country officials to Navaho voter education. In addition, New Mexico, unlike Arizona, does not require a literacy test for voting eligibility.¹⁶

Indian vote as decisive factor

In some districts and in close races the Indian vote could be—and in some cases has been—a decisive factor in Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Washington, Oregon, North Dakota, Utah, Minnesota, Nevada, and Alaska.

In Montana the Indian vote could have been a decisive factor in the close election of Senator James Murray in 1954, who won by only 1,728 votes. In 1952, the seven tribes in Montana had

9,681 members of voting age, of whom 4,414 were registered to vote in the general election.

Senator Frank Church of Idaho won his primary election in 1956 by only 170 votes. According to the Chairman of one of the small tribes in that state, almost 100 per cent of the eligible voters on his reservation went to the polls and accounted for about 180 votes for the candidate.

The Indian vote could have been decisive in the 1952 election of Congressman Wayne Aspinall, Colorado, whose victory by a margin of twenty-nine votes was contested in a precinct where Indians held the balance of power.

An Indian issue which weighed heavily, and perhaps decisively, in the 1956 election of a member of Congress was the Presidential veto of the \$5 million settlement granted by the Eighty-fourth Congress to the Crow Tribe for the Yellowtail dam site. This Congressman won the election by 2,641 votes, whereas he lost to the same opponent in 1954 by 1,628 votes. The counties where the dam was an issue reflected most of the shift in the voting.

Legislators from states with significant Indian populations agree that their Indian constituents are an effective voice in making known their opinions and needs. It is significant that some 300 bills presented to each Congress are of concern to Indians, and many private groups, in addition to the Indians' own tribal, intertribal, and national organizations, act quickly to help tribes protect their interests.

Comments by Congressmen in recent correspondence with the writer point up the increasing effectiveness of tribal spokesmen in making clear their wishes to lawmakers.

They are an effective voice in legislation which concerns them and make their needs known by writing and paying calls in per-

son, even to coming to the Nation's Capitol.
—Warren G. Magnuson, U. S. Senator
(Washington)

It would seem to me that Indians have become politically minded because everything they have ever accomplished or anything they have worked for has been done through the government. . . . The Indians are becoming more effective in this respect [and] I have been impressed by appearances made by Indians before Congress. . . . Their numbers are not great compared to other [groups] but I have found their interest in political affairs to be quite lively. As I have said before, they have been forced to express themselves through political channels. . . . I think that their political effectiveness would be greatest, relatively speaking, in an election for Representatives in Congress.

—Edward Thye, U. S. Senator
(Minnesota)

The tribes in my district are a most effective voice in legislation which concerns them. I have made a practice to meet with their tribal councils and with their leaders each year. From these meetings, I have learned much of their general outlook on matters important to them and also profited from the expression of viewpoints on specific legislation.

—Wayne N. Aspinall, Member of
Congress (Colorado)

The Indian people are very definitely an effective voice regarding legislation which concerns them. Probably one-third of my mail is from Indian people primarily from my Congressional District, but a large amount of it is from those outside of my district.

—E. Y. Berry, Member of Congress
(South Dakota)

As near as I can ascertain, substantially larger numbers of Indians have registered and voted at each subsequent election. I think I can safely say that the Indian vote is now courted by most candidates and spokesmen for both political parties.

—Stewart L. Udall, Member of
Congress (Arizona)

Our Indian people have been very effective in making known their views on legislation, through their tribal chiefs, through tribal councils, through direct personal correspondence, and by sending delegates to Washington.

—Ed Edmondson, Member of Congress
(Oklahoma)

Influence on Indian vote

It seems safe to say that Indians vote for or against a man or a party because of his or its action on some Indian bill of vital importance to them. For example, it would appear that Indians of Idaho worked hard and voted generally for the new Senator, Frank Church. The one exception was a tribe which had been greatly assisted by the former Senator, Herman Welker, in securing the passage of a bill important to its welfare. On the other hand, a tribe in South Dakota and one in Arizona, previously heavily Republican, showed their disapproval of recent Indian policies by recording 2 to 1 and 8 to 1 votes for the other party.

There is no doubt that Indian political participation in state and national affairs has lagged in large measure because of lack of communication, knowledge of issues and candidates, experience in the mechanics of voting, and effective organization. The greatest factor in getting Indians to the polls has been the development and growth of their own organizations, tribal and intertribal, and finally of the National Congress of American Indians. These groups have been able to interpret the issues confronting Indians, to offer information about candidates, and to explain the mechanics of voting.

Organization is the Indians' best hope of having some part in determining their own future and in continuing to exist as Indian tribes in a nation committed to a philosophy of respect for cultural differences. The Indians are their own

¹⁴ John C. Rainer, "Report on New Mexico Citizenship Project" to Arrow, Inc. (Washington, December 1956), p. 13.

¹⁵ Information received by writer from tribes, December 1956.

¹⁶ Report on New Mexico Citizenship Project; House Report No. 2680, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, September 1954, pp. 187-249.

best spokesmen, their own best diplomats; but they can exercise these roles effectively only in proportion to their opportunities to exchange information and to use their combined strength and their concerted voice.

This thought was expressed by Congressman Lee Metcalf, Montana, speaking to the NCAI Thirteenth Convention in Salt Lake City, September 1956.

It is heartening to me to know that an organization like the National Congress of American Indians exists and functions. If no such body were in existence the Indians of the United States would be faced today with the necessity of bringing about the formation of an equivalent representative organization. . . .

In my first term in Congress I saw the Indian people and their property under the most persistent and serious attack, and the ironic and tragic aspect of this attack is that in most cases, I believe, it was based on good intentions with the presumed interests of the Indians at heart.

I have watched the attack go forward and it has disturbed me greatly. In this complex field where everybody is an expert and yet no one is really expert, any attempt to put forward a simple, easy solution must be viewed with misgiving.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Indian tribes in North America had a prior history of effective self-government when Europeans arrived on this continent. That their right of self-government was inherent was recognized first by the European powers and then by the government of the United States.

2. Indian self-government continued to operate even though at times the

tribes' powers were usurped by administrative officials; however, the act of usurping tribal powers did not destroy the tribes' powers to act.

3. Indians have a superior record of citizenship as expressed by the quantity and quality of their services and contributions to the war efforts. There has been no evidence of disloyalty among them. A few have sought and held national, state, and county offices and served on juries—creditably. They pay all the taxes other citizens pay, except the tax on those of their lands which are held in trust. This freedom from United States taxation was something that the tribes reserved to themselves rather than had granted to them—and for it they gave considerations to the United States of immeasurable value, namely, great cessions of land and resources and cultural contributions.

4. Although a very small proportion of our population viewed as a whole, Indians are growing rapidly in numbers. Accompanying this trend, Indians are also growing away from exclusive identification with their own tribal groups and toward a broader consciousness of their affairs regionally and nationally.

5. In the last decade, with the upheavals caused by widespread Indian military service in World War II and renewed attacks on Indian rights and property, state and regional intertribal councils are organizing and strengthening; a national Indian organization founded in 1944 is now functioning effectively and appears to be permanently established; and startling increases in registering and voting were recorded on many Indian reservations in 1956.

Religion Among American Indians

By RUTH UNDERHILL

Abstract: The primitive religious ideas of the American Indians, their ritualistic forms, their social function, and their chief practitioners are described in this article. The persistence of these ideas and the manner in which they affect the Indian's acceptance of the white man's ways are illustrated. Special attention is paid to the rise of the Peyote Cult and its development into the Native American Church, which appears to be a transitional institution ultimately leading to the acceptance of the white man's religion.—Ed.

THE American Indian of pre-Columbian days, at least the male, spent much of his time and effort in activity involving the supernatural. With little knowledge of natural science or medicine, with small acquaintance with other peoples outside a few neighboring friends or enemies, a large section of his world was unknown, mysterious, and, possibly, threatening. His techniques for dealing with this unknown, which he conceived as supernatural, I shall speak of as religion.

Few groups had any consistent theology. Their interest was in action which would secure health and prosperity and protect them from danger. Explanations of the spirit world for the average man might be fragmentary and even contradictory, although, as Radin has pointed out, there was usually a group of thinkers who strove toward greater consistency and understanding.¹ Nor had the spirit world much connection with ethics. It is true that in advanced cultures like that of the Pueblos and their pupils, the Navahos, there was an emphasis on peacefulness for those engaged in religious activity. Even there,

¹ Paul Radin, *The World of Primitive Man* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953), pp. 37 ff.

however, such offenses against society as murder, theft, lying, greed, adultery and so forth were dealt with by the family or council. Only when a group became so large and mixed that these local agencies lost their effectiveness did the priest take over with his threat of supernatural punishment. Such a situation was rare in any group north of Mexico. The spirits did indeed punish, but not for what a modern would call sins against society. What drew their wrath was a breach of taboo, such as failure to perform a ceremony correctly or disobedience to ceremonial rules concerning a mother-in-law or a woman in childbirth. Such emphasis on ceremonial regulations is a familiar stage of religious development, long known in the Old World.

PRE-COLUMBIAN RELIGIONS

In sketching the religious attitudes of Indians in North America, I shall use the past tense. It is true that many of these attitudes and usages developed from them are still in force. However, many have been given up and many have changed, either in historic times or recently. Therefore, my attempt in the first part of this paper is to outline early religious attitudes. One may see

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that even through changes, much of their essence has persisted.

Mana and taboo

Most Indian religious attitudes have worldwide counterparts, and some seem so fundamental that they may have been brought by the first paleolithic immigrants. Among these are the concepts of mana and taboo.² The Melanesian word mana has been standardized by anthropologists to refer to a widespread primitive belief in some invisible force pervading the universe. It can be focused on any object, animate or inanimate, endowing that object, for the time being, with supernatural power. Sacred places, objects used in ceremony, or human beings under certain circumstances can be imbued with this power. The Siouan word *wakan*, the Iroquoian *orenda* and the Algonquian *manitou* all refer to it, and many other tribes have the concept if not the name.

As a corollary, the focus of power was dangerous to one not in a sacred state. This is the familiar concept of taboo which is as worldwide as that of mana. It regards the focus of power as untouchable, not because it is unclean, but because it belongs to the supernatural world with which contact may be dangerous. To meet the situation, an age-old technique has been developed whose remnants are visible even among modern people. Briefly, it requires that anyone who has been in contact with a supernatural power, either voluntarily or involuntarily, must negate the danger by withdrawing both from human society and from bodily activity. As interpreted by various Indian groups, this can mean seclusion; fasting; abstaining from speech, sleep, looking at the sun or at fire, touching the head (the most

important part of the body), or touching the lips with water.

The life crises

This technique, in whole or in part, was used by many Indian groups at the life crises of birth, puberty, and death. These were occasions when an uncontrollable biological event swooped in to affect human life. Those under its influence were considered subject to supernatural power, and they practised the techniques which would keep them safe and also keep others safe from them. Such an attitude was found most often in the food gathering and hunting groups where organization was simple. With agricultural groups, who had a wealth of ceremonies, the seclusion rules, especially those for women, were often obscured or omitted.

Here we must differentiate between girls' and boys' puberty. The acknowledgment of maturity for boys, as we shall see below, is usually accompanied with ordeals and initiations undertaken on the boy's own initiative. A girl's puberty, without any effort on her part, fits her to perform the miracle of childbirth. The menstruant and the parturient are considered under such strong supernatural influence that, unless they withdraw, they would be in danger themselves and would certainly bring danger to men. This attitude is particularly true of the hunting and food-gathering groups. On the Northwest coast, a girl's withdrawal at puberty might last for months and might include the use of a scratching stick and drinking tube to avoid touching hair or lips. With some California groups, as in parts of South America and the Basque region of Europe, the husband was considered so intimately connected with his wife that, after childbirth, he, too, must abstain from action.

There is no theology involved in this behavior. No priest or medicine man

needs to participate, for the so-called purification which sometimes follows seclusion does not always take place. Various statements are made as to diseases or misfortunes which may follow if the woman fails to withdraw, but they are not always the same. They seem to belong to an elementary system of magic unconnected with the spirit world. They coexist with various ideas about gods and spirits and are unconnected and unexplained.

With some older Indians, these ideas about women's seclusion are still in force. One reason for their fear of hospitals is the fact that the white nurses are known never to seclude themselves. A male patient cannot tell when they may be spreading supernatural danger. Even converts to Christianity find the taboo hard to forget. I remember a young woman who refused to teach her Sunday School class during her periods because of danger to her boy pupils. I also remember a man with important matters to put before his local council who could not attend because his wife had just given birth.

Withdrawal in some degree was practised by the bereaved after a death, and sometimes by enemy slayers, murderers, even whale killers. Here there is an explanation. There is danger from the soul of the departed which either wishes to take a loved one with it for company or to injure its killer. Here is the beginning of a theory about the supernatural which is different from the pure magic of the restrictions at childbirth. It seems possible to me that, early though such theories are shown to be, the withdrawal at childbirth, unconnected with any spirit, may antedate them.

The spirits

A belief in spirits and a purposeful attempt to conciliate them is found in every Indian tribe. Spirits of the dead,

just mentioned, did not play the all-important part sometimes found in the Old World. True, some far western tribes imagined them as stealing the souls of the living and so causing illness. A few thought of them as acting the part of guardian spirits, and others conceived of them as reincarnated in children. As a rule, it was thought that the average dead person existed in the afterworld only until the last person who remembered him on earth was gone. A few might be elevated to powerful spirits or gods.

This afterworld was a shadowy place to which both good and bad went indiscriminately. Days of withdrawal were often observed by mourners or corpse handlers while souls were supposedly on their journey thither, and they were supplied with food for this journey. Some tribes also supplied their dead with goods to keep them contented so they would not return. To this end, too, their dwellings were often destroyed and their names never mentioned. This belief and practices cause difficulty for Indians in going to hospitals, for many have died there, but the building stands replete with supernatural danger. They also make it difficult for white men taking census because names of the dead must not be mentioned.

Other spirits were those of animals, plants, and natural phenomena. To most Indians, there was no sharp dividing line between these and human beings. The Sioux spoke of all living things as the two-leggeds, the four-leggeds, and the wingeds. All these had life and must be treated as fellow beings. So must even the plants and Mother Earth who bore them. A Comanche on being urged to plow and reap objected: "Shall I stab my Mother's breast and cut my Mother's hair!" True, agricultural tribes did dig the earth, but usually they had a tradition of a supernatural visitant, perhaps the

² See among others, Rafael Karsten, *The Origins of Religion* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935), pp. 30-31, 66.

corn plant, which had bidden them do so. Every act connected with planting was a religious ceremony. Every wild thing, too, was treated with consideration. The Papago woman asked permission of the plants which she plucked for basketry. The Zuni apologized to the deer he killed.

Although it is hard to reconcile this attitude with the life of the hunter who killed for a living, there was a saving explanation. The plant or animal eaten was only an outward form assumed by an immortal spirit. When that was consumed, the spirit returned to its home. If it had been well treated, by way of ceremony and proper disposal of the remains, it would return in a new dress to serve man again. To this end, seal bladders and salmon bones were thrown into the sea, so that they might return to the seal and salmon villages. Deer horns and buffalo heads were kept in a sacred place. The various "first fruits" ceremonies for plant and animal foods were an example of respect shown to what must be used.

Sometimes mana was thought to be concentrated in a particular representative of a genus; the Algonquians believed in an Owner for each sort of animal. On parts of the Northwest coast, the belief was that the animals, which were so much better able to get food than primitive man, had once owned the earth. They had their present characters but could take human form when they wished. In fact, they can do so still, and thus they appeared to fortunate visionaries. A number of tribes believed that an animal was either the ancestor of a human group, married an ancestor, or magically assisted him. Such totemism might result in clan names, clan functions, sometimes a prohibition against eating the animal as with the Yuchi of South Carolina, or a ceremony involving it as with the Hopi Snake clan. However, there were also

kin groups without totemic connections. Nor was it always true that a group with one animal patron must not intermarry. An animal might be the creator of a whole tribe, as the coyote was with the Miwok of California. It might be a culture hero or a trickster-transformer, like the hare with the Winnebago or the raven with the Tlingit. In fact, the word "totem" cannot be used in America without a careful definition of the concept as used in the group concerned.

Animal spirits appeared in some form in almost every Indian group. In addition, the more organized peoples imported or devised anthropomorphic concepts like the War Gods and Kachinas of the Southwest or the False Faces of the Iroquois. A few horrifying beings appeared like the Cannibal Spirit or the Windigo of the North Woods. (Has the gloom of the forest anything to do with this sort of imagination?) As a rule, there was no sharp division between good and bad forces as is found in monotheistic religions. To use the well-known simile of the electric current, power was thought to harm or benefit according to the channel through which it passed. Thus, the same shaman, according to his attitude, could dispel a disease or use it to kill. A Guardian Spirit helped as long as proper behavior was observed toward it. If not, it might injure or kill its protégé. Occasionally, there is mention of a bad or deceptive spirit, but this concept was a vague one. Nor is there any proof of a High God, keeping the spirit world in order. Certain beautiful expressions occur, such as the Algonquian Great Spirit and the Creek Master of Breath. These generally turn out to have been very limited concepts, either of a distant creator who later ceased to function or merely of a spirit higher than the others.

The spirits were approached in two

very different ways and were closely connected with the economics of a tribe and its degree of organization. The two ways are vision and ceremony.

The vision

Across the northern part of North America stretched an area of hunting peoples. They lived for most of the year in seminomadic small bands with little organization and little chance for large assemblies. Much of the time, the hunter faced his dangerous task alone. His need was for health, courage, and luck for himself, but the fate of others hardly concerned him. In this area the individual male sought a vision which would assure him of the luck phrased as spirit power.

The vision took numberless forms among the different tribes and was sought under varying circumstances. With the Woodland Algonquians of the East, the Salish of the Northwest and some Plains tribes, it was sought at puberty. Here, every boy (and a few girls) hoped for supernatural help to guide his career and ensure success. To that end he practised seclusion and fasting, sometimes repeatedly, but *before* the supernatural experience, not after as with women. Sometimes he added or deals to gain the spirits' pity and show his courage. In fact, this was a religious ritual based on a definite theology, not a blind observance of taboo. It served as a substitute for boys' initiation ceremonies, rare in North America.

The puberty vision followed a standard form for which the boy was well prepared. An animal appeared in its human guise and took him to its village in the forest or under the sea or perhaps delivered instruction on the spot. This consisted of a song to be used when power was needed and usually a fetish which was given or which he must find or make. With the fetish went a rudimentary ritual which must

be followed on pain of losing power or being injured by it. Even an unimaginative youth was likely to achieve such a vision after repeated trials. Often he had some supervision from an older man or a whole group of them. If his hallucination was not of acceptable form he was likely to be told: "That was a false spirit. Try again."

After the puberty vision, the boy went into an apprenticeship to realize the promised power. He did this with an absolute conviction of success and an image of himself as one favored by the spirits. This was a potent incentive to success. It was just possible that in such an arduous occupation as whaling, he might fail in spite of this psychological help. In that case, there was no distrust of the spirits. He decided or was told that the vision coming to him had been an evil spirit in disguise. We can hardly overestimate the value of this vision experience at a time when a boy's character was being formed. The lack of it in boarding schools seems to me to have been one cause of Indian demoralization. To an Indian with culture history so different from the white culture, the Hebrew-Christian teaching rarely provided a substitute.

With the Woodland Algonquian the voluntary, strenuous vision quest ceased after puberty, but on the Plains it was carried on much later. In the Sun Dance of the Dakota and Mandan, mature men were tortured in a group in expectation of a vision to come. Individuals, at other times, practised seclusion and torture for added power. In other Plains tribes, men, at least, prayed and fasted when special help was needed.

This idea of supernatural help through revelation has much in common with Christian concepts. Some Christian teachers have, indeed, built on it, only suggesting that the direction of power be changed from success in war or hunting, now inessential, to success in

righteous living. Most have insisted, however, often without much study, that all the old practices be swept away. As a response the Indians, particularly in the Plains area where the vision was prominent, have worked out their own combination of vision and ethics. The resulting Peyote religion will be discussed below.

Going west and south from the Plains and the Plateau Salish, the vision experience becomes less strenuous. It might even arrive unsought. In a large area including the Great Basin and much of California, even some of the Southwest, it came as a dream in sleep. A Mohave of southern California found himself on the sacred mountain at the beginning of the world and learned a power like scalping or the right to sing a clan song from the lips of the creator, himself. Luiseno boys in California had visions in a group, under the influence of a drug, *datura*. Along the Pacific coast, beginning in northern California, spirit power may come unsought (although not always) and even unwanted. One is reminded of mediums of eastern Asia and the Pacific by the way in which the recipient of power is temporarily affected with either illness or madness. Here the power is less often an animal than the wealth spirit, or the war spirit. With the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island, the whole power concept is reduced to a dramatic show and a means to prestige. A highborn boy pretends to be kidnapped by the Cannibal Spirit and returns, pretending madness. Lowborn people were not expected to have visions.

The shaman

The medicine man, or shaman, was the arch visionary. I define such a person as one whose powers came from direct contact with the supernatural, rather than from inheritance or memorized ritual. True, it is impossible to

make a clearcut distinction for often the son or relative of a shaman was thought to have a better chance of inspiration than others. Also, his predecessor might teach him some of the sleight of hand which sometimes accompanied exhibitions of spirit power. According to the area, power was obtained, just as it was for the average man, either through quest and ordeal, or often unsought through dreams in sleep. The difference was that the shaman's experience was more prolonged and often more strenuous. Sometimes he had several spirits, providing different powers.

The chief function of the shaman was curing. Here he used a method so ancient and widespread that it may well have been brought over by some of the earliest immigrants.³ This method rests on the belief that illness is caused by an intrusive object, such as a worm or a stick, shot into the body by some malign influence. The shaman sucked out the object, sometimes varying his process by rubbing, smoking, and blowing. Then he exhibited the object to spectators. Shamans were frequently accused of sleight of hand in this process. Still, I can testify that many actually believed in their power and felt that a few tricks were necessary drama for the ignorant. Granted what we now know of psychosomatic medicine, the faith generated in the patient by the shaman's procedure may have had real therapeutic value.

A less widespread belief about disease and its removal was that of spirit possession. Here the shaman actually exorcised an evil spirit and sent it away. Another belief, found chiefly around the Pacific coast, was that illness was caused by the loss of the patient's soul which had strayed or had been spirited away

³ Forrest E. Clements, *Primitive Concepts of Disease*, "University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology," Vol. 32, No. 2 (Berkeley: University of California, 1932), pp. 209-16, 213-19.

to the land of the dead. Special practitioners, sometimes in a public ceremony, made a trip to the other world to retrieve the soul. Among the Eskimo, as on the east coast of Asia, shamans dramatized a flight to the moon or to another spirit world.

The shaman's function proliferated, especially in the West, where there were war shamans, weather shamans, bear shamans, and snake shamans. Some were merely diviners, foretelling the future or selecting curing practitioners. This last function was necessary where a number of different curing methods had accumulated in one area. In some form or other, the shaman existed in almost every North American tribe. With the agricultural Hopi, who had ceremonial means of curing, he was reduced almost to disgrace. With the Zuni, he was given the aegis of a society. His curing function had such appeal for the average man that the shaman may often be found in a tribe which has given up most other native practices.

The communal ceremony

Standardized ceremonies, at regular dates, required certain conditions. The simplest was that it must be possible for a large group of people to gather and be fed. This was impossible for hunters and food gatherers at most times of the year, since such a gathering would frighten the game animals and use up the wild plants. Second, the people must all have a common interest, so that they all sought from the supernaturals one and the same boon. This, too, did not apply to hunters, except when there was a herd of animals to be surrounded. That was the case when the Southern Paiute held their yearly antelope drive or a Plains group its great buffalo hunt. On each of these occasions, there was a standardized ceremony, although much of the Sioux Sun Dance, it is interesting to see, consisted

of a vision quest pursued by several men in company.

The groups whose chief contact with the supernaturals was through standardized ceremony were the agriculturists. True, they retained many elements of the visionary and shamanistic belief, since they had, at some time, lived the hunting life. However, their needs were now different. Much of their work in the fields was co-operative, and the individualistic attitude was not useful. Moreover, the rain or sunshine which they needed must come to all alike. For them, a communal appeal to the spirits was the natural thing. The spirits, too, were new ones, having to do with weather and agriculture. It seems possible that they and their accompanying ceremonies were imported along with the magic-working plants they fostered.

Wherever the ceremonies were worked out, they had a good deal of resemblance to the ritual imposed by a spirit on its individual protégé. In its simplest form, this meant a song and the honoring of a sacred object. However, as the place of ceremony remained the same, sacred objects could be elaborated into masks, costumes, images, and even theatrical properties like the Hopi snake at Palölükonti. The song could be expanded into a whole suite of songs and dances. The same officiants could be used from year to year. These tended to standardize the ceremony, learn it by heart, and transmit it to successors.

THE PRIEST

Such a ceremonial officiant I shall call a priest. True, his ritual had a supernatural source, but often it was thought to have been dictated by the spirits long ago, and his present duty was merely to follow it without error. However, he handled sacred paraphernalia and therefore must practice some

form of withdrawal, at least seclusion and fasting. The Pueblos, at least, brought in ethical considerations by demanding that he should have only peaceful thoughts. The priest and the shaman were two separate functionaries, often practicing in the same society. However, the line between them might be blurred, the shaman developing a little ritual, the priest supplementing his ritual by vision.

The ritual form

The most usual rituals were often for the sake of weather and crop growth. For the latter, there might be two or three rituals, corresponding to the life crises of birth (planting); maturity (green corn) and death (harvest). Others were special pleas for rain, rituals to help or to celebrate war raids, and pilgrimages to obtain blessing—the Papago salt journey or the Pawnee Hako and great ceremonies “to keep the world in order.” Ceremonial officiants can also cure, but in quite other circumstances than those that call for the shaman. They treat afflictions arising supernaturally from breach of taboo generally connected with a ceremony. The cure consists in performing the ceremony, or the injured part of it, correctly; thus erasing the error. The famous Navaho chant, which is a curing ceremony for an individual, comes partly under this head. It is performed with memorized ritual, on a Pueblo pattern, by a priest for a patient who is thought to be “out of harmony” with the world. However, the myth behind it involves visits to supernatural animals in their villages, in the northern hunter’s style.

Each tribe had its own series of ceremonies and its own fostering spirits, often those of the plants themselves. There is not enough space here to name all the ritual acts worked out, but they fall within a large common framework.

This included purification of the participants, which might mean all those present or only officiants. It might be by a sweatbath, as with the Sioux; vomiting, as with the Navaho and Creek; or confession, as with the Iroquois. There were offerings to the spirits: tobacco, food or, in the Southwest, the feathered wands called prayersticks. There was little blood sacrifice. Individual Plains Indians sometimes cut off a finger to gain the spirits’ pity. A dog was ritually killed and eaten by some tribes, and the Pawnee killed a human captive to help the crops. The concept of vicarious sacrifice in Christian belief seems, therefore, strange to many Indians.

Other concepts not usual in the communal ceremonies are those of humility and worship. The ordeals of the individual vision seeker, as I mentioned, are sometimes phrased as appeals for pity. In the communal ceremonies, the atmosphere is more often that of a bargain between respected allies. The priest, having performed his ceremony and made his offerings without error, expresses his confidence that the spirits will give man the rain and crops he needs.⁴ In spite of these differences, thousands of Indians are now members of Christian churches. It is interesting to see which sects have proved congenial to the different tribes—Catholics to the Pueblos, Presbyterians to the Pimas, and Quakers to the Iroquois. Granted that historic opportunity had a good deal to do with the case, still, the Pueblos were already given to pageantry, the Pimas to a town-meeting style of discussion, and the Iroquois to a dream dictation very much like that of the “inner light.”

⁴For details see Ruth M. Underhill, *Ceremonial Patterns in the Greater Southwest*, “Monograph of the American Ethnological Society,” Vol. 13 (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1948).

POST-COLUMBIAN RELIGIONS

The coming of the whites brought successively a period of frustration and insecurity to various Indian groups. As has happened all over the world, this usually meant a religious revival and the leadership of some seer or prophet who preached a solution to their problems. In the early days, this solution was simply a return to the old ways with abstinence from all food and equipment which came from the white man. Special ceremonies on an Indian plan might be added.

The promised result was the disappearance of the white man and the return of the old life, either through magic or through successful war. Such movements I may call reversion religions.

Reversion religions

Some of the most important of these looked forward to successful war. Among them can be named that of Popé, leading to the Pueblo revolt of 1680; that of the Delaware prophet and Pontiac’s conspiracy, 1672; that of the Shawnee prophet, brother of Tecumseh, and the Ohio revolt, 1805. All of these wars came to grief.

As time showed the hopelessness of war, the visionaries began to promise a magical solution involving the disappearance of the whites or the finding by the Indians of some new and peaceful land. Such leaders were Kanakuk of the Kickapoo, 1827; Tavibo of the Paiute, 1870; Smohalla of the Sokulk, on the Columbia River, 1889–90. In response to a vision claimed by Wowoka, a Paiute, many tribes, especially from the Plains where disruption was extreme, accepted Wowoka’s gospel. This meant the Ghost Dance, with special costume, songs, and dances dictated by the prophet on a Paiute pattern. The contention of the devotees was that they intended no attack on the whites, but

expected their magical disappearance. These gatherings among the Sioux were misunderstood by the whites and resulted in the massacre of Wounded Knee. Since its prophecies were not fulfilled, this type of reversion religion died out like the other.

Amalgamation religions

After Christian teachings had become somewhat familiar, there was a series of what I may call amalgamation religions. These did not contemplate the conquest or disappearance of the whites. Instead, they aimed at peaceful living for the Indians under the new conditions. Though they often kept old Indian customs and eschewed Christian theology, they included definite ethical teachings. The need for such teaching was obvious since Indian groups were breaking up, and the old clan and family influence was not sufficient to control behavior. Above all, liquor was making its inroads, and the new preachers demanded total abstinence as well as peaceful and upright living.

Among such preachers was Handsome Lake of the Iroquois, 1799–1815, who was profoundly influenced by Quaker missionaries. In the Southern Puget Sound country, in 1881, John Slocum founded the Shaker religion, a compound of Christian elements and Indian style vision. Both of these cults are still functioning. The most widespread of all was the Peyote religion, many of whose adherents were brought together in 1918 as the Native American Church. Like other cults, Peyotism involved a combination of old Indian practices with social ethics. It had no one prophet, although several Southwestern tribes tell of a suffering individual who had a vision after the old pattern. He saw the peyote plant in human form, was given the directions for a ceremony and ethical maxims, and was bidden to teach these to his people for their salvation.

Peyote (Mexican peyotl) is a small globular cactus with a root like a carrot found growing on both sides of the Rio Grande. It contains a number of alkaloids, the chief being mescaline, and has the power of producing hallucinations with intense and varied colors. It was used by Mexican Indians, notably the Huichol in elaborate ceremonies. Late in the nineteenth century one of the Plains tribes, perhaps Kiowa or Comanche, roved into Mexico, brought back the cactus, and evolved a Plains-type ceremony centered around its use. Peyotists in Oklahoma were organized in 1918 as the Native American Church and since then eleven other states have issued charters to several denominations of Peyotists. Nearly all groups are affiliated with the Native American Church, which has national officers and the largest membership of any Indian group in the United States.⁵

The Peyote religion teaches an ethical doctrine much like those of the monotheistic religions. However, it eschews specific Christian theology, its exponents often stating that while Christ came to the whites, peyote came to the Indians. This is an obvious reaction to the subordinate place so often given to the Indian converts in a church organization. Indians resent being treated as inferiors in religion as elsewhere.

Their meetings, which have been attended by a number of anthropologists including myself, are like some Protestant prayer meetings, where the program includes singing, prayer, and testimonials. They are held in a tepee strewn with white sage in the Plains manner and with a half-moon shaped earthen altar as in some Kiowa ceremonies. During the evening, a drum and rattle are passed around clockwise, one man singing a song, supposedly of his own composition, while a man on

one side of him drums and on the other rattles. Meanwhile heads of the cactus, usually dried, are passed around, each person expecting to eat eight during the evening. After midnight, when the round has been made once, there are testimonials from individuals who have been helped to follow "the straight road," giving up liquor and other faults. At dawn comes a token meal of old Indian foods, then prayers asking God's help for Indians, whites, and all the world.

Statements have been made that Peyote meetings are wild orgies like those due to marijuana. Obviously, these opinions are expressed by persons who have never attended a meeting. The effect of peyote is color visions accompanied by extreme lassitude and unwillingness to move at all. Its principal ingredient, mescaline, is now being investigated by several scientific groups; the conclusion so far is that it is not habit forming. To produce any bad effects such as shortened respiration, at least 350 mgs. of mescaline are needed; white experimenters have taken as many as 700 without harm. The standard buttons (eight) taken at meetings contain only some 107 mgs.

Membership in the Native American Church is growing and for obvious reasons. The Indian is at a point where he really desires to share the advantages of the white man, yet he still feels something of a maladjusted outsider. A religion which provides him with purpose and with self-esteem would seem desirable help, unless we get scientific proof that it is injurious. The areas where it is spreading most are those under present stress, like the Navaho reservation. On the contrary in Oklahoma, the place of its origin, I was told that some of the younger, more fully acculturated men object to the Indian elements in the religion and are joining the white man's church.

The Acculturation of American Indians*

By EVON Z. VOGT

Abstract: Despite all the pressures for changing the ways of American Indians into those of the white man, there are still basically Indian systems of social structure and culture persisting with variable vigor within conservative nuclei of Indian population. The author outlines a conceptual framework for the analysis of American Indian acculturation in different areas of the United States, provides a brief synoptic review of the degree of acculturation in such areas, and discusses the limiting factors to full acculturation by comparing the situation of the United States with that of Mexico, and considers the development of "Pan-Indianism" as an emerging stage in the acculturation process.—Ed.

BY THE mid-twentieth century it has become apparent to social scientists studying the American Indian that the Indian population of the United States is markedly increasing and that the rate of basic acculturation to white American ways of life is incredibly slower than our earlier assumptions led us to believe. During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of this century, the American Indians were prevailingly thought of in American public opinion as a "vanishing race." Vestiges of this opinion are, indeed, still with us as illustrated by the fact that an impressive "Memorial to the American Indian" is shortly to be built on the outskirts of Gallup, New Mexico—at the edge of the Navaho Indian country where the Navaho population has increased from 15,000 (at most) in 1868 to almost 80,000 in 1956

and where Navaho culture persists with great vigor!

We were led to these comfortable assumptions about the vanishing American Indian by the fact that there *were* important population declines earlier in our history—many Indian tribes, in fact, became extinct—and by the observation that the Indians *had* undergone impressive changes in certain aspects of their cultures. It was anticipated that the population decline would continue and that the acculturative changes would proceed apace with all tribes and in all aspects of their culture as white American institutions impinged upon them. Earlier generations of young anthropology students were urged to go into the field and collect ethnographic data on Indian culture before it completely disappeared.

It has also been felt strongly that just as European immigrant groups are becoming Americanized within a few generations in the great American "melting pot" so, too, will the American Indians become assimilated. However, students did not stop to raise seriously enough the question of the vast difference be-

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⁵ J. S. Slotkin, *The Peyote Religion* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956).

tween the American Indian and the Europeans. European immigrants all came from the same general stream of Western culture and they, by and large, were motivated toward assimilation when they migrated to the United States. Not only were the Indians linguistically and culturally completely different from the peoples of Europe, but they also had little choice in the matter. European culture came to them in their native habitat and proceeded by force to overrun the continent.¹

The acculturative changes which formed the basis for our earlier observations involved several different kinds of processes. These processes have been in operation in varying degrees since 1540 when Coronado arrived at Zuni and established the first contact between Europeans and American Indians within what are now the continental borders of the United States. In the first place there has been an important "drifting out" process from almost all American Indian populations over the centuries in which individuals and families have left their native settlements to take up residence in American communities. In some cases, this rate of migration has been great enough to involve almost all of the Indian population; but in many other cases, it has had the effect of "draining off" the most acculturated segment of the population each generation and of leaving a conservative reservoir of more traditional culture carriers intact to carry on their Indian way of life.² We now also perceive clearly that we must differentiate between acculturative changes taking place

in these individuals and families that are drifting away from the traditional ways of life and the Indian sociocultural system which may be undergoing quite a different type of change and at a much slower rate.³ This difference between *individual* change and *system* change in acculturation situations is fundamental, and it means that we should not jump to the conclusion that full acculturation will soon take place simply because we observe a certain segment of the population leaving Indian country to take up residence in the white world.

A second widespread and continuing process has been the replacement of Indian material culture with goods, techniques, and technological equipment of the white American way of life. There is no American Indian tribe today who is living close to the aboriginal level in its patterns of food, clothing, and shelter. But it is now clear that just because Zuni Indians, for example, build more modern type houses with running water and electric lights, invest in radios and refrigerators, and drive new automobiles, it does not mean that they necessarily abandon their kinship obligations or give up dancing in Katchina dances. Indeed, it has been startling to many of us to observe how completely the inventories of material culture in Indian households are composed of items derived from white American culture,⁴ and, yet, how relatively slow the rate of change is in social organization and religion in the same community.

All American Indian populations have

³ See the recent interesting exchange between Romney and Metzger and Bruner on this problem. A. Kimball Romney and Duane Metzger, "On the Processes of Change in Kinship Terminology" and Edward M. Bruner, "Rejoinder," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58 (June 1956), pp. 551-56.

⁴ E.g., John M. Roberts, *Zuni Material Inventories, A Study in Value Inference* (forthcoming).

¹ L. Broom, B. J. Siegel, E. Z. Vogt, and J. B. Watson, "Acculturation: An Exploratory Formulation," *The Social Science Research Council Summer Seminar on Acculturation*, 1953, *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56 (December 1954), pp. 988-89.

² E.g., Edward M. Bruner, "Assimilation among Fort Berthold Indians," *The American Indian*, Vol. 6 (1953), pp. 21-29.

also been undergoing a process of increasing involvement with our white American sociocultural system: in economic relationships to our market economy; in crucial adjustments to our state and national political systems, which now hold the ultimate control of force, and to our educational system, which now provides schools for almost all Indian children; in important connections with Christian missionary movements that now touch every Indian population. The earlier isolation of Indian populations from the main streams of modern life has decreased markedly in the past few decades, and today only one tribe—the Havasupai living deep in a branch of the Grand Canyon in northern Arizona—cannot be reached by automobile. As a result, the languages, social structures, and religions have all shown some change as the modern world closes in upon the Indian cultures.

But what is interesting to the close observer is that, despite all these pressures for change, there are still basically Indian systems of social structure and culture persisting with variable vigor within conservative nuclei of American Indian populations. It would be rash indeed to predict now that these cultural features will completely disappear in the course of acculturation in one, two, or even several generations.⁵

This proposition raises the fundamental question as to why we have had to alter our earlier expectations concerning the rate of American Indian acculturation and why full acculturation to white American ways of life is not occurring in the contemporary scene. In this article I shall outline a conceptual framework for the analysis of American

Indian acculturation, provide a brief synoptic review of the acculturation situation in different areas of the United States, and then discuss the limiting factors to full acculturation by comparing the situation of the United States with that in Mexico. The final section will consider the development of "Pan-Indianism" as an emerging stage in American Indian acculturation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF ACCULTURATION

Although students of American Indian acculturation are not yet ready to provide a definitive synthesis of the processes, we have developed a framework for understanding the general outlines in terms of two sets of variables: (a) *the nature of the two cultures which come into contact*, involving such questions as the types of sociocultural integration, settlement pattern, attitudes toward strangers, and so forth, and the intercultural compatibility of these patterns; and (b) *the contact conditions*, involving such questions as whether the contact is "forced" or "permissive," of long or short duration, intensive or sporadic, and so forth.⁶ The interaction

⁶ See R. Redfield, R. Linton, and M. J. Herskovits, "Memorandum on the Study of Acculturation," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 38 (1936), pp. 149-52; R. Linton (Ed.), *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940); A. Irving Hallowell, "Sociopsychological Aspects of Acculturation," in: R. Linton (Ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 171-200; Ralph L. Beals, "Acculturation," in: A. L. Kroeber and others, *Anthropology Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 621-41; Broom, Siegel, Vogt, and Watson, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*); Edward H. Spicer, "Spanish Indian Acculturation in the Southwest," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56 (August 1954), pp. 663-78; Julian H. Steward, *Theory of Culture Change* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955); M. J. Herskovits, *Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 461-84; Edward P. Dozier,

⁵ See Oliver LaFarge, "Assimilation—The Indian View," *New Mexico Quarterly*, Vol. 26 (Spring 1956), pp. 5-14; Clyde Kluckhohn, "Covert Culture and Administrative Problems," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 45 (April-June 1943), p. 219.

between these two sets of variables leads to the types of intercultural relationships we observe and to a complex and varied set of processes of change that are just beginning to be understood adequately. These processes are of two major orders which may be differentiated by the terms "microscopic" and "macroscopic." The microscopic comprise specific recurring sequences of events in acculturation, such as the diffusion of concrete objects between the two cultures—the replacement of stone by steel axes being a classic example of this type of process. The macroscopic comprise the more pervasive patterns of change which persist over long-time spans and involve alterations in the sociocultural systems. In the first case the results have more to do with simple additions, subtractions, or replacements in cultural and linguistic content; in the second instance the results have more to do with structural and pattern changes, of which we are able to identify a number of different types—"additive," "fusalional," "isolative," "nativistic," "assimilative," and so forth.⁷

SYNOPTIC REVIEW OF THE ACCULTURATION SITUATION

The early history of Indian-white relations has been covered in the first ar-

"Forced and Permissive Acculturation," *The American Indian*, Vol. 7 (1955), pp. 38-45; Bernard J. Siegel (Ed.), *Acculturation, Critical Abstracts, North America*, "Stanford Anthropological Series," No. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955); Edward Spicer (chairman), E. M. Bruner, Helen Codere, E. P. Dozier, David French, and E. Z. Vogt, "Notes on the Social Science Research Council Interuniversity Summer Seminar on American Indian Culture Change," 1956, unpublished.

⁷ These types will be discussed in detail in Edward H. Spicer (Ed.), "New Perspectives in American Indian Culture Change" (forthcoming) which will constitute the published report on the 1956 SSRC summer seminar on "American Indian Culture Change" (see note 6 *supra*).

ticle of this issue of THE ANNALS. My purpose here is merely to outline certain of the major trends in acculturation in terms of the two sets of variables we utilize to account for the processes.

East of the Mississippi

By and large, the Indian populations were forcibly removed from the areas east of the Mississippi River as the American population expanded and the frontier moved West. It is significant that the conditions of contact were such that it did not make much difference as to whether the aboriginal cultures were loosely integrated, scattered small bands of Northeastern Algonquian peoples or more complexly organized agricultural peoples such as the Southeastern Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw. By about 1845 the removal was substantially completed, and today only scattered small pockets of Indian population remain, principally in isolated regions—the Eastern Cherokee in the Great Smoky Mountains of North Carolina; the Seminoles, a subdivision of the Creek, who found refuge in the everglades in Florida; six small clusters of Iroquois in New York State and the Oneida who moved to Wisconsin in 1832; several groups of Algonquian peoples in the northern woods of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota; and a few other remnants such as the Abnaki in Maine.

But, even in this region, where the pressures for acculturation have been maximal, certain basic Indian cultural patterns persist with surprising vigor. This has been recently demonstrated by the work of Speck and Broom on the Cherokee; Spoeher and Sturtevant on the Seminole; Fenton, Wallace, and others on the Iroquois; and Keesing, Hallowell, Spindler, and others on the Algonquian peoples.⁸

⁸ E.g., Frank G. Speck and Leonard Broom, *Cherokee Dance and Drama* (Berkeley: Uni-

The Plains

In the prairie and plains between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, removal took place later and was not carried to the same extremes. Oklahoma on the Southern Plains was utilized as a region in which to resettle many of the displaced Eastern tribes and a large number of the Prairie and Plains tribes. In the Dakotas and eastern Montana a number of large Indian populations, especially the Dakota, or Sioux, remain on reservations. Other small remnants include the Mesquakie, or Fox, in Iowa, and the Omaha and Ponca in Nebraska.

The removal or reduction of the Plains tribes involved a great deal of violence in the latter half of the nine-

versity of California Press, 1951); Alexander Spoeher, *Camp, Clan, and Kin Among the Cow Creek Seminole of Florida*, "Anthropology Series, Field Museum of Natural History," Vol. 33, No. 1 (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1941); William C. Sturtevant, "The Medicine Bundles and Busks of the Florida Seminole," *The Florida Anthropologist*, Vol. 7 (May 1954), pp. 31-73; William N. Fenton (Ed.), *Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 149 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951); A. F. C. Wallace, *The Modal Personality Structure of the Tuscarora Indians*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 150 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952); A. Irving Hallowell, "Some Psychological Characteristics of the Northeastern Indians," in: Frederick Johnson (Ed.), *Man in Northeastern North America*, Papers of the Robert S. Peabody Foundation for Archaeology, Vol. 3, 1946; Joseph B. Casagrande, "Ojibwa Bear Ceremonialism: The Persistence of a Ritual Attitude," in: Sol Tax (Ed.), *Acculturation in the Americas: Proceedings and Selected Papers of the XXIXth International Congress of Americanists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 113-17; George D. Spindler, *Sociocultural and Psychological Processes in Menominee Acculturation*, "University of California Publications in Culture and Society," Vol. 5 (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press, 1955).

teenth century. The development of strong warfare patterns and the use of the horse and gun made these tribes into formidable opponents for the United States Army. The Indian wars which took place on the Plains have so impressed themselves on the national consciousness as to make the Plains Indian into the prevailing stereotype of the American Indian. It is also significant that some of the most important nativistic reactions to occur in the United States came in the wake of these developments on the Plains—the Ghost Dance, followed by the less nativistic, more transitional Peyote Cult.⁹

Again, although pressures for acculturation throughout this area have been great and the acculturation which has occurred has involved much personal frustration and demoralization for individual Indians,¹⁰ certain basic Indian ways of life persist in almost all cases, even in such apparently highly acculturated groups as the Mesquakies near Tama, Iowa.¹¹

Intermontane region

It is certainly no geographic accident that all the large remaining Indian populations of the United States are located west of the 20-inch rainfall line. Here the land is much less desirable for farming without irrigation, and the to-

⁹ Bernard Barber, "A Socio-Cultural Interpretation of the Peyote Cult," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 43 (October-December 1941), pp. 673-75; see also A. F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58 (April 1956), pp. 264-82 for an important new theoretical treatment of nativistic movements.

¹⁰ E.g., Gordon MacGregor, *Warriors Without Weapons* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

¹¹ Fred Gearing, "Today's Mesquakies," *The American Indian*, Vol. 7 (1955), pp. 24-38; see also Scudder Mekeel, *The Economy of a Modern Teton Dakota Community*, "Yale University Publications in Anthropology," No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936).

tal population density continues to present a marked contrast to that of the more humid eastern half of the nation. An additional important historical dimension was added to this picture by the fact that the main frontier of white settlement leaped across the arid intermontane region in the mid-nineteenth century when gold was discovered on the Pacific coast. These facts had special significance for the Southwest which I shall discuss below, but they were also important in lessening the pressures for early and forced acculturation in the territory to the north.

Through much of the intermontane region, especially in the Great Basin of Utah and Nevada, the aboriginal cultures were at such a low level of technological development and sociocultural integration as to create a contact situation in which these Shoshonean peoples had little to lose and much to gain by attaching themselves by small kinship units to the scattered ranches and mining camps. In this situation acculturation has proceeded quite rapidly and with relatively little strain.¹²

Pacific coast

In the Pacific coast region strong acculturative forces were set in motion by the middle of the nineteenth century after gold was discovered in California and desirable lands were made available for settlement in Oregon and Washington. White-American population increased rapidly, and the Indian cultures were not organized to withstand much pressure. The result was the complete extinction of many groups and the reduction of others to small remnant populations living, in most cases, on reservations made up of a number of different Indian cultures. The Warm Springs reservation in Oregon with a combination of Wascos, Sahaptins, and

¹² Steward, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 56-58.

Paiutes is a good example.¹³ In these cases Indian cultural patterns have not completely disappeared, but the process of acculturation has moved much further than it has in the Southwest, for example, and within a much shorter time period.

The Southwest

There is not much doubt that we find the largest and most conservative nuclei of American Indian populations in the Southwest. Here the time span of European contact has extended over four centuries, but the earlier Spanish control did not effectively reach the scattered encampments of the Apachean tribes, nor penetrate effectively to such tribes as the River and Upland Yumans. The major efforts were directed toward the Eastern Pueblo; the Hopi villages were never brought under effective control and the Zuni villages only periodically. The Pueblos were characterized by a relatively high degree of sociocultural integration in aboriginal times. The major effect of the Spanish effort seems to have been to add a few material culture items—such as wheat, domestic livestock, and a veneer of Catholicism—but it also increased the effectiveness of their boundary-maintaining mechanisms which operated against further acculturation in social organization and religion.

Since gold was discovered in California right after the United States acquired this territory, the American frontier also tended to leap across the Southwest, leaving the Indian lands and cultures intact for an additional generation. Effective Anglo-American control did not come until late in the nineteenth century, following the roundup of the Apachean tribes and the coming of the railroad. Only in the past fifty

¹³ Katherine and David French, "The Warm Springs Indian Community—Will it be Destroyed?", *The American Indian*, Vol. 7 (1955), pp. 3-17.

years have contact conditions been such as to lead to new trends in acculturation. As of 1956, the acculturation situation is changing fast; but at the same time, Indian populations are increasing throughout the Southwest, and conservative nuclei of most tribes will certainly maintain Indian patterns for many generations to come.¹⁴

LIMITING FACTORS TO FULL ACCULTURATION

A number of hypotheses have been advanced to account for the persistence of Indian culture in the face of increasing pressure from white American society toward full acculturation and the complete assimilation of Indian populations. To mention only a few of the common hypotheses, there is, in the first place, the argument, often advanced by the lay public, that isolation of the Indian populations on remote reservations administered by the Indian Bureau has insulated them from proper exposure to educational facilities, mass communications, and so forth and has prevented them from obtaining the means for assimilation. This hypothesis has undoubted merit, but it certainly fails to account for the many cases of Indian groups which have been subjected to a great deal of contact, yet who continue to maintain many of their old patterns. Witness, for example, the Tuscarora living on the outskirts of Niagara Falls, New York, or the Isleta Pueblo located within fifteen miles of Albuquerque, New Mexico.

A more interesting hypothesis, also emphasizing contact conditions, has been advanced by Dozier¹⁵ and others to the effect that "forced" acculturation, if not so extreme as to lead to early absorption of the subordinate group, will re-

sult in a high degree of resistance to change in indigenous cultural patterns. This formulation appears to work well for cases like the Southwestern Pueblo where the aboriginal sociocultural systems were highly enough organized to develop patterns of resistance when "forced" acculturation occurred. It applies less well to tribes with a low level of aboriginal sociocultural integration, and, of course, does not apply at all to cases where the acculturation process was relatively "permissive" and the groups still maintain their old patterns.

A third type of hypothesis, involving a theory about the nature of culture, has been the thesis that while the material aspects of a culture can change readily, family and kinship institutions are more persistent; that the aspects of a way of life which have been labeled as core culture, implicit values, cultural orientations, and personality type, are still more persistent.¹⁶ This type of hypothesis appears to apply to certain tribes and to some ranges of our data. But the formulation in its present form will not account for all the variability we observe in rates of change in different aspects of American Indian culture. It also does not answer the basic question as to why *any* Indian patterns should be preserved at all considering the kind and degree of pressure for change many Indian tribes have experienced.

Still a fourth hypothesis stresses the importance of an organized communal structure. Eric Wolf¹⁷ has recently

¹⁴ For recent data on the Southwest see Emil W. Haury (Ed.), "Southwest Issue" of *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56 (August 1954).

¹⁵ Dozier, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*).

¹⁶ R. Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 360; E. Z. Vogt, *Navaho Veterans*, "Papers," Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1951), p. 119; Spicer, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 667; A. Irving Hallowell, *Culture and Experience* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), p. 351; Edward M. Bruner, "Cultural Transmission and Cultural Change," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 12 (Summer 1956), p. 197.

¹⁷ Eric R. Wolf, "Types of Latin American

characterized this structure as a "corporate" community that maintains a bounded social system with clear-cut limits, in relation to both outsiders and insiders, and has structural identity over time. His thesis is that in Latin America the persistence of Indian-culture content seems to have depended primarily on maintenance of this structure and that where the structure collapsed, traditional cultural forms quickly gave way. This formulation has not been systematically explored with United States-Indian data; but it strikes me as an attractive hypothesis, especially in accounting for the high degree of persistence we observe among still very conservative tribes living in compact communities, like the Southwestern Pueblos. It is also crucial in explaining many of the differences between the acculturation of the American Negroes and the slower acculturation of the American Indians. But what concerns us more in this attempt to understand the limiting factors to full acculturation is why some important Indian patterns continue to persist among groups whose corporate structure has been shattered.

In all of these hypotheses, and others which cannot be discussed for lack of space, it is my impression that we have tended to de-emphasize recently, in our analyses of United-States-Indian data, what is perhaps the most important factor of all: our persisting Anglo-American "racial" attitudes, derived historically from Puritan Colonialism, which strongly devalue other physical types bearing different cultural traditions. These inflexible attitudes are of course directly related to the superordinate-subordinate structural character of Indian-white relationships in the United States. They are also related to the lack of a large mixed Indian-white population which would provide cul-

tural models and reference groups along the continuum of acculturation for the conservative nuclei still living in the native-oriented Indian communities.

We pay lip service to the idea of Indians being the "First Americans," we now manifest considerable interest in their customs, and we decorate our homes with Indian rugs and pottery and dress our women in fashionable "squaw dresses" derived from Indian styles; but the barriers to full acceptance measured by such an index as the rate of intermarriage are still formidable in most areas of the United States. There are, of course, exceptions in some localities, as among the Menominee of Wisconsin, among the Wascos on the Warm Springs reservation in Oregon, or in parts of Oklahoma where intermarriage is more frequent.¹⁸ There has also undoubtedly been some admixture in all areas over the centuries.¹⁹ But taking the nation as a whole and considering especially the localities of high Indian population, such as the Southwest, the rate of miscegenation with whites continues to be astonishingly low.

The contrast with Mexico is sharp and illuminating. In Mexico interbreeding between Spanish and Indian began almost immediately after the Spanish conquest. Even though miscegenation was prohibited during the late Colonial period, the total process has moved far enough to produce a profoundly "mestizo" nation.²⁰ There are

¹⁸ E.g., Spindler, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*); French, *op. cit.* (note 13 *supra*); William W. Newcomb, Jr., *The Culture and Acculturation of the Delaware Indians*, "Papers," Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, No. 10 (1956).

¹⁹ H. L. Shapiro, "The Mixed Blood Indian," in: Oliver LaFarge (Ed.), *The Changing Indian* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942), pp. 19-28.

²⁰ See Sol Tax (Ed.), *Heritage of Conquest* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952); Ralph L. Beals, "The History of Acculturation of Mexico," in: *Homenaje Al Doctor Alfonso*

still relatively unacculturated and unassimilated Indians remaining in various parts of the nation; but when Indian groups enter a transitional stage and begin to move in the direction of integration, there are cultural models and reference groups for them all along the continuum of acculturation, from the most native-oriented Indian communities to the sophisticated urban life in Mexico City. The sociocultural system is also open for the ambitious and talented Indian individual like Benito Juarez who began his career in an isolated Zapotec Indian village and went on to become one of Mexico's greatest presidents. But, even more important, the system is relatively open for transitional Indian groups as they proceed generations by generation along the continuum to fuller integration and acculturation. There is now a conscious and conspicuous positive valuation of the Indian heritage on the part of Mexico's political and intellectual leaders.

In the United States, on the other hand, the path to full acculturation is confusing and frustrating, and an ultimate ceiling is still firmly clamped down by our persisting Anglo-American "racial" attitudes. Instead of proceeding generation by generation along a continuum to full acculturation, it is as if an American-Indian group must at some point leap across a spark gap to achieve a fully integrated position in white American society.²¹

Caso (Mexico: Imprenta Nuevo Mundo, 1951).

²¹ Within and near many U. S. reservations there has recently emerged a continuum of sociocultural groups that can be arranged in an order from "native" or "native oriented" through "transitional" to "American-marginal" or "acculturated" and does bear some resemblance to the situation in Mexico. See, for example, Fred Voget, "Crow Socio-Cultural Groups," in: Tax (Ed.), *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), pp. 88-93; Spindler, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*). But the process has not moved as far or as profoundly as it has in Mexico, and

I do not mean to imply that biological interbreeding per se affects the process, but that biological miscegenation leads to profoundly different self-conceptions and evaluations; to the kinds of reference groups that seem to provide a kind of natural "ladder of acculturation" in many areas of Mexico that is so conspicuously lacking in the United States; and to a much more permeable barrier at the extreme end of the acculturation continuum.

PAN-INDIANISM

Since a kind of ultimate lid or ceiling has been placed upon full acculturation and assimilation in the United States, it is now pertinent to raise the question as to what is happening to Indian groups who become reasonably well educated by our standards and move a great distance from their aboriginal ways of life without becoming fully integrated in the larger United States society. One way of looking at the problem is that we shall continue with a type of cultural pluralism for some generations to come. But in a vast number of cases, the process has moved too far for Indian groups to continue to find much meaning in their own particular aboriginal cultures, and what appears to be emerging is an interesting type of "Pan-Indianism."²²

This Pan-Indianism is assuming a form in which increasing numbers of American Indians are participating in customs and institutions that are describable only as Indian. These customs and institutions are being synthe-

the problem of achieving full integration into white American society still exists.

²² See Margaret Mead, *Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 66-68; C. S. Brant, "Peyotism Among the Kiowa-Apache and Neighboring Tribes," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 6 (Summer 1950), pp. 212-22; James H. Howard, "Pan-Indian Culture of Oklahoma," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (1955), pp. 215-20; Newcomb, *op. cit.* (note 17 *supra*), pp. 117-22.

Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57 (June 1955), pp. 456-57.

sized from elements derived from diverse Indian cultures and to some extent from white American culture. There exists also in many regions, and especially in Oklahoma, a loosely knit, informally organized grouping of Indians who have joined forces to participate in these Pan-Indian activities.²³

Historically, the beginnings of this type of Pan-Indianism are found in many of the nativistic movements which followed in the wake of conquest, the spread of the Ghost Dances being a classic type of example. The later emergence of the Peyote Cult, which involved not only the exchange of customs and ideas among Indian tribes and the incorporation of Christian concepts, but also intertribal participation in the same ceremonies, carried the process much further and continues to be one of the focal points in Pan-Indianism.²⁴

Conspicuous more recent developments are the various powwows and intertribal ceremonial gatherings. Some are organized by the Indians themselves, especially in Oklahoma and the Middle West; others, like the annual Gallup Inter-Tribal Indian Ceremonial, are managed by white businessmen to promote local business interests. But in both types, there is enthusiastic intertribal participation on the part of the Indians and a strong encouragement of Pan-Indianism.

Although the cultural elements found in this emerging Pan-Indian movement are derived from diverse Indian sources, it is highly significant that a high proportion of these elements are drawn from Plains culture: the war bonnet, the Plains-type war dance, and so forth. These elements have become symbols of Indianism to the Indians themselves to

a degree that bears little relationship to the aboriginal facts. And it is probable that their importance as symbols derives in part from the fact that these elements are central features of the prevailing white-American stereotype of the American Indian. They are the features of Indian culture which white tourists expect to find when they attend intertribal ceremonials, and Indians are rewarded by the whites for behaving in conformity to the stereotype. This phenomenon is evident at the Gallup Inter-Tribal Ceremonial where a close-to-aboriginal Navaho or Apache dance receives only a scattering of applause, but a Plains-type war dance enjoys a thundering ovation from the white audience, regardless of whether the dance is performed by the Kiowas or by the Zunis! The result is that more and more tribes are adopting Plains styles of dancing, and Pan-Indianism proceeds apace.

Other features of Pan-Indianism include intertribal visiting and intermarriage, which are also of crucial importance, and the national Indian organizations such as the National Congress of American Indians which, to date, are less important than the powwows.

The significance of this Pan-Indianism in general terms is that it provides a social and cultural framework within which acculturating Indian groups can maintain their sense of identity and integrity as Indians as long as the dominant larger society assigns them to subordinate status. In the future, it is probable that this Pan-Indianism will develop greater political significance than it has at present, and that organizations like the National Congress of American Indians will speak more effectively for a more highly organized American-Indian minority which will begin to take the franchise more seriously and be more carefully listened to in the halls of the United States Congress in Washington.

American Indian Personality Types and Their Sociocultural Roots

By GEORGE D. and LOUISE S. SPINDLER

Summary: It appears that American Indians probably exhibit some pivotal and core features of psychological structure in common, and that these core features function differently in variant tribal and areal cultures. The combination of these features in the basic personality structure of each society appears to exhibit considerable stability through time, and apparently selectively limits effective choices of new cultural alternatives as long as it continues to function. By reversing the relationship between culture change and psychological structure, we can see that several distinct types of personality emerge, representing various combinations of experience, needs, and results of experience. These types are cast somewhat differently in the framework of male and female roles in culture change.

THE questions with which we will be concerned in this paper are: what psychological characteristics may be considered universal among the Indian tribes of North America? What are some of the variations around these basic psychological themes? Does psychological structure act as a selective screen in culture change? What are some of the personality types cast up in the process of change as Indians in groups and as individuals adapt to the impact of twentieth-century American culture? Although each of these questions is indeed broad enough to justify a separate article, they belong together. We will place most emphasis on the last two questions. This is because psychological structures as selective screens and the psychological types cast up in culture change situations provide focus on relationships that will be of significance in new developments in the status or cultural position of American Indians.

We must at this point declare our hesitance about stating some of the generalizations it is necessary to make in the treatment of these questions. Although no area in the world has been so combed over by anthropologists as has North America, the combing has been done mainly with *cultural*, not *psychological*, tools. For large areas, psychological data—including impressionistic descriptions of character—are lacking. What psychological data are available—and probably more is available for North America than for any other major culture area of the world—are frequently not comparable from one tribe to another because of differing theoretical orientations in their treatment, different levels of abstraction in interpretation, and the variant purposes of research.

Inference from cultural materials alone is frequently unsafe because the manifest aspects of culture sometimes vary

²³ Newcomb, *op. cit.* (note 17 *supra*), p. 117.

²⁴ Weston LaBarre, *The Peyote Cult*, "Yale University Publications in Anthropology," No. 16 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938). It is significant that the Peyote Cult is now formally incorporated in some states as the Native American Church.

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from situation to situation without corresponding variations in psychological structure, and vice versa. We have used what is available in the literature of psycho-cultural studies among North American Indians, have inferred from cultural patterning to a limited extent and from life histories, and have projected from our own observations among Wisconsin Indians, particularly the Menominee. Much of what we will say in the following pages, however, must be regarded as constituting reasonable hypotheses rather than established fact.

COMMON PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

As we checked through the psychologically oriented studies—including autobiographies and psychological “asides” in ethnographies—of Indian tribes representing all of the major culture areas in North America except the Southeastern Woodlands, it seemed clear that some psychological characteristics are more widely shared than others, and that of these some may be regarded as representing modal tendencies. We regard them not as static, but as long-standing features of a relatively high degree of stability. They characterize in a very general sense limited aspects of the aboriginal personalities of American Indians and possibly characterize the pan-Indian psychological core of the least acculturated segments of contemporary tribes. We shall, therefore, describe these core psychological features, and later treat their variations, as though we were speaking of aboriginal America.

Without attempting to document the many sources from which inferences and data were drawn, we can tentatively describe the psychological features most widely exhibited among North American Indians as a whole in the following way: nondemonstrative emotionality and reserve accompanied by a high degree of control over interpersonal aggression

within the in-group;¹ a pattern of generosity that varies greatly in the extent to which it is a formalized social device without emotional depth; autonomy of the individual, a trait linked with socio-political structures low in dominance-submission hierarchies; ability to endure pain, hardship, hunger, and frustration without external evidence of discomfort; a positive valuation of bravery and courage that varies sharply with respect to emphasis on highly aggressive daring in military exploit; a generalized fear of the world as dangerous, and particularly a fear of witchcraft; a “practical joker” strain that is nearly everywhere highly channelized institutionally, as in the common brother-in-law joking prerogative, and that appears to be a safety valve for in-group aggressions held sharply in check; attention to the concrete realities of the present—what Rorschachists would call the “large D” approach to problem solving—practicality, in contrast to abstract integration in terms of long-range goals;² a dependence upon supernatural power outside one’s self—power that determines one’s fate, which is expressed to and can be acquired by the individual through dreams, and for which the individual is not held personally account-

¹ There are exceptions to each of these descriptive statements. The Mohave and Navaho, for instance, are subject to abrupt swings of mood and are emotionally volatile, though the Navaho are described as outwardly impassive. See G. Devereux, “Mohave Culture and Personality,” *Character and Personality*, Vol. 8 (1939-40), pp. 91-109; A. Kroeber, “Mohave Disposition,” *Handbook of the Indians of California*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 78 (1925), pp. 729-31; C. Kluckhohn and D. Leighton, *The Navaho* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947).

² This may vary according to the extent to which a people are sedentary, accumulative, and status-oriented. It seems probable that nomadic hunting, and gathering peoples, as most North American Indians were, would usually exhibit this practical, reality-centered approach.

able, at least not in the sense that one’s “will” is accountable for one’s acts in Western culture.

VARIATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Each of the items in the preceding list of “core” psychological features varies by context and serves somewhat different purposes in somewhat different ways in each culture. They are, therefore, in no sense fixed psychological constants. They are, rather, foci around which psychological and cultural elaboration has taken place in more or less unique ways in each culture. Study of this variation will lead to greater understanding of the behavior of American Indians, historically and in the present, than does the abstraction of common psychological denominators. If we analyze one of these foci—the handling of aggression—we find that it is true that American Indian cultures as a whole tend to exercise sharp controls on interpersonal, in-group aggression; but that the kinds of controls, what is being controlled, and the purpose of controls vary impressively from situation to situation. The following is an attempt to sketch the salient features of aggression control and channelization in three culture types, corresponding to culture areas in North America, as examples of variation.³

On the Plains, for example, out-group aggression is highly channelized—among tribes like the Comanche, Sioux, Arapaho, Crow—by raids on other tribes for horses, scalps, and booty and with systems of status based on one’s daring in these exploits. And here also in many tribes, in-group aggression is highly channelized—in legitimized wife stealing by certain men’s societies, highly

³ The definition of culture area terms for North America used in this paper is that of A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923), p. 337.

aggressive sexual conquest with males “counting coup” on women in some tribes, very rough institutionalized practical joking on relatives and old people, and ritualized boasting about military, and frequently sexual, exploits.⁴ We infer that these Plains Indians are high in aggression, but that their cultures provide channels for it so that random in-group expression of aggression was infrequent enough not to be a major cause of disruption.

Among the Algonquians of the Northeastern Woodlands—the Ojibwa of Ontario and Wisconsin, the Menominee, the Naskapi of Labrador—there are fewer outlets for the expression of aggression on out-groups. Only some of the southern tribes tortured prisoners of war as a public spectacle, or even had formal warfare. The primary outlet for aggression seems to have been, and still is among the least acculturated groups within tribes, witchcraft—just as it is, coupled with gossip, among the Pueblo peoples like the Hopi and Zuni of the Southwest.⁵

⁴ There are a multitude of descriptions of Plains patterns along these lines in both popular and ethnographic literature. See, for instance, E. C. Parsons (Ed.), *American Indian Life* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1922) for short, vivid, fictionalized stories; and A. Wallace and E. A. Hoebel, *The Comanches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952) for an ethno-historical analysis. A. Kardiner, in *Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), provides a psychoanalytic interpretation of Comanche character, and G. Devereux, *Reality and Dream* (New York: International Universities Press, 1951) analyzes the neurosis of an anonymous Plains Indian in terms of an areal Plains personality.

⁵ See D. F. Aberle, *The Psychosocial Analysis of a Hopi Life-History*, “Comparative Psychology Monographs” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951) for a discussion of the functions of witchcraft in Hopi society; and L. S. Spindler, “Witchcraft in Menominee Acculturation,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1952), pp. 593-602 for the Menominee.

The sociocultural mechanisms centering on aggression are of a rather different order in the Northeast than on the Plains. Here there is great stress on kind words, on treating everybody nicely, on never giving offense, not gossiping and fighting, not "showing off," not stealing women, doing favors whenever you are asked for fear you might displease someone if you refused, and on being quiet. The emphasis is seen in the constant, carefully phrased exhortations: by parents to children, by elders to participants during ceremonies and feasts, and in folklore, as well as in everyday behaviors.⁶

This pattern within these Northeastern societies can be regarded as functioning to control in-group aggressions in situations where formal sociopolitical control systems are almost nonexistent and decidedly atomistic. This does not mean that the Northeastern Algonquians are potentially, or latently, highly aggressive, hostile people.⁷ It only means that a psycho-cultural system of controls over in-group aggression must be used as social insurance, in the absence of a formalized, authority-centered system of control.

Among the Southwestern Pueblo peoples, where a superficially similar pattern of restraints on the expression of interpersonal, in-group aggression oper-

ates, the sociocultural setting is quite different; and the psychological process becomes altered. These societies are highly organized into communities governed by differentiated theocracies and structured by various interlocking and overlapping categories of kin, maternal clans, and ceremonial societies. The stress is on conformity to the rules of the group, with the theocrats as censors. That all is not peaceful with the Pueblos is indicated by considerable bickering, gossip about even a light deviation from social norms, robust teasing of children by the special classes of relatives so privileged, and open breaks of intragroup hostility that have resulted from time to time in the splitting of villages, with one of the factions going off to establish a new community.⁸

In the Pueblos the stress on overt interpersonal amiability, on constraint of direct interpersonal aggression, on avoiding the spotlight and not boasting, on conformity, helps maintain a tightly organized system of sociopolitical controls, in contrast to the situation in the Northeast. This support apparently operates in part as a cultural compensation for the potentially disruptive effect of strong covert hostilities—and indeed the covert hostility may be in part a result of the tight system of controls—so the psychological and sociocultural systems interact to maintain each other. It thus appears that atomistic Algonquians and organized Pueblo peoples both exercise exceptionally strong psy-

⁸ The social psychology of the Pueblos has been a matter of some dispute. For support of the interpretive sketch we are drawing here, see Aberle, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*); L. W. Simmons, *Sun Chief* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942); F. H. Ellis, "Patterns of Aggression and the War Cult in the Southwestern Pueblos," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1951), pp. 177-201; W. Bennett, "The Interpretation of Pueblo Culture: A Question of Values," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1946), pp. 361-74.

cho-cultural sanctions against the overt expression of interpersonal, in-group aggression; but these sanctions support different sociopolitical systems by controlling psychological processes of different intensity.

The point has been made that the mechanisms for releasing and controlling aggression must be formed out of cultural materials peculiar to each situation, irrespective of cross-tribal commonalities, but that the emphasis on control of aggression is a central focus in these highly diverse cultural situations.⁹

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE CHANGE

That the bio-emotional and cognitive-perceptual organization shared by a group of people, and often referred to as "basic personality structure," is quite stable over time and through different levels of manifest culture change is one of the better documented generalizations of significance to our topic. This stability of psychological pattern may be described, as did Scudder Mekeel in his study of the Teton Dakota, as a retention of "values and attitudes behind the concrete pattern of culture."¹⁰ He demonstrates how bravery, generosity, fortitude, and moral integrity, basic values of the past embodied in the conception of the "good man," survive despite their dysfunctional role in the modern situation. For example, the very high value placed upon generosity expressed in the

⁹ We recognize that all psycho-cultural systems include mechanisms for handling aggression. What is uniquely Indian about this is that the controls of aggression are highly developed and are linked with a nondemonstrative emotional mode that results in at least an appearance of interpersonal amiability in many, if not most, tribal and areal personalities.

¹⁰ H. S. Mekeel, *The Economy of a Modern Teton Dakota Community*, "Yale University Publications in Anthropology," No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936).

giving of goods at most important social occasions and in the hospitality extended to relatives and friends makes the accumulation of property necessary to the goal of material success in American culture very difficult. In fact, if a Teton Dakota does become successful in the white man's eyes and in terms of accumulation of property, he necessarily loses his security-giving membership in the Indian primary group, as long as that group lives by values derived from the Dakota past.¹¹ Unless white society has a rewarding place for him he will become an isolated and unhappy individual.

The stability of psychological pattern may also be described in terms of highly generalized attitudes, such as the belief in immanent justice, which are considered indicative of basic world view. Laura Thompson explores to this purpose responses to psychological devices like the Thematic Apperception, Moral Ideology, and Emotional Responses tests by Indian children 6 to 18 years of age in five tribes: Zuni, Navaho, Papago, Dakota Sioux, Ojibwa. She finds evidence that world view in each tribe is congruent with the aboriginal mode of life and that these world views have apparently persisted despite great changes in the economy, social structure, and manifest culture.¹²

The most striking evidence for the persistence of psychological structure is provided by the work of A. Irving Hallowell. He administered Rorschach projective tests to several hundred Ojibwa men, women, and children living at three different levels of acculturation. These

¹¹ For an insightful discussion of the role of the primary group in a similar situation (Mandan-Hidatsa), see E. Bruner, "Primary Group Experience and the Process of Acculturation," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (1956), pp. 605-23.

¹² Laura Thompson, "Attitudes and Acculturation," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1948), pp. 200-215.

⁶ See A. I. Hallowell, "Some Psychological Characteristics of Northeastern Indians," in: F. Johnson (Ed.), *Man in Northeastern North America*, "Papers of the Robert S. Peabody Foundation for Archeology," Vol. 3 (1946), for an analytic description of the pattern.

⁷ The projective test data from this area do not indicate high aggressiveness or hostility, although tribes do apparently vary in the degree and pervasiveness of anxiety. See the several papers on this and related subjects in A. I. Hallowell, *Culture and Experience*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955; and G. D. Spindler, *Sociocultural and Psychological Processes in Menominee Acculturation*, "Culture and Society Series," Vol. 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955).

Indians varied in the degree to which their sources of subsistence, social organization, religion, and language approximated aboriginal or modern American culture. Hallowell's conclusion is dramatic; while the Ojibwa appear more and more like whites at the most acculturated levels in the manifest aspects of culture—dress, language, religion, and so forth—there is . . . "no evidence at all for a basic psychological shift in a parallel direction."¹³ What shifts do occur are regressive and disintegrative. They do not fundamentally alter the basic psychological structure; they merely corrode it.

The Spindlers did a study along somewhat similar lines of Menominee Indians with four distinct levels of acculturation, from a native-oriented base to a thoroughly acculturated, white-collar group. All the Menominee lived on the same reservation community. Without becoming involved with various other phases of the problems studied, we can note that the conclusions drawn concerning stability and retention of psychological structure were fundamentally the same as those of Hallowell, insofar as the samples are comparable. But there is this important difference: the Menominee situation provided a group of Indians who had attained occupational and social positions equivalent to those of high status in the nearby white towns. This was due to the presence of a Menominee-owned and managed lumber industry. The modal psychological structure exhibited by a sample of the men in this elite group departed dramatically from that exhibited in native-oriented and culturally transitional levels. It constitutes a psychological transformation, a reformulation of personality in successful adaptation to the demands

of status achievement, punctuality, and the linkage of work and success appropriate to the middle-class American value system. This suggests that significant psychological changes do occur when the barriers to achievement on the white man's terms are broken down, and the new adaptation thereby becomes rewarding rather than punitive.¹⁴

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AS A PERCEPTUAL SCREEN

What has already been said about the stability, sometimes dysfunctional stability, of psychological structure in culture change situations, suggests the determinant role of personality as a selective, perceptual screen. In the absence of clearcut and meaningful rewards for psychological readaptation, the psychological structure based upon the survival of attenuated traditional culture will block out whole areas of the new cultural environment and makes possible the learning of only limited techniques of white culture as necessary accessories to getting along in today's world.¹⁵ But the selective role of psychological structure goes beyond this. Two instances of those described in the literature will be noted.

Anthony Wallace cites the absence of fear of heights, a penchant for alcohol, and the lack of anal-reactive (retentive) traits (with the presence of so-called "oral" traits) in the modal personality structure of the Iroquoian Tuscarora as significant aspects of the "sorting screen," with the following results.¹⁶ About one-third of the Tuscarora adult

¹⁴ See G. D. Spindler, *op. cit.* (note 7 *supra*).

¹⁵ This has also been noted by E. Bruner, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), and for the Sioux by E. H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1950).

¹⁶ A. F. C. Wallace, "Some Determinants of Culture Change in an Iroquoian Community," in: W. N. Fenton (Ed.), *Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquoian Culture*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 149 (1951), pp. 59-75.

males are workers on high steel construction and are sought after by contractors because they lack the mildly phobic fear of heights normal in whites. The Baptist Church and Temperance Society flourish on the reservation to reduce the incidence and severity of drinking. The Tuscarora refuse to become "anal-reactive" whites. That is, they do not save money, keep appointments punctually, or compulsively tend to the maintenance of their possessions—fields, cars, homes, and equipment—despite one hundred and fifty years of attempts (by whites) by persuasion, example, and punishment, to make them do so.

In an interesting research, Evon Vogt and John Adair studied the attitudes towards veterans of World War II, the acceptance of the innovations they brought back with them, and the reintegration of the veterans in their home communities among the Navaho and Zuni.¹⁷ The Zuni requested large numbers of deferments for men in religious offices when the draft began; and when the draft board asked that deferments be requested only for men who held these offices for life, the Zuni filled lifetime offices that had not been occupied for years and revived ceremonials that had become defunct. When the Zuni veterans returned, they were met with a solid front of conservatism. Deviant behaviors of any sort were gossiped about, and strong pressures were exerted by the priests and others to make veterans conform to the traditional Zuni norms and reintegrate into the traditional statuses and roles provided by Zuni social structure. The veterans who could not conform left the community.

In contrast, hundreds of Navaho males enlisted, few deferments were requested,

and there was no increase in ritual activity to keep medicine doctors or religious functionaries at home. When the Navaho veterans returned, they were greeted with interested curiosity, the pressures to conform were not intense, and some have been active innovators since then.

Adair and Vogt point to Zuni and Navaho differences in sociocultural systems, patterns of warfare, and degree of curiosity about the outside world as antecedents of the selectively variant responses to the contact processes of which returning veterans are a part. In short, the tightly organized and inflexible, community-oriented and centripetal Zuni selected differently from the same stimuli than did the more loosely organized, more flexible, more outward-oriented Navaho.

Psychological structure appears to be associated with differential selection of alternatives available in culture change situations. The process can be seen as large in scope as one views the adaptations of tribes in whole culture areas to the impact of European-American culture. But space forbids further discussion except to note a word of caution—that the *conditions* of contact are often so massively determinant that the psychological structure of the people may affect the response to contact but not the end result, as in the numerous cases in North America where forcible removal, destructive forms of religious proselyting, epidemics, or military action virtually destroyed whole societies and cultures.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES GENERATED IN CULTURE CHANGE

Now we reverse the relationship between psychological structure and culture change described so far. We will discuss certain personality types and psychological processes generated in the melee of culture change and culture con-

¹⁷ John Adair and Evon Vogt, "Navaho and Zuni Veterans: A Study of Contrasting Modes of Culture Change," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1949), pp. 547-61.

¹³ A. I. Hallowell, "Ojibwa Personality and Acculturation," in: Sol Tax (Ed.), *Proceedings and Selected Papers of the 29th International Congress of Americanists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 112.

flict. While we will draw to a large extent from our own observations of Indians we have known and studied,¹⁸ the parallels with other situations are such that generalization is possible.

The major criteria for similarity are that a "native-oriented" or "least acculturated" category of individuals, oriented predominantly towards the traditional culture, exist in the tribal community; that varying degrees of culturally transitional states be represented; and that some individuals or groups be so acculturated to white norms that they are potentially capable of being assimilated into the contemporary American social and occupational structure. These conditions obtain in varying degrees and with unique ramifications on many, but not all, Indian reservations in this country.¹⁹ In some cases whole tribal communities fall into one or another of these acculturative categories. The Western Pueblos, for example, can be considered native-oriented societies. And the Southern Ute appear to function, as a whole, at an apathetic, disorganized, transitional level of adaptation.²⁰ With this introduction, we will sketch some of the psychological types, representing kinds of personal-social adaptation to the conditions of life brought about by the impact of European-American culture upon American Indians.

¹⁸ The authors' major field work has been done with the Menominee. We have also made excursions of short duration to Chippewa reservations in Wisconsin, did a brief psychological study of Winnebago Peyotists in 1954, and visited the Walker River Paiute, and Eastern Pueblo peoples. Statements concerning Menominee personality are based on analysis of Rorschach tests, autobiographies, interviews, and participant observation.

¹⁹ See, for example, F. Voget, "Crow Socio-Cultural Groups," in: Tax (Ed.), *op. cit.* (note 13 *supra*), pp. 88-93; and E. Bruner, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*).

²⁰ As described by O. C. Stewart, "Southern Ute Adjustment to Modern Living," in: Tax (Ed.), *op. cit.* (note 13 *supra*), pp. 80-87.

NATIVE TYPE

This type was raised as an Indian, had only marginal contacts with whites and white culture, and lives in a world perceived and patterned by the symbols and motivation of the traditional culture. He thinks and acts Indian, and speaks as one in both a figurative and literal sense. He will represent the modal, aboriginal personality type of whatever tribal group he is a member. As a Menominee, his emotional and intellectual range is limited without being attenuated, his emotional balance highly controlled without being constricted. He is sensitive to others' feelings, but not imputative. He accepts the dictates of fate, retains equanimity under duress, and achieves control under provocation. He avoids any action that will arouse another's anger or hostility, partly because he fears retaliation in the form of sorcery. His fantasy life is active and functions within a world where men and animals transform into each other, and where dreams provide inspiration and guidance drawn from the pool of supernatural power in which all beings and objects float. His personality is adequate within the traditional setting, but he is quite unequipped, psychologically and technologically, for competition in the modern socioeconomic system. He is aware of this, and is nostalgic for the life of the past, but regretfully comprehends the futility of wishing for its return. Almost by definition he is aged, and as an elder he constitutes part of the slim stock of leadership stemming from the past and providing continuity for the native-oriented group. With him, the ancient culture will die in its comparatively vigorous and comprehensible form.

REAFFIRMATIVE NATIVE TYPE

This type is usually represented by younger men. He was raised Indian,

and frequently by grandparents, but has experienced comparatively wide and intensive contact with white culture through years of boarding school, intermittent occupation with the white economic system, and usually has traveled outside the reservation. For one reason or another he encountered blocks in his adaptation to white culture, and may not have been strongly motivated to adapt in the first place. He has rebounded from white culture back to the tradition-oriented primary group maintained by geographical isolation and the influence of elders within the reservation community. His psychological position is, therefore, different from that of the first type, even though he is a member of the same primary group. He has some doubts about the traditional culture that he has to submerge by compensatory and self-conscious identification with the native-oriented group. Because of this, for him the native-oriented group and its affirmation in ceremonial form assumes some of the character of a "nativistic" movement.²¹ He is ambivalent about whites and white culture, and unlike the elder, has some doubts about his personal adequacy in the Indian as well as in the white man's world. His personality, however, is modally like that of the native type, but clouded by his doubts and ambivalence, distorted somewhat by his compensations, and attenuated in some degree through cultural loss, since he has learned no one culture fully. This type probably constitutes the largest portion of most native-oriented groups existing in contemporary reservation communities.

²¹ The literature on "nativistic movements" is extensive. For recent analyses, see F. W. Voget, "The American Indian in Transition: Reformulation and Accommodation," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (1956), pp. 249-63, and A. F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *Ibid.*, pp. 264-81.

TRANSITIONAL TYPES

In one sense all Indians are in transition. Here we are referring to the types of individuals who are clearly suspended between the white and Indian ways of life, and are not identified strongly with either native-oriented or acculturated social primary groups. They are marginal men. There is no one transitional type, even in this restricted sense. But all of the discernible types are marked by at least one feature held in common; they are, as Hallowell concluded for the Ojibwa, still fundamentally Indians in basic psychological structure, even though this structure is badly corroded by regressive breakdown. The breakdown, among Menominee at least, is represented particularly in loss of emotional controls that are so important in the traditional setting, in a reduction of active fantasy life, and in the development of marked anxieties accompanied by outbursts of overt and sometimes very destructive hostility. These transitional people are unpredictable. They are capable of great generosity and hospitality and are also capable of dangerous violence, particularly when drinking—and they drink frequently. They are the unknown quotient in tribal decision-making and shift abruptly from one stance to another in general councils where problems of tribal policy are thrashed out. Since they constitute a sizable portion of most tribes today, their psychology must be taken into account in attempts to develop rational and progressive withdrawal programs designed to eventuate in completely independent status.

More space would allow us to describe the variants in transitional type. We can only note that the unpredictable, aggressive type probably represents the majority, but that passively withdrawn, and acculturation-oriented types also exist in significant numbers. One has

given up and is vegetating; the other has set his sights on achievement in white terms and is trying to acquire the necessary techniques, with varying degrees of success.

A SPECIAL DEVIANT TYPE

In many reservation communities there exist various special religious bodies such as the Peyote Cult or Shaker Church.²² These groups and the religious observances associated with them constitute a variant solution to the problems of culture conflict and self-doubt engendered by the culture change situation. They provide, through the primary groups they make available, a social reference point for the free-floating, marginal individual. They also provide a more or less coherent rationalization of the culture conflict itself, since in their religious observances and the premises behind them, white and Indian patterns of belief and behavior are intermingled.

The Peyotists among the Menominee represent, modally, a particular personality configuration. They exhibit a high degree of self-involvement in their fantasy life, retrospect about their past lives, ruminate about their sins and about the hope of salvation, and are preoccupied with the symbols and meanings of Peyote ritual and rationale. They are anxious people, who introspect rather than project their anxieties in outbursts of violence. Though they exhibit a certain "schizoid" tendency in their intense self-concern and introspection, they are sufficiently reality-centered to earn a living and live lives that on the whole are better ordered than those of the ungrouped transitionals, with whom they share the experience of cultural disorganization and culture conflict.

²² Voget and Wallace, *Ibid.*; and G. D. Spindler, "Personality and Peyotism in Menomini Indian Acculturation," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1952), pp. 151-59.

Though the Shaker Church and other similar institutions are not directly comparable to the Peyote Cult in commandment or ceremonial, they satisfy many of the same needs in culture change among American Indians and may therefore be selective of, and support, some of the same personality traits, it is hypothesized.

ACCULTURATED TYPES

Acculturation processes among American Indians do not necessarily eventuate in the emergence of middle-class American personalities or culture patterns, even when they run full course. Acculturative adaptation may occur to a middle-class standard, a laboring class pattern, or move in the direction of the cultural norms and values of variant local subgroups with whom Indians come into contact. Therefore, acculturated psychological types are not all the same.

We will describe a personality type that is represented modally among elite acculturated Menominee Indians who have adapted to a middle-class socioeconomic and cultural pattern of norms. This acculturated type does not display the stoic control of emotions characteristic of the native type, nor does it exhibit the anxiety and unpredictable hostility of the transitional type, nor the self-involvement and search for resolution of personal and cultural conflict of the Peyotists. In the psychological constellation of this type, emotions and aggressions are highly channelized toward the achievement of success, exhibited in economic and occupational attainments and the accumulation of property. Anxiety is present, but is integrated with the personality structure as generalized tension, which helps make the individual quick to respond and keeps him moving toward his goals. The range of intellectual interests is comparatively broad and the fantasy life vigorous, but not particularly introspective. In short,

this type is the achievement-oriented middle-class American personality. It constitutes a marked psychological departure in the Menominee continuum of adaptations and requires a dramatic rechannelizing of energies and capacities. It is probably not represented in many reservation communities today, for when a person reaches this state in most situations, he leaves the reservation and is assimilated into the American social structure. The rewards at home must be high to keep him there.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALES AND FEMALES

We have written as though all psychological types were males. This has been a necessary convenience, but the matter cannot be left there. Women, among the Menominee, exhibit consistent, over-all, differences from the men, in psychological adaptation to the exigencies of culture change. They are less anxious, less tense, react more quickly in problem-solving situations, exhibit less loss of emotional control, are more limited in intellectual interests and experience, and are less introspective.²³ The women also exhibit more

²³ These statements are based on statistical tests of difference applied to male-female Rorschach scores and to comparative analyses of autobiographies. See L. S. Spindler (Mary L.), "Women and Culture Change: A Case Study of the Menomini Indians," unpublished

consistent retentions of basic Menominee values through all levels of acculturation than do the men. These differences seem to be accounted for in part by the fact that the basic roles of women as mothers, wives, and social participants change less than do the subsistence-based and more public roles of men, so that the past and the present have greater continuity for women.

As a consequence of these significant and consistent differences, Menominee women within each acculturative category in the reservation community exhibit psychological adaptations somewhat different from those of men in the same categories. Most of the intracategory differences can be traced to the greater continuity of women's roles and express various permutations of the overall differences in psychological structure and value retention stated above. But limitations of space prevent further discussion.

To what extent the male/female differences in psychological adaptation to culture change exhibited among the Menominee are present in other tribal communities is an open question. Data available for a number of Indian tribes suggest that fairly wide generalization may be possible.

Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1956, for these data and further analysis of psychological adaptations among Menominee Indian women.

The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent

By EDWARD P. DOZIER, GEORGE E. SIMPSON, and J. MILTON YINGER

Abstract: The place of Indians in American society may be seen as one aspect of the question of the integration of minority groups into the social system. Only by maintenance of freedom for cultural variation can a heterogeneous society keep conflict at a minimum; individual freedom is a widely shared cultural value. Integration means a unity that permits differences and opposes only differences that lead to discipline conflicts. It implies full equality in health services and in educational, political, and economic opportunity among all groups. In asking what shall be the place of Indians in American society, the authors give an analysis of the conditions that favor or hamper integration.—Ed.

MOST studies of American Indians are concerned with one tribe or with a related group of tribes. The wide variations in culture and in experience make it necessary, in the examination of many current questions, to focus on particular groups. In some ways, however, Indians have shared and continue to share a common situation. All of the cultures have been affected, although to different degrees and at different rates, by the impact of the dominant society. All groups have been influenced by the legal patterns and administrative policies of the government. None has escaped the effects of the changes in law and policy. The authors of the papers in this volume, while concerned with the range of variation among Indians, have sought primarily to sketch a picture of their common experience.

It may be useful now to view "American Indians and American Life" from an even broader perspective. The place of Indians in American society may be

seen as one aspect of the question of the integration of minority groups into the social system. Such important developments as the passage of laws terminating the Indian status of several tribes since 1953 and the Supreme Court decisions outlawing segregation have focused the attention of the nation sharply on the place of its minority groups. The study of integration takes us into fundamental scientific and policy questions. What is the nature of the unity of a mobile and complex society? It cannot rely on what Durkheim called the "mechanical solidarity" of the relatively undifferentiated society. A free society repudiates any thought of integration based on coercion. Is it possible to maintain the unity necessary to a society while permitting a wide range of cultural values and group allegiances? Most social scientists are convinced that it is possible. Indeed, they are likely to declare that *only* by maintenance of freedom for cultural variation can a heterogeneous society keep conflict at a

minimum, preserve the flexibility necessary in a time of rapid change, and support the cultural value, so widely shared, of individual freedom.

From this point of view, the integration of American Indians does not imply their absorption into some dominant homogeneous culture. Freedom to be completely assimilated as individuals would be a live option; but freedom to be related to the total society as culturally differentiated groups would be equally possible. This point of view, however, is not accepted by everyone. After centuries of contact between the Indian cultures and the dominant groups, America has not yet formulated a policy to which there is anywhere nearly universal assent, either among Indians or on the part of policy makers. To some, *E pluribus unum* means that a new unity will be woven out of the diverse strands of our society, each group perhaps contributing to the total social and cultural life, but losing its separate identity. This we shall call assimilation. To others, *E pluribus unum* means a more complicated kind of unity, one that permits differences and even welcomes them as contributions to the richness of society. Only those differences that lead to disruptive conflicts are opposed. This interpretation implies, moreover, full equality in health services, in educational, political, and economic opportunity among all groups. This we shall call integration.

What shall be the place of Indians in American society? It is not our purpose to outline policy, but to point to certain facts that set limits to policy. Formulas often fail because we do not recognize the effects of all the conditions under which they must be carried out. What are the realistic alternatives; what programs seem doomed to failure? Few will deny, for example, that it is no longer possible to preserve aboriginal Indian cultures unchanged.

Roads, cars, radios are going to become more common, not less. It seems unlikely that the trend toward public-school education for Indian children in mixed schools will be reversed. An Indian young man after service in the armed forces does not return to his tribe unchanged. The increasing inadequacy of the tribal land base to support the growing population will continue to encourage some Indians to seek employment in cities.

Such facts as these are far more readily taken into account in policy formation than the more surprising facts of the opposite kind. Despite long contact with an overwhelmingly more powerful system, many Indian cultures have retained their vitality. In an earlier paper in this volume, Vogt has shown that Indians have added items of material culture from the surrounding society much more readily than they have changed basic aspects of their social organization and religion. The Spindlers have shown how much continuity there is in basic personality structure even in the face of cultural change. Tribal organizations are kept intact by a process which draws the most acculturated members out of the group, leaving the conservative members behind to perpetuate the ancient ways. One may regard this continuity in the Indian style of life as a happy or an unhappy fact. What one may not do is disregard it. American Indians are being and will continue to be integrated into the total society only in ways that give full recognition to their personal tendencies and motives, the power systems within tribes, and the opportunities available to them outside their groups.

"INDIVIDUAL" VERSUS "GROUP" ASSIMILATION

Much of the concern over the presumed lack of assimilation and integra-

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tion of American Indians into the total American culture may stem from a misunderstanding of early Colonial and United States' relations with American Indians. As both D'Arcy McNickle and Theodore Haas make clear in previous papers in this volume, American Indians were considered sovereign groups or separate nations from the time of the English colonies virtually to the present. Removal of the Eastern Indians to the region west of the Mississippi and the creation, later, of reservations demonstrate this policy of treating Indian tribes as separate, sovereign groups.

Few Indian tribes have disappeared completely. Since attempts to exterminate whole groups were almost always thwarted, most American Indian groups in existence at the time of initial white contact are still present. The Indian population declined until 1900, but after that date, as Hadley's paper shows, significant and even spectacular population increases are evident for most tribes. The fact that virtually the same groups of Indians encountered by the original settlers are still represented strikes some Americans as surprising, especially in the light of the recent "integration" climate. In terms of the "melting pot" conception of democracy, the American Indian situation indicates that these people are not being absorbed or assimilated into the dominant American culture. Indeed, American Indian groups still retain many aspects of their own distinctive ways of life and have in only rare instances become "Americanized." It is clear, in fact, that our relations with them in the past have mitigated against assimilation. One must recognize, however, that despite the relative lack of assimilation of Indians as groups, the process of integration, which permits cultural pluralism, has moved forward. There are still ongoing Indian communities, differing from one another and differing from the dominant American cul-

ture, yet forming parts of a complex society.

Even the "melting pot" notion of democracy, however, has not been completely negated. Because of historical relationships between American Indians and the majority population, and because Indian groups persist, we have been relatively unaware of another process. This process has rarely been reported in the literature. The important fact is that through the years many individual Indians have passed into the main American cultural stream. Although exact figures are difficult and perhaps impossible to get, there is reason to believe that the number has been large. It is possible that as many Indians as are enrolled as tribal members today have been absorbed into the larger society. Throughout the country there are ordinary "white" American citizens, and "Negroes" as well, with enough Indian admixture to entitle them to be enrolled on a reservation. The reason that such individuals are not enrolled is that often a full-blood Indian who left his reservation and married an Indian from another tribe, a Negro, or a white, did not care to enroll his children in his own tribe—or that of his wife's tribe if she were Indian—or did not want to bother with the technicalities. In the case of a man marrying a white or Negro woman, his children and his children's children would all have been entitled to tribal enrollment as defined in many reservations because they possessed one-fourth or more "Indian blood." Thus the individual Indian who leaves his group and his descendants, including individuals up to the third degree of kindred, are excluded as Indians. The children growing up in an environment that is not Indian become, of course, culturally American and racially either white or Negro. This "drifting out" process was certainly an important factor in the American South-

west. There was a tremendous increase in Spanish-American population in this area in the years from 1700 to 1900, from approximately 10,000 to 150,000, an increase which cannot be explained on the basis of natural increase and immigration from Mexico. Indeed, we have conclusive evidence that the population was fed from Pueblo, Navaho, and Apache Indian groups.¹

Governmental policies of Britain and the United States, then, have tended to perpetuate American Indians as separate and distinct groups, but these policies have not prevented the movement of individuals and families out of Indian communities.

In the assimilation of individuals, as La Farge points out, many of the Indians who make the best adjustments and who have been the most successful in the dominant American cultural system have come from conservative, on-going cultural groups.

American Indians appear not to assimilate as groups, unless rewards for doing so are available in their indigenous environments. There are few instances of such successful transitions, although a favorable reservation locale with rich natural resources may bring them about. The Spindlers describe such a case among a group of Menominee who have undergone a psychological reorientation. This Menominee example is a rather special case, however. Most Indians are assimilated as individuals, leaving their communities voluntarily to seek a livelihood elsewhere. Once they surmount social and economic barriers, they often remain indefinitely in new occupations and surroundings quite different from those of their reservation communities.

Thus historical evidence from specific

¹ See Frederick Webb Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians, North of Mexico*, Smithsonian Institution, U. S. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 30, Part 2 (Washington, 1912), p. 325.

American Indian communities indicates that voluntary movements out of these communities have been going on for a long period of time. The reservation system has not in the past and does not now hinder this process. The most likely to adjust to new conditions, in fact, appear to be those who move out of long and firmly rooted communities. Termination of federal governmental services and the breakup of reservation communities would appear not to enhance or speed up integration. There is evidence that some maladjustments would result in the home communities and that the American cities and towns which receive these Indians would face various problems of rehabilitation.²

CONFLICTING ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING INDIAN AFFAIRS

Assumptions which seem to have underlain much of federal policy with respect to American Indians are that assimilation is inevitable³ and that it is desirable.⁴ Neither belief is fully warranted. Concerning the first point, McNickle points out that even during the Colonial period it was assumed that Indians would take over European ways, and Havighurst states that the education provided by whites for Indians has always sought to teach white culture. Since constant and strong external pressures for more than a century have not produced a loss of community identity and full acceptance of American habits of thought and conduct, assimilation is not to be expected within a few generations.⁵ The second assumption, as seen in Senator Watkins' view of "freeing"

² See Le Verne Madigan, *The American Indian Relocation Program* (New York: Association on American Indian Affairs, 1956).

³ John Provinse and others, "The American Indian in Transition," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (June 1954), p. 388.

⁴ Edward Spicer, Letter to Editor, *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56, No. 5 (October 1954), p. 890.

⁵ See E. Z. Vogt's article in this volume.

the Indians, is challenged by those who oppose "forced" assimilation. The latter feel, as Oliver La Farge says, that assimilation should occur after a tribe has reached social and political competence and on the basis of individual preference. A third attitude influencing Indian policy is that the Bureau of Indian Affairs is "harmful because paternalistic and restrictive of individual freedom, as well as wasteful of public funds,"⁶ a belief that supports recurrent moves to abolish the Bureau.

Other assumptions are common, if not universal, among Indians. They include: (1) over the years, the Indian can expect no consistency in policies regarding him, (2) the interests of the dominant society will take precedence over the interests of Indians in any policy decision, (3) the Indian can do little to affect decisions concerning Indians, (4) the turning over of Indian affairs to the states is inevitable, (5) a state administration is more likely to be hostile to Indians than is the federal administration.⁷

RECENT POLICIES AFFECTING INDIAN INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION

The two sets of assumptions mentioned above are related to different interpretations of certain historical developments. The Allotment Act of 1887, intended to detribalize the Indians, provided for dividing tribal reservations into individual land parcels. By 1933, 91,000,000 of the 138,000,000 acres owned by Indians in 1887 had ceased to be Indian owned. The Indian land that remained "on opened and allotted reservations was checkerboarded with white holdings—holdings which too frequently constituted the only access to

lands still held by Indians or controlled the only water supply available for working adjacent, arid Indian properties. . . ."⁸ The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 forbade the further allotment of lands of those tribes which voted acceptance of the Act. By various means, the Indian land base climbed back to 56,000,000 acres in two decades.

Since 1953, as indicated in the papers by Arthur Watkins and Oliver La Farge, laws providing for the termination of federal supervision over certain tribes have been passed by Congress. The Indian status of some tribes has been ended, and Concurrent Resolution 108, Eighty-third Congress, First Session (1953), provided for the extension of this policy as rapidly as possible. In May 1955, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs returned to the practice provided for in the Act of 1887, that is, the issuing of patents-in-fee to "competent" Indians who requested them. These policies are seen as forced assimilation by most reservation Indians, by some tribally enrolled nonreservation Indians, by many anthropologists, and by the Association on American Indian Affairs. They are regarded by many off-reservation Indians and by the members of Congress "as the measures which are most conducive to Indian integration."⁹

⁸ *Indian Affairs*, No. 11, "New Series" (August–September 1955), p. 1.

⁹ Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Congress of the United States, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session on S. 2750 and H.R. 7319, Part 7 (Flathead Indians, Montana), February 25–27, 1954, *Termination of Federal Supervision Over Certain Tribes of Indians* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 819. During these hearings subcommittee members asked those who testified against termination if supervision should be carried on ad infinitum, if they think that the Indian is "not a very bright person," and if they are against segregation.

¹⁰ Paul Jones, Chairman of the Navaho Tribal Council, after consultation with tribal

Opponents of termination offer the following reasons for their position: (1) many Indians are not prepared to enter the white world, and this world is not prepared to receive them; (2) the best corporations that Indians could form would not be an even match for such powerful corporations as the Montana Power Company; (3) taxes will increase because of the new burden which will come after individual Indians have sold their land and spent their money, or, in some cases, after they have been forced to seek new livelihoods because they no longer have tribal lands for cattle grazing; and (4) in ceding their lands to the United States the Indians made certain treaty bargains, and they are entitled to the benefits of those bargains.¹¹

EDUCATION AND INTEGRATION

Education is an important part of the integration, or lack of integration, of Indians into American life. As Thompson points out, separate federal schools for Indians were established primarily as a result of the treaties entered into by Indian tribes and the federal government. Compensation for land given up usually included provisions for tax-free land at some other location and educational opportunities to be provided by the government. The government gave subsidies to schools established by missionaries in the early 1800's, and these responsibilities were expanded as a result of provisions in treaties made up to

"associates," asserted in a letter to Oliver La Farge, President of the Association on American Indian Affairs, that the policy of the present Administration of the Bureau of Indian Affairs "in opening the door for competent Indians to find their way into the stream of American economic life just like other citizens is a decision of courage and wisdom." *New York Times* (October 30, 1955), p. 59.

¹¹ Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*), pp. 788, 927.

1880 and in some additional cases where treaties carried no provisions for education. Following church-state separation discussions about 1870, the federal government began to withdraw support to mission schools and to increase the number of federal schools. At that time, most Indians lived in unorganized territories, and the majority were not citizens of the United States. In 1924, when citizenship came to all Indians residing within the country, education became a state responsibility. Since education is financed partially by local funds, the nontaxable status of Indian lands often presents financial problems to local districts. Language and cultural differences also pose problems that some local districts seem unable to handle. The Act of June 4, 1936 (49 Stat. 1458) provides financial aid to local districts where large blocks of nontaxable land are included within a school district, and special assistance can be given also to local districts, with proven financial need, which enroll large numbers of non-English-speaking children from homes "unaccustomed to modern ways of living." Much of the increased enrollment of Indian children in public schools is the result of assistance provided states and local districts under the provisions of this Act. Additional legislation (Public Law 874 and Public Law 815, both amended by Acts on August 8, 1953, plus the Act of August 12, 1955—69 Stat. 713) provided that Indian children from tax-free Indian lands may be counted as "federal impact" along with non-Indian children residing on other federal properties. These laws have also increased the public school enrollment of Indian children, and all long-range plans of the Bureau are aimed at public rather than federal schools for Indians.¹²

¹² We are indebted to Hildegard Thompson, Chief, Branch of Education, Bureau of Indian Affairs (letter of Sept. 12, 1955 and ear-

⁶ E. Spicer, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 890.

⁷ Ruth H. Useem, "Statement on 'The American Indian in Transition,'" *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (June 1954), pp. 393–94.

The Bureau provides some assistance to qualified Indians to pursue courses in higher education through counseling, a limited number of scholarships, loans, and grants from federal funds, information services, co-operation on foundation scholarship programs, and so forth.¹³

It is impossible here to indicate the many views and implications for integration of current policies concerning Indian education. One study found that 38 per cent of the children in Indian schools in 1946 were of normal grade or ahead of their expected grade as compared with 8 per cent in 1928.¹⁴ Another study concluded that "the greater the degree of contact of the Indian child with the white man's culture, the higher he scores on educational tests."¹⁵ Many public schools which Indian children at-

lier article in this volume) for much of the factual material in this paragraph. Thompson states that great progress has been made by states and local districts in assuming educational responsibility for Indian children. Undoubtedly, this is true, but real problems exist in some states. One-fifth of Arizona's population is Indian, and more than 25 per cent of its area is included in reservations. Indian incomes are low, and they pay little in taxes. See J. E. Officer, *Indians in School* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1956). A summary of this report is given in *The Christian Science Monitor* (December 5, 1956), p. 14.

¹³ See Hildegard Thompson's article in this volume. Havighurst points out that only 200 Indians enter college annually. The Warm Springs Indians of Oregon have inaugurated an educational program which they hope will produce ten college graduates annually. A *New York Times* release (October 2, 1955) states: "Although the tribe was established on its 560,000 acre reservation 100 years ago and Indian Bureau schools have operated there since, there has never been a college graduate from the tribe."

¹⁴ Shailer Peterson, *How Well Are Indian Children Educated?* (Washington: U. S. Indian Service, 1948), Summary Chapter, p. 6.

¹⁵ K. E. Anderson, E. G. Collister, and C. E. Ladd, *The Educational Achievement of Indian Children* (Washington: U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1953), p. 77.

tend are all-Indian. Nevada's Supervisor of Indian Education Division finds that a most satisfactory situation exists where Indian students constitute a minority of the total school enrollment and that less satisfactory results are achieved where public schools are located on a reservation and the enrollment is entirely Indian.¹⁶ Attitudes have changed considerably since 1928 when a state superintendent of public instruction wrote:

The Indian will never develop into much more than a very mediocre American citizen. The Elko school tried the amalgamating process for several years. Finally the board decided that it would segregate the Indian children from the white children. . . . It is our belief that Indian children should be provided with only such fundamental teachings as will fit them to make a living of a decent sort, through the use of simple tools, the simple elements of farming, cattle raising, gardening, washing, ironing, cooking, sewing, etc.¹⁷

The gradual integration of Indians into American life through education is being supplemented by some new economic opportunities, by somewhat greater political participation, and by improved health services. As the articles by Kelly, by McDermott, Deuschle, and Adair, and by Peterson make clear, the problems and the steps toward integration in education are similar to those found in other major life activities.¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions concerning the assimilation and integration of American

¹⁶ Statement provided on September 19, 1955 by E. A. Haglund.

¹⁷ State of Nevada, *Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction* (1927-28), p. 37.

¹⁸ See Zimmerman's article in this volume; also see La Verne Madigan, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), and Edith Mirrieles, "The Cloud of Mistrust: The Plight of American Indians," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 199 (February, 1957), pp. 55-59.

Indians stand out: (1) Indian groups residing on reservations (homelands) will continue indefinitely as distinct social units; (2) although Indian communities resist assimilation, they are constantly making adjustments to life around them; (3) although Indian cultures, as self-contained systems, will probably disappear eventually, this fact does not seem to many Indians to be "a reason for abandoning their present way of life";¹⁹ (4) optional assimila-

tion on an individual basis, unlike forced assimilation, would leave the way open for assimilation to occur "at the speed and in the direction which the people themselves desire";²⁰ (5) even though many Indians continue to live in separate communities with some distinctive cultural patterns, integration into the life of the larger society can still take place.

Spring Indian Community," *The American Indian*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1955), p. 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁹ Katherine and David French, "The Warm

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SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

LEONARD D. WHITE (Ed.). *The State of the Social Sciences*. Papers presented at the 25th Anniversary of the Social Science Research Building. Pp. xiv, 504. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. \$6.00.

On the twenty-fifth anniversary (November 1955) of the opening of the Social Science Research Building at the University of Chicago a three-day celebration was held during which papers were presented by members of the faculty and invited guests. These presentations make up the present volume, substantial in paper bulk and in scientific weight. Although the title would suggest a collection of compilations or review chapters, the majority of the essays consist of new explorations of or contributions to knowledge in the field. Social scientists, at Chicago and elsewhere, are likely to be excited by the offerings.

The contributions published in this volume come from leaders in anthropology, economics, education, history, political science, psychology, and sociology—all of the disciplines recognized in the Division of the Social Sciences at Chicago, except geography. (Geographers participated in the programs but apparently did not present

prepared papers.) There are also three papers dealing with the relationships between the social sciences and the humanities.

In a short notice like the present one, even a listing of all authors is impossible for lack of space. Mention of a few papers of special interest to the present writer and perhaps to readers of *THE ANNALS* should not, of course, be taken as suggesting invidious comparison. As new leads in theory I found particularly significant James G. Miller's "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," and Clyde Kluckhohn's "Toward a Comparison of Value-Emphases in Different Cultures," although I am getting a little tired of "toward" in the titles of such articles. Leo Strauss' "Social Science and Humanism" perhaps should be read following David Riesman's "Some Observations on the 'Older' and the 'Newer' Social Sciences." On the more "practical" side Herbert Emerich discusses "New Bridges between Theory and Practice," and John Nuveen and Hans J. Morgenthau offer two papers on diplomacy. Other readers will be attracted by other subjects. Whatever their tastes may be in social science, I can assure them that the present volume offers a varied and satisfying menu.

JOHN GILLIN

University of North Carolina

E. P. HUTCHINSON. *Immigrants and Their Children, 1850-1950*. Pp. xiv, 391. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1956. \$6.50.

The purpose of this volume is "... in part a survey and a guide to census data on immigrants and their children in the population and labor force." This work was prepared under the aegis of the Social Science Research Council in cooperation with the Bureau of the Census. It is a sequel to the Census Monograph, *Immigrants and Their Children: 1920*, by Niles Carpenter, published in 1927. Hutchinson's study traces the developments of the immigrants and their children since 1920.

The two works complement each other. While Carpenter's monograph dealt with the period that saw the close of free immigration to this country, Hutchinson's study concentrates on the period of restrictive immigration since the 1920's. He has, however, provided the reader with careful decennial summaries of the period 1850 to 1920 so that his work spans a century of census data, 1850 to 1950. I should add that the present volume contains very useful supplementary material in a number of scholarly appendices; this information will be of special interest to economists, sociologists, and demographers.

Some of Hutchinson's findings for the period 1920-1950 are of general interest. Despite the quota immigration system, based on national origin composition of the United States population, the foreign-born population "... continued to shift to the newer countries of origin after 1920." Among the foreign born the proportion of northwestern Europeans decreased while the proportion of southern Europeans and natives of the Western Hemisphere increased.

Hutchinson observes that the reduction of immigration has also contributed heavily to the aging of the foreign-born population. In 1920 the median age of this group was 40 years; by 1950 the median age of the foreign born was 56 years. He finds that since 1880 "... the foreign born have been outnumbered by their native-born children. In 1920 the latter exceeded in the ratio of about 5 to 3; and in 1950 the ratio advanced to 7 to 3. . . ."

Of interest is Hutchinson's conclusion

that native-born children of the foreign born, particularly in the period 1920-1950, do not continue the occupational specializations of their foreign-born parents. Furthermore, he finds that each national stock is in fact dispersed, though not uniformly, throughout the labor force.

Hutchinson has carefully refrained from interpreting these data in the larger context of United States economic growth or using these data as a basis for criticizing the current immigration legislation. In many ways, the data speak eloquently on these points. His primary purpose has been to analyze the data provided by the census from the standpoint of decennial comparability, accuracy and consistency, and to bring together in a single coherent form the various collections of census data on the foreign born and their children in this country. In accomplishing this objective Hutchinson has made an important contribution, providing basic source data that have been sifted, tabulated, analyzed, and edited. The appearance of his study at this time is certainly propitious in view of the current interest in revising our immigration laws.

ERNEST RUBIN

American University

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN and ALBERT J. REISS, JR. *Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities, 1950*. Pp. xviii, 421. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1956. \$6.50.

This is one of the Census Monograph Series carried out by the Bureau of the Census and the Social Science Research Council. It is indeed a monograph and not for those who shy away from data-laden books. It analyzes, by use of census statistics, the relationship between community size, location with respect to metropolitan dominance, functional specialization, growth and regional location, and such population characteristics as sex, age, race, and nativity, family composition, marital status, occupation, income levels, and change of residence.

This leads the authors to employ an eleven-point continuum, as far as community size is concerned, rather than the more

simple metropolitan, urban, rural, and farm classification usually employed by the Census and by social scientists. This continuum has the urbanized area of 3,000,000 at the one extreme, the rural farm at the other. Their handling of the metropolitan community leads them to new and more specific definitions for "suburbs," "urban fringe," and "rural-urban fringe."

The technique employed, that of making nation-wide comparisons of population characteristics by size and type of place, function, and so forth, of necessity covers up more that is socially significant than it reveals. Even so, certain important findings are derived that can be obtained in no other way. At many points the authors have given alternate interpretations of findings, showing that they are well aware of the socially meaningful complications of the data being manipulated.

At many points, findings are those long known and presented by rural sociologists. At others, they are new and even surprising, as, for example, their finding that the growing community is not the one growing in economic opportunity as measured by men and women in the labor force. It is, rather, the community with greater opportunity in the "white-collar" occupations—for workers in commerce, government, entertainment, and so forth. Places on the decline are those with a large proportion of their population in manual jobs and manufacturing. These are facts. The social scientist can immediately think of a great number of possible explanations.

Considering the difficulty of the task, the authors have done an excellent job of developing unique approaches to this area of social data and have presented it in about as interesting a manner as could be, with frequent summaries, charts, and interpretative insights. This will provide not only an indispensable reference book but also will stimulate and guide further research.

PAUL H. LANDIS

State College of Washington

RICHARD D. LAMBERT and MARVIN BRESSLER. *Indian Students on an American Campus*. Pp. xi, 122. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$3.00.

If one is hopeful about the intellectual and operational insights likely to come, for many fields, from sound studies in cross-cultural educational experiences, the field seems to have lagged unnecessarily. So it is comforting to welcome another thorough, albeit limited, study coming from the impetus given by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council which so far takes pains to emphasize that such studies do not prove "foreign student exchange is of questionable value."

But one cannot assure that this and similar studies may not encounter the reaction—"I didn't need so much research to tell me that." Such an oversimplified attitude should not and certainly will not discourage workers in this most fruitful (and difficult) area of research.

This is a sociological study of the experiences of sixteen Indians, two Pakistani, and one Singhalese enrolled during one academic year at the University of Pennsylvania, with stress on the "student," "tourist," and "ambassador" roles. The authors mention the difficulty of integrating sociological and psychological approaches—"the methodological impasse arose over the use of non-directive versus directive interview techniques."

They take pains to develop the thesis "that the major determinants of the experiences of Indian students in the United States lie in India, not here, and that Indian sociocultural norms provide the primary context for their selection and interpretation of experiences in the United States" (p. 13). (Does this mean that zealous hospitality committees might relax a bit?)

The authors refer to "a remarkable uniformity and stability of images" of the United States (p. 55). "... It appears clear that an over-all orientation to a foreign culture is more than a simple summation of discrete images" (p. 69). Once the individual moves back to his home environment, "the ambassador role is forgotten and only the student and tourist roles retain their impact" (p. 90)—an observation drawn from the highly useful counterpart volume, John and Ruth Useem's *The Western-Educated Man in India*.

The volume contends that action programs cannot be based primarily on the reactions of Indian students while they are still in the United States. They (and the Useems) found no evidence that ease or difficulty of physical adjustment, comfort or discomfort, was substantially related to subsequent adjustment here or after return.

"We cannot emphasize too strongly that those aspects of the American experience that do not survive the long voyage home are illusory gains—or losses—in the cross-cultural educational process" (p. 92).

Many useful comments are developed in the book on our educational system, home life and the like. And I agree with the authors that "cross-cultural education is an interactive process, enriching the visited as well as the visitor, and future research might well seek out ways of maximizing the benefits to be derived from such cosmopolitan contacts" (p. 104). "Common sense" and sentimentality are not likely to be enough.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL

University of Buffalo

C. WRIGHT MILLS. *The Power Elite*. Pp. 423. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

Who runs the country? The power elite. Who are the power elite? They are the corporate rich and the war lords functioning in and through the political directorate.

The corporate rich are not just the metropolitan "400" nor the highly paid corporate executives, but both together and any other whose riches originate in the corporation system. The war lords are the generals and admirals, their role in American society profoundly intensified since World War II. The United States will for an indefinite period make the most of its crucial decisions—in diplomacy, nuclear research and development, taxation, economic policy, and the rest—on the basis of considerations of defense, considerations said to be technically too complex for common understanding and said usually to be necessarily secret. The profits and productivity of the economy rest on military decisions, and the effectiveness of military decisions rests on the ability of the production machine to

fill the orders. Under these conditions of "military capitalism," the absence of a genuine civil service to provide the 1500 or so key officials of the Federal government means that increasingly these positions are filled by the corporate rich and the war lords, or their representatives. Thus meet the three structural hierarchies of the state, the corporation, and the military.

This is the top, the power elite, powerful and consolidated by mutual interests and by the fine grid of conformity through which its ranks are replenished and perpetuated.

Below the top is the middle level of power where most of the activities of politicians take place, where debate flourishes (but only on minor questions), and where the visibility is high—as high as, at the top, it is low. Mr. Mills argues with a shade of anger throughout the whole book, but a special rasp of impatience pervades his dismissal of the "theory of balance." He has no use for the "romantic pluralism" about the social and political system of many contemporary writers who see a complex pulling and hauling among diversified interests as the means by which society's frictions are abated and its conflicts resolved. The middle levels simply do not deal with the crucial questions and, in fact, are often unaware of them, given the technical obfuscation and secrecy that surround the decisions that count.

And at the bottom has developed a mass society, distracted by the mass media, atomized, inattentive, ignorant, lacking any real set of coherent publics that might hold the reins of power by holding those in the strata above them responsible.

A result of it all is what Mr. Mills calls organized irresponsibility, resting on a "higher immorality" that results because the older codes of uprightness no longer grip men and women, "nor have they been replaced by new values and codes which would lend moral meaning and sanction to the corporate routines they must now follow."

The book is important (though I suspect somewhat longer than necessary). It tries to encompass in one frame a description and an explanation of the exercise of

national power in the United States. In such a book I, for one, am willing to be understanding of the blunt generalizations that will appear to many as indiscriminating, and sometimes inaccurate. Some critics will feel, moreover, that Mr. Mills has underestimated the limiting effects that middle-level activity and lower-level publics have on his top elite, and that he has overestimated the solidarity of that elite. These difficulties, which for some will be profound disagreements, would be eased if more were known, or could be said, about what the power elite does and precisely how it does it. Mr. Mills would be the first to seek and use more data. In the meantime he holds that the "idea of the power elite implies nothing about the process of decision-making as such: it is an attempt to delimit the social areas within which that process, whatever its character, goes on."

ALEXANDER HEARD

University of North Carolina

BERNARD BARBER. *Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure and Process*. Pp. xix, 540. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957. No price.

Periods of rising prosperity and rapid social change make for an increasing interest in the nuances of stratification. Our day is such a period. Books on etiquette are having a new vogue, the editors of *Fortune* have amused the literate public with the not too subtle snobberies in the offices of the American business enterprise, and Mr. Russell Lynes, of *Harper's*, has carefully delineated the various "brow levels" in our society, carefully stressing the superiority of the "Upper Bohemians." Of late, discussions of the "Wives of Management" and who gets the mohogony desk or the carpet on the floor, and which "brow" prefers the martini and which the little red wine, to say nothing of reproductions of advertisements for "Brooks Brothers" suits, have even seeped into the scientific textbooks in sociology.

Thus it is highly appropriate that American sociologists have shown an increasing interest in the problem of social stratifica-

tion since World War II. In recent years, according to Professor Barber, they have been producing some hundred articles and books annually on various aspects of stratification. And, like our standard of living, the production is rising.

Professor Barber's excellent and exhaustive study of *Social Stratification* fills an important need. Far more than a summary of the vast literature, it attempts to relate a wide variety of empirical findings to a comprehensive body of systematic social theory. This excellent book has the merit of being analytical and abstract while at the same time succeeding in covering most of the important substantive material in the literature of sociology and the other social sciences.

Its merits, however, lead to certain inherent defects. In analyzing "The Structure of Social Stratification Systems" (Chapter 4), for example, Professor Barber sums up Medieval Europe in one paragraph of thirty-one lines and Soviet Russia in another paragraph of only sixteen lines. At least for teaching purposes, one mistrusts abstract and systematic generalizations when they are illustrated with such brief concrete examples. In spite of this criticism, the most valuable thing about this book is the catholicity of Professor Barber's reading and his many examples from different societies in time and space, brief and superficial though they must necessarily be at times. This is especially true because so much of American sociological theory has been based on purely American empirical data.

The chapters on social mobility are the most detailed and comprehensive in the book. Professor Barber handles the subject in an objective manner, betraying only an imperceptibly slight bias towards the desirability of a more open class system in this country. In this connection, the book ends on an optimistic note: "As social science develops," writes Professor Barber, "social change can be planned and foreseen." But who, one may ask, will "plan and foresee" this change, and in whose interests?

E. DIGBY BALTZELL

University of Pennsylvania

SHELDON GLUECK and ELEANOR GLUECK. *Physique and Delinquency*. Pp. xviii, 339. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$6.00.

Continuing their long-term studies of five hundred delinquent and five hundred non-delinquent youths, Professor and Mrs. Glueck have prepared a study focussing upon the constitutional aspects. The overall design of their studies has been presented in more detail in *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1950). In brief, a sample of 500 delinquents was matched with a sample of 500 nondelinquents by the four variables of age, general intelligence, ethnic derivation, and residence in underprivileged urban areas. These two samples were then somatotyped, using a variant of the Sheldonian system, and categorized into four comprehensive classes of component dominance: endomorphic, mesomorphic, ectomorphic, and balanced (no dominance). One hundred nine personality traits and sociocultural factors were then statistically analyzed with reference to these four physique types. A technique for multiple comparisons was employed, and the results presented in tabular form with numbers and percentages for delinquents compared with nondelinquents for the four types, and also the significance of differences between physique types. The fundamental and explicit assumption is "... that when significant variation is present in trait incidence among body types of nondelinquents, there is reasonable ground to infer that the trait is essentially related to body type, that is, oriented in constitution, although removed from the genes by one or more steps." Thirty-eight out of 67 traits and 24 out of 42 sociocultural factors were found to be associated with delinquency but were not found to have a significant varied effect on the delinquency of the physique types, and were treated as the common ground of criminogenesis. Each of the physique types was then treated with reference to traits that distinguish the body type from the others: their *delinquency potential*, traits that exert a special influence on the delinquency of that type, and the sociocultural factors that exert a special influ-

ence on the delinquency of that type. Mesomorphs, for example, whom they consider the "core" of the delinquent group, are distinguished by being less sensitive, less aesthetic, less sensuous, and so forth. Among those traits that contribute selectively to their delinquency are low verbal intelligence, feeling of not being taken care of, destructiveness and destructive-sadistic trends, emotional instability, and emotional conflicts. Sociocultural traits that exert a special influence on delinquency of the mesomorph are: careless household routine, lack of family group recreations, and meagerness of recreational facilities. The authors attribute the excess of mesomorphs among the delinquents, a statistically significant excess, to the fact (as defined in this inquiry) that this physique type is more highly characterized by traits particularly suitable to the commission of acts of aggression and a relative freedom from inhibitions such as feelings of inadequacy, marked submissiveness to authority, emotional instability, and so forth. In treating the question of which boys among mesomorphs actually become delinquent, they call attention to their remarkable finding that most of the traits that have a special impact on their delinquency are *not usually typical of that physique*.

Sifting through the awesome number of tables, theories of causation, and interpretations, some seemingly mild deficiencies may be noted. In the prefatory remarks the authors note the struggle they had in finding an adequate statistical method, and they list authorities with whom they consulted. The value of their statistical approach—the major body of the book—and the advice of their consultants are partially negated or dismissed with the revealing remark that "the test of the soundness of a project such as ours rests, in the final analysis, on the clinical 'good sense' and the internal consistency of the integrated result." This convenient court of appeals permits the authors to relegate a significant variation among nondelinquents into the limbo of "fortuitous." Though endomorphs among delinquents exhibit the highest percentage of emotional conflicts—84.9 per cent—they do not get into the accompanying discussion. Even

though numbering only 45, which affects the estimate of significance, this does not fit the general picture of the endomorphic temperament. The inadequacy of the Rorschach material is likely due to the fact that many of its categories are nebulous and highly redundant. The same criticism may be applied to the categorization of somatotypes. It should be carefully noted that comparisons of physiques with traits and factors were not based upon the analysis of each individual but upon groups of physiques. This imposes restrictions upon etiological interpretations, and it certainly imposes restrictions upon the application of the resulting data in individual cases. One of the late Professor E. A. Hooton's (to whom this book is dedicated) favorite examples of the obtuseness of this kind of information was that of the robbers and nonrobbers. Though the two groups could be easily distinguished, individual robbers and nonrobbers could not be discriminated.

The authors have judiciously included a cogent discussion of what they mean by causation and association, and in general are mindful of the "cart-before-horse" fallacy. Nevertheless, the reader will want to reread that discussion upon encountering statements such as one to the effect that low verbal intelligence is more potent in inducing mesomorphs to delinquency than ectomorphs. From the genetical point of view there is little in these data that suggests a genetic basis, even one or more steps removed from the gene.

Good correlations between occupations and constitution have been adequately demonstrated in various studies on such groups as chain store managers, clergymen, nurses, supply officers, and so forth. In these cases there have been a number of functional requirements which make the results as interpretable as the somatotypic differences between football players and tennis players. The study of relationships between the kinds of traits employed in this study and physique types is obviously much more difficult. It is intrinsically likely that more refined techniques, more genuinely etiological observations based on the successive measurement of objective traits on the same individuals over a long period of

time, the use of more rigorous methods such as those employed in population genetics are needed to deal adequately with the "cart-before-horse" fallacy and the other kinds of problems treated in this interesting and comprehensive inquiry. In the meantime it is appropriate that we also use good "horse sense."

W. S. LAUGHLIN

University of Wisconsin

MAURICE H. KROUT (Ed.). *Psychology, Psychiatry and the Public Interest*. Pp. xv, 217. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$4.00.

This reviewer is painfully aware of the pressing public need for adequately trained psychotherapists and so finds it unpleasant to report that this volume does not help us very much toward a solution of the problem.

Some of the authors do an excellent job of describing and defining the research and institutional relationships of psychiatry and psychology. In coming to grips with the highly controversial issue of medical *versus* nonmedical psychotherapists they lose, for the most part, both objectivity and clarity.

For example, in discussing training standards, the powerful professional pressure toward specialty certification in the medical group is ignored, and the lines are drawn between an M.D. degree and a Ph.D. in psychology. If not actually misleading, such a comparison is a confusing and pointless one.

Even greater confusion is expressed about opportunities for training. Some authors claim that psychologists can and do get adequate training for psychotherapy, while others protest that the medical profession *prevents* psychologists from getting adequate training because such training is only available in medical settings. All of this runs along with the theme that medically trained men are not well-trained for psychotherapy.

In the past, only the medical practitioner had both the legal privilege and obligation of treating patients. At least one author states that psychologists are able to carry on therapy on their own responsibility, yet suggests that a psychiatrist be kept on hand

as a "legal protector" to be used when a patient may run amok!

Strange distinctions are made in several papers on the kinds of cases currently treated by psychiatrists and psychologists. There is the surprising statement that psychiatrists "until recently applied themselves exclusively to the diagnosis and treatment of neurosis . . . and of functional and organic psychoses," while psychologists ". . . developed special skills in clinical guidance . . . which often, but not always, led marginally into diagnosis and therapy of the neuroses and psychoses." In other instances psychiatrists are said to treat psychoses while psychologists treat neuroses. *Mental illness* is looked on by one author as a semantic device used by physicians to include in their empire what rightfully belongs to psychology.

The prevalent tone of personal protest leads us away from the basic issue of public interest. As Rollo May notes (in one of the more sensible papers) the essence of the problem is to *insure* that those who are licensed and labelled as psychotherapists are adequately trained. Skilful and responsible psychotherapy can be and has been performed by nonmedical people. The treacherous problem is how to train and license therapists with optimal benefit and minimal risk to the public. This is a serious public problem and deserves to be treated seriously and disinterestedly. Perhaps such a treatment will be achieved soon.

ANDREW S. WATSON

University of Pennsylvania

MARGARET E. RICH. *A Belief in People: A History of Family Social Work*. Pp. x, 190. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1956. \$3.50.

This book by Miss Rich, who was an experienced and enthusiastic practitioner in family casework, describes the family work movement from the times of its earliest beginnings in the pioneer "charity organizations" up to the present day and the Family Service Association of America.

The early years of struggle experienced by the efforts of progressive individuals to build an organization that would fill the

need of family social work is most vividly described by Miss Rich. This is history in the best sense of the word, and it is exciting to see cohesion of purpose and method gradually emerge from the widely divergent beginnings. There were some early founders with a point of view far ahead of their times. In 1817 there is mention made of the founding of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism. A few years thereafter this organization changed its goal and aims and "devoted its energies to the prevention of juvenile delinquency"! It is reported that the societies early believed "the giver had a responsibility for the effect of his gift." It was this belief, among others, that spurred the early leaders such as Reverend Oscar McCulloch, Mrs. Joseph Shaw Lowell, Robert Treat Paine, and others to continue their untiring efforts for organization on a national level.

A great deal of painstaking research went into the writing of this book. It is a pity that Miss Rich did not live to see it published. She died a few weeks after the manuscript was completed, but she had managed to infuse into the book her own sense of what she calls "the high adventure of social casework." The latter chapters of the book are devoted more specifically to the organization and growth of the Family Service Association. Perhaps these chapters do not have as wide an appeal as the early ones.

Small mention is made of the contribution of psychiatry to this field. This omission is a little difficult to understand in view of the impact of psychiatry on the method and even the aims of social work.

Anyone who is interested in strengthening family life or the phenomena of charity organization in this country will find this book rewarding reading. Staff and board members of social agencies should find it especially interesting.

Through these pages much evidence is given that the early pioneers and organizers in family social work were amply endowed with a strong and dedicated "belief in people."

EVALYN M. STRICKLER

Family and Children's Service
Lebanon, Pa.

KENNETH SODDY (Ed.). *Mental Health and Infant Development*. Vol. I: *Papers and Discussions*; Vol. II: *Case Histories*. Proceedings of the International Seminar of the World Federation of Mental Health at Chichester, England. Pp. xix, 308; v, 289. New York: Basic Books, 1956. \$4.50 each.

Here is documentation of one of the century's most profound efforts of a group from several professions to understand infant development from a mental hygiene point of view. The second volume, which profitably may be read first, contains 13 case histories of so-called normal children in France, Great Britain, and the United States. The first volume consists of papers given by a faculty of 24 leaders from the same three countries.

The occasion was the International Seminar held by the World Federation for Mental Health, at Chichester, England, for three weeks beginning July 19, 1952. The faculty included anthropologists, psychiatrists, educators, pediatricians, psychologists, psychiatric social workers, a non-medical psychoanalyst, public health doctors, and public health nurses. Attendance included 51 persons from 30 countries. The case studies in Volume II were derived from various sources and include contributions from most of the professions represented in the faculty.

As in any such array of data and opinions a reader is aware of the limits of existing knowledge about child development, even though the contributions here presented are impressive. Dr. D. R. MacCalman, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Leeds, observes: "Mental hygiene, as we are experiencing now, is still in its own infancy and, for all the claims to the contrary, even a few years ago psychiatrists and psychologists had little to offer of positive or practical value to the normal mother with her normal child." It was with such humility, becoming to any professional worker, that these learned men and women from Algeria, Thailand, Uruguay, Sweden, and Switzerland, together with assorted doctors from the larger countries, searched for common factors in development faced by parents and their young children and by all those committed

to serving them. Be the cultures primitive or sophisticated, there seems to be much more that is common than uncommon. The nursing of babies in Europe and New Guinea has many similarities, and Europeans and Americans can learn something from the South Seas where there is almost no sucking of thumbs. The feeding habits of babies were given much attention both in case studies and lectures.

Dr. John Bowlby, of Tavistock Clinic, London, speaks of education and security as the "vitamins of mental health." His chapter on mother-child separation points to the threefold sequelae of separation: "increased anxiety and dependency, increased hatred for the mother, and a tendency to turn away altogether from love objects. This extreme result of separation . . . was found among those affectionless characters who cannot give their hearts to anyone because they have suffered too much pain in their early years." Wartime separation of many families appears as a frequent complication, especially in Europe.

Toilet training received almost as much attention as feeding habits. Dr. Edith Jackson, Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine, quotes from the widely read *Infant Care*, published by the United States Children's Bureau, in cautioning against too early toilet training: "A child can get to feeling that his mother is his enemy if she urges on him things he is not ready for."

Margaret Mead spoke of adaptations in family life as being slower than adaptations in technology. She says: "One of the reasons why we have to have so many books on child care and mother craft today, and Mental Health Congresses, is because people have grown up in one kind of family and have to live in another." Dr. Mead fairly characterizes the Seminar and its findings: "The publication of these case histories, and the discussion which they evoke, should themselves change the way in which interdisciplinary work in child development and child guidance is done tomorrow, and the day after."

HOWARD W. HOPKIRK
Louisville and Jefferson County
Children's Home

HISTORY

RICHARD PARES and A. J. P. TAYLOR (Eds.). *Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier*. Pp. viii, 542. London: Macmillan & Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. \$10.00.

Of professional historians in England today none has exerted a more potent influence on historical studies than Sir Lewis Namier. For the son of a Galician landowner, who never held a permanent university post until he was over forty, and who at one time had to go into business in order to save enough money to support himself for a few years in historical research, this is a remarkable achievement. Remarkable also in the diversity of the fields in which his influence has made itself felt. They can best be indicated by mentioning three of Namier's books, each of which has served as a starting point or as a model for further study: *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (1929); *1848: the Revolution of the Intellectuals* (1944); *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-39* (1948).

His various interests are reflected in the volume under review which contains contributions from sixteen admirers and friends. Several deal with aspects of English parliamentary history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; a few with social and political trends in nineteenth-century East-Central Europe; the last three with personalities and problems of the great international upheavals of the twentieth century.

Among the contributors there are many whose names count in present-day English historical scholarship: let me only mention (with apologies to others equally deserving) H. R. Trevor-Roper, Richard Pares, E. H. Carr, Hugh Seton-Watson, A. J. P. Taylor, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett. It is impossible, in the space at my disposal, to do justice to the contents of the volume. The general level both of historical interest and readability is remarkably high.

Some of the essays are very specialized, others deal with wider themes. Of these latter I mention, somewhat arbitrarily, "Russia and Europe as a Theme of Rus-

sian History" by E. H. Carr, "The Intellectuals and Revolution: Social Forces in Eastern Europe since 1848" by Hugh Seton-Watson, and "The War Aims of the Allies in the First World War" by A. J. P. Taylor. The last-named essay, deliberately kept strictly matter-of-fact, is nevertheless as pungently and brilliantly written as one would expect of this author.

But a perfect jewel is the essay with which the volume opens, "Oliver Cromwell and his Parliaments" by H. R. Trevor-Roper. Here we are presented with an entirely new interpretation of Cromwell's personality as an explanation of his persistent insuccess in dealing with the central problem of his Protectorship—finding a parliament with which he could work. The picture of the born "back-bencher" Cromwell, who clung to the simple, fundamentally conservative ideal of a return to the lost paradise of the reign of Elizabeth, and who never understood that parliaments, however they might be constituted, had to be "managed" (as she had done); who, man of moods and impulses, kept changing his "system" at every new discomfiture without ever grasping that fundamental truth; that picture is drawn with a masterly sureness of touch.

PIETER GEYL

University of Utrecht

ROYALL TYLER. *The Emperor Charles the Fifth*. Pp. 375. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1956. \$7.50.

The late Royall Tyler divided his life between historical scholarship and service to international organizations, and the reflections of a practical, modern internationalist on the sixteenth-century internationalist emperor Charles V, his diverse problems, and his achievements, should be of considerable interest both to historians and to students of international relations. This posthumous work, however, is not such a general biography as the title seems to imply. Although the book opens with the birth of the young prince at Ghent in 1500 and a discussion of his complex ancestry, and closes with a chapter on the retirement and death of the weary ruler in Spain in 1558,

it is composed largely of a series of topical studies in which the major problems of Charles's reign (not necessarily in chronological order) are passed in review. Although he devotes one chapter to the financial difficulties in Spain, Tyler is chiefly interested in the detailed description of dynastic, political, and diplomatic negotiation, and most of the chapters deal with imperial policy and its implementation in the various sectors of Europe. A question of balance arises from assignment of three chapters to Hapsburg dealings with England, while France and Italy are disposed of together in one; otherwise the picture is complete, and Tyler's effort to reduce to proper perspective the position of Germany in Charles's calculations is a helpful corrective to the more coherent treatment of Brandi.

Where Tyler permits himself to express general views, he is often suggestive. His intense admiration for the character and purposes of his hero is refreshing, and Charles emerges as a gifted statesman and strategist, at once realistic and idealistic, moderate and considerate, and sincerely devoted to the unity and stability of Europe. Tyler also attributes to Charles a larger measure of success than has been usual, and a more permanent achievement: the separation of the Netherlands from Germany, the "degermanizing" of Austria, and the long establishment of Hapsburg power in Italy. But unfortunately the generalizations are few and far between, and the book as a whole is a mass of narrative detail. Tyler's detail is often vivid and his style lively, although he has not always resisted the temptation to polish off a complex situation with a facile phrase. For illuminating, large-scale analysis, however, one must still prefer Brandi.

It is regrettable that the usefulness of the book will be much reduced by the general absence of documentation, and it may be noted that such slight documentation as appears does not support the claim of the publisher that the book is based largely on archival research. But the maps, the extensive annotated bibliography, the detailed chronology of Charles's life, and the handsome portrait gallery contained in thirty-

eight plates will considerably enhance the value of the work.

WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA
University of California
Berkeley

RAYMOND G. COWHERD. *The Politics of English Dissent: The Religious Aspects of Liberal and Humanitarian Reform Movements from 1815 to 1848*. Pp. 242. New York: New York University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Professor Cowherd, a bold man, has ventured into the labyrinth of English sectarian politics as they developed during the century before 1850. Anyone who is to follow him has a right to expect a clear warning about the dangers of being confused by the complex relationships in which the various religious groups stood to each other, and to have some understanding about the flexibility of such terms as Dissenter and Evangelical. Generally, the diligent reader will have some idea where he is at any particular moment, but the author has not always been as helpful or as consistent as he might have been.

The Protestants outside the established church were interested in many reform movements: humanitarian, religious, political, educational, and economic. In all these struggles Dissent was only one of the forces engaged on the reform side. It is a little like following the history of a single regiment through a war. It is necessary to sketch in the general strategy and the liaison with other groups as well as to tell the actual story of what the Dissenters did. This is asking a good deal, and to pack it all into 167 pages so as to give a considerable amount of intrinsically interesting information without getting too badly lost is something of an achievement. Certainly it is made clear that the bodies outside the church were very active and well-organized for making their wants known. Their most important role in politics seems to have been to help in giving religious overtones to demands for reform. On the heads of those who resisted the call to progress the pulpit called down the wrath of God.

Perhaps the chapter on education is the most successful. It shows the groups out-

side the church overwhelming Peel's government with petitions against the bill of 1843 which would have established church-controlled factory schools. In the educational schism, then already decades old, this was one of the decisive moments.

In spite of a correct statement of the case at the end, it is easy to get the impression that the Dissenters were always the main forward-looking elements. A careful reading reveals, however, that this was not the case. The Dissenters in politics had to make their alliances with the Benthamite Radicals or with the Whigs or with Tory Evangelicals of the established church. And sometimes Dissenters opposed rather than promoted reform, as when certain of their leaders took a stand against factory legislation. Liberty, it seems, cuts two ways. After all, it was Jabez Bunting, the leading Wesleyan, who declared that "Methodism is as much opposed to democracy as it is to sin."

CHESTER KIRBY

Brown University

BROOKE HINDLE. *The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789*. Pp. xi, 410. Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1956. \$7.50.

Professor Brooke Hindle of New York University has written a fascinating book in which he explores the degree to which science was a part of culture in colonial and revolutionary America. Writing clearly in a language which the nonscientist can understand, Professor Hindle draws brief but vivid sketches of the leading American figures in the eighteenth-century scientific scene. Some were teachers, others medical men interested in natural history, while others were business men. The most notable aspect of science in the years before the Revolution appears to have been the consistent devotion of these amateurs, who organized themselves into scientific societies, sent communications to be published in the scientific journals of Europe, and who wrote treatises describing their own observations and discoveries.

As early as 1743, as Professor Hindle points out, Benjamin Franklin set the tone

for the growth of culture, announcing: "The first drudgeries of settling new colonies which confines the attention of people to mere necessities is now pretty well over." In every province, he said, there are many people "in circumstances that set them at ease, and afford leisure to cultivate the finer arts and improve the common stock of knowledge." Franklin envisaged a company of learned men, drawn from all the colonies, who might work together to increase man's power "over matter, and multiply the conveniences or pleasures of life."

One of the attractive features of Professor Hindle's book is that it includes not only pure science but also the applied sciences. It is, therefore, at once a contribution to intellectual history and the history of technology or economic history.

Professor Hindle explores fully the way in which the movement for American independence tended to curtail the scientific pursuits, not only of men like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, but of others as well. As he ably demonstrates, such men wished to show the world the "favourable influence that freedom has upon the growth of useful sciences and arts," and they "bequeathed to the future the faith that science would flourish in America and that it would be instrumental in advancing the wealth and happiness of the nation." At the present time, when aspects of science constantly emerge among the foremost problems of the nation, we are fortunate to have a book like this, which so clearly sets forth the background for our understanding of the place of science in the growth of the American republic.

I. BERNARD COHEN

Widener Library
Harvard University

IAN CHARLES CARGILL GRAHAM. *Colonists from Scotland: Emigration to North America, 1707-1783*. Pp. x, 213. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1956. \$4.50.

The story of Scottish migration to this continent has been overshadowed by that of the Irish, Scots-Irish, English, Ger-

mans, and Scandinavians. Yet Scotsmen have for three centuries been buying one-way rather than round-trip tickets to many parts of the world, our own included. As his name suggests, Dr. Graham is one of them, with a bachelor's degree from London University and an Illinois Ph.D.

His book begins with 1707, when the full entry of Scotland into the United Kingdom flung the British "dominions and plantations" wide open to traders and migrants from north of the Tweed. It closes in 1783, or rather in 1775, when the American Revolution almost completely stopped trade and migration alike. During the first fifty years the trade mounts rapidly, but the migration is small, save when some special crop of rebels is banished instead of being executed. After 1763, however, and especially during the five years before the outbreak of the Revolution, the human flow gathers volume and speed in a veritable "epidemic fury of emigration" which sweeps England and Ireland as well. Yet Dr. Graham's estimate is that less than 25,000 Scots reached these shores during the twelve prerevolutionary years, and that this figure is probably higher than the total entries between 1707 and 1763.

Five chapters are devoted to the causes and character of the emigration, while three others describe the Scots in their new home. At every stage distinctions are drawn between Lowlanders and Highlanders, and still more between them and the Scots-Irish, whom Dr. Graham regards as a race apart, neither Scots nor Irish. The "forces behind emigration" are dealt with cautiously. Eviction of small farmers by enclosing landlords is deemed not to be of major importance; rather vague influences, such as "perennial grinding poverty" and "the age-old problem of the pressure of population upon a meager stock of the means of substance" are emphasized as constants, while the organized migrations which had characterized earlier decades and now dominated the prerevolutionary years were spurred on by rising rents, hard times, business panic, industrial depression, the seductive invitations of colonial authorities, and the ambition of younger sons of landed families to transplant the clan organization, ways of life, speech, and dress to the

New World. This transplanting scored some brief success, especially in North Carolina and New York, but since many of these Scots communities were Loyalist when the time came to take sides the words Tory and Scot tended to be used as synonyms.

HERBERT HEATON

University of Minnesota

PERRY MILLER. *Errand Into the Wilderness*. Pp. x, 244. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1956. \$4.75.

Effectively disguised by its disarming title and the woodcut of an Indian scene on the jacket, this volume contains a series of ten scholarly articles or essays—"pieces," the author modestly calls them—on various aspects of early American intellectual history. Though most of the pieces relate to New England and to the Colonial Period, one deals with Virginia, and there is some spilling over into the Federal Period; obviously there must be some concern with antecedent and contemporary intellectual development in England. The author is an authority in the field of the volume under consideration. All the pieces except the first, the title of which gives title to the volume, have been published already, usually in a quarterly whose character attests the regard in which the work of the author is held.

Space will allow comment on only a few of the essays. "Errand Into the Wilderness" was the task assumed by John Winthrop and his contemporaries as they "migrated to New England of building a revolutionary city where they could exhibit to Englishmen an England that would be as all England ought to be." In a larger sense, it is suggested in a later essay, the "Errand" was what happened and is happening as a result of the coming of the early settlers and the opening of the continent. "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity" traces the subtle modifications made by the Puritans in Calvinist theology; they softened somewhat the doctrine of election and made it advisable for one who thought himself of the elect to give evidence of it by good works. "Religion and Society in the Early Literature of Virginia," while acknowledg-

ing the importance of economic motivation, emphasizes religious motivation in the early settlement of that colony. "The Puritan State and Puritan Society" traces the evolution of the political concept of the social contract within the bounds of Puritan theology. "The End of the World" shows the efforts of Puritans to adjust the concept of the sudden coming of the end of the world and the Day of Judgment to the laws of Newtonian physics, and, dipping into the twentieth century, suggests that the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima met all requirements of early descriptions of that awful day.

Professor Miller writes for the reader who has an easy familiarity not only with the details of Colonial history and the intricacies of Puritan theology but also with the ideas of John Locke, Bishop George Berkeley, Jonathan Edwards, and others on such abstruse subjects as "The Rhetoric of Sensation," to mention the title of another of the essays. Not a little of the book deals with theology and, as the author himself says, "in the twentieth century . . . theology has become a wearisome desert." However, the pieces are interspersed with humorous comment and will be read eagerly by those interested in the development and influence of theological ideas.

CECIL JOHNSON

University of North Carolina

MANLY WADE WELLMAN. *Rebel Boast: First at Bethel—Last at Appomattox*. Pp. 317. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956. \$3.95.

Rebel Boast is Mr. Wellman's second major venture into the field of historical biography, although he is an established writer of fiction, a journalist, mystery story writer, and novelist. His biography of Wade Hampton appeared in 1949, and since that time he has written numerous books for boys, some with Civil War themes, as well as several mystery novels.

With the grace and clarity of a successful writer of fiction, Mr. Wellman tells the story of five young kinsmen who marched away from their homes in Enfield, North Carolina, to fight with the Confederate army at Big Bethel. The book chronicles the marching, fighting, loving, and suffer-

ing of these men and other "common" soldiers of the Confederacy—"ragged and hungry and wolf-lean and wolf-deadly," who "left to their children a tale . . . of how a war was bravely fought and bitterly lost" (p. 7).

With the First North Carolina Volunteer Regiment at Big Bethel, and later in Company D, 43rd North Carolina, the five kinsmen encountered hardships and privations quite different from the military adventure they had so eagerly awaited. They survived the terrible slaughter at Gettysburg, barred Grant's way in the Wilderness Campaign, marched with Jubal Early to the very outskirts of Washington, endured the siege at Petersburg, and two of them lived to lay down their arms at Appomattox. Hence their boast—"First at Bethel . . . Last at Appomattox."

The work is based largely upon documentary collections including letters, journals, and other family records. Although the author lists in his bibliography such invaluable references as *War of the Rebellion: Official Records*; R. V. Johnson and C. C. Buel, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*; and Douglas Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, it would seem that he paid scant attention to them. Other important published sources which could have materially assisted the author in reconstructing his narrative were entirely overlooked. Especially is this evident in the author's superficial understanding of military strategy and the intricate movements of the battlefield.

Both Mr. Wellman and his publisher have carefully pointed out that none of the book is fiction, yet it is evident that working within the broad outline provided by the facts the author has used his imagination well to develop sense and incident in great detail. The book has a high dramatic appeal, but this reviewer cannot help feeling that the picture has been over-painted. The professional historian might also question a statement which boldly declares that "here is as much of the truth about those five as is possible to discover . . ." (p. 9).

Mr. Wellman's book, nonetheless, is entertaining and useful to the casual reader in acquainting himself with various phases

of Confederate army history. The professional historian should not be blind to its worth because, as Professor Bell I. Wiley of Emory University has pointed out, many aspects of Johnny Reb's soldier life have been greatly neglected. Mr. Wellman certainly knows how to write, and while the book's contribution to scholarship is not phenomenal, it is fascinating and makes interesting reading.

F. JAY TAYLOR

Louisiana College

DUDLEY TAYLOR CORNISH. *The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865*. Pp. xiii, 337. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1956. \$6.00.

This is the first survey of the Negro soldiers' role in the Union army since George W. Williams and Joseph T. Wilson published their accounts in 1888. It is, therefore, the first to be produced since the bulk of the pertinent evidence became available. Out of that mass of material the author has fashioned a volume of superior craftsmanship—a timely work, in this decade of civil rights controversy, but also a volume of permanent value.

Professor Cornish traces in orderly fashion, but in lively prose, the whole story from the first discouraging struggles for Negro enlistment, through the first unauthorized Negro units, to the final official recognition of the 1st South Carolina Volunteers in August 1862, the large-scale organization of Negro regiments in 1863, and their broadening employment thereafter. The volume is concerned primarily with problems of general organization and policy, but there are numerous vivid descriptions of Negro units in combat. Two interesting contributions are the treatment of the previously neglected activities of Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas in raising Negro regiments, and the suggestion that a merit system for selecting officers had its real inception in the establishment of examining boards under the Bureau for Colored Troops which passed on applications for commissions in Negro regiments.

The picture that emerges is a balanced combination of idealism and realism.

Against the many who entered service to fight for their freedom there is balanced the unknown number who were impressed by methods rivaling the African slave trade. Alongside the Brahmin idealism of Thomas Wentworth Higginson and Robert Gould Shaw, there is the ruthlessness of the frontier abolitionists, James H. Lane and James Montgomery, operating in the John Brown tradition, and the opportunism of officers who gained quick promotion by commanding Negro regiments. Balancing the impetuosity of David Hunter and John W. Phelps are Lincoln's calm sense of timing and the effectiveness of Lorenzo Thomas and Rufus Saxton. Alongside the idealistic acceptance of Negroes as soldiers by right there can be found the readiness of soldiers like "Private Miles O'Reilly" to divide with Negroes the "right to be kilt."

In short, the author's apparent impatience with prejudice and irrational stereotypes does not unbalance his judgment. It is his sympathetic perception of real people caught in the paradoxical situations of human conflict that, more than anything else, raises this work above the commonplace level of historical monographs.

GEORGE B. TINDALL

Louisiana State University

STANLEY SIEGEL. *A Political History of the Texas Republic, 1836-1845*. Pp. xiv, 281. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Among works on Texas, especially those concerning the early history of that area, it is often difficult to discern and discriminate actual fact amid the folklore and legend that have attained, through usage, the stature, though not the soul, of truth.

Mr. Siegel, with a fine background in the history of the South, and a special interest in the development of Texas, has met that challenge and mastered it well. He presents the reader with an unusually well-researched and documented review of a fascinating but very controversial period in Texas history.

By limiting his concern to the short period of the independent Republic of Texas (with an excellent opening résumé of the

events leading to its formation) he has been able to show, in fine detail, the political maneuverings and interrelated personality struggles that resulted in a governmental policy and character still evident today in the continued healthy progress of that area.

It is probably fortunate that Mr. Siegel is not, by heritage, a Texan. He has neatly avoided the appearance of possible prejudice or favoritism in his study and has offered each situation and individual to the reader, with all evidence at hand, for the reader's own judgment.

Most readers, especially those familiar with Texas history, will find frequent surprises in the material presented relating to attitudes and opinions expressed by the various well-known men of the time. Several popular misconceptions are corrected, and many hitherto unknown or misunderstood episodes are brought into their proper relationships.

In considering the trials of the young Republic, the author has brought out very well the many problems concerning foreign relations, especially those with Mexico and the United States. While many readers have long been familiar with the generalities of these negotiations, Mr. Siegel has here added much long needed detail and explanation.

Since colonization of Texas was primarily from the East, it is logical that the predominant political influences would emanate from the population centers formed in the eastern and southern areas. However, one wonders at the lack of evidence, in this work, of any significant influence from the more western sections.

Though Mr. Siegel's book was surely not designed, nor does it appear, as light reading, it is more than just a reference volume. Without sacrificing accuracy, order, or factual detail, he has succeeded in arranging his material so that it is readable almost as a story.

The book is generously, but not excessively, supplied with footnotes, and contains, at the end, a good bibliography and index. With sixteen pages of illustrations, and a map of the area, it has emerged a more than usually attractive history.

The libraries, archives, and private collections of the Southwest contain an unguessed wealth of historical data, but only in works of this type is it made available to the general reader and student. It is a pleasure to see this study added to the bibliography of Texas history.

MURRAY G. SMYTH, JR.

University of Pennsylvania

RICHARD A. PRESTON, SYDNEY F. WISE, and HERMAN O. WERNER. *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*. Pp. viii, 376. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$6.50.

This is a concise, readable account of the notable developments in warfare over the centuries in our Western society. It begins with the Greek phalanx and ends, a mere 300 pages later, with the cold war.

For so brief an account of such a vast subject, the authors have done a most admirable job. The approach is modern-minded, with less concern for antiquarian detail than for the impact of weapons, tactics, and campaigns on society at large. The coverage is good, with more attention to naval warfare than is found in some books on the subject.

The authors' stated aim is ". . . to provide the professional military student with a background for his reading of military history, and to provide the civilian with an understanding of the significance of military developments in the evolution of society."

It is obviously the hope of the authors to lure at least a few civilian readers toward an interest in the historical background of the most important social problem of our time—warfare—by providing them with an account that is interesting and easy to read. In this hope they are joined by your reviewer.

Mr. Preston is Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada; Mr. Wise teaches at Queen's University; and Mr. Werner at the United States Naval Academy. Preston and Wise were World War II Air Force officers, and Werner is a Commander in the United States Naval Reserve.

There is a good index and an excellent short bibliography.

WAYNE C. GROVER
The National Archives

EVERETT W. HALL. *Modern Science and Human Values: A Study in the History of Ideas*. Pp. x, 483. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956. \$8.00.

Since this study "is addressed primarily neither to scientists nor to historians" but to interested laymen and students who desire a broader cultural framework for their special pursuits, it would not be fair to evaluate it according to standards of original scholarly research. Moreover, the absence of any reference, even for quotations, does not facilitate such undertaking. The scope of the investigation is unusually wide, both in time and in subject matter, extending from the medieval to the contemporary epoch and covering developments in astronomy and physics as well as in political theory, economics, and value theory.

The general thesis the book proposes to vindicate is that medieval science considered facts under categories of value, while modern "value-free" science and the philosophy based on it gradually have eliminated values from the fields of knowledge and denied them any other legitimate abode. The method applied to this purpose is a sort of socioeconomic determinism which frequently remains unconvincing. That, for instance, the rise of the theory of relativity has any correlation to Prussia's rise to political and industrial power (p. 241) is an affirmation which makes sense only if the author's methodological principle is accepted as a dogma. Incidentally, the attempt to give the addressed group of readers an idea of relativity proves, as could be expected, unsuccessful.

In the field of political theory, the author's choice of historic doctrines is somewhat arbitrary and seems dictated by his socioeconomic preoccupation. To omit the decisive contributions of Suárez and Vitoria, Spinoza and Puffendorf distorts the authentic picture of the reported processes. The same preoccupation is manifest in the treatment of the physiocrats whose alleged

dependence on Thomistic-Aristotelian economics (p. 158) tends to conceal the true source of their philosophic inspiration, the ethics of the radically anti-Peripatetic Malebranche.

Some sweeping "value-judgments" in which the author indulges should not remain unchallenged. To call the German romantics, Schlegel, Tieck, and Novalis, "definitely second-rate figures" (p. 194) or to consider Adam Müller's conversion to Catholicism as "sufficient outward evidence of his reactionary inclinations" (p. 196) does not help to rehabilitate value judgments as reliable assertions.

Yet, though not a few of the author's reports and socioeconomic constructions appear at best problematic, some parts of his book may usefully serve as background reading for advanced students. Professor Hall's own theory of values, presented in the last chapter, is stimulating though it hardly meets many objections raised against this kind of interpretation. To go into this matter, however, would exceed by far the limits set to this review.

PAUL SCHRECKER
University of Pennsylvania

AMALES TRIPATHI. *Evolution of Historiography in America, 1870-1910*. Pp. ix, 106. Calcutta: World Press Private Ltd., 1956. Rs. 7/8.

Dr. Tripathi is Assistant Professor of History at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Lecturer in Calcutta University. The present book is based upon a thesis for the master's degree prepared at Columbia University under the direction of Professor Richard Hofstadter. As the author states in his Preface, he is concerned with analyzing the "controlling assumptions" of American historians in the period under study and showing how these assumptions were "related to and affected by the development of the contemporary scene." In the nature of things, this theme requires Dr. Tripathi to deal primarily in that confused, confusing, and unprofitable genre of literature, the presidential addresses to the American Historical Association and their spiritual kin before and after the Association was founded. Dr. Tripathi nowhere

examines in any detail the question of how far the controlling assumptions set forth on such occasions do control. In the reviewer's opinion they are mostly the product of sheer incapacity for thinking in abstract terms plus an uneasy feeling that the occasion calls for having a go at this kind of thing anyhow. That the views expressed have had any great effect upon the speakers' real work as historians seems very doubtful. This is not to deny that historians do have discernible prejudices of a rather crude kind, but these are not the controlling assumptions that Dr. Tripathi has in mind.

If the ultimate relevance of these assumptions is left aside, the pervading animus of this book is that they are primarily conditioned by factors external to the life of the historical profession, and, more specifically, that American historians before Beard and James Harvey Robinson were seeking in "scientific" history an escape from "the objective realities of the Gilded Age." Of this hypothesis it can only be said that Dr. Tripathi's own evidence makes it appear questionable. For he shows that many scientific historians put their scholarship at the disposal of economic conservatism at home and imperialism abroad; from which it might seem that they neither wished to escape from "objective realities" nor did escape. If Dr. Tripathi means that they wished to take sides with respect to living issues while appearing not to, that is something else again, though still doubtful.

Presumably the present book will serve a useful purpose by introducing university students in India to some of the leaders in the organization of a historical profession in America. If, in fact, the book serves no other purpose than to bring to its readers' attention the figure of Henry Adams, who emerges even from this kind of analysis with his vitality intact, they may well regard it as an epoch in their initiation into Western thought. The book is in general very well written. Dr. Tripathi is, however, much given to omitting articles in places where the English language does not permit of this.

DONALD FLEMING
Brown University

GOVERNMENT AND LAW

ROSCOE C. MARTIN. *TVA: The First Twenty Years*. Pp. xiii, 282. University: University of Alabama Press; Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1956. \$4.50.

If you approve of the Tennessee Valley Authority as "a venture into socialism," which President Eisenhower once called it, then *TVA—The First Twenty Years* is a glorious description and defense of its varied activities. But if you consider TVA a federally subsidized invasion of the field of electric power generation and transmission, which has ousted privately owned power companies from its service area, the book fails to tell the whole truth. Published jointly by the presses of the University of Alabama and the University of Tennessee, it is based on fifty lectures delivered by nineteen TVA staff members in the first half of 1953 during a course in public administration at Florida State University.

According to the preamble of the TVA Act, it was created to improve navigation, provide flood control, provide reforestation and proper use of marginal lands, provide for agricultural and industrial development, provide for the national defense, and for "other purposes." Among those "other purposes" lies the tail that wags the dog.

During the 1933-53 years, according to TVA's annual reports, the total investment of United States taxpayers in the Authority through Congressional appropriations was \$1,319.5 million, of which \$924.5 million admittedly was in electric power facilities. During the same twenty years, power production and sale showed a net profit before interest on the taxpayers' investment (which TVA doesn't pay) of nearly \$255.8 million. But during the same score of years, the announced major purposes of TVA—the constitutional pegs on which its power activities hang—lost some \$146.4 million, leaving a net profit before interest of nearly \$79.4 million.

However, during the same years, the country's taxpayers had some \$231 million taken from them by federal tax gatherers to cover interest on the funds invested in

TVA, resulting in a net loss to them of nearly \$151.7 million from TVA's complete operations. Carried to the close of the 1956 fiscal year, this loss amounted to more than \$169 million. As the late Wendell Willkie once said, the Tennessee River and its tributaries run through only seven states, but TVA drains the entire nation.

Naturally, none of these facts is contained in this book, nor is any mention made of the fact that while TVA's power generation activities were authorized to prevent the waste of water power—an asset of the people—42.6 per cent of its electric generating capacity was installed in fuel-burning plants at the end of the 1953 fiscal year and 67.5 per cent at the close of the 1956 year.

Admittedly, as the TVA speakers so proudly stated in their Florida lectures, these altruistic, nonprofit major purposes of the Authority have contributed to some extent to advancement of the economy of Tennessee. Yet, despite expenditures by the Federal Government of some \$12.5 billion during the 1933–53 years on TVA dams, hydro- and thermal-generating plants and transmission lines, and on atomic energy plants within the state, the rate of increase in economic activity in Tennessee, according to the United States Department of Commerce, averaged about that of the other ten southeastern states, which received far less in federal outlays.

ERNEST R. ABRAMS

New York, N. Y.

R. J. HAMMOND. *Food*, Vol. II, *Studies in Administration and Control, History of the Second World War*. (Civil Series.) Pp. xiii, 835. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office; Longmans, Green & Company, 1956. \$9.00 trade, \$7.20 library.

This volume of the history on wartime food control is an interesting, detailed, and well-documented account of the control of fresh fish, eggs, potatoes, and milk; emergency and communal feeding; and consumer rationing. The main sources of information were the files of the Ministry of Food and occasionally other Departments.

The first part is concerned with fresh

fish, eggs, potatoes, and milk which, being wholly or mainly home produced and not having to go through a manufacturing process could not be controlled through Ministry of Food ownership and were therefore regulated by statutory rules and orders. In these efforts the administration was constantly forced by the conflicting interests of a multitude of producers and consumers, and problems of underproduction, overproduction, transportation and distribution, and various degrees of inefficiency in administrative personnel.

Although control of these foods was based on experience in World War I and plans developed in the period between the wars, numerous and repeated changes in regulations had to be made, and fairly effective control was not obtained until the war was more than half over.

The section on emergency and communal feeding reviews the measures taken to counter the destruction of food and food factories, the interference with distribution of foods by air attack, stocking of emergency food supplies, food problems in case of actual invasion, and the lessons learned when the air attacks finally materialized.

The section on rationing makes up the longest part of the book. It traces the development of the rationing system from World War I through World War II. The first part of this section is concerned with the complex problems of issue and renewal of consumers ration books. The second part deals with the even more complex problems of management of supplies to the retailer by means of coupons, returns, and permits.

The rationing system underwent many changes because of more and more foods being placed on the ration list, surpluses or shortages in supplies, and special rationing for certain groups such as miners, seamen, and others.

The information in this book should be of great value in any future attempts to ration or otherwise control food supplies in times of emergency. However, it is too much to expect that it would enable future administrators to develop a practical, smoothly operating plan of food control since such was not developed in World War II, in spite of experience in the previ-

ous war and extensive planning in the pre-war period, and conditions in a future emergency may be considerably different.

HAROLD T. COOK

U. S. Department of Agriculture

IRVING BRANT. *James Madison: The President, 1809–1812*. Pp. 540. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956. \$6.50.

As in the preceding volume, Mr. Brant continues to painstakingly present Madison as an architect of American foreign policy. Only here Madison is President, instead of Jefferson's Secretary of State. In sustaining his thesis, Brant offers additional evidence to the effect that the traditional idea of Madison as an ineffective leader is founded upon the prejudiced accounts of Federalists, the reports of British ministers who associated chiefly with Federalists, and the historical writings of Henry Adams. He combats this view with primary evidence which must be considered by scholars in a proper reappraisal of the international and domestic conditions that produced the War of 1812.

Repeatedly, he reveals that warlike speeches and papers attributed to the War Hawks were actually inspired by Madison. For instance, he proves a belligerent editorial published in *The National Intelligencer* on April 14, 1812 was written by the Secretary of State, James Monroe, Madison's chief lieutenant, and not by Henry Clay, to whom it was attributed at the time. He demolishes the story that Madison was waited on by a committee of War Hawks and requested to send the House a message recommending war. He presents strong circumstantial evidence that the war manifesto of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs, generally attributed to Calhoun, was written by Monroe after consultation with Madison.

Nor does he find that Jefferson influenced President Madison's foreign policy. The correspondence between them which the Federalists alleged to contain advice from Jefferson on international affairs actually dealt with Merino sheep and kindred agricultural matters.

Madison is presented as a President who

pretended to accept the French assurances about the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees at face value because he saw therein a legal excuse for renewing an embargo on British commerce. He hoped the embargo would cause the British to repeal their Orders in Council and stop violating the rights of neutral trade. If not, he was determined to urge a declaration of war upon Great Britain, which he regarded as a far greater menace than France to the territorial expansion and political sovereignty of the United States. In this presentation, Mr. Brant probably attributes too much political foresight to Madison.

Scholars of sectionalism will find in this volume much evidence of a sectional consciousness long before the slavery issue in the Compromise of 1820—a consciousness that was based upon the economic differences between the agricultural exporting society of the South and the commercial interests of New England. Here, too, is a version of the controversial Henry letters that is less favorable to the Federalists than Henry Adams' account in his *History of the United States during the Administration of James Madison*.

But despite these scholarly contributions, Madison as a flesh and blood person does not come forth from his archival tomb to walk across the pages of this volume.

ROBERT L. HILDRUP

University of Virginia

ALEXANDER L. GEORGE and JULIETTE L. GEORGE. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*. Pp. xvii, 362. New York: John Day Company, 1956. \$6.00.

Among the books published during the Centennial Year of Woodrow Wilson's birth was the one under review. In that respect, it is timely. Moreover, such a book was needed to correct the prejudiced account of House-Wilson relations which appeared in Viereck's *The Strongest Friendship in History* (1932). On the whole, the authors have done their research thoroughly, have presented their arguments convincingly, and have drawn logical conclusions. Especially is this true in the latter chapters of the book.

In the first chapter, however, there are some misstatements of fact. No source is given for the statement that, as a lad, Woodrow habitually cried when songs were sung in his father's church (p. 6). Wilson's father corrected the son frequently in oral discourse, not in written assignments (p. 7). Again, Wilson was named president of Princeton in June 1902, and he entered actively upon his duties in September 1902; he was not "involved in an enervating campus imbroglio" when his father died in January 1903 (p. 10). Finally, some of Wilson's friends did disagree with him without Wilson's concluding that they "no longer cared for him" (p. 32). Josephus Daniels, Henry Morgenthau and John Sharp Williams are examples.

Colonel House, who enters the book on page 75, was unlike Wilson in many ways. Born in the Southwest, of wealthy parents, House had been a world traveler, a youthful prankster and bully who, when he met Wilson, had, for a decade, been the power behind the scenes in the Administrations of four Texas governors. As some have claimed, House was not the first Texan to climb aboard the Wilson bandwagon, but when aboard, House soon took over the reins. For Colonel House, the man and the opportunity united in Woodrow Wilson. For Wilson, the Colonel filled the vacuum created when Paxton Hibben turned against Wilson at Princeton and was dropped by the latter. Refusing all tendered offices, House emerged the man of mystery and silence. He maintained a position of power and a place cooperatively independent.

Both Wilson and House, as the authors clearly reveal, were men ambitious for power. Wilson was determined to offset "the feeling of inadequacy branded into his spirit as a child"; House realized that he could gain prominence only through Wilson's complex personality, and during the seven years that the House-Wilson friendship lasted, the Texan showed a remarkable capacity for self-discipline. Accepting a place on the Peace Commission was House's initial mistake that ultimately led to the severance of his personal and political friendship with Wilson.

Except for influencing political appointments, the only domestic question to which

House gave his talents was the enactment of the Federal Reserve Law. From the very beginning of Wilson's administration, the Texas Colonel was Wilson's roving ambassador abroad. Although House was well aware of the domestic scene, he was the President's voice among the chancelleries of Europe. In foreign relations House rendered to Wilson his greatest service. The writers of this book disclose, and accurately so, that it was over the Covenant of the League of Nations and at the Paris Peace Conference that Wilson terminated his friendship with House. It was at Paris that Wilson's confidence in House was shaken by the intimate counsel which the President's wife gave him.

This book follows Professor Bailey and others in concluding that four-fifths of the opposition to the ratification of the treaty in the United States Senate was anti-Wilson not anti-treaty. This anti-Wilson feeling was fomented by Henry Cabot Lodge. Both Lodge and Wilson revealed unlikable personality traits in their struggle over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles containing the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Although this book may not be the final word on the unusual friendship between Wilson and House, it certainly is the best that has been written to date. The authors are to be congratulated upon a job well done.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

University of Florida

BASCOM N. TIMMONS. *Jesse H. Jones: The Man and the Statesman*. Pp. 414. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956. \$6.00.

When in 1898 Jesse H. Jones, the son of a Tennessee tobacco farmer, arrived in Houston to manage his uncle's lumber business he was an ambitious young man of twenty-four. Endowed with shrewd business ability and unlimited faith in the future of his adopted city, he established himself, in the course of little more than a decade, as one of the city's most distinguished and respected citizens and certainly as its most daring financial genius. Though soon involved in a variety of business enterprises, including banks and newspapers, his

most enduring interest lay in building construction and ownership. During his lifetime he literally changed the skyline of Houston by erecting in that city alone more than thirty skyscrapers. He built a number of others in Dallas, Fort Worth, and New York City. He seldom sold those he had built.

But in spite of his numerous business projects, Jesse Jones found time and energy for a great variety of public duties. He took the initiative in bringing about the dredging of the Buffalo bayou and thus made Houston a flourishing seaport. During the first World War he was Director General of Military Relief for the American Red Cross. In the campaign of 1924 he served the Democrats as Director of Finance, and in 1928 he brought the Democratic National Convention to Houston.

But the most significant public service of Jesse Jones began in 1932 when President Hoover, at the suggestion of Speaker Garner and Senator Glass, appointed him a member of the newly created Reconstruction Finance Corporation. President Roosevelt made him chairman of the RFC and later appointed him Federal Loan Administrator.

That the RFC under the leadership of Jones performed a valuable service during the depression and the second World War few would deny. It restored the banks to solvency; it rescued many of the most important railroads; through the Commodity Credit Corporation it made loans to farmers; it made self-liquidating loans to states and cities; it relieved the real estate mortgage situation by buying preferred stock in mortgage companies; it financed numerous public works throughout the country; and all this it accomplished without financial loss to the government. During the war years, while Jones was Federal Loan Administrator and Secretary of Commerce, he was also head of more than thirty special agencies including such important ones as the Metals and Rubber Reserve Companies and the Defense Plant Corporation.

This biography is one long song of praise in honor of Jesse Jones. Mr. Timmons believes that with minor extensions of power the RFC could have accomplished everything done by all the alphabetical agencies

of the New Deal and probably done them better. He believes that Jones, though often unorthodox in his methods, was the most successful administrator of his day, and he clinches his argument by emphasizing the fact that he, more than any other administrator, continued to enjoy the unbounded confidence of Congress. His final judgment is that Jones was the ablest man he has ever known.

Of course there are villains as well as a hero in the piece. The first among them was Vice President Wallace, but close behind followed Secretary Ickes, and sundry "strange creatures" infecting the administration. The President himself, though he had kept Jones in office for twelve years, does not escape unscathed. His final dismissal of Jones in 1945 is described as the political mistake of the century, explainable only on the basis of declining mental and physical powers.

Mr. Timmons, a prominent newspaper correspondent in Washington and a long time personal friend of Jesse Jones, has written an interesting and valuable biography of a very distinguished figure. But he has not written a critical and objective one. His hero seems almost too heroic and his villains too villainous. An impartial study of the definitive place of Jesse Jones in our recent history awaits the pen of a less biased friend or more critical writer. When Jones heard that his friend intended to write his biography he expressed the hope that the bad as well as the good would be reported. But the only failure Mr. Timmons discovered was that Jones in his youth had been a dismal failure as a cigar salesman.

ELMER D. GRAPER

University of Pittsburgh

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON. *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law*. Pp. xiii, 914. New York: Viking Press, 1956. \$8.75.

This is not only a biography of the twelfth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, but it is a critical study of the development of American constitutional law during the twenty-one years of Stone's service on the Supreme Court (1925-46). The first one hundred eighty

pages describe the preparation of Stone for the court; they recount his early years in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, his studies at Massachusetts Agricultural College, Amherst, and the Columbia Law School, his nineteen years of teaching in the latter institution (the last thirteen as dean), his seven years of legal practice in New York City, and his year's tenure as Attorney General of the United States.

Stone's years on the high court were featured by strong disagreements among the justices concerning the proper role of the court in the American constitutional system. After a brief period he found his place beside Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis in dissenting against the conservative majority headed by Willis Van Devanter and James C. McReynolds. The three were in essential agreement that the Constitution implied that the political departments were to have the power to govern and that the court should not strike down legislation merely because it was contrary to the personal predilections of the justices. In case after case the three great dissenters expressed their disagreement with the theory that natural economic laws were beyond the regulatory power of government. The great Holmes departed the court at ninety-two in 1932 and was succeeded by the equally liberal Benjamin N. Cardozo, who took his place beside Brandeis and Stone in fighting for the right of Congress to legislate for the "good life."

With the reshaping of the court by Roosevelt appointments (1937-40), Stone encountered a new problem. The new justices showed a propensity to interpret the Constitution in broad enough language to give free rein to congressional discretion. He countered with his doctrine of judicial restraint. He found himself again in the dissenting role, a role which continued even after he was promoted to the Chief Justiceship in 1941.

Acute as are his analyses of the changes in constitutional interpretation, Alpheus Mason's finest contribution in this elaborate study is the lifting of the screen of secrecy from the internal operation of the Supreme Court mechanism. Though the reviewer feels that publication might well

have been postponed until Stone's colleagues had left the court, revelation of the personal bitterness between justices serves to bring the court down from the high peaks to the level of human institutions. Stone's own personality contributed to these personal disagreements. But one result of unrestrained discussion in conference was the emergence of decisions springing from the hearts and minds of the judges. Sincerity replaced the "massing of the court" under preceding Chief Justices, and the judges' opinions were great improvements over those of former years when empty verbal apologies served for constitutional reasoning. Alpheus Mason has produced a monumental work on the Supreme Court, one that probably will not be equalled for many years to come.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING

University of Oklahoma

ANDREW S. BERKY (Ed.). *The Challenge to American Life*. Pp. 126. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956. \$2.75.

Where do we go from here, we Americans?

Andrew S. Berky of the Schwenkfelder Library at Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, two years and more ago, asked five distinguished men, who can be assimilated broadly to the category of educators, to answer this question in a brief lecture series.

The panel was made up of Presidents Harnwell of Pennsylvania, Hutchison of Lafayette, Burns of Williams, Commager of Columbia, and Johnston of the Carnegie Endowment.

The book is stimulating, and it is representative. Part of the stimulus is from annoyance with some of the representatives.

President Harnwell takes the field of science and industry, but it is hard to know exactly what he means by science or industry. He does not mention the extraordinary change in a few centuries from the medieval mentality that accepted miracles and fairies and magic as commonplace, to the matter-of-fact questioning today of anything that is not acceptable under the "laws" of physics and chemistry. In industry he might have mentioned the influ-

ence of cost as distinguished from science in the development of productivity. Industry, like the military, did not always welcome the professors.

President Hutchison discusses "Spiritual Man." Relativism is dangerous, as he says, but his demand to purge the Church of the false philosophy of social progress, and to return it to God's ordinances, absolute, eternal, and applicable, has an assumption of infallibility and absolutism which is really anti-intellectual. He utilizes the usual anti-Communist (and Communist) technique of asserting that if one takes the first step toward the "gentle philosophy of scientific humanism," he therefore will be driven to the extremes of Hungarian suppression. His judgments about the real ethical problems of politicians are juvenile. He seems to lack all confidence in people as they are. "We have been infiltrated. We have been deceived. We are going along with these evils."

The other three essays are of exceptionally high quality. President Burns knows the governmental problem and analyzes it well. He is not quite consistent in trusting the people and distrusting Congress, whose policy-making function he wants to turn over to the President and Executive Department. Perhaps he could help us here by putting in the limitations on popular capacity in referenda (which he omits). They can only pass on the kind of major issues which are really subject to broad popular understanding.

Neither can I agree with him that the political parties in the large urban centers and their periphery, that now contain most of our voting strength (note the concentration of Republican and Democratic attention on them this last fall), offer much opportunity for community leaders really to participate.

Commager's analysis of freedom and the free enterprise of communication is most satisfying and exciting, and Joe Johnston's analysis of the problems of peace is a close second. Both are a pretty thorough answer to President Hutchison.

All of which leaves the real problems of science and industry and their relation to a world like ours a bit neglected. We could do with a more effective analysis of

the relevance to them of religion. Try it again, Mr. Berky!

CHARLES P. TAFT

Headley, Sibbald and Taft
Cincinnati, Ohio

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. *Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787*. Pp. 245. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1956. \$4.00.

"A page of history is worth a volume of logic," writes the late Zechariah Chafee of Harvard, quoting Justice Holmes, and he proceeds to prove it by delving into the origins of three of the less-discussed liberties, fixed not in the Bill of Rights but the original Constitution. They are freedom of Congressmen to debate without fear of penalty, the ban on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and freedom of movement for all persons at home and abroad.

The third liberty, not expressly stated in the Constitution, is treated through Supreme Court interpretations of implied rights and reliance on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Chafee is too much the advocate to confine his study to history. His format for the three studies begins with the American right, goes on to explore at length the English origins and development and winds up with sharp critiques of current American lapses from principle.

He would not impair the right of Congressmen to defame private citizens in Congress, but he challenges immunity outside those halls even on official missions. He condemns the "test oaths" aimed at real and alleged Communists through virtual trials by Congressional committees as violating the ban on bills of attainder. He deplores the restrictions on travel abroad and entry to the United States aimed at the same targets.

Despite these critiques of present policy, Chafee asserts that his major purpose was to help us remember how these rights grew strong in England before they were embodied in our Constitution. For, he maintains, the future of our liberties depends greatly on the strength of our devotion to the achievements of the past.

I wonder how valid that concept is in a world in which American liberties are

increasingly influenced by events abroad. Historical counsel would seem to count less as we move further away from our English traditions of law into more universal concepts.

Not even those concepts can disregard the basic political problem Chafee poses—"how the few who govern shall be controlled by the many who are governed." In this respect, this limited study, forcefully and engagingly written, contributes to an understanding of principles too readily brushed aside under pressure, yet without whose preservation liberty is endangered.

ROGER N. BALDWIN

American Civil Liberties Union

NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS. *Obscenity and the Law*. Pp. xxii, 289. London: Secker & Warburg, 1956. (Distributed by Macmillan Company, New York.) \$5.00.

Mr. St. John-Stevas is to be warmly congratulated for providing an admirable survey of the treatment of obscene literature in English law. His literary interest combined with his legal training enables him to give a comprehensive account of the subject, tracing its history from the earliest times, and showing the development of the Victorian conscience and the corresponding increases in the severity of the attitude of the law. The difficulty which the law of obscene libel creates in the twentieth century is clearly explained, and one cannot fail to be impressed by the weight of the arguments in favor of reform, and by the proposals here outlined.

It may be thought by some that legislation is not the best solution to this problem. Certainly in dealing with horror literature Mr. Stevas himself doubts the wisdom and necessity for this. But with regard to obscene literature, as we already have laws which prescribe limits to what may be published, it is surely incumbent on us to ensure that these laws are fair and just and consistent with the fundamental principles of the criminal law.

Whether the legal test of obscene libel is so unprincipled in theory as Mr. Stevas makes out is debatable, but this is not the place to argue the point (see the reviewer's article in *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Autumn 1955). It cannot be denied, how-

ever, that the English law of obscene libel and the procedure by way of destruction order under Lord Campbell's Act are capable of being exceedingly harsh in operation. Mr. Stevas and the would-be reformers extol the virtues of the celebrated *Ulysses* case, in which Judge Woolsey and Judge Learned Hand interpreted the law so liberally, and some of their proposals are directly inspired by those judgments. The English judges are sometimes equally liberal in their interpretation (for example, Mr. Justice Stable in *R. v. Martin Secker & Warburg, Ltd.* in 1954), but Mr. Stevas would contend that this is not enough—they cannot be relied on to be liberal in their approach. A Bill was prepared and submitted to Parliament in 1955 designed to carry out a comprehensive reform of the law (this is reproduced in an Appendix), but the House of Commons only found time to give it a cursory glance. It is to be hoped that a further opportunity may arise in the near future for the matter to be considered.

Apart from consideration of the English law, the book contains a short chapter on the United States experience in this matter, and a brief but revealing account of the Irish censorship provisions. Appendices describe developments in the Commonwealth countries, and in certain European and Asiatic countries, and there is a short account of the Roman Index. Altogether it is a most stimulating and provocative book.

J. E. HALL WILLIAMS

London School of Economics

ECONOMICS

HAROLD L. WILENSKY. *Intellectuals in Labor Unions: Organizational Pressures on Professional Roles*. Pp. xiii, 336. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$6.00.

The role and functions of the staff expert in American unions have received some scattered attention in the past dozen years, but this study is the first effort systematically and comprehensively to explore the intellectual's role in the decision-making processes of labor organizations. Wilensky

defines a union "expert" or "intellectual" as one who works full time in the headquarters of a national union as a hired staff man responsible to elected officers and who "brings to the problem at hand a body of specialized information and skill acquired through formal education and/or training on the job." Economists, statisticians, lawyers, industrial engineers, lobbyists, education specialists, and a few other occupations fit the definition. Most accountants and the like do not.

Over 150 experts, plus 37 union officers and a smaller number of private consultants, ex-experts, and "outsiders with labor contacts" were interviewed, reinterviewed, and questionaired to provide the basic data for the study. The outcome confirms many previously held opinions of the difficult position of experts in the labor movement, refines and elaborates on some of these beliefs, adds certain new insights, and clothes all with the mantle of sociological method, lingo, and newly fashioned terms and typologies of which some, at least, seem needlessly involved and occasionally give the appearance of spurious accuracy. For example:

"4. The most frequent shift of each type [of staff expert] shows these specific patterns: from Missionary to Legislative-Liberal Missionary to Program Professional to Technician Professional; from careerist (Outsider or Rank-and-File) to Technician Professional. Any main type can move in the Politico direction, though the typical source is the Party Missionary. Quitting aside, the final resting place for all change-prone types are Technician Professional and Politico" (p. 172).

The absence of a concluding and summarizing chapter is a defect which, at least from this reviewer's standpoint and probably also from that of the reader, is not entirely compensated for by the brief concluding sections at the close of the main sections of the study.

Some of Wilensky's major findings relate to the role of the expert in strengthening (and occasionally weakening) the leaders' control over the organization; the intellectual's occupational and psychological insecurity (Wilensky's intellectuals have job consciousness, that is they are con-

scious of their own jobs); the high mobility of some staff experts within and outside the labor movement; and the sometimes subtle, sometimes quite clear, distinctions between the standing of the various classes of experts in the labor movement, with lawyers generally occupying a favored position. One of the most interesting generalizations holds that the degree of influence exerted by the expert on trade union policies increases as the question under consideration approaches the periphery of trade union interest. Union policies on the crisis in the Middle East or the Federal Reserve's rediscount rate may be largely staff controlled, but top officers generally take care to maintain tight control over questions involving internal power relations and most collective bargaining issues.

The book is honest and courageous. It will not please all union staffers and officers nor does it have that intention. The few so-called friends in the labor movement which Wilensky is sure to lose do not count for much in comparison with the value of this study as an aid to greater understanding of the role and problems of intellectuals in the employ of labor organizations.

JOHN P. WINDMULLER

Cornell University

JACK BARBASH. *The Practice of Unionism*. Pp. xii, 465. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. \$5.00.

A union staff intellectual gives an up-to-date description of the American labor movement which is frankly sympathetic and yet not maudlin. Without much overlap, this book is like the author's earlier *Labor Unions in Action*. It is newsy, well-documented, studiously unpretentious, clearly written—a good antidote for the unthinking antiunionism of the typical undergraduate.

Barbash relies heavily on case material from union and government publications, the commercial press, personal experience, and other sources not readily tapped by the beginning student or the busy practitioner. He uses systematic academic work less than he could have, though he adds a useful bibliographical discussion. His sources

combined with his assumption that "no two situations are alike," and his desire to show us how unions *really* work, make the book rich in descriptive detail, but light and casual in generalization, and a bit loose in organization. It is excellent for getting a "feel" for the stuff of collective bargaining—issues, tactics, and strategy; and internal union government—types and determinants of structure, and problems of administration. A Perlmanesque appreciation of "pragmatism" leads Barbash to the insight that the greatest differences between union leaders are not in doctrine but in their skills of planning and administration; some know more than others of what they want from the employer and how to get it. There is a nicely balanced treatment of unions in politics. There are short, competent discussions of strikes, picketing and boycotts, union rivalries, Communists, and racketeers. The chapters on why workers do or do not join unions, union leadership, and the use of technicians, however, seem superficial.

In all, we get more matter-of-fact reporting than we have a right to expect. But occasional lapses into official platitude and piety are inevitable. Dave Beck is pictured as an "articulate exponent of jurisdiction as a proper canon" (p. 96). In later discussion of trade union morality we learn that "invariably the teamsters will not go through picket lines of any kind" (p. 230)—which will be good news to unionists suffering from Teamster torment. Labor economists will be interested to hear that "... 'ability to pay' may be the single most important element in the union's formulation of wage policy" (pp. 128, 407).

The new AFL-CIO has come out firmly in support of three traditional principles: "autonomy" for its constituent internationals (which make the final decisions on jurisdiction, strikes, or anything else); "jurisdiction" (the only moral right the international has to any group of workers or type of work is that granted by the Federation, though this may be modified by National Labor Relations Board unit determinations); "no raiding" (each union shall refrain from cutting in on existing bargaining relationships of other unions). Barbash gives little attention to the ob-

vious conflict between these principles. More important, he glosses over the likely decrease in the worker's right to a union "of his own choosing"—as the Federation in order to resolve the conflict encourages topside deals between internationals, in which they trade groups of workers who were all satisfied in the union they chose before the trade and who feel deprived after. Maybe freedom must be sacrificed so that order may flourish, but this choice is always worth a second look.

Two implicit themes guide Barbash's treatment of the sticky problems of internal union democracy: democracy is mainly responsiveness of leaders to the popular will, not tolerance for organized opposition; and the United States provides a more antiunion environment than any other free society, past or present. He repeatedly invokes the myth of hostile encirclement. Arguing, with Philip Taft, that union machinery for disciplining erring members functions, on the whole, "justly and effectively," Barbash explains the deviations: "the union is, after all, a fighting organization" (p. 72); he justifies the dues checkoff: "... the union is fighting for its life" (p. 160); he explains that many union leaders lack humility: unfortunately, "... it may well be that survival and growth of an 'out' group ... requires a hardness and toughness ..." (p. 409).

If this book were titled "The Social, Political and Economic Impact of Unionism" it would come nowhere near the mark, but on his chosen ground Barbash provides one of the best nontechnical, introductory descriptions of union behavior available.

HAROLD L. WILENSKY

University of Michigan

EDMUND WHITTAKER. *Economic Analysis*. Pp. xiii, 460. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1956. \$6.50.

Professor Whittaker, author of an earlier work on the history of economic theory, has added another volume to the growing list of college texts. This time he has turned his attention to a presentation of the techniques, procedures, and data employed in economic analysis. The book is

intended for use in a second course in economics, taken after the usual introductory course in principles and problems. He has succeeded admirably in his twofold aim, to meet the needs of the practical-minded student of business administration as well as to hold the interest of the theoretically oriented student who plans to do graduate work in economic theory.

The organization of the volume, divided into two parts, is logical; its style is lucid and coherent. The first section deals with principles and procedures (economics as a science, as an art, interpretation of experience, and so forth); the second investigates various facets of today's economy from the viewpoint developed in the first portion of the book (consumption, investment, production, price, and so forth). Graphic and mathematical material is held to a minimum, although I daresay non-mathematicians will find some of the material more difficult than the author imagines. However, some of this material can be skipped without destroying the continuity or value of the book as a text. Difficult concepts such as marginal productivity, Walrasian equilibrium theory, and the Keynesian doctrine of money and employment are presented clearly and simply without distortion which so frequently results from attempts to simplify rigorous, complex ideas.

Part one suffers from the defects of its qualities. That is to say that methodological, philosophic, and mathematical concepts, as for example, multiple correlation analysis, the meaning of the *ceteris paribus* clause, Kant's categorical imperative, Lockean assumptions, and others, are handled too superficially. In exoneration I must add, however, that to do otherwise, would probably have enlarged the book beyond a reasonable and usable size. It is to Whittaker's credit that he attempts to introduce students so early in their careers to these vital methodological issues.

Here then is a text which many instructors will find most useful. Scholars in the fields of the social sciences, particularly those who studied economics many years ago or who have had little or no training in economics, may also want to turn to the volume to get some fruitful insights into

the nature and scope of modern economic analysis.

JULES KOLODNY

New York, N. Y.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *Capital Formation and Economic Growth*. Pp. xiv, 678. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. \$12.00.

This publication contains the papers submitted at a Conference of the Universities and comments on these papers. These are grouped in six parts: Part I, Sources and Channels of Finance in Capitalist Countries; Part II, Savings and Finance in the Soviet Union; Part III, The Influence of Enterprise and Business Organization in Advanced Countries; Part IV, The Influence of Enterprise and Business Organization in Underdeveloped Countries; Part V, Technological Progress and Investment; Part VI, General Theoretical Approaches.

It would take too much space in this short review even to list the names and the titles of the papers of the contributors and the commentators, let alone to give an adequate summary of the ideas contained in them. Attention has necessarily to be confined to certain points that strike the reviewer as important. If it is any compensation, the reviewer would like to place it on record that he is quite aware of the gross injustice done to the richness and importance of the book under review by this procedure.

The opening paper on "International Differences in Capital Formation and Financing" by Kuznets assembles with masterly skill the available statistical data on capital formation in several countries, evaluates them properly, and indicates the boundaries of the subject as defined by the available testable knowledge. Kuznets shows that with a given definition of capital formation, the ratios of net savings to net national product for developed and semideveloped countries fall within the limited range of 5 to 15 per cent; those of gross savings to gross national product falling within the range of 10 to 25 per cent. He also shows that the ratios of savings to national income do not appear to be positively correlated with the size

or increase of *per capita* income in that economy, and that foreign capital has played a relatively small role in economic development in the past.

Grossman's paper on current trends in capital formation in the USSR and the comments on it by Kaplan and others are very revealing. Grossman finds that in the USSR in the nonfarm sector of the economy, capital intensive techniques are being preferred so as to avoid costs of urbanization and so forth of workers from the agricultural sector who will migrate to urban areas if less capital intensive techniques were to be adopted in the nonfarm sector. This gives an indication of the consideration that might weigh with a planning authority in regard both to the choice of techniques as well as the criteria for allocating scarce capital resources.

Adolph Lowe's paper on "Structural Analysis of Real Capital Formation" brings to bear new insight on the Harrod-Domar dynamic models of growth. The Harrod-Domar models have been criticized because they are couched in real terms, but they rest on hidden assumptions about money. Lowe points out that these models may be all right with regard to money flows but not in regard to physical resources, unless these are utterly fluid which they never are.

In his paper Kuznets poses what may be one of the central problems of economic development. He writes: "At some phase in the growth of a developed country within the last two centuries there must have been a substantial rise in the capital formation proportions." This period of rising capital formation, it may be inferred, marked the shift from preindustrial to the modern era in these countries. How and why this happened and what factors were responsible for it are obvious questions on which a theory of economic growth must shed light.

And this is precisely what is not done adequately by the whole gamut of ideas thrown up in the conference. This is, however, not surprising because it is partly due to the paucity of information on this phase of the development of the advanced countries. It is also partly due to the complexity of the problem. What may appear to be a favorable factor in one

country might not appear to be so in another. An interesting example is at hand in this very book. Levy maintains that social mobility which prevailed in prerevolutionary China mainly hindered her economic development, and its absence furthered it in Japan, a thesis which, to say the least, runs contrary to the common sense idea that economic development is helped by social mobility.

But the value of this book is not worth one whit less because of this failure, for this in itself contains its saving grace. If it does not answer the questions it raises, still it asks the right sorts of questions, and once the right sorts of questions are asked, the correct answers to them are almost inherent in them.

N. V. SOVANI

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

LELAND M. GOODRICH. *Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations*. Pp. xi, 235. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. \$3.25.

Korea is a problem for solution by the United Nations, not for solution by unilateral or bilateral action—this is the United States' policy stand. The intricacies of the methods and events which led to this position and the difficulties which this position impose on the United States are the themes of this succinct yet penetrating account. Dr. Goodrich has taken the problem of Korea in order to explore the broader problems of United States action within the United Nations. Though a murky one, Korea is a showcase of our reliance on and our hope in the United Nations as an effective organ for the preservation of world peace.

Korea, though a familiar word to Americans now, was not so in 1945 when we became directly involved in the affairs of the peninsula. Korea was far away and seemingly outside the area of strategic concern to the United States. In the fall of 1947 the United States government faced with

the problem of "how to extricate itself from an embarrassing situation in Korea" felt that "bringing the question before the General Assembly for a United Nations solution seemed, under the circumstances, the most promising course." As Dr. Goodrich points out there are some who "would argue that the United States could have dealt with the Korea question as effectively, perhaps with greater effectiveness in the long run, if it had never brought the problem before the General Assembly." However, he has very effectively analyzed the subsequent action and concludes that "by developing its policies and actions within a United Nations framework, the United States was able, in co-operation with other members, to demonstrate that aggression does not pay, to broaden and strengthen its solidarity with other members of the United Nations and to increase the sense of security within the free world, while at the same time avoiding a general war."

This story of United States action in Korea and in the United Nations is arranged chronologically, so that it serves as a handy reference volume for the research worker. It is an expanded version of a booklet: *Korea: Collective Measures against Aggression* (International Conciliation, No. 494), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, October 1953, pp. 131-92. The book is well documented and has a collection of appendices. Bibliographic references, almost all from American or United Nations publications, can be found in the footnotes. The book is written by an American for American audiences; thus there is relatively little reference to other viewpoints—especially to those of South Korea. Syngman Rhee is probably the single most important individual in this period of Korea's history. In the book, however, his role is mentioned only rarely and his personality—a definite factor—is not assessed. The book treats rather clinically and theoretically, and not too realistically, the complex events of Korea caught in the midst of international affairs.

American policy in the United Nations on the Korean problem must of necessity be based on realities in Korea and the Far East. The Chinese Communist entrance

into the Korean war, well outlined in this book, illustrates that the "highly complex political problem" of Korea cannot be solved bilaterally by any two powers or outside of a general settlement of Far Eastern problems. The United States has been dealing with the Korean question through the United Nations for the most part; where political excursions outside this framework have been attempted, they have not been very successful. This book, "concerned with the use made of the United Nations," clearly charts some of the possible moves which can be made and some of the difficulties which may be encountered within the United Nations. Thus it is a valuable reference volume for both those interested in Korea and in the United Nations.

SHANNON McCUNE

University of Massachusetts

ALLAN B. COLE (Ed.). *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955*. Pp. xxix, 265. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

The cumbersome title of this work (for one thing, why not call a war a war?) indicates both the importance of the subject and the standpoint from which it is approached. The documentary history seems to be a popular form of scholarly writing today, presumably because it involves largely editorial functions and requires little in the way of synthetic or critical power. The present volume displays both the merits and the very real dangers of the documentary approach, as well as what seems to the reviewer an excessive propensity for diplomatic details.

With the choice of documents there is little reason to quarrel, except that some of the purely diplomatic ones might have been omitted in favor of certain important documents not included, such for example as the speeches by Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh at Hanoi on March 7, 1946 explaining their reasons for having negotiated with the French. One is also troubled by the fact that the authenticity of certain documents (such as a set of instructions to Chinese Communist personnel going to Vietnam) apparently rests entirely on the au-

thority of the Department of State. That is not to say that the authenticity of these documents is suspect, but merely that further proof would be welcome.

The commentaries which preface the various sections of the book seem to the reviewer to offer an excessive amount of undigested diplomatic detail, much of which hinders rather than helps the reader. For example, the discussion of the Geneva Conference almost totally misses the main feature of the negotiations, the fact that Communist China not only dominated them but also forced Ho Chi Minh to accept a considerably less favorable settlement than nearly every one felt that he was entitled, on the basis of the military situation, to expect. Why? Peking was anxious to appear as a champion of "peaceful coexistence," and it wanted to prevent the Viet Minh from growing too strong.

In sum, the documents in this book will be useful to those with the necessary knowledge to use them. The commentaries should be handled with care. One hopes that some one will undertake to continue the great work of Devillers, which is dismissed a trifle patronizingly in the bibliography, from 1952 down to the present. The author of such a work would find the book under review a considerable help.

HAROLD C. HINTON

Georgetown University

F. JAY TAYLOR. *The United States and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*. Pp. 288. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. \$5.00.

Dr. Taylor's exhaustive and interesting study might well be read in conjunction with Claude G. Bowers' *My Mission to Spain* (New York, 1954). Where Bowers' book emphasizes the civil war in Spain as seen through the eyes of an historian-ambassador, Dr. Taylor's account is devoted to the reaction of America to that war, to the Embargo joint resolution of January 1937 and the Neutrality Act of the same year, to the conflicting pressures to keep or to revoke the Embargo, to the cold war between pro-Loyalist and pro-Franco factions.

In his account of a controversy which aroused such a high degree of emotion

among so many millions of Americans, it is clear that, like ex-Ambassador Bowers', Dr. Taylor's sympathies lie with the Spanish Republic and that he is something less than convinced of the wisdom of the Embargo legislation. Nevertheless, his account is calm, scholarly and unbiased and lets the record speak for itself.

For that record, the author has relied in main upon two types of material: newspapers, periodicals, books and pamphlets falling into the period of approximately 1936-40, and, therefore, contemporaneous with his subject; and documentary and manuscript material becoming available about a decade after the end of the Spanish war. In particular, he has made good use of diplomatic correspondence in the Department of State archives, including consular reports, dispatches and memoranda; of captured German foreign policy documents; and of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt "Official Files" from the Hyde Park collection. This new material helps to pin down many specific points, but it reveals few secrets. It is surprising how little the material appears to modify the broad picture of the facts reported by competent newspapermen writing at the time of the event. Dr. Taylor has not written revisionist history, but his thorough examination of materials and his scholarly analysis and interpretation make it probable that his book will be basically the standard treatment of the subject.

Like many who have examined the issue, Dr. Taylor finds the public position of President Roosevelt on the Spanish Embargo issue inconsistent with his general philosophy and sympathies—particularly so in light of Mrs. Roosevelt's statement that "... Franklin knew quite well he wanted the democratic (that is Loyalist) government to be successful." But the pressure for the Embargo was too strong, and in this instance, Roosevelt (to use the scheme of analysis of a recent biographer) played the role of the Fox rather than that of the Lion. Most important pressures in Dr. Taylor's account appear to be the influence of Great Britain (then in her Chamberlain phase), the religious pressure (though in fact American Catholics were rather evenly divided as to the merits of the conflicting

parties in Spain), and in particular the predominance of isolationist sentiment in the United States and the widespread belief that it was practicable to "legislate neutrality."

To those who remember the emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding the Spanish Civil War and to younger readers who may wonder what it was all about, Dr. Taylor's account should prove to be a rewarding experience.

HUGH J. PARRY

Paris

HENRY PELLING. *America and the British Left: From Bright to Bevan*. Pp. x, 174. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$3.50.

This volume, first published in England and now in the United States, traces the development of British Left-Wing political thought—first Liberal and Radical, and later also Socialist—relative to the United States from the controversial days of the Civil War to the equally controversial period of the New Deal and the Second War. It was written by a Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, and consists of a series of studies of particular issues in British policies which throw light on contemporary views of America. The studies, however, make no attempt to "assess the 'impact' of America in relation to other factors in British politics: and the reader should beware of overestimating the importance of that influence from the selective evidence here presented." Mr. Pelling's research at various American universities and libraries was facilitated by a Smith-Mundt Fellowship which permitted him a year's study in this country.

This is a literary canvas which begins with John Bright (1811-89), millowner and Quaker, Radical M.P. (1843-89), and strong supporter of the North in the Civil War but who never visited the United States; it concludes with Aneurin Bevan (1897-), miner, Labor M.P. since 1929, who has not crossed the Atlantic since 1934, and includes a wide range of British Liberals, Radicals, and Socialists. Excellent biographical data and footnotes are provided by the author. The work throughout is of a scholarly nature, but the style recommends itself to the average reader who is

interested in enlarging his knowledge of the prominent people composing the Left Wing of British politics from 1865 forward.

The announced purpose of Mr. Pelling's book is to demonstrate how the fund of Radical good will for America and its institutions, contrasting with the prejudices of the "educated" classes in the mid-nineteenth century, gradually disappeared in the succeeding decades. In the 1950's the majority portion of the so-called "anti-American" feeling was to be found among the adherents of the Left in British politics. The "cooling-off" process, however, was not unique to Great Britain. Radicals of other countries to some extent at least fell under the spell of enthusiasm for the United States and went through many of the same stages of disillusionment. The diverse factors which made for a change in attitude on the part of Britain included the enormous growth in American industry after the Civil War (which ended the Jeffersonian ideal for a commonwealth based on much simplicity), the increasing participation of America in world politics (which deprived its statesmen of the reputation for disinterested diplomacy derived from the policy of isolation), and the increasing restrictions placed on immigration (which signified the closing of the "golden door" mentioned on the inscription of the Statue of Liberty).

The further development of British Socialism is described as well as its alliance with British trade union leadership at a time when the latter had come to harbor grave fears concerning the growth of industrial monopoly in the States. No comparable alliance of Left-Wing forces was effected in America itself. The last two chapters of this interesting book concern the 1930's and the post-World War II period. They stress the reversal of the old Radical attitude to America, with Socialist ideas leading British workers to distrust American capitalism. "Only the very much more pragmatic view of the British trade union leadership," in the author's opinion, "prevented these suspicions from seriously affecting Anglo-American relations in the years after the war when the Labor Party was in power."

Mr. Pelling concludes that a further change of attitude is indicated "provided

that recent trends are not thrown out of balance by unforeseeable world events." He foresees a more realistic assessment of American society by British Left-Wing thinkers and political leaders. Moreover, he emphasizes that although Anglo-American relations have been subjected to heavy strain in the last decade, principally arising from the different approach of the two countries to Far Eastern problems, "the alliance with America remains, and is likely to remain, as the foundation of British foreign policy."

MARY E. MURPHY

Los Angeles State College

B. S. KEIRSTEAD with the assistance of MURIEL ARMSTRONG. *Canada in World Affairs, September 1951 to October 1953*. Pp. xi, 268. Toronto: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1956. \$4.25.

This volume, one in a series published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, is much more than a record of Canada's external relations during two critical years. It is an interpretative account and a reasoned analysis of Canadian foreign policy from 1951 to 1953, written by B. S. Keirstead, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Toronto and a frequent commentator on international affairs for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Taking the position that foreign policy is not simply a series of separate ad hoc decisions but a set of decisions within a framework of goals and principles, Mr. Keirstead outlines the objectives of Canadian foreign policy. First among these is a stable and peaceful world in which, for the short run, security is provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the hope of an eventual settlement negotiated from a strong Western bargaining position. A second goal is the economic recovery of Western Europe and especially of Great Britain, not merely as a matter of sentiment but also because of the importance of the British market to the Canadian economy. In addition, there is a deep Canadian interest in the independence and the economic progress of the

democratic nations of Southeast Asia, an interest stemming partly from Commonwealth ties, partly from the need to contain Communism, and partly from the hope that a strong rapport may be established between Asiatic and European culture. Finally, Canada supports the strengthening of all international bodies, especially the United Nations.

The techniques through which these goals may be attained are classified by the author as political or diplomatic, military, and economic; the greater part of the book is concerned with the application of these techniques to the problems involved in the conclusion of the Korean War, the efforts to establish an effective defensive structure in Western Europe through the European Defense Community and NATO, and the economic consequences of rearmament. Throughout his discussion, he keeps before the reader those internal determinants of policy that restrict the freedom of choice of the policy maker—the regional nature of the Canadian economy, the limitations imposed by the Canadian federal system, and the multicultural pattern of the society.

Along with his analysis of Canadian policy, Mr. Keirstead provides for the American reader a valuable opportunity to see ourselves and our policies as others see us. He indicates the distaste felt by Canadians of all parties for the manifestations of McCarthyism in the United States; he expresses the fears of Canadians that the forces of "non-modern" Republicanism might secure the adoption of American tariff policies harmful to Canada; he criticizes the official American attitude toward Syngman Rhee and our oversimplification of the problems of Japan and Germany. He stresses the inadequacy of military assistance as the principal means of support for the free states of Asia and underlines the importance of adequate provisions for economic improvement: "We have been sending an infant with a water pistol to shoot down a man-eating tiger, and we have been disputing as to whether we have supplied him with enough water."

All of this is done in the spirit of constructive criticism, and he emphasizes that disagreements are unusual occurrences in Canadian-American relations and are con-

sequently those that require analysis and understanding.

KENNETH E. MILLER

Hunter College

KLAUS KNORR. *The War Potential of Nations*. Pp. viii, 310. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

The purpose of this book is to explore and clarify the underlying bases of war potential in modern times. "Potential" is defined as "a collective term for all the relevant elements of military strength other than the armed forces themselves." The emphasis on war potential, rather than military forces in being at a particular time, means that the author's main analysis relates either to a war of extended duration or to an extended period of military build-up as a preparation for possible war. Other war situations are dealt with only obliquely.

A leading feature of the work is the recognition of war potential as a much broader concept than merely economic or industrial strength. Potential military power, says the author, is determined by three things: economic capacity, administrative competence, and motivation for war. The purpose of the book is "identification and appraisal of numerous variable conditions" that affect these components of war potential. Eventually it should be possible, the author believes, to devise concrete and specific ways of measuring the war potential of nations, although admittedly the present work does not go far toward achieving this end.

The economic aspects of war potential are presented in considerable detail, covering such "standard" categories as structure of population, foreign trade and war potential, the analysis of National Product components and necessary changes in these components in a war economy, and so forth. There is an interesting and informative discussion of the importance of flexibility in an economy in order to realize the maximum war potential. The treatment of administrative capacity and the will to fight leaves the reader with a certain sense of frustration, which may be inevitable in view of the perhaps necessary vagueness of the suggestions for measuring these elusive factors.

The most fundamental question about the book is the usefulness of analyzing the capacity of a nation to wage a long drawn out war in view of the changed world conditions in the nuclear age. As the author is fully aware, war potential in the traditional sense may not be significant in the outcome of an all-out nuclear war, which may devastate one or both combatants in a very short time. Nevertheless, he argues, a study of war potential along traditional lines may be warranted by the possibility that the combatants, each possessing nuclear power of totally destructive proportions, may refrain from using it in a major war, or may by tacit or open agreement limit the use of these weapons to strictly military targets. One may question the likelihood that a war in which the major powers are in open combat will continue for very long to be governed by such restraint; aside from this question, what seems more likely is that for some time wars may be local actions of a limited character where the major powers will not be overtly pitted against each other. Under these circumstances, the major determinants of success may be substantially different from those treated in this volume.

EARL C. HALD

Washington, D. C.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

HARRY B. ELLIS. *Heritage of the Desert: The Arabs and the Middle East*. Pp. vii, 311. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1956. \$5.00.

Mr. Ellis, author of *Heritage of the Desert*, maintains that comprehension of the internal and external problems of the Middle East depends upon an understanding of the Arab people and an appreciation of their heritage. As Middle East correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, Mr. Ellis demonstrates, by means of the material he presents, that he is well qualified to write on the Middle East. His experience was not gained vicariously, but rather was the result of several years spent in the field—traveling, observing, and in-

interviewing oases dwellers, Bedouin nomads, peasants, and Arab leaders.

In keeping with this philosophy Mr. Ellis reviews, in the first six chapters, the history of the Arabs, their various migrations, the building of an extensive Arab empire, the Mongol invasion and subsequent disintegration of the empire, the conquest and rule of the Ottoman Turks, the penetration of Western influence, the rise of nationalism, and the establishment and failure of British and French mandate rule in the Arab world.

In the succeeding three chapters, the author discusses the search for unity among the Arab states, the impact of westernization on the Middle East, and Soviet infiltration into this area. Mr. Ellis points out that despite a common language and a common religion any real sort of unity among the Arab states does not exist. Inter-Arab rivalries have caused further dissension to the point that the Arab states are not even today in accord as to their attitudes toward Israel. In the author's opinion, unity is not possible until each state coordinates its individual programs toward a common goal. The impact of westernization on the Middle East has been in part responsible for the confused relationships prevalent among the Arab states. It has, postulates Mr. Ellis, caused a rebellion among the young men educated in Western schools against their feudal overlords who are, more often than not, the political leaders. These revolutionists favor a unified Arab world. Westernization has further led to Arab suspicion and distrust of the Western world which, in turn, has opened the way for Soviet offers of new trade agreements, technical aid, and industrial and agricultural equipment to the Arab states. These offers, with seemingly "no strings attached," appear more attractive to the Arabs than military alliances or economic agreements with the Western powers who overtly covet the strategic location and the rich oil reserves of the Middle East.

Mr. Ellis devotes the remaining five chapters to the problems of Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt with the same thoroughness, clarity, and unbiased appraisal that he employed in the

previous chapters. This book should prove to be interesting and informative to the layman, interpretive to the scholar, and quite revealing to those who formulate foreign policy.

GEORGE T. RENNER, III
Arizona State College
Tempe

HAZEM ZAKI NUSEIBEH. *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*. Pp. xiii, 227. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. \$4.00.

Arab nationalism has been on the whole badly served by its interpreters to the West. Perhaps this is because it has not yet become fully articulate. Its spokesmen not only express for the most part a local reaction to a particular set of events, they tend to phrase it in terms of an emotionally colored vision of the Arab past and the Arab present and seldom set the lives and aspirations of the Arab peoples within a coherent pattern of ideas. "The literature of Arab nationalism," remarks the author of this book, "is noted for its dearth of political theory." He has accordingly set out to elucidate its content, in the light of the past, and its legacies, the impact of Western concepts, the gropings of various Arab writers, and the episodic discontinuity of political life in the Arab countries. Inevitably, the book as it proceeds takes on more and more the character of a program rather than of an exposition, and a program derived from the special standpoint of its author and his conviction that "nationalism represents the totality of any people's experiences." More especially, as a non-Muslim, he is concerned to diminish or remove the factors of history and tradition which divide the non-Muslim minorities from the Muslim majority. The Arab-Islamic legacy (although "it has been outstripped by the tremendous advances in the various domains of the sciences") is conceded to retain significance for Arab nationalism "in order to discover its own essence and sources of strength," but only until adequate formulations are forthcoming of the spiritual values of modern civilization. In order to convert an Islamic into an Arab tradition "in many instances little more is required than a change of

epithet." This belief that intellectual reassessment can change the real forces that have shaped the Arab peoples is repeatedly asserted or implied. "The case is strong for the separation of state and religion. . . . If properly argued, it stands a reasonable chance of winning substantial popular support." On the other hand, Dr. Nuseibeh does not conceal the many uncertainties and dilemmas which have beset both the essays of Arab theorists and the experiments in constitutional democracy in the Arab countries. For their solution he looks to the cultivation of "scientific attitudes" in planning both social reform and economic development and hopes to find in a restoration of the balance between "the spiritual and the material, the political, the economic and the social" that coherent synthesis which will reintegrate Arab national life.

H. A. R. GIBB

Harvard University

E. M. H. LLOYD. *Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 1940-45*. Pp. xiv, 375. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

This timely book deals with methods used by the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) to assure an adequate food supply to the peoples of the Middle East during World War II. The work ranges over a score or more countries and branches out into a number of related fields—strategic, political, financial, and technological. Because of drought the people of the Middle East villages were threatened with starvation, yet badly needed shipping could not be diverted from the war effort. Food supplies had to be obtained by expanding production, centralizing reserves, and preventing hoarding. Cereal-collection schemes were successfully launched in Egypt, Syria, Persia, and Iraq. In Egypt a million acres were shifted from cotton to food production. The armed forces of nearly two million men obtained their cereals from the outside and, with the exception of some Egyptian rice, maintained a flour ration of a half kilo per man.

Ceylon needed rice because other exporting areas were occupied by Japan. Egypt

could have met this demand, but she chose to increase her home consumption by twenty-five per cent. Because of sugar rationing in North America and Britain and increased production in Egypt, the Middle East consumption was maintained at pre-war levels. The key to anti-inflation lay in control of food prices, but it was equally true that collection and distribution of home-produced food depended on controlling inflation. "The two were in fact interdependent and formed part of a combined policy." All this had to be done in a group of countries where there had been no previous concerted action or self-discipline. Also the area was subject to heavy military expenditure in a crucial theatre of war. In addition readers will find here a probing discussion of the connection between inflation and urban food distribution and the methods used to check inflation by the sales of gold.

Since the war, both agricultural and food production have risen twenty-two per cent and population increased about the same. Therefore, production per head has remained at prewar levels. The margin between population growth and the growth of food production is very narrow. "Indeed, technical aid from the outside can contribute little unless it is accompanied by simultaneous advances in education, political stability, and social reforms inside each country." The fact that there was no runaway inflation during the war and hence no violent devaluation afterward has helped the Middle East greatly in the stabilization of its economy.

JOSEPH E. WILLIAMS

Stanford University

LLOYD A. FALLERS. *Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People*. Pp. xiv, 283. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons. No date. 30 s net.

The Soga are a Bantu-speaking people of eastern Uganda. Beginning with their first contact with the British in the middle of the nineteenth century, they have changed from a group of autonomous and mutually hostile kingdoms to a unified part of the Uganda Protectorate, practicing elec-

toral democracy and remoulding their governmental institutions rapidly and steadily as a part of the Uganda state. Much of this change seems to have been in direct response to the introduction of Western concepts of a civil service bureaucracy, political democracy, and social unity. This carefully executed ethnography examines the process of institutional modification and the stress and inconsistencies within tribal society that have been its accompaniment.

As a case study in cultural change, this little book has something for nearly every student of men and their societies. Those interested in leadership will find much of value in the account of the roles of headman and chief under traditional conditions and under colonial administration. The colonial administrator will learn a good deal from Dr. Faller's attention to British officials as both policy enforcers and teachers of a new way of life. Political scientists will be a bit startled at the extent to which one form of social organization can be transmuted into another by democratic rather than totalitarian techniques. Anthropologists will welcome the fullness of the ethnographic materials on another Bantu group.

Psychologists are likely to pose the crucial question: Why did it not all happen long ago? What social cement held the Soga kingdoms together before the British introduced new ideas and helped to implement them into societal forms that permitted a more peaceable and productive way of life? For the strains and inconsistencies that have been the by-products of unification seem far less sharp than those built into Soga social organization during the centuries before the Protectorate.

For Soga organization followed the two lines of kinship and the political state. Within kinship groups, egalitarian relationships prevailed and were strongly reinforced. Within the state system, however, relationships were markedly hierarchical. The sources of conflict are obvious. One finds it difficult to treat others as kinsmen (or nonkinsmen) in one situation and still practice impartial governmental administration. The acceptance of leadership from nonkinsmen is fraught with conflict of loy-

alty. The recruitment of governmental official personnel is subject to nepotistic impulses of uncommon strength involving a particularly large group.

While the superimposition of Western bureaucratic notions and forms of organization amounts to the introduction of institutions in conflict with both the kinship and state systems of the pre-Protectorate Soga, it is not difficult to find the rewards for the eventual and even the rapid acceptance of these new ways. The reinforcements mediating diffusion are relatively easy to understand. But the preservation of traditional Soga society in the face of the inherent stresses resulting from its dual organization remains something of a puzzle. It is a puzzle well worth unraveling. Some basic aspects of group solidarity and cultural cohesion may well be revealed in the process.

EDWARD J. SHOEN, JR.

Columbia University

EUROPE

J. EDWARD GERALD. *The British Press Under Government Economic Controls*. Pp. xiv, 235. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$4.50.

The issues of press freedom under various economic controls in the Western democracies have been of increasing concern to the managers of mass media and to the theorists of journalism and political science for the past two decades. Regulation of some of the economic activities of the mass media tentatively, but ineffectively, emerged in the United States in the 1930's, but in Britain the government economic controls, imposed in 1939, have been variously continued since the conclusion of World War II to this day. In this volume, Professor J. Edward Gerald, of the University of Minnesota, who had earlier analyzed the situation in the United States in *The Press and the Constitution*, has provided an excellent detailed description, replete with facts, concerning the British press experience since 1939. Moreover, he has written an incisive commentary on the essential issues involved and on the significance of controls. When a government

agency allocates available paper differentially to various papers in terms of the societal functions which the papers are assumed to perform, and similarly allocates to book publishers, that agency has assumed some essential control of the flow of the mass media on the basis of administrative assessments of culture values. Yet, Professor Gerald concludes that the press, in times of emergency, of monetary controls, and of materials shortages, cannot claim exemption from all economic regulation, but that the regulations should be vigorously limited in order to maintain press freedom. He states that "society can very well afford to work out ways to maintain the press as a little-regulated island of private enterprise in the welfare state, regardless of what it does with other parts of the business system, for the sake of having an independent system of mass communication. The press does not require exemption from social security laws, minimum wage or tax laws of uniform application, or exemption from reasonable regulation of the nature and content of advertising. But as a working principle, the freedom of the press precludes an ad valorem tax on advertising and protects the definitions of advertising as an expense which the advertiser may deduct in arriving at net income for tax purposes and it should prevent arbitrary manipulation, through regulation of imports or use of monetary controls, of the supply and price of newsprint and of heavy machinery for use by the press."

The sections of this volume deal with how newsprint controls were administered, newsprint control in peacetime, effect of the government controls on representative newspapers, what happened to ownership and management under economic controls, books under economic controls, efforts to improve performance of the press, and the author's chapters on press freedom and economic controls. This is a sound and well-balanced study which attempts to assess the issues involved in the maintenance of a reasonably free press in an increasingly controlled economy; an issue of great practical, as well as theoretical complexity. It is written with journalistic clarity.

WILLIAM ALBIG

University of Illinois

BURTON PAULU. *British Broadcasting: Radio and Television in the United Kingdom*. Pp. xii, 457. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$6.00.

Dr. Paulu presents a comprehensive and sympathetic study of the British Broadcasting Corporation in all its phases: its background, constitution, and structure; its finances and technical facilities; its staff and its programs; its services at home and abroad, and its television. And to round out the study, the BBC's only British competitor, the newly formed commercial Independent Television Authority (ITA), comes in for its share of analysis and description. Yet, this enormous field is covered clearly, with notes and bibliography, and in eminently readable English. Even the chapter devoted to finances, despite its frightening tables of figures, can be read with understanding!

"BBC" actually comprises three "networks": The "Light Programme," appealing to 70 per cent of the audience; the "Third Programme," appealing to 1 per cent only and "for the educated rather than educational"; and the "Home Service" for the balance. The last is the senior service and is regarded as the keystone of BBC broadcasting. The "Light Programme," according to Dr. Paulu, is "more similar in concept and performance to America's national networks" than either of the others. The "Third" is obviously designed for a very limited audience. But of the "Home Service" Dr. Paulu writes: "If any really 'whole' person should unfortunately be condemned to listening to just one radio network for the rest of his life, he could do no better than to take the BBC's Home Service. . . ." This is high praise indeed.

While television by BBC has so far been similar in spirit to BBC broadcasting, the inauguration of the first independent, commercial television station, 22 September 1955, brought a new kind of blood into the broadcasting picture. Nevertheless, the outcome of the novel competition is not yet determinable. BBC continues its way, and ITA is busy blazing a trail—often with markers imported from the United States.

Dr. Paulu's book, though most scantily sketched here, deserves careful reading, not

only by radio and television enthusiasts but also by a broad segment of the general public. Its occasional comparisons between American and British broadcasting principles and practices are to the point and helpful. Above all, the understanding Dr. Paulu reveals of so diverse an approach to the use of mass media in the public interest is refreshing. This reviewer can only hope that some publisher of paperbacks some day soon may want to put out a slightly condensed version of *British Broadcasting* for popular consumption. The book fully deserves the widest possible circulation.

PHILIP L. BARBOUR

Norwalk, Conn.

LEWIS J. EDINGER. *German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era*. Pp. xiii, 329. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956. \$4.25.

This is a scholarly and readable case study of the attempt of the exiled leaders of a great political party to organize, near the boundaries of Hitler's Third Reich, a revolutionary movement against the Nazi dictatorship. Dr. Edinger possesses a remarkable knowledge of the German Socialist movement and also of Marxism-Leninism. He presents the results of his research with superior dialectical skill.

The volume is divided into nine chapters, the first three dominated by the coming of the Nazi revolution, the organization of the exiled committee of the German Social Democratic party, and the subsequent reorganization of the party's policies. The remaining chapters form a study of the failure of the 1934 unity manifesto of the party executive, the United Front episode, the diaspora of the executive officers after the fall of France, Ollenhauer's statesman-like organization of the executive committee in London, and a concluding analysis of "revolution by remote control."

The author shows in detail the attacks on the party executive by revolutionary and Communist leaders, as well as other left wing groups. He emphasizes correctly the importance of the *New Beginning* pamphlet. The vicissitudes of the party executive are traced from the first organization

in Prague through the movement to Paris and the final organization of the London committee.

Dr. Edinger explains the party's tasks to awaken the forces of freedom in Germany, to plan a revolution against nazism, to secure world support, in the name of "the other Germany," for the overthrow of German and international fascism, and to prepare the way for a future German Socialist state. He indicates the failure of the various techniques which the party executive used against the Nazis, including Lenin's organization of the Communist revolutionary movement. Meanwhile, the oppositional slogan of the Comintern, "every communist a leader of five social democratic workers," had its effects both within the Hitler Reich and Western Europe. The German working class in spite of all differences among Marxists was, however, saved from the attempt to impose an alien authoritarian and dogmatic pattern upon the German social democracy. Finally, the author asserts that history was on the side of the exiled Social Democratic leaders, who returned fully justified in their rejection of a united front and uncompromised by any alliance with the Communists.

Dr. Edinger has difficulty with a working definition of political exiles. He disagrees with the "political bias" of Churchill, while ignoring Guido de Ruggiero and F. L. Reinhold, whose "Exiles and Refugees in American History" was published in *THE ANNALS*. The author is correct in stating that not more than one-sixth of the anti-Nazi emigration—about 50,000 persons—were exiles "in the true sense of the word." But he underestimates first the political cohesion of the social democratic masses who remained in Germany, and second the strength of those Germans, independent of any Marxist ideology, who in the national elections from 1919 to 1933 voted with the Social Democratic party.

This well informed book is a comprehensive study of the leaders of the majority of the fifty thousand who were driven from Germany by the National Socialist revolution of 1933. It is scholarly, objective, well-written, and the result of a critical and exhaustive analysis of the available sources. Dr. Edinger's study should

be read by all students of modern Germany.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ

Stanford University

JOHN GEORGE STOEISSINGER. *The Refugee and the World Community*. Pp. vi, 239. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$4.50.

The purpose of this book is to examine the role of international organization as a technique for dealing with the refugee problem.

The refugee problem has always been with us, but never so acutely. Nonconformists have had two choices—flight or conversion, but the twentieth century practically closed these escapes. Hitler's new racism made conversion almost impossible, while immigration restrictions made flight difficult.

The first response of the world community came with the Soviet Revolution in 1917, when voluntary organizations gave relief. In 1921 the League of Nations appointed Fridtjof Nansen to deal with the problem.

The severest refugee crisis came when the Nazi regime touched off the anti-Semitic atrocities. There was no escape through conversion: the German Jew could not become an "Aryan." The democracies took no firm stand, and the extermination policy of the Nazis was tacitly tolerated.

World War II worsened the tragedy. Millions fled before the Nazi armies. Then came upheavals in Asia through the conquests of Japan. These mass dislocations necessitated action, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was set up.

When the United Nations appeared in 1946, it was faced by this problem. After long debate, the International Refugee Organization was launched; the first experiment of international scope where a determined effort was made to protect the refugee. The IRO did much to repatriate and resettle refugees in new lands. This was difficult because of rigid immigration restrictions. Our Congress would make no change in the quota law of 1924. Despite all obstacles, the IRO rendered signal service. Some governments admitted refugees

on purely utilitarian grounds: they wanted strong laborers, while intellectuals were excluded. After much persuasion certain countries took refugees out of undiluted humanitarian considerations.

The IRO had financial difficulties and ceased operation in 1952. Refugees are still leaving countries where freedom has become extinct. There was Israel, India, and most recently Hungary. The IRO achieved a partial solution of an apparently permanent problem.

Since then several temporary agencies appeared, but their accomplishments have been few. Of all the agencies, the IRO has been outstanding; it has been most unified and integrated in its approach.

The book is an objective presentation of a significant issue in international relations. It is well-documented. It is no polemic but points out clearly some of the problems we still have to face.

WILLIAM C. SMITH

Dana College

MICHAEL BALFOUR and JOHN MAIR. *Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945-1946*. Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946. Pp. xii, 390. London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. \$7.70.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs has indicated its estimate of the importance of the Allied occupations of Germany and Austria following World War II by including this volume in its well-known Survey Series. Michael Balfour, who served on the staff of the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany during the years 1945-1947, was commissioned to undertake the section dealing with Germany. John Mair, a member of the Political Division of the British Element of the Commission for Austria during the period 1945-1948, was invited to prepare the briefer study relating to Austria. In both studies reliance had to be placed on such American official papers as were available and on unofficial sources in view of the decision of the British Government that no access to official British papers would be permitted until the official histories had

been published. Since the project had to be fitted into the pattern of the survey of international affairs covering the period 1939-1946 conducted by the Royal Institute, the formal scope was limited to the years 1945 and 1946. Actually, however, such a limitation was not strictly enforced, and the German study particularly includes numerous references to events of 1947 and 1948, thus making it a survey covering most of the military government period of the occupation.

Although these are not detailed and technical analyses of the tangled skein of events involved in the occupations of Germany and Austria—the German section runs to 265 pages and the Austrian to 111 pages—they are, nevertheless, important contributions to the literature in these fields. Admirably organized, lucidly presented, and generously footnoted, they present well-balanced and, in perspective, over-all accounts of the early period of the occupations which could not easily be found elsewhere. Despite the participation of their authors in the British section of the occupations, they impress a reader as notably impartial, considering the highly controversial character of what took place. Virtually all aspects of the occupations are dealt with, but their most important contribution is probably the presentation of the attitudes and relations of the four occupying powers. The Balfour study should be especially interesting to students of the occupation of Germany because of the light thrown on the Russian record. The authors were obviously handicapped by not having access to the official records in Britain, but they have made good use of other sources and their personal associations and observations have to a considerable extent made up for such a lack.

HAROLD ZINK

Ohio State University

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN. *Germany's Eastern Neighbours: Problems Relating to the Oder-Neisse Line and the Czech Frontier Regions*. Pp. x, 309. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$4.80.

This book, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, produced an avalanche of criticism in Western Germany. The objections range from

polemical articles in learned journals to coarse and insulting outbursts in newspapers. The reason for this vexation is simple: Miss Wiskemann presented in her book an objective history and evaluation of the Oder-Neisse line as the de facto frontier between Poland and Germany. Her findings not only do not support recent West German views and claims, but bluntly expose them as revisionist propaganda known from past times. In addition, Miss Wiskemann's strongest documentation is based mainly on German sources.

The record of complicated wartime diplomacy leading to the establishment of this frontier had been diligently compiled and annotated. The documentation leaves no doubt about British and American agreement to give Poland the area up to the Oder and Neisse rivers.

The tragic but unavoidable population transfer after the war is broadly discussed. The author rightfully condemns the mistakes made during the resettlement and at the same time recalls to the Germans much worse precedents when Hitler, with the tacit approval of the German people, resettled and destroyed millions of Poles in order to produce *Lebensraum* for the Germans.

At present there are in Germany three kinds of "expellees": first, those who accepted Hitler's invitation during the war and came voluntarily, in expectation of sharing the benefits of Hitler's war; they were settled mainly in Poland and left or were removed after Hitler's defeat. To the second and largest group belong Germans who fled or were expelled from the area east of the Oder-Neisse line and from the Sudeten area. Finally, the third group are refugees from the Soviet-occupied Eastern zone of Germany.

Miss Wiskemann shows that these newcomers are both a burden and an asset for Western Germany. The booming industry absorbed all who were able and willing to work. Particularly the Sudeten Germans contributed greatly to the recovery and recent economic prosperity of the country. Only the agrarian element creates difficulties in the process of integration. But these are rather an outcome of the obsolete agrarian structure of Germany where land

reform is long overdue. Evaluated in long-term perspective, the newcomers are definitely a biological and social asset for the twice-defeated nation.

The objective and sober approach to complex problems and developments in the border area between Teutons and Western Slavs makes this book a valuable contribution to the understanding of a hotly debated problem of our days. One could object that not knowing the Polish and Czech languages Miss Wiskemann was confined primarily to German sources and their use of Polish and Czech materials. But just this deficiency provides another advantage for the book: based on German sources the author could elucidate just that which German propaganda publications attempt to obscure.

WITOLD S. SWORAKOWSKI

Stanford University

SIEGFRIED KRACAUER and PAUL L. BERKMAN. *Satellite Mentality: Political Attitudes and Propaganda Susceptibilities of Non-Communists in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia*. Pp. 194. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$4.00.

The Bureau of Applied Social Research has undertaken a qualitative analysis of 300-odd interviews with escapees from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The interviews were conducted in 1951-52, and samples of them were integrated into the study under review. Some of the major headings are: the interpretation of the Soviet yoke, workers' discontent, captive minds, the characterization of nominal and convinced Communists, strong points of the regime, strengths and weaknesses of totalitarian propaganda, forms of resistance, liberation through war, responses to Western communications, and metamorphoses of hope. The material grouped under these challenging titles consists of the appraisals of escapees supplemented by comments and evaluations by the authors.

It is a matter of regret that almost five years have elapsed between the holding of the interviews and the publication of this study. But the unexplained delay has its advantages. While the chapters reflect the thinking of people in Stalin's last years, it

is illuminating to see in the light of more recent events the degree of accuracy of the various opinions and evaluations put forward. Furthermore, in spite of the many important transformations which have occurred in the Soviet orbit since the interviews were held and the samples selected, most of the passages of the book remain surprisingly fresh. It appears from the study that people were less affected by totalitarian propaganda than was generally supposed five years ago. The attitude of some of the escapees was colored by wishful thinking but many of them revealed common sense. In some cases appraisals by the escapees proved more correct in the light of subsequent events than were the cautious evaluations of their statements by the authors. For example, recent events in Poland and Hungary seem to justify the escapees' opinions about the very small number of convinced Communists more than they do the reservations on this point added by the authors (p. 57).

The study as a whole is a provocative presentation of how people feel and react in regard to various factors under Communist dictatorship. It is readable and in many respects gives a more realistic picture of life in satellite countries than do speculative studies on the same subject. But the method applied has its shortcomings. In the opinion of this reviewer, the over-all picture could have been made clearer and more realistic if the appraisals and evaluations of the various questions had taken place separately for each country. Although attitudes towards the Communist regimes were influenced in the case of each person by a great many factors, in a single country at least the national background and political climate would have been the same. For a great variety of reasons, the attitudes towards and expectations from Soviet Russian Communism were different in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the postwar years. The process of sovietization and communization also presented important variations and necessarily provoked different reactions. Although the differing attitudes of Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian escapees are pointed out many times by the authors (for example, pp. 97, 99, 100, 102-3, 105-6, 129-

30, 136, 143), the fact remains that the mixing of appraisals of individuals belonging to three greatly differing societies blurred the clarity of analysis and lowered the possible common denominators in the various categories. The over-all picture emerging from the samples included in the volume is somewhat clearer for Hungary than for Poland and Czechoslovakia. If the problems had been analyzed separately for the three countries, the final results would probably have offered a clearer picture for each country than the appraisals taken under a great number of headings from individuals with different national backgrounds. This method would have provided a more realistic basis for comparison on the national level.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

ASIA

MAURICE ZINKIN. *Development for Free Asia*. Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Pp. viii, 263. Fairlawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1956. \$4.50.

This book, by the author of *Asia and the West*, grew out of a paper written for the Kyoto conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1953. To it, Mr. Zinkin brought a considerable background of practical experience in India, first as a member of the Indian Civil Service and then on the staff of a large firm. The list of Indian consultants and critics in the Preface is an indication of his acquaintance with the personalities and problems of that country. There is appended a case study of government planning in India. Most of the illustrations adduced are drawn from Indian experience, but the principles they illuminate are of wider application.

This is one of the most realistic books yet written on the problems of economic development, and there is hardly a page without shrewd insights and convincing arguments. Mr. Zinkin does not deal in abstractions from a distance. He knows that development must be of, by, and for the people, and primarily the peasant.

After a preliminary part devoted to definition of the issues and to a sharp distinction between a vague craving for betterment and willingness to pay its price, the argument falls into three parts—economic, political, and social—with most space devoted to the latter.

Population he recognizes as a complication, but except for specific areas of limited resources, it is not an impossible obstacle. The rate of increase in most underdeveloped countries is much less than in the United States or the British Dominions.

The crucial question is how the spring may be touched that will set in motion the energies of self-improvement in village communities that for centuries have been steeped in illiteracy and inertia. Emphasis is laid on education and community development. The politician has a valuable role to play. He must lead, but if the underdeveloped countries are to retain their democratic institutions, he must also be re-elected. The bureaucracy also has much to contribute. Mr. Zinkin knows the weaknesses and the temptations to which both are prone, but realizes that there is an inevitable bias towards planning and state initiative. The peasant doesn't know enough and his resources are too limited to expect him to develop initiative and plan for himself.

Moreover, what he can do must be done within the broad framework of investment, savings and monetary policy, taxation, expenditure for public utilities and for productive enterprise. On all of these topics Mr. Zinkin has penetrating and wise observations.

Within the limits of a brief review it is not possible to summarize or appraise his argument. This is a book to be read and pondered. In the reviewer's judgment it is a notable contribution to the literature of the subject.

J. B. CONDLIFFE
University of California
Berkeley

KENNETH W. MORGAN (Ed.). *The Path of the Buddha: Buddhism Interpreted by Buddhists*. Pp. x, 432. New York: Ronald Press, 1956. \$5.00.

This volume, one of a series initiated by the National Council on Religion in Higher Education to promote better understanding of non-Christian religions, presents an account of Buddhism in the words of leading Buddhists in various Buddhist countries of Asia. The presentation is not a study in comparative religion but a straightforward presentation of the life and teachings of the Buddha, the spread and development of Buddhism during the past 2500 years, and the beliefs, attitudes, and religious practices of Buddhists in Southern Asia—Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and in the Mahayana countries: Tibet, China, and Japan.

The various writers depict graphically the daily life of the monks, the techniques of Buddhist meditation, popular customs and traditions at religious shrines, Buddhist art and scriptures, and many other aspects of that religious faith. Also, the wide variations in Buddhist theory and practice as found in the different sects are related.

The bibliography, besides including general secondary works on the two branches of Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, also lists translations of Buddhist writings.

The glossary includes many of the principal terms used in Buddhism, and, although it does not intend to be exhaustive, will aid the student who is beginning his study of Buddhism.

CECIL H. HOBBS

U. S. Library of Congress

CHITOSHI YANAGA. *Japanese People and Politics*. Pp. ix, 408. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1956. \$7.50.

Three general treatments of Japanese politics were published last year in the United States. This one is by a professor at Yale whose earlier work on modern Japanese history, *Japan Since Perry*, provided background for this interpretation of post-war and contemporary politics. Economizing on space devoted to conditions before and during the war—and even more on trends during the occupation period, the author skillfully conveys the historical depth of such institutions as patriarchy, the Emperor, and bureaucracy. Attention

is paid to the structure and functional realities of government under the Meiji Constitution of 1889, but present and continuing features are emphasized. Perhaps the recurrent comparisons and contrasts with practices in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States have been derived from Professor Yanaga's experience as a teacher. He tends to begin each section with political generalizations, to mention selected Western experience, and then to proceed with the Japanese subject matter.

This is intended as a textbook; indeed, some chapters (for example VII, VIII, and IX on the Cabinet and the Diet, and XIV–XVI dealing with economic planning, law and the judiciary, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) are saved from handbookishness only by the sense of vital processes which is conveyed. One can, for example, follow a hypothetical bill—it might just as well have been an actual one—through the drafting and legislative stages.

There is one chapter which deserves special laurels and wide reading. It is the third, discussing Japanese political behavior. This is a gem, for it brings to bear on politics insights into patterns of Japanese emotional life, psychology, and social relations.

All but one of the sixteen chapters, the thirteenth, dealing with bureaucracy, occur in clusters of three. The first group deals with culture and facts of life; the next triad treats organized forces, institutions, and constitutional structure; then come sections on executive and legislative organization and functions, followed by chapters describing the parties and the electoral process. The final three, which have been mentioned parenthetically above, are not the strongest in the book. Description of local government is almost wholly lacking, as is any mention of the Peace Treaty, Security Pact, the Administrative Agreement, and Mutual Security Act from the chapter on "Relations with the Outside World."

Points of difference in interpretation between author and reviewer probably arise chiefly from space limitations. For example, if Japan has been very receptive to foreign influences during certain long periods, the pendulum has also swung in the

other direction. The treatment of religious toleration in Japanese history might give an exaggerated impression, and latent ethnocentrism was hardly noted. Perhaps it is too much to say that the Left Socialists were or are the instruments of Sohyo (The General Council of Trade Unions). But these criticisms, to which should be added the few factual repetitions, do not basically detract from the high merit of *Japanese People and Politics*.

ALLAN B. COLE

The Fletcher School
Tufts University

PETER BERTON, PAUL LANGER, and RODGER SWEARINGEN. *Japanese Training and Research in the Russian Field*. Pp. xii, 266. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1956. \$4.00.

The extent of Japanese interest in and knowledge of the outside world, considering the remoteness of Japan from its main centers of creative activity, is often a source of wonderment to Westerners. This interest, however, has a very practical side. To be well-informed about Russia is to be forewarned against the traditional foe; to be familiar with foreign lands and peoples is indispensable to success in foreign trade on which Japan's survival is dependent. Moreover, the Japanese people, denied during three centuries of national seclusion the stimulus and broadening of world-wide contacts, are eager to make up for lost time.

The work under review provides a detailed and well-organized account of the development and extent of Japanese studies in the Russian field from their inception in the latter part of the eighteenth century to the present. These studies were born of Japanese government defense and strategic requirements, and, as far as Russia is concerned, are even more important today. Consequently they continued to expand until 1941 when war conditions caused a set back, resulting in a reduction of Japan's total personnel engaged therein to less than one half of that of the prewar peak. Nevertheless today the output of published material, we learn, substantially exceeds prewar production. We are also told that in popular interest in Russia, Japan ranks first among the nations out-

side the iron curtain; second after the United States in the number of research centers, teachers and students in this field; but surpassed also by Great Britain and West Germany in the volume and quantity of research.

The work is divided into three parts chronologically, and there are seven appendices. Part I deals with the period prior to the Bolshevik Revolution and is very brief. The division between Part II and Part III is V-J day (1945). Each of these two parts describes training, research, and political and cultural organizations rather fully. The final chapter presents a very useful "Summary and Conclusions," ending up with ten recommendations to Japanese scholars, which should, in the opinion of the present reviewer, prove very helpful. The appendices contain tables of contents of selected Japanese publications in the Russian field, programs of meetings and conferences on Russian literature and science, and a list of institutions and organizations interested in Russian subjects.

Only one minor criticism might be mentioned: in the transliteration of Japanese names, identification by the reader would be facilitated if the long *o* sound could be distinguished from the short *o* sound by a diacritical mark.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
South Miami, Fla.

LUCIAN W. PYE. *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning*. Pp. xvi, 369. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. \$6.00.

Mr. Lucian Pye, who is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at M.I.T., has made a welcome and careful effort to investigate the guerrilla warfare which has been going on in Malaya for nearly a decade. He undertook this study through field work in Malaya, where he interviewed surrendered "enemy personnel," collecting some sixty selected case histories, with the full cooperation of the British and Malayan authorities, and through the normal working processes of the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. This is a case study of the Malayan Communist party. It takes off from a discussion of Communist doctrine (Part I) which

is a useful summary especially in relation to the role of the peasantry and of geographical base areas in the Mao style. The author then places the MCP in its environmental setting through the various phases that took it through the war, the immediate postwar period, and the emergency or terrorist period (Part II). Two-thirds of the book (Part III) deals with the case histories, seeking to draw from them both specific and general conclusions as to the nature of their political behavior. In the final pages the author makes some suggestions about the problem of creating free and representative institutions in underdeveloped societies.

In these underdeveloped areas, argues Dr. Pye, many persons are losing their sense of identity with the traditional ways of life, and communism appeals most to those who have been affected by the impact of the West. The party offers a sense of personal security in an otherwise hostile and impersonal world; here they can find status, rank, advancement, and the respect of others. "The promise of knowledge is also a promise of action; a sense of futility can be replaced by the spirit of the activist" (p. 8). The Asian Communists are distinguished from other Asians by the fact that they reject their traditional values almost completely and have failed to identify themselves with the new way of life. Peoples' Liberation Communism has about it an extremist quality, within the general framework of world communism, which arises from excessive impatience, a sense of imminent success, and an impetuous drive for power.

A careful examination of sixty case histories provides unusually important data. The cases include old line terrorists who had war experience against the Japanese and some very recent recruits. Dr. Pye is perhaps overly ambitious in attempting to draw too many conclusions from this material for all underdeveloped countries. It is also open to question whether or not he has made his case in claiming that certain policies and tactics of the Communists in Asia are "distinct and unique" (p. 18). Too much is made of the point that the Communists practiced terrorism rather than true guerrilla warfare (p. 95). What they

did seems to have been well adapted to the needs of the situation from their point of view, and in spite of British skill and effort they are still strong and active, not only in the jungles but also in overt political organizations in the cities. The author claims (p. 95) that "guerrilla warfare cannot achieve victories over an enemy vastly superior by conventional military standards," but the British are leaving and the Communists are not liquidated. The statement (p. 285) that the MCP did not "capture or exploit" an already developed spirit of nationalism in Malaya needs modification according to racial groups. Rising Chinese nationalism, especially after 1949, certainly made Malayan Chinese much more susceptible to Communist exploitation. Because India and Indonesia are free their nationals in Malaya are also susceptible to anticolonial appeals.

Our studies of Communist political behavior by the case method have been limited mainly to Europe. Mr. Pye is to be commended for making this contribution to the study of Communists in Asia where the effort has been completely out of balance with the need.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR
University of Washington

CARLOS P. ROMULO and MARVIN M. GRAY. *The Magsaysay Story*. Pp. 316. New York: John Day Company, 1956. \$5.00.

The reader may regret but must forgive the exuberance of this book by understanding that the Filipino people—the social condition of whose masses is static and one with which they are not content—look upon President Ramon Magsaysay as a Moses who will contrive their escape from bondage and lead them out of the wilderness where for centuries one generation after another has vegetated. They have seen change come to their country, rich with resources for farming and even industry, but very little change of substantial benefit to them.

Because he is from their own rank, they anticipate from Magsaysay's administration a change affecting them favorably with opportunities to forge ahead. They elected him by a huge majority in 1953. He has

not betrayed them—far from it, as the book shows—and there is, therefore, every prospect they will give him a second term in November of this year. Though he has won only “fringe” advantages for the people so far, their faith in him is still strong. He is a product of the soil, and when he campaigns he speaks Tagalog, the language, rather than the dialect of the provinces. Since there has been no such man in Philippines national politics since the death, more than 20 years ago, of the late Senator Teodoro Sandiko, of the same region, the people hear him gladly.

The book shows how Magsaysay rose to leadership as a guerrilla commander in the resistance to Japan during the Pacific war. It also shows that he was magnanimous enough to hold nothing against Filipinos who elected to dissemble their inner feelings and choose a more cautious course.

President Magsaysay's business career which was an exacting test of his probity and ingenuity—putting a bankrupt busline back in the profit column—was brilliantly successful. It was followed by the interval of guerrilla warfare which led to a seat in the Philippines' Congress and chairmanship of its military affairs committee. His open criticism of the tactics against the *Huk* rebels induced the late President Elpidio Quirino to give him command of the Army, and again probity and ingenuity won him the national reputation that made him president. On August 31 this year, in the fourth year of his first term, he will be 50 years old. This is not an old age, even in the Philippines, and it is topped with lusty health.

The book is written by the popular Philippines diplomat, Dr. Carlos P. Romulo, and a collaborator, Marvin M. Gray, a newspaperman. A memorable chapter is the one on the 1953 election. With security at the polls assured by the army and constabulary, and *watchers*, many of them school teachers, seeing to it that the ballots were freely cast, the boxes were sealed and sent to provincial capitals for transmission to Manila. Members of the Election Commission, tantamount to a court, were on duty day and night, and one commissioner set up a cot in his office in order not to delay a moment his action

on complaints. Then Magsaysay was *in*, all right, but when the hurrahing was over and an inventory made, it was found that, as usual, the landed conservatives, the *Nacionalistas*—though of Magsaysay's party—were in decisive control of Congress.

The remainder of the book concerns the tug of war this situation precipitates. Dr. Romulo is himself a politician, so these chapters are expertised. The basic problem is to break the hold of the traditional gentry and ruling class upon the land and over the peasantry. The Philippines and the whole world will benefit from getting that done, but we should not anticipate miracles and expect it to be done overnight. *Moning*, the affectionate term for “Ramon,” will countenance no evasion of rights, or of the courts; no direct action, no violence. The situation is a close parallel to that of England under the Corn Laws. Those laws were not repealed in a day but *in half a century*. If in half a century the agrarian traditions, customs, and laws of the Philippines that are such a drag on their economy are repealed, it will be rather an astonishing change-about; Magsaysay will be remembered in the tentative role of Burke, and some hero, perhaps yet unborn, in the decisive role of Peele.

WALTER J. ROBB

San Francisco, Calif.

SOVIET UNION

RAYMOND A. BAUER, ALEX INKELES, and CLYDE KLUCKHOHN. *How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*. Pp. xiv, 274. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$4.75.

This book represents a revised version of the final report (unpublished) of the Harvard Research Project on the Soviet social system. Its main source is hundreds of interviews conducted with Soviet refugees in Europe and the United States and thousands of questionnaires administered to them. The project was carried out in 1950–51, but the persons interviewed and questioned, with relatively few exceptions,

had left the Soviet Union in the early forties so that, strictly speaking, the facts learned from them are now about 15 years old. But the authors believe, and rightly so, that the system has not substantially changed. Whenever possible they have singled out, for comparison with the rest, data obtained from later refugees, and they have found no substantial difference. Moreover, they have consulted the now numerous monographs on the various phases of the Soviet system and have interwoven what they found there with the findings of the project. Of course the system is not static; in many places the authors mention, in footnotes, changes which they had to make in their final report, prepared when Malenkov was the top man. It is interesting that now, probably one year after the volume was ready for publication, the situation has in certain regards returned to what it was when they were completing the final report.

The presentation of the Soviet system does not follow the usual pattern of political and economic institutions, the family, education and so on. The volume is devoted mainly to the study of informal relations and adjustable mechanisms without which the formal system would probably have collapsed. A substantial part of the book deals with the individual in Soviet society, especially with the sources of dissatisfaction and the attitudes toward the Soviet system and the West. This study is followed by a survey of the differential positions and correlated attitudes of the social classes, generations, and nationality groups. It is obviously impossible to summarize the findings. One may perhaps single out the following: among the sources of dissatisfaction, the collectivization of agriculture occupies the first place, and terrorism the second; low standards of living preoccupy the masses much more than the intellectuals, while the lack of real participation in political decisions, which in the Soviet Union covers almost everything, comes only as a poor fourth. The authors have been surprised to learn that differences of attitudes toward the system depended much more on one's class position and occupation than on membership in the various nationality groups, although among the

non-Russians dissatisfaction with the process of Russification is conspicuous.

The authors conclude by some “forecasts” which, after all, are mere statements about alternatives to which no differential probability is assigned. They seem, however, to believe that return from collective leadership to one-man rule is probable.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Fordham University

B. H. LIDDELL HART (Ed.). *The Red Army: The Red Army—1918 to 1945; The Soviet Army—1946 to the Present*. Pp. xiv, 480. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956. \$6.00.

The character of the Russian peasant is the key to an understanding of the Soviet army. This conclusion runs like a thread through a collection of articles drawn together by the military expert of the *London Times* from the pens of those who have known the Soviet soldiers as allies, as enemies, and as members of the army. Contributors come from world famous soldiers such as Weygand, Guillaume, Guderian, von Manstein and Niessel; equally famous civilians such as Sir David Kelly and Sir Eric Ashby and some astute political scientists such as Leonard Schapiro. Soviet émigrés also add their revealing inside comments.

Being a peasant army it is characterized as accepting discipline blindly, needing no coddling of personnel, operating well in wild terrain, improvising well in little things but lacking in initiative in the absence of superior orders. The purge of the high command in 1937 is even laid to the peasant base; it being said that Stalin faced officers demanding abolition of his sacrosanct collective farm system to improve troop morale. The same peasant base gives a strategist reason to suppose that the army would be vulnerable to atomic attack because the troops, fearing to move without superior orders, would not scatter sufficiently quickly to avoid destruction. One Soviet émigré explains the army's characteristics because of serfdom, and its lack of independent individuals because of the *mir*. A German officer supports his conclusion by reference to the Rapallo years when Soviet

officers took down verbatim the advice of their German tutors and memorized them so that they became doctrinaire rather than imaginative thinkers.

To the political scientist the detailed accounts of campaigns and Soviet equipment may be of secondary interest, but there is much to merit reading as a contribution to an evaluation of Soviet political strength and weakness. Some of the lessons gained by the soldiers are transferable to Soviet political analysis generally. It is true that Soviet politicians are doctrinaire in all things and are shaken with difficulty from positions taken for reason of doctrine. It is also true that Soviet citizens accept authority more readily than Westerners.

Perhaps the soldiers have missed one feature they could not observe, namely the restlessness of Soviet civilian intellectuals and the disgruntlement of this group with the unending demand for discipline. The soldiers have not heard the stirrings of desire for guarantees which might banish fear of personal extinction at a dictator's whim. In these stirrings rises a new factor in Eastern Europe which the soldier critics have not experienced and which helps to explain Hungary and Poland, if not the USSR herself.

JOHN N. HAZARD

Columbia University

BORIS MEISSNER. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Party Leadership, Organization and Ideology*. Edited by John S. Reshetar, Jr. Translated by Fred Holling. (Foreign Policy Research Institute Series, No. 4.) Pp. 276. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$5.00.

Voprosy Istorii, emulating the spirit of self-criticism that permeated the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, editorially deplored the backward "state of scholarly treatment of the history of the Party" and pleaded that "it is necessary to put an end to exegesis and dogmatism, to follow undeviatingly Leninist teaching and Leninist method and to create scholarly studies permeated with fresh thoughts, with the spirit of creative burning and inquisitorial investigation, facilitating in this way the victory of communism."

With the Lenin-worship and Communist goals omitted, this indictment and plea have at least a suggestive applicability to the condition prevailing in the United States where, in the absence of adequate reading lists of substantial, objective, and in other ways scholarly publications, pervasive propaganda has imbued everybody with an unquestioned competence to talk about the Soviet Union and the Communist party with dogmatic authoritativeness and moralization, with but a scant and usually biased acquaintance with even the most elementary of the pertinent facts.

The volume here under review is a welcome addition to that slowly accumulating shelf of books on the Soviet Union to which sincere seekers after facts can confidently go without any disquieting suspicions of bias, unwarranted generalizations, and a priori moralizing.

Its two expository chapters, four extensive appendices of Communist documents and writings, and elaborate catalogues of party committees, deal only with the Communist party, its organization, its doctrines and rules, its two most recent congresses, and the personnel of its national and state governing bodies. However, this scope is less restrictive than might at first appear, for it must be remembered that in the Soviet Union there is only one party.

This party, of which only seven and a quarter million of the state's two hundred million people are members, maintains an organization closely paralleling the hierarchy of the Soviet government and plays a dominant role in the Soviet systems. As Nikita Khrushchev has recently stated: "The people, led by the Party, armed with Marxist theory—there is the great and invincible force, the creator of the new life, the creator of history."

While the recent party congresses did much to modernize, streamline, centralize, and professionalize the whole party fabric and to replace the "cult of the individual personality" with the idea of collective leadership, the author concludes that "the autocratic ruling organization and its ideological principles have remained essentially unaltered."

ARNOLD J. LIEN

Washington University

JAMES JOLL. *The Second International, 1889-1914*. Pp. 213. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$3.50.

In August 1914, the internationalism inherent in the European Socialist movement fell victim to the transcendent appeal of nationalism. The failure of the generation of leaders dedicated to the Socialist ideas of international solidarity and international brotherhood to resist the power of this appeal—indeed many were caught up in its dynamism—heralded the demise of the Second International. Though its life was relatively short, much of the history of Western Europe during the 1889-1914 period, particularly of the political and ideological development of the French and German Socialist parties, was interwoven with the development, internecine struggles, and subsequent ineffectiveness of the Second International.

The author, a Lecturer in Modern History at Oxford University, has effectively organized the complex problems confronting the Second International, and the actions and attitudes of the men who dominated its politics, into a compact, interesting narrative. Attention is focused on the development of "European Socialism as it found organized expression in the Congresses and other activities of the Second International." This traditional approach was adopted on the assumption that the complexion of European political life was in no small measure influenced by the interaction of the French and German Socialist parties upon one another and upon the other parties of the International. The doctrinal disputes and political differences dominating the various Congresses are developed with great skill.

In a brief but excellent introductory chapter, setting the stage with the personalities, political currents and ideas of the time, Mr. Joll relates the background behind the establishment of the Second International. From the beginning it was evident that existing differences between the Marxian and non-Marxian Socialists would prove a divisive factor of some consequence. The French Socialist movement, so split as to mirror the varying shades of the political spectrum, never produced the monolithic, disciplined party which was the strength

(and weakness) of the German Social Democratic party. In time, the Germans were in fact "able to impose their policy on the other Socialist parties of Europe, showing in their disregard of the circumstances in other countries a blind insistence on doctrinal uniformity"; and ironically enough, they became the first in 1914 to forsake their own rules and destroy the facade of Socialist solidarity.

The dilemma of nationalism versus socialism remained unresolved. Increasingly, as is made vividly clear, an air of unreality permeated the speeches and resolutions of the International, not only with respect to the pressing questions of militarism and nationalism, but to the approaches to political power as well; 1914 shattered all illusions.

Though covering well-trodden ground, the author develops his theme with sophistication and clarity. The vignettes of the most prominent leaders, that is Jaures, Liebknecht, Bebel, Kautsky and Bernstein, add to the interest and value of this work.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Harvard Russian Research Center

MICHAEL BORO PETROVICH. *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870*. Pp. xiv, 312. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

This study diligently details the evolution of Russian Pan-Slavism in the nineteenth century to the period prior to the outbreak of the Turkish War of 1877. Attention is devoted principally to the thoughts and activities of the Slavophiles of the reign of Nicholas I and then to the Pan-Slavs of the next generation. The Slavophiles supplied the fundamental ideology to the Pan-Slavs and, indeed, certain adherents of Pan-Slavism such as Ivan Aksakov were among the original Slavophiles. This is rather well-known. What is perhaps not so well-known is the author's documented conclusion that "from 1856 to 1870, Count Ignatiev's efforts notwithstanding, Russian foreign policy was not determined by Pan-Slavism." Later on, of course, it was to buttress the practical aims of Russian diplomacy.

By and large, Mr. Petrovich has succeeded in reducing to coherence the mass of

prolix, frequently half-digested materials produced by the Pan-Slav movement. At the same time he has given us an abbreviated history of Slavic studies in mid-nineteenth century Russia. The documentation is admittedly limited to sources available in non-Soviet libraries.

What impresses this reviewer strongly in Mr. Petrovich's study is the divorce of the content (not the origins) of Pan-Slav ideology from Western European, Slavic, or Russian historical realities. Theories were evolved, ideas were propagated, which can only be called delusions of the nineteenth century. The negative comments attributed by Mr. Petrovich to Granovski and to Gorchakov in regard to these ideologies and to their proponents are apposite. Mr. Petrovich's own position emerges in the comment: "It is a legitimate cause for wonderment that in the face of Slavic disunity, the Russian Panslavists could have fabricated an ideology on the basis of such a chimera as the unity of the Slavic world."

Apart from a certain pro-Serb nationalist orientation, a serious objection which can be directed against Mr. Petrovich's treatment is the loose, even unscientific, use of the terms "race," "blood," and "Aryan." Of course, subject matter of this kind has many semantic traps, and with the greatest good will one can fall into them. Even so, it is as jarring to read expressions such as "the Slavic race," with variants, as it would be to come upon the repetition of the "American" or "Anglo-Saxon" race. (For examples see references on pp. 11, 42, 79, 96, 152, 176, 200.) Incidentally, for the date "1942" on p. 108, "1842" should undoubtedly be read. Nevertheless, this monograph is worthy of the serious attention of students of Russian history.

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THE FUTURE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

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FOREWORD

The papers in this volume of THE ANNALS are addresses presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy, April 5-6, 1957, at The Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia.

Each of the six sessions of the Annual Meeting was devoted to a single aspect of the general theme—"The Future of the Western Alliance."

The meetings were well attended by members of the Academy and by delegates representing cultural, political, social, and economic organizations from all over the world. The audience participated actively in the discussion of each of the papers here published.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

Is Western Europe the Pivot of American Foreign Policy?

By JAMES BURNHAM

Abstract: The basic issue in world affairs is whether, in the world social and political reorganization now in process, Western (or European) civilization will maintain its ascendancy or will be destroyed. Since Western civilization as a whole is now under attack, the parochial conflicts within Western civilization fall to secondary importance. The United States is organically a part of Western civilization. The correct and most effective United States foreign policy, therefore, must be a "European policy," conceived in the perspective of the civilization as a whole. So viewed, the primary present objective, a required premise to any wider world objectives, is seen to be the reconstitution of the Western base itself through the recovery of the captive regions—namely, Eastern Europe. Until this is accomplished, other foreign policy moves will continue to be as they have been for the past decade: negative, defensive, transitional—merely holding operations. Within the next decade, either Eastern Europe will rejoin the West, or the United States will be compelled to fall back on Fortress America.

DURING the past decade the United States has made strenuous efforts to break loose from Europe. In the eyes of most Americans some of the time, and of some Americans all of the time, Europe is a chain dragging at American feet. Europe's traditionalism, as Americans judge it, blocks the path of progress. Europe's class distinctions offend the American sense of social equality. Europe's guild and cartel rigidity prevents dynamic economic development. Europe's cynicism disturbs America's boyish, pragmatic optimism.

But it is above all in relation to the rest of the world, to Asia and Africa, that America is impatient with Europe and most sensible of the European drag. Europe's imperial and colonialist past—so it seems to many Americans—sours all our relations with "the awakening masses" of Eurafica. An America that maintains the old liaison with Europe is

tarred with the black imperialist brush, inherits all the piled-up hatred of the brown and black and yellow peoples for the insolent, domineering white men who burst out of Europe in the fifteenth century. America must cut those sordid, compromising ties. Pushing the outdated Europeans into the back pews of history, America will join hands with the rising new "underdeveloped nations"—as these centers of mankind's most ancient civilizations are called with unwitting condescension by the brash newcomers. Once the restricting straitjacket of old Europe is cast off, a new, free, peaceful, and prosperous world will rise under American inspiration and on the American model.

This longing to escape from Europe has expressed itself episodically and in a variety of forms. We may sense it in the Yalta proceedings, where the Big Five, formally reduced to the Big Three,

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were in many of the sessions pretty well whittled down to a Big Two: the American Franklin Roosevelt disposing of the world's affairs in lordly give-and-take with the oriental ruler of an anti-European empire.

We find it in the whole postwar course of cavalier American anticolonialism, which helped push the Netherlands, Britain, and France from one after another of their holdings in Asia and Africa. Everywhere the United States has seemed ready to shut its ears to the reproaches of Europeans as it stretched out eager, perhaps overeager, hands to Indonesians, Indians, Koreans, Vietnamese, Persians, Egyptians, and North and Central Africans. An Arab, Indian, Japanese, or Indonesian could always be sure of receiving a red carpet Washington welcome; but a Britisher, Frenchman, or Italian has often had to sneak around to the back door of the White House.

On November 2, 1956, in a symbolic culmination, the American delegation at the United Nations joined one hand with the Communists and the other with the Afro-Asian bloc to condemn to outer darkness the chief nations of Western Europe, while the lesser European representatives drew back in dismayed abstention.

It would be incorrect, of course, to suggest that this straining away from Europe has been the unmixed or consistent trend of American postwar foreign policy. The American policy is more accurately described as ambivalent, schizoid. Every lurch away from mother Europe can be matched, or more than matched, by a return grab at her apron strings. We could write a postwar history in terms of the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and German reconstruction that would make Western Europe seem the almost exclusive focus of American diplomacy.

There have been in fact the two tendencies, which are not, moreover, recon-

ciled in a single over-all progress of American policy, but have often conflicted and interfered with each other. Sometimes, it seems that America is European-minded until just the critical point when it becomes all-important for Europe to have America by her side, and anticolonial just deeply enough to titillate but not to satisfy the leaders of the new Afro-Asian nations.

It is relevant, then, for practical as well as theoretical reasons, to inquire further as to what is, what can be, and what should be the American relation to Europe.

WORLD RELATIONSHIPS

Before commenting more directly on this compound question, I wish to establish a context within which my own answers, so far as I am able to arrive at any, will be formulated. A judgment concerning the relationship between America and Europe can be intelligibly made only in terms of a more general view of world relationships and of what is happening in the world.

In a book published sixteen years ago I stated the hypothesis that the world had begun a major transition, a social transformation, that I called "the managerial revolution." (The specific name I used is naturally unimportant. Others have used different words to refer to the same phenomena.) This transformation results from a number of causes, material, institutional and cultural, prominent among them the technological applications of science to communication and transport, mass production, medical hygiene, electronic and now nuclear devices, long distance weapons of mass destruction.

As part of the managerial revolution—which is a truly world revolution—there is taking place, and very obviously, a world political reorganization. The question is plainly posed: who is going to organize, who is going to run, a new,

viable world political order, a world polity?

At the moment there appear to be only two serious contenders: the Soviet Union and the United States. For many purposes, it is sufficiently accurate, and often illuminating, to say that the struggle for the world is being fought between these two. But neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is an autonomous power unit. Each is a dynamic center around which a wider complex forms; each seeks to draw additional areas, nations, and peoples within its field.

But further, the United States discernibly functions, whether knowingly or not, as the representative of the civilization that we call European, Western, Atlantic, or Christian. (I use these names interchangeably, because I believe that each, while stressing diverse aspects, designates the same historical entity.) Because of its size, wealth, power, and unexhausted energy, the United States takes the public lead. Nevertheless, in its behavior, values, methods, ideas, in its ontology as in its aesthetic sense, in its dreams as well as its implicit axioms, the United States continues to bear the indelible marks of its European lineage.

Viewed through the cultural glass, the Soviet Union at the center of its opposed power field appears as a negative force, challenging a United States that enters the lists not as an unattached knight-errant, but as present champion and prime standard bearer of Western civilization—that is, of Europe.

The issue of the contest is finally this: whether, in the world political reorganization now going on, Western civilization, led in its practical affairs by the United States, will succeed in maintaining its ascendancy or will be destroyed. I say, "succeed in *maintaining* its ascendancy," because for the past several centuries Western civilization has in fact been ascendant in the world polity,

partly through making some non-European regions Western, partly through imposing Western rule on peoples remaining altogether or largely non-Western. Since the West has been in the saddle, it is the West that must sustain the challenge. I do not suggest that "maintaining its ascendancy" can mean for the West merely keeping things as they were. For that, it is already much too late. Political ascendancy must now be exercised in new modes, with a new rhetoric, and the future forms have so far been no more than hinted at.

U. S. RELATION TO EUROPE

Now in defining my context I have begged my question. If the basic world issue is the struggle of the West for continued dominance—in the last analysis for survival—and if in that struggle the United States acts as a part and the leading part of the West, then questions about the general relation of the United States to Europe are pretty well answered, at least in outline. America's denial of a primary European tie can be no more effectual than Peter's denial or an impatient child's denial of a family that he feels has become a brake on an independent, self-sufficient career. Whatever the protests, the cock will crow—as it crowed at the dawn following America's UN vote of denial last November. The United States, having cast off Europe with words so bold and self-righteous, had to turn the next day to take up Europe's burden—had even itself to furnish the life-giving oil to the European nations denounced as criminals for their attempt to get it by their own efforts.

Still, even if my reasoning is circular, the general estimate can be a hypothetical guide both to what America does (as distinguished from what America's leaders from time to time say that they are doing) and to what America

might further do if our foreign policy, by being brought more coherently into accord with historical reality, is to have a better chance of success.

U. S. STRATEGIC FRONTIER

Suppose that we look from the perspective of the United States at the general problem posed by the continuing world crisis. Now the primary determinants of the American response to the crisis are *in fact* strategic and cultural. The strategic and cultural fields overlap but are not identical. Let us consider the outline of American policy as suggested by each.

From a strategic point of view the United States necessarily starts from its continental home territory, the inner base for manpower and weapons. But the home territory is only the core of the strategic system that is often called "Fortress America." Fortress America extends through Canada to the Pole on the north; south through Central America and about half way down South America; over the entire Caribbean area, and the coastal waters both east and west, out to such offshore posts as Bermuda and the Hawaiian Islands.

This entire area falls within the American strategic frontier. It is, we might say, "American territory." All of it is subject *de facto*, in the last analysis, to a unified military command—to United States command. The military command requires, and possesses, freedom of movement within the area. All of the economic resources of the area—raw materials, industry and industrial products, means of transport—are, to the extent needed, at the disposal of the unified command. No enemy is permitted to make a serious penetration of the Fortress boundaries. Indeed, even friendly powers can operate inside the Fortress only subject to the implicit rules and limits of the strategic system.

But against the world challenge of-

fered by the dynamic policy of the Soviet empire—the Eurasian counter-fortress—a passive defense of Fortress America cannot provide security. The American high command must seek world sea and air control in a system the lines of force of which are directed in part against the bases of Soviet power and in part to the protection of areas under threat of Soviet absorption. For the time being, at the present but rapidly changing level of armament development, such sea and air control requires the elaborate world network of sea and air bases that America does in fact occupy or control, either through its own or allied forces.

Some of the bases through which world sea and air control is currently being sought—and, outside the boundaries of the Soviet empire, being on the whole maintained—are in Western Europe. Others are scattered around the rest of the world. Analyzing from a narrowly American and strategic point of view, we should probably conclude that in geographical Europe only a few island and peninsular bases (the peripheral bases) are now strategically essential: in Scandinavia, Britain, the Iberian peninsula, in Greece or Cyprus, and possibly in southern Italy or Sicily.

U. S. CULTURAL FRONTIER

If, still from an American perspective, we make our observations through a cultural rather than a strategic lens, the geography falls into a somewhat different pattern. The strategic Fortress America reappears as a cultural entity. The Americas, that is to say, are not only a natural strategic unit, but are integrated culturally through a variant of European (Western or Christian) civilization. In fact, America extends culturally to the southern tip of South America, whereas a strategic frontier can perhaps be drawn at about the latitude of southern Brazil.

But with the exception of Russia proper (which belongs to another—the Byzantine—culture and is now subject to the anticulture of Communism), all of geographic Europe is integrally united with America in the cultural plane, although the nations of Eastern Europe are at present in enemy hands. The linkage of geographic Europe and America over and through the Atlantic basin yields "the Atlantic world"—which is, simply, the expanded core, the metropolitan base, of Western civilization.

But Western civilization is not confined to the Atlantic world. Europe in the cultural sense exists also in regions beyond geographical Europe and America. And therefore the basic "cultural system"—analogous to the strategic system—in which the United States discovers itself to be inevitably integrated, includes "Europe abroad": Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, and the more Europeanized of former colonies and protectorates.

The cultural determinant operates—though seldom publicly remarked—even in the key outlying bases of South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippine Islands. The leader of each of these bases—Syngman Rhee, Ngo Dinh Diem, Chiang Kai-shek, Ramon Magsaysay and his successor, Carlos Garcia—is a devout Christian: that is, in religion an adherent of the West. It seems impossible that this quadruple fact—which is not counterbalanced by any negative instance of the same order—should be mere coincidence. For that matter, former Premier Yoshida of Japan, with whose active collaboration Okinawa and Japan were brought within the American-Western system, was also a Christian.

The pattern of a Western system can thus be derived from either the strategic or the cultural imperative. Geographi-

cally the two patterns are not identical, but overlapping. More precisely: in the geographical dimension, the strategic system extends over the entire cultural system, except for Eastern Europe, which is forcibly cut off; but the strategic system extends also beyond the cultural system to include such non-Western localities as parts of north and central Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.

Generally speaking, the most secure strategic bases, the firmest links in the strategic system, are those which fall also within the cultural system: that is, which lie either in geographic Europe or in "Europe overseas" or in a region (like the Philippines or Lebanon) where European civilization has made a fairly deep penetration.

The strategic posts that lie altogether outside the European cultural system are frontier blockhouses, desert forts, islands in an alien sea. They have no internal resources or local stability. Their vital strength must be drawn from the distant home territory. Cut off, they would be quickly overwhelmed.

The point may be put somewhat differently. Let us start once more from the American strategic problem. Its solution leads in the first stages to the conception of Fortress America. This solution is, however, incomplete and must be further developed. Insofar as the extension of the strategic system spreads into areas that are—like America itself—part of the European cultural system, the expansion is "natural," organic. The military or material elements of the strategic system are reinforced and sustained by the historical, psychological, moral, and religious elements of the cultural system. Physical power is organized, to some rough degree of coherence, by common values, wants, categories, axioms, and by a common God.

But even this expansion of Fortress

America into the Western world is not sufficient to solve the strategic problem. The strategic system must be extended still further, beyond the boundaries of the West. These ultimate extensions, however, are no longer natural and organic. They are deliberate, artificial, not flowing out of history but imposed by the rational requirements of the science of war and power. And they are, therefore, troubled by the fragility of all the creatures of pure reason cut off from organic nature and time.

EUROPE AND U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

For an American policy that corresponds with the historical problems of our era, Europe must always come first—Europe, that is, in the sense of European civilization wherever, geographically speaking, it exists. It does not follow that America must be in a negative or hostile relation with all the non-European, non-Christian world. It is rather that, for the foreseeable future at least, positive relations with the non-European parts of the world must rest on the facts of power and joint interest more starkly than do relations with European regions, where power and interest are interlaced with the shared elements of the common civilization.

Leaving the Suez affair aside for the moment, we have during the past decade had closer relations with Britain than with any other power. Yet it would be hard to explain this from a purely rational and utilitarian standpoint. Britain and the United States are commercial rivals in many of the world's markets. The natural economic interests of the two differ widely in the Far East, the Middle East, much of South America, and potentially at least in relation to the Soviet empire. It is debatable whether the use of British soil for American strategic bombing and missile bases does not rather add to than lessen the military danger to Britain.

Nevertheless, historical and cultural ties normally outweigh all such negative factors.

But in those cases—not so many, to tell the truth—where the United States has in this postwar period maintained notably successful relations with non-Western countries, we invariably find that these relations are directly built on American power (negatively or positively applied) and on palpable joint interest. So it has been, obviously enough, in the case of the Philippines. As for Turkey, American power, thrust into the open by the Truman Doctrine, has shielded her from the Soviet threat; and the Turkish economy has solidly benefited from an American economic program that has been solidly repaid by strategic concessions, a stalwart Turkish contribution to the Korean crisis, and Turkish pressure against pro-Soviet or anti-American moves in the Middle East. In Iran similarly, American power, linked with British power, beat back a Soviet threat and forced a pro-Western reorganization of the government and army. An exchange of Iranian oil plus certain military positions for Western money and technical help have given the relation a solid backing of interest.

With South Korea and Taiwan the structure of the relation is still simpler. Both provide the United States with military bases of great importance, auxiliary military forces of considerable size, and diplomatic adjuncts of some value in blocking attempts to solidify Africa and Asia against the West. In return, America gives these two small and honorable clients strategic protection against Communist attack that would otherwise quickly overrun them and the technical and economic aid without which they would go quickly bankrupt.

In contrast, it has so far proved impossible to have satisfactory relations with independent India, in spite of what seems to be a mighty pro-Indian effort

on the part of the United States government and an active pro-Indian attitude among the leaders of United States opinion. The explanation is to be found in the failure of the United States to bring its power to bear, one way or the other, in relation to India and in the absence of compelling mutual interests. Indian opinion is hostile to the West and to the United States as present leader of the West. As the situation has been over the past decade, India has had no very strong practical motive, either strategic or economic, for close relations with the United States.

AMERICAN IDEOLOGY

An effective foreign policy can be developed only within the framework set by history, geography, and strategy. Success is not guaranteed if these are taken into account; but failure is certain if they are disregarded. I share the opinion of a good many Europeans that the typical American error in the conduct of its foreign policy—in this century at any rate—is what might be called "the fetishism of ideology." Americans tend to verbalize about foreign affairs in terms of our official liberal-humanitarian ideology. This becomes an idolatry when we suppose that the thin ideological abstractions can take precedence over geography, culture, and history.

Our ideology is egalitarian, democratic, optimistic, moralistic. It will not allow us to feel an innocent presumption in favor of men with our color of skin against those with dark, or persons who believe in our God as against those who have another God, or no God. International politics becomes a morality play with masked abstractions as the characters. We are "for" peace, law, democracy, self-determination, and a United Nations world; and "against" aggression, war, tyranny, imperialism, fascism, and national "selfishness." Through these mist-covered ideological glasses the

jagged truths of interest and power and struggle are softened and obscured.

We are ridden with ideological guilt if we favor a Christian country against a pagan country; an "imperialist power" against a colony or "underdeveloped nation"; a dictatorship over a democracy; an aggressor against a victim; power rather than verbal appeals to international law and justice.

This ideological fever reached a climax in the Suez affair. Ideology obliterated reality. In the name of the liberal-humanitarian abstractions the Eisenhower administration, at the height of the delirium, abandoned both our strategic interest and our cultural siblings. The President seemed to succumb to the hallucination that the friendship of the alien Nassers, Nehrus and Sukarnos could be a profitable exchange for the loss of our blood brothers of the West. To the chancelleries of the world, and most particularly to the wiser men of Asia, the UN vote of November 2, to which I have already referred, must have seemed the announcement of an American decision to attempt national suicide.

Luckily the frenzy is more usually held at the verbal level. In the show-downs the United States does usually act in accordance with the strategic-cultural, not the ideological, imperatives. We declare in words that we never interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, but we defend Greece with massive interference or help change the government of Guatemala to one more to our liking. We hate imperialism verbally, but we shore up the old imperialist villains of Europe with the biggest share of the Marshall Plan dollars. We are absolutely against war, but we cover the world with a system of military bases designed to be able to destroy our enemy. We are all for democracy, but in practice we find it possible to make advantageous agreements with the authoritarian regimes, open or politely dis-

guised, of a Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, Jiménez, Salazar, Trujillo, Pibulsonggram or Syngman Rhee. In spite of two generations of liberal-humanitarian indoctrination ingeniously fashioned to block acquaintance with the facts of life, we as a nation have not altogether lost the instinct for survival.

Thus we find that, having reached a peak last November, the ideological orgy turned into a period of drastic hangover, during which our leaders have tumbled headlong down from their dizzying abstractions. Having prevented Britain and France from solving their problems, we began pouring out our own money, energy, and oil to solve them for them. Having grandiloquently abandoned Europe verbally to cast our lot with Asia and Africa, we spend the immediately succeeding months in a massive effort to "rebuild the Western Alliance." Having in November repudiated the use of force, we step up our intercontinental missiles program.

These are fortunate inconsistencies. But the nation's interests, and the world's, would be better served if we recognized more clearly and continuously what we are, where we stand, and where we are bound in the end to go. In the end we cannot renounce Europe because for us Europe is not a heritage, a legacy from the past. The United States is itself European, a part of European civilization. For the United States, the attempt to escape from Europe is only a vain effort to escape from itself—an effort through which we can only injure ourselves and our civilization to the benefit of our enemies, present and to come.

REUNIFICATION OF EUROPE

I have been discussing Europe—and Europe, for the most part, not in the limited geographical sense but as meaning "European civilization," wherever located. It is my argument that in the development of American foreign policy

Europe, in the wide sense, comes first; that American security and interests are integrally linked with the security and interests of European civilization as a whole.

If this is so, then it is an error, perhaps a fatal error, to limit our focus to "Western Europe." Without the Baltic states, without the lands of the Teutonic knights, without Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia, and Rumania, Europe does not fully exist. The excision of the eastern flank can be a mortal wound. Without these lands from the Baltic to the Danube mouth, moreover, Western Europe is in the long run strategically indefensible. These eastern marches have always, indeed, been the indispensable shield of the Christian West.

Therefore, I believe and have contended for the past twelve years, that an adequate American foreign policy, which will be inevitably a European policy, will specifically focus on East Europe: that is to say, will be what has been called "a policy of liberation." In order to be defended successfully, Europe must exist; and Europe only half exists while the enemy holds its eastern sector. The first positive goal of an American, and a Western, policy that would promise to solve the world issue now posed can only be the recovery, the liberation, of the eastern sector—the reconstitution, that is, of Europe.

A few of us have argued in these past years that the recovery of Eastern Europe was not a utopian aim. At the end of the war, when the Western armies had overwhelming superiority, it would have been easy to block Soviet conquest of East Europe, given the political will to do so. Nor would it have been too difficult a task to release the captive nations during those subsequent years when we held a monopoly of effective nuclear power.

Even quite recently, a bold policy, though risking more, would have had a good chance of success. What if the

West had acted firmly in connection with the East German demonstrations of June 1953? Or in last autumn's crisis? Why not a Western ultimatum last September, declaring that military action by Soviet troops against East Europeans would be treated as a *casus belli*? Fantastic as this might seem from the point of view of official thinking, it might by now have released most of Eastern Europe.

But if the premises of official thinking exclude any such direct approach to European reunification, there is some reason to believe that the events of the past year have opened up, probably for a short time only, another road. It seems possible that Moscow may now *want* to disentangle the Red Army from Eastern Europe, if this could be done without an undue loss of face or an increased military threat from the West. It could be made the object of American and Western diplomacy to supply these conditions.

I cannot here state in detail what this would involve. Such a perspective is at present under active discussion in Europe, and along with a number of other persons in this country I have written at some length concerning it. What is required is an extension of "the Austrian solution." This would mean, in summary: reunification of Germany, negotiation of the eastern German (Oder-Neisse) boundary, withdrawal of all foreign troops from all of Central and Eastern Europe, and guaranteed military neutralization of the entire area. These steps are almost necessarily linked; whatever the preliminary bargaining, it is hard to see how any one of them could take place without the others.

If this program could be realized, the Red Army would be back inside the 1939 Russian boundaries and the West would have a *chance* to reconstitute Europe: geographically considered, to regain the strategic key to the world Heartland. There is evidence, I think,

that in the present conjuncture Moscow might accept a program along these lines; or, if such a program were actively pushed by the Western powers in a continuous political campaign, that Moscow might not be able to reject it.

CONCLUSIONS

Let me summarize my argument in the barest possible way, and thus conclude:

The basic issue in world affairs is whether, in the world social and political reorganization now in process, Western (or European) civilization will maintain its ascendancy or will be destroyed. Since Western civilization as a whole is now under attack, the parochial conflicts within Western civilization fall to secondary importance. The United States is organically a part of Western civilization. The correct and most effective United States foreign policy, therefore—strategic, political, and economic—must be conceived in the perspective of the civilization as a whole. So viewed, the primary present objective, a required premise to any wider world objectives, is seen to be the reconstitution of the Western base itself through the recovery of the captive regions—namely, Eastern Europe. Until this is accomplished, other foreign policy moves will continue to be as they have been for the past decade: negative, defensive, transitional—merely holding operations. Only through the recovery of Eastern Europe can the West, led by the United States, go on to the solution of the more general problem of instituting a viable world order.

The alternatives may be put as a dilemma. Within the next decade, either Eastern Europe will rejoin the West, or the United States will be compelled to fall back on Fortress America. And Fortress America, isolated in an alien world, would confront the bleak prospect of a regimented barracks life in a camp under perpetual siege.

Are We Moving Toward Fortress America?

By D. F. FLEMING

Abstract: Our efforts to encircle the Communist nations have failed: Eastern Europe is lost to the West; we have not won the atomic race; we have been distrustful of our own people; we discounted the power of education and industrialization to modify the Soviet system; we did not know that cold wars cannot be won. We need to understand the Communist peoples; to be aware that great powers need access to the sea; reduce our overseas bases; work for arms limitation and regulation; negotiate settlements of territorial issues; restore our friendship with Western Europe and the British Commonwealth; channel foreign aid through the United Nations; try to build a world community through the UN; and stand on our heritage as an example of human freedom.—Ed.

SINCE 1914 many influential Americans have believed in a Fortress America policy for the United States. They have thought that our military and economic positions are so strong that we could escape the costs and embroilments of actively engaging in world politics by standing guard in the Western Hemisphere and largely leaving the rest of the world to its own devices.

In the relative safety of the period after World War I, this policy was followed in the main. Since 1945, the opposite course of vigorous participation in world politics everywhere has been taken. Today there are signs that the pendulum may be about to begin a return swing from the containment of communism to self-containment.

In two recent articles the veteran Washington correspondent, Thomas L. Stokes, described the "vociferous flood of mail" to members of Congress complaining about foreign aid and the inability of the United Nations to solve age-old problems overnight. He called it "the most pressing and most ominous undercurrent in our national life today,"

and warned that "we cannot shirk this time and roll up our oceans around us."¹

FROM ISOLATION TO CONTAINMENT

All of us who want to see American leadership continue on a long-term basis should be deeply concerned about the violent swings in our attitudes toward the world.

After World War I we had the greatest opportunity to lead which a nation ever had. The great powers of Europe were either gravely wounded, defeated or destroyed. Russia was immobilized from the effects of war, revolution, and Western intervention, while we had waxed strong through our war efforts.

Even more important was the high plateau of moral influence upon which we stood in 1918. The magnificent leadership of Woodrow Wilson had gained for us a place in the hearts of the peoples of the world such as no nation had ever enjoyed. Leadership was really thrust upon us. There was world-wide agreement that the demand for a

¹ Thomas L. Stokes, *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 27, March 6, 1957.

league of nations to keep the peace, which had welled up powerfully in the United States, was timely and urgent.² Every thinking person felt that the pitiable slaughter and wastes of the years 1914-18 must not happen again.

Yet in spite of the shattering clarity of the need for a new international order, the United States became involved in a long drawn-out political struggle over the League of Nations Covenant and over credit for its authorship, which ended in the abdication of any role in the League other than peripheral activity in its later years. Unbelievable as it was, we retired into isolation from the political affairs of the world, except for occasional attempts to compose matters as in the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 and the Dawes and Young reparations plans.

This retreat from responsibility into boom-and-bust money making at home ended in an economic disaster, which opened the doors for Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo. Then, as another and far worse world war rushed upon us, we resolutely surrounded our island home with the paper walls of successive neutrality laws and awaited the deluge.

When it came, we were again involved in a world war infinitely more destructive of human life, resources, institutions, and values than the war of 1914. However, in the autumn of 1943 the United States Senate publicly promised in the Connally Resolution its acceptance of another league of nations, a promise which it faithfully fulfilled. No one could prove that our leadership in the first league would have averted the unspeakable tragedy of World War II, but everyone knew that we had not tried.

So in 1945 we led a new league, but the golden opportunity had passed. In 1945 there were only two great powers left in the world, not enough to make collective security work as it could have after 1918. The United Nations could give stability to the world only if the Big Two agreed, and they promptly disagreed over what kind of governments there should be in East Europe.

Then we swung all the way over from isolationism and promptly plunged into the most furious power-ideological conflict that has ever shaken this planet. We did this under two quick assumptions: (1) that the cautious, wary Stalin, the master of a frightfully devastated and weakened Soviet Union, was out to conquer the world just like the raging-tearing Hitler; and (2) that communism was a menace as urgent and dangerous as fascism had been.

Once again, as after 1918, we tried to do everything that might have kept us out of the last war; but again the conditions were new and different, as they always are. However, this did not prevent us from fighting the cold war with great zest and devotion for ten dark and dangerous years; while our own personal liberties suffered one assault and suppression after another as our cold warriors sought to eliminate at home not only the omnipotent, omnipresent Communist menace, but liberal utterances and dissent from the waging of the cold war.

If there is any history after the atomic age, future historians will think it very strange that the hysteria which we termed McCarthyism afflicted the mightiest and safest nation of recorded history.

Security by alliances

Hardly less strange will be the story of our effort to contain the Soviet Union and China with vast chains of military

² See the excellent account of the unprecedented citizen organization, *The League to Enforce Peace* by Ruhl J. Bartlett (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

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bases close to the Russian borders and at the mouths of Chinese harbors.

After our Pan-American alliances there was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was a legitimate response to the Soviet organization of East Europe; then ANZUS (security pact entered into by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1951), Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Baghdad Pact, along with bilateral pacts, until we now take pride in alliances with forty-two countries. Even this startling figure has not satisfied us. Since 1950, we have put military hardware and strings at the forefront of aid to our allies and the underdeveloped countries, and when some of them drew back we resented their neutralism.

Having long refused all alliances as entangling, we now want alliances with all non-Communist states until our structure of pacts is strongly reminiscent of Bismarck's handiwork, about which it was once said that it constituted a "network of secret, conflicting and almost unintelligible obligations of which no one could foresee the value, or even the interpretation, if they came into operation."⁸

Our alliances are not secret and they may not be quite that complicated, but many of our friends think we are "pact happy." It is also becoming increasingly apparent that these alliances represent little military strength, whereas the armed power of the encircled Communist bloc is rapidly increasing.

Soviet-Chinese responses

It is one of the ironies of the containment policy that it enabled Stalin to rally the Soviet peoples from the deep exhaustion and lethargy succeeding the gruelling forced marches of the five year plans after 1928 and of World War II

⁸ J. A. Spender, *Fifty Years of Europe, A Study of Pre-War Documents* (New York: Stokes, 1933), p. 55.

for a third heroic effort of forced-draft reconstruction and rearmament. Armed with the words and acts of containment, Stalin could and did drive his peoples to the brink of collapse; but he steered them through the perils of the cold war to the security of nuclear parity with the United States.⁴ Under the lash of our liberation threat he also overburdened the peoples of Poland and Hungary to such an extent that revolt came after his death, but then we were powerless to carry out our promises of liberation.

Our containment-liberation campaign has also had the effect of welding closely together the Soviet and Chinese peoples, with their enormous human and material resources, into a drive for full technical, industrial, and armament equality with the entire West—a goal they confidently expect to achieve within less than forty years.⁵ In the meantime, our Civil Defense Administrator has estimated, conservatively, that with present weapons they already have the power to kill 40 to 45 per cent of the American people in a surprise attack, even if the best bomb shelters that can be built were available.⁶

It is probable that our containment pressure reached its peak in the Congressional resolution of January 28, 1955, which threatened atomic war upon China in defense of Formosa, the Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu—all Chinese islands. Compared with that the Eisenhower Doctrine is a pale reflection of the Truman Doctrine, from which it

⁴ William A. Williams, "The Irony of Containment: A Policy Boomerang," *The Nation*, May 5, 1956, pp. 376-79.

⁵ Dean Acheson, "The Bases of a Foreign Program," *New York Times Magazine*, January 6, 1957, p. 34. He adds: "There are, of course, strains in Communist society which may develop into grave weaknesses, but any candid observer must see equal strains both within Western society and in its relations with Asia and Africa."

⁶ *New York Times*, February 19, 1957.

stems. Hereafter the counterpressure of the Red bloc to dissolve the ring of containment may be expected to increase constantly.

This is the natural and inevitable consequence of the containment policy. Khrushchev stated the Red goal plainly in late February 1957. In return for withdrawing the Red army from East Europe, the Soviet leader said that

Western European countries would withdraw their troops stationed in the territories of other Western European countries. The United States would also withdraw its troops to American territory from Europe and Asia, and along with that would go the liquidation of all foreign bases.⁷

This might be interpreted as asking for our withdrawal even from Greenland, but we may be sure that the main Soviet-Chinese demand is our withdrawal from Eurasia. We may be equally certain also that if the circumstances were reversed, and we were encircled with Soviet bases, we would never rest until the last Soviet defense base disappeared from the Western Hemisphere.

Pressures for withdrawal

As the Soviet-Chinese demand for our withdrawal is pressed and backed by growing power to enforce it, the position of our allies who own our foreign bases will become increasingly anomalous. Before the Hungarian tragedy last autumn, there was a strong tendency to resent the American bases. After Hungary, Iceland reversed her decision to send our airmen home. However, foreign troops are always an irritant to the natives and can hardly be accepted as permanent, even under conditions of conventional warfare.

But we live under conditions of thermonuclear warfare, which make it extremely important for us to be able to

⁷ Stewart Alsop, *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 24, 1957.

hit the Soviet-Chinese bloc from as many points as possible. Moreover, as Hanson W. Baldwin, the military expert of the *New York Times*, explained on February 17, our foreign bases have a great defensive value "as magnets which attract and hence disperse an enemy's attack."

For offensive use the bases must be manned with nuclear weapons including guided missiles, and when this was foreshadowed in the President's 1957 budget message and the Bermuda Conference reports, the Soviet Union promptly loosed a barrage of strong warnings to the host countries of our bases to expect nuclear retaliation in the event of war.⁸

Such warnings will be increasingly difficult to disregard since one or two H-bombs can destroy a small country. As Walter Lippmann put it:

There is no use under-estimating the diplomatic force of the warning against allowing bases for nuclear weapons, which was issued in Moscow last week. This warning is addressed to the key countries in the great semi-circle which extends from Japan and Okinawa through Iran and Turkey to Western Europe. This warning consists of a reminder to these exposed countries that in case of war, unless they are military neutrals, they will be defenseless targets for Soviet missiles. This is a powerful argument for neutralism, and it is not easy to see how the administration proposes to deal with that argument.⁹

This is indeed a conundrum for us, since as Soviet-Chinese power grows, those who rent us the bases will be more

⁸ *New York Times*, January 24; March 27, 31, 1957.

⁹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 28, 1957. On April 10, 1957, Drew Middleton reported to the *New York Times* from London that "Soviet warnings against the establishment of guided missile bases on the territory of members of the Atlantic alliance are viewed with increasing gravity in responsible circles here." There was "little prospect that either Norway or Denmark would agree to permit the construction of such bases."

and more strongly impelled to ask: "Why should we incur the certainty of destruction if war comes in order that the Americans should have a little better chance of survival?" The urge to survive being one of the strongest of all human instincts, there cannot be much doubt about the ultimate answer to this question. Nor can we forestall the outcome by telling our allies that the Reds would enslave them. They might, and they might not after the Russians and the Americans have finished destroying each other.

Effects of the Suez crisis

The probability of even our West European allies taking their chances on neutrality has been greatly increased by the unwise severity with which we treated our two chief allies during and after the Suez crisis. Just before our election they had indeed done something without telling us, after many frustrations at our hands; but this hardly justified the "rage," "anger," and "pique" in high quarters in Washington which our leading newspapermen reported.¹⁰

¹⁰ The Alsops wrote that "this city which has seen a good many extremes in political behavior, has never witnessed such an exhibition of pique and anger. . . ." James Reston said that "the White House rang with barracks-room language that had not been heard at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue since the days of General Grant."—*New York Times*, November 3, The Nashville *Tennessean*, November 5, 1956.

Drew Pearson stated flatly that the President used barracks-room language over the telephone in talking to Prime Minister Anthony Eden and so broke him that he called Premier Mollet in Paris within two minutes and called off the Suez invasion.—The Nashville *Tennessean*, March 27, 1957.

Beverly Baxter, London correspondent of the Canadian *Maclean's Magazine*, said on January 5, 1957, that when the President learned of the British-French intervention in Egypt "his anger grew to fury" and that "one of the best informed men in British politics told me that Eisenhower gave Eden absolute hell" over the telephone.

By yielding to their resentment our leaders not only inflicted wounds upon our chief allies which at the best will be long in healing; they also got us into the position of treating a highly dangerous and guilty dictator as an innocent victim and our most loyal friends as wanton aggressors. Even more serious, they virtually destroyed the bargaining power of the West at the world's most important crossroads. This "may prove to have been an irreparable error."¹¹

By first cajoling and then roughly suppressing our allies in the Suez crisis, we have turned loose long-term impulses toward unification and neutralism in Western Europe, even among those who opposed the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. For example, "a much respected senior English leader" who bitterly opposed the invasion said recently:

Now that it's all over I have been wondering about our relations with America. For instance I've been asking myself whether your air bases here are of any value to us, whether in fact they serve any purpose except to make us H-bomb targets if war comes.¹²

Fortress America?

Hereafter, three powerful forces will work to move us into a Fortress America position: the outward pressure of the Communist bloc against the ring of containment; the closely related but partly independent desire of our allies to be less involved in the power-ideological struggle, particularly to avoid certain nuclear death; and our own natural resentment against allies who may no longer desire our erratic leadership to or away from the brink of war, depending on the mood of our leaders, and against the costs of global containment.

These pressures both push and pull us

¹¹ Walter Lippmann, The Nashville *Tennessean*, March 22, 1957.

¹² Joseph Alsop, from London, The Nashville *Tennessean*, March 10, 1957.

toward a fortress position. Yet, a retreat all the way back would have extremely bad consequences. The attempt to man the fortress with ever more enormously costly weapons would cramp our economy, whose voracious needs require raw materials from all the world in increasing amounts. But even more important would be the psychology of resentment and frustration to be followed by fears, hysterias, and internal witch-hunts worse than those which afflicted us at the height of the cold war. A fortress, even a mighty one, which considers itself besieged is not a good place for those who love liberty for the individual.

It is essential to avoid such a fate and to seek a middle ground role in the world, one which attempts neither to run it nor to retreat from it. But before we are prepared to do that we need to understand why our effort to contain and encircle the vast areas and populations of Russia and China was destined to fail.

WHY OUR CONTAINMENT POLICY HAS FAILED

Our containment policy could not succeed, for these reasons:

Because the two chief consequences of World War II could not be avoided. Eastern Europe was lost to the West, not at Yalta but at Munich; and after Munich there was never a time when the West could dispense with the full power of the Red army until it reached Middle Europe if we were to win World War II. Also, after the war turned revolution loose in China it could not be suppressed by any sacrifices which we were prepared to make. The deepest lesson of the two world wars is that such holocausts destroy both governments and systems for the benefit of communism.

We relied on our atomic monopoly and discounted Soviet science and industry far too heavily. What a great people must do it can. In achieving a nuclear stalemate the Soviets turned the tables on us, even in the treatment of their scientists. We investigated and watched and suspected our scientists until Dr. Vannevar Bush could say in 1954 that our scientists "go on working," but "they feel they are not welcome."¹³ At the same time the Soviets gave their scientists "the highest standard of living and the greatest esteem that Soviet society has to offer."¹⁴

We embraced negativism in defeating other peoples' purposes. Archibald MacLeish said in an historic article that

never in the history of the world was one people as completely dominated, intellectually and morally, by another as the people of the United States by the people of Russia in the four years from 1946 through 1949.¹⁵

We copied some of the worst features of our rival's system. A virus theory of communism was accepted and its conspiratorial aspects were magnified into a deadly menace to the very existence of the mightiest nation of all time. We started questioning the loyalty of every person serving the government or working in defense plants, so that now, including families, 20,000,000 American citizens are always subject to investigation. So universally respected a lawyer as John Lord O'Brian has listed nine new practices inimical to our personal

¹³ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "The Encroachments on Freedom," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1956, pp. 41-42.

¹⁴ John Turkevitch, "The Soviet's Scientific Elite," *Saturday Review*, March 24, 1956, pp. 61-62.

¹⁵ Archibald MacLeish, "The Conquest of America," *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1949, p. 11.

liberties which violate the basic American conception of fair play.¹⁶

We disregarded the power of education and industrialization to change the Communist system. It was never possible to push the education of all the people with furious intensity, as the Communists did from the start, without giving the people the power to think, to compare, and to aspire to freer ways of life. It was never possible to promise everyone a better life and then create the means of delivering it, without meeting, if only slowly, the inevitable expansion of human wants.¹⁷ Nor can any great technical society be operated on a permanent basis by the compulsions and under the fetters of police state controls.

Important increases in personal liberty have already come to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Poland; only another cold war—or a hot one—can prevent the process from spreading throughout the Red bloc.

We did not know that cold wars cannot be won. This is because the *methods* which a cold war generates defeat its *objectives*. A Korean crisis drawn out three years too long, with the constant threat of its extension, provoked neutralism throughout the world and isolationism at home. Long continued embargoes on trade with the Communist nations forced them to draw together, develop their own resources rapidly, and advance through austerity. Attempting to arm the soundly beaten Germans and Japanese quickly against the Soviet

¹⁶ John Lord O'Brian, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 25-31.

¹⁷ On June 1, 1955, Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, suggested "the possibility that newly-created wants and expectations, stimulated by education and perhaps by more exposure to the West, will in time compel great and almost unpredictable changes in the Soviet system itself."—*New York Times*, June 2, 1955.

Union, and to force our allies into a European Defense Community, convinced all the peoples concerned that their welfare was not our primary concern. Arming Pakistan to get one more springboard into the Soviet Union alienated both Afghanistan and India—far more important to us—and forced them both into counter arms expenditures which they can ill afford, and which work strongly to defeat India's democratic experiment. The constant pressure of cold war talk, with its mounting threat of nuclear annihilation for all, made the outlook increasingly intolerable for all peoples and forced us to go to the Geneva Conference in 1955 and declare a truce. The methods of the cold war had defeated the objective of isolating and confining the Communist powers.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE LONG PULL

Since we have obviously overcompensated heavily since 1945 for our isolationist fiasco after 1918, it now remains for us to try to avoid another catastrophe at the end of our containment venture and to try to chart a course for the long pull, something in between Fortress America and a chain of containment stretching all the way around the earth.

Because we love to go all out in some direction, this will be a difficult way of living for us to accept. Is there, nevertheless, any workable alternative? And if there is not, is it not time to try to set up some guideposts for a more prosaic but durable way of living in the world?

The following suggestions are offered in the hope that they will contribute to our national longevity in a world soon to be manned by thousands of triggered guided missiles with nuclear war heads.

Remember our common humanity. At the height of the cold war fear of atomic death, Bertrand Russell besought us to "remember your humanity and forget everything else."

This is the first rule for survival in an age when everything can perish from the gradual atomic poisoning of the air by nations bent on seeing as many of their own big bangs as they feel the sacred canons of defense require. Before the atoms finish us all, one way or another, we need to remember that the Russians are a great people, with the same needs that we have; that the Chinese are by all odds the oldest, toughest, cleverest, and most numerous people on the globe—now highly organized and marching into modernity; and that we have to live in reasonable amity with these peoples or die with them in a monumental funeral pyre.

In these circumstances it might be better for us to speak to the Chinese before they decide not to recognize us. If, too, our government would permit us to go to China we would most probably discover a growth and evolution so rapid as to astound us, as much as the first two weeks of his recent tour of the Soviet Union impressed Joseph Alsop. He reported from Moscow on January 31:

These last two weeks have been the most interesting and awakening political experience which this reporter can remember in a very long time. Above all, the surprises have come thick and fast, succeeding one another with a rapidity at once bewildering and intensely stimulating.¹⁸

Wouldn't it be well for all of us to interrupt the new cold war long enough to catch a breath-taking glimpse of the dynamic and perhaps constructive developments taking place behind the iron and bamboo curtains?

Be constantly aware that no growing great power can long be denied secure access to the sea. Last year Professor William Ernest Hocking, of Harvard University, suggested that containment

¹⁸ The *Nashville Tennessean*, January 31, 1957.

was a suitable policy to curb the ambitions of would-be dictators, "but not to limit the needs of great peoples" and that "to defeat the natural intercourse among populations is folly." Noting that our containment policy was "visibly breaking down in the Middle East," he added that it is not possible to contain the needs of the Soviet peoples "for ample sea outlets," and that "the effort to keep the Chinese coast in permanent pawn to Formosa, in whole or in part, is doomed to failure."¹⁹

It is conceivable that the Soviet Union will continue to send virtually all of its commerce out past other peoples' guns if she is sure that the guns will remain silent, but it is not reasonable to think that China will endure the situation in the Formosa Strait any longer than she can muster the power to change it.

Withdraw from our most exposed positions while there is still time. It is much easier to get into an encirclement contest than to get out of one. However, our own striking power enables us to withdraw from some positions without fear that the cycle will end in our own encirclement and destruction. Probably most Americans do not know that they have above 900 armed stations overseas manned by more than a million men, and it is not likely that they would feel encircled if some of these posts were evacuated.²⁰

¹⁹ Letter to the *New York Times*, April 29, 1956.

Nicholas Kaldor, a fellow of King's College, Cambridge University, returned from a visit to the new China with the conclusion that "nothing can stop China in a generation or two from becoming one of the leading countries of the world. Communism is a new religion there and has released tremendous energy."—Henry R. Lieberman, *New York Times*, May 27, 1956.

²⁰ Benjamin Welles, *New York Times*, August 14, 1955; Hanson W. Baldwin, *Ibid.*, February 15, 1957.

Work for arms limitation and regulation. Some withdrawal is not synonymous with a policy of retreat to a fortress position. It is an essential aspect of the settlement of the lingering post-war issues.

The recent Polish and Hungarian revolutions have shown that the Satellite armies are no offensive threat to the West, nor any use to the Soviets except in the case of a new German push to the East. This evidence opens up opportunities for the thinning out and eventual withdrawal of forces on both sides in Central Europe. Fortunately, too, our government has decided after several weeks of debate "to explore cautiously the possibilities of disengagement" opened up in the Soviet note of November 17, 1956. This has been done in our disarmament outline laid before the UN General Assembly on January 14, 1957. For the first time we are apparently willing to envision the reduction of our military manpower below the level required to man our numerous foreign bases as a possibility, "under some circumstances, in the future."²¹

For the first time, also, we are apparently willing to consider something less than the absolute security of total inspection. Perhaps now we can escape from the assumption that the costs of ever more expensive weapons must constantly rise and that the huge defense sector of the budget is untouchable.

After the British had admitted in their White Paper of April 4, 1957, that the nuclear destruction of Britain could not be prevented unless by nuclear deterrents to war, the *New York Times* considered the additional burden thrown upon us and spoke editorially on April 7 of our people already cruelly taxed and our own vast resources strained by the

²¹ William Frye, "Disarmament in the United Nations: a New Chapter?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1957, pp. 91-95.

requirements of defense. As an alternative to plumping for atomic war in our own preparations, which the *Times* called "planned suicide," it suggested that "there is another alternative," negotiation with Russia for "self-enforcing" arms limitation.

Is there indeed any other alternative to the age-old end of the arms race cycle—ending this time in the destruction of Western civilization?

Negotiate settlements of the remaining postwar territorial issues. For the past ten years we have refused to propose or consider negotiable settlements in Germany, the Far East, and the Middle East, awaiting the building of positions of superior strength which have never been achieved and are less and less likely to be. For years it has been apparent that Germany could not be united against Russia, or the Far East dominated against both Russia and China. Now it is equally clear that peace cannot be made in the Middle East except in agreement with the Soviet Union.

In these areas we may be able to get neutralization in agreement with Russia and China, but we cannot maintain hostile organization against them. Would it not be well to recognize the geographic and power realities in these regions before our bargaining power is entirely gone? Even NATO is a rapidly wasting asset which should be used while it still has some negotiable value.²²

We should be continually conscious also that the longer tension remains high between ourselves and the Red bloc, the greater the probability becomes that the supersonic bombers and guided missiles

²² See the "total diplomacy" addresses by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, March 9 and 16, 1950. Also Serge de Gunzburg, of the *Agence France Presse*, *New Republic*, January 14, 1957, p. 11: "Western diplomacy persistently refused to try to solve serious problems which divide the two worlds."

will be turned loose, perhaps in some moment of panic or fear.

Guard well our greatly damaged friendship with the peoples of West Europe and the British Commonwealth. These are the peoples who are our closest kin and our most natural allies. We share with them a long heritage of liberty under law and together we have the strength to maintain a community of democratic peoples while the rest of the world evolves toward that goal. Without them we would be really alone.

Furthermore, in our harsh crackdown upon Britain and France last November, we have opened a rift which may eventually isolate us. We had already incurred the distrust of the vast bulk of the Asians. Then within the short space of six months, beginning in November, the brusque and unfeeling actions of our government undermined the friendship and confidence of both Western Europe and Canada. Could self-isolation proceed faster?

If we are to be the leader of our kindred nations, both their interests and feelings must be kept in mind and respected. For example, we cannot permit our Red-hunting Congressional committees to try to police the political morals of Canadian citizens until one of their Ambassadors, twice cleared but "named" a third time by an *Internal Security Subcommittee* of our Senate, commits suicide, angering the entire Canadian people and convincing the whole free world that our practices are still beyond the pale. On April 6, 1957, the *Christian Science Monitor* spoke editorially of the "world wide condemnation now raining upon the United States" and of "anger and contempt from peoples whose friendship and respect would be barriers to communism." Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Lester Pearson, said in the House of Commons that the tactics of our Senatorial investigators

"degrade only those who adopt them."²³

Nor can we regain Canada's friendship if we seek to operate the new St. Lawrence Seaway in a manner which would defeat its purposes for the Canadians, or if our corporations in Canada continue to pursue practices which make the Canadians feel colonial.²⁴

If also we are to be the leader of our natural friends, it will be essential to moderate sharply our opposition to their democratic socialism. In the autumn of 1956, Socialists were in the governments of twelve nations in this group and the effective opposition in five others. By constantly favoring the conservative interests in these countries, we have come close to dismissing a huge segment of the most effective anti-Communists from our ranks—just before the growth of a united Europe which is very likely to be governed by Socialists.

Channel much of our foreign aid through the United Nations and much more of it for economic development. Our obsessive preoccupation with military aid, even to the underdeveloped countries, and economic aid to support their military establishments, is self-defeating. It makes us the allies of too many reactionary ruling groups and incurs the resentment of the peoples, who, as James P. Warburg noted lately, "are going to change the status quo, whether we like it or not."²⁵

The result is also an undue burden on the American taxpayer, a load which the other democratic peoples do not

²³ The *Toronto Globe and Mail*, April 5, 1957.

See the account of the suicide of E. Herbert Norman, Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, in the *New York Times*, April 5, 1957.

²⁴ See the disturbing analysis by James H. Gray, "A Canadian Looks Us Over," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1957, pp. 37-40.

²⁵ An address to the Second Conference on World Disarmament and Development, March 9, 1957, p. 14.

carry in anything like the same degree. This fosters fortress mentality here.

Both dangers can be lessened by going along with the desire of many nations that real money be spent through the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, control of which could be made proportional to contributions to it. This would have the advantage of challenging the Soviet Union and all of the well-to-do UN members to put up their share of development funds. Far from losing credit, which we do not get under the present program anyway, we would gain in the trust of peoples helped because they need it and because it would make them stronger neighbors and trading partners.²⁶

This is a principle which should also guide our independent aid to the underdeveloped countries. The immensity of the need for capital in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is the real challenge, not communism. In October 1947, Henry L. Stimson, one of our wisest statesmen, said:

I do not mean to belittle communism. I only mean that the essential question is one which we would have to answer if there were not a Communist alive. Can we make freedom and prosperity real in the present world? If we can, communism is no threat. If not, with or without communism, our own civilization will ultimately fail.²⁷

What we need in our foreign-aid program is much more of our splendid tradition of Christian neighborliness and

²⁶ A Middle East Development Bank, modeled on the World Bank and affiliated with it, might well be the best channel for our aid in this area. The local states would supply most of the capital, which they are well able to do, and share in the management, yet with good conditions for sound operations. See the stimulating article by Harlan Cleveland, *The Reporter*, April 4, 1957, pp. 9-12.

²⁷ Quoted from the report of the International Development Advisory Board to the President, March 7, 1957.

much less military thinking. It is a strange situation when more than 75 per cent of what the public thinks is "foreign aid" actually goes for military purposes, directly or indirectly.²⁸

Even more important than true economic aid would be "a determined move" on the part of the richer countries "to shape their regular economic policies a little more in the interest of the underdeveloped countries," instead of dealing with them "on the principle of narrow selfishness" and on the basis of economic strength.²⁹

Try to build a world community through the United Nations. What the United Nations needs most is constructive, healing work to do. The world has long been one community for the purposes of trade and war. Now in the nuclear age it must also become a community for peaceful living.

We are currently in a depressed state of mind about the UN, and many may soon be demanding that we leave it because we can no longer control it. But instead of alternately by-passing and overloading it, we need to develop it into a permanent place for negotiation, co-operation, and for getting the world's work done.

We need to be aware daily, also, that the peace will be precarious until a functioning world community is organized.

Stand upon our own heritage as an example of human freedom. It will avail us nothing to girdle the earth with pacts and armed fortifications against communism if at home we determine guilt by association, condemn men for their ideas instead of their acts and on charges by secret accusers, without the right of cross examination, demanding

²⁸ Edwin L. Dale, Jr., *New York Times*, March 8, 1957.

²⁹ Gunnar Myrdal, "Trade and Aid," *American Scholar*, Spring 1957, p. 139.

also that the accused testify against himself.

Throughout our national life the world has looked up to us as free, upstanding men who feared nothing, least of all any one else's ideas. But lately we have convinced much of the world that we no longer rely on liberty as the greatest source of strength that a nation can have.

There is poignancy for us in a quotation from Carl Sandburg's *Remembrance Rock*, which says:

For we know that when a nation goes down and never comes back, when a society or a civilization perishes, one condition may always be found. They forgot where they came from. They lost sight of what brought them along.³⁰

Toward the future

Our rise from nothing to unparalleled power and prosperity within 300 years has been meteoric. But there is nothing to prevent our flashing out of the pages of history even faster than we came in, nothing except our own common sense and growing maturity.

Throughout our violent swings of the past forty years—into world politics, out and in again with a vengeance—one factor has remained constant, a moral responsibility for world peace and prosperity commensurate with our power. Professor Fred Warner Neal, of the University of California, has recently written an able article in which he stated

³⁰ Quoted by Arthur Hays Sulzberger, *New York Times Magazine*, December 12, 1954.

our difficulty as follows: "The great problem of our time is how to translate our moral responsibility into meaningful leadership, not of the world as we should like to have it but of the world as it is."³¹

It is essential to remember also that for survival and leadership in the nuclear age, wisdom will be as important as power.

As one who opposed our retreat into isolation for twenty years after 1918, and who has opposed the cold war since 1945, I still hope to live into a period in which the United States practises a great and stable role in a world of many systems, ideologies, and creeds, avoiding that total revolution which is synonymous with world war and relying upon the deepest aspirations which all men share to create eventually a world community, in which everyone can live in tolerable harmony.

When war between nuclear powers has become tragically absurd, and when there is no longer any place to hide—even in the mightiest fortress—is there any alternative?³²

³¹ Fred Warner Neal, "Moral Responsibility for World Leadership," *Western Political Quarterly*, December 1956, p. 834.

³² See Bernard Brodie, "How War Became Absurd," *Harper's Magazine*, October 1955, pp. 33-37; David Bradley, *No Place to Hide*, Boston, 1948; Richard S. Leghorn, "Mirage Fortress," *The Nation*, February 4, 1956. "In the final analysis there is no such thing as a nation being prepared for a nuclear war."—Civil Defense Administrator Val Peterson, *New York Times*, February 19, 1956.

Sources of Tension Between Western Europe and the United States

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Abstract: The Atlantic Alliance has undergone a transformation which shows its enduring strength, its limits, and the stresses with which it must continuously cope. Its strength lies in the community of interests between the United States and the nations of Western Europe. Its limits are circumscribed by the limitations of these interests to the defense of Western Europe. The stresses to which it is subject result from changes in the technology of warfare and in the over-all distribution of power, the "new look" of Soviet foreign policy, organizational deficiencies, divergence of policies and personalities. The rock of common interests upon which the Atlantic Alliance is built remains intact, but its surface is rougher than it used to be and the structure built upon it is in need of repair.

THE sources of tension between Western Europe and the United States must be seen against the background of the fundamental harmony which exists between Western Europe and the United States. The tragic events of November 1956 have made clear both the fundamental unity and the limits of that unity. Thucydides has said that "identity of interest is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals," and in more recent times the great British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, has put the same thought in the negative by stating that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of clashing interests." We can conclude from these observations that the Western Alliance is as strong and can only be as strong as is the harmony of interests underlying it.

The events of November 1956 have made obvious the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance, but they have not created it. The beginnings of that crisis antedate the autumn of 1956 by several years; for the conditions which created the At-

lantic Alliance during World War II and maintained it during the first decade following it have undergone in recent years subtle and at first imperceptible, but nevertheless drastic and permanent changes.

Seen from the perspective of the nations of Western Europe, three factors sustained the Atlantic Alliance in the decade following World War II: the atomic monopoly of the United States, the economic weakness of the nations of Western Europe, and the intransigence of Stalinist policies. The conjunction of these factors confronted the nations of Western Europe with the choice between national suicide and the acceptance of the political, economic, and military support of the United States. In other words, the Atlantic Alliance was for the nations of Western Europe a prerequisite of national survival.

This connection between national survival and the Atlantic Alliance is no longer as close nor as obvious as it used to be. The atomic monopoly of the United States provided the nations of

Western Europe with absolute protection against Russian conquest. With the Soviet Union having become for all practical purposes an atomic power equal to the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is no longer for the nations of Western Europe solely a protection, but has become also a liability. The atomic stalemate threatens not only the two superpowers, but also their allies, with total destruction. The Soviet Union has not been slow to point out, and the man in the street in Western Europe has not been slow to understand, that if there is a chance for the nations of Western Europe to survive in an atomic war it may lie in not being too closely identified, or perhaps not being identified at all, with the United States. Thus a latent neutralism has had a slowly corrosive influence upon the Western Alliance. The rise of this neutralism in Western Europe as a popular mass movement is not primarily the result of Communist propaganda, or of faintness of heart, or political decadence, but of the new objective conditions under which the nations of Western Europe must live in the age of the atomic stalemate.

DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POWER

Secondly, the distribution of power in the world has greatly changed since the beginning of the fifties. The weak nations have grown stronger and the nations defeated in World War II are in the process of growing very strong indeed. Ten years ago, the nations of Western Europe had either to join the United States or go bankrupt economically and disintegrate socially. The economic recovery of the nations of Western Europe has greatly diminished their dependence upon the United States. The Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the Common Market, and the development of East-West trade are likely to decrease it still more. Thus while the

nations of Western Europe are still in need of American economic aid, that aid is no longer a question of life and death as it was ten years ago. Today, they have, or at least have evidence that they soon will have, an alternative. They can stand on their own feet again and look beyond the wall of containment for new outlets for their energies and products.

The Soviet Union has been eager to use these new military and economic conditions under which the nations of Western Europe live for the purpose of weakening and ultimately destroying the Atlantic Alliance. What has been called the "new look" of Soviet foreign policy is essentially a new flexibility which has taken the place of the monotony of the Stalinist threats. In the face of these threats, no nation which wanted to survive as a nation had any choice; thus Stalin was really the architect of the Western Alliance. The new Soviet foreign policy alternately threatens and tempts, as the occasion seems to require, but always seeks to hold before the eyes of Western Europe an acceptable or even preferable alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. The rise of Germany to a position of political, military, and economic eminence, with all the fears and expectations this rise must cause in both Western and Eastern Europe, cannot help but add to the opportunities of the new Soviet foreign policy.

As viewed from the vantage point of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is also in the process of undergoing a subtle change, which in the end is bound to be a drastic one. For the United States, the Atlantic Alliance is the political and military implementation of its perennial interest in the maintenance of the European balance of power. The United States has always had a vital interest, paralleling that of Great Britain, in preventing any European power from gaining hegemony over the continent of

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Europe. It was in defense of this interest that she intervened in the two world wars and has been waging the cold war. Thus the vital interest of the United States in the protection of the nations of Western Europe against Russian domination is identical with the interest of these nations in preserving their national independence.

However, the military implementation of this identical interest is likely to change under the impact of a new technology of warfare. As long as the main deterrent to Russian aggression remains the atomic bomb delivered by plane, the military strategy of the United States is in need of military installations in Western Europe; and the nations of Western Europe have a corresponding interest in providing them. To the extent to which the intercontinental guided missile will replace airplanes as a means of delivering the atomic bomb, the interest in American military installations in Western Europe will diminish on both sides of the Atlantic. This interest will decrease still further when some of the nations of Western Europe will have atomic installations sufficient to deter the Soviet threat on their own. When this day comes, the Atlantic Alliance will take on a new complexion, probably losing some of its specific military aspects and tending to revert to that implicit community of interests which has tied the United States to Great Britain from the War of 1812 to World War II. It is to this contingency that the British Minister of Defense, Mr. Duncan Sandys, appears to have been referring when he justified in April 1957, in the House of Commons, the British emphasis on atomic armaments by asking: "When the United States has developed the five thousand-mile intercontinental ballistic rocket can we really be sure that every American administration will go on looking at things in the same way?"

DIVERGENT INTERESTS

However, the interests of the United States and the nations of Western Europe are not limited to that continent. Those of the United States and Great Britain are world-wide, and France is engaged in Africa. While the interests of the United States and of the nations of Western Europe indeed coincide in the preservation of the independence of the latter, they do not necessarily coincide elsewhere. The coincidence or divergence of these non-European interests has had, as it was bound to have, a strengthening or debilitating effect upon the Atlantic Alliance itself; and the vital interest of all concerned in this alliance has, in turn, limited their freedom of action outside Europe.

The United States, in particular, dealing with the colonial revolutions which are directed primarily against Great Britain and France, has been continuously confronted with a painful and inherently insoluble dilemma. The horns of that dilemma are the interest of the United States in the continuing strength of Great Britain and France as her principal allies and the American interest in preventing the colonial revolutions from falling under the sway of communism. If the United States underwrites the colonial position of Great Britain or France, as she did in Indochina, she may strengthen, at best, temporarily her principal European allies, but will impair her standing with the anticolonial peoples of Asia and Africa. If the United States sides unreservedly with the Afro-Asian bloc, as she did in the United Nations on the occasion of the Suez Canal crisis of autumn 1956, she weakens Great Britain and France and, in consequence, the Atlantic Alliance itself.

Faced with this dilemma which can only be solved at the price of impairing the vital interests of the United States in one or the other respect, the United

States has been inevitably reduced to straddling the fence by supporting half-heartedly on one occasion one side and on another occasion the other side, or else keeping hands off altogether. Algeria and Cyprus exemplify at present the dilemma and its evasion. In such situations, then, the Atlantic Alliance does not operate at all; for there are no common interests which could support its operation.

This has always been obviously true of Western policies toward Communist China. The policy of the United States has been one of implacable hostility, while Great Britain has sought accommodation. The Atlantic Alliance is here not only not operating, but the policies of its two principal members have been consistently at cross-purposes. The success of one would of necessity mean the failure of the other.

That such divergencies of interest and policy have not imposed greater stresses upon the Atlantic Alliance and have left it essentially unimpaired testifies to its inherent strength. Its rather painless revival after the crisis of November 1956, likewise testifies to it. It also points to what is essential and to what is not and may even be misleading and damaging in the Atlantic Alliance. Its essence lies in a community of interests which is limited but which, within its limits, is virtually unbreakable; for it embraces the vital interests of the members of the Alliance.

Common interests are the rock on which all alliances are built. Yet upon this rock all kinds of structures may be erected, some solid and spacious, others crumbling and confining. In other words, there are good and bad alliances, some which work smoothly and are enthusiastically supported, others which are cumbersome and are grudgingly accepted as a lesser evil. While the existence of the alliance depends upon a community of interests, the quality of the

alliance is determined by the manner in which common interests are translated into day-by-day policies.

It is in this latter respect that the Atlantic Alliance must cause concern. Here, too, the crisis of November 1956 has made obvious defects which antedate that crisis. Three such defects have, continuously and to an ever increasing degree, impaired the operation of the Atlantic Alliance: its organizational structure; the policies, domestic and international, of its leading members; and the prestige enjoyed by some of its leading statesmen.

NATO

The common interest of the members of the Atlantic Alliance in the military protection of their independence has found its organizational expression in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The strategic conception which underlies NATO is the assumption that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are able to defend themselves through a co-operative effort against a military attack by the Soviet Union. This is not the place to examine the soundness of this conception.¹ It must suffice to point out that NATO has never developed a convincing philosophy of its purpose. All members of NATO are agreed upon one objective: to defend their independence without having to fight for it. But how is this purpose to be achieved? Is primary reliance to be placed upon atomic retaliation with the local forces of NATO performing the function of the "plate glass" or "trip wire," or is a prospective aggressor to be deterred by the inherent military strength of local forces? The members of NATO have not seen eye to eye on this fundamental question, and NATO

¹ A detailed analysis of NATO is being prepared by the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago.

itself, in its official proclamations and policies, has not seemed to be of one mind either.

More particularly, declared purposes of NATO have been consistently at variance with the measures requested of its members for implementation of these purposes, and the measures requested, in turn, have been invariably at variance with the measures actually taken. Furthermore, declared purposes, requested measures, and the measures actually taken have been subjected to a number of drastic and confusing changes which cannot be explained exclusively by the revolutionary transformation which military technology is in the process of undergoing.

This confusion in policy, in itself conducive to political disunity and friction in day-by-day operations, has been magnified by the elaborate organizational superstructure which is intended to put the policies of NATO into practice. This superstructure, encompassing a plethora of committees in charge of coordinating a variety of political, military, and economic policies of the member states, must, even under the best of circumstances, make for friction and inefficiency. It magnifies these defects because it is much too ambitious in purpose and elaborate in operation for the agreed purpose of NATO to support it. In the absence of agreement on philosophy and basic policy, the elaborate organizational superstructure can be a source of weakness rather than of strength for the Atlantic Alliance.

CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE

An alliance, in its day-by-day operations, rests in good measure upon the mutual confidence in the willingness and ability of its members to co-operate effectively in achieving the common purpose. That confidence, in turn, rests upon the quality of the over-all policies pursued by the members of the alliance

and upon the character and ability of its leading statesmen. In both respects, the Atlantic Alliance has shown itself to be deficient.

There can be no doubt that in both respects the prestige of the United States as the leader and backbone of the Atlantic Alliance has drastically declined. It is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion whether this decline is rooted in objective facts or whether it is but the result of subjective preconceptions and emotions. Rightly or wrongly, the United States is no longer looked upon by its allies, as it was during the period immediately following World War II, as the leader whose strength and resolution, if not wisdom, can be relied upon to keep the Atlantic Alliance on an even course. In the sphere of policies, three factors are in the main responsible for that crisis of confidence.

In foreign policy it is sometimes, but by no means always, useful to keep the enemy guessing. But to keep your allies guessing, most of the time and on matters vital to them, about what you intend to do is bound to erode the foundations of confidence upon which the alliance in its day-by-day operations must rest. The allies of the United States have noted the discrepancies between the policy pronouncements of our leaders and the actual policies pursued, which appear to them to have evolved into a consistent pattern of unreliability. Liberation, the unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek, agonizing reappraisal, the "new look," intervention in Indochina, the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, the internationalization of the Suez Canal, the protection of the rights of Israel have been proclaimed as objectives of American foreign policy. Yet, in most instances the foreign policy of the United States appears to our allies to have been completely at variance with these pronouncements or, at the very least, their implementation remains in doubt.

This slow accumulation of loss of confidence reached a critical stage in the Suez Canal crisis; for here unreliability in policy appeared to be joined by indifference, if not hostility, to the vital interests of America's principal allies. For the vital interests of the United States and her allies to coincide in Europe and diverge elsewhere is one thing; for the vital interests of her principal allies elsewhere to be actively opposed and gleefully destroyed by the United States is quite another thing. To the former, the allies of the United States could reconcile themselves with relative equanimity; the latter could not help but raise for our allies the crucial question as to whether the Atlantic Alliance was worth so high a price. That they answered the question in the affirmative testifies, as pointed out above, to the vitality of the alliance. But under the dramatic impact of the experience which saw their interests and power destroyed, in a region vital to themselves, with the approval and active participation of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance tends to transform itself for our allies from an association of like-minded nations into a burden grudgingly borne.

That like-mindedness has in the past been the result not only of a community of interests, but also of a common dedication to the ideals of freedom. When in the aftermath of World War II Communist totalitarianism threatened to engulf Western Europe, the United States was looked upon by her European allies as the symbol and the incarnation of that dedication. That image of the United States has been tarnished throughout the world by the recent temporary decline of freedom within her borders. Some of our European friends have gone to the extreme of asking whether there was much to choose, in terms of freedom, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet while this cynicism has subsided under the

impact of the revival of the traditions of American freedom, there have remained a latent skepticism and general malaise, which cast their shadow over the Atlantic Alliance.

POLICIES AND PERSONALITIES

As far as long-range policies are concerned, the relations among nations must indeed be conceived in terms of interests. As concerns their day-by-day relations, we must also think in terms of personalities. We say that the United States and Great Britain have agreed on a certain policy, but tend to forget that Great Britain and the United States are abstractions and that in actuality the President and Secretary of State of the United States and the Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, speaking in the name of their respective nations, have agreed with each other. The smooth and effective operation of an alliance, then, depends in good measure upon the relations of trust and respect among its principal statesmen. There is no gainsaying the fact that the absence of such relations has become a great handicap in the day-by-day operations of the Atlantic Alliance. Regardless of the objective merits of the case, there can be no doubt that the leaders of our European allies have no longer the same confidence in the judgment and the authority of the President of the United States they had in times past and that they dislike and mistrust the Secretary of State of the United States with varying intensity but virtual unanimity. Whether they are right or wrong in holding such opinions is beside the point of this discussion; the fact that they are holding them has increased the strains under which the Atlantic Alliance operates at present.

While the negative reactions to our policies and statesmen on the part of our European allies are more important for

the Atlantic Alliance than our reactions to their policies and statesmen by virtue of the predominant position the United States holds in that alliance, our reactions, similarly negative, cannot help but add to the strain. The instability of French governments, the collapse of the Eden cabinet, the seeming futility of British and French policies in Cyprus and Algeria, the failure of their intervention in Egypt, all have made us doubt both the power of our principal allies and the wisdom of their leadership. The traditional political rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic has tended to

gloss over all these stresses and strains and has made it appear as though the Atlantic Alliance were something broader and smoother and also something more diffuse than it actually is. It is indeed built upon a rock of common interests, but the rock is of limited dimensions and its surfaces are sometimes rough. In spite of the great damage which the crisis of November 1956 has done to the Western Alliance and the position of its members, it has been useful in circumscribing more closely its limits and demonstrating, for all to see, its enduring strength.

Prospects of Continued Anglo-French Solidarity

By JEAN DE LA GRANDVILLE

Abstract: The system of alliances is the most practical one as a basis for international organization. In Europe the Organization for European Economic Co-operation was made necessary by the Marshall Plan. Further integration has been hampered by traditions of sovereignty, which are being overcome. More rapid progress may have been delayed by Great Britain's hesitancy to join in the European organizations, in spite of the French efforts to secure her co-operation. Developments on the Continent, such as the formation of the Coal and Steel Community, have brought Great Britain closer. The Common Market plan and Euratom may prove even greater inducements to full British association with the Continental states.—Ed.

THE subject of the prospects of continued Anglo-French solidarity is one close to the heart of a French diplomat and, in fact, close to the hearts of all Frenchmen. Nowhere in the world can other peoples be found who, as the French and the British, have a common history so tightly bound and so rich in glory.

However, I do not intend to go back to olden times, nor even to recall how, after nineteen centuries of almost uninterrupted strife since Julius Caesar held together Gaul and the British Isles, France and England reached an entente, a comradeship in arms, and a true friendship at the beginning of our own century. The problem of a Franco-British solidarity is in fact that of the association of Great Britain with Europe.

The harmony between States, the solidarity between two nations, those are not a question of principle. For many centuries, admirable plans for the establishment of peace by means of the respect of moral law have failed to produce any marked results. The natural right of individuals based on principles has remained within the realm of ab-

straction. On the contrary, a few definite facts, needs arising from a common experience, can result in setting up among several states a mode of life which eliminates conflicts, which forces them to accommodate themselves to it and finally to codify this status. Thus positive right is born, diplomacy is created, and in the end an "international domain" is established. You know how this domain is formed. It groups into a common entity: rivers, entire regions, procedures, methods, organizations of all types. This "international domain" corresponds to the international civilization which is ours. Unfortunately, this international civilization is not unique on earth. For, on the one hand, in what Valéry used to call the *monde fini* of today, our civilization is pushed under the impulse of industry towards a material uniformity, a standardized existence. But, on the other hand, human civilizations vary sufficiently to divide the world into three great regions: Old Europe, Eurasia, and what I will call the "oceanic hemispheres." Therefore, the unifying impulse breaks up against these divisions from which it draws a variety

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of forms. In the internal domain, the evolution of the world appears to be the same everywhere. Unification tends to integrate the masses into the economic and political framework of the state: the social plane supersedes the political one.

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The same cannot be said of international relationships. Evolution is not identical in the three large human groups I have just mentioned. In the Eurasian zone, the USSR has practically taken over the sovereignty of the Satellite states in such a way that they are sovereign in appearance only; and it has imposed, in the name of the international "proletariat," a Russian hegemony over these states.

The rest of the world offers very different aspirations. In what I have called the oceanic hemispheres, sovereign states resist this unifying and totalitarian tendency. But one can observe the development of an association, of a union, that is to say of a movement towards the progressive extension to all the states of the "international domain" I have defined previously.

The union of the American Republics has no object other than to maintain peace among its members by settling conflicts and to maintain an alliance in the face of aggression. The British Commonwealth is a more consistent association; it has its own institutions and practices an "empirical internationalism" which, while being without juridical foundation, is nonetheless an unquestionable success.

Finally, between Continental Eurasia and the immense oceanic associations, a group of very ancient civilizations form a belt. The numerous states which are included in it are all descended from these ancient societies from which they hold their inheritance. These states are

old in the West, younger in the center and in the East. On one side we have the Western and Southern parts of Europe, on the other side, the new independent states, from the Middle East to Indonesia. All these states are subjected to opposite forces: those that relate to their far away past and those which come from the two worlds on each side of them. We know that civilizations are due to pass away, but before that end comes they are put to a test, and it is to a very severe test that these authentic remnants of the past are now being subjected. If they let themselves be integrated into the Soviet bloc, then there is no possible coexistence between the two worlds between which they now stand, and we are rushing towards a conflict the form and the consequences of which we cannot even foresee. If, on the other hand, they come under a more or less stringent control by the oceanic states, hostility between the two blocs can but increase. However, they strive to remain faithful to the principles they intend to safeguard, and thus they will keep a strength sufficient to enable the world to find peace. Among all these civilizations on the edge of these worlds, we feel in Western Europe that our civilization is the one which must play the decisive role.

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

In what manner and to what degree have political developments followed this human evolution? This evolution has been so rapid that methods and concepts have been unable to keep pace with it. In international life the results has been to create a confusion among the systems for international organization. In the course of history, states have attempted to form groups, to organize themselves according to greatly varied systems which they now try to use concurrently at the risk of having these systems cancel each

other out because of the many contradictions they contain. Three systems now exist.

The first is the *directoire* or directorate. This directorate was instituted at Yalta by three states, which became four states when, at the end of the war, France joined with America, England, and Russia. Theoretically, it still functions in certain limited fields such as the problem of the reunification of Germany.

The second is the United Nations Organization whose objectives—co-operation, security, disarmament—are universal, but where the great powers by virtue of their permanency and their right of veto hold the reins of effective control.

Finally, the third system is that of alliances, and this system is still in force today, in a bilateral form on the Soviet side, in multilateral forms on the side of the Free World.

In practice, the first two systems work out badly or with difficulty. An apparently insurmountable opposition separates the USSR from the other great powers. Therefore, there remains only the system of defensive alliances. These are institutions as old as the world itself but which must constantly be built anew.

One must ask oneself—where will these alliances eventually lead? One could imagine that they tend to an active policy which will try to impose upon its opponents, whether Russian or Chinese Communists, the settlement of conflicts, the adherence to democratic principles, political and economic co-operation. But, such a policy would contain in itself a great risk of conflict.

On the contrary, alliances may be a means to develop between those who have signed them that *international* domain whose existence they acknowledge. Such is the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and the European organization on the other. They are both the sources

of an international policy, which, by definition, must function besides the mere sovereignty of states. In this manner a vista is suddenly opened upon new concepts of international life. These concepts are now finding a practical application in Western Europe.

EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY

World War II taught us a lesson, that of European solidarity. One fact became clear to all: it was that none of the countries of Europe could recover or defend themselves by their own means. Before the war, self-sufficiency might have seemed a workable proposition. It was the proud ambition of the totalitarian regimes, in particular, to be self-sufficient and to negotiate with other countries, not on a basis of interdependence, but on the basis of a calculated and controlled bartering system in which it was believed more honorable to deprive oneself of a commodity or of a service rather than to accept the help of others, and yet where the ultimate goal was to impose one's supremacy.

Today, we in Europe have become accustomed to recognizing our difficulties and deficiencies without a feeling of false shame. We have learned, or I should say we have learned all over again, for this has always been a Christian truth, that men are made for one another. Solidarity, not merely of men but also of nations, is the very basis of fraternity; and the latter is a moral precept and the logical consequence of man's condition. When in 1947 Europe seemed on the brink of disaster and anarchy, the Marshall Plan brought us immediate and substantial relief. This initiative was both generous and far-sighted, for it saved the lives of millions of human beings, while, at the same time, it restored the economic activity which war had interrupted or destroyed. For this twofold purpose, the Marshall

Plan made use of the available surplus production. Not only did it administer the oxygen needed to keep the patient alive, but it also provided the blood transfusion which enabled the economy to regain its strength and to function normally.

It was at that very moment that Europe began to think of its future. It was compelled to do so by the necessity of allocating and using the Marshall aid to best advantage. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation owes its existence to this temporary task; and the Marshall Plan, in guiding the European countries toward a lasting collaboration, has played a first-rate educational role.

PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

However, the difficulties facing European integration are formidable. They are first and foremost of a psychological nature. Integration means the renunciation of sovereign powers in favor of a common authority. Yet, for centuries the countries of Europe have waged bloody wars to gain their independence and establish their national unity, which in fact meant the same thing. They will not therefore relinquish without regret and without apprehension the smallest particle of their autonomy: it would be like repudiating all their past ideals and glory. In many countries we had to overcome, and we fortunately did overcome, feelings born of rancor and distrust. Lasting and cordial relations have been established between individuals and groups notably French and German. In this way the climate has been established slowly, patiently in depth to pave the way for integration.

This is why Great Britain's hesitancy in joining the European integration organizations often surprised and annoyed the French. It is true that this attitude is unfortunate and a cartesian mind

would be right to call it greatly illogical. Each time we, the Continentals, hear a voice from over the Channel bid us to unite, we or at least many of us are tempted to answer "with you" or even "not without you."

It is a fact that if our ally had wished to join us in these European organizations, her presence would have encouraged us and it would have weakened or even vanquished much of the opposition. But the Commonwealth thrives on empiricism whilst the French Union, like all our institutions, is based on logic. It is definitely not my intention to appraise the merits of either of these systems. But it is common knowledge that Great Britain neither thinks nor reacts always as we do. There lives on in her heart that instinct so well expressed by Shakespeare and which has outlived the ages:

This fortress built by nature for herself against infection and the hand of war . . . this precious stone set in the silver sea which serves it in the office of a wall or as a moat defensive to a house against the envy of less happier lands.

This difference in attitudes probably results from the geographical accident, measuring but twenty miles, which bears the name of the Straits of Dover. However, in view of the weapons modern nations now have at their disposal to destroy each other, this historical advantage that geography had given England seems to have lost its value.

Yet, France and her Continental neighbors cannot rely on sheer hope when it comes to the momentous decisions with which they are now faced. That is why from the very first the efforts of the French government have remained true, despite many changes in cabinet posts and the vicissitudes of majorities, to a persistent national ideal. They have tried to obtain the proclamation of a close and well-defined associa-

tion of Great Britain with these European communities.

Therefore I will try to analyze the reasons why England finds it difficult to associate herself with the Continent.

ENGLAND'S THREEFOLD ASSOCIATION

The Continentals easily come to the conclusion that Great Britain is a part of Europe. While this statement is true geographically, it is but partly true. Actually, England belongs to three groups of states. First and foremost, she is the nominal head of the British Commonwealth of Nations, a society of sovereign states predominantly non-European. Then, she is a member of the Anglo-Saxon community, and in this respect enjoys the closest relationship with the United States. Finally, she is one of the main states of Western Europe. But, you will note that Europe holds the last rank in this British association: the traditional factors of language, law, and religion win over the physical factor of geography. And lastly, British opinion is informed, but under a typical British light; and this important qualification provides an explanation for England's adroitness in her relations with the Commonwealth, for the on-and-off success of her relationship with the United States, and for her reluctance to share certain problems of Continental Europe.

Great Britain's authority over her partners of the Commonwealth, although it survives mostly because of the strength of ideological links, of the advantage of commercial and monetary relations, and of the system of periodical consultations with the Dominions, is nonetheless weakened on the essential plane of defense. England is therefore all the more inclined to tighten the links with the country toward which her own associates turn more and more each day: I mean the United States. Nonetheless it seems to me that the United States, conscious

of its strength and of its mission as leader of the Atlantic coalition, shows a growing tendency to make decisions by itself. While highly valuing British opinion, the American government does not readily accept the idea of a duumvirate of the Free World and it would often prefer to deal with a unified Western Europe.

For this reason, England may find herself bound to Europe more than her own instinct would dictate. In the course of history, her traditional policy has been to keep an equal balance among the more powerful states of the Continent and to intervene, whenever the balance of power seemed to be upset in a manner which she judged dangerous. Today, Europe being economically and militarily weakened, a policy based upon balance of power does not retain much meaning. England therefore has adopted a policy of support and co-operation while stipulating certain conditions for her association with the Continental states. Thus, up to now, we have seen her co-operate with Europe following the principles governing her relations with her partners of the Commonwealth but refusing to be bound to the Continent by any closer ties than those which bind her to the Dominions.

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

One must admit that the federalist movement was born on the Continent out of a reaction against nationalist excesses and the incapacity of states to protect their citizens efficiently. Well, no Englishman can express a similar criticism of his political system which has protected him from invasion and which has held the Commonwealth together until this day: he even feels instinctively suspicious of Continental states and of their political systems.

That is why British public opinion has so far been a little reluctant to accept

other forms of European co-operation than those having an intragovernmental consultative character. That is why the Organization for European Economic Cooperation has remained, apart from its role in matters of exchange and payments, a basically consultative organ. The Assembly of the Council of Europe enjoys no real power and uses a parliamentary approach to the solution of European organization rather than a federative one.

One should note finally that the Englishman who greatly prefers an old tradition to a written constitution, dislikes subscribing to new institutions which, because of their very complex status, seem to him unlikely to endure.

ENGLAND'S CHANGING POSITION

Such was the situation until very recently. But no matter how strong all these objections may remain, we now see the basic position of England being tempered by pragmatism. First, the Coal and Steel Community came into being. The potential market it opens up represents a steel production two and a half times greater than British production and a number of consumers four times greater than those of the United Kingdom. In a few years, should the experience be crowned with success, the price of metal products on the Continent will be lower than that of similar British products, which will not be able to meet export competition. Therefore, it is normal that Britain should have concluded a treaty of association with the Coal and Steel pool.

The British viewpoint on defense institutions has likewise been singularly tempered. Up to 1954, the military commitments of Great Britain as regards the Continent were exact copies of those subscribed to by the United States. On October 23, 1954, through the Paris Agreements which replaced the Euro-

pean Defense Community plans rejected by the French National Assembly, the United Kingdom for the first time in its history agreed not only to leave military units on the Continent which represent an important part of her military establishment, but also to delegate its authority for the continued stationing of these troops to an international organization voting on a majority basis.

Such a commitment was of fundamental importance from the point of view of European security as well as from that of the future evolution of the European structure.

More recently, a great many British political observers among whom should be first of all listed the name of the man who was to become Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, have become increasingly conscious of the possibilities open to the Free World by the new institutions the Continent is now fashioning for itself: the Common Market and Euratom. They felt that it would be a mistake to run the risk of a failure in the unification of Europe which might well lead to a desegregation of Western Europe. Needless to say, this evolution has been welcomed in the French Parliament and in the entire country with a very warm heart. Those of us who know England best are convinced that British pragmatism may take the "European" plunge if the Continent itself should decide to do so. When I was a student, one of my professors always recalled that sentence of Emerson when the philosopher says brutally in his book *English Traits*, in the chapter entitled "Ability": "They are atheistic in their scepticism towards theory but they kiss the dust before a fact."

CITIZENS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Statesmen pursue and are on the verge of achieving a policy based on a new concept of people to people relation-

ships. But the spirit is lacking which would give these new political institutions a lasting strength: the absolute need to create this spirit is the imperative of the day for all of us.

For too long, private citizens have remained aloof from international affairs. If they sometimes intervene in that field, it is with a purely passionate viewpoint. Yet, international affairs deserve greater attention. Every one must be convinced that they now take precedence over all others; that they must be taken

into account by all because they are accessible to all. No longer may international affairs be the exclusive privilege of a small minority: they can enter the public domain provided they are studied impartially. We believe that the association of free men of good faith, which has already produced its results on the European continent and in the great empires beyond Europe, will be able to foster that spiritual force which is indispensable to the success of a common enterprise.

Stability of English and French Foreign Policy

By ROBERT STRAUZ-HUPÉ

Abstract: The disintegration of the British and the French empires is the major cause of conflict of our time. As the remaining hopes for the preservation of empire wane, both Englishmen and Frenchmen are driven to contemplate the only alternative—federation—by which their problem can be resolved. France has already renounced a sizable portion of her sovereignty to supranational control agencies; so have the Germans. It took Suez to shock Britain into a genuine European response. In the last analysis, a closer Atlantic Union is needed to return Europe as a whole to a great center of political and economic power.—Ed.

AT Suez, England and France—and, with them, all of Europe—came to a turning point in history: the English-French fiasco in the Levant closed the long epoch of European nation-states as Great Powers. In world politics, Europe still matters—and still matters enormously. But no single European power can pursue a foreign policy as long as it does not do so by the leave of, if not in concert with, the United States or the Soviet Union—or both. It can be argued that the Suez incident merely dramatized a development that has been unfolding for a long time. Yet history is a series of tests, and a people does not become aware of its true standing among the states until it has met or failed to meet a specific test. In the last century, for example, the Ottoman Empire and Spain were mere shadows of their former might; but it took the battles of Navarino and Manila Bay to convince the international community, including the Turks and the Spaniards, that two spectres of world power had been laid to rest.

Whatever might be the future of England and France, it will bear only a

faint resemblance to their imperial past. As world powers, their foreign policies are now matters of record and are no longer subject to correction by feats of diplomacy and war. It is tempting, therefore, to study these completed cycles of history and to trace meaningful patterns from which other generations and peoples will derive wholesome insights in high policy. Unfortunately, as hard as we may look, we cannot discern any clear and instructive patterns; and whatever meaning we can find turns out, upon closer inspection, to be ambiguous. The most straightforward lesson which the histories of England and France can teach us can be summed up in one awful platitude: empires are perishable. England and France have come within sight of the end of the road. Their predicament, like that of all fallen heroes, is tragic. It is also ironic, for, in history, no masters of empire ruled as mildly and as well.

As for consistency, there has been none in the foreign policies of England and France. Whatever consistency historians profess to discern is largely a matter of their own conjectures. To be

sure, England is an island and France a Continental power. This geographic difference accounts for certain differences in basic opportunities and limitations which, throughout history, confronted English and French foreign policy makers. This does not mean, however, that all English and all French policy makers always recognized these respective opportunities and limitations.

It has been alleged that England, taking advantage of her position of geographic detachment from the European continent, pursued consistently the policy of the balance of power. Upon closer inspection of the historical record, we find that England sometimes followed and sometimes deviated from this policy. At times England pursued no recognizable foreign policy at all, if by foreign policy is meant a pondered course of action. We are told that France has been concerned perennially with her security vis-à-vis Germany. Yet less than fifty years ago, Frenchmen were more agitated over African great power rivalries (Fashoda) in which England and not Germany played the role of France's leading antagonist. Although neither English nor French foreign policy could ever lay claim to stability, both countries have much in common. If their foreign policies were not stable, their foreign problems, at least, displayed a consistent pattern.

England is a European power who deems herself not so much European as the member of a global Commonwealth. What has been most consistent in England's foreign policy throughout the last forty years or so is the contradiction between England's European interests and her Commonwealth interests, or rather, the inability of a long line of English policy makers to make up their minds as to exactly where England belongs.

France, not without the promptings of Bismarck, who wanted to appease the French spirit of revenge, turned to-

ward imperialist ventures in Africa, the Levant, and Southeast Asia. France, too, faced a dilemma: how to square her imperialist interests with those of the metropolitan territory. The contradictions and misapprehensions engendered by this duality of interests still permeate English and French foreign policy, and, to no small extent, distort the relationships between France and Britain on the one hand and the United States on the other. They are at the root of the difficulties confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

PRE-WORLD WAR II STATUS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE

Until World War II, England and France appeared to be able to bear the burden of both their respective political and military commitments in Europe and of imperial security. Then, Britain was still the leading naval power of the globe; France was, or thought she was, the major military power of the European continent. Their respective economies, despite certain far from reassuring symptoms, still provided the means necessary for the maintenance of great power status. Not that some warning signals were lacking! Before World War I, a Royal Commission, commanded to inquire into the decline of Britain's share in world trade, concluded that Britain was living beyond her means. After World War I, the surprising comeback of Germany challenged comparison with the economic stagnation of France. It took World War II to put the finishing touches upon the picture of Dorian Gray. The countenance of England and France had changed. Not only had the United States won the war in the West, but the survival of Britain and the very liberation and restoration of the French Republic were the achievements of American military and economic power. It can be small comfort to England and France to be told that their case is not

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unique: World War II revealed that no single nation state west of the Dnieper River possesses a territorial base large enough to accommodate international power. By virtue of strategic and technical developments, immensely accelerated by two world wars, England and France were reduced to the status of second-rate powers.

It would be surprising if an epoch of profound changes in power relationships and collapsing empires would be a peaceful one. All throughout history the disintegration of empires has been paced by revolution and war. The disintegration of the British and the French empires is the major cause of conflict of our time—just as the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires was the major cause of World War II.

Because of an unbridgeable gap in experience—the bodily involvement of all Englishmen and Frenchmen in the struggle has no counterpart in the American remembrance of World War II—the peoples of England and France, on one hand, and the people of the United States, on the other hand, are divided by profound differences in outlook. The outlook of Americans is essentially optimistic—and why should it not be? Both in peace and in war Americans have managed to increase their patrimony. The American way of life is well on the road to universalization. It can be argued that the peoples of Asia and Africa, when they reach for the blessings of various collectivist doctrines including communism, do so because of either a misapprehension about political theory or a misguided wish to cut their nose to spite their face. What they really want is the American way of life—its easy urbanity together with its wonderful gadgets.

Neither England nor France can keep on believing that they still have universal missions. Of course, there is still

a good deal of rhetorical affirmation of England's leading role in the Commonwealth and of France's *mission civilisatrice*. But how many Englishmen and how many Frenchmen yet believe that they are still the bearers of a universal mission?

AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN OUTLOOK

The consideration of the differences in outlook that separate Americans from their European or Western allies is basic to the consideration of every single topic in world politics. The fissures between the United States and its oldest allies are widened by the spectacle of a defeated Germany, for Western Germany was able to adjust herself to her new and reduced circumstances. Because conclusive defeat left her no other choice, she was able to learn a profitable lesson, which was lost on England and France. Germany managed with American aid to capitalize on her military disaster by renovating her productive plant from the ground up and turning all her energies to the development of her industrial power for peacetime use. Today, Germany holds again her prewar position as Europe's leading industrial producer and exporter. As far as Germany's economic hegemony in Europe is concerned, World War II has not taken place. This amazing albeit not entirely unexpected result fails to cheer most Englishmen and Frenchmen and explains their reservations, indefensible as they may be on grounds of political and economic logic, concerning a united Europe with German participation.

The major issue of world politics is still the challenge of Soviet communism, but it would be indeed surprising if English and French attitudes towards the menace of Soviet communism would be the same as those of the United States. Not that the average Englishman or Frenchman is an easier prey for Communist peace propaganda than the

average American. But the conclusions that Frenchmen and Englishmen, on the one hand, and Americans, on the other hand, draw from the same fact are different. Whereas Americans can conceive of the struggle of the Free World with Soviet communism as an up-and-onward contest that challenges their political ingenuity and technological prowess, Englishmen and Frenchmen can only consider themselves as expendable advanced positions of the great alliance which guards the approaches of the American continent. Given the bare facts, technological and strategic, of the situation, its stoic acceptance by the great mass of Englishmen and Frenchmen deserves more than a casual acknowledgment.

The risks which France and England now incur through atomic devastation are great now and likely to increase; by contrast the stakes have diminished and will, in all likelihood, become smaller. Few indeed are the Frenchmen and the Englishmen who believe that what is left of their respective empires can be kept intact. In both countries the great majority of the people are agreed on some sort of further devolution of empire. Whatever disagreement there is concerns specific conditions and timing. As the remaining hopes for the preservation of empire are waning, both Englishmen and Frenchmen are driven to contemplate the one and only alternative to national power, namely, federation.

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

France and Britain are groping for the larger union in which their individual problems can be resolved. The motivation of French and English policy as regards European union differs. Therefore, the practical policies differ too. France entertains misgivings even deeper than those of Britain as regards the resurgence and strategic ambivalence of Germany. The French Chamber, by a parliamentary maneuver, killed the Eu-

ropean Defense Community. Yet France has cast her lot with a series of agencies of European co-operation—the Schuman Plan, the Western defense union, the Common Market and Euratom. The explanation that France sees in these arrangements a mere device for keeping the Germans down by tying them to European collective controls, does not hold water. For better or for worse, France has surrendered a sizable portion of her sovereignty to a supranational complex of controls. So have the Germans. It required the traumatic shock of Suez to evoke a genuine European response in Britain.

It is impossible to deal here meaningfully with the intricacies of European politics of unification or the particulars of the British position. One thing, however, should be obvious. Gratifying as are the tendencies now abroad in France and England toward closer European co-operation, they tend to lessen the sense of urgency with which Frenchmen and Englishmen contemplate developments beyond their immediate sphere of interest. This immediate sphere of interest is increasingly confined to Europe proper, the Near East, and parts of Africa. Neither France nor Britain retains strategic interests elsewhere. Only the United States, of all the Western powers, can now afford a truly global strategic outlook. For Britain, Southeast Asia is an important market and no more. For France, the only continent that still matters is Africa.

An inherently pessimistic outlook and the contraction of world political horizons shape English and French attitudes towards the United Nations. Neither in France nor in England has the United Nations ever enjoyed the popularity which it has won in America. This can be explained, in part, by the intimate and, on the whole, dismal experience of England and France with the League of Nations; in part, by the skepticism of

old imperial nations towards schemes of world improvement; and in part, by the increasing anticolonial tenor of United Nations debates. The summary condemnation of the Suez expedition by the General Assembly did not endear the United Nations to the English and French public, including even those segments that opposed the venture as a bungling attempt at gunboat diplomacy in the age of atomic rockets. Be that as it may, very few Frenchmen or Englishmen believe that the United Nations, noble as may be the intention of its Charter, can serve, by itself, as an instrument of their respective foreign policies and as the guarantor of world peace.

Englishmen and Frenchmen have as many different concepts of military strategy as have Americans. Some believe that it is the retaliatory power of the United States that keeps the peace. Others think that it is simply the atomic stalemate which counsels both America and Russia to restrain their equally bellicose urges; and others, again, believe that the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, does not want war. But hardly anyone in France or England believes that whatever it is that keeps the peace stands in any palpable relationship to the United Nations.

PRESENT-DAY ROLE OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND

Whatever consistency can now be found in English and French foreign policy derives from compelling factors over which neither England nor France has any control. Despite the strains and stresses on Anglo-American and Franco-American relationships caused by the Suez imbroglio, the center of French and English foreign policy is neither London nor Paris respectively, but Washington. As long as the United States exercises its authority as leader of the North Atlantic Alliance, English and French foreign policy is unlikely

to deviate substantially from the course along which it has traveled these last ten years.

There might be a slackening in military effort; both England and France must interpret their failure at Suez as the consequence of overcommitments in too many places. No British or French government will be able to resist popular clamor, if not the very logic of the situation, which calls for a reduction in military budgets. NATO will have to tighten its belt and place almost exclusive reliance on strategic nuclear retaliation—provided the United States declines to pick up the costly bill for suitable tactical forces. Were the United States to refrain from filling the void created by the contraction of English military power, then any Communist challenge in Europe would have to be met by total war. The response would have to be all or nothing.

The contraction of English and French power has opened not one but many boxes of Pandora whence issue a spate of grave problems. Virtually all of these are insoluble within the traditional framework of European politics. Not even the immense resources of the United States suffice to halt the deterioration of English and French power and the consequent shift of the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East in the Soviet Union's favor.

On the surface, the breach between the United States and England and France has been healed by the ministrations of ambulatory diplomacy. But even the most happily worded communiqué does not restore an alliance which was deeply rooted in a sense of common destiny and now is threatened at the source of its strength. Since no amount of official conjurations will bring back to life those specific relationships which endured through two world wars and ensured the survival of the West against mortal threats from within and without,

new and even more effective relationships will have to be devised. The formula is simple; and more important still, there is no alternative formula that encompasses the problems posed by the decline in English and French influence and by the relative increase in the power of the Russo-Chinese bloc. The answer to these problems can be found only in the union of the Atlantic peoples.

Closer European co-operation and a closer Atlantic union are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they are contingent upon one another. It is only through European and Atlantic unification that the English and French people,

as well as the rest of the peoples of Western Europe, can hope for a brighter future and for the restoration of Europe as a whole as one of the world's great centers of political and economic power. The day of the European nation-state has ended. The prospects for England and France as sovereign nations are bleak indeed. As partners of the Atlantic Community they can play, unhampered by the crushing commitments that they no longer are able to bear alone, a great role in the defense of the West as well as in the economic and cultural advancement of the Free World as a whole.

Neutralism and United States Foreign Policy

By F. S. C. NORTHROP

Abstract: Nationalism dominated our foreign policy until at least the opening of the twentieth century. It was opposed to military invasions or wars arising from European imperialistic theories of foreign policy. After the Spanish-American War, two trends appear: one based on the European concepts, the other a doctrinaire neutralism. Our military, legal, and diplomatic leaders and teachers of international law become adherents of the classical European foreign policy concepts. At the same time, European foreign policy becomes increasingly influenced by classical American concepts. Those concepts should again guide the foreign policy of the United States.—Ed.

NEUTRALISM can be best approached through its historical and ideological context. Its historical context is both immediate, since World War II, and of wider scope reaching back in the case of the United States to the days of its Founding Fathers. In the case of other nations, it goes back to the fifteenth century when Vasco da Gama sailed from Lisbon around Africa to southwestern India where he inaugurated the Western imperialistic domination of Asia, Africa, and Middle Eastern Islam. The ideological context of neutralism is equally complex, involving at least five factors: (1) The political, economic, and religious or antireligious philosophies of (a) communism and (b) modern liberal constitutional democracy. (2) The religious and social philosophies of the African tribesmen; of Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian, or Shinto Asia and of Islam, which differ not merely within and among themselves, but also from the Stoic Roman legal or the Judaic-Christian West in either its Byzantine Communist or its liberal democratic modern variants. (3) The European theories of foreign policy in the im-

perialistic era. (4) The classical theory of United States foreign policy of its Founding Fathers, as given later positive application in accordance with its basic liberal democratic philosophy by President McKinley and Congress in Cuba in 1898 and by President Truman and Congress in Korea in 1950. (5) The subsequent confusions and contradictions resulting from the Europeanization of (4) by (3). Hence the relevance of United States foreign policy to neutralism.

CLASSICAL THEORY OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

The theory of United States foreign policy laid down by its Founding Fathers was neutralism. Washington's prescription of no "entangling alliances" is too well known to need further documentation here. Nowhere does the radical difference between the foreign policy of present and past United States military and political leaders become more evident than in the letter to President Monroe in which Jefferson wrote that "nothing should ever be accepted [by way of commitment outside the United

States] which would require a navy to defend it."¹ Although they differed on almost every domestic issue, Hamilton and Jefferson agreed on the neutralist theory of United States foreign policy. Noting that the key to British and French foreign policy was the quest for colonial possessions, Hamilton wrote:

Why then should we, by a close political connection with any Power of Europe, expose our peace and interest, as a matter of course, to all the shocks with which their mad rivalry and wicked ambition so frequently convulse the earth?²

As late as 1885 President Cleveland added:

Maintaining, as I do, the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington's day which proscribe entangling alliances with foreign states, I do not favor a policy of acquisition of new and distant territory, or the incorporation of remote interests with our own.³

Perhaps the first apparent break in this classical doctrine came with the doctrine of America's "manifest destiny" uttered by President Eliot of Harvard with respect to the domestic frontier and extended beyond the borders of the nation by President Theodore Roosevelt. Even he, however, in 1904 applied the traditional United States doctrine in declaring the United States neutral in the war between Japan and Russia. Recently a British student of comparative international law, Mr. N. C. H. Dunbar, has listed some twenty-one major proclamations by Presidents of the United States with respect to specific wars or invasions between Jefferson in 1806 and Theodore Roosevelt in the Russo-Japanese crisis of 1904 in which the neutralist theory of United States foreign policy was ex-

plicitly appealed to and applied. After contrasting this theory of United States foreign policy with those of Europe, he concludes: "The most important contribution which the United States has made to international law is undoubtedly the doctrine of neutrality." He adds that the period before Presidents Cleveland, McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt "marked the lowest point in the quality of United States diplomacy, and in the amount of popular attention devoted to it"; but that, nevertheless, in its "control of diplomacy [the United States] has always been more democratic than any other country."⁴ It never had a foreign-service elite.

To describe the theory which dominated United States foreign policy from the Founding Fathers until at least the opening of the twentieth century as neutralism is, however, to describe it only partially. It was not an unqualified doctrinaire neutralism that ignored what the issues in any foreign war were; it was, instead, a concrete qualified neutralism directed explicitly against one specific thing—namely, military invasions and wars arising from the theories of foreign policy of the European nations in the imperialistic era. Always when they urged their countrymen to be neutral, Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton referred to the wars arising between the European powers due to their imperialistic foreign policies vis-à-vis their colonial peoples. Why this specificity in their neutralism? Is not the answer clear? They had just had the concrete experience of being a colonial people under European dominance and had fought and won a revolutionary war to throw it off. Obviously, therefore, they did not want to side with their European oppressors to prevent

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¹ *Works*, Vol. V, edited by P. L. Ford (New York, London: G. B. Putnam's Sons, 1904-05), p. 443.

² *Horatius*, May 1795.

³ First Annual Message to Congress 1885.

⁴ N. C. H. Dunbar, "Two Theories of Bellum Justum in the 19th Century," a thesis submitted for the J.S.D. degree in Yale Law School, 1957, p. 257.

other colonial people from doing the same thing. Furthermore, in justifying and consolidating their revolution, the Founding Fathers had written a Declaration of Independence and Bills of Rights to both state and federal Constitutions which affirmed that "all men," not merely Americans, are born *in principle* not merely free but also democratically equal before the law and have the inalienable right to such democratic freedom and equality.

Basis for neutralism

In short, their neutralism with respect to any alliance with European powers rested neither on the expediency of the moment nor on the doctrinaire notion that entrance into *any* foreign alliance or war is an error. It rested instead upon the principles of their basic religious and political philosophy, that, namely, of Locke and Jefferson. Since this moral and political philosophy affirmed the natural right of everyone to freedom, it proscribed the siding with one or another of the European powers in the wars arising from their conflicting imperialistic conquests of other people. It did not follow from this, however, that this same philosophy in the case of a war between a European imperialist and a native people might not prescribe the sending of troops abroad on the side of the native people. This is precisely what occurred in 1898 in the United States military intervention into the war between the Spanish and the Cubans. President McKinley spoke of this decision as the action "of a neutral" made only after Spain had refused the mediation offered by President Cleveland two years earlier to settle the Spanish-Cuban war "on the basis of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain."⁵ Immediately Congress added in its Joint Resolution: "First, that the people of Cuba are, and

⁵ *Ibid.*, 285.

of right ought to be, free and independent." President McKinley's reference to his dispatch of American troops abroad as the act "of a neutral" shows that he did not regard the act as a departure from the classical United States foreign policy of the Founding Fathers. He was merely applying the basic Lockean-Jeffersonian natural-rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights to a foreign war in which one of the parties was a European imperialist power and the other party was a much weaker native people whose natural right to run their own affairs was being violated; then intervention in support of the native people was both just and called for. That Congress interpreted President McKinley's action in the same way is proved by the fact that the first sentence of its Joint Resolution states and applies to the Cuban people the basic moral and political principle of the philosophy in the Declaration of Independence. When the foreign war is one between imperialists conflicting over their conquests of native people, this philosophy of United States foreign policy prescribes neutralism; when the foreign war is between an imperialist and a native people, then the classical United States theory of foreign policy justifies entrance on the side of the native people.

TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY

As previously noted, these theories are the accompaniments of the Western imperialistic era. In fact, they produced it. Hence, instead of looking to imperialism as their explanation, we must look to them as the explanation of imperialism.

Our reference to the traditional European foreign policy has been in the plural. There are two theories. One is moral, teleological and monistic, and, hence, may be appropriately termed the

monistic morally based theory of foreign policy. A moral theory of foreign policy is monistic when it is based on religious and moral norms of one's own nation alone. The other is materialistic, mechanistic, and pluralistic, and, hence, may be termed the pluralistic power-politics theory of foreign policy. In European history, civilization, and politics, the former derived from Aristotle—in the case of England by way of Hooker, Shakespeare, the Church of England, and Sir Robert Filmer—and in the case of France and predominantly Roman Catholic European nations by way of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The second of the two European theories derives on the Continent from Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and the pluralism of the Italian tribal- and family-centered city states; and in Great Britain from Harrington, Hobbes, and Austin.

In Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, not merely man but all things were governed by teleological causality, that is, by purposeful causality, in which the content of the purpose was identified with *telos*, or inevitable future state of the system. This led Aristotle to identify the words "good" and "God" with the organically and internally related final causes of all things. Since this organically related final cause of all particular individual things was one rather than many, it followed that there was but one possible good aim for any person or any nation. Hence, the monism of this morally based theory of foreign policy as defined and made known to morally principled statesmen by Aristotle. The criterion, therefore, of any good foreign as well as domestic policy meant in practice the bringing into being everywhere of this Aristotelian Spanish, French, or Portuguese Roman Catholic or Tudor Elizabethan Church of England Conformist Protestant Christian way of life. Consequently, in bringing their particular Christian and Western

domestic ways of life to bear in the political, economic, and cultural conquests and domination of non-Western civilizations and people, the Western European Spanish, Portuguese, French, British, and German conquerors sincerely believed that they were doing what was religiously and morally good.

To this belief the Protestant Reformation made its unique contribution. As used by both the Lutheran Germans and Henry VIII, it broke the Christian universal man of Cicero and the Stoic Roman legal scientists loose from universal cosmopolitan man to identify him with modern nationalistic Protestant German chauvinistic or Church of England English man. This, combined with the French Revolution which was rooted in modern secular philosophy, produced modern Western political nationalism. This modern nationalism reversed the trend toward effective international law and the concept of moral man as any man whatever, which Cicero and the Stoic Roman legal scientists had introduced and which the later Roman Empire and its inheritor, the Holy Roman Empire, had tried and partially succeeded in making effective. At this point, the Protestantized monistic morally based theory of foreign policy and the pluralistic power-politics theory became identical; and the modern power states, each possessed of absolute and unlimited sovereignty, arose.

Aristotelian Christianity, whether Roman Catholic or Shakespearean and Elizabethan Church of England, also affirmed that it was in the natural-law nature of all things that certain people were born to be moral, religious, and political leaders and that others were born to be both their responsibility and their servants. In short, both Roman Catholic Christian society on the Continent and Conformist Church of England Christian society in Great Britain conceived a regal and hierarchical, rather

than an egalitarian democratic, type of society as the good one—not merely for Africans, Middle Easterners, and Asians—but also for Westerners. A democratic egalitarianism in politics, religion, or education, to say nothing about ideological, religious, and cultural pluralism, was not contained in their concept of the religiously, politically, morally, and educationally good. Thus, at Oxford and Cambridge, for example, it was taken for granted—as with the Filmerian First Families of Virginia—that the best education would be given, with minor exceptions, to those who in the divine dispensation and hierarchy of all things carry the greatest responsibility—namely, the sons of the First Families. Macaulay gave expression to this idea of the good of the monistic morally based theory of national foreign policy when, with respect to India, he said that it was the ideal of the British government in India “to form a class of persons Indian in blood and color but English in taste, opinions, morals and intellect.”⁶ With this ideal, the conception of British policy in India as that of carrying “the white man’s burden” became self-evident. The idea of a foreign-office elite making foreign policy decisions unmolested by unrestrained democratic legislative debates and control became equally self-evident. In a recent study of the leaders of the British government, its foreign ministers, and its foreign officers, the Britisher N. C. H. Dunbar has shown that a preponderant number of them came from the aristocratic families and were trained in the Aristotelian philosophy at Eton, Harrow, and the other Church of England “public schools” and at Oxford and Cambridge. Thus, just as the classical theory of United States foreign policy was rooted in the Stoic-cosmopolitan and the Lockean-Jeffersonian democratic

⁶ *Ibid.*, Chapter II, “The Aristotelian Background of British Foreign Policy.”

and egalitarian idea of the morally, politically, and legally good and just man, so the morally based theory of foreign policy of England and its Empire was rooted in its monistic Aristotelian hierarchical and regal Conformist Protestant Christianity.

Similarity of the two European theories

The pluralistic Machiavellian-Hobbesian-Austinian theory of European foreign policy seems initially to be the direct antithesis of this Aristotelian monistic morally based theory. Hobbes’s philosophy of physics followed that of Descartes, which, like that of Newton, was mechanistic rather than teleological in its causality. Hence, no room was left for teleological purpose and its morality. Consequently, war resulting from the conflict of material inertial forces described men in their state of nature. Since this state, according to Hobbes, is self-defeating and self-destroying, it became necessary if men were not going to destroy one another in their domestic relations to hand over their pluralistic, personal, material powers to one absolute sovereign power whose will was absolute.

At this point notwithstanding their initial apparent opposition, the European monistic Aristotelian morally based and pluralistic Hobbesian power-politics theories of foreign policy become identical in practice. For both there is no international law since there is no de facto sovereign in the international community with the physical power to enforce its will. The normal, even the good—good being identified with Protestant Reformation *Volk* or national man—relation between nations is that of war, except in so far as the monistic moral imperialism and unilaterally guided power-politics maneuvering of one’s own nation succeeds temporarily in dominating the situation. To this sombre consignment of humanity in this

atomic age, some contemporary Protestant theologians add another argument deriving from the original sin committed by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, a sin so irreparable as it is handed down from generation to generation that it becomes unreasonable and even irreverent with respect to the ways of God in history for any one to suppose that religiously moral or even secularly legal considerations can operate in international affairs. Thus do the Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr and the power politician Mr. George Kennan join their spiritual and material hands to make Hobbes and Jesus lie down together. Mr. Arnold Toynbee’s general induction from history of the law of “challenge and response” comes near to the same thing when taken erroneously as a prescription of what must be in the future, rather than merely as a description of what has been some of the time in the imperialistic past. It is hardly an accident that power-politics minded generals and diplomats quote Reverend Niebuhr and Mr. Toynbee so frequently. Such a combination of Christianity with Machiavelli and Hobbes has been the traditional European theory of foreign policy.

The only surprise is to find this theory embraced by Americans as spiritually sensitive and professionally able as Mr. Kennan and Professor Niebuhr. The fact, however, is that they bespeak a modification in the theory of United States foreign policy, embracing Republicans and Democrats alike, that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century. To this phenomenon we must now turn. Otherwise, the development of neutralism cannot be understood with respect to United States foreign policy in Asia during Mr. Kennan’s, Secretary Acheson’s, Mr. Paul Nitze’s and President Truman’s decision making and its spread to Europe under the foreign policy of their opposite numbers Mr.

Robert Bowie, Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, and President Eisenhower.

EUROPEANIZATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Reference has already been made to President Theodore Roosevelt’s doctrine of America’s manifest destiny. At the same time, the American Mahan was developing his theory of sea power. This new Republicanism put a novel and more militant interpretation on the meaning of the Spanish-American War. Centered in New York State, it expressed the effect of Europe on the Eastern United States. As such it was vigorously opposed by the Republican machines of President McKinley’s Ohio, Senator Robert La Follette’s Wisconsin, and the Chicago *Tribune*’s Illinois. The symbol of this New York State Republicanism was the Bull Moose carrying “the big stick.” It was the mood of a Republican United States which, accepting its power-laden imperialistic destiny, would forsake neutralism with respect to European wars to take on Europe at Europe’s own power-politics game. The practical result was a securing of land for the Panama Canal by methods for which a later Democratic administration guided by President Woodrow Wilson’s more classical theory of United States foreign policy found it necessary in all conscience to make amends.

The present relevance of this past history is that it is in this Theodore Rooseveltian New York Republicanism that General Douglas MacArthur received his political nourishment; from which Secretary of State Dulles derives; and to which, rather than the isolationist Republicanism of his native state of Kansas, General Eisenhower decided to attach himself as a voting citizen before he was called to be the Republican candidate for the Presidency. In fact, the battle at Chicago in 1950 between General Eisenhower and Senator Taft,

which still goes on, as yet undecided, in the Republican party was an issue between the more Europeanized, still persisting Theodore Roosevelt New York Republican machine and the differently Europeanized Middle Western Republican machines aided by Republican House floor leader, Representative Joseph Martin, from Massachusetts and Senator Styles Bridges from New Hampshire.

It is not correct to leave the impression, however, that the latter Middle Western and right-wing Republican theory of United States foreign policy is identical with the classical theory of the Founding Fathers, particularly as the latter theory was applied by President McKinley in Cuba. For Senator Taft of Ohio, like the older Senator La Follette of Wisconsin and Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts also expressed and represented a Europeanization of the classical theory of American foreign policy. Their Europeanization is, however, different from that of President Theodore Roosevelt and his New York Republicanism since it results from the emigration to the United States of the Irish from a then British-dominated Ireland and the German liberals fleeing from the defeated liberal revolution in Germany in 1848. Unlike Theodore Roosevelt who wanted the United States to carry a big military stick, these Europeans came to avoid military service; their mentality was quite other, therefore, than that of General Washington, Hamilton, or Jefferson. Hence, they wanted not even a small stick and nothing of United States troops abroad under any circumstances. The Irish settled heavily in Boston; the Germans in Cincinnati and Milwaukee. It is from the Cincinnati group that Senator Taft was born. It was to the Milwaukee group that Senator La Follette, notwithstanding his liberal domestic policy, went for his isolationist

foreign policy support. Hence, for Middle Western Republicans, whether La Follette economic liberals or Taft-Chicago *Tribune* conservatives, the classical theory of United States foreign policy became transformed into unqualified doctrinaire neutralism.

Thus it happened that the Europeanization of Republican foreign-policy thinking in two opposite ways during the twentieth century brought the Republicans up to World War II with two diametrically opposed theories of foreign policy, both of which were incompatible with the classical theory. The effect of both of these Europeanizations was to break United States foreign policy loose from the basic Lockean-Jeffersonian liberal democratic Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights philosophy which makes the society of the United States unique.

Influence of European theories on American leaders

But this is by no means the end of the Europeanization story. The legal profession and, hence, the Secretaries of State in both the Democratic and the Republican parties were also affected, as were the military leaders at West Point and Annapolis and the professors of international relations in the oldest universities. In fact, most of the latter came from Europe and, hence, unconsciously, and to this extent uncritically, brought European theories and ways in international relations with them.

Consider the elder members of the American legal profession first. Its law is that of the English common law. At the end of the nineteenth century the Hobbesian theory of law as the will of an absolute sovereign who had the physical power to make his will effective passed over by way of the English Austin through Thayer of the Harvard Law School to spread throughout the law schools of the United States and

capture minds like those of Judges Learned Hand and Thomas Swan, Justice Frankfurter, Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles and their foreign policy advisers Mr. Paul Nitze and Mr. Robert Bowie. The story of how this Europeanization of the classical natural-rights theory of United States law occurred has been told by Judge Learned Hand in his eulogy to Justice Stone in the *Columbia Law Review* of September 1946 and to Judge Thomas Swan in the *Vale Law Journal* of December 1947.

According to this English-Austinian legal philosophy, international law is not law, since there is no absolute de facto sovereign with the physical power to enforce its commands upon the pluralistic power-politics nationalistic states—each with its unilaterally controlled absolutely unqualified sovereignty. This is the reason why both the British and Secretary of State Dulles are so weak with respect to President Nasser's insistence upon Egypt's absolutely unqualified sovereignty over what goes on in the Suez Canal. The Egyptian leader is giving the British Prime Minister and the American Secretary a good dose of their own Hobbesian-Austinian philosophy of law and international politics. If any one thinks this is unreasonable, then he must also conclude that the legal and political philosophy not merely of the British and Mr. Dulles, but also of Dean Acheson, Judge Hand, Judge Swan, Justice Frankfurter, and all the countless other Hobbesian-Austinian positivists in high places in the United States is unreasonable also. Hobbes was quite clear on this point. Since for him and Austinians following him, law and justice are defined as the will of an absolute sovereign who has the physical power to make his will effective, Hobbes pointed out that on this theory there is no such thing as an unjust sovereign.

Nor is this all. According to this posi-

tivistic legal philosophy, law derives its effectiveness not from its moral content, but from the independent de facto Hobbesian physical power which the sovereign who wills it applies. This has the implicit effect of making physical power rather than moral principle the criterion of what happens in practice, even under law when law is effective. Then one uses the moral content of the legal norms to condemn one's enemies but believes according to positivistic legal theory, and hence in principle, that power alone is the criterion of any law's effectiveness. At this point the morally based theory of foreign policy, even when filled in with liberal democratic, rather than Aristotelian aristocratic content, becomes indistinguishable from the most materialistic power politics. Hobbes, there at the beginning in the legal positivists' definition of law, triumphs in the end and clubs become trumps.

Furthermore, as the legally positivist Judge Learned Hand has recently made clear in the aforementioned articles, according to this Hobbes-Austinian-Harvard Law School-Thayerian philosophy, the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights are not to be taken, after the manner of the Founding Fathers, as immutable natural law principles to be used by the courts in the judicial review of legislative statutes; instead, the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights are to be interpreted merely as "admonitions to forbearance" to the legislators and the electorate. It follows that if the legislature passes statutes or the Executive and his Secretary of State pursue a foreign policy that violates the Declaration of Independence for all men, this is quite proper legally. The sovereign will being what the legal positivist means by justice, it follows by definition that anything any sovereign state wills is just. Forthwith the natural-law philosophy at the basis

of the classical theory of United States foreign policy is removed, and the way is made open in positivistically minded legally trained United States decision-makers such as Secretaries Acheson and Dulles, Mr. Paul Nitze, and the Republican Chairman of the Planning Board of the State Department, Under Secretary Bowie, to make United States foreign policy identical with that of traditional Europe.

While this legally positivistic Hobbesian-Austinian Europeanization of the American legal profession was going on, the future generals and admirals at West Point and Annapolis were pondering Theodore Roosevelt's America's "manifest destiny" and reading Mahan and the German Clausewitz on national strategy. Also, two world wars threw them into collaborations with the military minds and political decision-makers of Europe. They would hardly have been human if, quite apart from the Theodore Roosevelt-Mahan influence, they had not unconsciously come to take European theory and practice with respect to national policy in some part at least for granted.

George F. Kennan and foreign policy

After World War I a young officer in the Foreign Service found his duties taking him to Europe. There in his formative years he saw the European type of foreign service in which both long-range planning and day-to-day decisions are made (not subject to vigorous democratic legislative debate) by a foreign-service elite who followed the European theories of foreign policy. The young man was impressed. After World War II he wrote two books attacking the moral and international-legal mentality in international relations and arguing for the power-politics theory.⁷ At about the same time he

⁷ George Frost Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* [The dates are significant] (Chi-

found himself as Secretary of State Acheson's and President Truman's Ambassador to the Soviet Union and later as Head of their Planning Board of the State Department. *Who's Who in America* (Vol. 29) reports that in 1949-50 he was "dep[artmen]t counselor and chief long-range adv[iser] to the Sec[retary] of State." The Hobbesian-Austinian legal mentality and the Hobbesian power-politics diplomatic mentality had come together. Let it be recalled that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bowie brought the same Hobbesian-Austinian positivistic legal mentality to the Secretaryship and the Planning Board of the State Department as did their Democratic predecessors. Senator Taft was a legal positivist also. This is why with strict legally positivistic integrity he later opposed the Nuremberg trials.

Mr. Kennan's appointment to Moscow was an exceedingly good one for a European-minded power politician, provided he departed sufficiently, as he did, from his power philosophy—to the effect that the ideological and the morally and internationally legal mentality had best be kept out of international relations—to pay attention to the Communist ideology as well as to Soviet military power, thereby avoiding the mistaken and costly judgments about the meaning of Moscow's occasional smiles into which his Republican successors later fell. The assignment in Washington was not so good a place, however, to put a European-minded power politician if one's aim was to present to the peoples of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia just revolting from European domination an image of America as the nation of a people who once issued their Declaration of Independence from European domination and in terms of the Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophy written

cago: University of Chicago Press), 1951. *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1954.

into that Declaration created a novel theory of foreign policy dedicated to the following propositions: (1) All men, not merely Americans or the physically strongest men, have the God-given natural right to be free. (2) The United States will be negatively neutral to wars between nations guided by a power-politics foreign policy, but positively on the side—even with physical support as occurred in the Cuban war against Spain—of people fighting for their independence against nations guided by power politics. A legal system or a nation achieves lasting influence and effectiveness, not from the policeman's club it must have and sometimes use, but from the freely accepted and shared moral principles in the hearts and minds of its people and of people the world over. Hence (4) it is not, as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Austin, and their contemporary followers think, physical power that makes morality and law effective; but law freely assented to and morally based and shared in the hearts and minds of the people that make a legal system's or a nation's use of force just and effective. Consequently, (5) no use of force abroad by any nation is justified or likely in the long run to be anything other than self-defeating, unless it is subservient to democratically grounded moral and legal principles and procedures and dedicated to the mission of guaranteeing to another people, again only with their free consent, the natural right to run their own affairs.

Paradoxically, while the Europeanization of military, legal, and diplomatic leaders and teachers in institutes of international relations went on in the United States during the early decades of the twentieth century, a converse classical Americanization of foreign-policy thinking and practice developed in Europe. If the rise of neutralism in Asia under President Truman's administrations and its spread to Europe under

President Eisenhower's administrations are to be understood, the reason for the latter remarkable development must be examined.

AMERICANIZATION OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY

Following World War I, the British turned from foreign philosophy to modern British philosophy. More specifically, they pushed the monistic, morally teleological Church of England and Aristotle and the monistic, morally and historically deterministic German Hegel into the background at Oxford and Cambridge to concentrate attention upon the more empirical modern British thinkers: Locke and Hume. With Hume ontological metaphysics received a rough jolt, and out went the metaphysically materialistic Hobbes also. This meant that even the aristocratic elite coming from Eton and Harrow to Oxford and Cambridge on their way to the Foreign Office became like the Founding Fathers of the United States in their domestic- and foreign-policy thinking. Forthwith abstract moralizing about Britain's carrying the white man's burden around the world or power-politics musing about any other nation's manifest destiny began to lose their former glamour. Other people, according to Locke and Hume, had as much right to freedom as Britishers. Also, other people than Aristotelian or Church of England aristocrats had the right to make domestic and foreign policy decisions for Britishers. Immediately the notion of an aristocratic foreign-policy elite began to look a bit woolly, not to say stuffy. With time these sons of British Conservatives began to make their influence felt in the Conservative party. Mr. Butler is their present leader.

Even in the nineteenth century the British Liberal party had rooted itself in Locke and Hume and their non-Hobbesian successors. The *Economist* of

London is their present spokesman. This is why, believing still that the classical America is the authentic United States, this sober and remarkably well-informed British weekly has been consistently pro-United States through the recent crisis in British-American relations.

The British Labour party was made up mainly of trade-union leaders. Unlike their Continental opposites, they did not immerse themselves in the socialistic philosophical doctrines of Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Marx, and Engels; nor did they have the privilege of attending West Point, to read Mahan or Clausewitz, or of going through the Inns of Court or the Harvard Law School to absorb unconsciously Hobbes and Austin. In this respect they were not unlike a contemporaneous young American named Harry from the state of Missouri, just out of the National Guard Regiment in World War I. Undoubtedly, if recent reports can be trusted, the State Militia and the National Guard have their weaknesses; but none of them is that of an awesome regard for the dying elite of Europe or an unconscious and uncritical absorption of the legal and political philosophy of Hobbes and Austin. The British Labour party and their leaders were of a like mind.

This did not mean that they had no moral or religious convictions. Quite the contrary. The late Lord Lindsay of Birker has recently described what they are.⁸ These moral and religious convictions are not those of the aristocratic Conformist Protestant Church of England with its hierarchical ideal for society and its in part theocratic theory of the good state; instead, they are those of the non-Conformist Protestant Christian sects, the same kind of non-Conformist Protestant Christians who con-

⁸ F. S. C. Northrop (Ed.), *Ideological Difference and World Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), Chapter XII.

stituted the religious majority in the United States when its federal government was founded.

The consequence was that even before World War II, Britain had already decided to return India to the Indians as their due, and career diplomats in the foreign and civil service were working to do the same thing in Africa. Only in those colonies such as the Union of South Africa where British and Dutch of the old European mentality had ensconced themselves in the government were they blocked. At this same time the British Empire was being transformed into the British Commonwealth in which all members stand on an equal democratic basis.

On the European Continent, a similar classical Americanization of European foreign policy was occurring. In some ways it is less fully advanced than in Great Britain; in their ways, more. With respect to foreign policy affecting non-European people, the French were not as far along as the British at the end of World War II. With respect to the European nations they were further along.

The former fact shows in their holding on to Indochina and Bao Dai too long—thanks in part, no doubt, to the power-politics minds in the United States Department of State and the Pentagon—and in the recent unpleasant news from Algeria. In the latter connection, however, it is important to note that the French people and an exceptionally large proportion of French statesmen are morally shocked. Were they still dominated in their value judgments by European monistic morally based imperialistic theory or the Machiavellian and Hobbesian power-politics mentality, there would be little that is shocking to them in recent reports from Algeria.

The sense in which the French and other Continental European nations have gone further than the British in the

Americanization of their foreign policy shows in their achievement of Continental European union for coal and steel and in all likelihood for atomic energy. That the European statesmen themselves consciously regard this as an Americanization of their foreign policy is shown by the name which they give to this development. They call it the movement towards a United States of Europe. This does not mean that the present nations of Europe are likely to become similar to the states of the United States with respect to the United States federal government. Such an extreme localization of traditional national sovereignty in the international Continental European community would probably not be wise or practical. This movement does mean, however, and this is the truly remarkable thing about it, that realistic, experienced statesmen and Parliaments in six Continental European nations have actually transferred part of their traditional Hobbesian nationalistic sovereignty to an international community under a common international constitutional law. Gone is the absolutely unlimited national sovereignty of Hobbes and Austin.

PERSISTING CLASSICAL AMERICA

It would be a grave error to leave the impression that the classical American theory of foreign policy is now taken seriously only in Europe. Not even the musing over abstract nouns like "manifest destiny" and "original sin"; or the emotive thrill that comes from the contemplation of a big stick; or the awe and envy which any sensitive person must feel before the self-assurance (now slightly tarnished) of the traditional European Foreign-Service-Office official; nor the instrumentally valid truths in Mahan and Clausewitz; nor even the unconscious, and, hence, uncritical, absorption of Hobbes and Austin in the

Harvard Law School of Thayer and his present successors or in the Columbia, Yale, and other United States law schools of 1920 can transform able diplomats and theologians like Mr. George Kennan and Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr; military men like Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Ridgway and Twining; or lawyers like Mr. Dean Acheson, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Mr. Paul Nitze, Mr. Robert Bowie or Mr. Christian Herter into one-hundred-per-cent imitations of Hobbes, Austin, and Machiavelli. The living law and traditions of their own country, the non-Conformist egalitarian and democratic Protestant and the Lockean philosophy of Jefferson, Adams, and the other Founding Fathers, together with its foreign policy implications, are in them in part in spite of themselves and of the questionable philosophy taught in the professional schools in which circumstance placed them in their impressionable youth. Hence, the confusions, contradictions, vacillations, and the broken image of America which their foreign-policy decisions were to present to the world later on; a broken image not entirely unconnected with the development of neutralism.

Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations

Fortunately, other Americans during the first half of the nineteenth century were not so easily impressed by Hobbes, Austin, and Machiavelli and the traditional European theories and ways in foreign affairs. One of them was President Woodrow Wilson. He and some of the aforementioned Americanized European statesmen took the positive portion of the classical theory of United States foreign policy, as exemplified by McKinley in his intervention on the side of the Cubans in the Spanish-American War, and generalized it to create a few

years later the League of Nations. Thus, in his War Message of 1917, President Wilson said:

It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.⁹

The response from the masses of people thronging the streets when he went to Paris at the end of World War I is something which those who experienced it will never forget. The response from the peoples of distant Africa, the Middle East, and Asia was similar. A new hope engulfed the imagination of men the world over.

Another American Roosevelt, whose first name was not Theodore, was to do the same thing in World War II. Winston Churchill as war Prime Minister built on this same Lockean-Jeffersonian classical British-American philosophy also. It should never be forgotten that John Locke as well as the Tory Church of England, aristocratic Elizabethan Woman of Empire, is in him and in part of his Conservative party also. Hence, his persistent insistence on British-United States collaboration.

But let us return to the one-hundred-per-cent classical American Woodrow Wilson. He saw that the spirit of the Lockean-Jeffersonian natural-rights egalitarian and democratic philosophy at the basis of the classical United States

theory of foreign policy ran grave risk of being misinterpreted and even violated if the decision as to when a nation is justified in sending its troops abroad to protect the freedom of another people is left to the unilaterally authorized judgment of that nation alone. The only way, therefore, to insure that the sending of a nation's troops abroad, to protect another nation's Lockean-Jeffersonian natural rights to run their affairs, from being misinterpreted by the very people one proposes to help, is to have it authorized, as under domestic law, by the legally processed decisions and rules of the world community. Hence, the absolute necessity of the League of Nations, if the Lockean-Jeffersonian based classical American theory of foreign policy is not to be misinterpreted abroad or used by power politicians at home as an excuse for throwing one's unilaterally authorized power-politics weight about. But Woodrow Wilson was more than a black-letter lawyer. He knew very well that more than the writing of an international constitution for the League was required. If people weak in physical power were to achieve by means of the League the right to run their own affairs to which the Lockean-Jeffersonian natural-rights philosophy tells them they are entitled; if even Woodrow Wilson's own nation is to have the advantage of such help and protection, then the right to this protection must be accompanied by a correlative responsibility—the responsibility, namely, to contribute automatically to the world-community authorized legally processed police action in the case of any violation of the right of a people anywhere to run their own affairs. Hence the necessity not merely of the Charter of the League of Nations, but also of its Article 10, which was Wilson's own Article and in his opinion a Monroe Doctrine for the world. Article 10 committed members of the League

“to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”¹⁰

One important qualification must be noted. As Professor James T. Shotwell has written,

The Covenant of the League of Nations did not prohibit war as a last resort if the Council of the League failed to settle a dispute. In that case, it provided that “the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.” . . .¹¹

This qualification is of a special contemporary interest, since the British and French governments, before the Suez affair and before they at Secretary of State Dulles' request took the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations, made it clear that if the United States and the United Nations failed to settle the matter, they, Britain and France, would deem themselves justified in acting unilaterally.

As is well known, it was President Wilson's insistence on Article 10 which brought down upon his head the wrath of the unilaterally acting Theodore Rooseveltian Eastern Republicans led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., and the equally unilaterally minded doctrinaire neutralist and isolationist Republicans; the isolationists objecting because any use of American troops abroad under any circumstances was anathema to them, the Eastern Republicans objecting because they wanted no legally processed world community restricting them in the way in which with their big stick they proposed to take over the traditional role of Europe. Thus Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations were defeated in the Senate of the United States.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

Presidents Truman and Eisenhower's inheritance

But the validity of the Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophy, the conviction in the hearts and minds of men that they *do* have the right to run their own affairs; that where a people is weak the world community does have the responsibility to see that this right is protected—this philosophy and conviction in the hearts and minds of men does not die so easily. Later evidence showed that two young men at the time were impressed. One was the aforementioned young man from Missouri just back with his National Guard Regiment from Europe. The other was a young man in the regular Army who had graduated from West Point. After World War II, each of these men found himself the President of the United States.

Unfortunately, however, they had to work with the military, legal, and diplomatic advisers whose minds had been immersed in Mahan, Clausewitz, Hobbes, Austin, Thayer, and Machiavelli and impressed by the foreign-policy ways of traditional Europe. Such was the situation when World War II broke.

One other inheritance must be noted. Following the defeat of the League of Nations and the Republican victory of isolationist Ohio's President Harding, one exceedingly important thing occurred. The Washington Naval Conference was held, and the traditional power-politics minded British-Japanese Alliance for the imperialistic aggrandizement of China was broken. The classical American policy of China for the Chinese and the “open door” for all to trade with China was applied. For this, however, one unfortunate price was paid. The United States took on with Britain, France, and Japan the traditional non-Chinese military control of the port cities of China. The result was that when, following World War II, the

⁹ J. T. Shotwell, *The United States in History* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 93.

Asians saw the imperialistic era of the Western European nations come to its end with the departure of European troops from Peking and from Chinese soil, they saw United States troops depart with the European ones. This left the impression upon Asian minds, not overlooked or unreported to his countrymen by India's Ambassador to Peking at the time, that the United States was as imperialistic as the British and the French.¹²

UNIQUE CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR II

This war ended when atomic bombs, then possessed only by the United States, were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This did not improve the Asians' image of America. Its big stick had now become the biggest bomb. President Eisenhower later described the situation as meaning also that man now has it in his power to destroy mankind. Forthwith the meeting of an international crisis by any nation's unilateral use of physical force lost most of the plausibility it may ever have had.

Furthermore, man's capacity to destroy mankind which this atomic age has made possible requires even the followers of Hobbes to carry the Hobbesian thesis to its logical consequence. This thesis, let it be recalled, is that it is necessary for people to transfer personal sovereignty in the state of nature to a sovereign power having the physical power to enforce its will upon them, because, their state of nature being one of mutual physical conflict and war, they would be self-destructive if they did not make such an unqualified and unreturnable transfer of sovereignty to the modern sovereign power state. But the amount of self-destruction that men would bring to bear upon one another

with the little popguns they possessed in Hobbes' seventeenth century when women and children were left unmo- lested in war is as nothing compared to the self-destruction that the modern Hobbesian power states with their absolute unilaterally used sovereignties can bring to bear upon themselves and the whole of mankind in this atomic age. Hence, if the Hobbesian logic which required a real transfer of each and every person's individual sovereignty to the modern nationalistic power states is at all valid, then the necessity of the latter states in turn making a similar transfer today to the world community is even more valid.

World War II ended also with two major powers rather than the normal one. This meant that neither dominated the world situation by his own unilateral use of physical power.

The situation was further complicated because the philosophical ideologies of the two major powers were incompatible if taken by each power acting unilaterally as monistic moral standards for civilizing the rest of mankind. This meant that the unilateral monistic morally based theory of national foreign policy was as self-defeating as the power-politics theory since its pursuit by both major powers would not merely hasten the coming of war by adding morality and religion to the power conflict, but would also bring annihilation rather than civilization—as conceived by either power—to mankind.

Nevertheless, the nature of the Communist ideology, its aims and its theoretically specified ways of implementing those aims had to be reckoned with. To take the Communists, their changing tactics, and their periods of smiling for something other than what the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist philosophy specifies that they mean was not merely to live in a fool's paradise, but to brook disaster for every free nation in the world.

But to pay attention to Communistic ideas and philosophy was to admit that, after all, ideas and ideals—good or not so good—really do matter in a realistic theory and practice of international relations.

Physical power in another nation is dangerous or not dangerous, something to be prepared for, or not to be prepared for, not because it is so much power, but because of the ideas, the philosophy of domestic and foreign policy of the decision-makers who have the power. It is one of the great and fortunate merits of Mr. Kennan, when he was Head of the Planning Board of the State Department, that he recognized this ideological factor and acted upon this recognition; but in doing so, he demonstrated that his practice was wiser and more realistic than his power-politics theory. This is pointed out by Mr. James Reston in a review of Mr. Kennan's Hobbesian philosophical theorizing about history in the *New York Times* of Sept. 30, 1951. In short, not merely the Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophy which makes the culture of the United States unique and without attention to which a foreign policy fitting the United States cannot be built; but also the philosophical nature of the Communist ideology and its theory of the necessity of resorting to force rather than merely to persuasion to implement that ideological world-embracing aim, make the shift from the power-politics to the pluralistic ideological theory of international relations imperative. Both the unilaterally dictated power-politics theory and the unilaterally determined monistic morally based theory of national foreign policy are obsolete.

Individual national philosophies and foreign policy

To be sure, the Lockean-Jeffersonian basic philosophy of one's own nation must be understood and used to deter-

mine the United States factor in one's foreign policy. To be sure, also, Communist ideology being what it is, power must be present in taxation-costly quantities. Nevertheless, we can only know that the latter costly need for power is the case if we believe in the Lockean-Jeffersonian worth of our own way of life and also know what the Communists' philosophically specified aims and ways are. The same is true of the cultural philosophies of all the other nations of the world. The native traditions of no two of them are exactly alike. These differing social habits and cultural traditions of the many peoples and nations of the world express and embody differing cultural philosophies—Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian, Islamic, Judaic, African intuitive and tribal. Clearly, an international policy that is going to draw the physical power to itself necessary to be effective before the Communists' ideologically crusading, power-implemented threat must fulfill the cultural and philosophical traditions of other free peoples as well as those of one's own nation. This means that after first fitting one's foreign policy to the unique philosophical tradition of one's own nation, one must then know with objectivity the many different religious and philosophical traditions and present guiding principles of other nations. In short, an effective national foreign policy must come to terms with ideological and cultural pluralism which includes factors in common as well as those which differentiate. For this the foreign office or state department of any nation must have a planning board headed by a civilian expert trained in the scientific methods of comparative cultural anthropology and the comparative philosophy of the world's cultures.

Men, however well-meaning, narrowed by isolated attention upon the power factor or the economic-aid factor alone, unmindful of the differing moral and

¹² Pannikar, K. M., *Asia and Western Dominance* (New York: John Day Company, 1953).

cultural norms of their own nation and of the particular foreign nation being aided, will not do.

In its issue of May 11, 1957, the *New York Times* described Premier Habib Bourguiba, Jr. of Tunisia as "one of the staunchest supporters of the United States in the Arab world," and then quoted as follows from a speech he made in Tunis the day before on economic aid from the United States:

It is well that Americans should know that peoples who have achieved their independence are more careful to safeguard their dignity than to satisfy their immediate needs. Dignity before bread is a basic principle. By ignoring, by having wanted to wound human dignity the occident has lost precious positions in the Far and Near East.

This observation points up the fact that a foreign policy based primarily on economic aid is likely to be self-defeating, since by ignoring spiritual and cultural factors, it fails to see that any nation is a nation because it has spiritual goal values, as well as material, military, and economic instrumental needs; and that these spiritual goal values are defined by their respective philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions. This, in fact, is the moral merit of nationalism, never to be forgotten: Nationalism expresses the spiritual fact that various peoples on the earth's surface have formulated their goal values with respect to the purposes of God for man and the meaning of the secular facts of human experience in different ways. The planning board of any state department which is objective and realistic about its own nation and other nations will first inform itself about the goal values of all. This is necessary so that it knows what it is doing in framing a foreign policy that relates the particular goal values and instrumental technologies of one's own unique cultural tradition to the different, equally unique, and cher-

ished cultural philosophies and material instruments of other nations.

Resurgence of Afro-Asian countries

A third and the most important development after World War II is the resurgence of the common people of Africa, Israel, Islam, and Asia. This resurgence expresses itself in the existence of the new nations of Israel, Free India, Pakistan, and Ghana; the Arab League; and the Bandung Conference. It bespeaks, however, more than the insistence of the masses of mankind upon the Lockean-Jeffersonian kind of right to run their own secular affairs. The resurgence is cultural and spiritual as well as material and instrumentally secular. Consequently, they are insisting not merely on running their own affairs, and, hence, democratically throwing out the traditional Hindu Maharajas, as in India; but also in doing so in the light of their own unique spiritual and cultural traditions. This means that, notwithstanding their acceptance and insistence upon what amounts to the classical United States Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophy—that is, the right to run their own affairs themselves—a United States foreign policy based on carrying Christian civilization and the American way of life to the world is doomed to generate the neutralism it has in fact generated and thereby be self-defeating. In addition to their deep respect for and acceptance of the Lockean-Jeffersonian component of United States culture, the masses of men throughout the world have an equal pride in and respect for the different spiritual traditions of their own particular religions and institutions. Hence, only a national foreign policy based on (a) the Lockean-Jeffersonian natural-rights-of-all-men philosophy and (b) ideological and cultural pluralism can hope to succeed in the contemporary world.

Into this technologically, ideologically, and internationally revolutionary post-World War II world came the North Korean Communists' military invasion of South Korea. The UN Police action followed immediately.

UN POLICE ACTION IN KOREA

In ordering General MacArthur to leave Japan with United States troops, President Truman and his advisers were not content to base their decision on a unilateral action of the United States alone. Instantly he raised the matter in the Security Council of the UN; and, thanks in part to the abstinence of the Soviet Union's representative, had the entire affair transformed into a legally processed and world-community authorized *police action* under the international law of the UN Charter.

The importance of this precedent is yet to be fully appreciated. First, it meant that in the application of the classic United States theory of foreign policy to a foreign people whose right to run their own affairs is being violated, two conditions, rather than merely one, must be satisfied before the United States or any other nation is justified in departing from neutralism to send its troops abroad. Not only must it meet the requirement specified by President McKinley and his Congress in coming to the aid of the Cuban people against Spain, but it must also meet the Wilsonian condition of being authorized by the world community under international legal rules and made a part of the world community's police action. Second, notice was given to prospective aggressors anywhere that the UN if the United States could prevent it was not going the way of the League before Mussolini's aggression. Membership in the UN was being taken as entailing the responsibility to share in policing the right of other people to run their own affairs as

well as the insistence upon such a right for one's own people. Third, and most important of all, as subsequent events were to show, the United States and other troops in the UN police action were removed from the status of being one belligerent on the same footing as the opposing belligerent in a *war* and were placed, instead, in the quite different status of being a peace-preserving police force in a world-community authorized *police action*—precisely like the local policeman who has to use physical force under legal rules in any Asian, African, or Western domestic community.

This meant that in any subsequent ending of the police action, the UN representatives would not come together on the same basis as the North Korean Communist aggressors' representatives, sitting about a round table as equal disturbers of the peace with Asian neutralists as the only "peace makers" present. Instead, it meant that the representatives of the UN police force would sit beneath the international law of the world community, before which the North Korean representatives, sitting on the opposite side of a rectangular table, would come as culprits brought by the world community's policeman to be judged, with the neutralists remaining at home where in their unilaterally decided isolationist neutralism they had placed themselves. There they could contemplate the somewhat tarnished peace-making professions of one who as a member of the UN insists upon its rights for one's own people, but then unilaterally isolates oneself from one's UN policing responsibilities by taking a holier-than-thou attitude toward the world community's policemen when those same rights are violated in the case of another people.

But why, if President Truman had been so careful to place his dispatch of United States troops to Korea upon such

a world-community authorized morally and legally impeccable basis, did so many Asians, in the face of the most blatant Communist aggression there, turn neutralist during his administration? It will help us to understand and, in part, but not wholly, condone this development of neutralism if the following things are kept in mind: (1) The traditional Confucian, Buddhist, and Gandhian-Hindu Asian conception of the moral and political leader as a mediator.¹³ (2) The neutralism of the United States after its first break from European imperialism, when considered as a blind mechanical rule apart from its underlying moral and political philosophy. (3) The aforementioned European-minded appointees and advisers and their deeds which the Asians saw associated with President Truman and his successor, President Eisenhower, and the resultant broken image of America which they produced. (4) The astute Soviet play upon (3).

SOVIET REACTION TO THE UN POLICE ACTION

It did not take the Moscow officials long to realize that if the Communist invasion of South Korea was not to turn, in the face of the UN police action, into an irreparable defeat ideologically as well as physically, the image of America in Asian, African, and Middle Eastern eyes as that of Locke and Jefferson, of the McKinley of Cuba, and of Wilson must be broken. They sent Mr. Jacob Malik, therefore, rushing back to the Security Council of the UN. His remarks were most illuminating. He said that the presence of the United States and other Western European military troops in South Korea was not the UN world-community authorized police ac-

¹³ F. S. C. Northrop, *The Taming of the Nations* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), Chapters III, IV, V, and VII.

tion which President Truman and the European statesmen had tried to make it out to be; but was, instead, a power-politics politician's excuse for covering up the old European power game of getting Western troops on Asian soil, into which some non-Western members of the United Nations had been duped to participate.

When the Head of the Planning Board of President Truman's own State Department himself says that the moral and international legal mentality is misplaced in foreign policy and affirms publicly in print that power is what matters internationally, this thesis by the Soviet Union's Ambassador to the UN is not easy to answer. When, moreover, beginning with President Truman and continuing with his Republican successor, one sees the control of foreign-policy decisions taken more and more out of the hands of the civilians of the State Department where classically it was centered and shifted to the National Security Council where the military as well as civilians make the major decisions, outsiders in Asia who are not Communists may be excused if they conclude that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador is in part right. When, furthermore, United States government military and press officials feed pictures of United States military planes and weapons continuously into the press of the United States and the world, thereby creating abroad an impression of America in which the military instruments of peace-protecting community-authorized UN police action are thrust into the forefront of the image of America—so that the Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophical heart and mind of America and America's respect for the different ideals and cherished traditions of others are covered up—need one wonder if those who want freedom themselves and want to believe in the liberty-loving and freedom-protecting principles of the United

States conclude that perhaps, after all, the Soviet's Mr. Jacob Malik is right, at least sufficiently so to warrant one in going neutral? Again the words of the Tunisian Premier are illuminating.

The only danger that threatens the occidental camp, which flatters itself to be the camp of liberty, exists precisely in the surviving tendencies or the support given these imperialist tendencies for opportunistic considerations. . . . As long as dissonance exists between words and acts, between the broad principles that bind the Western democracies and the incoherent opportunism of these same democracies . . . peoples newly arrived at independence have a right to doubt the sincerity of the free world . . . (*New York Times*, May 11, 1957).

The shift from President Truman to President Eisenhower did not help matters. In fact, neutralism increased, spreading from Asia to Europe and resulting in a completely divided Free West before the Soviet penetration of the Middle East in the Suez crisis. The lack of improvement under President Eisenhower should not surprise us, since, as previously shown, the same Europeanization of classical United States foreign policy characterizes the officials in key posts under him as under President Truman. So far as the traditional European Hobbesian-Austinian legal mentality with respect to the futility of international law is concerned, only the faces and party labels became different in shifting from Mr. Acheson to Mr. Dulles, and from Mr. Kennan and Mr. Nitze to Mr. Bowie and Mr. Cutler. But why, then, did matters get worse so far as the breakdown of Free World collaboration and the spread of neutralism were concerned? The answer is that President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State preserved all the Hobbesian-Austinian-mentality weaknesses of the Truman administration, while introducing certain additional novelties of their own.

NOVELTIES IN THE EISENHOWER- DULLES THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY

The first and most serious novelty occurred when in the 1952 election campaign General Eisenhower insisted against President Truman that the United States boys in Korea were in a war and not in a police action. Few other than President Truman yet appreciate the seriousness of that remark by the man who a few weeks later was to be President of the United States; and who, because of his election promises to get the boys home from a "war," was to have to negotiate with the Communists in Korea. The difference between American boys being in Korea in a war or in a police action is the difference between being there on the unilateral authorization of the nation using force alone or being there under international law with the authorization of a legally processed decision of the world community. It is precisely the difference under domestic law between a man who kills somebody in a local village upon his own unilateral decision and the policeman who kills somebody else in pursuing his line of official duty in accordance with the community- and legally authorized requirements of his task. The former type of killing is a crime called murder; the latter is a peace-making police action. President Truman had made sure before the American boys arrived in Korea that they were there not on the unilateral decision of the United States alone, but as authorized under international law by the world community. He was right, therefore, in the 1952 election when he insisted against General Eisenhower that the American boys in Korea were not in a war but in a police action.

This matter is of more than academic interest as the following consideration shows. Why did the Soviet's Mr. Jacob

Malik hasten back to the Security Council on the dispatch of the UN police action to the aid and protection of the South Koreans' right to run their own affairs? We already know the answer: It was to persuade the world that American and other UN soldiers in Korea were in a war and not in a police action and hence were just as responsible for the loss of life there as were the North Korean aggressors. Hence, when General Eisenhower maintained against President Truman that the American boys were in a war rather than in a police action, the man who a few weeks later was to be President of the United States unwittingly made the Soviet representative's case for him. The last vestige of Lockean-Jeffersonian community-authorized legality and principle beneath the presence of American or any other UN soldiers in Korea had been removed. The moral quagmire was thereby created in which the moral and legal principles justifying the loss of life in the UN police action became muddled and then engulfed. Also there ensued those troubles concerning round and square tables experienced later by Ambassador Lodge in the UN when the Asian neutralists insisted upon placing the UN and North Korean representatives together around a round table as equally guilty war makers, with the neutralists as the only "peace makers." These events show that more than an exceptionally successful military record and a rare talent as an intuitively good human being is necessary if one is not to commit tragically *bad* errors as a statesman concerned with United States foreign policy. A clear comprehension of the difference between a war and a police action, rooted in the classical Lockean-Jeffersonian theory of United States foreign policy as applied positively by President McKinley in the Cuban affair, by President Wilson in his Article 10, and by President Truman at

the outset of the Korean crisis, is also essential. In the Suez crisis, President Eisenhower showed that he had the latter theory of United States foreign policy in him. It is too bad that it took so long to come out. Otherwise, the muddying of the moral issue in Korea and the breakdown of Free-World unity in the West which produced the Suez crisis would not have had to be.

There was a second novelty in the foreign policy of President Eisenhower's administration. It showed in the issue between Secretary Dulles and Mr. Kennan, but included President Eisenhower also. In the 1952 election campaign, both General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles expressed their personal moral and religious convictions. Reacting from the blatant Hobbesianism of Mr. Kennan's theorizing about foreign policy, they affirmed that United States foreign policy must be morally based so that its allies can know where the United States stands and so that no compromise with or appeasement of communism and its fellow travelers will occur. Unfortunately, however, they failed to specify whether this moral basis was to be monistic or pluralistic; and, if monistic, whether it was to be implemented with military force. Thus, instead of making it clear where the United States was to stand, the effect was to leave its allies completely in the dark.

This uncertainty disturbed them for the following reasons: If the new United States foreign policy was to be morally monistic based on the Christian religion and the American way of life and was to be used in a crusade to roll back communism, there was a danger that it might proceed in the Theodore Roosevelt big-stick Republican manner unilaterally and impetuously without consulting its Free-World allies. Europeans noted also that both the Theodore Roosevelt big-stick military showdown-with-communism Republicans such as

General MacArthur, Admiral Radford, the late Senator McCarthy and Senator Knowland and the Middle West isolationist Republicans such as Senators Taft and Bricker agreed in wanting a go-it-alone unilaterally determined United States foreign policy. Either alternative would be fatal to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to Free-World collaboration generally. Naturally, European statesmen found themselves looking around for ways by which they could neutralize themselves with respect to these uncertainties.

European fears of U. S. foreign policy

European fears were not decreased when they recalled that General Eisenhower had described an objective military campaign in Europe as a crusade, that upon acceptance of the Republican nomination for President in Chicago, the first sentences in his acceptance speech were,

You have summoned me . . . to lead a great crusade—for freedom in America and freedom in the world. I know something of the solemn responsibility of leading a crusade. I have led one. . . . I will lead this crusade.

More than any other word in the English language, the word "crusade" which combines the intuitive religious and the military mind seemed to mesmerize the President.

Mr. John Foster Dulles' 1952 election campaign references to rolling back communism did not still Europe's rising fears. European statesmen and laymen reasoned that it is bad enough to have one of the two major powers off on a holy-war crusade to build the world over in terms of its own ideological image, but that it is absolutely fatal to peace if the other power indulges in this same moral monism also. Near the end of the election campaign in 1952, the Republican presidential candidate gave a

major address on foreign policy. On September 4 of that year the *Listener* of London reported the European reaction as follows:

Commentators in Western Europe, for the most part, were critical of Mr. Eisenhower's speech. . . . This disapproval centered on the fact that the western nations were united under the Atlantic Pact to resist Soviet imperialism in a military *defensive* alliance, and not one committed to the liberation of the enslaved nations by war. Other commentators pointed out that Mr. Eisenhower was not advocating their liberation by war, but that his policy—if put into operation and not considered merely as electioneering—would seem to involve the risk of war.¹⁴

When some years later Secretary of State Dulles, in a major foreign policy address, announced his "brink of war" threat of "massive retaliation at places and times of one's own choosing," again the definition of the word "one's" was left ambiguous. Immediately, Mr. Arnold Toynbee appealed to the Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophy of domestic and foreign policy to affirm, "No annihilation without representation."

Even in the United States at the very beginning of President Eisenhower's first administration, the moral emphasis in their foreign policy had expressed itself in the issue between Secretary Dulles and Mr. Kennan concerning how the threat of Communist aggression was to be handled. Mr. Kennan, with his knowledge of the Communist ideology and his misgivings about monistic morally based holy-war crusades in national foreign policy, and President Truman following him, had stood for the containment of communism. Mr. Dulles and other Republicans attacked this as

¹⁴ For a further account of the development of neutralism in Europe see F. S. C. Northrop, *European Union and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), Chapters IX and X.

appeasement and said that the new policy would be that of rolling back communism. Again, he failed to specify whether this rolling back, which because of its monistic moral basis accepted no mere containment of communism, was to be militarily backed or not. So incompatible were these two policies conceived to be by both Mr. Kennan and Secretary of State Dulles that even though the former was a career diplomat entitled to remain within the Foreign Service, both he and Secretary Dulles thought it wise to part ways. Mr. Kennan resigned to pursue his reflections upon foreign policy within the cloistered calm and politically innocuous confines of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton.

European union

The crucial event so far as Europe was concerned came with the defeat of the European Defense Community in the French Chamber of Deputies. It has been customary in the United States to attribute this defeat, not to the shift under the Republican administration from power-politics containment to monistic morally based rolling back of communism policy, but to the French fear of rearming the Germans. Why, then, but a few weeks later, did the French Chamber of Deputies vote for rearming the Germans, even under a German general staff, within the Brussels Treaty Organization? If it was German rearmament which they feared, certainly this would never have occurred; if anything, they would have preferred EDC, since EDC proposed to rearm the Germans under a European general staff, whereas the Brussels Treaty rearmed Germany under a German general staff.

Clearly, there must be another factor that was present in the EDC Treaty and not present in the later Brussels Treaty. What is this other factor? It

is that the United States is not a member of the Brussels Treaty. The latter treaty, unlike the NATO Treaty, is restricted wholly to European nations. In other words, the French preferred a re-armed Germany under a German general staff and under a treaty that was restricted to Europeans and quarterbacked by Great Britain to a rearmed Germany, even under a European general staff, that, under the EDC protocol to the NATO Treaty, was quarterbacked by the military-minded Pentagon under Admiral Radford. President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and the latter's monistic morally based theory of United States foreign policy.

Forthwith the movement toward European union took on a new meaning. Whereas initially it had been conceived as an essential part of United States-United Nations collaboration in the policing of the peace of the world, not merely in Europe, but also in Asia; henceforth it would mean for Europeans the implementation of the neutralization of Europe with respect to United States foreign policy.

In his aforementioned stand within the UN in the fall of 1956 with respect to the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Great Britain, and France, President Eisenhower returned the compliment by disassociating the United States from the foreign policy of Great Britain and France with respect to communism in the Middle East and in Africa. In this event, the neutralism with respect to collaboration throughout the Free World which began in Asia under Mr. Kennan's power-politics containment policy and which spread to Europe under the Republican monistic morally based rolling back of communism crusade spread to embrace the United States also.

The tragic irony of the situation is that so far as deeds, rather than words, were concerned, the morally based crusading rolling back of communism the-

ory of foreign policy of President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State and the power-politics containment foreign policy of the Democratic Mr. Kennan turned out to be almost identical with, if anything, the Republican policy the weaker. Two decisions made by President Eisenhower suffice to make this unequivocally clear. The first decision occurred when the French faced defeat in Indochina unless air-force aid came from the United States. President Eisenhower decided not even to contain the threatened Communist defeat of the French, to say nothing about rolling it back, thereby allowing the French to go down to one of the worst and most humiliating defeats in their history. The second momentous decision came in the Hungarian revolution. Again, President Eisenhower and his Secretary decided against rolling back communism and allowed the Hungarian patriots to be smashed by a ruthless Soviet military attack. Nevertheless, so far as the growth of neutralism in Europe and the breakdown of allied collaboration in NATO and in the Middle East were concerned, the crusading rolling back words had done their damage.

In her unilaterally prepared and announced military White Paper of April 4, 1957, in which Great Britain declared her intention—probably for more than financial reasons—to withdraw ground troops from the Continent and, depending largely on rockets with atomic war heads, to withdraw into something that suggests a Fortress Britain, the unilateralism which bespeaks an increase of neutralism reappeared. The pro-United States *Economist* of London reports NATO officials on the Continent to have been shocked more by the unilateral way in which they were informed than by even the contents of the information itself.¹⁵

¹⁵ "A Jolt for NATO," *Economist* (London), April 13, 1957, pp. 149-50.

The Free World at the present moment is not far from the situation in which each nation is attempting to neutralize itself with respect to the foreign policy of other nations. Yet both President Eisenhower and the British White Paper affirm that no nation in today's world can protect itself alone. Clearly, neutralism under such circumstances is a self-contradictory and self-defeating policy.

What is the way out of this impasse into which Free-World policy under United States leadership, first Democratic and then Republican, has led everyone?

ESCAPE FROM NEUTRALISM

In the Suez crisis, President Eisenhower returned United States and UN policy to the sound basis from which his unfortunate statement about American boys in Korea had removed it. This occurred when he and the majority in the UN declared the *unilaterally* initiated invasions of Egypt by Israel, Great Britain, and France to be an aggression and to be a violation of the world-community authorized international law upon which the UN rests and upon which the only constructive hope for peace can be reared. This amounts to a return to the classical United States theory of foreign policy as applied by the Republican President McKinley and the Democratic Presidents Wilson and Truman. This theory affirms any use of a nation's forces abroad to be immoral and unjust unless it meets the two following conditions: It must be dedicated to the task of protecting a foreign native people in their right to run their own affairs and it must be authorized not merely by the legally processed decision of the nation sending the troops, but also by the legally processed international legal rules and decisions of the world community, thereby making

the status of troops abroad that of participation in a morally based, legally sanctioned peace-making police action, rather than in a war.

To this conclusion, the analysis of the causes of neutralism made in this paper adds one additional requirement. This requirement is that the moral and international legal basis of national and UN policy must be pluralistic rather than monistic. The reason is that people the world over are not merely demanding protection from the world community in the right to avoid annihilation in an atomic age and in the Lockean-Jeffersonian right to run their own affairs; but they are insisting also upon the right to run them in the light of their own philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions. They simply do not believe that any one religion or nation has a monopoly on God and on civilization.

The following considerations make clear that such a theory of foreign policy meets the difficulties and has a real chance of succeeding. First, it puts the moral mind and heart of the people of the United States in the forefront of the image of itself which America presents to other people, thereby removing the broken image caused by the traditional Europeanization of United States foreign policy that has produced so much neutralism. Second, because of its moral pluralism, drawing on all the spiritual resources of the world, such a United States and UN policy has the chance to draw unto itself the collaborative physical police power sufficient to keep even the most blatant and powerful aggressor under control. Third, it puts the United States and the UN unequivocally on the side of the masses of men in Africa, Israel, Islam, and Asia who are declaring their independence and who constitute an overwhelming majority of the people of the world. Fourth, it undercuts the whole purpose of the Soviet cold war which is to dupe

the United States into putting her military fist, rather than her Lockean-Jeffersonian heart and mind, into the forefront of the image she presents to the world, thereby generating neutralism and leaving the UN impotent before Communist aggression. Fifth, even for Middle West Republican doctrinaire isolationists and neutralists, it offers the best option they have since it requires more conditions to be met before American boys are sent abroad than does any other theory. Sixth, the Suez affair shows that the Lockean-Jeffersonian morally pluralistic theory of foreign policy has the support even of the very European nations which it condemned in that crisis. This fact became evident when the British, French, and Israelis bowed to President Eisenhower and the UN action. Consider in the British case why this occurred. The reason was that Prime Minister Eden found on the President's and the UN's side not merely the Labour party and the Liberals as represented by the *Economist*, but also the aforementioned Americanized Conservatives of his own party, led by Mr. Butler.

Possibility of ending neutralism

Looking at the constructive developments since World War II, it appears, notwithstanding the omnipresent neutralism, that the causes of this neutralism can be removed; that four major precedents for doing so have been set and accepted. The first was President Truman's decision in the Korean crisis to forego the right of all traditional major powers to act unilaterally and to process, instead, the dispatch of American boys abroad through the UN. The second was his decision, when an issue arose between what the UN Field Commander in all sincerity thought to be wise in Korea and what the majority in the UN decided to be best. Again

President Truman decided to forego the traditional Hobbesian major-power right to act unilaterally and so withdrew General MacArthur from his command and accepted the world community's judgment. The third precedent was evident in the Suez crisis when President Eisenhower, forced to choose between siding with his best friends or putting his nation unequivocally against the unilateral use of force and on the side of the world community's international law, chose the latter course, as did the majority of nations in the UN. Never since World War II has African, Middle Eastern, and Asian respect for United States foreign policy been as high. The Lockean-Jeffersonian philosophy of foreign policy does remove neutralism when followed one hundred per cent. The fourth important precedent, the most important of all, occurred when the British, French, and Israelis accepted the judgment of the world community and when a majority of the British people showed themselves to be against their own government and on the side of the United States classical foreign policy and an effective world law.

The victory for moral and legal international principle in national foreign policy has by no means been won. The roughest shoals lie immediately ahead. One present temptation is to say that, because the UN Assembly in the Suez crisis has produced no permanent positive solution of the Israeli-Arab problem, that, therefore, the Assembly has demonstrated its perpetual incompetence and that the matter must be left to the old power-politics maneuvering of the major powers in the Security Council. This thesis completely overlooks the fact that the latter policy, precisely because of the neutralism and divided Free World which it produced, had failed even more lamentably. As the London *Economist* pointedly notes, "To jump out of the fire into the frying-pan may be instinc-

tive, but it confers no immunity. . . . The [powers in the] Council . . . had failed to solve the problem in eight years."¹⁶ It was precisely because of this failure that the Suez crisis arose. The UN Assembly may therefore be excused if, after putting an end to the Suez war and placing its token forces between the combatants, it has not found a permanent solution in a few weeks.

Nevertheless, a UN which merely slaps down those who resort to force unilaterally will fail, unless a majority of its members pour in the moral will sufficient to enable it to solve the injustices which brought the unilateral actions forth. It needs to be made unequivocally clear that the responsibility for policing the world's peace is that of the world community and not that of any member of that community, however strong economically and militarily that member may be. Only if the peoples of the world are as vigorous in taking on the responsibility of freedom as they are in insisting upon its rights can either freedom or peace be obtained. To insist upon the right to freedom while not assuming the responsibility to police freedom is like insisting on drawing money from a bank in which one refuses to make a deposit. Obviously there can be nothing to draw out if first nothing is put in. Hence, the United States and other nations need to throw all their energies into the UN to insure that its responsibilities are assumed. Too quickly, perhaps, after his epoch-making and correct decision in the Suez crisis, President Eisenhower rushed in to Congress with a plan authorizing him to send money and arms to the aid of individual nations in the Middle East who ask for such aid. This has the unfortunate effect of giving the Soviet Union a similar right to accept another Middle Eastern nation's invitation to

¹⁶ *Economist* (London), April 13, 1957, pp. 109-10.

do the same thing. Such a result could have been avoided had President Eisenhower worked, instead, through the UN to get it to come to the aid of any Middle Eastern nation calling for help and had then asked the Congress of the United States to give him the authority to provide such aid along with other nations in the UN were the majority in that body to authorize it. Again we see the importance of Wilson's second condition being met before the departure from neutralism upon the part of any nation is justified, the condition, namely, that no use of a nation's military or other physical power abroad is justified unless it is authorized by the world community.

This principle being established with respect to any nation's dispatch of military troops abroad, how is it to be implemented through the UN Assembly so that the latter body provides constructive positive solutions to the crises that confront it? The *Economist* of London has provided the most practical answer yet offered to this question. This answer is that the gulf between the Secretary General with his staff and the eighty-one members of the Assembly needs to be filled by the appointment of "small, manageable bodies which, for lack of a better name, might be termed

select committees." These committees being

carefully tailored to meet several vital requirements . . . should be small, to permit of quick and precise decisions and, if necessary, of mobility; . . . sufficiently representative of the various groups and interests in the Assembly to make it unlikely that the parent body would reject their findings; . . . given as much authority as the Assembly can muster . . . [and] a strict rule of privacy for all their proceedings . . . to screen out [publicity hunters] and leave a clearer field for the solid citizens who are actually concerned to get results.

Some such development, the *Economist* suggests, would give responsible scope to "the powers of the second rank, and other states that are ready to put more power to UNO's elbow," thereby making "for a sense of individual responsibility."¹⁷

In any event, the four aforementioned precedents constitute the hard cases in the international field out of which effective law can be made. It appears, therefore, that the escape from neutralism is not merely possible, but also, in these hard cases and in the foregoing practical suggestion of the London *Economist*, in part under way.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Current Russian Designs in Europe and the Middle East

By ANTHONY J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

Abstract: Soviet foreign policy since the war has remained true to its objective of world dominance. The means used have progressed from nonaggression pacts, scrapped when they were no longer useful, to offers of "peaceful coexistence," accompanied by offers of economic aid to underdeveloped countries and designed to draw such countries out of the Free World's orbit. The grim events in Hungary and the Middle East are a part of the Kremlin's plan of world domination. The threat can only be averted by a firm policy of collective security, illustrated by NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact.—Ed.

SINCE my subject concerns "Current Russian Designs in Europe and in the Middle East," I think it would be appropriate to begin with a broad-brush reference to the areas which, since World War II, have become victims of Soviet expansion; thereupon to examine the Soviet methods employed to further their evil objectives, and then to discuss the targets of current Soviet aims.

Because we, in the United States, have come to recognize the need to look outward, to recognize the dangers of our times, and to accept the task of dealing with them, our country has a vital interest in conditions prevailing and actions taken in every part of the world. Our interest is not only vital, but proper—the conditions do much to determine the action, and in these days of close international relationships, the actions, no matter where they occur, can have a

direct and possibly far-reaching effect upon us.

Since the close of World War II, we have observed the cynical, mercurial switches in Soviet foreign policy: from bluster to affability, and back again to bluster. When the wave of affability, which marked the Soviet approach to the Geneva Conference at the "summit," gave way to renewed bluster, the Chief of the Soviet Union Communist party, Nikita Khrushchev, predicted the downfall of the Free World through a worldwide triumph of Communism. Only very recently he has taken every opportunity to warn the Communist and Free Worlds that nothing of importance has changed in the way the Kremlin intends to carry out its policies. In their February party congress in Moscow, the Communist leaders did not rule out violence as an instrument of policy. All

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they said was, in effect, that there were areas where, and occasions when, their aims could be achieved without violence. Khrushchev also confirmed the Cominform as a boring-from-within spearhead aimed at achieving this end by every means, including the violent overthrow of free governments.

This would mean, of course, the Cominform on the outside working hand-in-hand with the Moscow-guided Communist parties and their agents on the inside of each targeted country. Since Mr. Khrushchev is the molder and spokesman of Soviet foreign policy, we should be in error to underestimate the boundless ambitions or the formidable armed forces behind his vehement utterances.

The ultimate objective of the Soviet Union's foreign policy remains global pre-eminence.

Although from time to time Soviet policies may have seemed to veer sharply, the stark fact is that their methods may change, but their objective remains the same. And, towards this end, they have invariably followed a single course—one of unscrupulous opportunism in the pursuit of extending their power, regardless of what innocent people may suffer.

Soviet strategic planning includes the probing for and exploitation of weakness, with a view to gaining a foothold and eventually control over a given area, which, in turn, is intended as a springboard for expansion farther afield.

NONAGGRESSION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Towards achieving their evil ends, the Soviets have varied from offers of pacts of nonaggression to those of "peaceful coexistence"—and all the while, the fears engendered by the threat of the Soviet's formidable military capabilities are exploited by the Kremlin to the advantage of its imperialistic aims. Its implementation of treaty obligations is guided not by the ethics recognized by

the international family of nations, but purely by national interests. When an economic treaty has served the Soviets' political purposes, the economic aspect is shelved. Immoral as these actions are, the record of Soviet regard for agreements governing propaganda within the frontiers of other countries is even more so. Interference in the affairs of another state is of major importance in forwarding the Communist creed.

Let us recall the fate of those who were drawn into nonaggression pacts with the Soviets: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Rumania, and Nationalist China. The first three—the Baltic States—were overrun by the Soviet forces following the fall of France in 1940 and have since been incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1939, the Red Army invaded Poland and Finland. The following year the Soviets seized Bessarabia from Rumania. The Soviets' pact with Japan endured only until Germany had been defeated in 1945, at which time the Soviet forces invaded Japanese-held territory in the Far East.

Moreover, Nationalist China was invaded by Russian troops in 1945, and Russian arms helped Mao Tse-Tung to conquer it. This adds up to 10 nonaggression pacts broken in 16 years—and 12 treaties of alliance abrogated by the Soviet Union. Figures show that armed aggression has followed a nonaggression treaty by an average of 8¾ years. Indeed, in the past decade, 14 nations and more than 600 million people have been drawn into the Communist orbit.

Now—as regards the Soviets' more recent approach—that involving offers of "peaceful coexistence." To them, coexistence means a temporary gap in the process of achieving ideological domination.

In our way of thinking, it implies acceptance of differing political systems. We believe the nations of the world can live in peace and mutual acceptance of

their several forms of government, but only if there is removed the atmosphere of hate and suspicion generated by Moscow.

As recently as 1955, we witnessed a new departure in Soviet foreign policy: the diplomacy of blandishments in the field of economic aid to underdeveloped countries. This dangling of offers of assistance now accompanies their proposals of "peaceful coexistence."

I may add that the record indicates that acceptance of Soviet offers of assistance and "peaceful coexistence" by smaller nations not enjoying the backing of Free World collective security would be to risk the "kiss of death" to independence. Their fate would be similar to that which so often befalls misguided individuals beguiled into co-operation with Communists. The former find themselves rapidly involved beyond their depth; thereupon, hopelessly compromised, eventually victimized by blackmail, and end up as the "truck" with the Communists in the "driver's seat."

It was with a great splash that the Soviets embarked on a trade-and-aid program, but when compared with the investment of the United States in the welfare of other countries, the Soviet contribution has been incalculably small.

For this, and perhaps other reasons, some may be inclined to minimize the importance of this Soviet action; they may tend to assume that the Communists would not be able to "deliver the goods." But, I think, we must not underestimate the Communists' intentions, or their capabilities.

There can be little doubt that the establishment of the collective security organization of Western European nations has had an important effect upon Soviet policy; that it has contributed towards the Kremlin's changing from a policy of violence to a more subtle policy of political subversion and economic penetration.

SHIFT IN COMMUNIST POLICY

This does not mean, however, that Kremlin policy is undergoing a complete change. Rather, it means that the Kremlin considers its shift to a softer policy towards the Communist parties in Western European and other countries and its economic barter approach in Asia and Africa are more apt to succeed in detaching the Western nations from those areas than by pursuing the more violent policies of Stalin. Yes, the more resilient and resourceful policy of Khrushchev is, in many ways, a greater menace to the West than the rigid policy pursued by Stalin.

Ours was a hard experience in dealing with Stalin. How, then, should we expect to fare any better in dealing with his survivors, whose chief claim to significance at the time they took over was, in effect, to turn "state's evidence" against their former partners in misdeeds against God and humanity?

Perhaps Stalin did not consider himself sufficiently powerful to allow deviations from the strict Soviet line among other Communist parties. But Khrushchev and his associates have manifested more confidence and less rigidity. What they are doing is, in effect, to permit the Communist parties abroad to work within the political framework of their respective countries towards the seizure of power—all the while driving for the weakening or nullifying of the influence of the United States and other Western nations in Russia's areas of subversive operations.

Here in our country the Communists gave evidence of shifting and turning in line with the gyrations of Soviet policy. But, there is nothing to warrant our acceptance of the claim that the party has broken its ties with the Kremlin. All they have made known is that they might exercise some degree of independence in interpreting theoretical

Marxism-Leninism. And, we may have reason to doubt even this.

For, it is significant that, at its New York City convention, the Communist party reportedly failed to act on resolutions: one finding fault with the Soviets' barbaric crushing of the Hungarian revolt; another criticizing Soviet anti-Semitism. If my information on the above score is correct, then the very fact that the Communist party in our country thus adopted a silent role concerning Soviet misdeeds in Hungary and tacitly excused Soviet anti-Semitic measures would strongly indicate that the party continues to be subservient to the Kremlin; it would also indicate that it will continue to harbor spies and traitors.

A shocking glimpse at high level thinking in Moscow concerning the fate of the Jewish people in Eastern Europe was afforded during General Sikorski's conference with Marshal Stalin in 1942. As Prime Minister of the Polish government established in London and as Commander of Polish forces, General Sikorski's purpose was to discuss military arrangements. The General later told me that when the conversation touched on postwar problems, the General informed the Marshal he was trying to find a forward-looking solution for the economic difficulties of the Jewish people in Poland. General Sikorski was stunned by the Marshal's revolting response. Clapping the General on the back, Marshal Stalin facetiously bade him to cease worrying; Hitler, he assured the General, would solve that problem for them both.

If there has taken place any degree of evolution of Soviet society since Stalin's death, it has not served to soften, or alter, the main direction of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, those who followed Stalin as rulers of the Kremlin have shown themselves to have been not only more subtle than he, but more adventurous.

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

In the area of the "captive countries" of Central Europe, the Soviets experienced a setback. However, by the brutal employment of their formidable military power they have been able to recoup a considerable portion of their losses.

Through the influence and with the aid of the Soviet military authorities, the Kremlin reverted to the harder policy of the days of Stalin. It ruthlessly suppressed the revolt in Hungary and asserted its over-all control in Hungary and other "captive countries."

Throughout all areas of the former and semicolonial lands, the Soviets are leaving no stone unturned towards converting rampant Arab nationalism to their own purposes against the West. While Russia's desire for an outlet in the Middle East dates back to the Czars, even Stalin refrained from positive intervention in that area, following his setback in Azerbaijan. But, no reluctance has been manifested by Khrushchev and Company to move in through diplomatic and economic support for the Arab nations.

In attempting to gain domination over the area and deny the West access to its Middle Eastern oil sources, Khrushchev aims to throttle Britain, France, and other Western European states. If he could thus bring them to their knees, he would have accomplished a major short-range objective; namely, a collapse of the NATO alliance. These measures, together with threats and warnings against allowing bases for nuclear weapons in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, West Germany, Greece, and other countries, are, at the same time, aimed at setting the scene for the liquidation of our overseas bases.

Through this cunningly bold strategy, the Soviets aim to upset the world bal-

ance of power and isolate the United States.

CURRENT SOVIET DESIGNS

Therefore, in spite of recurrent peace offensives, the threat of militant communism to the United States in particular, to the Free World in general, is by no means an empty one.

It has been a shaky peace that has been hovering over the nations of the globe. The continuing possibility of a further disruption poses a disquieting threat to the lives of millions.

Until the recent military upheaval in Egypt, the world had, since the armed conflict in Korea and Indochina, been without overt battlefield hostilities. However, there had been local guerrilla conflicts and an uncomfortable amount of trouble-in-the-making.

Deterioration had marked a number of critical situations abroad, and for many months prior to the eruptions in Poland and in Hungary and hostilities in Egypt, it had seemed that the trouble spots in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East, and in the Far East were more than apt to worsen before they became any better. And that is just what did take place.

Now, as I read the current picture in its full meaning, the grim events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are related and form part of the Kremlin's global strategy to gain world domination. Their long-range strategy would seem to be aimed at gaining a dominant hold over the land mass of Europe and Asia, which contains the greater part of the world's population and a large share of its resources; this, with a view to isolating the United States preparatory to an eventual showdown with us.

Toward the achievement of this long-range strategy, several shorter range objectives figure importantly, namely:

To deny the United States in particular, the West in general, access to

their overseas sources of raw materials.

To gain control over the Middle East.

To break up NATO.

To win over or neutralize countries friendly to us, the uncommitted nations, and all possible of our present-day allies.

In the Far East their efforts are focused on Japan; in Europe, on Western Germany; also, through threats, at this stage, on Norway, on NATO's northern flank, and in the Middle East, on NATO's southern flank on Egypt and Syria—the latter two countries figuring as centers of Soviet operations in the Middle East.

What has been taking place in the Middle East is no accident. It stems from a deliberate and carefully planned move by the Soviet Union.

Military action by the Israeli, as well as by the British and French, uncovered, among other sinister things, the important military build-up, which for some time previously the Soviets had been effecting in Egypt and in Syria: something over 400 million dollars of equipment and munitions in Egypt, about 50 million dollars worth in Syria.

The Kremlin has not forgotten that, before World War II, Russia was held in place by the power complexes of Japan and Germany. Japan held the bear by the tail; Germany held it by the nose.

When World War II ended in the defeat of Germany and Japan, the restraints on Russia were removed. The bear promptly proceeded to trespass on other nations' real estate, and, once it secured a foothold, it refused to back out.

Today, unless the Soviet succeed in its continuing efforts either to win over or neutralize Western Germany, the odds are very much against the Soviet's consenting to Germany's unification.

It is significant, moreover, that Russia's partner, Communist China, is busily

seeking Japan's co-operation in efforts to oust the United States from Asia, suggesting that the two might thereupon join in dominating the area.

Targets in Europe and the Middle East

As regards recent events in Eastern Europe—for about a year the Russians had tried to adopt a pose of respectability. Prompting this effort was an important objective. It had been concluded that the West in general, the United States in particular, must be denied access to their overseas sources of raw materials if the objective of world domination were to be further advanced.

This, then, would require winning over the uncommitted nations—and eventually, if NATO could be broken up, all possible among our present allies. But this called for some impressive gesture towards the “captive countries,” which might serve to play down the Kremlin's identity with “ruthless colonialism” and thus gain favor among the Socialist, and all possible other political parties, in Western Europe and the uncommitted nations.

In order to further their short-range objectives, an effort was made to establish a deceptive type of “independence” for the “captive countries” by permitting them to function within the framework of “national” communism, but still holding them firmly under Soviet control. Poland and Hungary were to be allowed this pseudoindependence. The scenic effects included the dusting off of several anti-Stalin, yet dyed-in-the-wool Communists, and bringing them into the forefront of the political arena.

Their tasks included forming contact with political elements in Western European and in the uncommitted countries for the purpose of enticing these countries from our leadership into a strictly European coalition. This European organization was envisaged as a

third power, positioned between ourselves and the Soviet Union. However, the scheme of “national” communism fell to pieces as a result of the tragic events in Hungary—where exposure of the bear's claws led to a wave of revolution in West Germany as well as in other states of Western Europe.

Meanwhile, the Soviets' ambition to gain control of the Middle East was quickened by the turbulent events in that area as well as by a desire to divert attention from the grim happenings in Hungary.

In further muddying the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Suez, the Kremlin perceived the quickest way to cause a cleavage between the NATO allies and to start the ball rolling towards realizing its over-all Mid-Eastern ambitions. We may be sure that the Kremlin will seek every opening to keep the Suez area in ferment. Prior to the outbreak of open hostilities in Egypt, the Middle East was, from a political standpoint, a “can of worms.” Since the “cease fire,” the situation there is no less complex.

The Russians are bent upon exploiting these complexities to their own advantage. The Kremlin's interest is one of grim practicalities, stemming from a clear comprehension both of the military and political profits which it would achieve from domination of the Middle East.

What is more, the record of Soviet actions is such as to prompt our alertness, lest difficulties in Eastern Europe and the Middle East presage further trouble at some distant points. I have in mind, for example, Berlin and the Far East, including such potential trouble spots as Korea, the Formosa area, Hong Kong, and Indochina.

In our earnest search for an honorable, just, and equitable peace it would be extremely important that, while recognizing the danger of war, we keep an

open mind and a willingness to explore every possible facet of all conciliatory gestures the Communists may advance. This would be in the interests of keeping alive our ardent hopes for an eventual general peace settlement, and of holding the confidence of the Free World in our reasonableness and willingness to leave no stone unturned toward that end. At the same time, in light of the disillusioning record of the broken word, and lest an agreement turn out to be a trap, it would be only prudent that our willingness to listen be re-enforced by a full measure of the wholesome “show-me” mindedness, traditionally ascribed to our compatriots from Missouri.

There would be few, if any, I think, who would not welcome any negotiations that held promise of a tenable agreement for limitation of armaments. For this would mean opening the way to our diverting the monies and efforts involved to satisfying human needs. At the same time we would want to establish an inspection system of such iron-clad nature that it would insure Soviet compliance with all aspects of an agreement, and, in event of noncompliance, that it would lessen the danger of a surprise attack.

Moreover, there would necessarily be, among others, an additional important consideration. For, judging from its past actions, Moscow appears to be determined to hold on to its booty of World War II. This, of course, includes Eastern Germany, as well as the “captive” countries. It would therefore be unthinkable to permit any possible agreement on arms limitation to imply the West's acceptance of existing military boundaries between the Free World and the Soviet bloc. Such vital considerations would rightly be reserved for a general peace settlement.

Aside from the moral aspect, I need not point out the potentially disastrous

psychological effect of any action which might imply acceptance of these frontiers upon the peoples of the “captive” countries, as well as upon those of Western and Eastern Germany. It would dash the prayerful hopes of the Eastern European peoples to regain their freedom and the legitimate aspirations of a divided Germany for reunification.

No, nothing has come to light to indictate that the threat from the Soviet bloc has diminished.

I am confident that recent events in the Middle East as well as those in Eastern Europe and elsewhere have served to point up the necessity for indivisibility in the Free-World front against militant communism.

Collective security, an instrument of enlightened self-interest, forms the bulwark against possible Communist aggrandizement. This concept is the basis of the North Atlantic, the Southeast Asian, and Baghdad alliances.

An important purpose of this collective defense posture is to convince others that if they start a general war they would risk national suicide.

Today our military power, which includes the economic and military strength of Free World collective security, has reached a point of deterring a Communist attack. It is due only to this Free-World strength and resultant military stalemate, that the Soviets appear to have softened their characteristically violent line. Even so, they are still engaged in trying to achieve a superior military advantage—and the isolation and Communist encirclement of the United States. We cannot afford to permit them to achieve these ends, or even to let them think it possible to do so. This calls for sustained support of our military strength, necessarily composed of armed forces adequate to their tasks. It is, of course, only upon a sound economy that this measure of military strength can be built and main-

tained. Yet, because the maintenance of these military forces is essential to our national security, we would be serving our own interests to maintain them at such levels as might be considered our minimum requirements by the authorities concerned. This is the only way, under the circumstances of our times, to insure the respect of our potential enemies and the confidence of our friends. Nothing is free, and nothing worthwhile is cheap.

Furthermore, no developments have yet taken place to render it prudent to terminate our foreign aid program. Its significance can be measured, in part, for example, by the fact that our Army is now helping to train and equip more than 200 indigenous combat divisions in 44 countries—a force considerably in excess of the strength of our own Army.

To put it bluntly, it is more to our advantage, in terms of economy, financial costs, and manpower, to help allied nations to maintain their armed forces through economic and military assistance than to try to provide our own soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the absence of those forces.

Many an eligible American youth, not being drafted, would be in uniform today if it were not for the allied forces supported by our foreign aid program. This program has served to tie together

the many complex factors which compose the unprecedented structure of Free World collective security. It has served as a booster for the development of the military forces of our allies and as a transfusion in the economic blood stream behind their effort.

In the main, the results are bearing out the purposes as originally conceived; that is, to help others to help themselves. Those who might question the wisdom of continuing this foreign aid program would do well to ponder the extent to which it would prove more costly to us to carry on alone; this in terms both of a necessary increase in our own military strength and of consequent financial expenditures.

Lest we might, at times, grow complacent, we should bear in mind that, while unity is easy to maintain in the face of an immediate danger, it is not so easy to maintain, when that danger, even though no less real, appears to recede in imminence.

Clearly, moral suasion has no impact upon the unscrupulous. The only effective deterrent is strength, which entails armed force, and the capability of using it. The only world opinion for which the Communists have any regard is that which is so backed up. It is this language that the leaders of militant communism understand!

The Soviet Union and German Rearmament

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Abstract: Western hopes and Soviet fears of German rearmament are both products of past German military prowess. But Germany has no future as a military power thanks to the industrialization of Russia and the advent of the atomic and thermonuclear age. NATO strategy is unworkable. Muscovite anxieties are irrational. Soviet responses to German rearmament are reviewed and the need for a reappraisal of policy expounded.

INITIAL apologies are in order for my inability to divulge any secrets of Soviet foreign policy or diplomacy. When I found myself in Moscow in 1956, I made an effort to ferret out some secrets and to visit the Foreign Ministry which, along with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is housed on Smolenski Boulevard in Moscow's first skyscraper opened in 1951. But like my old friend and schoolmate, John Gunther, I was never quite able to get through the doors. Under somewhat amusing albeit frustrating circumstances, I took up the question of an interview of the Soviet Foreign Ministry with the bureaucracy of Intourist. The Intourist bureaucracy referred me to that of Voks, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. When I posed the question to the local representative of Voks, he said I should discuss it with the bureaucracy of Intourist. I told him I had already done so without result. He wrinkled his brows and muttered, "*Ne moshno*—not possible"—and finally said: "You may go and look at the outside of the building." I said I had already done that, that it was a very beautiful building indeed, and I should be glad to look at it again; but I would very much like to get inside. This, he said, would

be very difficult; but he would work on the problem.

He called me daily for several days and finally, as I was about to leave for Kiev, he phoned me once more and told me he had decided that I must take up the matter directly with the Foreign Ministry. I said, "My dear fellow, how can I do that? You told me I could only look at the outside of the building." "Oh," he said, "you must have hope. You must have faith. You must write a letter." I said, "To whom should I write a letter?" He answered, "You must write a letter to Foreign Minister Molotov." This seemed to me rather absurd, but several of our Embassy people and also Jack Raymond of the *New York Times* commented that you never can tell when a letter may be answered.

So I penned a letter to Foreign Minister Molotov asking some very searching questions about past and present Soviet policy, including some questions about German rearmament; and then I went on my way to Kiev, Rostov, and Stalingrad. A fortnight later upon my return to Moscow, I was not surprised to find no answer to my letter. But I was much surprised the next day at the public announcement that Foreign Minister Molotov had resigned his post.

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ASSUMPTIONS: WEST AND EAST

But even in the absence of revelations from high quarters, it may yet be useful to review briefly the public record of the Soviet response to German rearmament. It seems to me, however, that that record is meaningful only in relationship to the basic assumptions of Western policymakers in their sponsorship of German rearmament and of Soviet policymakers in their opposition to German rearmament.

The unorthodox argument about to be presented will be that these basic assumptions on both sides are highly questionable, if not altogether false; and that the hopes and the fears on both sides with regard to this matter have no rational basis and have no operational significance. I will, of course, venture to hope that the exposition of the problem which has been treated by Ambassador Krekeler and the further exposition of it by Major General Lindsay will convince all of you—and I hope it will even convince me—that the rather unpopular view I am about to present is quite wrong. I want to be convinced because I should be as loathe as anyone to believe that the energies and resources of America, of Western Europe, and of Germany are being devoted to a meaningless enterprise.

The basic assumptions behind Western sponsorship of German rearmament, if I read the record rightly, are two: that Western Europe is threatened by Soviet military attack; that Western Europe can be effectively defended against Soviet military attack by rearming a Western Germany allied with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The basic assumptions behind Soviet fear of and opposition to German rearmament are also two: that the Soviet bloc is threatened by Western military attack and that a rearmed Germany will

greatly facilitate such an attack and render it almost inevitable.

Now let us consider the possibility that all four of these assumptions are quite illusory and bear no relationship to recent, current, or prospective realities or probabilities. Policies based on illusion and unreality are usually doomed to failure. But what men and statesmen believe to be true, however untrue in fact it may be, is true for them in the sense that such beliefs motivate attitudes and actions. Therefore, the problem before us is real, even though in my judgment the assumptions creating the problem are unreal.

THE MAGIC OF MEMORY

If we ask ourselves why Soviet policymakers cling to their false assumptions, the answer is not mysterious. Their assumptions and their fears, in my opinion, are not feigned. They are very real. The men of Moscow cling to these false assumptions, I believe, because of their recollection of German military victories in 1915–16–17; because of their knowledge of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk; because of their knowledge of the Allied and American military intervention of 1918 and 1919; and finally because of their very fresh and recent knowledge of the appalling cost to Russia of the German invasion of 1941 and 1942. The material and human losses suffered by the Soviet Union in resisting the German invasion were far larger than the losses of all the other United Nations put together. Apart from appalling devastation and destruction, the population figures released last year in Moscow indicated a population deficit of 15 to 20 million people and revealed that the present populations of Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia are smaller than they were in 1940. Available data strongly suggest that the cost in lives of World War II to the Russians was about

25 millions of people. This is not forgotten.

If we ask why Western policymakers cling to what I regard as unrealistic assumptions in these matters, I think that the answer also is not very mysterious. The assumption of the danger of Soviet armed aggression against Western Europe is rendered quite plausible to all of us by the Marxist messianic vision of world revolution and by Soviet imperialistic aggrandizement in the wake of World War II. The assumption that Western Europe can be defended by German arms is rendered plausible by the fact that Germany was the dominant military power of the continent after 1871; that German arms almost conquered Europe in World War I; and that German arms did conquer Europe and almost conquered Russia in World War II. Western and Soviet policymakers alike, it seems to me, are still under the hypnotic spell of the past prestige of German military might, despite German defeat in two world wars. That spell has not been broken by any realistic facing of the new facts of power in our time.

RED MENACE: FACT OR MYTH?

Now as to the dubiousness of the Western assumption of the threat of Soviet military attack against Western Europe, I must limit myself to the opinions of two very distinguished American authorities in the matter. The first of these, speaking before the Third National Conference of Churches and the World Order on March 8, 1949, said:

So far as it is humanly possible to judge, the Soviet Government under conditions now prevailing does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy. I do not know any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this Government or any Government who believes that the Soviet Government now plans conquest by open military aggression.

The speaker was John Foster Dulles.

The other American authority is former Ambassador George F. Kennan writing in *Harper's Magazine* last August of what he called

a rather common impression that Stalin was a man of war aiming to launch a military onslaught against the non-Communist world, whereas his successors are men of peace. Proceeding from this assumption, people argue that whereas it was right for us several years ago to orient our policies exclusively to the danger of war, we now no longer need do this. This is a great oversimplification. Stalin was not what you would call a nice man. His intentions towards ourselves were strictly dishonorable, but these intentions, I am convinced, did not include the determination to unleash a third world war in the grand manner. The image of a Stalinist Russia poised and yearning to attack the West and deterred only by our possession of atomic weapons was largely a creation of the Western imagination, against which some of us familiar with Russian matters tried in vain over the course of years to make our voices heard.

CALL TO ARMS

Now as for the doubtfulness of the Western assumption that Western Europe can be defended by rearming Germany, it will be useful to look at the record here and to reconsider the facts of power in the mid-twentieth century. The decision to embark upon the rearmament of Germany was, to begin with, an American decision. United States military and diplomatic circles began talking in these terms as early as 1948 or 1949. Following the outbreak of the Korean crisis, Secretary of State Acheson persuaded the NATO Council in September of 1950 to approve and endorse formally and officially the rearmament of Western Germany and its inclusion in the Western Alliance system. The first formula negotiated for this purpose, the European Defense

Community formula incorporated in the treaties of May 26, 1952, in spite of heavy pressure by Secretary Acheson and even heavier pressure by Secretary Dulles, who spoke of an "agonizing reappraisal," was rejected by the French Assembly in August 1954. All Frenchmen, like all Russians, all Czechs, all Poles, most Europeans, and many Germans, view the prospect of German rearmament with fear and sometimes with horror. Then under still heavier American pressure, Premier Mendès-France felt obliged to yield and to accept German rearmament under the new formula of the so-called "Western European Union" embodied in the Paris Treaties of October 23, 1954. The French Assembly rejected those treaties also in late December of 1954; but finally, early in 1955, ratified them very reluctantly and with heavy heart.

WEHRMACHT OHNE MACHT

Now what can be reasonably expected in the years to come if the present program of German rearmament is, in fact, carried through? The projected *Bundesheer* will be by far the most powerful national army in Western Europe. This projected army, however, will have no military value whatever, either defensively or offensively against the Russians, against whose wicked designs we are told we must have a German army for common defense of the West. The reason the new German army will have no military value against the Russians is quite simple. The Russians and their allies will, if they must—and if they feel they must, they can do this quite readily—match the new *Bundesheer* gun for gun, plane for plane, tank for tank, division for division, in a ratio of two or three to one if need be. The result will be that the balance of military forces on the Continent will remain exactly what it is today, with over-

whelming superiority in landpower and airpower on the Russian side.

If there is to be a new arms race in Central Europe, this race will be exactly like the global arms race of the past ten years. That is to say, it will be quite like the famous race in Wonderland which Alice ran with the Red Queen. "Faster, faster," cried the Queen until at last they ran so fast they seemed to be flying through the air, their feet scarcely touching the ground, when suddenly, as Alice was getting quite exhausted, they stopped and the Queen propped Alice up against a tree and said, "There, my dear, now you may rest a bit." Alice looked about her in great surprise, still panting a little, and said, "Why, everything is just as it was! We've been under this same tree the whole time." "Why, of course we have," said the Queen. "What would you have it?" "Well," said Alice, "in my country if you ran very fast for a very long time as we've been doing you'd generally get to somewhere else." "Ah," said the Queen, "a slow sort of country yours must be! Now here it takes all the running you can do to stay in the same place. If you want to get to some place else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"

THE STRATEGY OF NIHILISM

The new arms race will leave us all under the same tree and in exactly the same place. Do not our NATO planners and strategists know this? Of course, they do, since they are intelligent people. Do they not propose to do something about this? The answer again is yes. They do propose to do something about it, and what they plan to do is extremely interesting. They propose—and this was the announced decision of the NATO Council, the NATO Military Committee, and the NATO standing group in December 1954

—to counterbalance Russian superiority by using tactical atomic weapons at the outset of any new war. This war will, of course, never be fought; but we might consider the implications of the NATO strategy.

If NATO forces are to use tactical atomic weapons at the outset of any new war, then of course Soviet forces will use tactical atomic weapons at the outset of any new war. And how a distinction is to be made between the use of tactical atomic weapons to destroy armies and strategic atomic weapons to obliterate cities, I as a layman do not know. I do not see how such a distinction can be observed or enforced. "Operation Sagebrush" in the American Southwest in 1955 seemed to indicate, if I read the reports rightly, the armies using tactical atomic weapons against one another would wreak inconceivable devastation and death over the whole area of battle and far beyond it. The NATO air maneuvers of June 1955, in Germany, code-named "Carte Blanche," led to the conclusion that if 335 small or garden-variety or "baby" atomic bombs were dropped between Hamburg and Munich, 1,700,000 Germans would be killed and 3,500,000 Germans would be wounded, not counting any victims of atomic radiation.

It is not a matter of record that this report engendered great enthusiasm in Germany for further rearmament. On the contrary, when the NATO strategy was announced, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in February of 1955 published two articles by Lidell Hart asserting that the NATO strategy would be suicidal. In March of that same year, 1955, a certain Colonel Boguslaw von Bonin was dismissed from the West German Defense Ministry at Bonn then headed by Dr. Theodor Blank for saying publicly and contrary to superior orders that Germany could not be expected to raise an army in the service of a strategy

which would make the complete destruction of Germany inevitable in case of war.

Colonel von Bonin is, I believe, correct. In the event of the war which will never be fought, the new *Bundesheer* cannot defend Western Germany, Western Europe, or anything at all. The basic reason is, of course, that Germany's role as a military Great Power is ended forever. It is ended forever by the industrialization of Russia, which is an irreversible process. Moreover, it has been ended by atomic and thermonuclear weapons. In case of war, ten hydrogen bombs, properly placed, could annihilate utterly the entire population of Western Germany. The same is true of Britain and Japan. A larger number would be required to produce the same result in the United States and the Soviet Union. They are available. This is why the war will never be fought.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE

Meanwhile, Soviet policymakers, also I believe hypnotized by memories, illusions, unrealities, and above all by their fears, their very real fears regarding German rearmament—which are quite as irrational as are Western hopes regarding German rearmament—have responded in a fascinating variety of ways to an imaginary danger. Their over-all response, which probably is not to be deemed irrational but only common sense, has been, of course, to reject German reunification on Western terms and to refuse to consider any reunification of Germany so long as the Western powers ask that Germany should be unified, armed, and allied with the Western powers and that the Eastern frontiers of such a unified Germany should be modified in Germany's favor. Soviet policymakers have stood now quite long in this posture of negation, knowing full well that Western policymakers are unwilling thus far to offer any carrot to

change Muscovite minds and are unable to apply any stick to change any Muscovite minds. However, Moscow's response in detail has exhibited great flexibility, adaptability, imagination, and a good deal of inconsistency.

I must limit myself only to the major items of that response in two categories: Soviet measures of conciliation and appeasement designed to change Western and German minds by offering apparently advantageous alternatives to West German rearmament; Soviet measures of defiance and defense designed to change Western and German minds by demonstrating the futility of West German rearmament.

Among the Muscovite measures in the first category have been the following: Soviet offer to join NATO in March of 1954; the announced reduction of Soviet armed forces in 1954 by 640,000 men, followed by the announcement of a further reduction in May 1956, of 1,200,000, this to be completed by May 1, 1957; the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty on May 15, 1955, and Soviet evacuation of Austria in exchange for Austrian neutrality; the proposals at the summit conference at Geneva in July 1955, for German unification, German neutrality, German disarmament, and a European Security Pact; and the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with the German Federal Republic in September of 1955. Much more recently have come the proposals of November 17, 1956, for aerial inspection of armaments or "open skies" within a 1,000 mile zone in Central Europe.

Among measures in the second category, measures of defiance and defense in the face of German rearmament, have been Malenkov's replacement by Bulganin as Soviet Premier in early February 1955, followed by Zhukov's appointment as Minister of Defense, followed by a 12 per cent increase in the Soviet

military budget, and by renewed emphasis on heavy industry including war industry. These changes, in my opinion, were primarily motivated by Western acceptance of the program for German rearmament. Further measures include Soviet abrogation on May 7, 1955, of the wartime alliance treaties of 1942 and 1944 with Britain and France; negotiation of the Warsaw Pact as an Eastern European counterpart of NATO, with the initial agreement signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955; the rearmament of Eastern Germany; the maintenance of Soviet troops in Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere; the bloody and ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolution of last autumn; and sundry threats and warnings to Britain, France, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and other Western states.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

How then do matters stand and what then can be said about the prospects? All Soviet threats have been ignored in the West and all Soviet offers have been rejected. All Western proposals have been rejected by Moscow, since none of these offers any reasonable *quid pro quo* for Soviet acceptance of the Western proposals. Western protests and threats have been ignored by Moscow. The prospects, it seems to me, are that German rearmament will have no effect whatever on the established balance of military power between East and West; but that it will perpetuate indefinitely the partition of Germany and thus delay indefinitely the final conclusion of the cold war through a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi* between East and West.

The question of what alternatives are available is still a question not very much debated in the United States. The question is, however, much debated in Germany, France, Britain, and through-

out Western Europe as a whole. Among the alternatives is, of course, the possibility of some negotiated formula for the neutralization of a unified Germany; for a withdrawal of foreign troops from such a unified Germany; for a disengagement of the major antagonists in the cold war in a broad neutral zone in Central Europe. The policymakers of Moscow have been striving to negotiate some such formula for the past several years. All their overtures have thus far been rejected.

By and large, the policymakers of Washington and currently of Bonn, with grave doubts among those of Paris and London, are still resolved as of now to continue striving for a reunified, rearmament Germany allied with the West against the East. This endeavor in my opinion will fail. Its only result, if it is persisted in, might be German military domination of Western Europe. The result cannot be, and will not be, a rearmament unified Germany allied with the West. This is a political impossibility. We can have, if we like, a unified Germany which is unarmed and neutral or we can have a divided Germany with West Germany armed and aligned with the West. But the announced goal of Western policy of a reunified, rearmament

Germany allied with the West is outside the realm of military and political possibilities. This will never be.

PROSPECT

Should it turn out that continued success in the enterprise of rearming Western Germany should lead, as it must ultimately lead, to some semblance of German military domination of Western Europe, I put it to you that the men of Moscow, despite their fears and phobias, will acquiesce in this result. Indeed they will view it with a certain satisfaction as they gulp their vodka. For any such result would inevitably mean a further disruption of the Western Alliance. This result, I believe, will not serve the best interests of Germany, of Western Europe, of the United States of America, or of the security of the Free World as a whole.

I venture therefore to express the hope that in the days to come we may prove capable of undertaking a reappraisal of our course in these matters, not necessarily an "agonizing" reappraisal, but a constructive reappraisal. I venture to hope we may arrive through such a reappraisal at a more hopeful pattern of policy to promote Western security for the future.

The German Defense Contribution

By HEINZ L. KREKELER

Abstract: Psychologically, Germans were unprepared in 1950 for the thought that the defense of Europe required their active participation. Now the overwhelming majority favor the re-creation of a German army as part of the NATO command. An important factor in this change of attitude was the restoration of sovereignty in 1955. Principles underlying participation are that German troops are to be used for defense only and that the people will enjoy protection on a par with that given other NATO partners. The will and the means of common defense will be strengthened by growing economic and political stability stimulated by the European common market plan.—Ed.

THE outbreak of the Korean crisis provided the occasion for the Allied leaders to take stock of the military situation in Europe. The following conclusion was arrived at, and it has remained to this day the basis for the defense of this sector of the free world. Geographically, Europe cannot be defended without the inclusion of the area of the Federal Republic of Germany. The defense of this region, however, can only be effective if its population contributes to that defense.

When this fact became publicly known in 1950, it came as a shock to the German people. They were totally unprepared for it. Past events had brought about a profound change in the Germans. It was understood that settlements by force of arms could contribute nothing to the solution of political problems, and indeed that they only and inevitably posed still greater problems. Hitler's crimes had produced a deep-seated abhorrence and had led people to reject the use of force in any form. And now the German people were suddenly called upon to contribute to their own defense.

The ethical bases for this summons

were compelling. The necessity for defense was obvious. No one could expect, in the long run, that Germany would be defended without the Germans themselves bearing their share of the burden. Despite this, years passed before the effects of the shock had worn off. Psychological reactions are rarely overcome by logical arguments either in the case of individuals or of entire peoples. Personal experience and contemplation of one's circumstances alone can bring about a change.

In this respect perhaps it was well that the practical realization of this idea took a longer time than was assumed in 1950. To begin with, some political prerequisites had to be established. It was unthinkable that Germany should make a defense contribution at a time when she had not yet fully regained her sovereignty. Neither the Germans nor their future allies, however, wanted this sovereignty to lead to a situation where a German defense contribution would be established without regard to her neighbor's necessities and wishes. Means were sought for the solution of this problem, and they were found in the form of the European Defense Community.

Apart from its purpose as an instrument for the furtherance of European integration—which was regarded as indispensable for many other reasons—the EDC was conceived as a means of effecting Germany's defense contribution in an integrated way without at the same time involving any discrimination against Germany. For it was clear at the outset that any discrimination was incompatible with the aim of bringing the German people into a common effort.

The European Defense Community faltered and fell. This represented a considerable setback to European integration, a setback which only now is in the process of being overcome. As we know now, this meant a delay of several years in the setting up of German divisions. On the other hand, it gave the German people time to reconcile themselves with the idea of a defense contribution; so that today, when the first German divisions are about to be reported to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization command, the overwhelming majority of the German people stand behind them.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMED FORCES

In May 1955, German sovereignty was finally established with the so-called Paris treaties. Simultaneously Germany became a member of the Atlantic Treaty Organization. As a special instrument of the common defense policy and as a means for close co-operation in the field of armaments the West European Union was created. Thus the way was opened for the German Bundestag to pass the laws necessary for the establishment of the armed forces. The deputies took their task very seriously; so seriously that their own government, as well as their allies, became restive, fearing that because of the duration of the parliamentary discussions they would fall behind in setting up the prescribed units. The German Bundestag, however, was

determined not to be hurried, but to create a solid legal foundation for the new armed forces. Their primary goal in doing this was to assure that these new armed forces felt themselves inwardly bound to defend not only their homeland and their people, but their democratic institutions as well.

The higher ranking officers of the new armed forces were carefully screened by an independent committee on their attitude toward basic democratic principles. Finally, the way was free for the recruitment of the first volunteers. There then ensued a long public and parliamentary debate over the question of whether or not the obligations which had been assumed could be fulfilled with contingents made up only of volunteers. Military experts and political leaders were convinced from the beginning that these contractual obligations could be fulfilled only by general military conscription. They were and are of the opinion that a military draft is better suited to democratic institutions than are armed forces which consist solely of professional soldiers and volunteers. As in every case, the introduction of general military conscription proved to be a heavy political mortgage. Meanwhile, it has been introduced, and on April 1 of this year the first 10,000 draftees were called in Germany, having already undergone registration and inspection last autumn.

It is Germany's responsibility to raise twelve army divisions, a tactical air force of approximately 1,300 planes and a limited navy whose primary task is coastal defense. Initially, it was intended to set up the cadres for the twelve divisions, then to fill them out with draftees and, after appropriate training, place them at the disposal of the NATO high command. In the light of events of the last year this program has been shifted, not in its aim, for that remains the same as before, namely the

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setting up of twelve divisions, but rather in its time schedule. Within this year five divisions will not only be set up but brought up to their required strength and so trained that they can be placed as operational troops at the disposal of the NATO high command by the end of the year. Three of these five divisions will be ready by summer of this year. I should like to emphasize that we shall, of course, fully meet our obligations.

Germany can no more be defended separately than can any other European country; only a common defense makes any sense at all. And only a common plan can assure that this defense will be effective. I should like, therefore, to point out a few basic principles which guide us in making our defense contribution and which we believe must be observed—and will be observed—if this defense is to be effective. First, it is our fundamental idea that all these armed forces may only be used for the purpose of defense. As self-evident as that may be, it should nevertheless be stated repeatedly. It is also necessary to do this, because our adversaries always ascribe aggressive intentions to us. There are no such intentions; and the German contribution to NATO defense for that reason can be regarded only as a contribution to the stabilization of the world situation. A second important point is this: when a people are called upon to make a defense contribution, they expect as a result of their efforts that they will enjoy protection—protection for their lives and protection for their homes. From this follows as an inevitable conclusion a very definite concept of general strategy; or, to put it the other way around, it forbids considering the area to be defended as merely a battlefield. The concept of the so-called forward strategy and the concept of sword and shield have become publicly accepted, and they prove

that the idea which I have set out as fundamental forms the basis of the common conception.

DEFENSE OF EUROPE

The European homeland, including the German, shall be defended. That means that any conceivable enemy will be prevented—in so far as this is possible—from penetrating into this region. A strong shield of ground forces able to carry out this task must be ready. The twelve German divisions will help to form this shield. Still another fundamental point is this: although, of course, with a defense community goes a certain division of tasks, a careful effort must be made to guard against this leading, however unintentionally, to any sort of discrimination against any of the partners. Such a discrimination would be the surest way to weaken the most valuable element in common defense, that is, the absolute resolve of self-preservation and the enthusiasm to make a contribution. In stating these fundamental principles, I am not going astray in useless generalities. Whoever has followed these discussions of recent years knows that these principles time and again have proved to be the basic factors and that they have really furnished the foundation for common defense. It will be necessary in the future, too, from time to time to remember this.

I should like here to quote a brief excerpt from an address given by the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO forces, General Norstad, in New York on January 30 of this year:

Alliances prosper by example and by the equitable assumption of risks along with advantages. Hence it is most important to the fostering of this alliance that the United States, Canada and Britain maintain troops on the continent of Europe in convincing numbers. Moreover, the presence of these troops on European soil, their

physical, visible and tangible presence alongside the ground and air forces of the European nations will be a steady reminder to the Russians that any aggression will instantly bring down on them the total power of the alliance.

We fully agree with the ideas which General Norstad has expressed here. I should only like to add the following in a supplementary way: the aim of the Free World is the prevention of war. Essential to the realization of this aim is the determination to maintain a common defense and to present in common a solid defense front. We have accepted the consequences of this. Although the defense efforts of the Federal Republic are constantly growing, in the spirit of a common unity of interests it voluntarily contributes to the financial support of the troops of its allies on German soil; and this contribution amounts approximately to 13 per cent of the total defense budget.

The military potential of every country has two basic factors, the strength of which in the last analysis determines its importance. One is political stability and the other is economic capacity. In many respects both go hand in hand. If we apply this criterion to Germany, we come to the conclusion that here, too, results can be expected only from common effort and the closest co-operation.

ECONOMIC CAPACITY

I will consider first the economic side. German economic reconstruction has evoked recognition and many friendly comments, especially in this country. This should conceal from no one the fact that the economic development of every European country will find a definite ceiling as long as the economy of this country does not enjoy the advantages of a large market, such as the United States offers; and indeed that means that it must be a domestic market. The recognition of this, step by step,

has now led to a great endeavor to form a common economic area of 160 million inhabitants that will embrace almost as many consumers as the United States. This was preceded by the formation of the Coal and Steel Community—an important event for our study today if one considers that coal and steel are the basis for all armament industries. This community has existed now for several years and has proved its worth. It will be followed by another community for co-operation in the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy, which will be essential to the production of electrical power in Europe in the future. And at the same time, the treaty signed in Rome on March 25 concerning the formation of a common market is to come into force. I am convinced that this common market will be of the most decisive importance to the defense potential necessary for the defense of Europe. But of course, the economic strength of Europe is quite substantial even today.

I should like to cite a few figures which are illustrative of this. In 1956, the members of the European Coal and Steel Community produced 249.1 million metric tons of coal; the United Kingdom produced 225.6 million, the United States 488.3 million and the Soviet Union 305 million. These six countries comprising the common market produced 56.7 million metric tons of steel in the same year; the United Kingdom 21 million, the United States 104.3 million and the USSR 48.6 million. And in the field of electrical power the common market production was 172.8 billion kwh, the United Kingdom 80.2 billion kwh, the United States 547.5 billion kwh and the Soviet Union 170.2 billion kwh.

European Common Market

With the establishment of the Common Market we may confidently expect that Europe will keep in step also with

the other great economic areas in the further increase of its economic capacity. I am also convinced that this close economic co-operation will, at the same time, provide an essential contribution to political stability, not only because of the importance of the economic basis for a stable political situation, but also because a prosperous Europe, vigorously developing its economy, will, in the eyes of every European, be something for the defense of which everybody will be ready and willing to make greater efforts and sacrifices than he would for an organism which he feels is foredoomed anyway.

This European idea is the basis for our common defense. Europeans are firmly convinced that an isolated national effort makes no sense. In a united Europe, Germany is a partner among others. I can assure you that it does not want special privileges, but by the same

token it will not accept any discrimination. And it is impossible either to exclude or to isolate Germany from Europe without destroying Europe. This should be taken into consideration by all those who play with the idea of the neutralization of certain areas in the center of Europe. The beginning of such a process would mean the end of Europe and thus also the end of this bastion of defense of the Free World.

I have intentionally placed the German defense contribution within the framework of this broad concept since it can only be significant within this relationship; the German people have made the decision to make their contribution only with this understanding. And I wish to ask everyone who concerns himself with these questions to look at the defense of Europe as a task which can be accomplished only on a common basis and only in a common effort.

The Military Potential of NATO

By RICHARD C. LINDSAY

Abstract: NATO required a military expression if it was to satisfy its political purpose. This required the development of national potentials into combined military capability. At the outset, the capability was insignificant, but the potential based on the resources and the heritage of the free peoples of the West was virtually unlimited if will and unity existed. By capitalizing on that potential, we now have a capability which is a prime factor in world affairs.—Ed.

TO appreciate the military aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, one must have some background on the existence of that organization as a political institution. NATO, which now includes fifteen sovereign members, came into being as a response on the part of free nations to the alarming and clearly aggressive actions of the Soviet Union in the years after World War II. Without attempting to recall each unhappy instance, the Soviet Union had offered clear proof of its determination to engulf peaceful free nations, imposing upon them a despotic domination directly in conflict with the basic values which had given the Western world its greatness. Facing this threat and noting the tremendous military power which the Soviet Union had maintained intact and improved after World War II, the free nations of the Western world recognized that a collective resistance to this threat was their only true hope. This led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949.

From its conception, the organization was a political expression of common purpose. This was—and still is—the defense of the membership against aggression. The member nations recog-

nized that only in unity would they find strength. Only by freely joining their individual capabilities in a common cause could these nations hope to oppose successfully the possibility of extension of the Soviet dictatorship.

Against the background of common agreement in this political expression, consideration could then be given to the obvious requirement for an active defense expression—one that would assure that the full weight of the strength of the member states could be applied, as directed by the political authority, in common cause. That military effort, or that military expression of NATO, had one primary objective above all others and that was to constitute a deterrent to war. It had become quite evident that the Soviets were no respecters of weakness. A posture of military strength was a guarantee of peace. To have this posture to get that guarantee was NATO's highest purpose and first obligation. Of course, it followed that a second purpose would be to establish a capability to mount an effective defense in the event such action were required. I stress the two points of deterrence and defense because, in spite of Soviet propaganda to the contrary, NATO has never had anything but a

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deterrent and defensive character. It is to those purposes that the organization was and remains dedicated.

MILITARY EXPRESSION OF NATO

To create the military posture that would be essential to satisfy these purposes called for, as a first requirement, a special unity. Historically, nations have established military strength to further their own national policy which would not necessarily coincide with or relate to the national policy of a neighbor. Thus, the first essential in creating any military expression of NATO was to assure unity among the several national military forces—not a unity in respect to uniform, equipment, and pay—but a unity of objective within the purpose of NATO.

To relate, to co-ordinate, to unite this number of separate military efforts was an awesome job. It was something for which there was no precedent in peacetime. It would call for sacrifice, but it had to be done; and from this necessity was derived what is probably still NATO's most valuable asset. I mean the will to unite; the will to act in concert; the will to fight in mutual support of one another. This is in my mind the first element—and the most essential one—of the potential of NATO, be it military or otherwise. General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in a recent public statement referred to this will as an essential element of the deterrent effectiveness of NATO; he also recognized it as "the most perishable of our assets." With this will our fundamental problems in creating a military strength could be solved.

The things that had to be done were reasonably evident. Some means of controlling the several national military contingents had to be established; this called for the creation of a command structure which would include international staffs. There had to be one

agreed way of assuring the defense of the peoples and nations involved; this called for one common defense plan which would apply equally to all the NATO nations in defining the role of the military forces they were contributing to the NATO effort. Effective physical means of controlling the forces operating in the area from Norway to Turkey and in the Atlantic had to be created where they did not exist; this called for new and improved systems of communications. The usefulness of NATO's air strength was limited by inadequate airfields; these would have to be improved. The military forces themselves were not adequately equipped with modern weapons. In this connection, equipping of military forces had been accomplished on the basis of national considerations. Consequently, new equipment programs were required which would be consistent with the role of national forces concerned in the overall NATO effort. These were some—perhaps the major—issues which had to be faced and solved if this effort were to succeed. In this trail-blazing effort, there was no past history of peacetime alliances of free nations to provide a precedent for action and a basis for encouragement. Never before in the history of man had free nations so concerted their military resources in time of peace!

With this background then, let us examine what has been accomplished, what military potential has been developed in and by NATO.

NATO'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS

First, it would be well to arrive at some understanding of what military potential should mean for us in this context. As has already been suggested, it demands will; from the will we derive unity; only with these, can there be military potential. NATO's creation derived from will and unity—NATO's de-

velopment has resulted from will and unity—any effectiveness that NATO is to have in the future must also derive from will and unity. As an additional—one might almost say, secondary—element of military potential, we have the military *capability* that we have created within NATO. It would be well at this point to spend a few minutes discussing that capability.

To do this, I would like to consider some of the specific accomplishments that have been realized in the six years that the military side of NATO has been organized. I propose to examine what has been done in the areas we have just highlighted as the major problems which faced the military side of NATO.

We said that there had to be a command structure with international staffs in order to exercise control over the forces that would be available to this command. That structure has been developed and it exists today. At points as far apart as Norfolk, Virginia; Oslo, Norway; the island of Malta; and Izmir, Turkey, there are today functioning military headquarters, which are prepared to exercise command over the military forces that have been made available to NATO in the event of war. In these staffs, officers of many nations work together, directing their efforts toward the common purpose defined for this great alliance.

We said, too, that a common defense plan was essential to this effort. Such a plan has been in existence for some time and has in fact undergone numerous refinements to take account of improved weapons systems and technical advancements. The plan for the defense of the NATO area is in the hands of appropriate commanders who are prepared to direct their forces toward one objective: the defense of the peoples joined together in this alliance.

We said earlier that another requirement was that communications be made

available and improved so that physical means of exercising control over forces throughout the area in question would be available. Through contributions made by the NATO members, these communications systems have been built or installed where required and we have today a significantly improved capacity to communicate throughout the NATO area.

Airfields

Mention of contributions by the member nations leads us very properly to the next point, that of providing airfields in order to capitalize on the great potential which the NATO air strength offered. Building airfields is not an extremely difficult job as engineering and construction jobs go. However, building airfields in many countries to satisfy an international user is more difficult. Throw in the necessity for multilateral financing and cost-sharing among fifteen nations and the problem assumes respectable proportions. Yet, NATO solved this problem quickly and effectively. It did so because of the will to get ahead with establishing an effective defense. As a result, NATO has developed more than 150 airfields stretching from northern Norway through Central Europe and the Mediterranean area over to eastern Turkey. The difficulties that result from taking land for this purpose, installing airfields with modern jet aircraft near centers of population, stationing foreign forces in provincial communities—all of these have been overcome. That this has been done so successfully and so quickly is another evidence of the effect of the will to get the job done.

Still another area that had to be taken care of was re-equipping forces and developing those forces consistent with their role in NATO defense plans. In this area, tremendous progress has also been evident. In all forces—land, sea, and air—there has been a numerical

increase on the order of four to five times. In terms of effectiveness, the improvements that have been made simply do not permit comparison of the military capability today with the military capability that existed in 1951. As far as equipment is concerned, the NATO forces have also made great progress, in great part thanks to the generous contribution which has been made by our country's programs of mutual aid; that assistance was fundamental to the improvements that have been realized.

NATO AND U. S. FORCES

But we are examining NATO's military potential, and the military posture in Europe is only part of the story. Just as NATO is an element in the defense of the United States, so are United States forces which are not a part of NATO an important, even critical element, in the defense of NATO Europe. I have specific reference to our strategic air capability, which is not turned over to NATO, but remains subject to United States direction, prepared to retaliate when and as required as the key strike force in the world-wide battle against communism. This strategic air strength is indeed vital to the defense effort of NATO. The two efforts are mutually supporting and they are carefully coordinated. NATO's defense planning places proper reliance on the accomplishment of essential tasks by the U. S. strategic air capability.

Based on this evidence, it would seem that there is good reason to be well pleased with the progress that has been made in developing a military capability in NATO. I believe that this is certainly so; but there is by no means any basis for complacency on our part. There are continuing improvements and additions to be made. It would be dangerous to reflect on our accomplishments and overlook the fact that the Soviet

Union has made good use of these same years to improve its own position as well as the effectiveness of the Satellites.

This, then, would suggest that we do have a considerable military capability, that we have realized substantial progress, and that NATO continues to be a developing and healthy organization. I feel that these are proper conclusions. This is not to suggest that within NATO all is a bed of roses. Certainly, this is not true, particularly in the political sphere. The Suez situation, the Cyprus problem, French difficulties in North Africa, all these have introduced strains and created troubles for NATO. But these can and must be overcome. Given the will to remain united and the will to persist in maintaining an effective defense organization, NATO must overcome whatever current difficulties exist now and those that may occur in the future. That will remains undamaged. Again, that will is in my view the most valuable attribute of NATO. It is essential to the effective use of the military strength that has been created; it is essential to improve that strength. And it is here that a curious relationship becomes evident. We must have the will in order to create and maintain our military effectiveness. Yet, the fact that we have realized this effectiveness is an element in creating the atmosphere of confidence that is necessary to nourish the unity and determination we require for the future.

This interrelationship leads to still another conclusion—in my opinion, it is a rather difficult thing to talk about the military potential of NATO in isolation. I feel that there is only one potential and that is a composite of military, economic, political, and cultural elements. I feel, too, that by a careful development in all of these areas, we will create a strength and a determination of united free peoples that will be one of the wonders of our time.

CONCLUSIONS

By way of summary, then, I would say that first, NATO required a military expression if it was to satisfy its political purpose. This required development of national potentials into combined military capability. At the outset, the capability was insignificant. However, the potential based on the resources and the heritage of the free peoples of the West was virtually unlimited; its ultimate parameters were established solely by the will and unity of these free people.

Today, by capitalizing on that potential, we have a capability which is a prime factor in world affairs. Yet, I submit, we have simply scratched the surface of this potential. We must continue to capitalize on it to maintain and improve our combined strength; we must extend its influence into other areas.

This, I believe, will bring us ultimately to a full realization of the potential of NATO. Too ideal an objective? Perhaps—but one promising a return which would more than justify our most dedicated and determined effort.

The Trend in International Payments: Britain and the United States

By GEOFFREY W. ALDINGTON

Abstract: Britain's economic objectives are to build her economic strength to assure her ability to bear the long-term burdens of defense, development of resources, and raising standards of living. To achieve these objectives, Britain must maintain the Commonwealth and her own position in it and gain the effective collaboration of the Commonwealth, Western Europe, and the North Atlantic Community in meeting the problems of the Free World. In this collaboration a common economic policy which will result in a balance of payments is essential.—Ed.

ALTHOUGH the question of the dollar and sterling can obviously be dealt with in a wide variety of ways, I feel that it is only by an attempt to place it against its broad background in world politics and economics that it can be made real, or at any rate made interesting. And since, unfortunately from the British point of view, the problems which beset sterling are very much more intractable than those confronting the dollar, I would begin with some definitions from the British point of view. Let us first consider then the major objectives of present-day British economic policy; secondly, the main political ends which Britain seeks to serve in the execution of that economic policy; thirdly, the main economic trends of the postwar world which surround the execution of policy; and finally, the kind of economic philosophy and practice which would appear to give Britain the best chance of attaining her economic objectives.

CURRENT BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY

The economic objectives can be defined as an attempt to build up our

economic strength in order to assure our ability to bear the long-term burdens we have undertaken. These are the burdens of defense, the development of our resources at home and in the Commonwealth, and the raising of the standards of living.

Now it is, I think, necessary to realize very clearly that there is nothing absolute about the standards we set ourselves. If we in Britain are either incapable or unwilling to make the effort needed to attain these standards then we simply have to reduce them. For unless there is compatibility, the result can only be a grave weakening of our total position, economic, military, and political, in the councils of the world.

Secondly, there is the fact, plain and simple although disagreeable, that we have to live in the world today as we find it, not necessarily as we should like it to be. And we must seek to conduct ourselves in such a way that we can live and live reasonably with it as we do find it. We in Britain cannot afford any more economic crises, and it is primarily by our own efforts that we must seek to improve the position. Moreover, al-

though in this paper I am concerned essentially with external economic policy, there is an inevitable connection with internal economic policy. Britain's postwar experience has shown very clearly that the two are inextricably interrelated. If we follow unsound internal policies then our external political position and our economic position invariably go wrong. Any additional financial commitment which Britain incurs abroad has in the last resort to be met from her internal resources, and the same is true in reverse. Additional expenditure undertaken at home affects our position abroad because it has to be paid for in taxation. And with taxation at its present level that means less incentive and the danger of inflation. Both these affect our exports and so our external income.

POLITICAL ENDS

When we come to the main political ends which British external economic policy should seek to serve, we find again that there is an essential interconnection. Steady economic strength is obviously necessary to any nation which wants not only to behave like but in fact to be a major power. But there is another relationship which is not quite so obvious, but which in my view is basic to the question. It is that we cannot hope to pursue effective joint policies with other nations on a long-term basis in the political and military fields if we are pursuing essentially divergent policies in the economic field. It is no doubt an arguable proposition, but it appears to me that in the long run any deep cleavage in economic philosophy and practice can in present-day conditions lead only to a similar cleavage in other fields of action. Sir Winston Churchill once referred to the importance of the United Kingdom remaining in the middle of what he called three

great intersecting circles: the Commonwealth, Europe, and the North Atlantic Community. As a very broad definition of British political and military aims, I would then like to take first the maintenance of the Commonwealth and Britain's central position in it; secondly, the achievement of effective collaboration of the Commonwealth, Western Europe, and the North Atlantic Community in confronting the problems and threats which face the Free World today. In this way I am convinced that we have the best chance of establishing a basis for what President Eisenhower has finely called "peace with justice."

These then are the aims which our economic policy must seek to serve. And as I have said, we serve them best by seeking to make ourselves economically sound. But there is, I think, another deduction based on the belief I mentioned about the connection between economic and political policies. British policies should endeavor to gain acceptance not only in the Commonwealth but in Europe and North America also. We have heard much in recent years about the collective approach to freer trade and payments. This is the reasoning which lies behind the term "collective" in this sense.

POSTWAR ECONOMIC TRENDS

No good policy was ever made in a vacuum, and I now come to the third part of my background. This involves the major economic facts and trends which must surround, and to some extent shape, our policies in the postwar world. Here we have to distinguish between long-term and short-term trends. This is because the economic and political objectives are, for effective purposes, permanent ones and should not be changed nor our efforts to reach them diverted by short-term difficulties however severe they may be. Nevertheless,

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in the postwar world there are four major long-term trends which have a continuing influence.

First and foremost there is the great impoverishment of Britain as a result of two major world wars.

Secondly, there is the overwhelming economic power of the United States, a power which was enhanced both absolutely and relatively to the rest of the world by the two world wars. It is a fact, and by no means a censure, that alone of the major allies in World War II America and Canada emerged financially and industrially stronger than when they entered it. The United Kingdom emerged immeasurably weaker. Whereas before the war the United Kingdom was creditor to the rest of the world to an amount approaching 3,500 million pounds, by the end of the war she was a debtor to almost the same sum. British gold and dollar reserves hardly changed despite the liquidation of over 1,000 million pounds worth of British overseas holdings to pay for war supplies. Those of the United States and Canada substantially increased. United States and Canadian exports, excluding military supplies, were at the end of the war about twice the volume of 1939. British exports had been starved because of concentration on war industry, and they had fallen in 1945 to about one third of their prewar volume.

PROBLEMS FOR ATTAINMENT OF ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

Here then, we have two main factors: Britain's impoverishment and the great increase in economic strength of the United States and Canada during the war years. Now the first of these Britain can in time and by hard work and good management improve. And indeed she has made considerable progress in the rehabilitation of her export trade. The second, the economic strength of the United States and Canada, will con-

tinue to grow, and indeed for the benefit of the world it is essential that it should. Thirdly, there has been ever since 1945 what is called the "dollar gap" which, put in its simplest terms, means that countries outside the United States have wanted more from the United States than they could pay for by their exports and services to this country. The problem has been increased by the fact that the United States has grown to be the greatest creditor country in the world in a decidedly protectionist frame of mind. On the other hand, it has been very greatly relieved by American generosity since the end of the war in terms of loans and gifts to the economically distressed countries of Western Europe. Britain is faced with the problem of filling this gap by natural means, that is by trade, rather than by extraordinary means or aid. Fourthly, there has been a very uneven distribution between the United States and the rest of the world in the commodity which always can in the end be used to balance accounts—that is gold. The United States has had more gold than she really needs, and the rest of the world has had much less. So, when the balance with the United States has become adverse, other countries have been unable to meet it with gold, and so have tended to add to the restrictions which they put upon imports from America. This is of course a highly simplified statement of a very complex subject. What I want to establish, however, is that inadequacy of gold reserve in the world outside of the United States has been a real brake on the free movement of world trade.

DOLLAR-STERLING RELATIONSHIPS

Let us now turn to the relationship between the dollar and sterling. The dollar area with Canada comprises roughly 9 per cent of the world's population and about 30 per cent of total world exports. Moreover, the great feature

about the dollar is its universal acceptability and its free convertibility. That is, in simpler terms, the fact that anyone inside or outside the United States who holds or acquires dollars can acquire in exchange for them any currency he wishes at at least the official rate of exchange. For foreign countries outside the dollar areas such as the United Kingdom, whose currencies are broadly not freely convertible into dollars, it means that unless they can earn enough dollars to pay for their dollar needs they will have to pay in gold, or borrow, or restrict trade. This relates, of course, to countries and not to individuals. That is to say when a currency is not freely convertible into dollars, the broad rule is if a citizen earns dollars he has to pay them into a central bank; in the case of the United Kingdom into the Bank of England, and he gets in this case sterling instead. If he wants to spend dollars he has to make out a convincing case and get permission. And this is the real basis of exchange control. The United States dollar has been freely convertible at a fixed rate of exchange. The Canadian dollar has been made freely convertible at a flexible rate. Currency freedom in these countries is not frustrated by trade restrictions since neither country has, broadly speaking, any major positive restrictions on its imports, nor does it discriminate, again broadly speaking, in the source of these imports. Here again, I would exclude, of course, security controls of the kind which operate in the case of Soviet Russia and Communist China. Freedom of trade and of finance, in fact, go together, and only thus does convertibility acquire its true value. It follows, of course, that if you are to sustain a convertible currency and the free import policy which goes with it, you must be strong; and the massive strength of the dollar has been the major fact throughout the postwar scene.

Sterling area

On the other side of the picture, sterling is the currency of the United Kingdom and of the United Kingdom alone. It is also the currency in which the group of countries known as the sterling area, which comprises about a quarter of the world's population and does a quarter of the world's trade, carries out its trade and payments not only within itself but with the rest of the world as well. More than this, many countries outside the area do their trade even between themselves in sterling and so keep reserves of sterling. In fact, one half of the world's total trade and payments is carried out in sterling. The sterling area for practical purposes is the British Commonwealth minus Canada. Certain outside countries are members, notably some of the major oil countries in the Middle East, Burma, and Eire. Prior to 1931, there was no sterling area because sterling was in every sense of the phrase as good as gold, and there was no challenger to sterling as a world currency. In 1931 Britain went off the gold standard and the rudiments of the sterling area as we now know it emerged. But at that time, it was no more than an informal arrangement between countries with certain common interests who kept their currencies in line one with another. In 1939, with the outbreak of the war in Europe, Britain imposed exchange controls in order to husband every dollar and all the gold she could to meet her war needs. This exchange control meant first that the sterling area was given formal recognition and definition for the first time, and secondly that there had to be agreement to follow common policies designed toward saving and earning as many dollars as possible. The membership naturally changed as the neutrals formerly associated with the sterling countries fell away; apart from Egypt and Israel, who

left the area since the war, the membership is now the same as it was in 1939. In the postwar years the policy of saving and earning dollars continued in order to establish a peacetime position; an instrument of war in effect became an instrument of peacetime economic policy. Now, however, the sterling area extends over a much wider field of internal policies, development, and the broadest questions of international economic policy. This extension of the field for common, agreed policies is highly important because the action or inaction of one member of the area must in some degree affect for good or for bad the position of all the others. Nevertheless, the policies followed are voluntary ones and are in no way imposed by the financial center of London.

In addition to having common economic policies, the members of the sterling area use sterling to settle their transactions one with the other, and with a great part of the rest of the world. And since sterling is the basis of these settlements, the other sterling countries keep their reserves in sterling and not in their own currencies. It follows then that an essential feature of the sterling area is that it is a commercial and banking system with its center in London and the main responsibility for its operation resting with the United Kingdom. Any banking system needs reserves which are universally acceptable, and the sterling area consequently pools its gold and dollar savings. The rest of the sterling area pays its gold and dollar earnings into the central reserves which, although they are always available for the use of the area as a whole, are the property of the United Kingdom. Other countries of the sterling area are then paid by the United Kingdom in sterling for the gold and dollars which they contribute towards the reserves. This is one of the more important ways in which countries in the rest of the ster-

ling area acquire sterling balances. Similarly, the rest of the sterling area can and does call upon the reserves to meet their needs of gold and dollars against payment for such drawings in sterling. It is a cardinal feature of the sterling area system that the United Kingdom must honor any check presented by the rest of the sterling area for gold and dollars or other currencies, for as a banker it cannot allow a check drawn upon it to bounce.

FUNCTIONS OF GOLD AND DOLLAR RESERVES

The first and main function of the gold and dollar reserves is to meet any shortfalls in the earnings of the sterling area as a whole below its outgoings to the rest of the world. These can be shortfalls on trading or current account with the rest of the world as a whole, and not simply with the dollar area. For example, the reserves fell by over 750 million pounds in one year during the crisis of 1951-52. But this was not all due to a deficit with the dollar area, for during the same period the sterling area as a whole was in deficit with Europe to the extent of 543 million pounds, and we had to pay Europe 181 million pounds in gold. These shortfalls can be and are materially affected by the sterling balances, the debts which the United Kingdom owes to other countries inside and outside the sterling area. The total of these balances stands at the moment at about 3,900 million pounds of which some 3,000 million pounds are due to the sterling area. These figures are not as formidable as they may appear at first sight because a great deal of the balances are needed for currency and other reserves. Nevertheless, they do mean that the countries which earn them can draw on this capital and so run a larger deficit than they otherwise could do with a consequentially larger claim on the reserves. It is, however,

important to bear in mind that it is as much the relative size of reserves and liabilities that matters in assessing the position as the absolute figure at which the reserves stand. In this connection, it is interesting to compare the position as it was in mid-1954 with that of the middle of last year, 1956. In 1954, the reserves stood at 1,078 million pounds, the highest point they had reached since 1951, and over the next two years they fell by 236 million pounds. But over the same period sterling liabilities improved to the extent of over 160 million pounds, so that the resulting total position represented only a comparatively small over-all deterioration. Secondly, there may be shortfalls on capital account, either repayment of debt, investment, or short-term capital movements. The most incalculable element in this is of course that of the short-term capital movements, which exchange control is practically powerless to check. There may be those which arise from normal commercial practice; for example an American merchant may buy sterling and keep it in London because he can get a better rate of interest there, or, far more important, those which arise either from confidence in sterling or in lack of confidence. These movements due to confidence are sometimes referred to as leads and lags. We have recently seen an extreme example of this in the speculative runs against sterling which followed the Suez crisis last November and which made necessary a large-scale calling up of support funds and negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the Export-Import Bank in order to restore international confidence by a massive parade of support funds.

CONFIDENCE IN STERLING AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

It is this question of confidence which is really at the root of the problem and which makes somewhat unreal the ques-

tion which is frequently raised of how large the gold and dollar reserves of the sterling area should be. Here we cannot really think in absolutes, because if the world at large has confidence that Britain's internal and external policies are sound, we shall get by perfectly well with reserves smaller than those which would be needed if that confidence did not exist. But no economic system has ever been yet devised which was not subject to ups and downs, and we must count upon periodic ups and downs. Above all we must be able to impress upon the world that we can weather them satisfactorily—a process in which in turn the reserves obviously play a vital part. All then we can safely say about the level of the reserves is that they should be very considerably higher than the present figure of 762 million pounds at which they stood at the end of 1956. It is, however, possible to estimate the desirable level of Britain's balance of payments with the rest of the world. It should be in the region between 300 and 350 million pounds over the year in order to meet immediate needs, to allow room for investment expansion at home and abroad, and to build up the reserves. That figure has been exceeded once in 1950 and achieved again in 1953. In the first half of 1956 there was a surplus of 144 million pounds, and the year ended with a provisional surplus of 233 million pounds—a good result but still not good enough. Britain's trading position showed a very considerable improvement over last year as a whole. Total exports rose by 11 per cent over 1955, and there were very gratifying increases in exports in the dollar area. Those to the United States were up by 21 per cent in value and to Canada by almost 30 per cent. Moreover, the increase in exports was largely in comparatively new fields such as electronic equipment, Diesel locomotives, and chemicals. The underlying trading position of the

United Kingdom and of the sterling area as a whole was in fact encouragingly strong in 1956. And although the results of the Suez crisis were of course extremely serious, it was not very long before there was a reversal of many of the psychological factors which resulted in the heavy run against sterling between July and November of last year.

UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Now let us look at the position of the balance of payments from the other side, from that of the United States. It was in the 1870's that America first began to export more merchandise than she imported. But until World War I, the export surplus was more than offset by net payments for invisibles such as ocean freight, tourist expenditures abroad, the earnings of foreign investors in the United States, and remittances to relatives by United States immigrants. America emerged from World War I as a major creditor and a capital-exporting nation, and in each subsequent year the United States has exported more goods and services than foreign countries have brought into this country. This persistent excess has been financed in various ways in various periods. Roughly speaking, it was done by government loans during and immediately after World War I, a heavy outflow of United States capital in the 1920's, American purchases of gold in the 1930's, the Lend-Lease program during World War II, and a variety of government foreign grants and loans during the last decade, and especially in the first postwar years. In 1947, economic relations with war-torn areas were being slowly re-established. Relief and reconstruction needs were still desperate, however, and there was at the same time a strong impulse in those countries which had not been devastated by the war to spend their wartime accumulation of liquid dollar assets. As a result, in 1947, American

exports of goods and services amounted to some 20 billion dollars, while imports came to something like 8 billion dollars, leaving a 12 billion dollar gap. Some 6 billion dollars of this were covered by grants and credits extended by the United States government and about 1 billion dollars was disbursed by the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund. In addition, foreign countries liquidated about four and a half million dollars worth of their gold and dollar holdings.

PROBLEMS OF THE DOLLAR GAP

In these circumstances it was little wonder that talk of the dollar gap dominated all thought and discussion of international economic problems. Fortunately, progress toward balance in the economic relationships of the rest of the world with the United States was rapid after 1947, thanks very largely to the beneficial effects of the European Recovery Program. By 1950 the decline in American exports from the postwar emergency levels, together with increases in United States imports, had reduced a surplus of exports of goods and services to an amount less than the outflow of government grants and credits. As a result, foreign countries as a group were able to begin restoring their depleted gold and dollar asset holdings. This process was temporarily interrupted as a result of the Korean crisis, but in each of the last five years United States export of goods and services, other than transfers of military aid in kind which require no reimbursement, have exceeded purchases of goods and services from other countries by a relatively moderate amount. United States grants and credits together with American private investment abroad have more than offset the imbalance. 1956 was the sixth consecutive year in which foreign countries were able to increase their gold and dollar assets holdings, and this

expansion of their reserves has been among the principal factors contributing toward the progressive relaxation of discriminatory practices against dollar goods achieved during the past several years. It would, of course, be entirely premature to suggest that the problem of the dollar gap has come within a measurable distance of a solution. In 1956 American total dollar payments abroad were approximately 21 billion dollars, of which 12 billion dollars were for merchandise imports, 2,900 million dollars for United States military expenditures abroad, and nonmilitary grants-in-aid comprised some 2 billion dollars. On the other side of the account, some 19½ billion dollars were spent on United States merchandise exports and services and about 1½ billion dollars went into foreign holdings of gold and dollar assets. It is obvious from those figures that the United States government still plays a very important role in American economic international relationships. The grants-in-aid amount to a good deal less than half their size at the peak of the Marshall Plan operations in 1949, but they still represent a sizable burden for the American taxpayer. Moreover, an even larger sum is being paid out for the procurement of foreign goods and services for American military establishments overseas. Thus about 21 billion dollars are available to foreign countries annually; something like 5 billion dollars come from the United States government, which is as much to say from the American taxpayer; and the latter is certainly interested in estimating the prospect of this burden of financing the surplus of exports being removed from his back.

BALANCING THE ACCOUNT

What then are the ways in which this might be done? One, of course, would be to cut back United States exports of merchandise, or, in other words, have

foreign countries reduce their purchases of American goods. A cut of about 20 per cent would balance the account and in an economy like the American, whose gross national product is very close to 400 billion dollars a year, a loss of some 4 billion dollars in exports does not at first sight look very serious. But the point is that a 20 per cent cut could not be evenly enforced, and it would hit some major industries and products such as construction equipment, chemicals, wheat, and cotton very heavily. Another way to bring the account into balance would be for the United States to import more from abroad. It would need an increase on present figures of rather more than 20 per cent, and here again in terms of the over-all gross national product it would not appear to be insuperably difficult. But here also the effect could not be evenly distributed, and some of the industries most directly affected would no doubt have a great deal to say on the subject. Our experience in recent years with bicycles, watches, and textiles makes that quite certain. There is general international agreement that there should be gradual and reciprocal removal of unnecessary barriers to freer trade and payment, but all negotiations on the subject have accepted the view that this trend cannot be carried through without due regard to the impact on individual industries. There is a third possibility—to try to balance the account at a lower level of total trade by reducing exports and endeavoring to keep imports from growing. This would, however, inevitably set in motion reactions throughout the world which might well rebound to the serious disadvantage of America's political, economic, and security position in the world as a whole.

Finally, there is a possibility of increasing the total level of trade and investment, and in that process increasing imports at a faster rate than exports.

This would involve acceptance of the belief that the American economy will continue to be a dynamic and expanding economy marked by sustained growth and high levels of production and employment. It almost certainly involves a process of gradual abolition of quotas or quantitative restrictions on trade, although it does not necessarily mean the abolition of tariffs. Tariffs are an impediment but not an absolute bar; quotas on the other hand are absolute bars once the established quota is filled. Such a system also implies a gradual working toward a position into which any country can use its earnings in any other country to buy anywhere else in the world. On this basis each country would have to look not to its bilateral position with any other country but to its over-all position with the rest of the world. Multilateral settlement of payments is of course ultimately the same

as convertibility, and convertibility is a means to an end, that of a higher level of trade, and not an end in itself. There are no pat solutions to these problems; but if we accept, as I think we must, that a continued imbalance in the relationship of the dollar and sterling as the only two really international currencies of the world is essentially unhealthy, then I think it is clear that the objective of freer trade and payments is the one to which our policies should be directed. This is the concept of trade and not aid. It gives the countries of the Free World a real opportunity to do what they want to do, to live by their own efforts, and to play their full part as strong and independent nations. The stakes, I suggest, are enormous not only in terms of world prosperity, but in terms of the direction the world will ultimately take in the struggle between freedom and Communist domination.

The Future of American Economic Aid to Europe

By CHARLES P. TAFT

Abstract: Economic aid to Europe includes anything consciously provided which helps the balance of payments of European countries in the long run. Even aid to underdeveloped countries indirectly benefits not only Europe but the entire West. Our national security depends on the stability, peace, and independence of the underdeveloped world. Our trade policy, then, becomes an important factor. The purpose and scope of financial aid need definition, and both Congress and the public need to be informed of the importance of such aid.—Ed.

MY FIRST problem in discussing the future of American economic aid to Europe is that American economic aid to Europe in a strict sense is almost ended. However, economic aid must include military equipment; it must also include off-shore contracts for military equipment—that is, contracts like those for rifles made in Belgium for NATO. Unquestionably, these are all part of our aid.

Another factor in American economic aid and more important economically is the amount of money the United States Armed Forces spent for maintenance and recreation in foreign countries and especially in Europe; which, as Mr. Aldington has pointed out, amounts to about 2,900 million dollars a year. The debts to sterling-area countries created by Britain during the war came about almost entirely from exactly this type of an item. Those debts amounted to over 3 billion pounds to India because British and other troops were stationed in India during the war. If anybody had gone to Egypt, certainly one of the poor countries of the world, and tried to borrow 35 million pounds at the beginning of the war, he would not have been

successful. England, however, because English troops were maintained there owed Egypt 350 million pounds. This was the way Mr. Keynes financed the war instead of by government borrowings. This was certainly a very skillful operation even though it left some heavy obligations afterwards. Those are the two largest items in the sterling-area balances in London which is and has been a very large and heavy weight around the neck of England's economy.

I cannot predict how much economic aid in the form of military equipment from the United States or by off-shore purchases is going to continue in the future; that is almost entirely up to the way the Pentagon makes its case with Congress. And they probably will do fairly well with what is necessary.

I suppose that economic aid to Europe certainly includes aid to Yugoslavia and what we are now apparently proposing to do for Poland. It might even include emergency relief payments made to Austria or to Yugoslavia for the maintenance of Hungarian refugees, although those are relief payments rather than standard economic aid. In fact the only possible definition of economic aid to

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Europe, it seems to me, is anything consciously provided which helps the balance of payments of European countries. I am considering this aid on the long-term basis, not on an emergency relief basis.

Obviously then, we are also talking about Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, or Lebanon. Can we ignore, in their economic effects on the Western Alliance, aid to other Near-East or African countries, or for that matter to Afghanistan and countries like Korea, Japan, and Indonesia? I should think not, even though it is not strictly within the terms of economic aid to Europe. It certainly affects the future of the Western Alliance. Obviously, it has a very direct economic effect so far as the sterling area is concerned, which includes the Commonwealth and certain other countries that are involved in this general description. If the English are going to be withdrawing any further than they have already from some of these countries, either militarily or otherwise, and we substitute for them, we are thereby assisting in the reduction of Britain's obligations which have become part of their balance of payments. This whole question of the sterling area sometimes has repercussions which cause difficulties with American industries. Take for instance the feeling of the hand-tool people about both India and England. Americans who had sold saws in England for generations found themselves suddenly cut off and the market taken over completely by British producers, not for competitive reasons, but for exchange reasons. The same thing is true in India to a very substantial degree. So here is an element which does get back to a European pattern. Besides it creates certain kinds of reactions in this country that make it difficult to continue the support of foreign aid. Therefore, my topic cannot be limited to economic aid to Britain or even Spain, but

must include the underdeveloped countries because they do affect the balance of payments or the economic situation of the European partners.

FUTURE OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WEST

I would like to make several general points. The first is that the national security of the United States depends, not just upon direct military aid to nations that are competent to use it effectively, but upon the stability, peace, and independence of the underdeveloped world. So does the national security of all the Western Alliance.

My second basic point is that even more for our allies than for ourselves, economic growth among the billion people in these underdeveloped countries means more foreign trade and more investment opportunities. While this opportunity is essential for the economic life of our partners in the Free World alliance, it is not conceivable to me that American free enterprise should overlook it, however small its percentage of our own gross national product may be. Here, of course, you get into the field of trade policy which is involved in the Organization for Trade Cooperation on which President Eisenhower has recently sent a message to Congress and on which he secured the co-operation of Jere Cooper, the Democratic Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, in the introduction of a new bill. This new bill was revised in accordance with the hearings and the recommendations of the Ways and Means Committee last year.

I should say that here, too, we run into difficulties that may not have been clear from what Mr. Aldington said in referring to trade quotas. The United Kingdom and other European nations, because of exchange restrictions and the balance-of-payments situation, had to put quotas on 100 per cent of their trade immediately after the war, or

rather they had to keep them because they were on already. This is now reduced to less than 50 per cent of trade with England and corresponding percentages in other countries. Germany's quotas are lower; those of a few other countries, France's for instance, are higher. European nations, therefore, have actually reduced these restrictions substantially.

On the other hand, our own use of quotas is higher now than it was in 1946. We find ourselves in terrible arguments about items that turn out to be wholly inconsequential, with immediate quota restrictions being demanded by individual industries. I am sure all of you have read and wept over the stories about velveteens. You may not realize that all the plants in the United States making velveteens employ only 1,200 persons. This represents a small number compared to the 64 million employed. I do not want to say that 1,200 persons are not important; but when you consider the manufacturing of cheap violins and you find that the only persons who are involved in the recommendations of the United States Tariff Commission are employees of one plant in Columbus, Ohio, which used to employ 250 and now employs 93 persons, you begin to wonder what all the commotion is about. However, it is enough cause for the Committee for a National Trade Policy to have to work hard.

I will now simply mention in passing that for many Americans, including myself, the humanitarian consideration for helping Europe, in the sound European tradition, is profoundly moving, especially in the area of origin of our major religions and ethical cultures. So the problem is really the future of all United States economic aid.

Here, it seems to me, we have managed to obscure the basic issues almost completely by a totally inadequate job of public education. This failure be-

came apparent first in the mix-up between appropriations and annual expenditures of the national budget which was exhibited in a perfectly shocking way a year ago this spring. To mollify economy-minded Congressmen, the program had been coasting along on lower annual appropriations than was being spent until the funds were used up, and then the normal expenditure of 4,900 million dollars looked like a sudden increase. Explanations were never made to Congress and to the public. There had been no increase—there had been a decrease. But because of having used up surplus funds and therefore having asked for less in annual appropriations in previous years, when the national budget was made up to take care of the needs for the succeeding year, it looked like a huge increase.

The failure was in the second place in the want of effective distinction between military aid and economic support of military defense in seven threatened areas on the one hand, and economic aid to seventy-five underdeveloped countries on the other. For the fiscal year ending last June 30—for which Mr. Aldington has given the correct figure of 5 billion dollars for the total aid, military equipment cost 3 billion dollars—850 million dollars went to economic-defense support in the seven threatened countries: the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Greece, Turkey, Korea, and Afghanistan. Then came ½ billion dollars in assistance to industrial countries, and only 450 million dollars were given to seventy-five underdeveloped countries; 200 million dollars went for disaster relief to balance out the total.

When the United States Chamber of Commerce wants to reduce the national-budget total by 200 million dollars, which parts are they trying to reduce? Most of the members of their committee do not know because they are not familiar with this breakdown. They

may be right in their demands—I wouldn't want to argue with them. But it depends on which expenditure they are attacking. If they are attacking the 3 billion dollars for military equipment, it is less than the 10 per cent of the total that they are proposing to cut. If they are trying to cut the 450 million dollars to seventy-five underdeveloped countries, it is almost 50 per cent. Which is it? We do not know. The public does not know. I am saying that the job of interpretation has not been good.

DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL

I am not advocating putting direct military aid in the defense appropriation bill. This has been recommended by a number of committees and distinguished people. It should not go there, both because its economic effects have to be appraised as economic aid and because it has to be related to the economic-defense support. This is clearly in the economic-aid area. When I do say that these first two military categories ought to be in a separate bill from aid to the seventy-five underdeveloped countries, it is not enough to put them under separate titles of the same bill. This will not distinguish them because all newspaper reports will lump them the way they do the total appropriation for health, welfare, and education or the total appropriation for the Department of Commerce. If you want to separate the amounts so the public can understand them, you must have them in two bills. Then economic aid to industrial countries, to underdeveloped countries, and for relief should be in three separate titles in another bill, that is, in a second separate bill. Finally, all appropriations should still go to the same administrative agency, presumably the International Cooperation Administration in the Department of State.

PURPOSE FOR LOANS

The future of economic aid in the sense which concerns you and me lies in this clear separation. It is no mere technical change; it is a complete change in atmosphere. But the future of this program depends equally upon a clear statement in this second bill, the bill which covers economic aid to industrial countries, economic aid to underdeveloped countries, and relief. There must be in it a clear statement of the general purpose of the aid, which is the promotion of stability, peace, and independence of the receiving countries by encouraging their over-all economic growth. Whatever is done should fall within that general class, but it should go further. There should be a clear statement of the specific ways in which this money should, or rather could, be spent. For instance, the expenditures might be limited to loans for certain purposes, with grants given only in very special circumstances based upon practical screening criteria obtained from actual experience.

The program has to be tailored to each country because each country is different. I am convinced the bills should limit the uses of the funds to the following: improvement of the productivity of agriculture, both to get more food for populations increased by health measures, which is the worst problem in the underdeveloped countries, and to support increasing nonagricultural employment. Normally 90 per cent of the workers in underdeveloped countries are in agriculture. As you know, in the United States only 10 per cent of the workers are actually engaged in raising products for agriculture although 12 or 13 per cent live on farms. The second purpose is transportation, both by road and by rail. The third is power.

The fourth is education. The training of finance capital, of management,

of supervisory personnel, of foremen and straw bosses, of skilled and semiskilled labor—this is the greatest lack of underdeveloped countries. They want to industrialize, and they cannot possibly do it. You give them a steel mill and they will not be able to run it effectively because they lack the skills to do so. They will not have them for a long time to come.

Five, technical assistance should be given in commerce, industry, distribution, and service industries which are adapted to the needs of the country. In France, which is a modern industrial country, we introduced clothing plants like the ones in Philadelphia and Cincinnati, for example, where the direct-selling method is used of what are supposed to be made-to-order suits, but which are uniformly manufactured ones with minor changes to fit individual sizes. You know the process. We tried this in France, but it was not successful. Nobody there ever bought their suits that way, and they just did not propose to buy them that way, that is all. On the other hand, supermarkets have become very popular all over the world, a result which nobody would ever have expected. They have been particularly successful in Brazil; super markets are not only liked by Brazilians, but they are also a new way of cheap distribution of necessary food. This is the kind of thing that has to be adapted to the country and to the way the people can accept new things. You may have to try some ideas that fail in order to discover successful ones. But that is the object of technical assistance.

Now there may be some aid projects that do not come under these headings, but unless they can be brought into a simple category which is easily understood by the American public and by the Congressmen who represent it, it is better to exclude them. Programs will have a much better chance of getting

Congress to understand and then to support them if they are based on a straightforward and simple presentation like this.

Some of the projects may produce an argument as to whether these new enterprises are going to be socialized, that is to say run by the government, or whether they are going to be run by private entrepreneurs. This, however, should not be given too great emphasis. Countries may start as India is starting—with the thought that they are going to be able to run these industries as a government operation. Governments are going to find in many cases that the new industries are a first-class headache and they are going to be very happy to let somebody else run them. But at any rate, even though you may be against public operation of business in the United States, in those countries probably it cannot be handled any other way. If that is the case, then governments should administer these industries. If England or France operate railroad transportation through the government, how can you expect French or British colonies to have any other ideas concerning their management? Certainly our people are going to encourage the development of private initiative. But those skills must be developed before you can expect to have a private-enterprise economy in some of the underdeveloped countries. And that matter should not be one of argument if the problem is clearly understood and well described.

FOREIGN AID AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

I would suggest that we are at a critical point in the whole approach to foreign aid, and for the moment and perhaps permanently we shall have to keep a major part of our attention on public relations. This is a penalty for past failure in that respect. The program which I suggest would seem to bar economic aid in the nonmilitary bill

from European countries except certain ones back of the Iron Curtain and for Spain on this side of the line. I do not think we need be too concerned about that. But the involvement of Britain, France, Belgium, and Holland overseas, where colonial ties are broken but often leave commercial relationships, the prospect of essential export markets and sources of essential raw material supplies, make it very certain that United States foreign aid there is essential to the Western Alliance. Insofar as the Fairless report (*Report to the President by the Private Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program*, March 1, 1957) limits its endorsement to military aid and defense support, it is totally wrong. The International Ad-

visory Board, headed by Eric Johnston, made a very good report. It is very encouraging that the Senate and the House Committee reports are more realistic and in general take the position on aid to underdeveloped countries which I have described. The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee reported recently that United States Point Four programs in Latin America should be continued at the present levels, but that the African program should be stepped up considerably. Last December Mr. Richards of the House made a somewhat similar report. But the future of United States economic aid as a support to the Western Alliance still depends on a strategy of public and Congressional education such as I have outlined here.

Economic Prospects in Western Europe

By MILTON GILBERT

Abstract: Originally formed to help distribute American financial aid in Europe under the Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Cooperation has since 1950 been the main forum for discussion and common action about the economic problems of Western Europe. In 1951, the Council called for an over-all expansion of production of 25 per cent in five years and set targets for various basic industries. Most of them were achieved. The next five years will show a slower rate of development, and the real demands for resources are likely to cause strains in the economy. Various ways in which the United States can offset this strain are suggested.—Ed.

SINCE few Americans seem to be familiar with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, I may say that it is an international organization made up of seventeen countries of Western Europe—all the non-Communist countries except Spain and Finland. It was formed in 1948 as part of Europe's recovery effort under the Marshall Plan, and in its early days devoted much of its time to the allocation and effective use of American aid. Since 1950 the OEEC has had nothing to do with aid, but has found a useful and exciting role in being the main forum for discussion and common action about the economic problems of Western Europe. A principal activity of the Organization has been the freeing of European trade and payments; but it deals also with problems of general economic policy, energy, manpower, shipping, and the major industries. It has recently been dealing with the oil crisis created by the blockage of the Suez Canal, with European co-operation in the field of atomic energy, with the creation of a free-trade area among its member nations, and with the problems of economic

expansion in the years ahead. The United States participates in the work of the Organization as an associate member contributing its advice and counsel, but it does not enter into the formal agreements made at the OEEC nor contribute to its general budget.

I am at present on leave from my position on the Secretariat of the OEEC and wish to emphasize that I write in a purely personal capacity.

It was first suggested that my topic should be "The Economic Health of Western Europe." My first impression was that this title was a bit too clinical—I don't find analogies between economics and medicine very appealing since, as I am sure you will agree, economics is really more scientific. So I proposed "The Economic Prospects of Europe" as my topic.

I want to make it clear, however, that I did not suggest the change because I wanted to avoid the question implicit in the original title. So, I will say outright that in my judgment the economic health of Europe is quite good. This does not mean that there are no economic problems—in fact, the very na-

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ture of the economic process, which is the allocation of scarce resources, implies the existence of problems. But Europe's problems are those of a healthy economy—of an economy that is vigorous and expanding, with more things to do than there are resources to do them with. They are not the problems of stagnation, of lack of progress, and of an absence of initiative which would generally be taken as signs of an unhealthy economy.

OEEC EXPANSION PROGRAM

I may illustrate this by what has happened to the economic expansion program adopted by the OEEC five years ago. In 1951 an effort was being made by most countries of Western Europe, particularly those who were also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to increase their defensive strength because of the threat to security implicit in the Korean crisis. A higher level of defense expenditures presented real difficulties to Europe since so much still remained to be done in the way of reconstruction and recovery of both real investment and consumption standards.

Under these circumstances the Secretary General, M. Robert Marjolin, proposed to the OEEC Member Countries that an exceptional effort be made over the coming five years to expand the total economy so that the large increase in output would allow civilian objectives to be met at the same time that defense was being increased. Accordingly, the Council adopted a resolution calling for an over-all expansion of production of 25 per cent in five years—a rate of approximately 4.5 per cent a year—and setting targets for various of the basic industries that would be required to reach the goal.

While the various targets set were believed possible, I think the general view at the time was that they were quite

optimistic. Nonetheless, now that the five years have passed, we find that most of them have been achieved. Total output has gone up almost exactly 25 per cent; industrial production rose 32 per cent compared to a goal of 33½ per cent; the target for electric power was attained and that for steel considerably exceeded. Only in the case of coal was the goal missed by a significant margin. In the case of house construction, for example, the target was to double the number of units being built; but I believe the rise of 75 per cent actually attained represents a notable achievement. At the same time as these production goals were being met, great progress was made in freeing intra-European trade from quantitative restrictions and in liberalizing dollar trade. This record surely demonstrates the vigor of the European economy.

PROSPECTS OF OEEC

To turn now to the prospects, I believe that 1956 marked a turning point in the trend of expansion in Western Europe and that the next five years will see a substantially slower rate of development. The best estimates we have been able to make indicate that the increase in total output for the five years ahead will be between 17 and 18 per cent, compared with 25 per cent in the past five years.

Why is this likely to be so? The answer to this question lies in the fact that for both the elements of growth, the labor force and productivity increase, there were possibilities of exceptional rates of increase in the past five years that cannot readily be continued in the next five. The essence of the matter is that five years ago there was still considerable slackness in the European economy of both manpower and industrial capacity and that it was still in the process of postwar recovery. Taking up this slackness and thereby attaining a

high rate of expansion involved the following factors:

In 1950 there was a significant volume of unemployment in various countries of Western Europe. Over the following five years unemployment was reduced by 1.3 million persons whose employment contributed to increasing production. At the present time very full employment conditions have been reached in most countries so that there is little margin for further reductions of unemployment. The only large pool of idle manpower now available is in Italy.

The movement toward full employment resulted in drawing a fairly large number of women into the labor force from 1950 to 1955. While this tendency should continue in the years ahead, it is likely to do so at a slower rate. Moreover, the trend toward longer education will delay the entrance of younger people into the labor force.

The same forces have led to a lengthening of the average work week, both through fuller use of the standard working week of forty-eight hours and through the use of overtime. In the years ahead this trend will change because of labor pressure for a shorter working week and for longer holidays.

The labor force was increased over the past five years by migration from outside Western Europe—particularly of labor from Eastern Europe into Germany and from North Africa into France. The prospects are that this movement will be less in the coming years.

It may be mentioned also that the natural increase in the labor force will be somewhat smaller as it will be affected by the lower birth rates which prevailed during the war years.

One must not exaggerate the influence of any of these factors, but together they mean that Europe will have less possibility of increasing its employed labor force and hence less possibility of

increasing production. In addition, the annual rate of productivity increase was exceptionally large during the past five years in some countries because productivity generally increases fast in a reconstruction period and because it was a period of catching up for the new, more productive industries.

In summary, it is expected that total hours worked will rise by about 3.2 per cent in the present five-year period compared with 8.6 per cent in the years 1950–55, and that the over-all productivity increase will be 13.6 per cent compared with 16.5 per cent in the previous five years. The conclusion that output will rise 17 to 18 per cent instead of 25 per cent follows from these underlying projections.

REAL RESOURCES

Now, I would like to stress that this change to more normal rates of growth in Europe is not necessarily bad and in no sense pessimistic for the future. It is not a misfortune to have already reached full employment and to have completed the postwar recovery process. Nonetheless, there is a transitional period ahead in which the rise in over-all demand must be fitted to the reduced rate of increase in the supply potential—and this is a process that is likely to result in strain. It is likely to do so because there are still pressing needs for resources that arise from powerful economic and social forces. I would say that signs of strain were already quite apparent in 1955 and 1956, in the form of inflationary pressures and renewed balance-of-payments problems. In the years ahead it will take careful management and firm policy measures to achieve the growth potential of the economy without distortions that come from excessive strain.

In trying to form a judgment about the economic outlook in this regard, we must examine the various uses of re-

sources in order to see what pressures are likely to arise. Of course, one must assume no drastic change in the international political situation that would demand a radical change in defense outlays and hence in all other uses of resources.

From a real standpoint, the most persistent pressure for resources in the next five years can be expected from investment requirements. In the period 1950 to 1955 there was a tendency for investment to take a larger share of total output; the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) accounted for by fixed investment rose from 16.7 per cent to 18.2. In the years ahead we expect this trend to continue and have calculated that by 1960, investment should be taking a bit above 19.5 per cent of the total GNP. Whereas the GNP is expected to rise by 17 to 18 per cent, investment is expected to increase 24 per cent.

This view is partly dependent on the fact that, although investment in Europe is already high, productive capacity is now quite fully utilized so that investment demands for expansion will be large. But more particularly, it is the requirements in a few specific areas that give the projection of a relative rise in capital investment.

Steel capacity

After a careful study of trends in the various categories of steel uses, it is estimated that steel capacity will have to rise from 77 million tons to 102 million tons in the course of the present five-year period. This will mean an increase in the level of investment from \$700 million to \$1.2 billion.

Energy

The dominant increase in investment for energy production will be in oil refining capacity and in petroleum exploration. Demand for petroleum fuels

is expected to rise by approximately 50 per cent and the increase in investment will have to be of the same order of magnitude. In addition, plans for atomic energy are being expanded rapidly and it is apparent the investment in this field will become a significant figure in the five years ahead.

Shipping

The main demand for increased investment in transportation will come from the need to add to the capacity of the tanker fleet. It is expected that oil imports will rise by about 50 per cent and even before the Suez crisis, tanker capacity was being quite fully utilized. In addition, projections indicate that air transport facilities will have to be approximately doubled over the next five years.

Roads

During the postwar period thus far, the construction of new roads has proceeded slowly because of more pressing requirements in other sectors. At the same time there has been a rapid build up of vehicles on the roads, their number having increased from 9.5 to 16.6 millions from 1950 to 1955. Consequently, further postponement of road building is becoming increasingly difficult—particularly in view of the fact that the number of motor vehicles is expected to rise over 25 millions by 1960. This does not include motorcycles, scooters, and motor bicycles. We expect road investment to about double in five years.

Schools

While it is difficult to predict just what governments are apt to do about a problem like inadequate schooling over any given period of time, there is no doubt that school investment will rise appreciably in the years ahead—and may increase as much as 100 per cent. For Northern Europe the needs will be

concentrated in secondary and higher education. They arise primarily because present standards of education are just not producing enough technically trained supervisors and enough manpower with higher skills to fill the needs of modern industry. The shortage of trained people is considered a problem in the United States; you may be sure it is much more so in Europe. After age 14, the percentage of young people in school falls off very rapidly; at age 15 only one-third of the children are attending school; at age 17, 10 to 15 per cent; at age 20, only 4 to 5 per cent. And these figures leave out the less developed countries of Southern Europe. Quite apart from the need for more education, the rise in the level of income is producing greater demand for it because more people can afford to keep their children in school instead of sending them to work. Furthermore, in the years ahead the postwar population bulge will be moving up to the secondary schools and creating a natural pressure for more facilities.

For Southern Europe the education problem will be different since the need will be to increase the quantity and quality of primary education. There is still a great deal of illiteracy in this area and in much of it, children are not in school for even the limited compulsory number of years.

It cannot be expected that these problems will be solved in the next five years, not alone for economic reasons. In fact, the bottleneck in improving education will certainly be shortage of teachers rather than shortage of facilities. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that investment in school construction will come close to doubling in the next five years.

Underdeveloped areas

Finally, it should be mentioned that Europe still has underdeveloped areas for which investment needs are great,

particularly Greece, Turkey, and Southern Italy. Development programs have been drawn up for these areas which are reasonably concrete and realistic. Their implementation will be a factor in the rising trend of investment.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The second possible source of strain in the European economy is from the balance of payments. So far as the current balance is concerned, it can be said that economic expansion in the years ahead need not have a disproportionate effect on imports. While demand for a few basic materials, like petroleum, will be exceptionally high, a study of the whole range of import requirements does not indicate a rate of increase that cannot reasonably be matched by increased exports. I would say that from a purely physical standpoint, the outlook appears quite good and that danger of great difficulties in the current balance would only arise if strong inflationary increases in total money demand were permitted.

However, maintenance of the current balance is not the whole story. If one includes the capital items and transfers, there is a prospect of some strain largely because the present situation is not really satisfactory. The problem has several aspects:

Gold and foreign currency reserves are too low at present and should be built up over future years.

The margin for foreign investment is too small at present to make an appropriate and necessary contribution to the underdeveloped areas outside Europe which are dependent on her help for their development.

Europe is now receiving a fairly substantial flow of dollars at present from United States military expenditures abroad and other extraordinary United States outlays, and these are scheduled to decline in the years ahead.

If the situation is to be improved in these respects, it means utilizing some part of the increased production for creating a margin in the current balance of payments. I expect the OEEC countries to make strong efforts in this direction and hence believe that an improvement in the real balance of payments situation will also contribute to the general strain on real resources.

Finally, I believe one must expect that demands for a continuing rise in the flow of consumption will also contribute to strain in the European economy. In fact, it may be said that the need for limiting the rise in consumption, in order to allow adequate investment and balance-of-payments improvement, will be one of the major issues of economic policy in Europe for the next few years. It involves not only appropriate use of fiscal instruments but also finding the means of keeping the increase in the national wage bill within the bounds of economic possibilities.

It is quite easy, of course, to propose tough measures by government authorities that would sufficiently restrain consumption to avoid any problem. But when account is taken of political and social realities, and given the intention of the Western countries to maintain a high degree of economic freedom and a reasonably high level of employment, the accomplishment of this task is far from easy. Consumption must be allowed to rise when employment and productivity are rising; obtaining a rate of increase that does not disturb economic stability requires skillful management of policy instruments and the co-operation of an informed public.

U. S. POLICY AND EUROPEAN ECONOMICS

In conclusion, I would like to pose the question of what this picture of European Economic prospects should mean

for American policy. These prospects are that total production will expand at a slower rate in the years to come and that, even though the rate of expansion cannot be called unsatisfactory, the real demands for resources are such as will be likely to cause strains in the economy. Anything that it is reasonable and feasible for the United States to do to ease those strains will be a real contribution to the economic and political strength of our principal allies. I would emphasize the following points:

To have sound expansion in the years ahead Europe must have increased trade with the outside world, and particularly with the dollar area. This requires a liberal trade policy by the United States. Recently, all the evidence has indicated that protectionist pressures are stronger; efforts to widen the scope of protection on the grounds of defense essentiality are a very dangerous development. As Europe wants to buy more from the United States and to further liberalize dollar trade, a freer trade policy by the United States would be mutually beneficial.

Our government has already given political support to the idea of the Common Market and free trade area which Europe is now in the process of establishing. These bold and imaginative steps toward a Europe free of trade barriers will be essential means for assuring productivity growth. I think we should now consider something more than giving support to this program; we should consider ways and means of co-operating with it and participating in it. We should do this in our own interest—as well as in Europe's. We should not ignore what will be the second richest market in the world with a population of 260,000,000. How we are to deal with it and how we are to assure mutually beneficial trade with it, demands some rethinking on our part. I feel strongly that the kind of dickering we

have been doing in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will just not be adequate—and I mean not adequate to provide our own industries with sufficient opportunities for trade with Europe. We will need to reappraise what must be done to create reciprocity in our trade relations with Europe.

The prospect of pressure on resources must be given weight in planning Europe's contribution to Western defense and in our own military aid program to Europe. I am not an expert in these matters so I will leave the implications of this to others. I may add, however, that to have strong and willing allies, we must be interested in their economic well-being and not consider them only in terms of military potential. Of course, we don't really do that, but we do sometimes create that impression.

I believe the United States should give some support to the co-operative atomic energy programs now being developed in Euratom and in the OEEC Atomic Energy Agency. I mean the giving of significant financial support which I understand has already been proposed to Congress. Such support would not only

help Europe, it would be of great benefit to our own atomic energy industry.

Another problem is the underdeveloped countries of Europe. They have worked out practical development programs which merit and need our financial and moral support. The stage has been reached where really moderate help can accomplish a great deal in economic development and in maintaining Western unity. The proposal for a free trade area presents a challenge in this respect since the underdeveloped countries may need some help to be able to participate on an equal footing. Europe should do its share; but help from the United States may also be needed.

Finally, I believe the West would be strengthened if closer ties could be established with Spain and Finland. An important step in this direction would be their membership in the OEEC. Help from the United States would facilitate this step and would be very much in our interest. You know, United State help was needed to get the other European countries into the OEEC, and it proved to be very worth while. I think the same should be true for Spain and Finland.

The Diplomatic Potential of NATO

By CLARENCE K. STREIT

Abstract: NATO as presently constituted is proving too weak to meet present and future needs. Its legislative, executive, and judicial powers are ineffective, not to say nonexistent. There is a pressing need for a strong Atlantic union to meet political and economic as well as military demands of today's world. In this NATO has proved unequal to the task and in times of crisis has been completely by-passed. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that NATO is a union based on units of diplomacy or sovereign nations rather than being a more democratic federal union based on sovereign citizens. The body politic is an artificial unit, hampered by national rather than international allegiances. A strong and effective Atlantic federal union must, therefore, be built up by first splitting up these bodies politic and then reuniting these men into a greater and more internationally minded organization.—Ed.

SINCE I still consider myself a reporter, I believe in giving at the start the main thing I have to say and then adding the supporting evidence. So I shall start by giving my own answer to the question "What is the diplomatic potential of NATO?" which is implied in my topic.

From the standpoint of time, the diplomatic potential of NATO is greater than that of any alliance in the past, as far as I know. But it is too little for present needs and tragically inadequate for the future. You have to judge these things in several ways. Compared to alternatives, its potential is much greater than that of diplomatic channels; but it is far less than what its members would enjoy if they changed the alliance into a federal union.

Now in developing the reasons for these conclusions, I would first like to define my terms; second, describe the NATO system; third, show that it is not good enough as it now is, that its diplomatic potential permits of considerable

expansion, but that at best, the diplomatic system cannot meet our needs and we should call a convention to explore how to replace it with an Atlantic federal union.

Now for my definitions. You have no doubt heard the story which distinguishes between a lady and a diplomat, but I would like to add a new section to it. As the story goes, if the lady says "No," she means "Maybe." If she says "Maybe" she means "Yes." And if she says "Yes" she is no lady. But if a diplomat says "Yes," he means "Maybe." If he says "Maybe," he means "No." And if he says "No," he is no diplomat. We shall see later that there is no little truth about diplomacy in this story. But first I would like to add my little section to it.

My addition seeks to distinguish between a diplomat and a man—a man in the high and broad sense in which the word is used in democracies to cover both men and women—and to name the ideal on which they base their hope and

their faith. Now if a man says "Yes," he means "Yes." If he says, "Maybe," he means "Maybe." If he says "No," he means "No," or he isn't the kind of man you would hold up to your son as a model.

In diplomacy or the diplomatic system, you find the type of international organization that picks the nation as its sovereign unit, as distinguished from this individual man I have described who composes—or rather the men and women who compose each nation or each federal union, and who form the sovereign units in any democracy.

INDIVIDUAL MAN AS BASIC UNIT OF GOVERNMENTS

This matter of units may seem dull, but I think it is of high importance. One of the reasons, it seems to me, why political science has fallen so far behind physical science is that its professors pay so little attention to their units; they think so little in these terms. Physical science has advanced by reducing matter to its basic units, to atoms. It can then recombine them with marvelous results; and then by dividing its indivisible unit, the atom, physical science has created even greater wonders.

In political science the potentialities are far greater, for political science deals with men. Great as is the power that results from splitting the atom, still greater obviously is the power of man who is able to release and harness this energy. Basically, there are only two ways to combine our organized societies in the international field. We must combine them either as bodies politic or nations, on the one hand, or as individual men on the other.

We all know that such bodies politic as the United States and Great Britain are not true basic units since they are composed of individual men and women—of ourselves. We know they are divisible. After all, the United States

split away from Britain, and since then many individual Britons have become Americans, and some Americans have become Britons. But you cannot split a man in two without destroying him. In individual man then we have the only true basic unit in political science.

In fact, the word "individual"—have you ever thought of it, the word "individual" means that he cannot be divided. We release no human energy when we split a man. But we do release tremendous power when we unite bodies politic by splitting them first into the men who compose them and then reuniting these men into a greater body politic.

This is the way that all of the great powers have been formed in the political field: by members of tribes becoming the citizens of a city state, such as Athens; or the subjects of one of the little kingdoms whose people later combined to become subjects of the King of England or of Scotland, and who then united to form Great Britain; or the peoples of the thirteen states in America becoming by federation "We the people of the United States."

One does not have to be a political scientist or a practical politician to know this. I sometimes think that one has to be a political scientist or a practical politician to do what Tom Paine said was impossible. That is, to unknow what we already know and to act, and what is worse, think as if the only practical unit in international organizations were not individual men, but plural men—the body politic.

Its artificial character is often hidden by likening a nation to a man, calling Britain, John Bull, and the United States, Uncle Sam. You can shake hands with a man, with any American, but who has ever shaken hands with Uncle Sam? The only sweat and blood and tears that even Winston Churchill could draw from John Bull were drawn

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from the sweat and blood and tears of individual Britons.

DIPLOMATIC POTENTIAL OF NATO

In organizing our Atlantic community on which our freedom and our peace depend, we have ignored, not to say flouted, the fact that the unit of every great power—and we are spending billions to get power in NATO—is the individual man. We have composed NATO of the units of diplomacy—that is, of sovereign nations, as an alliance and not as a federal union of sovereign citizens.

Let me turn now to the term "potential." What is the potential of NATO as a diplomatic instrument for meeting the needs of the free Atlantic community? To answer this question, we must first know what we want from NATO. Is it the prevention of war? We do want that, but I think it needs qualification. One can prevent war by surrender and by the ways the West followed recently in Suez and in Hungary—by appeasement. But if we seek merely to prevent war by these means we do not have any need for NATO. We want something more.

Is our primary need then to preserve the national sovereignty of each member nation? If this is the answer, then the potential of NATO would seem to be very high at first glance for, as we have seen, its supreme unit is the sovereign nation. But each democracy in NATO is based on the opposite sovereign, on individual man. Each of these nations maintains as we do the principle that man was not made to make the state more powerful but that the State is made for man—to make each person freer, stronger, more independent. The North Atlantic Treaty recognizes that fact, for in its preamble it stresses the preservation of individual freedom as an objective. Referring to the Member Nations it says, "They are

determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." To this end Article III provides,

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

NATO's purpose, in short, is to preserve individual freedom, without war if possible; but to defend it with arms if need be. Here again we need to be clearer. Military aggression is not the only international danger that freedom faces. An economic depression, which began in 1929 in the United States which was then a good friend of the Weimar Republic, soon invaded Germany and delivered freedom there to the Hitler dictatorship without a shot being fired except in celebration. Depression can deliver freedom to dictatorship even more readily now. For now we face the Communist dictatorship which fattens on economic misery and has its partisans and conspirators in every NATO and non-Communist country in the world. It is prepared to take advantage of any economic crash as no power ever was before. Its strategy, in my opinion, aims at winning not through launching another world war, but through speeding and exploiting a depression which it believes is overdue in the capitalist Atlantic community.

The North Atlantic Treaty does not squarely face this danger of economic aggression as it does the danger of military attack. The closest it comes to it is in Article II, where the allies agree to contribute to peace "by promoting conditions of stability and well-being." They say then they "will seek to elimi-

nate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

Having gained, I hope, a better understanding of what, at any rate I mean, by the diplomatic potential of NATO, let us consider now how NATO actually functions.

ORGANIZATION OF NATO

NATO's constitution is the North Atlantic Treaty. When that treaty was signed eight years ago on April 4, 1949, the United States Marine Band provided the music, and it justified the motto of that Corps, "Semper Fidelis." Always faithful to the truth of freedom, it played some songs from *Porgy and Bess* whose titles showed the bandmaster had a profound understanding of the workings of diplomacy. For one of the songs that he played when the delegates signed the treaty was entitled "It Ain't Necessarily So." You see, he knew that the diplomat's "Yes" means "Maybe." And another song he played was even more devastating. It was the one entitled, "I Got Plenty of Nothin'." This is a fact. I checked it. One can understand with what feelings the latter song was played by the Marines since they were among the first to have to risk their lives the previous times when diplomacy's potential for peace turned out to be exactly nothing.

Was the Marine Band too harsh in its judgment of the infant North Atlantic Treaty? Let us see.

The North Atlantic Treaty provides for no law-making organ, no executive organ, and no judicial organ. The organization that has grown out of it still has none of these organs. It does have a number of features that are sometimes likened to legislative or executive organs—but this "ain't necessarily so." These features are bodies and offices such as the Council, the Secretary-Gen-

eral and his Secretariat, the Supreme Allied Commander, and the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe, called SHAPE. Alongside of these there has grown in the past two years a body called the Conference of Members of Parliament of NATO Countries. This body has no official status in NATO; it has no powers whatever; it has no agreed way of expressing its will and practically no budget. Even so, it does have, I think, a very promising future. In fact, it is one of the most cheering signs in NATO.

The NATO Council is composed of one representative from each of the fifteen Member Nations. Ministerial sessions are held in December and May. The Council representatives are by custom the foreign ministers, usually flanked in December by the defense and treasury ministers. In between, the Council sits in permanent session with each nation represented by its permanent representative, usually a man of ambassadorial rank. All sessions of the Council, whether ministerial or permanent, have these characteristics: each Member Nation has one vote—Iceland, one; the United States, one. Unanimity is required for any serious decision. In the last analysis, the only decision the members of the Council can make is to recommend this or that action to their respective governments.

Some people have called the NATO Council both its executive and legislative organ. It is neither. A former top officer at SHAPE, who should know, once told me that he found that dealing with the NATO Council was like being out in the Atlantic in a rowboat without any oars and without any helm. The Council cannot legislate, though it can negotiate treaties and executive agreements. It may, and it does, explore, modify, and shape national policy—within limits that may be narrowed without notice. The Council has no

executive power whatsoever. Its agreements have some moral weight with governments; and if approved, either in advance or later by the governments, they can be very far-reaching. Thus, an agreement made in the Council in 1950 which led to the establishment of an integrated force under the supreme command of an American officer is the present international force of NATO.

Now let us turn from the Council to the Secretary-General, an office which it similarly created in 1952 and which it fills. The Secretary-General has been likened to an executive; at best he is really an administrator without power to enforce anything on any nation. NATO's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, a very able man, has held office since 1952. He is now about to be succeeded by Prime Minister Spaak of Belgium. The fact that Mr. Spaak, a most dynamic political leader, resigned from the top post in his country to become Secretary of NATO suggests the importance that this office has already and is likely to acquire.

The other NATO officer who resembles an executive but isn't one is the Supreme Commander. He has always been nominated by the President of the United States and has always been an American officer: General Eisenhower, General Ridgway, General Gruenther, and General Norstad—all of them extremely able men. His staff at Supreme Headquarters near Paris is composed of officers and men from all the NATO countries except Iceland, which has no military force. This Commander is actually under the command of the Military Committee of NATO in which each member has a veto.

The judiciary department

Let us turn now to the third department, the judiciary. In some other respects, notably in having a permanent military force, NATO has realized the

potential of diplomacy better than has the United Nations. But on the judicial side it falls short of the latter's achievements. Where diplomacy's characteristic, "it ain't necessarily so," rules as in NATO, there is obvious need of some impartial means of deciding what is so. And it is precisely here that NATO is weakest. After leaving everything wide open to doubt, it provides no means at all for interpreting any disputed passage or resolving any doubt, however serious it may be.

Every democratic people is convinced that its own citizens are the most virtuous people in the world. But every democracy would consider it the acme of anarchy to provide no courts whatever and permit each sovereign citizen to interpret its constitution and laws as he pleased. NATO embodies this acme of anarchy. In this essential field, it carries the principle of unlimited national sovereignty further than does even the United Nations—and mind you, it is upon this NATO alliance that we really depend for our military security. The Charter, like the League of Nations Covenant before it, does provide some judicial machinery, an International Court of Justice. NATO has none whatever. As the treaty now stands, each ally carefully reserves in Article V the right, in the event there is an attack against another NATO member, to take only "such action as it deems necessary." Each is thus its own judge as regards the supreme NATO commitment.

Unfortunately, to abolish this escape clause and replace it with a court, or other body empowered to decide such issues, will not change matters very much. Think it through, and you will see that if NATO did have this kind of court, it would mean little in time of grave emergency. Why? Because the court would have no means of enforcing its verdict. If it did have such ma-

chinery in theory, it would be ineffective in practice at the moment when the machinery was needed most. The only way to enforce a verdict on a sovereign ally is for the other allies to go to war against it. And if you are already at war with another power, you'd rather have your ex-ally neutral than to force him into the camp against you. It's as simple as that. Such was the picture of NATO last year.

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Last April, when these weaknesses were most apparent, Secretary Dulles made the first speech a top spokesman of the Eisenhower administration ever made devoted to the need of strengthening NATO. In it he said:

The time has come to advance NATO from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning. The historic weakness of the West has been its disunity. Out of this disunity came wars which have taken the lifeblood of its finest youth and weakened its economies. A major task of post-war statesmanship was to find the ways whereby the West can maintain its solidarity. Much, indeed very much, has been done in this respect. But more can still be done to make sure that the good in Western civilization is not again negated by its differences.

As a result, last May the NATO Council approved the Dulles proposal that a Committee of Three be named to explore how to strengthen it further. This committee, composed of three very able Foreign Ministers—those of Norway, Italy, and Canada—made its report last December and the NATO Council approved its recommendations and discharged it. Did these recommendations strengthen NATO substantially? You can judge for yourself from the fact that even the *New York Times* did not rate the text of this report or any extensive excerpts from it as worthy

of publication. To my knowledge, the only private publication in the world that published practically all of this report is a magazine that I myself edit, *Freedom & Union*.

The chief feature in this report was its insistence on the value of consultation among the member states. The report said that consultation "means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, before national positions have become fixed." These are very brave words. But how little they mean was shown as soon as the Council had approved them. In the Senate hearings of the Eisenhower Middle East resolution, Senator Kefauver drew from Secretary Dulles (I was present at the time) the admission that his consulting thereon with NATO was really merely a matter of informing it of what we were about to do.

Secretary Dulles then explained that consultation was, I'm quoting, "almost an insoluble problem" because he could not consult with NATO on any important policy before consulting with Congress. But in doing this, obviously, policy becomes fixed without the Allies having had any voice in arranging the policy. The difficulty he pointed out there, which faces all the NATO countries, seems to make nonsense of the great hopes that were based on the development of consultation in the report of the Committee of Three.

The able trio who wrote that report will readily admit, I am sure, that with all of its improvements NATO is still far from being good enough to meet present, let alone future, needs.

NATO AS A DETERRENT TO COMMUNISM

True, it will suffice to keep Soviet Russia from invading Western Europe. Few informed people in the Atlantic community now believe that any such

danger is imminent. For my part, I am on record as believing even at the height of the Berlin blockade in 1948, which led to the creation of the Atlantic Alliance, that there was little real danger of Russia invading Western Europe. My belief has long been that the Communist dictatorship aims to win the world, not by launching a world war, but by fostering local wars in Asia and Africa; exploiting the nationalism that unites the peoples there against the West while it divides the Atlantic democracies against themselves; and speeding and exploiting another economic depression.

There is no little evidence that the Kremlin is banking most of all on the disunion which, as Secretary Dulles pointed out, has so often negated the good of the West and brought on wars, and—he forgot to add—economic depressions.

It seems that Stalin's prestige is again rising in Russia, and certainly the Suez episode should help give him a prophet's authority there. In his last important state paper, the one of October 2, 1952, Stalin answered certain comrades, as he called them, who feared that there was more danger of conflict now between communism and capitalism than among the capitalist nations, or to quote Stalin—that

the contradictions between the camps of socialism and the camp of capitalism are stronger than the contradictions between capitalist countries [and that] the progressive people of capitalism have been taught sufficiently by the experience of two World Wars which dealt serious harm to the entire capitalist world, not to permit themselves again to drag the capitalist countries into a war among themselves.

These comrades are mistaken, Stalin said and continued:

Let us take first of all England and France. . . . Can one suppose that they will indefinitely suffer the present situation . . . when

American capital is seizing raw materials and markets in Anglo-French colonies?

That may not be your picture of our policy, but I was over in Britain and France in December, and it is the picture of our policy that a good many people over there have. To continue quoting Stalin:

Would it not be more true to say that capitalist England, and in its footsteps also capitalist France, will be forced in the end to tear themselves away from the embraces of the United States and enter into conflict with it in order to secure themselves an independent situation?

Just five years later, at the very time that the Hungarians were toppling over Stalin's statue in Budapest, his authority was being restored in Moscow by the cleavage over Suez between the Americans, on the one hand, and the British and the French, on the other—a cleavage which not only allowed Moscow to advance in the Middle East but to smash the Hungarian revolt. Stalin continued in 1952:

Let us proceed, . . . to Germany and Japan. To think that these countries will not try again to rise to their feet, break through the "regime" of the United States, and break forth on the path of independent development—to think this is to believe in miracles.

When the Suez Canal was opened recently, did you notice the nationality of the ships that went through with the first convoy? I did. In it there were no American, British, or French ships. There were German and Italian ones.

All this is but the latest proof that the success of NATO in preventing Red attack on Western Europe will not suffice to check Communist advance elsewhere. NATO was not a year old before differences between the United States and Britain over Red China helped bring on the Korean crisis.

Then dictatorship advanced in South-east Asia, through Britain's holding back the United States and France in Indochina. General Gruenther, then the Supreme Commander at SHAPE, warned at Senate hearings last May 31 that at the February 1956 Communist Party Congress in Moscow eleven out of twelve main speakers had cited as the number one objective of Soviet foreign policy the dismemberment of NATO. Not two months after that warning, the three great North Atlantic Allies once more divided among themselves at Suez. Only a few weeks after all three of their governments had stressed to NATO's Committee of Three how important it was for them to consult in the future before launching any important move, the British and the French landed in Suez without consulting the United States. Not very long afterwards, the United States launched the Eisenhower Middle East Doctrine without consulting them. NATO urgently needs to be strengthened, and most of all on the political and economic sides rather than the military one, on whose decline attention has been centered recently by the transfer of French NATO divisions to Algeria and by the recent British decision to reduce their forces drastically. However strong the military setup may be, it cannot cope with its other danger I mentioned—the economic danger. However strong the economic commitments may be, neither they nor the military ones can ever be effective so long as the political structure of NATO is so weak and the possibility of the Atlantic community reaching and maintaining common policies in any field is so uncertain. While remaining basically an alliance of sovereign nations—that is, without changing from diplomacy to democracy, and becoming a federal union—NATO's strength in these fields could be increased, however, far beyond present plans of member governments.

NATO AND THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

How far short it now falls of its potential even on the diplomatic basis may be seen by comparing NATO with the alliance which our thirteen states formed under the Articles of Confederation. This alliance, though its supreme unit was the sovereign state, was much more advanced structurally than NATO is. Like the NATO Council, the United States Congress under the Articles of Confederation was composed of delegates named and instructed by each member government, each state, small or large, having one vote. Like NATO, the United States then had no executive organ. The President of the United States during this period in our history served for one year, as does the NATO President and he cut no more figure in the public eye. Though the United States Congress was then, as John Adams contemptuously called it, "a diplomatic assembly," it proved how much further one can go with diplomacy than we have gone in NATO—the alliance on which we have spent the most billions and which is the keystone of our defense. The Congress of the United States, when the thirteen states formed an alliance, was stronger than NATO in these eight ways:

Congress could act where the NATO Council can only recommend.

By a vote of only nine of the thirteen states, Congress could act, even declare war, whereas NATO can recommend action only by unanimous consent.

Congress was free to name the Commander-in-Chief of its Continental Army whereas NATO must accept the nominee of one Member State, the United States. Congress could also commission all the other officers of its Army, from captain up. NATO cannot do this.

Congress could not only formulate foreign policy for all the thirteen states,

but it could enter into alliances as a body as it did with France; it could make peace as it did with Great Britain; it could name diplomatic envoys to represent it in nonmember nations, as Franklin and Jefferson did in Paris and John Adams in London. No state could enter into any other alliance or send any envoy abroad without the consent of Congress. The NATO Council has none of these powers.

On the financial side, Congress enjoyed the same power each Member State had to issue its own currency and to raise loans abroad and at home. The NATO Council has none of these powers.

By the Northwest Ordinance, Congress had an immense territory to govern. The NATO Council has nothing to compare with this.

The Articles of Confederation provided the judicial machinery for the settlement of disputes which is so striking an omission in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Articles of Confederation allowed the citizens of each Member State to move freely in and out of all the other states and to enjoy in each of them all the privileges and immunities of its own citizens. There is nothing like that in NATO.

It is evident from this that diplomacy has hardly begun to realize its potential in NATO. But even if it did, even if NATO became so close an alliance as the Articles of Confederation, the diplomatic system would still fail to meet our present needs. For if so strong an alliance as the Articles of Confederation failed to work effectively, what is the sense in hoping that we can strengthen the diplomatic structure of NATO enough for it to meet the dangers of war and depression? The Articles of Confederation did fail, and the proof is that the people scrapped that system for our present federal union.

But now when some of us suggest scrapping the NATO alliance for an Atlantic federal union, many people say, no, the comparison is not valid. It was much easier, they say, for the thirteen states then to federate. They had so much in common, the same language, the same political system. All this was true of the confederation too. If diplomacy failed despite all these advantages, if it failed despite the stronger structure it achieved under the Articles of Confederation, how can we expect it to work in NATO, no matter how much we perfect it, no matter how completely we achieve its diplomatic potential?

FEDERAL UNION

I now want to discuss the federal union solution to this question—to this alternative to alliance. The federal system of governing the relations between democratic states which our Founding Fathers invented in the Constitution is the only democratic answer to the problem. And it works. I do not need to prove that to you. It is the only system in history that has ever succeeded in uniting democracies effectively and enduringly as regards their common affairs. It has proved as effective in the economic as in the military field.

How an Atlantic union could best be organized, what form the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the central government should take, what powers should be transferred to it, and which ones guaranteed to each state in it—these are questions to which I have given my own personal answers in *Union Now* and in the *New Federalist* which I co-authored with Justice Owen J. Roberts. But the answers given there are of little importance. The only important answer to these questions is the one that could be given by a convention called for the purpose of debating the whole problem, pro and con, and then bringing back a collective answer for the

approval of each of the states represented in it.

A resolution asking Congress to call such a convention was introduced in the last session of Congress by an impressive bipartisan group of Senators and Members of Congress. I understand that it will be reintroduced in the present session. This resolution would have Congress invite the other six democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty: Canada, France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to meet in a convention with delegates from the United States to

explore and to report to what extent their people might, within the framework of the United Nations, and in accordance with the basic principles of the Constitution of the United States, achieve more effective democratic unity in advancing their common economic and political affairs, their joint defense, and the aims of world peace and individual freedom.

This wording, you will note, is so broad as not to limit the convention to the possibility of federation. It could explore any other proposal, any means of strengthening it while not departing from its present basic diplomatic framework. Therefore, no one who favors this convention has to commit himself to an Atlantic union.

The convention the resolution calls for, it is important to note, would not be a diplomatic conference. The problem has already been explored through diplomatic channels last year by the NATO Committee of Three. The proposed convention would be patterned instead on the one of 1787 for which the City of Philadelphia is justly famed. In that convention the delegates from each state were officially appointed as in a diplomatic conference. But it differed from the latter in the following important ways: The delegates were not instructed by their government, as diplo-

mats are. They were each free to speak and vote as their individual wisdom and conscience instructed them.

This system has these two immense advantages: First, it harnesses to the problem the key element responsible for all of democracy's greatest successes—whether in science, invention, business, industry, or what you will—and that is the resourcefulness, common sense, enterprise, and vision of the individual citizen acting as a free individual. Secondly, it gives the best assurance that the country will not be committed to anything. For the delegates, since they are acting only on their own instruction, cannot possibly commit anyone but themselves, whereas a diplomatic delegate can commit his government.

These two advantages, it seems to me, were decisive in producing in that Philadelphia convention the most enduring success in the history of interstate conferences—the United States Constitution. The potential of this nondiplomatic convention approach to the problem is as great as is the potential of the nondiplomatic federal system which it created. And yet, the fact is that we have not yet even tried to explore the vital problems we face by this convention system that produced the greatest result in history.

Now in conclusion, I would like to recall that until his death a very great Philadelphian, the late Owen J. Roberts, led the fight for this convention as the founder of the Atlantic Union Committee. He mobilized behind it many leading men and women of many fields, such people as Will Clayton, former Under-Secretary of State, who is Vice-President of the Atlantic Union Committee; Elmo Roper, who is now its President; atomic scientists such as Arthur Compton and Harold Urey; business executives such as Chairman Paul Litchfield of the Good-year Company and Chairman Harry Bullis of General Mills; labor leaders—

the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations has officially endorsed this convention proposal. Of all the hundreds of leaders who favor this proposal, I want to mention but one more, General George C. Marshall, and quote him in closing. I saw General Marshall the day that Justice Roberts died, and he paid Justice Roberts then a tribute that I believe history will confirm:

Justice Roberts' services to defense as well as to the judiciary were manifold. But perhaps the finest thing he did was the sacrifice he made in resigning from the Supreme Court to devote himself to the cause of Atlantic union.

The subject today is vitally important and the period fateful. All probably agree to the importance of Atlantic union but few act.

Thus spoke General Marshall of Justice Roberts. If you are tired of yesses that mean maybe and maybes that mean no; if you are weary of treaties and commitments and promises that "ain't necessarily so"; if you've had "plenty of nothin," we who are proud to follow Justice Roberts invite you to join with us in acting now to get another history-making Philadelphia convention called; this time to explore how to harness to freedom and peace the vast potential of Atlantic federal union.

American Diplomatic Leadership in the West

By JAMES P. WARBURG

Abstract: Our foreign policy over the past ten years has been no success: Communist expansion has not been halted, the non-Communist world is not united, and peace is no closer. Why? We are ill prepared for world leadership by our ignorance of geography, languages, and history, that is, by a parochial world view borne out of indifference produced by a feeling of impotence and frustration. Having power we have little notion of how to use it. We moralize too much, confuse legalism with morality, and often exhibit self-righteousness obnoxious to other peoples. Our leaders, unwilling to risk unpopularity by adopting a flexible and imaginative foreign policy, have become prisoners of a public state of mind, created largely by their own propaganda.—Ed.

OVER the years, the American Academy of Political and Social Science has so often and so generously offered me the hospitality of its platform that I cannot participate in this year's discussions without awareness of what I have said here in the past. This applies particularly to a paper presented at the annual meeting in April 1948, just after the rape of Czechoslovakia, when President Truman had for the first time clearly set the course of foreign policy, which, broadly speaking, we have followed ever since.

On that occasion, I ventured to express a number of then most unfashionable doubts and misgivings.

According to President Truman's explicit statement to the Congress on March 17, 1948, his newly defined foreign policy rested upon the conviction that "one nation, and one nation alone" was responsible for the failure to make a just and lasting peace. In questioning this premise, I suggested that the Soviet Union had ruthlessly exploited rather than created the crisis in world affairs; that this crisis had arisen from

a number of causes of which Soviet expansionism was only one; and that, if there had been no aggressive Communist dictatorship in the world, we should still be confronted with the problems caused by the destruction and dislocation of a great war, by the Asian revolution, by the decline of European power, by the unexpected accretion of power to the United States, and by the new dangers, new opportunities, and newly aroused expectations created by the dawn of the atomic age.

In adopting an oversimplified, scapegoat analysis of a complicated and many-sided world crisis, it seemed to me likely that our government might well become so preoccupied with the single aim of stopping Soviet expansion as to overlook the political, social, psychological, and economic conditions which had actually made possible the spread of communism and the expansion of Soviet imperialism.

This danger loomed all the greater in my estimation because our government appeared to be placing more and more reliance upon the military means of con-

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tainment, in contrast to its earlier approach exemplified by the Marshall Plan. Such a shift in emphasis to rearmament and military alliances seemed to me likely to commit the United States more and more to the preservation of the status quo and to undermine American influence upon the masses of mankind seeking such changes as land reform, the establishment of better living conditions, or emancipation from foreign domination.

A final critical observation, made at a time when the United States still held a monopoly of atomic weapons, was to the effect that our government had apparently not yet grasped the single, most important fact of the atomic age; namely, that war had ceased to be even a last-resort instrument for restoring peace and justice.

Summing up this evaluation of our then new foreign policy, I stated the belief that it would logically lead either to a war in which victory would be indistinguishable from defeat, or to a fatal alliance between Soviet communism and most of the revolutionary forces at work in the world, especially in China and the rest of Asia.

As an alternative to excessive preoccupation with military containment, I ventured to suggest that the United States should pursue two broad aims:

That we should throw our great moral and economic strength behind the emerging, non-Communist, progressive movements throughout the world, respecting the native characteristics of those movements, whether or not they conformed to our particular political and economic prejudices and predilections.

That we should throw the full weight of our military and economic resources behind the United Nations, with the openly avowed purpose of strengthening that organization to the point where it could reliably enforce universal national disarmament.

I concluded by saying:

If these were our positive aims and if we pursued them with intelligence and determination, a large part of our present limited and negative objective would automatically be realized. We should then draw to our side those existing forces which can and will, if supported, stop communism and which can and will achieve One World. We should, in other words, achieve the stopping of communism as a by-product of a positive policy.

This dissenting view, expressed nine years ago, remains in essence my view today. Of course, the world picture has changed, in some respects for the worse and in others for the better. During the intervening years, I have applied and reapplied the same basic thesis to the specific problems which have arisen in Europe, in Asia, and in the Middle East. I have written and spoken so much on the various aspects of our foreign policy that I feel like the man who came to a psychiatrist in order to be cured of the habit of constantly talking to himself. When the physician asked him why the breaking of this harmless habit seemed so important, the sufferer replied: "Oh, doctor, you haven't any idea how I bore myself!"

In order not to bore you as well as myself, I shall attempt to approach the subject of American world leadership from a somewhat different point of departure.

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE

It is, I think, hardly possible for anyone—Republican or Democrat—to claim that our foreign policy over the past decade has been a success. It is true that, here and there, we have been tactically successful, as for example, in defeating the Russian blockade of Berlin, in defending South Korea, and, especially, in saving Western Europe from economic chaos through the Marshall

Plan. These tactical successes have been offset by tactical losses which I need not enumerate. The fact remains, however, that, if our aim has been to halt Communist expansion, Communist expansion has not been halted; that, if our aim has been to unite the non-Communist world, it has not been united; and that, if our aim has been the firm establishment of peace, we are no nearer to peace than we were ten years ago.

Opinions may and do differ as to how much of an over-all failure our postwar policy has been, and also as to how much of that failure could have been prevented. It still remains true that we have neither reached nor made any great progress toward reaching our basic objectives.

I am not concerned with assessing the blame upon one political party or another, much less upon the individuals who have borne the burden of leadership. What I should like to suggest is that we explore together those reasons for our failure which may properly be said to have their roots in the nature of the American society—that is to say, in us collectively as responsible—or irresponsible—citizens of the United States.

IGNORANCE AND INDIFFERENCE

Looking at the matter from this point of view, I am inclined to suggest that the most obvious cause contributing to our nation's failure as a world leader is ignorance—ignorance of geography, ignorance of languages and cultures other than our own, and, above all, ignorance of history.

We are constantly learning too late. We begin to acquire a rudimentary knowledge of the geography of an area such as Southeast Asia or the Middle East only when a crisis has arisen sufficiently serious to cause sketch maps to accompany the front-page stories in our newspapers. Thus, we began to learn

geography during the war; and, since the war, we have discovered the existence and the whereabouts of places in Asia like Jakarta, Pusan, Bandung, and Saigon or Damascus, Elath, Amman, and Riyadh in the Middle East. By the time we know something about the geography of an area—not to mention its history—it is quite likely to have been lost to hostile influence.

We learn languages—if we learn them at all—through vacation travel or business connections. We learn them in order to buy meals or trinkets or to engage in profitable transactions, but not in order to understand the culture and literature of other peoples. That sort of language study we leave to the so-called experts. But, when we suddenly desire to establish an effective propaganda service in the Middle East, we find that an American who can speak fluent Arabic is as rare as a Sanskrit scholar.

Our knowledge of history is incredibly parochial and, even as such, limited. To all intents and purposes, history begins for the average American citizen with the settlement of Jamestown and the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers at Plymouth Rock. The French and Indian Wars are vaguely recorded in our minds without any comprehension of their European context. The War of 1812 has no relation to the Napoleonic Wars. We are familiar with the American Revolution and amazingly well-informed and fascinated by our Civil War. But to most Americans, World War I consists of the *Lusitania*, "Hang the Kaiser," Belleau Wood and Chateau Thierry; while World War II begins with Pearl Harbor and ends with the Battle of the Bulge, Hiroshima, and the Japanese surrender on board the battleship *Missouri*. About the developments in times of peace which have caused or could cause wars and battles, the average American knows but little.

Why are we so ignorant of the past and so unfamiliar with the world beyond our own borders? Obviously, one reason is that we have until recently lived in a more or less self-sufficient little world of our own. But a whole generation of Americans has grown up since this secluded, nursery-like, happy existence became a memory. Most Americans now living knew, even when they were children at school, that the United States had become a world power and that the American destiny was inextricably interwoven with that of many other peoples in distant lands. To say that most Americans know this is, of course, not to say that they have accepted it. But why has this generation of Americans not come to terms with what it knows to be a fact? Why has it not sought to inform itself?

In part, the fault lies, I suppose, with an educational system which overemphasizes the natural sciences and vocational training, neglecting philosophy and the social sciences, especially history. But this does not explain why the majority of Americans are satisfied with such a system of education. It does not explain the absence of a popular demand for better teaching of languages, geography, history, and the social sciences.

The media of mass communication could, no doubt, cater less to the prevalent taste for sensation and entertainment and perform more of an educational function than they do. But, again, this does not explain the existence of the prevalent taste.

The simple fact is that we are not ignorant about the world in which we live because the facts are unavailable to us. In terms of what is available, we should be the best informed people in the world. We are ignorant, not because knowledge is beyond our reach, but because we are not interested enough to reach for it. Our ignorance is an expression of a curious indifference.

ALIENATION

This raises the much more difficult question of why Americans should be indifferent to matters which directly and vitally concern the safety and survival of their families, their homes, their businesses, their jobs—in other words, the whole “way of life” which they cherish and wish to preserve. Permit me to suggest certain lines of inquiry which might prove fruitful.

To a very large extent, indifference to world affairs and to the formation of national policy may be due to a sense of impotence and frustration. The average citizen of the United States has become more and more alienated from the democratic processes of decision-making. The problems of national policy seem to him too complicated for his comprehension. The decisionmakers seem to him too remote for him to be able to exercise any influence. We are no longer a nation of small farmers and small businessmen, each accustomed to weighing certain familiar risks and making decisions. We have become a nation of wage and salary earners, dependent for our livelihoods upon Big Business or Big Government. Our daily lives no longer demand the weighing of risks and the making of decisions. The risks are weighed and the decisions made for us by the managers of Big Business and Big Government. This may be one factor causing apparent apathy. If so, it would seem important to seek ways and means by which the average citizen's sense of proprietary interest in and responsibility for national policy may be restored, so that the democratic process may function in a modern mass society.

PERVERSION OF BIPARTISANSHIP

A second line of investigation might lead us to inquire why we make so little use of the opportunities for public education presented by an election year.

In the past three presidential elections, we have had practically no informative discussion of foreign policy. We have had what amounted to a bipartisan conspiracy of silence. Insofar as foreign policy and world affairs were mentioned at all, they were discussed in terms of hindsight partisan criticism or defense, without reference or relevance to future courses of action.

In our most recent election campaign, the leaders of both parties avoided any serious discussion of world affairs. As one politician put it, “There is no mileage in discussing foreign policy,” meaning that the American people would be bored by any such discussion. It is doubtless true that the people were bored by the Pollyanna propaganda of an administration that boasted of having established peace and by the Cassandra-like croakings of an opposition which denied the administration's extravagant claims and decried its doings, but offered few alternatives to the policies it criticized. Given the choice between soothing syrup and castor oil, the people preferred the more pleasant medicine, in spite of the fact that, as election day approached, the evidence accumulated that all was not exactly well in the best of all possible worlds. But this does not prove that the people would not have been interested in an informative discussion during which existing policies and possible alternatives would have been debated on their merits. The people have always shown themselves interested in any issue over which the candidates seriously lock horns in an election year.

I am not saying that Mr. Stevenson would have been elected, if he had chosen to make foreign policy a major issue, although he might well have been elected if he had laid the groundwork for a dissenting position over the past four years. What I am suggesting is that the function of the opposition in a

two-party system is to ventilate the defects of existing policies and to propose the means of remedying them. This applies to opposition leadership in the Congress no less than to opposition candidates for the Presidency. Fortunately, some of the opposition leaders in the Congress are at last beginning to fulfill this function.

The concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy has become dangerously perverted. Granted that, in times of crisis, united support of our nation's foreign policy is desirable, such support is useful and constructive only if all the aspects of foreign policy have first been hammered out in full and free debate between the party in power and the opposition. When bipartisanship merely provides an excuse for indolence and a cloak for timid conformity, I submit that it actually endangers the nation's security by depriving national policy of informed public support. “Don't rock the boat” is a poor slogan when the boat is headed for the rocks.

In addition to ignorance and apparent indifference, there are a number of other characteristics of *homo Americanus* which seem to me worthy of investigation. I shall briefly mention a few.

ATTITUDE TOWARD POWER

One of the obstacles to our nation's emergence as an effective world leader is a limited concept of power and a curious attitude toward its acquisition and use. It appears to be inherent in the American character to seek power with considerable energy and determination and then, having attained it, not to have any very clear notion of how to put it to use. One might call this an almost purposeless acquisitiveness—a pursuit of power more because of a keen competitive instinct than because of any wish to possess and exercise it.

What is more, we seem unable to distinguish between different kinds of power

and their uses. We seem to associate the use of power with coercion, although there are many ways of using various kinds of power to gain freely given consent and co-operation. This may be a symptom of an American culture which grew out of a frontier society. In any case, I suspect that our invention and possession of atomic weapons and our government's excessive preoccupation with military policy have increased the tendency to think of all power as physical power and, hence, to regard its use as morally reprehensible except in self-defense. Whatever the origin of this rather limited concept of power, its prevalence inhibits the full development of precisely those nonphysical and non-coercive components of national influence and power which are essential to leadership, especially in an age in which force has lost its power as an instrument of national policy.

GENEROSITY AND NIGGARDLINESS

Closely linked to this ambiguous attitude toward power is our somewhat similar attitude toward the private and public expenditure of money. As individuals, we are a free-spending and generously giving people. As citizens—that is to say, as taxpayers—we are extremely tightfisted. In principle, we want our nation to reflect in its actions the same generosity toward other peoples which we express as individuals when we contribute unstintingly to the relief of suffering throughout the world. But, in practice, we are most reluctant to permit the use of public funds for such purposes. As a result, our government embarks upon bold new programs of aid to world-wide economic development, such as no other nation has ever undertaken, only to have its projects all too frequently emasculated by niggardly appropriations. Thus we raise false hopes and cause bitter disappointment. Without attempting to explain this phenom-

non, which also possibly bears some relation to the somewhat anarchic attitude of a pioneer society toward all governmental authority, I submit that this habit of mind inhibits the development of effective American leadership.

LEGALISM AND MORAL JUDGMENTS

We come now to a somewhat delicate subject. Bluntly stated, I believe that our failure to realize our potential of leadership is due in large measure to the fact that we not only moralize too much and confuse legalism with morality, but that we often exhibit a self-righteousness which cannot fail to be obnoxious to other peoples.

Let me say at once that I do not agree with that school of thought which holds that moral standards cannot be applied to the conduct of nations. If one accepts the doctrine that the sole obligation of a national government is to pursue what it deems to be "the national interest," one ends up by endorsing the Bismarckian thesis that might makes right. Most Americans rightly reject that thesis, holding that, while nations cannot be judged precisely by the standards applied to individuals, certain moral criteria do properly apply to national conduct.

Our trouble is that we confuse moral criteria with legalism, and that our legalism is often based upon incorrect assumptions as to the existing body of law. An example of both tendencies is furnished by our government's recent actions with respect to the Middle East.

From the legalistic point of view it was perfectly clear that by invading Egypt, Britain, France, and Israel had acted contrary to their obligations under the United Nations Charter. It was equally evident that Soviet armed intervention in Hungary was in contravention of the Charter. It was, therefore, legalistically correct to demand the withdrawal of the invading forces from

Egypt, just as it was legalistically correct to demand Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. This action, however, ignored the moral distinctions. Even speaking legalistically, it ignored not only the debatable question of whether Egypt had broken "the law" in seizing the Suez Canal but also the unequivocally clear violations of the Charter committed by Egypt in its belligerent actions against Israel—actions which had gone unpunished and only half-heartedly protested for a number of years.

From the point of view of morality, there surely was a distinction, almost wholly obscured by this legalistic approach, between the brutal suppression of a revolt against foreign tyranny and the exasperated but far less brutal action taken by the invaders of Egypt. There was clearly a further moral distinction between the desperate action of Israel and the invasion of Egypt by Britain and France. Did it serve our national interest or the interests of justice to place Israel, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union in the same moral category? Did it enhance our prestige to take this legalistic stand without regard to the circumstances surrounding each of the actions so self-righteously condemned?

MISCONCEPTION OF "INTERNATIONAL LAW"

These questions gain importance from the fact that there is no international law in the true sense of the word. Nor can there be any laws binding upon national governments and peoples unless and until there is established some degree of supranational government. What we normally call international law is for the most part nothing more than a collection of treaties and agreements between fully sovereign nation-states. The Charter of the United Nations is not a law; it is a multilateral treaty. Short of war, it can be enforced only upon trans-

gressors too weak to resist enforcement or upon those nation-states which are voluntarily law-abiding. In these circumstances, the existing rudimentary beginnings of international law lose their moral force when one transgressor is brought to book and another defies the "law's" authority.

The height of absurdity was reached some months ago when the Soviet government brazenly announced that it favored the imposition of sanctions on Israel.

It was all very well for President Eisenhower to declare that "we cannot apply one standard to our friends and another to those who oppose us." This is morally correct; but, translated into policy, it amounts to enunciating an unenforceable doctrine, especially when coupled with the admission that a nation, such as Soviet Russia, must be exempted from enforcement because of its strength. If it is true, as President Eisenhower has also said, that there cannot be "one law for the weak and another for the strong"; then, in simple justice, there can be no coercive enforcement against the weak so long as enforcement against the strong remains impracticable.

SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS

Our failure to recognize the inadequacy of treaties as law enforceable by due process and our failure to distinguish between technical and moral judgments is, unfortunately, not our only shortcoming in this area. Our leadership potential suffers even more from the all-too-frequent assumption that we possess infallible knowledge of what is right and what is wrong. The utterances of our present Secretary of State sometimes give the impression that he is in constant and direct communication with the Deity. Although the average American citizen may not carry self-righteousness to quite that sanctimonious extreme, it is, nevertheless, a na-

tional characteristic to view the world in terms of black and white and according to a moral standard which Americans blandly assume to be universally accepted. Once during an earlier Arab-Israeli dispute, I am told on good authority that a well-intentioned American mediator exclaimed without any awareness of the absurdity of what he was saying: "Come, come, gentlemen. Let us all calm down and look at this thing like good Christians!"

To sharpen the two points I have been trying to make:

We cannot exercise effective leadership so long as we act as if there were a body of enforceable supranational law, when no such body of law exists and when the so-called laws that do exist are unenforceable. We do the United Nations a disservice by treating it as if it were a world government. The alternative is to dedicate ourselves openly to the transformation of the United Nations into an organization that can enact world law and enforce it, meanwhile recognizing its limitations.

We cannot exercise effective leadership until we recognize that, just as there are a number of religions in the world, so also there are codes of moral behavior which do not necessarily conform to our standards of right and wrong. We have both a right and a duty to live up to our idea of what a universal moral standard should be. But we must learn to respect the moral judgments of others even when we disagree with them. If there is one quality more essential to leadership in this age than any other, it is true humility.

I realize that I have not even touched upon the immediate problems and decisions that confront us with regard to the future of what we call the Western Alliance. I have not done so partly because my views on these matters have been publicly stated before, most recently in a *Memorandum to the 85th*

Congress, published on January 3, 1957. However, the more important reason for taking the present approach is the belief that world leadership accrues to a nation only when the spirit of leadership is in its people; that is to say, when the nature and behavior of a people are such as to exercise a power of attraction and to inspire the friendship and emulation of other peoples.

MAIN SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership accrued to ancient Greece not because of the conquests of Alexander but because of the emulation inspired by the Age of Pericles. Leadership accrued to Rome, not because of Caesar's conquests, but because Rome inspired even in barbarians the desire to become Roman citizens. In its history to date, our own country came nearest to real world leadership in the days when Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence. In those days we had no physical power comparable to that of Britain, France, and Spain. But we had the power of a revolutionary idea—the idea that governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed and that they exist to serve the dignity and the full development of individual man in his enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

We shall not achieve world leadership—we shall not be worthy of achieving world leadership—until we rub the rust from the beliefs upon which this nation was founded—until we revitalize the meaning of the American Revolution.

World leadership cannot be won on the potential battlefields between us and the Communist dictatorships. It must be won primarily here at home. Montgomery, Alabama, is today a more crucial point in this respect than Budapest, Cairo, or Jerusalem.

Having said all this, I do not wish to leave you with the impression that I condone the shortcomings of those men

to whom the American people have entrusted the making of foreign policy during recent years. We, as citizens, cannot be held responsible for the tactical blunders of an inept Secretary of State nor for the reluctance of a President to exercise firm leadership. But we are, I think, responsible at least in part for the static inflexibility of our nation's foreign policy in a rapidly changing world. We are responsible for a climate of opinion in which any radical change of course is viewed as a confession of error rather than as an adjustment to altered circumstance.

I suspect, for example, that both the President and the Secretary of State might, if left to their own devices, alter our present policy with respect to China, knowing that policy to be dangerous, self-defeating, and divisive of the anti-Communist coalition. Yet the President and the Secretary of State have become so much the prisoners of a public state of mind, created largely by their own propaganda, that, to date, they have not dared to make any change. Lest this be considered a partisan statement, let me hasten to add that many leading Democrats, among them the recent Democratic candidate for the Presidency, must be equally aware of the fact that we are in a dead-end street in the Far East and yet have been equally unwilling to recommend a revision of our policy.

The inflexibility and, hence, the unimaginativeness of our foreign policy—and these are, I think, its greatest shortcomings—result in large measure from the unwillingness of popular leaders to risk their popularity by advocating or doing unpopular things. This hoarding of popularity, instead of putting it to use, is a serious defect of leadership. But the fact remains that the things which need to be done—the adjustments to changing circumstance which need to be made—are unpopular. They are un-

popular because the people of the United States, lacking leadership direction for their humanitarian and creative impulses, are living in a state of ignorance, indifference, and smug self-satisfaction—living as if nothing much mattered except new cars, new houses, new clothes, new gadgets, and lower taxes.

This does not excuse the default of leadership and the almost deliberate creation by leadership of such a sterile climate of opinion. But neither does it exculpate us, as citizens, from preferring pleasant bedtime stories to the truth.

Least of all does it excuse those of us who work in the field of political and social science from failure to direct public attention to the possibilities for creative action which lie before us. We are bogged down in contemplation of the perils of this dangerous age. Great though the dangers and problems may be, they are dwarfed by the opportunities.

FUTURE OF WESTERN MAN

Since I have departed somewhat from the topic of American leadership in the West, I should perhaps add this postscript.

I am more concerned for the future of Western man than for the future of the Western Alliance.

In my judgment, Western man must get out of uniform if he hopes to exercise any important influence upon a world hungry for peace. Moreover, he must learn how to live in and with a world which has forever escaped from his domination and control. If the Western nations are to work together successfully in adjusting themselves to rapidly changing circumstance, a military alliance does not seem to me the most suitable embodiment of their solidarity.

What is more, even a political alliance of the Western nations does not

seem to me to hold any great hope for the future, if that alliance is organized as an association or union of predominantly white-populated and relatively prosperous nations concerned primarily with preserving as much as possible of the status quo.

The future of Western man will, in my opinion, be determined by his ability to guide and to aid, rather than to resist inevitable change; by his creative vision and inventive skill, rather than by his physical power; by the strength of his example, rather than by his preachments.

A Western Alliance is desirable insofar as it may serve to demonstrate that the nations of the West have at long last learned to live at peace among each other. Beyond that, it seems to me more important for the Western nations to cultivate friendships among the non-Western peoples than to band together as a separate part of the human race.

After all, the only valid, long-range reason for a Western Alliance is to work more effectively toward the creation of a world in which all nations, all races, and all peoples will be united in a common purpose.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CLYDE EAGLETON and RICHARD N. SWIFT (Eds.). *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1955-1956*. (Prepared under the auspices of New York University's Graduate Program of Studies in the United Nations.) Pp. x, 217. New York: New York University Press, 1957. (Distributed by Oceana Publications, New York.) \$4.50.

This survey is the seventh in the series of annual reviews of United Nations activities. Six of the seven articles, analyzing and interpreting its work, were contributed by the editors and other members of the university staff. The seventh, devoted to a survey and appraisal of the record of the United Nations during the first ten years, was written by the Director of the American Association for the United Nations, Mr. Clark Eichelberger.

The primary responsibility of the United Nations, to maintain international peace and security, has had to be discharged in the poisoned atmosphere of the "cold war," inflamed national prejudices, and unsettling political and social upheavals. It has had to exhibit tact, patience, skill, and flexibility in negotiation. In 1955 the Algerian and Cyprus crises were embittering international relations, but the sensitivity of the colonial powers to the "intrusion" of the United Nations into these "domestic questions" made it inexpedient for the Organization to discuss them. It did discuss, investigate, and disapprove of the racial policies of the Union of South Africa, but,

facing the defiance of the Union, it could do no more than enter a protest. Confronted since 1947 with the complicated and explosive Palestine question, it marshalled all its resources, including the mediating skill of its able Secretary-General, to find a solution, but the intransigent attitude of the disputants nullified its best efforts.

The framers of the Charter wisely recognized that long-range economic and social planning calculated to create "conditions of stability and well-being . . ." throughout the international community were also vital to world peace. Working through the Economic and Social Council, regional Commissions, and the intergovernmental specialized agencies, the United Nations has fostered studies and developed programs on behalf of underdeveloped nations, world health, human rights, education, refugees, and so forth, with increasing success, and on relatively slim budgets.

Sixteen additional states were finally admitted to the United Nations in 1955, breaking the long deadlock. Many of them were politically immature, skeptical, and particularly bitter against the colonial powers. In seeking their objectives, they often showed little regard for settled parliamentary procedures, or respect for sound legal principles. This has led some critics, Eagleton among them (p. 156), to question whether, in the current climate of international politics, it is a propitious time to call a General Conference, as contemplated by the framers, to review the Charter. In the meantime, as Eichelberger points out, it has been growing "by the

addition of new bodies, by interpretation, and by improvisation" (p. 206).

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A. LOVEDAY. *Reflections on International Administration*. Pp. xxi, 334. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. \$6.75.

This is a rather special book. It does not claim or even intend to be another textbook on principles of administration. It concentrates on a number of problems which are somewhat removed from the details of administrative routine; that is, from subjects which immediately come to mind when one ponders the public debate concerned with international agencies and administration.

For instance, large portions of the book discuss the recurring theme of the difficulties involved in having officials of varied countries with oftentimes intensely different culture patterns, mores, and manners work and live with each other as well as deal with governments and people of differing backgrounds. Another of many perplexing factors described here is the fact that international administration is conducted on behalf of groups, or member states, whose knowledge of each other is "at best superficial, at worst distorted by prejudice or animosity." When animosity and diversity of interests divide the national delegates to an international meeting, the *international official* still must be able to remember that he is the servant of all member states, and "that he is not to take sides in a dispute, but to further the purpose of the organization which employs him." The risk of divided loyalties creates specific problems for an international administration, and it is the cause of some of its major difficulties. In fact, the very task of the international agency may be stymied, and rendered impossible, if member states fail to sustain the individual official in his duties, or if, on the contrary, they interfere with them in the name of a narrowly conceived and misunderstood national interest.

Problems of utmost delicacy surround the policies of recruitment and morale.

Some states insist on nominating their candidates for posts; for example, in the Secretariat of the United Nations. It is not always politically possible or advisable for the head of the administration to refuse to accept such persons, although he is aware that thereby he will include in his administration persons receiving their instructions from elsewhere, individuals with little or no loyalty to him or the Organization. "In such circumstances, morale is certain to be adversely affected; . . . The house will be divided against itself." The book discusses in detail protective measures and staff regulations necessitated by these incursions into the freedom and purposiveness of the international organization.

The book is instructive throughout and opens vistas on little known features of international administration which could be discussed with such insight only by a person who spent twenty-five years of his life as an international official.

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A. H. ROBERTSON. *The Council of Europe: Its Structure, Functions and Achievements*. Pp. xiii, 252. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$7.75.

The author of this study has had an unusual opportunity, as Counsellor in the Office of the Clerk of the Consultative Assembly, to observe and evaluate the work of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, as a recognized legal scholar and student of international affairs, he has the background of knowledge and training which has enabled him to use this opportunity to best advantage. Students of international organization are indebted to him for presenting the results of his observations and reflection in this book which fills a real need.

Most of the book is devoted to a detailed, systematic, fully documented, and highly objective analysis of the nature of the Council, its structure and operating procedures, and the work that it has accomplished. Included as appendices are the Statute of the Council, a table of ratifications of conventions and agreements concluded under the Council's auspices, and a note on the Council's publications.

In a final chapter, the author undertakes to evaluate the Council's achievements and its prospects for the future. For the long run, he is optimistic. He admits that the Council has failed to bring about a federal structure of Europe but thinks the charge unfair since that was not within its statutory terms of reference. He believes that the Council has important credit items in its balance sheet: it has provided effective machinery for the negotiation of international agreements, it has lent political support to the technical work of other international organizations, and it is a forum of great value for the formulation and expression of European parliamentary opinion in important political issues.

It is this last point that Mr. Robertson would particularly stress. In his judgment, "it is the [Consultative] Assembly which gives to the Council its distinctive character and it is by the success or failure of the Assembly that the Council will be judged." The extensive creation of international organizations has made effective control by national parliaments over international relations increasingly tenuous. Many of these international agencies have the character of international executives but are responsible only to national executives, not to national parliaments or to any form of international legislature. The Assembly, he believes, "constitutes—at least in embryo—the international legislature before which the international executive is responsible." While he does not claim that the Assembly has yet established itself as a European Parliament, "it represents the first step in that direction"; "it is only in the first stage of its evolution"; and "further development along those lines is very probable."

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ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ, ALVIN J. COTTRELL, and JAMES E. DOUGHERTY (Eds.). *American-Asian Tensions*. Pp. xiii, 239. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$3.75.

This small volume, a publication of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, looks into re-

cent history for light on important aspects of contemporary international relations. Defining *tension* as "a condition which reflects the pursuit of incompatible foreign policy objectives" (p. xii), the authors find tensions of varying degrees and kinds in our relations with five Asiatic countries. These include two "neutralists," India and Indonesia; two allies, Japan and the Philippines; and a fifth country, Egypt, whose conspicuous place in the current headlines testifies to the timeliness of the analysis. The technique used is to examine newspaper editorials as well as the statements of government leaders in the countries concerned. The result is to give a picture of tensions which has concreteness and a certain degree of objectivity, from the point of view of the spokesmen for these Asiatic countries. This represents a real contribution since we all too rarely try to see the world, and ourselves, through the eyes of others.

The implications are on the whole rather ominous, even though the authors admit that they have deliberately stressed the tensions and said little about the more harmonious aspects of the relationships. With regard to India, for example, disagreement is considered to be fundamental since we give priority to the struggle against Communism whereas the Indians are apparently much more worked up about "colonialism" and "imperialism." This determines the differences in attitude toward the Korean crisis (although India did join in the United Nations condemnation of aggression on that occasion), the recognition of Communist China, military aid to Pakistan, and many of the other sources of friction. The authors' conclusion is a pessimistic one: "the fissure which has opened between the two countries is likely to widen into a chasm" (p. 196). Nor, apparently, can we Americans do very much about it for "the initiative for an improvement in Indo-U. S. relations will have to come from New Delhi" (p. 197). This surely is debatable. The authors themselves point out that some of the friction has arisen because of statements made about India by some American "personalities," as well as by the lack of clarity and consistency in certain aspects of our foreign policy.

The relationship to Indonesia is regarded as similar, on the whole, to that of India. Japan and the Philippines present no fundamental conflicts with us; in fact the very word *tensions*, as here defined, may be a misnomer with regard to them. As far as Egypt is concerned, the conflict is described not as one of ideologies (as in the case of India) but rather as strategic and economic, with the Israeli situation as obviously crucial. When this book was written, the expectation was that Egypt would obtain assistance in financing the Aswan Dam project, and the rapidity with which the whole situation has changed shows how difficult it is to predict what will happen tomorrow or the day after.

The book is interesting and stimulating and should give valuable background information to our policymakers as well as to the general reader. With regard to the method used, however, two questions appear to be pertinent. First, is it helpful to turn the spotlight "on jarring tensions, not upon gratifying harmonies" (p. xiii) since tensions can so often be mitigated by starting from areas of co-operation and known agreement? Second, how can we be sure that the excerpts from newspapers and spokesmen are truly representative and continuing reflections of prevailing attitudes?

It remains true on the whole that what the authors set out to do, they have done well.

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NORMAN A. GRAEBNER. *The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950*. Pp. ix, 289. New York: Ronald Press, 1956. \$4.00.

Mr. Graebner has written an excellent analysis of the *raison d'être* and of the proponents of the neo-isolationism which had an enervating effect upon the formulation and execution of American foreign policy during the period of 1950 to the middle of 1956. In fact, even though the seekers of the status quo ante bellum (World War II) have lost some of their past vigor, their influence is still felt in key Congressional circles, as well as in the ranks of the military.

The author writes with clarity about the basic conflict of ideas among the policymakers of American foreign policy: political expediency versus mandatory diplomacy in the atomic age. He outlines the thoughts of the key Congressional figures who were successful in harassing the Truman Administration in 1950-52 and who were too anxious, as well as too successful, in committing the Eisenhower Administration to unrealistic goals in the execution of foreign policy from 1953 to the July 1955 Summit Conference of the Big Four at Geneva, Switzerland.

As Mr. Graebner rightly and courageously points out, the pet theories, unsubstantiated by the factual information available to unbiased students of both Asia and Europe and the developments in both areas, became the unrealistic bases upon which American foreign policy had to be built in order to receive Congressional support from the neo-isolationists from 1950 onward to the middle of 1956. The methods utilized by the neo-isolationists to effect the change in foreign policy had a devastating effect upon the career diplomats in the State Department in that they justified mass hysteria and half-truths in juxtaposition to the intellectual honesty which must be part and parcel of the field reports of the Foreign Service. In the long run, it was the tactical miscalculation of the neo-isolationists which led to a substantial lessening of their influence in Congressional circles and to the focusing of public attention upon the glaring inconsistencies in the arguments of the men who failed to understand the implications of the spirit of nationalism in the form of anticolonialism in Asia.

In passing, the author comments on the official American policy of "not recognizing" the Asian-African conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. He is of the opinion, and this reviewer agrees, that some foreign policymakers did not grasp the implications of the spirit of nationalism which had already manifested itself on the Asian scene and will shortly become more evident on the African continent with the advent of political independence to key African countries.

With good reason the author has quoted extensively from key English newspapers in

an effort to demonstrate concretely the reaction in the United Kingdom to the inconsistent statements anent foreign policy in the addresses of the policymakers of the Eisenhower Administration. While the policymakers supposedly were sincere in some of their basic ideas about Asia and Europe, their sincerity could not be translated into action without the dubious loss of the support of the Congressional neo-isolationists. The over-all result was the loss of flexibility in the formulation and execution of foreign policy in the atomic age. In its place were substituted the rigid ideas which belonged to the horse-and-buggy era when American leaders shunned international responsibilities and wrapped themselves in the cloak of American economic and military "invincibility."

Mr. Graebner has painstakingly amassed evidence from both primary and secondary sources to support his cogent arguments and to place the blame for the resultant confusion in the ranks of certain foreign policymakers upon those responsible for it.

The book is of value to those researchers anxious to pinpoint the thoughts of Congressional leaders and how such thoughts, when applied without careful analysis, can mislead the American people in the realm of foreign policy.

SAMUEL P. PERRY, JR.

The Boston Chronicle

CARLOS P. ROMULO. *The Meaning of Bandung*. Pp. viii, 102. Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. \$2.50.

This account of the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung in 1955 has all the liveliness, clarity, and even fitful brilliance that generally characterize General Romulo's writings. Its readability is embellished by his vivid account of a number of behind-the-scenes incidents at the Conference, heretofore largely unpublicized. There are fifty-nine pages of text and a forty-page Appendix. The latter contains the author's two major speeches at Bandung and the text of the Conference's Final Communiqué. Nine pages of the text are a reprint of an article which he wrote for the *New York Times* in June 1955.

This book does not provide a balanced

description and analysis of the Bandung Conference. General Romulo's own point of view and prejudices often appear to color his descriptions and give direction to his analysis. What stands out particularly is his discussion of Prime Minister Nehru's role. Although the Indian statesman did not attain all the objectives which he sought at the Conference, certainly on the whole he was reasonably successful. Perhaps if General Romulo had been better informed concerning Nehru's objectives, he might have credited him with more success. It is certainly true that Nehru's demeanor frequently struck some of the Conference delegates as being arrogant and overbearing, but Romulo in describing this draws a stronger bow than most other anti-Nehru delegates would probably feel was warranted. His criticism of Nehru involves an attack on neutralism, which he says "works in practice to the advantage of Communism. For a Communist state, or, even more so, an anti-Communist state to heed such a plea is to give aid and comfort to Communism." Nehru's policy, he states, is not true neutrality, for actually his position has been anti-American and pro-Russian.

General Romulo's reply to Prime Minister Nehru was able, and his role in general at the Conference was relatively significant. However, the prominence given them in his book is disproportionate. The replies of the Turkish, Pakistani, and Lebanese delegates to the Indian Prime Minister were fully as able as Romulo's, and their over-all roles in the Conference quite as important. Yet General Romulo limits each of them from a third to a half a page, while devoting five pages of text in addition to twenty-nine pages of the Appendix to his own statements.

The important point is made that the Conference was a healthy experience for Communist China. It must also have awakened her leaders to a more realistic assessment of the nature of the international environment constituted by the non-Communist Asian countries. This was, indeed, one of the principal objectives of the five Colombo powers which sponsored the Conference. However, the author appears to be little concerned with the basic objec-

tives of the sponsoring countries, and he does not undertake to measure the extent to which their objectives were realized.

While this book contains some significant data concerning the Conference not to be found elsewhere, and while it gives an excellent account of General Romulo's role at Bandung, it is likely to leave the reader with a rather partial understanding of what was achieved there and what the Conference meant to its five Asian sponsors.

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ERIC ROLL. *The Combined Food Board: A Study in Wartime International Planning*. Pp. xiii, 385. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

This book is the eleventh to appear in the Food Research Institute's ambitious series on Food, Agriculture, and World War II. Its theme is the management of the Allies' wartime food policies internationally, through their chosen instrument, the Combined Food Board, established in Washington in June 1942. The word *planning* in the subtitle was perhaps not well chosen, for it implies a degree of control over the separate national agencies that the Board never exercised. Lord Woolton, British Minister of Food, explicitly rejected the notion that the Board should "determine the food policy of this country"; so too American practice. As Mr. Roll says (p. 302) "the Board itself had no direct part whatever in the production, movement, or distribution of a single ounce of food."

How did this body, without powers even of the indirect kind conferred by the possession of a powerful and expert staff all its own, contrive to play an important part in inter-Allied policy for four years? The answer, implicit in Mr. Roll's study, is that the mere fact of the Board's existence was the most important thing about it. Even when it was not so much a general staff as a battlefield (between American consumption and United Kingdom stocks, for instance), it remained the focus of activity, imposing rules of conduct upon the combatants. Above all it was the standard-bearer of moral authority in food questions: had not President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill declared that "in principle the entire food resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool"? Both countries, as Mr. Roll shows, were often backsliders from this principle; the American food administration was at times weak and irresolute, the British fearful and unwilling to treat the other Allies as they themselves claimed to be treated. Nevertheless, in the postwar food crisis, the principle of parity was in great measure vindicated.

Mr. Roll, an economist turned British civil servant, was connected with the Board throughout its career, and he traces in detail its origins, vicissitudes and eventual supersession by the more representative International Emergency Food Council. As was only to be expected, he perhaps exaggerates the importance of some of the Board's undertakings (that is, the Consumption Levels Inquiry) and the extent to which it took the initiative. Otherwise his account is judicious, fair-minded, and unobtrusively candid. Obligatory reading for students of wartime food problems, it will be salutary fare for those interested in international economic co-operation.

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ASIA

Cultural Freedom in Asia. (Proceedings of a Conference held at Rangoon, Burma, February 17-20, 1955 by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Society for the Extension of Democratic Ideals.) Pp. vii, 296. Rutland, Vt.; Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1956. \$2.00 outside Asia and U. S.; \$1.00 inside Asia and U. S.

Aside from the exceptional instances when a single editor is assigned to the task of editing and knitting together the proceedings of a conference into a coherent and readable whole, most conference re-

ports tend to be a jumble of disparate statements marred by lack of preliminary over-all planning and by resulting tedious repetitions. What lends special interest to this collection of twenty-two papers by intellectuals, writers, and scholars from all over Asia and delivered at the Rangoon conference is the novelty of the subject matter and the frankness of some of the speakers.

Two main aspects stand out in this symposium of "Asians speaking for Asia." The first is the responsible judgments on the problems of the contemporary world which men who only a decade before had been fighting against Western colonial rule are able to express. The second is the belief, voiced by several leading figures, that whatever the merits of Western democracy as contrasted with totalitarianism, Asia should develop patterns and institutions of its own, designed for its particular conditions.

It would not have been surprising if non-Western peoples only recently liberated from Western colonialism approached the West today with at least suspicion, if not outright resentment. When we remember that it has taken Americans nearly two hundred years to get over out anticolonial sentiment about the English, it seems a miracle that Indians, Pakistanis and Burmese can speak dispassionately of their former rulers. This lack of passion is a tribute both to their own self-control and to the respect inspired by England now that "the captains and the kings" have departed from Asia.

The Japanese, unburdened by the experience of colonialism, go further and deplore exaggerated anticolonialism by fellow Asians. Zengo Ohira, professor of international law, says: "The touchiness of extreme nationalism which is fearful of all contacts lest they lead to 'domination' is, it seems to me, a sign of lack of self-confidence in one's ability to maintain one's independence, and it stands in contradiction to the general world tendency toward international cooperation." He regards rejection of all foreign influences as "quixotic" and believes that the best remedy for unequal treatment, characteristic of colonialism, is modernization of Asian conditions.

But by what methods should Asia modernize its politics, its economy, its society as a whole? Should it copy the West—or Russia—or borrow from both?

Jayaprakash Narayan, India's leading Socialist, who forswore politics several years ago to work with Gandhi's disciple Vinoba Bhave in the Bhoodan, "land-gift," movement, gives an unequivocal answer. "We in Asia," he says, "are inclined to imitate those, whether of East or West, who have gone ahead of us in the application of technology and science, in the organization of life. Some turn to Europe or America, some to Russia or China; but I am convinced that we have to evolve by ourselves our way of life, we have to create our own pattern."

A former Marxist, he opposes the concept of a welfare state which undertakes to do everything for the citizen. "Let us seek our salvation ourselves. . . . Real democracy is direct democracy." Nor should science become master, or a higher standard of living a new god. We must not necessarily reject the advances of science, Narayan declares, but ask science "to advance one more step and create a machine that will not enslave man."

Those of us who wonder how the West should contain Russia in the East and how we should reform Asia will find in this volume evidence that Asian leaders, undeterred by their seemingly overwhelming problems, are giving much constructive thought to reform by their own efforts in defense of their newly acquired independence.

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KLAUS MEHNERT. *Asien, Moskau und Wir: Bilanz Nach Vier Weltreisen*. Pp. 433. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1956. No price.

Klaus Mehnert is one of the leading German journalists and commentators on foreign affairs. For that role he is eminently fitted by his life's experience. He was born of German parents in Moscow in 1906 and received his education in Germany where he specialized in Russian his-

tory. In the year 1928-29 he traveled for the first time around the world, to the United States, Japan, China, and the USSR. He repeated the trip in 1936 after having spent two years as a correspondent on German newspapers in Moscow. From 1937 to 1946 he lived in California and Hawaii, in Shanghai and China. Since 1946 he broadcasts and writes on foreign affairs in Stuttgart. But he has not settled down. In 1954 he started his fourth trip around the world which brought him to all the countries of Asia and of the Pacific, and in 1956 he spent several months in Russia.

The present book is, as he calls it himself, a balance sheet drawn up after four trips around the world. It was first published in November 1956 and appeared in January 1957 in the present third edition. He wrote the book as a German and for Germans. He is convinced that German and Western interests can be served in the long run only by an understanding and considerate treatment of Asia. He believes that German youth has a great task ahead, to co-operate in the building up of Asia. He feels that ten years after the end of World War II, the time has arrived for a German policy in Asia, a policy which cannot look for guidance to past German policy but must take into full consideration the rapid and complete change which the intervening years have produced in Asia and in the relationship of this greatest continent to the Western world.

The book is written in a lively journalistic style. It is good reporting and acquaints the reader in an easy way with the leading personalities and short-range and long-range problems of the Asian peoples. In the final chapters, Mr. Mehnert asks himself the question how it could happen that the United States, in spite of all its material help and personal idealism, is being regarded by many Asians with great suspicion. He believes that one of the reasons for the lack of American popularity is the American habit of thinking much too much aloud, with an emphasis on aloud rather than on thinking. When the United States government decided in 1951 to alleviate Indian famine by sending a large shipment of wheat as a free gift, there was a vociferous clamor raised in the United

States. One party asked why America should give wheat to the Indians who don't support American foreign policy, whereas another party supported the gift as an instrument to influence Indian foreign policy in America's favor. Both voices equally jarred India's nerves. The formerly friendly relationship was, for the time being, irreparably harmed. The Russians immediately shipped a small amount of wheat, quickly without any discussion or conditions, and thus easily won the popularity race, though in the end they did infinitely less for India than did the Americans. Until very recently the saber rattling of many American statesmen and the support for French oppression of Indochina and Algeria were other reasons for America's unpopularity. But, Mr. Mehnert states in a postscript, the policy which the Eisenhower administration followed in the Suez crisis has gone a long way toward restoring the traditional popularity of the United States throughout Asia.

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D. A. TOMASIC. *National Communism and Soviet Strategy*. Pp. viii, 222. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$4.50.

This is not only a timely book but one of the best analyses available today on the boiling situation in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe. Maybe the recent explosions in Poland and Hungary have raised too high the hopes of the Western world in regard to the possible "collapse" of the Soviet Empire. At any rate, a good genesis of the phenomenon known as Titoism has been overdue since even the previous studies of the nationalistic trends in international communism had not foreseen how fast and how serious would be these rebellions.

Tomasic's previous writings have shown how he, as a Croat, hates Tito and Titoism; but in this latest work of his, his calm and probing accumulation of empiric facts has been really most effective in showing "that the Kremlin leaders had found again in Tito and in other Yugoslav Communist leaders, as they had in the

past, devoted and faithful agents of revolutionary objectives of world conquest" (p. 180). Yet, one must also wonder whether Tomasic's conclusions are exactly right, considering the fact that, in the spring of 1957, Tito was back again in the Kremlin's doghouse.

At any rate, the total effect of Tomasic's contribution is outstanding. His major theme is Titoism, but not Titoism as a political and historical phenomenon alone. He is concerned with Titoism in terms of Soviet strategy. But because Titoism is the classic example, Tomasic gives one of the most detailed accounts of the origins and development of this movement that is available to the specialist, together with a description of Titoism in other satellite states. He supports his presentation with numerous original references (pp. 206-218) drawn especially from Yugoslav sources. The conclusions are interesting and stress that "national Communism" seems "to be only temporary adaptations between nationalism and Communism. In the end, if Communist rulers fail to satisfy the basic human needs and longings of the people, they will irretrievably lose the support of the subjected multitudes. Such a situation, however, will mean the disintegration of monolithic Party rule and the end of 'national' as well as of international Communism" (p. 205).

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C. E. BLACK (Ed.). *Rewriting Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past*. Pp. x, 413. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$7.50.

This volume of twelve essays reviews the main trends or zigzags in Soviet historical writing. Edited by Professor Cyril E. Black of Princeton University, it contains essays by three scholars who fled the Soviet Union and by five American scholars, one of whom was educated in France. This book was initiated by the Research Program on the U.S.S.R., organized by the East European Fund, Incorporated in order

to help former Soviet scholars continue their work in this country and to make available the products of their research. It is another proof of the wisdom and skill with which the Research Program was directed.

For one reason or another, relatively little research has been done in this country on Soviet historiography. This volume is, therefore, particularly useful and illuminating, and Professor Black has contributed an important service to his fellows in the social sciences by selecting and editing these papers. As a group, they show clearly that historical scholarship has decayed markedly in Russia in the last forty years. Professor Black's introductory essay, which describes the relationship between the historical profession and politics in the Soviet Union, makes clear just why this has happened. The historians have faithfully followed the party line, in its twists and turns, to the distinct harm of scholarship and the profession.

The most interesting essay to this reviewer is probably that of Konstantin F. Shteppa, former Professor of Ancient and Mediaeval History at the University of Kiev and Chairman of the Committee for Byzantine Studies of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. This brief study of the "lesser evil" formula reviews the controversy which developed among Soviet historians after 1937, especially between 1948 and 1951, over the addition to the Tsarist "prison of peoples" of various national groups in the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. The most distinguished and original article is that of Ihor Ševčenko of the University of Michigan on Soviet study of Byzantine cultural influence upon Russia. Against a background of earlier Russian scholarship on this subject, Professor Ševčenko has demonstrated how the ultra-patriotic tone conquered in this field also, with distinguished Soviet scholars, including Grekov and Brunov, striving to prove the originality of Russian culture. The Soviet efforts to demonstrate that a Slavic script existed in the tenth century before Byzantine influence was felt and that St. Sophia in Kiev was built in the eleventh century by Russian builders are a sadden-

ing illustration of the perversion of a profession and a craft by men under fearful pressure.

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MARC RAEFF. *Siberia and the Reforms of 1822*. Pp. xvii, 210. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956. \$3.50.

The field of Siberian history has not been dealt with in any exhaustive way in English, despite a few noteworthy studies by Kerner, Lantzeff, and others. Thus Professor Raeff's learned monograph, which aims to trace the transformation of Siberia from "colonial backyard" to "province" in imperial Russia, is a welcome addition to the literature. The present work is divided into two parts which are "independent but by no means unrelated," as the author observes. In the first, Professor Raeff surveys the very backward conditions prevailing in Siberia prior to the time of Alexander I. He discusses the administrative activities of Pestel (not to be confused with the Decembrist) and Treskin, and he subjects to intense analysis the remarkable reforms for this vast area of the Russian realm instigated from the year 1819 by the well-known adviser of Alexander I, M. M. Speranski, when the latter was named Governor-General of Siberia. These reforms, specifically ten statutes, were conceived, in the spirit of social and economic freedom, to be defended by an orderly and enlightened administrative structure. Part II of the monograph deals in some detail with the native peoples of Siberia in the period under review.

Mr. Raeff is very persuasive, if not quite convincing, in his belief that "the statutes of 1822 introduced to Siberia for the first time . . . something which we can call the rule of law. . . . The basis for clear and orderly governmental procedure had at last been established in Siberia. . . ." Here Speranski's high qualities as statesman and administrator emerge. Indeed, we see him as a kind of impatient Peter the Great insofar as Siberian affairs are concerned. Regretfully, however, these reforms did not

go far enough on the one hand and, on the other, were only too frequently undone in practice by hostile conservative elements. In passing, it is of some interest that Speranski, in his vision of a reorganized Siberia, "was quite distrustful of American enterprise, in particular that of whalers and traders in the North Pacific." The sections of the monograph which examine the political outlook and activities of Speranski are outstanding.

The enormous amount of research which Mr. Raeff has compressed into this rather slender work is sometimes a little too concentrated, especially when the confusing technical make-up of the book is taken into account. Hence, the overflowing materials produce occasional incoherence in an otherwise valuable contribution to the history of Russian colonial policy.

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VÄINÖ TANNER. *The Winter War: Finland Against Russia, 1939-40*. Pp. x, 274. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Stanford University Press is to be commended for publishing this American edition of Foreign Minister Tanner's memoirs.

When the volume first appeared in Finland in 1950, it aroused immediate interest and controversy. In two months it went through five large printings.

Most Finns applauded the reminiscences as an exciting and authentic account of the foreign minister's role during the crucial two-year period when the Finns learned the difficulties of doing business with the Communists, fought alone and gallantly against overwhelming odds, turned down a last-minute offer of assistance from England and France, and finally yielded to the severe terms of the Moscow Peace.

There were inevitably some dissenting opinions. The Finnish Communists labeled the memoirs as "an attempt to beautify Tanner's criminal activity." The *Novoje Vremja* joined in, castigating the book as propaganda for a war of revenge, and added a pointed warning: "It is important

that the Finnish people realize that Tanner and his cohorts are openly continuing their treaty-breaking politics against the Soviet Union."

In Stockholm, too, the anti-Swedish tone of a number of Tanner's assertions (particularly the charge that the Hansson declaration of February 16, 1940 had had the effect of stiffening the Russian demands on Finland) brought forth shouts of disagreement and chagrin.

In the less strained climate of 1957, American readers undoubtedly will find the memoirs a revealing and dramatic introduction to the complicated diplomacy of the period. The present edition is unabridged, save that three documents (Tanner's radio address of March 13, 1940, the government's proclamation at the conclusion of the war, and Mannerheim's final order of the day) have been omitted. The translation (by whom is not revealed) is very competent and accurate, although a fastidious sleuth might find some minor discrepancies or omissions (for example, 400 naval mines and 50,000 hand grenades do not appear in the list of British shipments, page 132).

Tanner's contribution, like all memoirs, constitutes a form of special pleading which requires careful checking against other available evidence (in this case, the reminiscences of Mannerheim, Niukkanen, Frietsch, von Born, and a number of others).

One is prompted, after reading Tanner's moving account, to speculate about the "ifs" of history. For example: if the Finns had offered greater concessions to the Russians in 1939, would the Winter War have been avoided? Some have implied as much. Yet there remain other fundamental questions: What were the real goals of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Finland? Would Finland have been compelled to follow Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet orbit? Could the Finns have preserved their national existence without an unforgettable demonstration of their courage and strength?

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JOHN H. KAUTSKY. *Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of International Communist Strategy*. Pp. xii, 220. New York: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall, 1956. \$6.00.

In this short, scholarly monograph the author attempts to discover how Moscow directs a branch line in another part of the world. He tries "to assess the role played by the Soviet . . . and . . . Chinese Communists in the formation of the strategy of the Communist Party of India." To carry out this objective, Dr. Kautsky studies "the twists and turns of the CPI since 1945" and tries to find out how far they correspond with the fluctuations of the strategy of Moscow and Peking.

The writer discovers three types of Communist strategy: leftist, rightist, and neo-Maoist. To avoid misconception, he defines them carefully. In the leftist strategy, which is old and classical, the comrades are workers, peasants, and petty bourgeois elements. They form a strong united front and head a revolution from the bottom of the social pyramid overthrowing the main enemy which is capitalism along with feudalism, foreign imperialism, and the bourgeoisie. In the rightist strategy the arch enemy is fascism, and the subsidiary foes are feudalism and foreign imperialism. The "evils" are eliminated in two stages. The first revolution, made up of the bourgeois-democratic people, is directed against fascism, and the second revolution, composed of the proletarian-socialistic elements, is hurled against the bourgeois-democratic group. In the neo-Maoist strategy the enemy is foreign imperialism first and feudalism second. The revolution to overthrow the "evils" is carried out, as in the rightist movement, in two stages. The imperialist and feudal forces are eliminated first, and the bourgeois-democratic elements are leveled down next in a socialistic upheaval.

In all these three strategies the comrades are allowed to make alliance with forces which suit their convenience. In the leftist revolution the poor people of all

classes are expected to join together. Hence the movement is from the bottom upwards. In the rightist strategy the alliance is made among leaders; so it is from the top downwards. In the neo-Maoist policy, the Communists are allowed to choose their fellow travelers from all sections of the society. The use of armed force is always permissible. "The difference between violence and non-violence is dismissed as a matter of degree." In the implementation of the policy, the comrades use riot, sabotage, strikes, street demonstrations, and even civil war whenever opportunities permit.

The discovery of these strategies is no less striking than the alliance and direction that exist between Moscow and Peking, on one hand, and the headquarters of CPI on the other. Between 1933 when the Communist party was reorganized in India and 1954—a period of twenty-one years—the CPI changed its policy seven times. Each time except one it followed the changes made in the policy of Moscow. The only time the CPI did not exactly follow the party line was the period (1948–1949) when Moscow was busy evaluating the new strategy used by Mao Tse-tung in China. The Indian party was then dominated by B. T. Ranadive who followed a strong leftist policy. Thus Dr. Kautsky has dug up abundant proof to show that the Communist party of India is closely tied to the chariot wheel of the Kremlin.

But how does Moscow direct the activity of the CPI? How is the directive communicated? The author rules out personal contacts which are few and far between; he does not find much communication through letters, written orders, or aerial messages. Dr. Kautsky believes that most of the directives are discovered by Communist theoreticians in India from the written statements published periodically in the influential party papers and magazines in Moscow and Peking. Though the directives are thus made available to the enemies, their publication has one merit: it leads to a factional struggle in the party in the foreign land and the survival of the fittest leadership. Incidentally it keeps Russian interference from outside at a minimum.

Dr. Kautsky's book is really a history of a case study. He states his objective, shows how he gets his material, and uses a method which is irreproachable. The language is also sober. The author does not draw too many conclusions. He shows that the Communist party of India is a branch of the Kremlin's international conspiratorial activity; it is distantly yet effectively directed by Moscow, and it uses violence whenever or wherever it needs to achieve its ends.

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PETER YERSHOV. *Comedy in the Soviet Theater*. Pp. 280. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1956. \$5.00.

A history of comedy in the USSR throws as sharp a light on the interests and concerns of Soviet Russians as one is likely to get from any other type of study. On the one hand, since in a totalitarian state the playwright is of necessity a propagandist, the themes of his plays indicate what the state considers it important to emphasize at any given time. On the other, since if he is writing comedy, he must, whatever his ultimate purpose, begin by making people laugh, his method, therefore, reflects the temper of his audience. Peter Yershov, who comes from Odessa where he taught at both the University and the Theatrical School, knows his subject well. He analyzes in this book the plots and patterns of some hundred plays from 1917 to 1954, classifying them according to major types—for example, *Agit-Comedy*, *Comedy of Manners*, *Industrial and Agricultural*, and *Psychological Comedy*—and showing their relation to important political events. Much of his study confirms one's expectations: the primary intention of the Soviet theater is not to entertain but to moralize; one finds in it a monotonous ringing of changes on the "socialist" virtue of subordinating individual problems to state interests, exaltation of Russia and condemnation of the West, idealization of the party, hero worship, and subservience to official decrees. But there are also surprises. For though

one would expect serious, even tragic, undertones in moralistic comedy that aims to picture what should be as much as what actually exists, one is hardly prepared for the kind of treatment one gets, for example, in Pogodin's *After the Ball*, in which a girl's attempt to shoot her father and her consequent suicide are held up to ridicule. In another vein, one discovers that excessive hero worship can backfire, as when Stalin, as the "Father of the Peoples," begins to look like a figure in the lives of saints. This kind of picture, says Mr. Yershov, "causes a concealed smile"; it "exemplifies the boomerang effect often produced by such attempts at exaltation and lyricism in apotheosizing 'the Leader.'" All in all, one finds in this study ample evidence to support its author's conclusion that, "despite the fare offered, Soviet people still laugh in the theater, of course, but they laugh most of all to themselves, and their laughter is bitter, not the laughter desired by their masters but the laughter of victims convulsively making a grimace as they are offered in sacrifice. The history of Soviet comedy is one of tragedy, a microcosm epitomizing the development of all Soviet art."

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PING-CHIA KUO. *China: New Age and New Outlook*. Pp. xi, 231, viii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. \$3.75.

This is a highly interesting interpretation of modern Chinese history and a challenging analysis of new China's role in today's world. The author, an historian of repute, appraises current developments as a stage in the broad sweep of China's history, searches out the fundamental trends that led to the Communist triumph, and discusses the major problems involved in the process. Dr. Kuo, after a long career as a university professor, official in the National government of China, and staff member in the United Nations, now makes his home in the United States. To judge from his book he is a proudly nationalistic Chinese, hostile to the Kuomintang, full

of admiration for the rulers of mainland China, and also devoted to the United States. This combination of background and outlook should make the book stimulating fare both for the general reader and the specialist.

Dr. Kuo's main theme seems to be first, that historically China has had a two-class society—the rulers and the ruled, the oppressors and the oppressed—and second, that the Communists rose to power by giving leadership to the tremendous desire of most of the Chinese for a new social order, a desire which was particularly strong in the vast rural areas. This bald restatement certainly does not do justice to Dr. Kuo's detailed and thoughtful analysis, but I must take issue with the theme. That there were explosive revolutionary tensions in twentieth century Chinese society is of course true. That the Communists brought relief to the poorest segments of the population and gave them something to fight for is also indisputable. But China's class structure was much more complex than Dr. Kuo's exploiter-exploited dichotomy suggests. Mao Tse-tung was fully aware of the graded structure of Chinese society and of its complexity. He made many field studies to determine its class composition and class alignments, and he wrote several important theoretical essays on the subject. As a practical revolutionary he could not operate in terms merely of the oppressor-oppressed dichotomy, however useful it was for propaganda purposes. Historical understanding is scarcely advanced by so simple a formula.

In spite of this inadequate initial thesis, Dr. Kuo gives a clear exposition of the components of the Communists' success. He discusses the dynamic effect which Borodin and other Russian revolutionary advisers had upon the young Chinese Communists from 1924 to 1927; Mao's rise to leadership through his selective use of Communist doctrine to fit real Chinese conditions and his practical success in creating a revolutionary base among the peasantry; the creation of a closely knit and tough party leadership through ten years of bitter persecution and civil war; the development of a hard-fighting Red Army, a volunteer force recruited from the peasant bene-

ficiaries of the Communists' rural reforms; and the golden opportunity which Japan's invasion provided and which the Communists, in their unrelenting struggle to seize power, exploited to the full. The negative side is Dr. Kuo's picture of their adversaries, the Kuomintang, as a party of reaction: surely an oversimplification!

The chapters on foreign policy are particularly interesting. Dr. Kuo emphasizes the determination of China's new leaders to win for their country world recognition as a great power and to exercise hegemony over eastern Asia. He traces the tough and belligerent tactics—deliberate provocation and creation of tension—which the People's Republic followed during its first five years, and he points out that the more recent tactics of superficial conciliation are designed to achieve the same ends. In discussing the outlook for the future, Dr. Kuo urges upon the United States a twofold policy: positive respect for China as a great power in Asia and effective steps against the world-revolutionary aspects of Chinese communism. This means adjustment to the facts of life in China, at the same time giving support and strength to the potential victims of China's expansion in Asia. The program makes good sense, though I found a number of doubtful assumptions woven into the argument. There was, for example, the assertion that a strong China is a force for peace and that the best assurance for peace in Asia is a strong China (p. 207); that the aggressive expansionism of Communist China has been effectively checked by the United States (p. 210); that China cannot possibly duplicate in Asia the behavior of Russia in Eastern Europe (p. 214); that it is not likely that other Asian nations can be aroused to support a revolution modeled on the pattern of the Communist revolution in China (p. 225). Comforting ideas if there were any real basis for them.

Fundamentally, Dr. Kuo foresees the emergence of a strong but peaceful China, increasingly independent of but basically friendly towards Soviet Russia. He believes it will make its adjustments with the West without resort to war. To encourage such an evolution will, he emphasizes, re-

quire great wisdom and patience on our side.

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MAUNG MAUNG. *Burma in the Family of Nations*. Pp. xi, 236. Amsterdam: Djambatan, International Educational Publishing House, 1956. \$4.50.

This small book is a useful addition to the increasing body of literature on the new countries of Southeast Asia. The author, a rising young member of the Rangoon Bar, produced it originally as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Utrecht. In his own words, he has attempted "to trace the emergence of Burma into the family of nations, and to study briefly her constitution and her legal system with emphasis on the place and function of international law in the scheme of things." Although this treatment naturally has led to the restatement of a good deal of historical background already to be found in the pages of such writers as Hall and Furnivall, the legal approach and the emphasis on the rule of law have resulted in a work which will be of great interest to all serious students of Burma. The book is well-documented and the appendices, which occupy about seventy-five of its two hundred and thirty-six pages, contain many materials not readily accessible elsewhere. Dr. Maung Maung is to be congratulated on a volume which throws fresh light on the development of Burma's external relations and which contributes so helpfully to an understanding of her place in the world community.

PHILIP W. THAYER

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SHANNON McCUNE. *Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography*. Pp. xiii, 250. Rutland, Vt.; Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. \$5.00.

Korea's Heritage is a textbook summarizing Korea's social and regional geography and focusing on the geographic factors in

the "Land of Morning Calm." From firsthand knowledge, the author recognizes the silent but extremely important role of geography in the life and livelihood of all Koreans who feel a close bond to their native land. *Korea's Heritage*, therefore, purposely reveals and stresses geographical factors which are too often neglected.

In arriving at an over-all survey, a regional approach is employed. Following a brief historical introduction and a simple description of the political pattern, Dr. McCune analyzes the location, situation, and the general character of the land according to geography and population. After a detailed description of each of ten separate regions, a descriptive analysis is given of the agrarian economy and industrial developments as related to the main stream of Korean civilization. To understand the geographical character of the different regions enables one to more readily understand the interrelated factors of the whole country. In a summary of the social geography together with a brief description of the geographical regions, the author brings into focus the geographical factors which pose the problems Korea faces today.

In an attempt to summarize the historical, social, economic, and political Korean scene, there is some repetition of material in the organization of the book which reduces its readability. The regional analyses, the first parts of the text, and the climatic discussions are well-presented with a good exposition of the author's long-standing specialty. Generally, the charts used throughout the text are up-to-date and appropriate. However, some descriptions and analyses are not reliable as they depend upon pre-World War II statistics to a considerable degree for data in many fields of information. Although the division of the country makes some current data unavailable, the author has been able, in some cases, to obtain more recent information. The extreme weakening effect of geographic diversities within Korea which were magnified by the imposition of the 38th parallel as a rigid barrier between the North and South after the Pacific War is not strongly emphasized by the author. The true picture of internal political events in North

and South Korea since the liberation in 1945 is avoided.

To the reader with a special interest in the Far East, information which deals with Korea's social, economic and political aspects may seem somewhat too general and unavoidably so in a book of this compass. However, the general reader, and especially the prospective visitor, will find *Korea's Heritage* a useful reference since it not only introduces Korea's regional geography but gives an interesting account of historical factors, past and present, which have made the "Land of Morning Calm" what it is today.

The fundamental factor of geographical location has played a most vital role in Korea's history, and Korean history confirms the truism that geography is a contributing factor in international politics. Korea is located at the center of the triangle of East Asia. A strong military power in control of the Korean peninsula, it is in a powerful position to dominate contiguous states. Control by a combination of powers can only result in intrigue, suspicion, and jockeying for advantage. Korea reflects the political influence of her neighbors in the political geography of her buffer position in East Asia. Geopolitically, the "Land of Morning Calm" has been well named the "Balkans of the Orient."

Although the author offers a sobering appraisal, supported by carefully analyzed statistics, of the economic realities of present-day Korea, he finds the total picture not without hope provided the Koreans are given the right kind and amount of foreign aid and the opportunity to work out their own reconstruction in harmony and peace. He is in sympathy with the vital unification problem which is not only a matter of life or death to the Korean people but is also a matter of prime importance to the peace and security of all Asia. If sound decisions are to be made concerning this strategic area, knowledge of Korea's geographic position, character, and diversity is important to the understanding of the social, economic and political problems of this strategic land. It is the aim of Dr. Shannon's book to present this knowledge. Because of the divided status of Korea,

much of this text is not of nationwide application; a more comprehensive survey and better balanced report on Korea may be written in due time—as soon as the country is reunited.

KYUNG CHO CHUNG
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GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

OSCAR JÁSZI and JOHN D. LEWIS. *Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide*. Pp. ix, 288. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$5.00.

From ancient times our Western tradition of political morality has included the belief that citizens have a right to resist oppression, the usurpation of authority, and the persistent misuse of power. The right of passive resistance has rarely been denied; that of active resistance when lawful means of protest have failed has frequently been claimed, and in extremity the latter claim has sometimes been extended to include tyrannicide or the right of an individual to commit political murder for the sake of conscience. The last position was not infrequent during the religious wars of the sixteenth century among both Catholic and Protestant theorists, and it was held with diminishing frequency by revolutionary writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At its best the theory, as Professor Lewis says, was "not an aberration of unscrupulous or irresponsible men" (p. 90) but an assertion of the right of conscience to override even the most stringent moral rules in circumstances that admitted only the most desperate remedies. With the progress of constitutional government, the right of unlawful resistance became a less burning moral issue, and tyrannicide came to be regarded less as a moral right than as a relic of violence and barbarism. It is a dreary commentary on the politics of the twentieth century that responsible scholars can regard the issue as no longer antiquarian, that with the rise of the Fascist and Communist tyrannies "the right of private resistance against the tyrant becomes

an urgent moral problem" and "a re-examination of the ancient doctrine of tyrannicide . . . has become, unhappily, a timely problem" (pp. viii-ix).

The book is a quite sober and scholarly examination of the moral grounds on which tyrannicide has been justified. It is divided into two parts. The first and approximately one third of the whole is written by Professor Lewis and deals with the history of the doctrine down to 1660. The second, written by Professor Jászi, treats the eclipse of tyrannicide with the progress of stable and constitutional government, its sporadic literary occurrence (as in Landor and Mazzini) in the nineteenth century, its distortion as the author regards it in nihilism and conspiratorial terrorism, and its revival particularly in the German resistance to Hitler. The conclusion reached is that, while political murder has occurred in all times and places and has sometimes been frequent, "pure tyrannicides . . . have been extremely rare" (p. 166), though they do occur. And indeed this conclusion is not surprising in view of the limitations that the authors place upon the concept. Not only must the situation be such that less desperate remedies are hopeless, but the man who ventures to take the law into his own hands must be "motivated by altruistic considerations" rather than by "personal ambition for power" (p. 167), which is notoriously difficult to prove or even for the agent to be certain of, and in addition he must act with reasonable assurance that murder will release forces of moral regeneration to remedy the evils created by tyranny. It is at least doubtful whether any such calculation of probabilities can ever be very convincing and still more doubtful whether a man who is prepared to act "with the conviction of a martyr" is in a state of mind to make it. Some of Professor Jászi's case studies (Chapter XV) seem rather hypothetical, and his account of the abortive attempt to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (Chapter XVI) is more successful in showing that some of the participants acted from a conviction of pure motives than in proving the clarity of their judgment. The reviewer is doubtful whether this kind of agonizing moral dilemma, which conscientious men may be

compelled to face, can be solved by any process describable as a reasoned decision.

GEORGE H. SABINE
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Cornell University

G. C. FIELD. *Political Theory*. Pp. xvii, 297. New York: Barnes and Noble, no date. No price.

The late Professor G. C. Field of the University of Bristol was a scholar of Greek philosophy and political theory. This last book, which he rewrote from lectures, opens with a summary of salient aspects of the history of political theory and then examines the basic questions which general political theory seeks to answer. It is a book written simply and modestly, but it possesses a ripened wisdom which clarifies problems and encourages examination of fundamental concepts.

By emphasizing the psychological fact of the state of mind of the members of a community in obedience, Professor Field believed some of the troubles over the definition of sovereignty could be avoided. This would simplify considerations of federalism within a state and international obligations between states. Going on to consider forms of government, he believed that criticism of democracy could not be summarily dismissed, since the need for the expert or specialists, which the criticism stresses, must be regarded as basic for any form of government. Important decisions cannot be left to all the citizens indiscriminately. Professor Field saw the answer of democracy in the "independence of mind, respect and tolerance for others, interest in public affairs, willingness to think about them and discuss them, and a sense of responsibility for the whole community," which are encouraged. The most essential condition, he believed, was that free expression of opinion and free discussion exist. Freedom to hear others was as important as to be free to express one's own views. With respect to economic systems, he doubted that any particular system was necessary to have democracy. In any case it would have to come to grips with oligarchy.

The book deals with the relations of the state and the individual, nationalism and

internationalism, politics and economics, and morality and politics. An Appendix deals with the essential meaning of democracy as formed by the Greeks and indicates briefly the absence of these essentials in the Soviet and satellite systems. For Professor Field, the concept "economic motive" was almost meaningless. He felt that one could not deduce laws about politics from economic phenomena, as one must look at what goes on in the minds of men.

The spirit of reasonableness and lack of dogmatism appear throughout this book. Forces of nationalism are regarded as having greater appeal to people than internationalism, and a moderate strengthening of the habit of international co-operation could come only gradually. With regard to morality and politics, differing systems merited some respect, as all demonstrate some regard for values going beyond the individual. The visions Utopians have for their end goal, Professor Field believed, show too great disregard for the present and near future. The end, he believed, could be realized in various degrees all the time, and discussions of political problems going on all the time could help attain it.

DALE PONTIUS
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GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JR. *The Presidency in the Courts*. Pp. xi, 391. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. \$5.50.

This is a book which the author claims to have worked on for almost a decade. The reviewer does not doubt the claim after reading it. Professor Schubert has accomplished the laborious task of combing through the multifarious decisions of the American judiciary concerning executive actions and produced a comprehensive analysis of judicial opinions on Presidential power.

The values of Schubert's book are manifold. He proves beyond doubt that the courts have not, by their adverse decisions, seriously obstructed the exercise of power by the President and his agents. In only thirty-eight unreversed cases, including fourteen Supreme Court opinions, has executive action been held illegal—a record that is

insignificant in view of the range of time and powers involved. In the light of this judicial documentation, Presidential strength is revealed all the more clearly. Moreover, the rise of subdelegation and redelegation of Presidential powers is well illustrated (in fact, so well illustrated that its implications are somewhat alarming in view of the reluctance of the courts to question whether the actions of subordinates have been consistent with the chief executive's policies). Methodologically, this book demonstrates the value of reading lower federal court and state tribunal decisions not only to gain insight into the judicial process but to tap a rich vein of the intellectual stuff of jurisprudence.

Schubert's work is packed with carefully drawn and stimulating observations on the many facets of judicial and executive powers. Yet, it is difficult to accept his rather dogmatic conclusion that judges should limit themselves to "enforcing, for citizen and official alike, the requirements of existing law" (p. 348) and leave resolution of the critical questions of constitutional law to the President and Congress. One wonders, as did Justice Cardozo, whether the very existence of the power of judicial review has not generally restrained those executives and legislators who might otherwise in their activities have disregarded just principles and procedures.

As to style, a large percentage of the 873 footnotes could have been eliminated as superfluous or incorporated into the text. The use of a subject guide, with its ambiguous phrases, is a questionable substitute for an index, although the annotated listing of adverse cases and the general table of cases are welcome aids.

While this volume will not be widely read because of its technical nature, it well deserves to be added to the library of any serious student of American government.

DONALD R. MCCOY

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JAMES W. BRISCOE. *The Great Prize*. Pp. 309. New York: Pageant Press, 1956. \$5.00.

EDGAR WIGGINS WAUGH. *Second Consul: The Vice Presidency: Our Greatest Political Problem*. Pp. 244. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956. \$3.75.

These volumes are presented by their authors as calls to action on the part of the American people for the remedy of alleged flaws in our Constitution. The problems to which these efforts are addressed center in the Office of the President, although Mr. Waugh develops his argument collaterally through an analysis of the Vice-Presidency, and Mr. Briscoe approaches the problem more directly. Similarity of theme ends the resemblance between the books. *Second Consul* presents a relaxed treatment of the two highest elective offices in the United States, offering tentative suggestions for reform action. *The Great Prize* allows only such institutions as motherhood and the family to remain unscathed in its attempt to convince the American electorate that both Presidency and Vice-Presidency should be abolished and an Executive Council substituted.

Second Consul is a review of the anomalies attached to the Vice-Presidential office, those originating in the Constitution, and those based in the traditions of American politics. The most pertinent section is that dealing with the succession of the Vice-President in the event of Presidential inability to perform the duties of office. The only definitive proposals made in the study are in this connection, with the author proposing a Presidential Power Commission composed of the first eight established department heads and eight members of Congress. These would include the floor leaders of both houses and the chairman and ranking minority member "of that standing committee of each (house) charged with matters pertaining to Presidential inability." These sixteen voting members of the Commission would be joined, for discussion purposes, by the Vice-President, the Speaker, the President pro tempore, and the President's wife. The Commission would function when the issue of Presidential inability was "raised by any two voting members provided one is a member of the President's party, or by any four regardless of party." Nine members

of the Commission would be required to support a finding of inability.

This proposal would appear to create as many problems as it might solve. Possibly Sam Rayburn was right when he said regarding a proposed amendment on Presidential inability, "I don't like it. We've got along for 168 years and I don't think many bad things have happened."

The Great Prize consists of extended citations from well-known authors, interspersed with comments purporting to show that the quotations prove the thesis of the volume. Many of the historians and political scientists so used will be surprised to learn of being cited as supporters of the proposition that the President of the United States be replaced by an Executive Council. This Council would be composed of fifteen men selected from that many regions for staggered terms of office, and not eligible for re-election.

Need for such reform is based upon three assumptions. Few will quarrel with the premise that the Presidency as presently organized is too big a job for any one man. That the choice of Presidential candidates and the election of an American President are thoroughly undemocratic procedures will obtain less agreement, as will the contention that politics and political parties are evil conspiracies posing an increasing threat to democratic government in America. Even fewer will accept the argument that our present discredited, inefficient, and dangerous concept of the Presidency stems from "how really undemocratic our founding fathers were, and how reactionary was the Constitution they drafted."

The author is not modest about the virtues of the Executive Council, for it would achieve "strength, wisdom, true leadership, and administrative efficiency," plus freedom from the curse of politics and the spoils system. Precedent for the Council is based upon assertions that boards of directors administer modern corporations, that city councils administer municipal government, and that the Ecumenical Council of the Roman Catholic Church administers that institution. Doubtless Pope Pius XII, in the unlikely event that this volume

comes to his attention, would be surprised to learn of the last point.

GABRIEL E. JANOSIK

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WALTER MILLIS. *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History*. Pp. 382. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956. \$5.75.

For more than a quarter of a century Walter Millis has been interested in American military history. Indeed, his first book—*The Martial Spirit* (1931)—won the Pulitzer Prize. *Arms and Men* is the author's sixth book and in some respects is his best. This is more than a commentary on American military history; it is a review of the military history of the United States in relation to the economic, political, and social phases of our history.

The United States was born in eighteenth century violence when martial tactics and weapons tended towards moderation. England was defeated by an American armed populace, democratically organized. As a step towards the democratization of war, Washington urged a compulsory ready reserve system of well-regulated militia. Although Jefferson cut the small army in half, he founded the United States Military Academy and fathered our military education.

The Industrial Revolution, as the author states, changed the technical weapons and how the decisions of war were wrought. To meet these conditions Calhoun urged an expansive volunteer national army. Although this was never realized, the assumptions remained at the foundation of our military policy until the Draft Act of 1917.

Several years before the Mexican War of 1846, William Upshur, in 1841, urged that the United States Navy be enlarged to one half of that of the strongest nation and that all ships be constructed of iron. This was more than twenty years before the Battles of Hampton Roads which doomed sailing ships and unarmored wooden vessels. Although many have claimed the Civil War to be the first modern war, this writer argues well that it was less modern and more transitional.

In our drift towards modern sea fighting, iron ships and Mahon's *Influence of Sea Power on History* influenced us, but the Spanish-American War really converted us to aggressive navalism. Subsequently, Elihu Root created a managerial revolution in our militarism by the creation of the Army War College, the Army General Staff, and the reorganization of the National Guard.

In the mechanization of war, the author contends, the preparedness program, 1915-16, was a remarkable episode. In 1916, when we mobilized against Mexico, our unsolved military problems were revealed. Mr. Millis is on firm ground when he argues that modern warfare is a great socializer, a firm centralizer, an extreme nationalizer which has completely federalized our military forces.

In the complete mechanization of military forces after World War I we were much slower than Germany who, in 1940, achieved in four weeks that which she failed to do in four years, 1914-1918. The scientist, the engineer, and the technical expert, as the author points out, were mobilized in numerous ways in World War II. In 1945, the world was dominated by three major factors: the United States as the foremost power, Russia as our chief competitor, and atomic warfare which made all diplomatic and military solutions uncertain.

This book is well written, excellently organized with logical arguments. It should be widely read and generously consulted.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

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University of Florida

R. ERNEST DUPUY and TREVOR N. DUPUY. *Military Heritage of America*. Pp. xv, 794. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. \$10.00.

This is a work of practiced hands. Both Dupuys, father and son, are professional Army officers and have written much about American military history. The former's work on West Point is something of a classic; the latter has taught Reserve Officers Training Corps students at Harvard. The present work is a worthy successor to William Addleman Ganque's classic *History*

of the U. S. Army. It is also something more—more substantial, more skillfully written, not so single-mindedly dedicated to apotheosizing the American regular soldier. True, the Dupuys lambaste the militia and our historic policy of unpreparedness in peacetime as lustily as the most ardent disciple of Emory Upton could desire. On the other hand, they also praise the Army's own John McAuley Palmer, "a modest, scholarly soldier" (p. 118) who fought for a small regular establishment and a well-trained, uniform state-controlled militia subject to federal integration in time of war. After recounting all the cases in which the militia fled and the regulars stood fast, the authors seem on the whole to lean toward Palmer's view.

They make no pretense to original research nor even to wide reading. Their chapters are dotted by notes acknowledging indebtedness to standard general works, sometimes "condensed with substantial modifications" (p. 51), sometimes excerpted in long passages (pp. 201-203). The enormous literature of specialized scholarship on American military history is little reflected. Inevitably, the authors perpetuate some venerable inaccuracies such as locating the Battle of Cowpens on the banks of the Broad River instead of six miles away (p. 105) and the assertion that in the Civil War the "much superior" rifled artillery supplanted smoothbores (p. 218). They also show a penchant for advancing as unassailable truths points of view (for example, the wisdom of MacArthur's advance to the Yalu) that are actually controversial. Several emphases should be noted: that on periods of formal war where there are only seven pages on the period 1783-1812, only eight on the post-Civil War Indian hostilities, and only sixteen on the years between World Wars I and II; that on modern warfare where more than half the book is on the period since 1914, and only seven pages are on the two centuries or more of American experience before the Revolution; that on tactics at the expense of administration, "home front" activities, and even strategy. These emphases are vigorously defended and perhaps defensible, but they do not add up to a survey of the "military heritage

of America." For most readers—and this reviewer expects they will be legion—these defects may well be offset or even obscured by an engaging, lively style and the convenient packaging of much useful information.

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON

Washington, D. C.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Pp. xiii, 534. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

The problem of civil-military relations is of critical importance in American affairs. This book is an important and provocative contribution to its proper understanding. Essentially, it presents a theory of civil-military relations from which conclusions are drawn concerning appropriate arrangements for the United States today. Huntington establishes his basic propositions, formulates his theoretical framework, and analyzes historical and contemporary developments in the United States and abroad with skill and insight. The clarity and precision with which the book moves forward make it a delight to read.

The purpose of civilian control is to minimize the power of the military vis-à-vis civilian groups. According to the Huntington theory there are two principal types of civilian control. Subjective control attempts to achieve its goal by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective control achieves control by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. The essence of subjective control is the denial of an independent military sphere; the essence of objective control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism. Objective control thus minimizes military power in political affairs by professionalizing the military, rendering them politically sterile and neutral. This ideal civil-military relationship has been most nearly approximated in Imperial and, briefly, Nazi Germany.

It is the Huntington conviction that American liberal democratic values have produced a form of subjective control. The United States Constitution, moreover, does not provide for effective control, since

it does not permit the objective type that assures a high level of military professionalism. These circumstances have contributed to a weakened military posture. While this has presented no serious risks in the past, the question today no longer is what pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with our liberal values, but rather what pattern will best maintain the security of the country. Objective control is required not only because it reduces the political power of the military to the lowest possible level, but because it maximizes the likelihood of achieving military security. Huntington concludes that objective control and survival can be achieved only by a weakening of American liberalism. He finds hope in the "New Conservatism" of the present decade.

The weakness of the analysis is in the presumption that objective control, narrowly defined, alone can achieve a proper subordination of the military to the higher purposes of a society. Yet the challenge to those who cherish liberal values cannot easily be evaded. Our national security demands that many outmoded notions of military affairs stemming from nineteenth century antimilitarism and pacifism be rejected.

JOHN W. MASLAND

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Dartmouth College

JOHN W. MASLAND and LAURENCE I. RADWAY. *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

The soldier statesman is not a rare phenomenon in history, and the United States has had its share of men who have achieved distinction in the political as well as the military realm. But never have military officers as a group played so large a part in the determination of national policy in this country as they do today. No longer can military decision and advice be divorced from nonmilitary considerations in either the foreign or domestic fields. More and more, Army, Navy, and Air Force officers find themselves working side by side with civilians in matters that touch upon many aspects of our national life. And if the

present trend continues, may of these same officers can expect, when they retire, to serve their government in other capacities and to take on important posts within the civilian community.

In the past, military education emphasized the traditional role of the soldier as a leader in combat. It must still do so, for, in the final analysis, military forces exist to fight wars and to win them. But with the increase of military participation in policy-making has come an awareness of the need for a broader education of selected senior officers. As a result, the entire military school system has been thoroughly overhauled and modernized in recent years, the curricula have been modified and broadened, and new joint institutions have been established.

How well does this military educational system prepare its students for the increasingly important role they must assume as they rise in the military hierarchy? To answer this question, Professors Masland and Radway of Dartmouth spent three years on an intensive study of the service schools. By interviews, correspondence, questionnaires, personal observation, and a study of the published and unpublished sources, they have gathered a wealth of material on the way the services train their officers at all stages of their careers. The result is at once a comprehensive survey of the educational system of the services (about which little is known) and a fascinating and important case study in the adjustment of military institutions to nonmilitary needs.

On the whole, the authors give the services high marks. In turn, they consider all levels in the school system (except the Branch schools), analyzing in each case the organization, faculty, curriculum, student body, and method of instruction. They find much to praise, but they do not withhold criticism, either, when they believe it is due. They deplore the tendency toward conformity and parochialism, the weaknesses of the instructional system, and the reliance on lectures. But on balance the record is one the services can be proud of. It is a record also that every serious student of our military institutions and every officer aspiring to high rank should read and ponder. Much may depend on how

well these schools meet the challenge of our times.

LOUIS MORTON

Office, Chief of Military History
U. S. Department of the Army

KENNETH P. WILLIAMS. *Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War*, Vol. IV: *Iuka to Vicksburg*. Pp. xv, 616. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. \$7.50.

Almost everyone now knows that the general Lincoln discovered was Ulysses S. Grant. The most crucial months of the Civil War furnished the basis for that discovery and constitute the theme of this volume in Kenneth Williams' series. Bragg's bold offensive into Kentucky accompanied Lee's Maryland invasion, and if Corinth had been lost to Van Dorn, Shiloh's bloody slaughter would have been in vain.

Here are all the minutiae and color that any but the most captious specialist on the period could possibly wish. Grant's predicament as a commander in hostile territory, with widely dispersed forces, faulty communications, and ever-threatened lines of supply, is made evident. Yet under adversity his career reached its zenith. Helpful to colleagues and subordinates, he constantly sought to further the Union cause regardless of personal cost. And never was he distracted from his own major goal—to clear the Mississippi River. Resourceful in expedients, aggressive and tenacious beyond belief, plagued by dilatory or intriguing lieutenants, and hampered by misunderstanding or non-co-operation in other departments or at Washington, his resolution was unwavering. Repulsed time after time at Vicksburg, he finally crossed the Mississippi below the city, cut himself off from his supplies, and—in a campaign of unparalleled audacity—took Jackson, Mississippi. He defeated two Confederate armies and returned to invest the river stronghold. Following such strategy and marching, the capture of Pemberton's force seems almost anticlimactical.

Williams' style is still fascinating. His readers feel the perplexities of decision-making and participate in charges, siege operations, or desperate defenses. But the West was a most complex war theater with

co-ordination and co-operation lacking on both sides. The over-all picture is sometimes difficult to follow, and one is carried bewilderingly from Oklahoma to Alabama to Kentucky or Mississippi. There is much interesting but superfluous detail: Halleck's 421 telegrams in 13 days, Frederick Grant's ride on a transport, or the author's opinion on Confederate Governor Moore's proclamation to Louisianans. One wonders if, unlike Grant, Williams occasionally loses sight of his objective.

Moreover, despite prodigious research and impressive documentation, the work's dispassionateness may be questioned. If Grant is slow in concentrating, he waited "prudently"; incomplete success at Iuka was caused by an adverse wind, Rosecrans' delay, and Price's decision to retreat; and liberties with Halleck's orders are justified by poor communications and a changed situation. While the book's villains—Buell, Rosecrans, McClernand—undoubtedly deserve censure, the benefit of the doubt is rarely extended to anyone but Grant. This volume would have been even better had its partisanship not been so obvious.

DONALD H. STEWART

Cortland, N. Y.

JOHN H. SCHAAR. *Loyalty in America*. Pp. vii, 217. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$3.50.

This analysis of the anatomy of American loyalty is a timely book, for few subjects of public interest today require the scholar's attention more urgently. Since the basic terms involved in contemporary discussion and governmental programs touching upon problems of disloyalty are still largely inchoate and undefined, only through persistent systematic analysis can we hope to achieve any sort of clarity of either purpose or result. Dr. Schaar has made in this book a contribution to this end.

The book is mainly a synthesis of existing knowledge on the subject. It lacks the insights of historical scholarship which one finds in Merle Curti's *The Roots of American Loyalty*, the sharpness of focus of Morton Grodzins' *The Loyal and the Disloyal*, or the searching analysis of legal procedure presented by the recent report

of the special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program*. Indeed, the main flaw of the book is that it seeks to synthesize too much and thus, with one notable exception, covers too much ground in too diffused a fashion. This is especially true of the first four chapters of the book, which are also marred by the use of too much formal sociological jargon. Here the reader will find the noun "structure" used as a verb—which seems to be the hallmark of sociological gobbledegook—and such mouth-filling phrases as "the system of normative and empirical referents."

Nor are the main points of these four chapters such as to require this type of analysis. For what the author seems to be interested in demonstrating is that loyalty is a very complex concept, that in a democracy loyalty is inescapably pluralistic in nature, and that the contemporary furore over loyalty is a consequence of basic social and economic changes in our society which have created widespread feelings of insecurity. He pursues mainly the following themes in describing these changes: "spiritual uprootedness, individual isolation and loneliness, declining sense of values, impotence before blind and powerful forces. . . ." The underlying theme of our age, he maintains, is alienation, reflected, for example, in the fact that in his judgment the "salient feature" of American politics today is "widespread public indifference, negativism, inaction." Where the sense of alienation is so common, an urge to conformity is to be expected. "The cry for loyalty," he writes, "is essentially a cry for certainty and stability in the face of uncertainty and change."

Having traversed the field of formal definition and didactic analysis, the book comes into its own in the long fifth chapter which is one of the best analyses of the federal loyalty-security program that this reviewer has seen. Dr. Schaar has obviously studied the whole record with great care and points up the critical problems inherent in the program: the concern with potential rather than with actual disloyalty, and the emphasis upon association and conformity as the measure of proof. That is to say, guilt

is determined not by traditional methods and standards well known to the law but by improvised administrative methods and by standards which generally determine a man's guilt by the nature of his associations and by the measure of his conformity with the values of the general community.

While this essay on the federal loyalty program is very well done, it seems to this reviewer that a somewhat more dispassionate approach would have given more space, if not weight, to the government's own position in these matters. For example, the reasons which would require the hearing boards to permit cross-examination of adverse witnesses are more persuasive than the reasons advanced by the Department of Justice for justifying the absence of confrontation. Nevertheless, the Department has made no secret of the reasons upon which it relies to support its position on this critical procedural issue, and a really dispassionate scholarly analysis would at least have drawn attention to them. Similarly, while Congress may be wrong in its estimation of the magnitude of the problem of communism in America, the least a scholar can do is to state clearly what the Congressional view is, and surely one who disagrees with a judgment on questions of fact of this sort reached by the nation's representative body assumes a heavy burden of proof. In short, this book reaches the point where objective scholarship veers off into special pleading. There is of course no special objection to the position of the advocate, and obviously advocacy has its uses, but it should not be permitted to blur basic distinctions of both method and purpose.

The brief concluding chapter offers the observation that "the real problem of disloyalty in the United States today is posed not by the weak and miserable band of the actively disloyal, but by the legions without loyalty. This is the real, the crucial problem." This is an extremely interesting suggestion, but it is advanced only as a suggestion. It is to be hoped that this promising scholar will some day pursue his investigations along this line.

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ROGER HILSMAN. *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*. Pp. 187. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$4.00.

The very existence of the system of intelligence activities and agencies of the government of the United States today is one of the great marks of change in the position of this country in the world and in the attitudes of the United States toward the world. The scope of the work is a mark of the range of things that cannot be taken as static in an age of radical change, not only military strength and weapons, but technology, and all the economic and social and political foundations of power.

Yet when Roger Hilsman set out to examine the basic philosophical attitudes about intelligence work prevailing both outside and inside the system he found a customary pattern of thought that could be characterized as unmodernized. The prevailing philosophy amounts to a residue of crude elements of empiricism and positivism. The philosophy described puts a major emphasis on descriptive facts as the essence of knowledge. The higher synthesis or integration of knowledge is then the ordered aggregation of facts as in an encyclopedia or almanac. In order to reach this finding Hilsman examined the writings on the subject, beginning with those of leading operators and administrators and going on to the working levels and the outside observers—the latter including the writer of this review who dissents only from the implication that all are in the same position. The approach is reminiscent of that of Lippmann in his book on *The Common Philosophy*. The method appears generally sound and the findings substantially correct.

Such a common philosophy of a group is, of course, a sociological type of phenomenon. It grows up in the group on the basis of the commonly acceptable positions, altered only by energetic and exceptionally successful influence of individuals or minorities. It reflects the general social and ideological matrix from which the special group and its ideas have been drawn. What is commonly accepted passes without question most of the time because to question it is to arrest the group activity and bears the immediate onus of obstructionism.

What does Hilsman have to say about how to do things better? For this he departs from the context of the intelligence system alone and focusses his attention upon the problems of making national policies. He properly notes the importance of the separation of problem-solving from decision-making. Yet the man who generates knowledge must work in close relation to the one who takes responsibility for action, and, as Hilsman says, "the implementer should act within a frame of knowledge." There is no field where this problem of the relation of knowledge to action and of thought to both is brought to sharper focus and exhibited in more macroscopic plainness than in the field of intelligence work. The subject should be of keen interest to both social scientists and philosophers.

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KENT COOPER. *The Right to Know: An Exposition of the Evils of News Suppression and Propaganda*. Pp. xiii, 335. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956. \$4.00.

This is a book on freedom of the press by a man who is devoted to the press and suspicious of the government. In his discussion of newspapers he does not make the qualitative distinctions that a scholar would make. At one point a reader might conclude that he thinks the *Chicago Tribune* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* are two of the greatest papers in the United States because they are vigorous and have strong personalities. Some of his readers, with other criteria of excellence, may rank these papers poles apart.

However, even those who do not share all of the newspaper enthusiasms of a veteran press association director may read with profit his defense of freedom of the press. With good reason he prefers to define this freedom as the "right to know," for the important aspect of the freedom is not the freedom of a few publishers and reporters so much as it is the right of the public to have access to news and opinions.

The roots of contemporary threats to the "right to know" are, in this book, traced largely to the wars we have been through. Censorship in wartime, used in attempts to prevent news from getting out about the blunders of officials as well as information about matters vital to the national defense, breeds attitudes that carry over into postwar periods. Government officials who engage in news propaganda activities in time of war hate to stop when the fighting ends. When we slid from World War II into the cold war we gave a big boost to such attitudes and prolonged the censorship and propaganda hang-over.

The believer in the people's "right to know" will probably share the apprehension expressed in this book about these developments, and he will agree with the author's conviction that inquisitive reporters at the seat of government are guardians of the people's rights. Some indication of how far we have come since the pre-World War days may be found in the radical sound which the following words, directed at activities of the United States as well as those of other countries by this politically conservative author, have for postwar ears: "Motives in government news may be obscure. But they can be and always ought to be suspected."

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RICHARD B. MORRIS (Ed.). *Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation*. Pp. xxi, 617. New York: Dial Press, 1957. \$7.50.

Ambitious, energetic, precocious, charming, Alexander Hamilton has long suffered from the excessive enthusiasm and praise of supporters as well as the unbounded virulence and abuse of detractors. Contemporaries and biographers alike seemed unable to view him without obvious bias, and in their accounts he became almost automatically the hero or the villain. Thus the reader got only a distorted picture of a truly towering figure in American history.

The outstanding contribution of this work is its judicious and scholarly treatment of a complex and controversial subject. The

editor, Professor Richard B. Morris of Columbia University, writes with understanding and authority on the Federalist period. In this book he allows Hamilton "to speak for himself, to present his basic ideas in his own words." By means of generous sampling from basic sources, coupled with helpful explanatory notes, Morris succeeds in giving a remarkably full and arresting portrait of the many-sided Hamilton. We see him as a soldier, statesman, lawyer, lover, husband, and father.

A brief introduction presents Hamilton as a great nationalist, an administrative genius, the friend of business enterprise, and the gifted proponent of an enlightened conservatism. Next appears a useful chronology in which with commendable caution Morris lists Hamilton as having been born in Nevis "c. 1755-57" and thereby at least recognizes the research of the late Major General H. U. Ramsing. Then comes the meat of the volume. This includes selections from Hamilton's writings neatly grouped under a dozen headings. Representative of all that Hamilton was and stood for, the selections naturally begin with the American Revolution, place heavy stress on his ideas on government, economics, war and peace, leaders and leadership, and then end with life and death. In all these fine words one somehow misses what Dr. Frank Monaghan once aptly termed "the inner Hamilton." That we may never know, for Hamilton was a very complex man. Only rarely and, perhaps, most revealingly in his most ignominious aspect—the Reynolds Affair—do we glimpse the man behind the words.

The introductory note (pp. 566-68), entitled "Birth, Youth, and Family Ties," is open to question at a few points. The spelling of Hamilton's mother's name is surely "Faucett" and not "Faucitt." She was jailed because of alleged indecent conduct and not because of any "curious laws" of St. Croix. John Michael Lavien, a sorry figure, accused his wife Rachel of desertion and adultery. His divorce petition does not mention Alexander Hamilton by name. Lavien's stated purpose was to secure his estate for his son Peter, lest it be taken by Rachel for her illegitimate children. It was ironic that under the prevailing Danish

law it was that same Peter Lavien who, as the only legitimate heir, deprived Alexander and James Hamilton of any share in their mother's estate. The story of Alexander Hamilton's early years in the West Indies was complicated, and it is often difficult to separate fact from fiction in later accounts.

This is an excellent work that reflects credit upon both Professor Morris and upon Columbia University—the King's College of Hamilton's day. This volume will be a handy source of information for the general public. For the specialist it should also prove most helpful while Dr. Harold C. Syrett and his staff are preparing the definitive edition of Hamilton's works.

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THOMAS JEFFERSON. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*. Vol. XIII: *March to 7 October 1788*. Edited by Julian P. Boyd and Mina R. Bryan. Pp. xxxi, 664. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. \$10.00.

The fascination of this incomparable series grows with each succeeding volume. For this we have to give thanks to the richness of Jefferson's far-ranging mind and many-sided personality, to the momentous events which he and his correspondents were interpreting, and to the never-failing excellence of the editorial scholarship.

The major item of national interest, whereof this volume supplies continuous documentation, was, of course, the ratification of the federal Constitution. On this subject, the letters sent to Jefferson by his friends speak frankly and eloquently of the struggles, anxieties, and victories of a critical year. Jefferson himself had reached the view that the Constitution was necessary and should be adopted, but that early amendments should be added to incorporate a Bill of Rights and to prevent indefinite re-eligibility for the Presidency. It was embarrassing to him to have Patrick Henry in the hotly contested Virginia Convention attempt to enlist the authority of his name as an opponent of the Constitution. But Madison was able to report his friend's opinions with balance and with truth. By the fall, George Washington was able to write with a new note of hopefulness about

symptoms of economic improvement and political stability.

In Europe Jefferson regards, with a mixture of optimism and uneasiness, the efforts of the French monarchy to undertake much-needed reforms. He offers strictures aplenty on the royal despotism, while applauding the honesty and integrity of the King. Even so, and with such an informed and penetrating observer there on the spot, one is scarcely aware of the magnitude of the tidal wave that is destined soon to engulf the government of France and its social order. In letters of advice to American friends traveling through Europe, and in the replies they send back to him, one is constantly reminded of the connection that exists between a people's happiness and their form of government. A long and delightful letter contains admirable advice—still worth following today—about the way to learn from travel abroad, advice that is interspersed with judgments that fully reveal Jefferson's own cultural tastes and social values. "The people you will naturally see the most of will be tavern keepers, Valets de place, and postillions. These are the hackneyed rascals of every country. Of course they must never be considered when we calculate the national character" (p. 268). "The Cathedral of Milan," he calls "a worthy object of philosophical contemplation, to be placed among the rarest instances of the misuse of money" (p. 272). Finally, it is significant to read of John Paul Jones presenting a copy of the new United States Constitution to the Empress of Russia, and of her remarking that "the American Revolution cannot fail to bring about others, and to influence every other government" (p. 583).

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RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON. *The Far Western Frontier, 1830-1860*. (The New American Nation Series.) Pp. xix, 324. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. \$5.00.

When George P. Garrison's *Westward Extension, 1841-1850*, appeared in the old American Nation Series in 1906, it was

credited by the editor as a work "differing in many ways from the conventional view of the period," and it promised to lay bare "the real forces" which gave the expansion movement impulse. The acquisition of Texas, Oregon, California, and New Mexico brought America not only vast new empires, "different Wests," but a host of problems whose solution determined the course of national history. In the process, the frontiersman fixed his mark on the American character just as surely as the civilizing agencies of the East proved decisive, in the long run, wherever the flag was carried. What the West did was to make possible the fulfillment of individual dreams and national aspirations on a scale and to a degree unprecedented in modern times. It proved to be an almost limitless outlet for the creative energies of a great and restless people.

All this, of course, was implicit in Garrison's book, but the emphasis was essentially political, and although it was firmly grounded in archival records, a half century has rubbed off its freshness and made necessary a new and explicit appraisal of what the Far Western epoch did for America and what the older and settled East did for the Far West. To this challenge, Professor Billington has applied his fine talents, drawing upon a wealth of sources and special studies, to assess the importance of Far Western expansion in all its colorful and significant detail.

Although he recognizes the weaknesses of the Turner thesis, especially in the light of the corrosive effects of the frontier on men and institutions, Professor Billington, nevertheless, emphasizes that there is validity to the "frontier hypothesis" if it can be shown that a variety of environmental factors produced different patterns of response. This he proceeds to do. Nor does he minimize the importance of what Garrison and others called "land hunger" which was, more precisely, the free and cheap land which set the goals for westward migration. After the Panic of 1837, the Far West, and especially the Pacific Coast, looked ever so attractive to the hard-pressed Mississippi Valley folk, whose eagerness for new worlds to conquer set in motion a new westward movement. Once again, men's imagina-

tions were stirred by the promise of unbounded riches.

Exciting, picturesque, filled with the hazards of glorious adventure, the story is now, as then, something to write about. It is a tribute to Professor Billington that he evokes the drama of it all while, at the same time, holding fast to the moorings of sound and meaningful scholarship. The book underlines recent findings of such scholars as Robert G. Cleland, Norman A. Graebner, J. W. Caughey, and LeRoy R. Hafen, among others. From the perceptive "Editors' Introduction" to the critical essay on bibliography, the volume is consistently good, pointing out the relevant and authentic in the frontiersman's last great western achievement. In his analyses of the annexation of Texas, the occupation of Oregon, the conquest of California, and the aftermath of the Mexican War, the author repeatedly recognizes "the complexity of human motivation" in determining the paths of empire.

What weaknesses there are in the account rest in the omission of materials dealing with the diplomacy and sectional politics of the 1840's, but these are promised for other volumes, so it may be said that Billington's book is a trail blazer, in many ways, in the New American Nation Series.

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STANLEY HOFFMANN and others. *Le Mouvement Poujade*. (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 81.) Pp. xxvii, 417. Paris: Armand Colin, 1956. No price.

The rise of the Poujade movement will probably be subject to many interpretations for years to come. Students and historians will find in Mr. Hoffmann's excellent work a wealth of material. The book is an interesting attempt at interpreting what is to some a rather baffling phenomenon whose newness and contemporary development make it that much more difficult to treat adequately.

What is the Poujade movement? As Mr. Hoffmann's study shows, Poujadism, which first began as an economic (antitax) revolt of a specific group, that of small

shopkeepers, was soon transformed into an important political force gaining the votes of over two million Frenchmen and with fifty Poujadist deputies in the National Assembly. It is easier to discover what Poujade and his followers stand against than what they stand for: Poujadism is antigovernment, anti-big business, antilabor, anti-Semitic, anti-foreign, anti-political parties, antitaxation and anti-intellectual. In spite of its lack of a positive program, or perhaps because of it, Poujadism, which many consider as a Fascist movement, has been successful. Why? Neither economic factors, such as the rigidities of the French economic system or dissatisfaction with taxation and its enforcement (the movement started in an underdeveloped and economically depressed area of France where many small shops were going bankrupt), nor the political situation alone could account for it. In fact, Poujadism has not at any time come forth with a specific economic or political program (save to call for a meeting of the States-General) of its own. Was it the oratorical talent and personal magnetism of Poujade? While important, they certainly could not be considered as decisive. But a combination of these elements came at a time when exasperation prevailed among the French population. They were looking for a leader whom the people, particularly of the middle class, could identify with, and thus Poujadism was born.

It is interesting to note that in March 1952 a poll showed that the vote of the middle class was distributed among all parties, with one fourth of Communist votes coming from self-defeating members of the middle class. The basic weakness of the center parties which one would expect to enjoy the support of the middle class is pointed up. Poujadism makes wide use of the class concept in calling for support among peasants, cadres, and the middle class as a class, and it plays shrewdly on the latter's anarchistic chord.

It is difficult to predict Poujadism's future. While it has definite strength among certain groups, it is also weak in organization and planning. Its leader is more interested in action than administration. There is strong government, labor, and po-

litical opposition to it, and the present trend toward unification of European markets might remedy some of the economic ills which fostered the movement.

Mr. Hoffmann's work provides valuable insight and indispensable documentation on a significant development in contemporary France. It is to be regretted that there is no index.

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WILBUR DEVEREUX JONES. *Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism*. Pp. xi, 367. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1956. \$5.00.

Edward Stanley, better known as Earl Derby, was three times Prime Minister of England. Yet, even to professional historians, he remains a shadowy figure, not committed wholeheartedly to any particular line of action. He was, however, a useful ad interim Prime Minister at a time when neither Liberals nor Conservatives commanded any stable majority. And especially was this true after the repeal of the corn laws when the free-wheeling Peelites were an uncertain factor, and Palmerston revolved in his own orbit.

Derby came from an old and very wealthy Whig family. He liked the status quo and always raised innumerable objections to changing it. Nevertheless, he slowly and cautiously moved with the times. He voted for the great reform bill of 1832, but reluctantly; he abetted the passage of the second one of 1867, but without enthusiasm. The progressive Lord John Russell, Derby found annoying; however, he hated to join the Tories, and he distrusted the background of Sir Robert Peel. For a time he toyed with the idea of forming a third party which would appeal to anti-Peel Tories and to old-time Whigs. Failing in this, Derby crossed the Rubicon, became a Tory, and stuck by the country gentlemen of England when Peel deserted them to advocate free trade.

Derby's three brief ministries followed this event. Peel took with him into exile the ablest of the younger Tories. Who should lead the party? There were only three choices: Lord George Bentinck, Dis-

raeli, and Derby. The first of the three cared more for the turf than for politics; the second was a Jew, yet to win his spurs as a loyal Tory; the third, Derby, was a popular, handsome, friendly aristocrat, a capable speaker and a pre-eminently safe man.

By 1867, the rising star of Disraeli threatened to eclipse that of his Prime Minister. But that did not disturb Derby. A seat had been bought for him in Parliament in 1820 when he scarcely was twenty-one, and now, for forty-seven years he had served his country. He viewed the Reform Bill of 1867 with suspicion; but after all it was a Tory measure. Derby did not oppose. All of his life he had yielded to the inevitable, except on the corn laws and the Church of Ireland. In regard to them he would concede nothing.

In this beautifully documented book, Professor Jones has made a most elusive man live again; he has, furthermore, conducted the curious reader through a veritable maze of personal jealousies and party wranglings with skill and sympathy.

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SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

MAX GRÜNHUT. *Juvenile Offenders Before the Courts*. Pp. vi, 143. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. \$3.40.

Dr. Grünhut's book is a welcome contribution to the literature on judicial and magisterial policy which, after a promising start in Germany (Exner), the United States (Glueck, Gaudet), and England (Sir Leo Page), has made but little progress in recent years. The center of the stage has rather been held by discussions of such issues as the indeterminate sentence and the treatment tribunal. Whatever may be our views on these latter topics, it is clear, however, that very considerable powers of discretion are still and will probably be retained by the courts. What is needed at present is an all-round approach to the sentencing problem from the juridical, statistical, and sociopsychological angles. What is

also required is a closer link between the study of the criminological situation, on the one hand, and of the sentencing or treatment policy of the courts, on the other, whether this link may be established by way of prediction techniques or by other means.

Dr. Grünhut deals with five aspects of juvenile delinquency in England and Wales, two of them related to its criminological side, two related to its treatment by the juvenile courts, and there is, finally, a discussion of the relationship between delinquency and its treatment. After a general introduction, the local variations in juvenile delinquency are examined for the period 1948-50 on the basis of figures available for the 134 police districts. These are classified according to sex and age groups, that is, 8-13 and 14-17, juvenile court jurisdiction for delinquency cases in English law being confined to the 8-17 age groups. As no direct information was available about the total numbers of boys and girls in each of these age groups, the rates had to be computed from other sources. These rates made it possible to classify the police districts as high- and low-delinquency areas with figures ranging from 9.9 per thousand in rural Cambridgeshire to 61.8 in industrialized Bootle, with a large center group and a mean of 25.2. With some minor reservations, the author's figures confirm the general impression that industrial areas are high and rural areas low delinquency districts. This statistical picture is supplemented by some observations on "the social setting of high-delinquency areas where, differing from most other writers, the author concludes that such areas are 'places where the population has been remarkably stable' (p. 44); there is little poverty but a high proportion of small incomes.

Turning from local variations to differences between prewar and postwar delinquency, the author holds that the statistical increase after the war must be a real one because, among other reasons, it has appeared in all European countries. This argument is not entirely convincing since the same factors which may have reduced the accuracy of English statistics are likely to have been in operation elsewhere too.

In view of the somewhat doubtful value

of juvenile delinquency figures, the reader feels on safer ground in Chapters III and IV which deal with treatment. Not surprisingly, the local figures show differences in treatment practice nearly as striking as the differences in delinquency rates. One of the most interesting findings is that in low delinquency areas probation is often used while fines are rare, whereas in high delinquency areas the opposite is true. Even so, however, the author stresses that four-fifths of all juveniles live in areas where the treatment practice is not much different from the average. The most significant postwar trend is a shifting of emphasis from probation to fines. Naturally fines are popular where the courts have to cope with large numbers. Not content with such quantitative comparisons of treatment policies, the author has also arranged for the collection of material from 700 cases from five districts to see whether any variations in treatment policy could be explained by differences in the characteristics of offenses and offenders. He concludes that personal factors rather than the gravity of the offense seem to determine the choice of treatment as well as its effect. Nothing emerges to indicate what may be the best policy for serious forms of juvenile delinquency, and it is not without reason that the author concludes: "Juvenile delinquency is a field in which much discussion is going on but where few sensational new discoveries can be expected" (p. 118). Nevertheless, there is plenty of useful information and common sense in this unsensational study which was, by the way, carried out with the support of the Home Office and Oxford University.

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OSCAR HANDLIN. *Race and Nationality in American Life*. Pp. xiii, 300. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1957. \$4.00.

Professor Handlin is at present the most prolific source of books dealing with ethnic groups, and he may in time become the successor of Marcus Hansen whose promising career was all too soon cut off. However,

it is not likely this volume will advance him very far toward that status. In fact, the various works dealing with immigrants and Jews which he has so far written do not, in my judgment, equal the remarkably able job he did in his first book, *Boston's Immigrants*. In the introduction he tells us: "The book deals with a general problem." That problem appears to be racism and its role in intergroup relations. First, the Negro is its "most notable victim." The author, in thirteen chapters, divided into four sections, deals with "three levels of behavior—rational justification, scientific theory, and emotional reaction."

In the case of the Negro, prejudice coupled with exploitation practically defined his inherent and perpetual inferiority. Such attitudes were easily and naturally transferred to certain types of immigrants, notably eastern and southern Europeans and also to the American Indians. Such a classification led to severe restrictions as to numbers admissible beginning in 1921 and culminating in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 wherein about 24,000 of the 149,000 quotas are allocated to "inferior" ethnic groups of southern and eastern Europe. The northern and western Europeans are classified as superior and desirable. Whether Congress is motivated by prejudice or an honest and sincere, albeit mistaken, conviction may be debated. Generally speaking, members of Congress are sensitive and responsive to the wishes of their constituents, and if their constituents want certain restrictions it is gratuitous to label either Congress or constituents prejudiced in matters where our own prejudices lie in a different direction.

When Professor Handlin states that "this country is and always has been vitally concerned with the progressive diffusion of its democratic way of life throughout the world," he might learn from Asia and the Middle East that many nations do not regard this concern very highly, surely not any higher than propaganda. The Soviet Union is equally "vitally concerned." To say that "it was the manifest destiny of the United States to create a model that would show the way to the people of the rest of the world" is to repeat what other nations regard as juvenile arrogance. It may not

be too late for this country to cease and desist its high moral preachments, mind its own business, and help others work out their own destiny even when they reject the American way, but only when they request our help.

In a sense, Professor Handlin is trying to advance a "liberal" policy by use of obvious propagandist methods. For example, we learn (p. 225) that "an anachronistic committee system and factional divisions in the major parties put a cluster of rural and isolationist Senators and Congressmen into a strategic position from which they effectively frustrated the will of the majority." The only alternative to this "anachronistic" system apparently is to put the future of our country in the hands of those whose decisions will be based on sentiment and sympathy rather than on convictions that the future of the United States is a matter of soul-searching conscience.

One gets the impression that Professor Handlin believes that refugees and other distressed people not only have a right to enter this country but that the United States has an irrefutable legal and moral duty to accept them. This reviewer dissents. Why not do a fraction as much for our own Indian population? In their case we do have an irrefutable moral duty. We created their misery.

Racism, prejudice, and intergroup hatred and suspicion probably will never disappear. This book will give the reader some of the more cogent reasons why they are still with us.

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E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER. *Black Bourgeoisie*. Pp. 264. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$4.00.

"The primary purpose of this study is to make a sociological analysis of the behavior, the attitudes, and values of the 'black bourgeoisie'—a new middle class that has emerged largely as a result of higher education and northward migration. This group, the author maintains, has broken with its traditional past, being without cultural roots in either the Negro world

with which it refuses to identify or the white world which excludes it. Owing to racial discrimination and segregation, it suffers from deep-seated feelings of inferiority for which it compensates by escaping to a world of make-believe. The latter consists of the myth of the importance of Negro business, exaggeration in the Negro press of the achievements and wealth of Negroes and the recognition accorded them by whites, and the fabulous life of Negro "society." As to their behavior and attitudes, the picture presented is almost quasi-pathological: excessive drinking, sex, and gambling; no real appreciation of religion, art, literature, or music; conspicuous consumption; sham, pretense, and lives devoted largely to fatuities. When one reads such sweeping statements one wonders whether the author has not himself indulged in exaggeration. Clearly he deplores the alleged situation, for his attitude is quite censorious.

It is undoubtedly true that some middle-class Negroes try to compensate for their deep feeling of inferiority in a white world, and the author has vividly indicated the psychological effects of insecurity, frustration, and struggle for status which result in overcompensation, self-hatred, and escape into delusions. For several reasons, however, the reader gets the impression of overstatement of the situation and lack of adequate substantiation. Very little direct evidence is presented concerning the behavior and attitudes of the so-called black bourgeoisie. Though it is not stated, perhaps the main basis for the conclusions is personal observation. But this is a large group scattered over the country. Frazier identifies the group as composed occupationally of professional and technical workers; managers, officials, and proprietors (except farm); clerical, sales, and kindred workers; and craftsmen and foremen (the "lower-middle class"). Though he gives no figures, these groups according to the 1950 census number some half a million male Negroes and almost a quarter of a million female. Incidentally, if all these categories constitute the middle class, where is the upper class? With such a large and scattered group one would expect to find considerable variety of behavior patterns and

attitudes. The only exception to the general picture which the author seems to make, however, concerns some of the middle-class Negro intellectuals who are not deceived by the world of make-believe. "They will have nothing to do with Negro 'society' and refuse to waste their time in frivolities. They take their work seriously and live in relative obscurity so far as the Negro world is concerned. Others seek an escape from their frustrations by developing, for example, a serious interest in Negro music—which the respectable black bourgeoisie often pretend to despise. In this way these intellectuals achieve some identification with the Negro masses and with the traditions of Negro life. But many more middle-class Negroes, who are satisfied to live in the world of make-believe but must find a solution to the real economic and social problems which they face, seek an escape in delusions."

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JULIAN H. STEWARD and others (Eds.). *The People of Puerto Rico*. (A Social Science Research Center Study.) Pp. ix, 540. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1956. \$10.00.

Starting with the assumption that a complex national culture consists of many "subcultures," a team of anthropologically trained investigators undertook, in the late 1940's, a study of Puerto Ricans in different local communities, selected for their contrasting ecological adaptations and their economic importance in the national society. In *The People of Puerto Rico*, five of these studies are presented against a background analysis of the island's historical development and are placed in a theoretical setting by Julian Steward, the project's director. The integrity of each community and each piece of research is retained as, in separate chapters, Robert Manners describes "the small farmers who grow tobacco and mixed crops," Eric Wolf "the hacienda owners, the peasants, and the farm laborers of the coffee area," Sidney Mintz and Elena Padilla Seda, respectively, the proletarianized life of workers on "corporate-owned and government-owned

profit-sharing sugar plantations," and Raymond Scheele some "prominent and wealthy families of business and professional men." The attempt to fit the studies into the formal plan of the book results in a somewhat pedestrian style and considerable repetition, but this is incidental, and from the whole emerges a clear picture of a society in transition, its members struggling through various and conflicting adaptations towards a new and as yet unstable integration.

The book, based on exceedingly careful work and presenting a wealth of data, is important to students both of Puerto Rico and of the wider Caribbean area, particularly as it discusses the historical circumstances in which the contemporary society developed. Although its emphasis is primarily social and economic, it also—partly by implication—makes a valuable contribution to studies of national cultures. Assuming, as have many far less competent critics, that the purpose of such studies is to seek out and define cultural "uniformities," the authors focus upon *differences* in content, organization, and style in the social segments described. They indicate how the several subcultures interlock, but they do not discuss the unmistakable regularities (not *uniformities*) that can be derived from their own analysis. Despite its more limited intention, the book suggests the need for this kind of precise, multiple study of different versions of a complex culture to demonstrate the intricate interrelationships of patterning that make up the whole. More specifically, the work is a permanent contribution to our knowledge of Puerto Rico.

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JOHN TRACY ELLIS. *American Catholicism*. Pp. xiii, 207. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956. \$3.00 cloth; \$1.75 text.

This brief appraisal of American Catholicism is one of nineteen volumes in a series entitled "The Chicago History of American Civilization" which is now in process of publication. If the subsequent volumes measure up to the standard set by Monsignor Ellis, the series will make a valuable

contribution to American historiography. The author is the successor of Peter Guilday as editor of the *Catholic Historical Review* and Professor of Church History in the American Catholic University, and he has proven his competence as a historian by his recent two volumes on the life of Cardinal Gibbons (New York, 1952). Unlike many Catholic writers, Monsignor Ellis does not carry a "chip on his shoulder" in dealing with controversial issues but follows the example of his former colleagues at the Catholic University of America, Richard J. Purcell and Peter Guilday, in writing American Catholic history according to modern historical canons.

At the end of the colonial period, Roman Catholicism in America was everywhere under legal restraint except in Pennsylvania. Outside Maryland and Pennsylvania their numbers were negligible. Due to the almost unanimous Catholic support of the American side in the War for Independence, attitudes toward Catholics radically changed, and increasingly Catholics were accepted as useful citizens. By the middle of the century, more than a million Catholic immigrants had come to the United States, mostly from famine stricken Ireland and revolutionary southern Germany. By 1880 Roman Catholics had become the largest religious body in the United States. From the beginning American Catholicism has been Irish controlled. The author notes the fact that American Catholics have made few contributions in the realm of education and culture. This is due to the lack of any serious cultivation and patronage of the intellectual vocation and to the fact that the great majority of Catholics are of the middle and lower classes and absorbed in the task of making a living.

The author calls attention to the fact that in spite of the tremendous growth of the Catholic Church in the United States—now by far the largest religious body in the nation—there is almost a total lack of influence in the formation of the American intellectual climate. In accounting for this fact, the author suggests first that up until recent years the Church was preoccupied with the hundreds of thousands of immigrants. This resulted in the creation of a nonintellectual climate. Second, the au-

thor suggests the nationwide discrimination against Catholics to keep them out of posts of leadership. He cites the Alfred E. Smith presidential campaign of 1928 as a notable example of a nationwide prejudice. Catholics have risen to power in the United States on the Municipal level, where a large proportion of the voters were Catholics, but they have held few policymaking positions on the national level.

To the question do Catholics seek a union of Church and State, the author quotes with approval the following statement of the National Catholic Welfare Conference: "No group in America is seeking union of Church and State; and least of all are Catholics."

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E. K. FRANCIS. *In Search of Utopia: The Mennonites in Manitoba*. Pp. xv, 294. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. \$6.50.

Prominent among those ethnic groups seeking a new life when Manitoba became open to settlement toward the end of the 19th century were the Mennonites. Unlike the Hutterites, the Amish, and the Pennsylvania Dutch, to whom they are related ideologically and in their Anabaptist origin, the Mennonites are not conspicuous for their long dress, long hair, or beards. Yet they and their neighbors in Manitoba have little difficulty in determining precisely who is one of them. A Mennonite is one whose father or grandfather came from Russia as a refugee from religious and economic persecution in the Ukraine. His mother tongue is a low German vernacular. He has a Mennonite religious affiliation which is reinforced by a sense of history and of ethnic destiny. Mennonites have fought with the state about parochial schools of their own, the privilege of abstention from participation in government, and immunity from military service, although today not all of them are quite as separatist in these respects as their forefathers used to be.

There were about 40,000 Mennonites, 8.7 per cent of the rural population of the province, in 1941. This book is about them, their settlement, their economy, their struggle for ethnic survival, evidence of ac-

culturation, and an epic mutual aid organization to finance migration movements. After World War I approximately 10,000 of them, "Auswanderers," left for Latin American countries to escape the temptations of "the world" that was beginning to threaten the group's cultural traditions. They were replaced by about 8,000 "Russlander" refugees from Soviet Russia.

The very existence and survival of the Mennonites for over four centuries challenges those still addicted to theories of economic or psychological determinism. Dr. Francis documents this in a skillful cross-fertilization of historical inquiry and sociological observation in the field. The book will be equally informative to Mennonites identified with their culture and anxious to preserve it without much change and to those who favor assimilation.

Dr. Francis demonstrates that controlled acculturation is not necessarily an index to assimilation. By the end of World War II the Mennonite group in Manitoba did not show any "signs of serious permanent disorganization." On the contrary, ethnic cohesion was still strong. By the standards of their non-Mennonite neighbors in the larger society the Mennonite utopia will find new converts. But by the criteria that here is a group which takes care of its sick, the infirm and the aged, in which there has been no pathetic break between succeeding generations, and where symptoms of social disorganization—delinquency, crime, divorce—are sufficiently rare not to be thought of as major community problems—by these standards, their utopia is not too far beyond the horizon.

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BERNARD KUTNER and others. *Five Hundred Over Sixty*. Pp. 345. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956. \$4.00.

Five Hundred Over Sixty reports a study of the Kips Bay-Yorkville area in New York City. The co-operating agencies were the Department of Health of the City of New York, Cornell University Medical College, Cornell University Social Science Research Center, and Russell Sage Founda-

tion. The study attempted to answer three questions: (1) What social and cultural factors facilitate adjustment to aging? (2) What kinds of people successfully adjust themselves to aging? (3) What forms should be taken by programs designed to serve the needs of the aged? The researchers interviewed 500 Kips Bay-Yorkville residents of 60 years and over and studied the community facilities serving the aged. The book is divided into four parts. Part I describes the area studied; Part II gives detailed tables showing the older person's adjustment in relation to marital status, employment, activity level, and degree of isolation; Part III treats health in old age, and Part IV reports on trends in services in New York City.

The following are some of the specific findings of the study. Married people tend to be better adjusted than single or widowed people. Men and women are equally well adjusted. Older persons of a high socioeconomic level are better adjusted than those of low social economic positions. Low status single men make the worst adjustment, while high status married men make the best adjustment. Of all the values involved in adjustment to retirement, the feeling of being useful and wanted is paramount. In general those who are regularly employed have higher morale and make a better adjustment. Self-image and morale are fairly closely associated. Persons of high socioeconomic status generally have a higher conception of self than those of lower status. Although having activities is associated with good adjustment, being employed is even more important to good adjustment; activities by themselves help fill a void in the older person, but they cannot entirely compensate for regular employment. Health is closely associated with good adjustment, and the higher socioeconomic groups have the advantage over the lower status groups on health; health is also closely associated with continued employment.

To summarize: to be well-adjusted in later maturity, keep your spouse, your money, your health, your job, and be of upper socioeconomic status.

Those working with the aged will be interested in the later sections of the report

dealing with community services for the aged and the attitudes of the aged toward using these services.

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ROBERT S. WEISS. *Processes of Organization*. Pp. ix, 117. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Institute Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1956. No price.

This slim volume is a useful contribution to the rapidly growing sociology of organization. It is based on a study of the Bureau of Government Research, a military agency which sponsors private contract research. The general methodology is that of the Survey Research Center plus considerable emphasis on sociometry. A valuable methodological Appendix is included.

The author is concerned both with outlining a new framework for studying any organization and with suggesting a few limited hypotheses which arise from the study of this particular one. His framework emphasizes three areas: how job responsibilities are distributed, how people adjust to these responsibilities, and how they co-ordinate with each other. More generally he is concerned with how the organization and the people in it adjust so as to make it possible for the organization to perform its assigned tasks.

The Bureau was divided into Administrative and Scientific Sections. Employees in the former performed specific, routinized bureaucratic functions with sharply defined responsibilities. In the latter, a high degree of flexibility and imagination was required with responsibilities being quite diffuse. As a consequence the "organizational process" in the Scientific Section was quite different from that in the Administrative Section and from that reported in previous studies of bureaucracy.

For instance, status and real responsibilities given a title depended as much on the title holder's legitimacy to hold that title as on the title itself. Thus among individuals of the same rank, men received more responsibility than women and Ph.D.'s more than non-Ph.D.'s.

The difference was shown also in the elements of job satisfaction emphasized. Those with routine, service jobs mentioned security and status in the community. The others were more concerned with the job itself and professional development.

Cross circuiting of the lines of authority was encouraged through frequent meetings and informal contacts between divisions. Co-ordination was not obtained through "giving and taking of orders" but through the "give and take of ordinary interaction" made possible by "commonality of goal, identification with a collectivity, and desire to do a good job." In other words, efficiency and high morale was possible in one government department without hierarchical controls.

Though the study was perhaps overcompressed and poorly written, the methodology is stimulating, and there are many valuable insights and comparisons with other fields of human endeavor.

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PIERRE BLETON. *Les Hommes des temps qui viennent: Essai sur les classes moyennes*. Pp. 235. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, Économie et Humanisme, 1956. 630 fr.

Is there a "middle class" between the working class and "high society"? The author does not categorically answer "yes." Throughout his book he uses the plural "middle classes" and, after some 220 pages of original demonstration, concludes that "the middle classes are reluctant to think of themselves as a social class and to organize themselves accordingly." He adds, however, that "they are an active social fact" since a "middle class" mentality, though not yet fully established, is on the edge of being formed. The author thinks that the outlook of public officials and, above all, of executives in industry, business, and the public utilities is beginning to be adopted by the other, extremely varied social and occupational groups which make up this embryonic class.

This is unquestionably the most original feature of the book, but one immediately

wonders what the foreman and the manager, the corner drugstore-keeper, the dentist, the chief of a governmental service, the ladies' hairdresser, the farmer, and others can have in common. Is a common outlook by these different groups within the realm of possibility or is it purely Utopian? Moreover, a class, the author says, can only be formed if those who are conscious of belonging to it are also conscious that they are not a minority. In France the middle classes are still a minority. "They will perhaps become a majority and a common denominator by annexing the *better* part of the agricultural and working classes following the rise in their standard of living." What would then be the common outlook? Further, how could such a class be called "middle" since the working class, deprived of its best elements, would no longer be the basis of the social structure? It is an acknowledged fact that the labor movement, political and trade union, began in the more specialized trades and that the most active elements have been and still are the highly skilled workers and not the unskilled laborers. These two questions remain open and so, therefore, does the question whether a "middle class of society" can be formed.

In the author's view, the middle classes in France originated in the burghs of medieval times. The citizens, he says, originally merchants and nothing more, later turned to great public office, to the liberal professions, to landowning and ultimately to industry. Occupying a position midway between the people and the nobility, they were able at the collapse of the First Republic and the First Empire to accede to power and thus reach the top of the social hierarchy. But the citizen class, though still a unit, very soon took on a dual aspect. A definite break between the "moneyed men" who, since they had economic power, also had the real political power, and the "liberals" took place only as a result of the inflation which followed World War I. The "liberals," seeing their wealth reduced, then turned away from the "capitalists" and thus reconstituted the "middle classes."

This reasoning would lead to the conclusion that for almost a century France was

divided into two classes. That is questionable; the author himself, moreover, recognizes that "France is too well balanced socially ever to have suffered from a class dualism."

The second part of the book sets out to explain the increase in the number of citizens who occupy a "middle" position in society. This is the result of promotion within the working class (executives), the declining economic power and political influence of small and medium independent businesses and investors, and the growing importance of the middleman. At the same time, the growth of large towns, the spread of education, the increasingly similar way of life and the encroachment of the State on individual liberty have contributed towards the weakening of class distinctions. "The idea of class has thus lost its importance, at the same time as class is becoming increasingly determined by economic factors," in other words, the social hierarchy is no longer based on a scale of values but depends essentially on the degree of wealth.

This conclusion leads the author to establish three tests by which citizens can be divided into social classes, namely income, occupation, and way of life. The application of the income test, however, seems rather uncertain. Disregarding perquisites, the author "at the risk of being over-generous" fixes a "basic net income of 600,000 French francs a year," which represents the "social minimum below which it would be impossible to ensure a standard of living appropriate to middle class ideas." This is an abstract notion, and more detail would be desirable. The second test would do away with the difference between the self-employed worker and the salary earner; both would be part of the middle classes if their occupation was predominantly "technical" and if they agreed to work "under contract." Not only executives but government employees, members of the liberal professions, and even heads of firms, would progressively fall into this classification.

The last part of the book is an attempt to analyze the middle class mentality and is an interesting study of the psychology of "executives" and their preferences in books,

plays and films, and in political parties and ideologies.

Although much of the book is controversial, this does not detract from its value, because it deals with a problem which is both politically and socially a live one. The author nowhere claims to provide the final answer to the problem; his object is solely to suggest a new approach and this is, undoubtedly, the great merit of this book.

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WILLIAM W. BIDDLE with the collaboration of LOUREIDE J. BIDDLE. *Growth Toward Freedom: A Challenge for Campus and Community*. Pp. x, 171. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. \$3.00.

Every year more and more educators become convinced that a college is not complete without a community dimension. They see that through some community of its own choosing the college welds together the various elements of its faculty and student population and, at the same time, creates bonds between itself and the larger community of which it is a part. They see that these community relationships are making it possible to overcome the artificial barriers to learning set up by traditional academic arrangements.

This book was written out of the experience of Earlham College with an experiment in community education. The Biddles and their collaborators apparently discovered what to them is the brand new idea that a college has a responsibility for educating citizens in the community as well as for educating students. This insight and ideal is one which has been held and advocated by the land-grant colleges since Civil War days. It has been reshaped and applied in new directions by state teachers colleges, and many private colleges across the nation for at least a quarter of a century. Nevertheless, it is true that there are still too many public and private colleges that are *in* the community (and state) but not *of* it.

Dr. Biddle addresses this book to citizens and leaders who are actively engaged in community activities, and also to teachers

who could shape and direct instruction to these ends. The headings of three chapters indicate the character of the problems studied: first, the question is raised whether the college will accept responsibility for ending academic isolation and becoming at least partially a community-centered institution; the second major idea concerns the similarities and differences in teaching methods for adults and for college age students; the third concept deals with the use of work camps and other devices for conducting a community program in a local setting or beyond state and national boundaries.

The reviewer finds the book naive and based on something less than a systematic philosophy of what constitutes adult education and the college's responsibilities for it. The findings rest on many conflicting or nebulous assumptions. For example, one comes away confused as to whether the authors believe a program in community education should be conceived and conducted as a service to adults, or whether it should be conducted as a therapeutic service for stimulating students and giving an element of reality to their programs of study. Similar doubts arise as to the relation of the faculty to adult education and community services.

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JOHN LADD. *The Structure of a Moral Code: A Philosophical Analysis of Ethical Discourse Applied to the Ethics of the Navaho Indians*. Pp. xv, 474. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$8.00.

It is the stated purpose of the author, who is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, "to explore the problems in describing the ethics of societies other than our own."

All anthropologists deal, to be sure, to a greater or lesser extent with the moral codes or ideas of the people they study. But for the most part they do not subject these codes or ideas to the kind of analytic examination to which the philosopher is ac-

customed. Even when something of this sort is attempted, as, for example, by Richard Brandt in a study of Hopi ethics (Chicago, 1954), the range of phenomena included is much wider than a really precise definition of "ethics" would permit.

Professor Ladd's volume, then, is a really ground-breaking effort to examine the ethical code and discourse of a nonliterate non-Western people on the basis of a thoroughgoing philosophical analysis of descriptive and prescriptive ethics. The offspring of this fertile union of philosophy and anthropology is a fair child indeed.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I presents a general analysis of the aims and methods of descriptive ethics. In Part II the structure of ethical discourse is examined and a logic of ethical reasoning constructed. Part III applies the general theory of descriptive ethics, thus worked out, to the ethical discourse of the Navaho Indians. In addition, there are ninety pages of "Field Notes" containing a verbatim record of the author's interviews with his Navaho informants.

Professor Ladd's hypothesis is that the Navaho moral code is a "materialistic prudentialism," which hypothesis seems to fit well with the data he presents. There can be no quarrel with the author's judgment that the Navaho code is philosophically interesting in itself. And the interest is not lessened by the fact that, while the Navaho system differs greatly from the familiar Western ethical systems, Professor Ladd does find in it some resemblances to moral ideas propounded by such "atomic egoists" as Epicurus, Hobbes, and Spinoza.

This is an immensely stimulating book, not only in regard to the intellectual challenge it presents to the reader, but also in regard to the summons it issues to other explorers in the new territory it enters. For while the volume is more than the mere "survey of the relevant problems" which the author modestly terms it, further investigation and analysis should be provoked by it. Certainly a most promising line of advance has been laid down laid down by Professor Ladd.

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GEORGE E. MYLONAS. *Ancient Mycenae: The Capital City of Agamemnon*. Pp. viii, 201. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

Mycenae has long been famous as a site of past glory. The Greeks remembered it as the city of Agamemnon, the king who conquered Troy but died tragically upon his return. Homer immortalized these heroic episodes and the fame of Mycenae, although the place had lost its eminence in classical times.

The first archaeological approach to the site was inspired by an ardent modern belief in Homer. Schliemann did not prove his point when in 1876 he announced the discovery of the grave of Agamemnon. What he had uncovered were amazingly wealthy shaft-graves of much earlier military chieftains of Mycenae. Nevertheless, Schliemann demonstrated that the mythological fame of Mycenae was based on prehistoric reality.

Scholarly digging followed the first romantic successes: Tsountas worked at Mycenae from 1886 to 1902, and Professor Wace led expeditions in 1920-23 and 1939. In 1949 Wace published a volume, *Mycenae*, which seemed a comprehensive statement on the site.

Just then archaeological fortune put Mycenae back in the center of attention. The Greek government started restorations. In 1951 repairs to the vaulted "tomb of Clytemnestra" led to the accidental discovery of a second complex of shaft-graves. Moreover, 1950 had seen the chance find of a clay tablet written in Linear B, one of the scripts known from Minoan Crete and Greek Pylos. Wace continued his excavations and uncovered several merchant's establishments containing Linear B records. Ventris and Chadwick published their decipherment of Linear B as an early form of Greek (1953) and Mycenae suddenly moved into the realm of potential history.

Professor Mylonas in this book continues the story where Wace left off in 1949. It is gratifying to see the amount of new material even from a cursory examination of the plates. The text deals with aspects less emphasized by Wace like the history of Tsountas's excavations; it also offers a critical reappraisal of previous interpreta-

tions concerning, for example, the chronology of the citadel, but the major contribution is a preliminary description of the new shaft-graves in whose excavation Mylonas collaborated. The new graves are less rich than Schliemann's, but their value is to be measured by the priceless opportunity to observe all the technical details of the burial ritual which Schliemann left unrecorded.

Mylonas and Schliemann share an unshaken faith in Homer. The critic might want to argue here, but only in detail. Archaeology in general owes Homer one of the most inspiring chapters in modern excavation.

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ECONOMICS

TALCOTT PARSONS and NEIL J. SMELSER. *Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory*. Pp. xxi, 322. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$6.00.

As the subtitle indicates, the book is an attempt to integrate economic and social theory. An economy is viewed as a subclass of a general social system, the distinctive character of the former lying in its emphasis on adaptive functions. Other subsystems emphasize goal attainment (the polity), or integrative functions (society in its solidarity aspects), or value maintenance (groups of units in society as carriers of traditional patterns as well as of strains). Since economic theory is a special type of social theory, there are parallels to economic analysis in general social theory. Economy being one of the subsystems in general society, economic analysis can be assisted in establishing the parameters of its equations by the application of theoretical findings for these other subsystems. There are restatements of some tenets of economic theorizing in the vocabulary of general social theory, and some examples of how other segments of social theory can

contribute to the determination of parameters of the economic equations or models.

The book is offered in the hope of promoting a synthesis of theory in economics and sociology. This reviewer, whose work has been in economic analysis and measurement, found it difficult to learn much from the discussion, partly because of a forbidding style. Style apart, the substantive difficulty can be put by saying that the analytical categories advanced by the authors are results of ascribing some meaning or purpose to various types of social action. But the authors do not pause to demonstrate how such ascription and the resulting categories can be tested by the use of empirical data, and their proper warning against identifying institutional units with the "pure" analytical categories only accentuates the difficulty. If "polity" is, by definition, the goal-attainment subsystem, but government should not be immediately characterized as essentially a "polity" institution, who is to say what roles governments perform and how is he to demonstrate that his statement is valid? Nor are the authors' conclusions impressive when they illustrate the use of noneconomic segments of social theory in providing parameters for economic models, for example, for the consumption function (p. 225). Whatever contribution is made here has little to do with the names attached (such as latent pattern maintenance) and much more with the empirical studies in the sociological literature.

I would be the last to question that, in dealing with many problems, economists have been neglectful of noneconomic aspects of society and should learn much about them from other social science disciplines. But I can see little use in attempts to create general theory by setting up a nomenclature and then applying it to a variety of economic processes under the illusion that one somehow explains a series of actions by giving it a name. The fact that governments are partners in the creation of credit and do it because society gains in the process can be studied without calling it a boundary interchange between the subsystems of economy and polity—unless specific consequences, in the way of empirical constraints, of such calling are claimed and

demonstrated. There is much too much substitution of name (or equation) creation for empirical study in economic theory as it is; the book under review, if its example is followed, would only accentuate this proneness to verbal theorizing. If synthesis is to be desired, the ingredients must be of value. The valuable ingredients are not names or categories, no matter how suggestive, but empirically tested propositions concerning behavior patterns and relations.

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G. A. HOLMES. *The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth-Century England*. (Cambridge Studies in Economic History.) Pp. xiv, 180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$4.00.

During the last twenty-five years notable progress has been made in the study of the social and economic history of the English landholding class from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries, but there is still much to be done. The most serious gaps in our knowledge lie in the early twelfth, the fourteenth and fifteenth, and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Books now in preparation by Mr. K. B. McFarlane, Dr. David Spring, and others will go far toward elucidating the subject in the fifteenth and eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and Mr. Holmes has made in this book an important contribution for the fourteenth century.

The title chosen by Mr. Holmes is somewhat misleading—it promises both more and less than the book contains. A more appropriate if rather cumbersome title would be "the resources in revenue and manpower of some members of the higher nobility in the fourteenth century." Actually it is a study of the possessions of the house of Mortimer with valuable comparative material on a few other great families.

Mr. Holmes has utilized a large amount of unpublished and little used material. While he has made no revolutionary discoveries, he has supplied support and illustration for generalizations which others have made on inadequate foundations. He shows himself a careful and sophisticated

scholar who is fully aware of the deficiencies of his material. Still more important is his realization of what questions are really significant.

This book contains valuable illustrative material on a number of important subjects. It shows clearly that while landed estates were the basis on which political power rested, they were created by the possession of that same power. Mr. Holmes also describes in the period in which they began to develop the devices such as joint enfeoffment and trusts by which the nobility sought to avoid the disadvantages of feudal tenure. There is some interesting illustrative material on the hotly debated subject of "bastard feudalism." The last chapter is perhaps the most important part of the book. It shows the nature and source of the resources drawn by the lords from estates in different parts of the realm and the varying effects of the Black Death on these estates. Finally Mr. Holmes prints in an Appendix interesting examples of the material he has used.

This book is a specialized monograph of rather limited scope. To appreciate it one must be familiar with the problems which interest Mr. Holmes and with the past and future of the institutions he deals with. Readers so equipped will find it extremely valuable.

SIDNEY PAINTER

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NICHOLAS KALDOR. *An Expenditure Tax*. Pp. 249. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956. (Distributed by the Macmillan Company.) \$3.25.

At the close of World War I, an expenditure tax was advocated in the United States as a substitute for the high surtaxes on individual incomes. Some thought the new federal income tax would not survive unless it was substantially lightened. During World War II, the Treasury advocated a graduated spending tax as a supplement to the individual income tax both to aid in curbing inflationary spending and to raise substantial revenues. The idea found favor among a number of American economists. Professor Irving Fisher for some time had argued that the rational basis for an income

tax was individual expenditures. All of these proposals, however, were rejected by Congress.

Today in the United States there is considerable criticism of the income tax. Both the individual and corporate taxes are said to be confiscatory by some persons who would greatly moderate the rates or even abandon the income tax. Probably most Americans think the income tax is here to stay but that it could be improved in numerous particulars. Economists have often contemplated the possibilities of a graduated tax of some sort on consumer spending as a substitute for various excises and sales taxes or as a measure for regulating the flow of spending. To those interested in tax theory, this stimulating book of Professor Nicholas Kaldor of King's College, Cambridge proposing a graduated expenditure tax will provide interesting reading.

The author notes that Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, Irving Fisher, and other economists have advanced proposals for spending and taxes, and he weighs the early arguments for them. He also relates his case for an expenditure tax as a substitute for the existing income tax to recent and current economic theory. He contends that a graduated tax on expenditures would be preferable to the income tax as a measure of economic control and social progress and would also be more consistent with egalitarian aims.

Professor Kaldor concedes that the administrative problems of a general expenditure tax would be quite serious, but he believes they would not be insurmountable. He thinks that these problems could probably be overcome by the gradual development of an expenditure tax which would apply only to the higher bracket taxpayers, originally, and which would, in time, be substituted for the surtax on individuals.

Professor Kaldor's book is well-written, and his thesis is rationally developed. His book is, in effect, a challenge to the modern income tax. It will probably most strongly appeal to those interested in economic and tax theory. As the author states, there is probably little likelihood that the modern income tax will be abandoned. On the other hand, there is general agreement that this and other modern taxes could be much

improved. It is appropriate to inquire concerning the reforms which are needed to attain a more rational and equitable system of taxation.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER

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WALTER ISARD. *Location and Space-Economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land Use, Trade, and Urban Structure*. Pp. xix, 350. New York: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, 1956. \$8.75.

This is not a book for relaxed reading, not even by the trained student of economic theory. Comprehension of its compact technical argument requires careful and repeated study. Doubtlessly the book will find its principal use as a text or reference source for an advanced course in economics.

The author's approach to location theory is eclectic. Dr. Isard is concerned with drawing together and extending the propositions, or "doctrines" as he styles them, found in earlier works, notably in those of von Thünen, Alfred Weber, August Lösch, and E. M. Hoover. This is done within the framework of equilibrium and substitution economics. Starting with a simplified equilibrium model, he first analyzes the localization of a transport-oriented-producing activity in units of "transport inputs," or transportation costs. The initial analytical problem is then allowed to grow more complicated by successive additions of other production and marketing cost factors such as (1) labor, power, raw materials, and other items the spatial distributions of which vary independently of distance and (2) economics of scale and concentration (agglomeration) which, too, are independent of geographic positions. Costs of these two types are treated as substitutable by or for transportation costs. Hence, given a set of assumptions about minimum cost locations for each factor, the entire locational pattern of an economy can be analyzed in terms of substitutable transportation costs.

Although the ingenious use made of substitution theory and the fresh treatment of

agglomeration and the application of location theory to the analysis of interregional trade are enough to place this book among the important contributions to the literature on location theory, its main virtue lies elsewhere. It resides rather in its depth and the scholarship with which the accumulated literature is explored and in the skillful synthesis of a large mass of theoretical argument achieved by the author. In these respects the book is a seminal work of exceptional merit.

Still, two omissions from Dr. Isard's book strike me as unfortunate. Conspicuously absent is any reference to empirical materials bearing on the theory expounded. It is difficult to avoid the inference, therefore, that location economics has yet to advance beyond the state of an intellectual exercise. The author also appears to share with most other location theorists a lack of concern for the pertinence of his work to small areas, for example, metropolitan areas. While the geographic scale on which the author operates is not specified, it is clearly intended to be an interregional one. But does the logic of the argument change when the question of location must be treated intraregionally? If so, how?

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EDWARD S. MASON. *Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem*. (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 100.) Pp. xi, 411. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This is the hundredth volume of the Harvard Economic Studies, a scholarly enterprise that has left its mark on American economic thought during the half century of its existence. Professor Galbraith, the present editor of the series, introduces the book with a brief sketch containing in outline a history of the memorable publishing venture. The series was started in 1906 on the recommendation of Taussig and Carver, the latter serving as editor for a period of over twenty years. Financial support was, and continues to be, drawn from funds made available under the will of David A. Wells, on terms that sound rather restrictive if taken literally but which liberal

construction helped to make acceptable. Among the early volumes of the series there was much economic history. Later, with the fading of the influence of the German graduate schools, economic theory came into its own, culminating in the notable contributions by Chamberlin, Samuelson, and others.

It is thus under the happy auspices of a double jubilee that the present volume of Dean Mason's collected essays has been published. If the rich variety of Harvard's economics department may be said to represent American economics at its best, the work of the distinguished author can stand as a symbol of this achievement. As thinker and as doer, Dean Mason has been a source of profound inspiration to a whole generation of American economists. The unique blend of realism and analytical power, instead of adorning only the comfortable halls of academe, has been an outstanding feature also of Mason the patriot and economic statesman. Few towering figures in the field of academic economics can pride themselves of a similar record in the public service.

The essays assembled in the present volume span the past two decades. They only tell of a small part of Mason's wartime work with the Office of Strategic Services. A more complete report of this could make a story as fascinating and inspiring as that of the exploits of a crack division. The element of integration which holds together the different sections of the book under review is the problem of monopoly and of the large firm, which has proved one of the most persistent issues of the American economy. Indeed, it is one of the principal links with the period of the 1930's, a period so fertile in seminal economic thought. The papers which are reprinted here are without exception important contributions to the solution of the problems posed by the concentration of economic power. Many of them are famous, and some have been widely discussed ever since they were first published. There are newly written introductions to the different parts of the book, which is opened up with a survey of the literature down to the 1950's, likewise newly written. Anyone who is professionally or otherwise concerned with

a fundamental problem of the American economy will be grateful for having some twenty authoritative studies available between two covers.

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SEYMOUR MELMAN. *Dynamic Factors in Industrial Productivity*. Pp. xiii, 238. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956. \$4.75.

Professor Melman finally concludes in his study that "employers do not increase wages in order to raise the ratio of labor to machine costs; workers do not welcome threats to job security in the name of productivity gains. Management does not forego additions to its administrative functions that are needed to solve its business problems, in order to affect aggregate productivity increases."

Melman does a very workmanlike job of proving this in both England and America. These conclusions had been known for some time, and his study is one more interesting contribution to its confirmation.

In the course of his study he attempts to prove three hypotheses as follows:

The first is that the degree of mechanization of industrial work is controlled by the ratio of alternative labor to machine cost.

The second is that labor productivity is governed by the relationship between alternative labor and machine cost.

The third is that the growth of administrative overhead in industrial firms has limited the effect of rising labor productivity on the output of goods per person.

The first two hypotheses are obvious and known to every elementary student of engineering economics.

The third revives an old dispute. How economically useful is the marketing and administration function? The primitive Socialists were ready to dispense with the function altogether. Veblen attempted to draw a distinction between useful engineering management and useless financial management. Nobody will dispute the fact that the costs of management have risen disproportionately as the cost of labor has de-

clined. The significant question is whether or not this rise in the cost of management and administration has justified itself.

Melman's implicit indictment of the increasing costs of administration will appeal to two groups who occupy positions at opposite poles.

The first group represents the occasional unsophisticated Socialist who when he asks for a wage increase points to the rise of an "unproductive parasitic overhead" carried by the company. His claim is that those company drones are riding on the backs of the workers.

The second group is made up of the primitive owner-managers who have, like Henry Ford senior, felt that cost accounting and other gimmicks are just a waste of money. Their opposition to scientific management was based on the additions it made to the clerical and office staffs.

The problem that remains unanswered by Melman is whether or not this administrative group makes an actual contribution to the production process. Would it be possible to manufacture and distribute this plethora of goods without the corps of marketing men and advertising executives to create new markets and enlarge old markets, without the teams of financial executives whose job it is to channel capital resources into the mass production of these products, without the bodies of researchers and technicians whose job it is to discover new processes and new products?

If differentials between companies in overhead exist, may not this mean that the low overhead cost companies are riding the coattails of the high overhead cost companies? The advertising of a single automobile manufacturer may cause an expansion of the general market for cars in which both the nonadvertiser and the high cost advertiser participate.

Administrative overhead means a distribution machine, a research apparatus, an organization team. All of these can be dispensed with in the short run to the superficial cost advantage of some particular firm. The fate of the firm is likely to be that of the donkey whose owner experimented with giving the donkey just one less meal each week until the donkey expired.

Though we may take issue with Melman's implicit deductions, the book in other respects can serve as an ideal model for an economic investigation.

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MIRIAM HUSSEY. *From Merchants to "Colour Men": Five Generations of Samuel Wetherill's White Lead Business*. Pp. xvi, 149. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956. \$5.00.

This volume literally contains *multum in parvo*. Into little more than 150 pages Miss Hussey has packed a mass of material comprising text, tables, appendices, and an index in which the name *Wetherill* alone requires three columns of references. It is a study in depth rather than breadth, as is evidenced by its preponderant reliance upon a body of business records covering *Five Generations of Samuel Wetherill's White Lead Business* in Philadelphia, from its post-Revolutionary multiple mercantile beginnings to a simplified industrial activity well before the close of the nineteenth century. This long-lived family enterprise actually survived into the present century when it was finally acquired and liquidated in 1933 by the National Lead Company, itself the product of a different stage and type of industrial evolution.

The author's concern is, however, not with these larger forces and transformations in American industry, which might especially interest the economic historian, and possibly even the general reader. Her theme is primarily, and perhaps somewhat too exclusively, linked with the fortunes of this family firm which was distinctive, if not unique, for retaining an independent existence and relatively small size and stable character in a century of rapid industrial expansion and change.

This case study in business history is developed in painstaking fashion and embraces all the minutiae of production, purchases, and sales, as well as prices, profits, and losses. It is, indeed, a thrice-told tale, with an unavoidable tendency toward the repetition as well as the accumulation of

data. In the first three chapters is recorded the chronology of the business, with its changing names and rather bewildering succession of Wetherills. The second time over, in the next three chapters, the author offers a topical analysis and survey of business methods, manufacturing processes, and personnel policies; these begin to reveal trends and principles which give meaning to the statistical details.

In the final chapter, Miss Hussey presents an over-all summary of the "five generations" and their contributions. From it the reader will reap the benefit of a compact and clear-cut presentation of the "problems common to all generations," and the factors accounting for both continuity and ultimate decline. It is this which, of course, raises this exhaustive case study of a small business to the level of cautious, correct, and meaningful conclusion.

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ARTHUR KORNHAUSER, HAROLD L. SHEPARD, and ALBERT J. MAYER. *When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers*. Pp. 352. New York: University Books, 1956. \$5.00.

EDWARD LEVINSON. *Labor on the March*. Pp. xxii, 325. New York: University Books, 1956. \$3.50.

"Can labor deliver the vote?" is not the sort of phrase to be found in *When Labor Votes*. Nevertheless, this wordy report does incidentally offer the answer, "Yes, labor can deliver the vote." Actually, the survey's focus is on a related but different matter, namely the psychological and sociological pattern formed by a sample of workers and the relation of that pattern to political attitudes. The substance of the book deals only with Detroit-area auto workers voting in one national election—1952.

The authors directed 828 interviews of United Auto Workers and Congress of Industrial Organization members in the Detroit area during the fortnight before the 1952 election and then reinterviewed 351 in the months following the election. The original sample was about 1500 workers.

The two interview questionnaires take up about 22 printed pages in one of the many appendices. (Could this ambitiousness be related to the fact that 156 workers refused to be interviewed, 306 could not be found, and 12 were reported dead?)

One conclusion of the study is that on the whole Detroit auto workers went along with labor in 1952. About 65 per cent were solid, with another 25 per cent or so uncertain but agreeable. Roughly, Wayne County went 58 per cent for Stevenson, the union sample gave him 75 per cent. Roughly, the county gave Governor Williams 63 per cent, the union sample gave him 85 per cent. Moreover the proportion of blue-collar workers going to the polls was apparently up to the average for the total Detroit-area population, and this is unusual.

But all we have here is one city and one election. Clearly, a long series of similar studies on many election situations, perhaps with attempts at control groups, would be essential to a generalization. One swallow does not make a summer. Especially in Michigan where old-timers say neither the weather nor the climate of opinion is merely representative of the rest of the nation. We need more information before we can "... assume, as we are inclined to, that our results can be taken as approximately true, not only for auto workers but for great numbers of other urban industrial workers (as they are or as they are becoming). ..." The study notes that the Eisenhower appeal makes him a special case.

But the above quotation refers to *all* the results of the report, and probably the most valuable results are broadly sociological. The analysis breaks the sample down in many different ways such as religious groups, ethnic groups, color groups, degree of social alienation, life satisfaction, education, and so forth. The report gives major attention to all those complexities and the bearing of all those factors on political behavior.

It is difficult to bring coherence to such material. Conclusions end nearly all chapters and are restated in the last chapter. The final pages speculate at considerable length on "broader interpretations." Per-

haps this reader's ignorance of sociology explains his feeling that the empirical findings are more interesting and significant than the speculation—though that is provocative.

Among the innumerable journalistic pot shots that Levinson takes at William Green in *Labor on the March*, the reissued story of the birth of the CIO, is the charge that Green was "ever the man to see both sides and usually end up on neither." This accusation could never be made against Edward Levinson.

His book, in 1938 and now, gets its fascination and its value from two sources: first, it is a bitter, impassioned, highly personal attack on the old craft-union leaders of the American Federation of Labor, and second, Levinson's prejudices fitted the urgencies of his time; he was right. Powderley and the Knights were idealistic in a confused sort of way; the AFL is inept, corrupt; and Lewis' CIO is led to triumph by a shaggy-maned hero "with stony gray eyes."

"This fine book . . . contains so much of the history and the spirit of the early days of the struggle," says Reuther in a special introduction, "that many people have suggested that the occasion of labor unity would be a superbly appropriate moment to reissue *Labor on the March*." Older AFL men must feel that right now would be a superbly appropriate moment to omit any mention of Levinson's corrosive indictment. A young man, however, could learn a lot about the 1930's from this book—and painlessly at that.

Reuther suggests that Levinson, who also wrote *I Break Strikes*, set the stage for the La Follette Senate Civil Liberties Committee. James T. Farrell's Foreword calls the book "great"—and "alive" which it decidedly is. Farrell speaks of the new edition as commemorating not only Levinson's memory but also labor's courage in trying days. The thirties and Edward Levinson are both worth remembering, but this reviewer found nothing in the reissue relevant to labor's current need for a basic program, unless it could be the moral that new departures call for new blood.

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MURRAY R. BENEDICT and OSCAR C. STINE.
The Agricultural Commodity Programs: Two Decades of Experience. Pp. xliii, 510. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1956. \$5.00.

This book is very largely a capitulation of the various congressional acts that have been passed to assist the farmer in receiving a favorable return for his agricultural products during the last quarter of a century. It is the third volume in a series of the University Century Fund dealing with the problems of the agriculture producer.

The present publication uses the commodities approach as being the most practical and satisfactory to farmers. This is because the commodities and areas involved were those in which political pressure for direct and quick action was most vigorous and vocal. The new agriculture programs have abandoned the earlier policies of federal nonintervention in agriculture business affairs and moved towards a managed and planned agricultural economy.

Most of the programs now in operation were developed as a means of dealing with two of the most uncharacteristic periods in the nation's history: one a prolonged and severe depression, the other a period in which war requirements were dominant. The time now seems to have arrived for devising more carefully considered and specialized programs designed to meet the needs of the farmer and the general public under a different set of conditions.

The programs in the early stages—1933 to 1936—were treated as emergency measures. However, the continuing government intervention soon came to be widely accepted. The traditional preference of farmers and of the American public generally for freedom to produce, process, sell, and buy with a minimum of government interference was still strong. The depression decade did not provide a favorable setting for the return to freer trading and unregulated production. The result was the continuation of extensive government control of production and marketing.

At this time of writing the issue is whether to return to less government control or continue and increase the extensive government participation in the production and marketing. The authors are almost

certain that it will not be a return to the marketing and production policies of the pre-1930's era. The present principal subject of controversy is the level of such supports, not whether supports shall or shall not be provided.

The authors admit that the parity formula used was one of the causes for the failure of the potato program, although continued use became representative of fair price relationship between commodities. In discussing the wool program they state that "the index of prices received by farmers for meat animals as a whole stood at 292 in 1954 (1910-14 = 100); the index of wool at 298. It appears, therefore, that the increase authorized in the price of wool, if warranted, must be justified in terms of the announced policy of stimulating wool production rather than on grounds of equity."

In discussing the wool problem, it would seem that the authors did not take into consideration that the 1910-14 base period used for parity represented (1) The lowest five year price period for wool on record which was about 24 per cent below the cost of production. (2) Sheep numbers had reached a high point in the cycle and the tariff had been removed. (3) During the 1942-49 period, when 45 per cent of all sheep in the United States were being liquidated due to unfavorable wool prices, the United States Department of Agriculture parity price of wool averaged 116. (4) The Wool Act of 1954 just about replaces the losses in tariff protection that were occasioned by the Trade Agreement Act reduction of 25 per cent, plus a loss of about 67 per cent in tariff protection due to inflation in costs of production without a corresponding increase in the tariff.

The volume is well written and shows a fine sense of organization. It gives a splendid history of the rise and fall of the various farm relief programs during the last quarter of a century. The eleven chapters that deal individually with the major agriculture commodities are supplemented with some 800 footnotes that go into detail on many of the programs. Although it gives very little in the way of a solution of the problems it should be very useful to

those charged with shaping the farm policies of the future.

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WESLEY McCUNE. *Who's Behind Our Farm Policy?* Pp. vi, 374. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$3.50 cloth; \$1.50 paper.

This is an important book which adds significant information on agricultural policy formation. To a large extent it brings up to date the author's earlier work, *The Farm Bloc*, and is written in the same matter-of-fact, mildly muckraking vein. It is journalistic, rather than scholarly, relying on the author's personal knowledge and information, instead of on documentation, for its extensive and detailed portrayal of the group basis of agricultural politics.

In his Foreword, the author urges that more scholarly research should be undertaken, stating that "perhaps this who's who and what's what . . . will stimulate further work on this overlooked aspect of American agriculture, food and political science." And certainly his volume is just what he says: a who's who and a what's what, for he is very definite in listing the names and connections of key people in the farm group structure.

The author reviews the activities and positions of the farm organizations, co-operative associations, youth organizations, and most other groups that have some connection or interest in agricultural policy. He makes a real contribution by presenting the interlocking directorates of farm, business, and commercial pressure groups and in describing the operating patterns of business organizations, foundations, and communications media in this policy field. Only a few pages are devoted to the activities of government agencies, although the relationships of the private organizations to agricultural government are treated in detail.

This detailed record of the role of influence and the influential in agricultural policy decisions challenges many popularly held myths and clichés about the importance of the real dirt grass roots farmers in policymaking. It presents, in contrast,

a disturbing picture of manipulation and subversion of farm groups by organized commercial and industrial interests. From the point of view of the political scientist, it is perhaps unfortunate that the author did not draw upon group concepts and theories and attempt to relate his description to the problems of policy formulation in a democracy.

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RECREATION IN THE AGE OF AUTOMATION

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CLARENCE ARTHUR KULP

1895-1957

Dr. C. Arthur Kulp, First Vice-President of the Academy and member and former Chairman of its Executive Committee, died on August 20, 1957.

Dr. Kulp was born in eastern Pennsylvania in 1895 and received his higher education at the University of Pennsylvania. A member of the faculty of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce since 1919, he introduced instruction in the broad field of social insurance. He later became Chairman of the Insurance Department, and at the time of his death was Dean of the School. He was elected to the Board of the Academy in 1947; in 1951 he was chosen as Vice-President and in 1953 as First Vice-President.

He assisted many governmental agencies in planning and administering programs for retirement and unemployment and workmen's compensation, including consulting service with the United States Social Security Administration and the Railroad Retirement Board and with compensation agencies in Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. He roved widely in his field and was the author or editor of a number of books and monographs. He lectured widely and was active in foundations and civic organizations.

Dr. Kulp was a diligent and dedicated worker for the Academy. He spent many hours counseling and inquiring, and took a leading part in formulating Academy policy.

FOREWORD

Americans are experiencing a change in the structure of their lives in relationship to the content of time and the pace and values of living. The contemporary leisure mode is rooted in a unique partnership of scientific research, engineering skill, and mass production accelerated by pressure from trade unions. It is characterized by new quantities of "*unsold time*," *energies unspent* in the economic process, and *disposable income* above the requirements of the minimum necessities of living. As a result, enjoyments once reserved for a privileged elite are becoming widely distributed. The new concept of man in relation to time gives promise, in an age whose tempo has been quickened by the application of atomic concepts and electronics, of the flowering of a great culture. Already there is emerging a new role for the family, a new concept of neighborhood, a new sense of community, and a new vigor of participation.

The contemporary intellectual revolution, generally referred to by the technical word, automation, is providing machines which, within their competence, think, feel, and act like men and which, assuming drudgery and monotonous repetitive operations, increase productivity. Within the industrial system a relentless logic necessitates abundance. Leisure, as we experience it, becomes a function of an unseen but very real and enormously fruitful configuration of scientific concepts and theories which overarch and undergird our complex era. This characteristic edifice of our times is as representative of our modern spirit as the Parthenon was an expression of the age of Athens and the Amiens Cathedral a symbol of the Gothic concept of thirteenth century Christianity.

This volume seeks to provide an introduction toward an understanding of the leisure mode in tomorrow's living. In organization the book divides the discussion into six parts. Part I talks about fundamentals in an attempt to define basic concepts. Part II discusses the movement toward professional leadership and professional standards as the fact of leisure is assimilated into the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual life of our times. In Part III the editors present a series of sampling papers to indicate through an examination of some few representative specializations the breadth, depth, and thrust of the leisure mode. Within the evolving profession of recreation there exist a contemporary dedication and zeal for effective performance which can only be compared with the spirit of the Christian missionary movement in the nineteenth century. This concern is especially evident in the areas which the editors have broadly classified as "therapeutic recreation." Part IV gives three papers on commercial recreation to indicate: the resurgence of participation in a family sport, geographical range and mobility as shown by travel, and a new concept of debt in terms of a budget program for leisure enjoyment. Part V presents two representative case histories in public recreation to emphasize the need for planning, for professional and technical competence in leadership, and above all for the necessity of political literacy and civil courage in the support of recreation policies. The brilliant concluding paper ties together the thinking of the contributors and organizes a working agenda of issues for public and professional discussion. In all, the volume indicates the growth of professionalism in

FOREWORD

recreation administration, an encouraging development in the reconstruction of philosophy as the factors of leisure and abundance are assimilated into the charters by which men live, and a thrust toward growth, depth, and quality.

The leisure mode, accompanied by many urgent problems, is taking its place in history. Its pattern stands in the line of evolution from feudalism, based on a stable agricultural society, through industrialism, based on a fruitful if strenuous factory system, to a creative and livable era characterized by freely disposable time and the wherewithal to enjoyment. The opportunity inherent in the promise is provided by the potent productive trinity—the scientist, the engineer, and the industrialist. The realization will depend upon the growth of man in spiritual stature, his competence for inner control, and his good sense and wisdom in pursuing values which his abundance enables him to possess.

PAUL F. DOUGLASS

A Philosophy of Leisure

By WILLARD C. SUTHERLAND

Abstract: The social meaning of work derives from the acts of creation it makes possible. The creative use of leisure suggests a philosophy which may be summarized under the ideas of integrity of purpose, liberty to choose goals, objectivity, equality in fellowship, common command of skills, growth, and inner joy. Since the average citizen is unable to invent new uses for his leisure, a professional elite shares a heavy responsibility for discovering criteria for ways of employing leisure and creating enthusiasms for common ends within the moral aims of the community.

THE widening distribution of surplus over the minimum needs of existence provides man with the opportunity to contemplate things in their order and worth. As he redefines his expectations in relation to time, man, as Santayana says, has the opportunity "to become"¹—but only he who "has enlarged his mind and tamed his heart" can enjoy the free life which material competence makes possible in increasing abundance. Since, as Lewis Mumford observes, the "esthetic flower" develops out of the "economic leaf," man's released activities grow out of his conditioned activities. In Mumford's view:

Without compulsory labor, civilizations would not originally have produced enough spare energy to maintain their higher activity. Without freedom from compulsory labor, man cannot enjoy these higher activities. . . . The *role* of work is to make man a master of the conditions of life: hence its constant discipline is essential to his grasp of the real world. The *function* of work is to provide man with a living: not for the purpose of enlarging his capacities to consume but of liberating his ca-

capacity to create. The social *meaning* of work derives from the acts of creation it makes possible.²

Thus, as man is enfranchised from the purely utilitarian process which for ages has impoverished his spiritual life, he finds himself in the possession of an "internal environment." The delicate maintenance of the stability of this environment

is the condition both of his sanity and health, and of his being set free to think and feel and exercise his senses without keeping too sharp an eye upon the bare necessities of survival.³

Within the lightening of the burden of work is a continuum of reactions ranging from laziness through idleness and boredom to conspicuous leisure. This leisure is described by Veblen as the nonproductive consumption of time developed from a sense of the unworthiness of productive work and as evidence of pecuniary ability to afford a life of idleness. Genuine leisure however requires spiritual power to enjoy.

¹ George Santayana, *The Philosophy of Santayana* edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1940), p. 332.

² Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944), p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*

Willard C. Sutherland, New York City, Director of Personnel Services, National Recreation Association, has devoted his entire career to the development of leaders for professional recreation.

Between the extremes of planned diligence which Max Weber described in the saying that "one does not work to live, one lives to work" and the theory of Aristotle that "we work in order to have leisure," some intellectual weeds have grown up. These weeds have their roots in the idea that recreation has a sort of medicinal value as a patent remedy in curing individual and social ills. Thus it is hoped that recreation may reduce crime, eradicate juvenile delinquency, improve employee morale, or hold young people within the church. Such expectations contribute to a false philosophy of leisure. Indeed, careful studies are beginning to indicate how ineffectual recreation may be in shaping conduct to such ulterior designs. It is necessary therefore to examine some fundamental concepts of leisure.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF LEISURE

A first condition for the enjoyment of leisure during time not sold for pecuniary reward is *integrity of purpose*. Leisure is an inward activity and the genuineness of its expression lies in the absence of propaganda or constraint. A use of leisure has value *per se* for the very reason that its end exists for creative expression. An old Chinese proverb states the case: "Life is not a vessel to be drained, but a cup to be filled."

A second fundamental concept of leisure is the *liberty to review goals*, to explore possible avenues of experience, to choose, and to agree upon the ends and purposes of activity. Teamwork comes from agreement.

A third concept is *objectivity*. Within the context of action, human relationships are free from personal feelings, personal prejudices, and personal imperialisms. No participant seeks either to achieve ulterior ends or to accomplish hidden plans.

A fourth concept is *equality in fellowship*. Persons enjoy their fellowship

with others in objective enjoyment of the common activity. In the association on the bowling team, for example, it makes little difference that one man is employer and the other employee; that one man is a physician and another a freight agent; that one man is rich and the other poor.

A fifth concept is *common command of skills*. There is something defective in their character when participants lack capacity and competence to participate. They must both *understand* and have the *know how* of the game.

A sixth concept is *growth*. Because men enjoy doing what they do well and increasingly better, there exists within the creative use of leisure an organic thrust toward depth and quality. In the field of photography, for example, mere activity in taking and collecting pictures can move into a study of aesthetics or into a detailed record of rose culture. Personal development places new responsibilities upon recreation leaders because it is entirely possible for "growing participants" to move beyond the competence of the leader. Hence constant inservice training is essential for the maintenance of the leadership position.

As people grow, they come alive. They become more interesting to themselves and to others. Life takes on new dimensions, creates new competencies, prepares man to depart on new missions, and helps them, as Goethe says, to "marvel," *Zum Erstaunen bin ich da*.

Finally, the inner joy which leisure experiences bring into living creates a feeling of satisfaction. Thus, leisure possesses a logic of its own. As Ruskin said, it produces values which "avail for life."

CREATIVE ELITES

Karl Mannheim reminds us however that

comparative studies in the use of leisure show at first glance that a higher position,

larger income, and increased security do not necessarily lead to culture. Unless material advancement is combined with personal example and the persuasion exercised by the presence of intelligent standards for the use of leisure, it may end in boredom, neurosis, and general decadence. . . . Security alone is no guarantee that surplus energies will be turned in any particular direction, unless they are guided by personal influence and education. . . . The average citizen is unable to invent new uses for his leisure.⁴

Historical records and sociological studies make it clear that the community must discover criteria for determining ways of employing leisure and creating enthusiasms for common ends within its moral aims. Hence the opportunity which mass leisure provides for the creation and assimilation of culture requires for its development creative elites, small groups of connoisseurs who create and mold taste, communicate purposes and skills, encourage the development of facilities, and accept the responsibility for

⁴ Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944), p. 317.

cultural initiative and the development of cultural traditions.

PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

To a large extent the cadre of creative leaders must come from the body of professional recreation workers who themselves experience continuing inner spiritual growth and increasing technical competence. Within the corps of the creative elite the philosophy of recreation must come into sharpest focus. Professional development, therefore, becomes an urgent task in the use of leisure.

It will be remembered that the Greek word for leisure is *skole*, the Latin word *scola*. Thus, as Josef Pieper points out, "the word used to designate the place where we educate and teach is derived from a word which means 'leisure.' 'School' does not, properly speaking, mean school, but leisure."⁵ It is apparent that more and more the task of the creative elite within the ranks of professional recreation will become that of cultural pioneers, catalysts, and teachers.

⁵ Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* (London: Faber & Faber, 1952), p. 26.

Leisure in the Light of History

By THOMAS WOODY

Abstract: The line between leisure and labor is tenuous and shifting. Nevertheless, from the rise of the earliest great civilizations of the East and West to the nineteenth century, there was a certain stability in that leisure was always the prerogative of a small free fraction of society. Christian idealism did not alter this. Asceticism opposed customary leisure activities, but the nobility of church and state generally enjoyed sports which doctrine condemned. The decay of feudalism, the rise of science and technology, a naturalistic philosophy of education, political changes in the direction of self-government, and new agencies of communication have brought leisure enjoyments to the masses.

LEISURE and labor are two sides of man's shield; both protect him. Labor enables him to live; leisure makes the good life possible. In the course of social development, various activities changed sides and what was labor became mere sport.

In a primitive condition the line between labor and leisure was not sharply drawn. Man's restless drive to activity, mental and physical, led him to playful actions when in a state of well-being and when primal needs did not impose more serious demands. In this alternation of work and play, the human male and female were akin to the animals around them. In this primitive world, children in the relative freedom of their immaturity playfully practiced many activities which would become laborious undertakings in later life.

Where propitious external conditions and human competence combined to fashion great permanent settlements as in Mesopotamia, China, Egypt, India, labor and leisure became more sharply defined; and both had increasing importance. Labor produced wealth; accumulated wealth became concentrated in a few hands; and leisure became the grand prize of those few who possessed

wealth. Labor was the lot of the great majority.

Historically, extended leisure depended on some kind of surplus wealth, public or private, whence one or many might draw sufficiently for maintenance. The individuals who composed the classes which controlled wealth put this valuable leisure potential to various uses: in extensive sportive activity, outdoors and indoors; in the development and pursuit of intellectual and aesthetic arts.

Freedom is a variable. Aristotle understood the interrelation of labor and leisure and that of both to freedom. We labor in order to have leisure.¹ If man labors effectively and sufficiently, he produces a fund of potential leisure whence a few may draw much or many may draw a little. Priests of Egypt enjoyed leisure because their status was supported by accumulations of wealth; and, thus situated, they were free to develop the liberal arts.²

¹ Aristotle, "Politica," *The Works of Aristotle* translated under the editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-31), Book VII, Section 15.

² Aristotle, "Metaphysica," *idem*, Book A, Section 1.

THE GREEK TRADITION

If we take the word of the Greeks for it, all school education is a leisure activity—however much three thousand years of groans and sighs from youthful learners suggest the contrary. In view of the Graeco-Roman tradition which played so large a role in Western culture, the Greek term *σχολή* (spare time, leisure, school) sheds light upon our theme. Plato³ made clear that this leisure for learning at school was enjoyed by those who had the *means*, and it varied with the wealth of parents. In early Rome, Suetonius⁴ tells us, lack of leisure retarded the liberal arts.

Leisure is freedom to do what one pleases. Both are elastic terms. Cicero, who had good reason to understand the relation between wealth and leisure and the contingency of freedom on them, remarked that "he does not seem to me to be a free man, who does not sometimes *do nothing*."⁵ If we conjure up a picture, ranging from the person who proves he is free by sometimes doing nothing, to those engaged in intellectual arts or participating in sportive contests, we gain a glimpse of what leisure meant to free men of the ancient world. One could run, wrestle, box, or take part in the whole pentathlon, the military sports of the Romans, play polo in China and Persia, enjoy the whole gamut of physical and mental recreations, and not be compelled to pursue a laborious occupation to get a living. It is significant that Plato and Aristotle banned illiberal tasks for free persons. Slaves

³ "Protagoras," *The Dialogues of Plato* translated by B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937). Vol. I, p. 96.

⁴ "On Grammarians," *Suetonius* translated by J. C. Rolfe (London: William Heinemann, 1914), Vol. II, p. 397.

⁵ Cicero, "On Oratory," *Cicero, On Oratory and Orators: with His Letters to Quintus and Brutus* translated by J. S. Watson. (London: George Bell & Sons, 1891), Book II, Section 6.

and others of inferior status must do menial and industrial work. Likewise, when physical sports or aesthetic arts became professions, they lost their status as leisure employments worthy of the citizen. The freeman might, of course, enjoy the role of spectator at professional performances.

The laboring majority: blacksmiths, potters, shoemakers, artisans of all kinds had little leisure, certainly. They had neither money to pay for a complete education nor time to devote to physical and aesthetic recreation. They were up before dawn and off to long labors. A line of W. C. Lawton's *Anthology* suggests they were rather tired of it and would have liked a shorter day: "Six hours a day to tiresome tasks are quite enough to give."⁶ To live, as any Greek knew, was the important thing. But constant labor must have left those of the industrial world little surplus energy for leisure and recreation.

THE ASCETIC PERSUASION

Christians put a stamp of ascetic teaching on labor and leisure. Labor was accursed. They learned from *Genesis*: ". . . in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground." Work was conducive to piety. Manual tasks were idealized. Spinning, weaving, hoeing, carpentry, and like employments were urged by St. Jerome, St. Basil, Cassian, and St. Benedict. St. Augustine wrote a treatise, *Concerning the Work of Monks*, to correct the error of some of the "religious" who favored the "lilies of the field, that toil not. . . ."

Leisure (idleness) was condemned: it hindered godliness; it was a snare of the devil. "Idle hands are the devil's workshop." "All the ulcers," says Cassian, which spring from idleness, are healed

⁶ T. Woody, *Liberal Education for Free Men* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 25.

Thomas Woody, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is Professor of Education at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of *Life and Education in Early Societies* (1949) and *Liberal Education for Free Men* (1951).

by work. A monk who labors contends with one devil; idlers face innumerable ones.

Preaching a warfare of mind and body, rather than the harmonious balance of both which the Greeks at their best had sought, the Christians made an assault upon athletic sports and pastimes. As St. Paul put it, "bodily exercise profiteth little"; but "godliness" profiteth much. "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh." The soul, the immaterial, was judged superior; the body, being material, was declared inferior. One should isolate himself from the "contagion of matter" and mortify the senses. These and kindred doctrines ran throughout medieval Christendom. They persist in somewhat altered form even today in certain areas.

Recreations, ministering to human senses, were generally taboo. Music, dancing, plays, games, races, dicing were condemned. Clement of Alexandria, more liberal than many of the early Christian Fathers, would permit walking, playing ball, and wrestling standing, if they were not done for show. Jerome⁷ warns women against sporting in the dance and all knowledge of lyre, harp, flute, and worldly songs.

Despite Christian equalitarian doctrines, feudal society in Europe preserved the ancient dichotomy: labor for the many; leisure for a few. There was some care taken to keep serfs from the leisure of schooling. Permission of the lord must be sought if one would put a son to school or make him a cleric. The Gloucester Cartulary (c. 1270) asked whether any had "made their sons clerics without leave."⁸ This restriction on villeins putting children to school to be-

come clerics or apprentices in town was designed to preserve plenty of labor on the land.

There were numerous church holydays besides Sundays. Walter of Henley's *Husbandry* estimated that there were eight weeks of religious celebration, leaving forty-four work weeks in the year. But these holydays if observed faithfully were for worship, not for leisure recreations. Admonitions to labor abound. Avoid "idleness and lethargy." "Give yourself not to idleness"; "arms are for working," says *The Babees' Book*. A shepherd should not leave his sheep and go to fairs or wrestling matches.

Pleasant pastimes are to be avoided. Go not to wrestling or to cock shooting, but stay at home, the Good Wife warns her daughter. Pleasures of dancing are especially sinful if engaged in on holydays. Literature abounds with anathema and admonition. Those "who dance on Church holy-days commit mortal sin," says Guillaume Pépin.⁹ Yet, as another preacher puts it, "those who ought to be at vespers are to be found at the dances."¹⁰

Human nature triumphed over ecclesiastical authority. Despite anathema, it was said, more time was spent on games than at Mass on holydays. Chaucer's clerk could trip and dance and cast "his legges to and fro." Havelock Ellis, in *The Dance of Life*, noted dancing in medieval English cathedrals. Dice and cards were used sometimes to pass the time in priories. Hunting and hawking were often the delight of the "religious" and the clergy, as well as of the worldly set. John Gower's *Vox Clamantis* complained of "rectors" who ne-

glect souls, but are diligent in hunting. An abbeys was admonished to get rid of her beasts and birds which consumed the alms intended for the poor. As for the bloody tournaments of the "horsey" set, the medieval counterpart of sports and spectacles of the Roman circus and arena which Christians had condemned so vehemently, the Church condemned them too, but ineffectually.

When cities developed, the inhabitants enjoyed more varied leisure opportunities than did peasants on the manor. "City air makes free," it was said; and citizens used their freedom partly in play. William Fitzstephen's account of twelfth century London mentions students' ball games and cock-fighting, citizens' sons engaging in feats of arms with lance and shield, combats in boats on the river, jumping, shooting, wrestling, throwing the stone, and dancing. In winter there was bull, bear, and boar baiting as well as sliding and skating on the frozen fens north of the city.¹¹

A NEW LIFE DEVELOPS

From the thirteenth century onward a new life emerged, contrasting sharply with the old and bearing many of the radical tendencies which persist, expanded and modified by other factors, to this day. The direction of the new life was, and is, man-centered and earthward. Learning came from the cloister and dwelt among men, at first a select few; but ultimately it mingled with the masses who never before had access to the leisure of letters. This most revolutionary change in respect to leisure so long an established fact in some Western nations is only now beginning elsewhere. Those long deaf and dumb in their villages are learning to hear and speak the language of letters and of science.

¹¹ John Stow, *A Survey of London* edited by H. Morley (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1890), pp. 117 ff.

The direction of the new life was no less radical in respect to the leisure of physical exercise and sports than in the realm of literary schooling. Humanists began a long, painful, and often defeated effort—not yet completed—to restore the balance of physical and mental culture which asceticism had denied. Vittorino da Feltre, Michel de Montaigne, François Rabelais, Desiderius Erasmus, Roger Ascham, Thomas Elyot, Richard Mulcaster, and John Milton—some in theory only, others in practice—gave a more or less generous place to physical aspects of leisure and learning. Benjamin Franklin, influenced directly by some of these, indirectly by the whole body of new thought on man's development, and himself an enthusiastic and expert swimmer, wanted a good place not far from town, high and dry, near a river, with gardens, orchard, and fields, for the Academy which he founded in Philadelphia. Diet and exercises—running, jumping, wrestling, swimming—for health's sake were a part of his *Proposals*.

These dreams did not readily come true. American colonies had derived a strong element of asceticism through extreme religious dissenters: Puritans, Quakers, and certain German pietistic sects. Cavalier Virginians knew how to dance, play instruments, and engage in sports—without a bad conscience. Some of those in New England, too, were *Not Quite Puritans*, as Henry W. Lawrence noted a few years ago. But generally pulpits thundered against dancing, sports, and all kinds of merrymaking, much as primitive Christians had once done, both for grownups and for children; and not only in school, but out of it. "Blue" laws sought to restrain adults; the teacher's law was reinforced by the rod. "Do not play by the way, 'tis against the teacher's rule," was not an empty phrase. Nevertheless, dancing and various leisure accomplishments,

⁷ "Letter CVII," 4, 8, *Select Letters of St. Jerome* translated by F. A. Wright (London: William Heinemann, 1928).

⁸ H. S. Bennett, *Life on the English Manor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), pp. 209 f.

⁹ G. G. Coulton, *The Medieval Village* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 255.

¹⁰ G. R. Owst, *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 395.

taught by venture masters and mistresses, were increasing in the small cities of eighteenth century America.

Meantime, in Europe, many factors were at work broadening the base for leisure intellectually and physically. Among the most important and far-reaching were the scientific-technological revolution, the emergence of a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy of man and his development, and political experiments in varying degrees of self-government. The scientific revolution and succeeding technological advancement brought into being an industrial order which required a mobile labor supply and increased education. Serfdom was abolished where it had long survived. The remnants of it were swept out of France in 1789. Prussia abolished serfdom in 1807, and Russia, in 1861. Industrial society required a degree of literacy; its system of factory production with unprecedented rapidity increased wealth which could pay for it. Germany had the idea of mass education in Luther's day; but peasants of Silesia were still in a deplorable condition, and their educational opportunities were meager when John Quincy Adams made his tour in 1801.

NATURALISM IN LIFE AND LEISURE

There had been an element of naturalism in early classical humanism. Follow nature's lead, discover talents and develop them, learn to judge the "hard" and the "soft" wit and deal with each appropriately were familiar themes. The place accorded sports was due to a recognition of the sportive tendency as natural in man, one to be used rather than thwarted. The passing centuries brought more and more prestige to this element of nature, so much so that by the eighteenth century naturalism emerged as an entire philosophy of life and education. Man is "good" as he

comes from the "Author of Nature"; the best thing is to let man develop in accord with nature's design without shaping him rigorously to fit existing, imperfect social patterns and institutions.

Putting the child at the center of the educational process, Jean Jacques Rousseau urged pedagogues to study him above all things. Child study soon took its first uncertain but important steps. Naturalism stimulated the growth of a new pedagogy, especially for the youngest years. This naturalism was fostered in Europe especially by Johann Basedow's *Philanthropinum*, Heinrich Pestalozzi's experiments at Neuhof and Yverdon, Christian Salzmann's Educational Institute, and Friedrich Froebel's *Kindergarten*. Parallel movements in the United States were encouraged by Bronson Alcott, William T. Harris, John Dewey, and numerous others. In all of these movements, play activities were recognized as important factors of a child's development. As allied sciences grew, play was seen scientifically as a factor in the normal growth process. Groos' *The Play of Man* and *The Play of Animals* had an important impact on pedagogical theory.

Naturalistic educational experiments also contributed to a specialized physical culture movement. Johann Guts Muths, who was profoundly impressed with the naturalistic philosophy, taught in Salzmann's Institute and popularized physical culture in Germany and abroad by his treatises: *Gymnastics for the Young*, *Games*, and the *Art of Swimming*. The Napoleonic wars increased attention to physical health and endurance as factors in national freedom and independence. Father Jahn made a contribution to Germany's *Freiheits-Krieg*, exercising young men on the *Hasenhcide* and inspiring them with his patriotic fervor. Henceforth *Die deutsche Turnkunst*, published in 1816, became famous outside as well

as inside Germany. German gymnastic was taught to Harvard young men and to others by Charles Follen, a liberal German who followed in Jahn's footsteps. Charles Beck opened an outdoor gymnasium in 1825 at Round Hill School. German gymnastics vied with Hjalmar Ling's Swedish system in American schools after 1885. Soon both gave way to games.

The nineteenth century American expansion of leisure activities in school and out was due to many factors. Fundamentally important were the growth of prosperity, which cut deeply into ascetic ideal and practice, the advent of naturalistic philosophy and practice from abroad, and a revolutionary change in higher education of women. Girls went to seminaries and soon also to college; thus they enjoyed an intellectual leisure opportunity heretofore unknown. Women leaders in colleges and the better seminaries were keenly aware of the significance of physical exercise and its relation to health; and they sought to do something about it, all the more insistently because it was necessary to counter the popular fear that girls' delicate constitutions and gossamer intellects would be shattered by the strain of serious studies. Catherine Beecher published her *Course of Calisthenics for Young Ladies* in 1832 and *A Manual of Physiology and Calisthenics for Schools and Families* in 1856. Dio Lewis' *New Gymnastics* and his Normal Institute for Physical Education (Boston, 1861), which shortly turned out seven women and six men graduates, further popularized the idea of health through physical recreation. Whether Lewis' beanbag tossing, backbending, walking, tennis, canoeing, and equestrian art at a rich college like Vassar really saved the health of the nation's elite is unknown; but girls did survive college in good health and learned much of life that was not in books.

PROGRAMS FOR PHYSICAL CULTURE

Edward Hitchcock's program at Amherst (1861), with its small gymnasium, was a pathbreaker which led others to raise physical culture from its habitual neglect. Hitchcock held a Harvard medical degree and enjoyed regular faculty status. With Harvard's Hemenway Gymnasium (1879), under Dudley Allen Sargent's leadership, the scientific approach to physical culture in American colleges was well under way.

Public schools were slower than private institutions in promoting physical recreation. The agitation by William B. Fowle (1826), Almira Phelps (1833), and by Catherine Beecher and Dio Lewis in their widely acclaimed works made an ever larger circle conscious of the value of physical recreation to personal health. Godey's *Lady's Book* in 1852 declared "slothfulness and inactivity" contrary to God's will. Boston began regular daily exercise in schools in 1853, and by 1860 several large city school systems made some provisions for gymnastics. Still, William B. Fowle's hopes for Boston were far from realized there or any place else. He said:

I hope the day is not far distant when gymnasiums for women will be as common as churches in Boston, and when our young men, in selecting the mothers of their future offspring, will make it one condition of the covenant that they be healthy, strong, capable of enduring fatigue. . . .¹²

Outside schools and colleges, America began to play. Here, as in schools, she learned from Germany and Sweden. Boston opened a public gymnasium in 1826 with a swimming school under the instruction of Francis Lieber. A German *Turnverein* at Cincinnati, opened in 1848, was swiftly followed by scores of

¹² T. Woody, *A History of Women's Education in the United States* (New York: Science Press, 1929), Vol. II, p. 111.

them with thousands of members, all affiliated with the national *Turnerbund*. But though German and Swedish systems spread, formal gymnastics took no deep hold upon Americans generally. Rather, it was games which won enthusiastic mass approval by participants and spectators. Baseball grew up from the 1830's. Football developed chiefly after 1860, but class games at colleges were not unknown earlier. Princeton played Rutgers in 1869, thus beginning the intercollegiate movement.¹³ Basketball, soccer, and other group sports have followed a similar pattern.

The playground movement, beginning in slender private experiments with sandlots in the latter half of the nineteenth century, became a public concern of Boston in 1889, and Philadelphia in 1893. Nevertheless, a penurious mind

¹³ D. B. Van Dalen, E. D. Mitchell, and B. L. Bennett, *A World History of Physical Education* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1953), pp. 372, 378 ff., 409.

and perhaps a lingering trace of asceticism still make some citizens unwilling to pay cash for "idle play."

In the light of its long history, certain trends of today in the use of leisure are conspicuous and significant. Cinema, radio, television, high-fidelity recording, and "museums without walls" are making it possible for all to appreciate the work of great artists as never before. Industrialized societies are giving increased scientific study to leisure recreations to alleviate the stress and strain of particular occupations. Radical changes in old democracies and in new have brought, or are on the verge of bringing, to the children of those who were serfs or slaves a few decades ago the sportive leisure once enjoyed only by a tiny, free elite. The Olympic games of the twentieth century are bridging in some degree a world otherwise divided. Sportive leisure is made possible for all mankind by the same science and technology which make the whole world one.

The Pattern of Leisure in Contemporary American Culture

BY MARGARET MEAD

Abstract: Leisure as a thing to be earned and re-earned was the typical pattern of traditional American culture. There was a definite rhythm between work and leisure, and all leisure was seen in the context of future work and good works. The depression and World War II brought about many imbalances in this system. In the last decade there has been a subtle shift in the balance from work and good works to the home. This is now the center for existence which in turn justifies working at all; the role of husband and father has become a vital one. Although there are many rewards in this home-oriented setup, there are also stresses and strains. These are often relieved by getting out of the home and away to work. At the moment our problem is to reach a new balance in which we discard the outmoded sequence of an age of scarcity and satisfactorily integrate the home ritual and shorter working hours of our new age.—Ed.

WITHIN traditional American culture, leisure is something that has to be earned and re-earned, except for the very old. Seen as play for the child, recreation for the adult, and retirement for the old, both child and adult have to earn their rights—the child by growing and learning, the adult by working. Unearned leisure is something which will have to be paid for later. It comes under the heading of vice—where the pleasure comes first and the pain afterwards—instead of virtue, where the pain or work precedes the reward. In some cultures, the joyful consumption of the harvest is felt as part of a natural climax structure; in others, the slightest feasting must be paid for later, almost as if it had been taken out of one's flesh. Within American culture, however, there has been a rhythm of work, virtue, and leisure. Good works—to be distinguished from work because they yield no monetary rewards and yet are enjoyed and not enjoyed—are classified with work, and the Sabbath comes into

more and more of an ambiguous position.

The model year, with its model week units, is to be found in Australia, New Zealand, and English-speaking Canada, as well as the United States. It is a year made up of weeks in which Monday to Friday are characterized by work, meals—taken for sustenance before, during, and after work—and sleep which prepares one to work again. Meals are a duty on the part of the one who eats them "to keep his strength up," and sleep is something one must "get enough of." But regular meals and uninterrupted sleep cannot be claimed by people who are not "working." In many working-class homes this differentiates men who work from women who merely keep house. Likewise, of course, children need their food and their sleep—or how can you expect them to do their lessons. There are small shifts in rhythm for special groups such as nursemaids with a day out on Thursday afternoon and butchers whose shops close on

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Wednesdays. Except for these, the first five days of the week for the Christian and the first four days of the week for the Jew are exactly alike. When late parties during the working week result from unpreventable accidents such as birthdays or departures, they are expected to result in headaches and interfere with work the next day. Then comes Friday night—payday for the weekly wage earners, end of school for teachers and students, the Sabbath meal for the Jews. It is the night for dates, movies, later and more irregular eating, more consumption of alcohol, and, in some classes in some parts of the English-speaking world, weekly conjugal love-making, carefully avoided all week. Saturday falls between rhythms and is a day on which fun and recreation—getting fit so that one will be able to work some more—are almost prescriptive. There are preparations for Sunday; shopping for a traditional Sabbath meal or a picnic; chores in the morning and celebration, courtship, gaiety in the evening. Recovery requires several extra hours of sleep varying strongly between Catholics, church-attending Protestants, and nonchurchgoers. Sleep is needed to repair the effects of jollification least by the Catholics, most by the completely secular.

On Sunday morning there is a need for rest. This is either to make up for the fatigues of the week's work, the excesses of the week end, or to "get ready for the hard week ahead." All three are argued by different age groups with different degrees of conviction. They argue as to whether "rest" is to be labeled as "good," because it keeps up one's strength, or "self-indulgent," the result of staying up too late on Saturday, or not caring enough about going to church. This calendrically regulated evaluation of eating, drinking, sleeping, love-making, foregathering with friends, theatergoing, newspaper reading, alarm

clock setting, or turning over and going back to sleep, means that all of these various activities are seen in their relation to work. Some people may live for their week ends, a smaller number may endure the week ends in order to get back to school or work. Both states of mind are in the workweek context. The punctuations of Christmas and smaller holidays are bonuses—Sundays with less of the aura of religious duties, discharged or undischarged. It is not one's duty to sleep late or go to bed early on Washington's birthday so that one will be bright-eyed and fit on February 23. No one is to be as fit on February 23, nor on the late afternoon of February 21 either. But longer vacations such as a precious week taken in winter—with some apologies, for it is still felt that it is moral to escape the heat when people can't work so well anyway, but immoral to escape the bracing cold—or the two weeks to a month in summer are like extended week ends. They combine escape from routine and the right to relax with the duty to "get rested" and build up for the next year's work.

THE PERSISTENT BELIEF

Throughout this whole pattern—modified as it may seem to be by contemporary changes in custom, by the Californian's moral insistence on getting the most out of his climate at all times, by the young airplane workers who struck until they had satisfied their urge to go swimming, by the miners who used to time their strikes to the hunting season, by the recognition in some households that adolescents need more sleep, or that some small children do not need to be sent to bed as early as others—there runs a persistent belief that all leisure must be earned by work and good works. And second, while it is enjoyed it must be seen in a context of future work and good works. People who are called pleasure-loving simply accent one part

of this interconnected rhythm more than the others. But the extremes, between those who are never weary of well-doing and those who neither work nor engage in good works, simply serve to point up the pervasive pattern.

The word *recreation* epitomizes this whole attitude of conditional joy in which the delights of both work and play are tied together in a tight sequence. Neither one may ever be considered by itself, but man must work, then weary and "take some recreation" so he may work again. The linkage effects both joy in leisure and joy in work. It is wrong to work too hard; to become deeply, obsessively interested in work, or good works; one *should* have some recreation. And the minute that it looks as if there would be more time in between work and good works than the amount needed for "healthy recreation," alarm spreads over the country. People are going to have too much leisure. . . . Seen in terms of "normal needs for recreation," this means more time than is needed to relax and get back to work again—unearned time, loose time, time which, without the holding effects of fatigue before and fatigue to come, might result in almost anything.

UNEARNED GAINS

Experience of many different sorts has shown that the pessimists are right, that relaxations of this relationship between time spent in work and time spent in leisure do often result in boredom, apathy, frantic attempts to fill up the time, too much drinking, promiscuity, gambling, reckless driving, and so forth. Unearned gains are not moral gains, and so there is a tendency to spend them in ways which are labeled as immoral, or at least as idle luxury. In Elliot Jaques's study of an English factory,¹

¹ Elliot Jaques, "Psycho-Pathology in Industrial Life," *Twentieth Century*, Vol. 159, May 1956, pp. 493-500.

he found that men who were making more than they believed, on a non-verbalized level, to be fair were spendthrift. This was characteristic of World War I war workers in the United States, whose position was felt to be twofold unfair—they were safe from the hazards of the trenches and were paid too much for their work, such earnings going into silk stockings and fur coats. And Jaques found that workers who were paid too little, within their deep evaluation of what their job was worth, became apathetic and wished to leave their jobs. The whole system is like a bowstring. If overstretched or slackened, pathological effects result.

The answer which the last hundred years have attempted to give to the problems of a discrepancy between the time and effort involved in work, the available patterns of good works, and the traditional amount of pleasure which could go with them without strain, has been the suggestion that people "take up something as a hobby"—that they should do something which is not serious, has no monetary value, and so will be of no use to anyone but oneself. It may, however, be "expensive," and so use up some discrepancy between earning and legitimate spending. It must be something which is somehow out of the value system, something neither good nor bad, neither quite work nor quite play, and which can therefore fall under the bridging concept of "recreation."

PRESSURES TOWARD A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

The period since World War II has seen a breakdown of this system of earned and re-earned limited pleasure. The depression brought a slackening of the whole system. When people did not have enough work, no money, and so no symbolic right to play, entertaining was curtailed, movie money was short, dates lacked gaiety, childbearing was post-

poned. Work when it came back would bring with it a renewed ability and right to get some joy out of life. But World War II introduced a mixed set of disturbances. These included war workers who made too much money; soldiers who had too little time on leave and who spent too much time in absolute dullness and boredom overseas; men and women who saw too little of each other; families who still had to postpone their little modicum of privacy and live with relatives. After the war, there came, understandably, a desire to recoup these quantitatively perceived losses, to get some joy out of life. This was, perhaps, less because joy was a goal than because of the desire to reattain an equilibrium which had been disturbed since the lush, disequibrated days of the late twenties.

Somewhere in the last decade there has come a subtle shift in this picture. This is a shift characteristic of our culture throughout its life and characteristic of most peoples who have depended on long hard hours of work for the majority in order that they should simply survive.² Conditions which have contributed to this shift can only be sketched in very roughly. They include a rising standard of living; rising wages; creeping inflation; and ways in which the relationships between work done, money made, and what one can buy are continually threatened. They also include a lowered standard of work proficiency in almost all fields; high wages for adolescents who often make more than their parents; easy installment

² I have not discussed in this paper the conspicuous consumption of the rich. In the United States this is related to our ethical system by the larger, longer time balance between yachts and gifts to foundations, especially for medical research. It is related by the need for recreation of those whose political or business burdens are great, or, when it is a question of enormous salaries for television stars or baseball players, by putting it outside the system—like gambling gains, which should be used up in immediate conspicuous consumptions.

buying, so that a car is fully used up by the time it is paid for, and the threat that this prosperity will not last. Furthermore, there is the fear that there will be an atomic war, or at least a devastating depression produced by automation. These are the terms in which individuals are experiencing the rapid shifts in our economy. There is our emphasis on the importance of mass markets to keep up production, on improved standards of living in other countries as helpful rather than threatening to our economy, on the unlimited possibilities inherent in automation on the one hand and free power on the other. There is a freeing of men from drudgery of all sorts so that their potentialities may be utilized. This is a thing which has only been experienced before in occasional small societies under conditions of extreme and usually temporary felicity. Such opportunities have never been experienced for the large majority of the people of a great civilization.

THE SHIFTING BALANCE

The generation which has married since the war has responded to these conditions by shifting the balance from work and good works to the home. The home, in which one was once allowed a limited amount of recuperation and recreation in reward for working hard, has now become the reason for existence, which in turn justifies working at all. This does not mean that many young people are not working very hard. Husband and wife often both work, combining work, children, and going on getting an education. But the emphasis is different. Jobs are selected as they will bear on the home. In the familiar phrase of how a man will account to his Maker for his life on earth, having been a good husband and father heads the list. Good works in the form of community service within the social environment right around the home have been moved into home life, as has most of

religious participation. "I had to join some church so my son could be a cub scout." Hours of work which permit a man to spend more time at home, length of vacation, amount of strain and overwork, all are valued as to how they will affect family life. As once it was wrong to play so hard that it might affect one's work, now it is wrong to work so hard that it may affect family life.

But has family life become leisure in this process of transformation? Reversing a proposition within the kind of moral book balancing characteristic of our culture produces many complications. A great deal has been done to turn modern home life into a self-rewarding delight. It has become something that is neither work nor something done in order to make a living, nor recreation, that is, something done to get you safely back to work again. The do-it-yourself movement, which parallels so neatly the shortage of skilled labor for home finishing and repairs, is not just a hobby. It is often a pleasant and meaningful contribution to family life. The newfound delight of young fathers in their babies is another intrinsically rewarding pattern which no large civilization has ever permitted its more privileged young men. The gay companionship of a large family, making do with a small house, one car, and two dogs, has many ways of fending off boredom and apathy and the demand for expensive entertainment. The car, the television set, the pets are seen as contributory to the home. Service on innumerable boards and committees in the community is also part of making the community safe for the children.

But there are hazards inherent in the old work-play rhythmic morality which lie just beneath the surface of these readjustments. If this home life really is to be classified as play, then it should be a good deal easier than it is. For our notions of play have been those of spec-

tator sports and easy enjoyment for a long time. Do-it-yourself with five children, besides being delightful, is strenuous, time consuming, backbreaking, nerve-straining, and confining—most of the things once characteristic of a good job which a man enjoyed. The job outside the home, if not seen as recreation in the spiritual sense, is becoming recreation in the physical sense. It is a relief from the exactions of the close personal life at home, a chance for a little peace and quiet, a quiet smoke, time to collect one's thoughts. The insidious old rhythm between enjoined activity and permitted brief limited relaxed behavior is reasserting itself. A girl goes to work until she marries, or after she marries, or after her children are in school as a supplement to the home. It is unfair of her employer to ask much of her work hours—as it would once have been unfair for him to infringe on her day off. If a man is doing the best he can, getting up at night with his young babies, taking them off their mother's hands as soon as he gets home, or perhaps getting supper because she has a part-time job too, it is unfair to ask him to wear himself out at work. As home life and personal relations thus take the center of the stage, the old rhythm remains with the job—less and less often a career—becoming the subsidiary, determined part of the sequence.

It is obvious that the whole question of *recreation*, which gives merely instrumental value to joy, needs a type of revision. This must be a revision which will make the members of a society—where delight in high level proficiency should now replace dogged willingness to work long hours for very limited rewards—able to integrate the shorter hours of work and the new engrossing home rituals into some kind of a whole in which these outmoded sequences, heritage of an age of scarcity, can be overcome.

The Economics of Leisure

By GEORGE SOULE

Abstract: The economic developments which made a general sharing of leisure possible, together with higher material levels of living, were a marked increase in productivity and an increase in the size of the labor force relative to the population. Gains in leisure were made under the market system by deliberate choice of workers for more free time even at the sacrifice of possible greater gains in real income. This choice has stimulated many industries supplying recreation wants. Market values do not apply to the allocation of free time by the individual. The problem of values is discussed.

LEISURE is a word often used but seldom defined. It is likely to be regarded as rest, idleness, play, or recreation. Any or all of these pursuits may at times occupy leisure, but surely they are not identical with it. People in their leisure time may engage in concentrated effort as in outdoor sports or taxing intellectual activity. They may be occupied in producing for themselves or others as in gardening, home construction or repair, useful social activities, painting, drama, music.

Recreation implies play of a sort which fits one for better performance on the job, but leisure is valued for its own sake. A member of the leisure class—that is, one not compelled to work for his living at all—surely does not devote his time solely to recreation. He may be a “play boy”; but if so, for what endeavor his play re-creates him might be hard to say. Those who have means to live without working often find work to do, whether in private life or in public; “leisure classes” have produced many leaders in war, politics, philosophy, science, the arts, and letters.

There is an overtone in the word lei-

sure which involves the absence of being driven by material necessity. In leisure, ideally, one does what one chooses and does it with interest, often with ease and freedom. Individually chosen goals pursued with disregard of economic and social pressures have characterized some of man's finest achievements.

To discuss the economics of leisure, one must think of it in economic categories. Such categories are production and consumption, demand and supply, the allocation of scarce resources to the end of fulfilling wants in the order of their importance. In this sense, leisure is a function of the demand for and supply of time. In the culture to which we are accustomed, most people sell part of their time to others—employers or customers—time to be occupied in producing what others want. People sell time primarily so that they may acquire enough money income to buy products sold by others. What one does in sold time is “the job.” Time sold is commonly thought of as work. Time not sold, “one's own time,” “free time,” is thought of as leisure, no matter what one does with it. Let us adopt this

common distinction as a working definition of leisure because, as I hope will appear, it is well suited to economic analysis.

Leisure, then, is time not sold; time not to be used at the direction of others; but rather time during which the individual is, or may be, master of his own living. It is in essence a nonpecuniary, nonmarket element in our largely commercial culture, though it may be strongly conditioned by that culture.

LEISURE AND PRODUCTION

In past civilizations, leisure was enjoyed only by a small proportion of the population. These few were typically owners of great landed estates who received the goods and services they consumed by virtue of their station and heritage. As commercial and, later, industrial civilization grew, some persons accumulated other forms of income-yielding property, such as money capital lent at interest or directly owned business establishments. Meanwhile the great majority toiled long hours for little more than enough to sustain life. The wide disparity in wealth and privilege was not, however, the primary cause of lack of leisure for the masses. Even more basic was the lack of enough production to sustain the population at more than a minimum level. The total income of the rich, since they were relatively few, if distributed evenly among all, would have added little to the incomes of those at lower levels in the social pyramid.

This situation has been altered only during the past century of rapid technological development. General enjoyment of both higher income and more leisure has been made possible because the output of goods and services has grown much faster than the population.

According to the most reliable statistical estimates, the real net national product in the United States grew about

thirteenfold between the decade 1869–78 and the decade 1944–53. During the same period the population increased only threefold. Real product per capita of the population therefore grew about four times in a little less than eighty years. The rate of its growth averaged about 1.9 per cent a year.

Net national product means, of course, the dollar value of all goods and services purchased by final users, excluding repair and replacement of existing productive equipment. It includes the products not only of manufacture, agriculture, and mining, but of transportation, distribution, construction, and services of all types. In real net national product the dollar figures are corrected for price changes, so that the totals of all years are approximately the same as if average prices had not fallen or risen at all.

Productivity

In 1850 the average worker, it is estimated, turned out about 34 cents' worth per hour—having the same purchasing power in cents as in 1950. By 1950 the average worker produced about \$1.94 worth per hour, or more than five times as much as a century earlier. The total man-hours worked grew somewhat less than five times between 1850 and 1950. The real value of the total output thus increased about twenty-five times, while the population was growing at a much slower rate. Obviously this gain permitted a rapid rise in consumption of goods and services by the average American. At the same time it made possible a reduction of the average hours worked. The standard working week in 1870 was about 70 hours; in 1950 it was about 40 hours—a reduction of about two-fifths.¹

¹ J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources: A New Survey* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), p. 902.

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Output per man-hour, often called productivity, if multiplied by the number of man-hours worked, equals the total produced in any period. The number of man-hours depends on two factors—the average time worked per member of the labor force and the number in the labor force.

When the labor force increases faster than the population, this development helps to raise total output and levels of living. In 1870 the labor force was 32.5 per cent of the population; thereafter the percentage rose steadily until by 1950 the labor force was 42 per cent of the population. This increase of the labor force as a part of the population helped to make possible a simultaneous rise in consumption per capita and reduction of working hours. In fact, however, the reduction in average working hours since the 1870's slightly more than cancels out the increase—relative to the population—of the labor force. The result therefore is not greatly different than if hours had not decreased and the

ratio of the labor force to population had not increased. The gain in per capita real income closely parallels the increase in productivity. If in the future the ratio of the labor force to population should cease growing, gains in shorter hours of work would have to be made at the expense of a less rapid rise in real income per head of the population than gains in productivity would otherwise make possible.

Size of labor force

Numerous influences have been at work, some to increase, some to limit, the size of the labor force. At the beginning of the period under discussion the birth rate was high, but the death rate, especially of infants and children, was high also. This meant that a larger part of the population was too young to earn money than in subsequent years when the birth rate and the death rate both were falling. A partly countervailing influence has been the abolition of child labor and the rise of the school-

TABLE 1—GROWTH OF THE LABOR FORCE, 1870-1953^a

YEAR	POPULATION		LABOR FORCE		
	TOTAL	10 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER	NUMBER	PER CENT OF POPULATION	PER CENT OF POPULATION 10 YEARS AND OVER
	(Millions)		(Millions)		
1870.....	39.8	29.1	12.9 ^a	32.5	44.4
1880.....	50.2	36.8	17.4 ^a	34.7	47.3
1890.....	62.6	47.4	22.8	36.4	48.1
1900.....	76.0	58.0	29.2	38.4	50.3
1910.....	92.0	71.6	36.0	39.1	50.3
1920.....	105.7	82.7	41.7	39.5	50.4
1930.....	122.8	98.7	49.3	40.1	49.9
1940.....	131.7	110.4	54.7	41.5	49.5
1950.....	151.1	121.8	63.5	42.0	52.1
1951.....	153.7	123.1	64.6	42.0	52.5
1952.....	156.4	124.6	65.3	41.7	52.4
1953.....	159.0	126.2	66.3	41.7	52.5

Source: J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources: A New Survey*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1955, Table 306, p. 725.

^a Figures for 1870 and 1880 represent those "gainfully employed," a somewhat broader concept than "labor force"; all figures at date census for particular year was taken.

TABLE 2—PER CENT OF POPULATION IN THE LABOR FORCE, BY SEX AND AGE, 1890-1950^a

YEAR	MALE				FEMALE			
	14-19 YEARS	20-34 YEARS	35-64 YEARS	65 YEARS AND OVER	14-19 YEARS	20-34 YEARS	35-64 YEARS	65 YEARS AND OVER
1890.....	54.2	94.7	94.9	70.1	25.6	23.3	13.3	8.6
1900.....	67.2	93.9	93.4	64.9	28.0	25.5	15.3	9.4
1920.....	55.8	94.3	93.9	57.1	29.6	30.1	19.1	8.2
1930.....	43.5	94.0	94.2	55.5	23.9	34.2	21.1	8.2
1940.....	38.4	93.8	93.0	43.4	19.8	39.8	24.8	6.8
1950.....	47.9	91.6	92.8	45.1	26.4	37.0	34.8	9.5

Source: J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources: A New Survey*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1955, Table 309, p. 728.

^a Estimates for 1910 not available.

leaving age, so that the average period of wage-earning now begins at a later age.

One of the main influences increasing the labor force has been the rapid growth of the percentage of women who work outside the home, especially in the middle-age brackets. An influence decreasing the ratio of the labor force to population has been the combination of a growth in numbers of persons over 65 with a decreasing percentage of the men in these age brackets who remain at work.

It will be seen from table 2 that a peak of work status for boys 14 to 19 was reached in 1900 at 67.2 per cent. Since then the figure declined to 38.4 per cent in 1940 and recovered—with the recovery in general employment from the depression of the 1930's—to 47.9 per cent in 1950.

Whereas 70.1 per cent of men 65 and over were in the labor force in 1890, the percentage shrank to 43.4 per cent in 1940 and 45.1 per cent in 1950.

The percentage of women who were in the labor force rose, in the age bracket 20 to 34, from 23.3 in 1890 to 37 in 1950; and, in the age bracket 35 to 64, from 13.3 in 1890 to 34.8 in 1950. Only minor changes took place in the lower and upper age brackets.

Since 1950 the percentage of the total

population in the labor force has been falling. This is due to a larger relative number of children under working age and the growing fraction of the population which consists of nonworkers over 65. Whether the "baby boom" will continue indefinitely cannot be predicted, although there are reasons for believing that the birth rate will not rise above present levels. It is also difficult to forecast whether or not the percentage of women who hold paid jobs will go on increasing. One anticipation is fairly certain—that the number of persons 65 and over will continue to increase and perhaps will increase rapidly. If the custom of retirement—voluntary and involuntary—continues to increase also, we may find that a large proportion of our new leisure class will consist of those in the upper-age brackets. If this leisure class is to be supplied with ample goods and services of the sorts produced in working time, the active labor force might find that it cannot gain much additional leisure without sacrificing desired increments in the amount of goods and services it is able to buy.

The prospects for further gains in productivity are bright, however. Even if the labor force should become a smaller fraction of the population than it has been in recent decades, output per man-hour may grow with sufficient rap-

idity so that there may be both more real income per capita and more leisure for all.

Unemployment and inflation

It would be unrealistic to pass on to other aspects of the subject without some mention of the effect on leisure of the recurrent chills and fever of our economy—unemployment and inflation. In depression, the labor force is unable to sell all the time it wants to devote to earning money; idleness is enforced by the lack of demand for workers. Since this idleness is not the result of voluntary choice, it does not fit the concept of leisure; it is a deprivation, not a privilege. The society suffers for lack of enough real income. Real leisure therefore shrinks, if it does not disappear. In inflation, unemployment virtually disappears; there is plenty of demand for labor in the aggregate. This demand results from a growth in spending faster than the increase in the products for sale at current prices; the outcome is a general rise in prices. But not everyone gains from inflation; the losers are those whose incomes do not rise as rapidly as the cost of the goods they are accustomed to buy. Of these persons, many will wish to work longer hours, or if possible to earn more by odd jobs. Thus their leisure is curtailed. Others who by choice or necessity have been living on fixed incomes—and many of these are dependent on pensions, annuities, and incomes from savings which are hardly sufficient at any time—become in effect unemployed; their leisure decays into enforced idleness. Inflation is therefore almost as destructive of real leisure as is depression.

LEISURE AND CONSUMER CHOICES

As economic productivity rises, the opportunity to choose between work and leisure rises with it. This choice may be made individually by persons who are

self-employed. The more they can satisfy their material wants in shorter working time, the greater their opportunity to choose more time for other pursuits. In our highly organized industrial society, to be sure, a large proportion of money-earners are employed by others and must, as a rule, work the hours which are specified for their jobs. Here the choice must be exercised through collective bargaining or influence on legislation. In pressing for shorter working hours, however, union members as a whole, whether they are conscious of it or not, are in fact making a choice between enjoyment of leisure and enjoyment of the purchasable goods that might have been produced by longer hours on the job.

The value of free time to the worker is in a sense set by what economists might call its "opportunity cost"; that is, free hours are chosen by the wage- or salary-earner because they are worth more to him than the opportunity to raise the country's output and thus indirectly make available to him a larger volume of goods. The opportunity cost of leisure rises as *standards* of living rise. If a worker of today were content with the goods and services which would have seemed sufficient to a worker of a hundred years ago, he might have much more free time than he has. To earn ample food, comfortable clothing, and a roof over his head would not require nearly as long hours as are now prevalent. But wants for purchasable goods have risen as productivity has risen. Prevalent standards of living include, among other things, automobiles, radios and television sets, mechanical refrigerators, washers, vacuum cleaners, longer dependency of children as they spend more years at school, more medical services, unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, and the multifarious tax-supported services of government. From time to time philosophically minded per-

sons object that such embellishments of living are not worth what they cost. For this point of view, expressed more than a hundred years ago, the classic American argument is Henry David Thoreau's *Walden*. In an economic sense, *Walden* might be called a plea for reduction of the opportunity cost of leisure.

Leisure, regarded as a deliberate choice of time in which to do what one chooses instead of what someone else chooses, is not always sharply distinguished from the job. There are fortunate persons who are able to make their livings doing what they most enjoy for its own sake; such persons have what might be called leisure in work. Perhaps the research scientist, the skilled craftsman, the rare successful painter or musician may make a modest income following his vocation. The converse of this role is played by the equally few and equally fortunate individuals who have sufficient independent means so that they can and do choose a highly satisfying vocation without regard to monetary reward; they illustrate work in leisure. Our society might be a more healthy and happy one if work and leisure could be more generally combined in one of these ways. Most of us, however, are compelled to make a choice concerning how we apportion our time between work and leisure. Like all economic choices, this is governed by a sense of relative values as determined by the consumer—the consumer of both salable goods and free time.

MARKET DEMAND AND LEISURE

The fact that so many people have gained access to so much time away from the machine or the desk has of course stimulated numerous industries which make goods usable in free time. Perhaps the first of these to feel a marked effect from growing leisure was the automobile—at the beginning sold

to the well to do or the eccentric and used by others, when it was used, mainly for transportation to or from the job or as a substitute for the traditional carriage drive on Sunday afternoons. The motor car, of course, has been employed increasingly for utilitarian transportation; but after the 48-hour week became general during World War I, it also became virtually a necessity in getting to and from places where recreation facilities were available. On increasingly longer weekends and vacations, Americans have taken to the road. In 1950 vacation travel topped the list of American expenditures for recreation; it is estimated that 12 billion dollars was spent. The American Automobile Association states that 66 million people take annual automobile vacations. About 85 per cent of vacation travel is by motor car.²

Many others depend for a large proportion of their sales on the automobile manufacturing industry. The use of automobiles leads to a demand not only for private resorts, service stations and motor inns that line the main highways, but for governmentally financed facilities such as roads, bridges, parks, golf courses, camping sites, swimming pools, and the like.

Radio was perhaps the next great industry to develop under the intensive stimulus of the enlarged free time of consumers. It did not appear on the civilian market until after 1918, and its growth was extremely rapid. Together with its cousins or offshoots—television, phonographs, records, and musical instruments—it accounted in 1950 for more than 31 per cent of the 10.5 billion dollars spent for strictly recreation goods and services. Reading, hobbies—including the wide range of do-it-yourself aids and pets—took 19 per cent of the 10.5 billion dollars; sports equipment 18.2 per cent; theaters, entertainment, and amusements—most of this

² *Ibid.*, p. 355.

classification consists of motion pictures—absorbed 16.6 per cent. Few of these products are newcomers on the market, but their rise to great industries could scarcely have occurred without the increase in leisure.

Participant recreation services, it was estimated, absorbed about 7.5 per cent of the strictly recreation market; organizations and clubs 5.0 per cent; and spectator sports such as admissions to ball parks, hockey rinks and racetracks, a mere 2.6 per cent.

If one should include in recreation, in addition to vacation travel and strictly recreation goods and services, such things as governmental recreation facilities, liquor, tobacco, sport clothes, candy, soft drinks, and chewing gum, the total consumer expenditure in 1950 would be 40.5 billion dollars or considerably more than 10 per cent of the gross national product for that year.³

In a rather materialistic sense, therefore, the access of huge amounts of free time has paid its way by providing expansion of markets and employment opportunity. It is unlikely that the demand for food or clothing—two of the basic human necessities—would have grown more rapidly than it actually did grow if consumers had not used so large a part of their disposable incomes for recreation products. In fact, the demand for basic food products has not risen faster than the population over a recent period; the expansion of food-processing and -marketing industries has been a response mainly to the desire of people, and of housewives particularly, to save time for other things than home preparation of meals. Clothing and textiles have not been classified among the most rapidly growing industries. The expansion of leisure is a factor of the first importance in the structure and growth of the American economy.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 357, 349, 347, 348.

CONSUMERS' CHOICE AND ALLOCATION OF TIME

One of the chief concerns of economic theory is the allocation of scarce resources in accordance with the wants of consumers. The standard categories of scarce resources are land—that is, natural resources of all kinds—labor, and capital. If in any country there is superabundant land in relation to population, raw land is costless or at least cheap. Superabundant labor often cannot be sold at any price. Capital costs decline towards zero as the supply grows in relation to the demand. But all these resources do as a rule command a price in modern societies because they are not often so abundant in relation to the demand for them that they can be had for the asking.

The conventional theory holds that scarce resources are allocated by a market system to meet the wants of consumers in the order of their urgency. Market demand offers signposts to the producers which, through the price and profit system, determine the nature of goods produced.

Consumers—who are in large part producers too—have demonstrated by their choices that they regard time as a scarce resource also. They sell some of their time in exchange for money with which to acquire marketed goods and services, but they have been willing to sell only a decreasing amount of it for this purpose. Each consumer regards his time as his private property, limited in quantity. As goods which can be bought by selling it increase in quantity, they tend to become worth less to the private owner of his own time than other uses that he can make of that limited and irreplaceable resource. In this sense the market system tends to allocate time in accord with the wishes of time consumers, just as it allocates land, labor, and capital. That is, through the mar-

ket for their time, workers decide how much of it they wish to sell at the price offered in preference to devoting it to their individual uses. As they keep more time off the market, the time they do offer for sale commands a higher price, partly because it becomes scarcer relative to the demand for it. The demand for workers' time increases as rising productivity makes it worth more to the employer or customer.

What of the allocation of the free time which the worker reserves for himself? He "spends" it, as we say, doing whatever happens most to appeal to him. It can be measured by hours, days, or perhaps weeks, just as marketable goods and services are measured by dollars and cents. The consumer of the pursuits or enjoyments for which he exchanges his free time is the judge of how much he spends for each way of occupying his leisure. The decision ultimately is, and ought to be, his; otherwise leisure would become as unfree and as subject to authoritative decision as the time that is sold. Yet it is possible to question whether the spender of free time always gets his time's worth; whether he wisely budgets his time income, or is cheated by occupying himself with pursuits which, as we say, are not "worth while."

Use of free time by Americans

Unfortunately we do not have as good figures showing how Americans spend their free time as the figures which reveal their spending of money. Sociologists have made partial observations of limited groups and have reached, now and then, conclusions that are disquieting to persons who adhere to the traditional values on which Western civilization is supposed to be founded. It is said that individual choice is at a discount; that persons do, not so much what their innermost selves might lead them to do, as what conformity requires

in order to rise in the social or economic scale. It is charged that great opportunities to increase knowledge, wisdom, or aesthetic enjoyment are wasted because, although people read much, they do not read many books; instead they choose literature desired for ephemeral entertainment. Even the books they do read are said to be largely sex thrillers and detective stories.

Great industries compete for the free time of the citizen, and in doing so they often use the same kind of sales methods that are employed to merchandise soap, proprietary medicines, cigarettes. Thus a commercial culture, it is said, warps the tastes and values of the public, ignoring the minorities none of whom is large enough to repay attention by those intent on exploiting a mass market.

It used to be said—though not so often of late years—that people in general act as passive spectators of games rather than engaging in sports and games themselves. Spectatorship is not always entirely passive; it depends on what one is looking. And in any case, what facts we have indicate that participant sports are widespread and popular; spectator activities often find it difficult to draw audiences. About three times as much was spent in recent years on participant recreation activities as on spectator sports. More is spent on concerts than on professional baseball games. More than 2,000 towns and cities regularly offer good music; there are 200 symphony orchestras in the country.

Figures do show that people choose a large variety of occupations for their leisure. There are some 34 million cameras in the possession of amateur photographers. In 1952, 60 million dollars' worth of tools were bought for home workshops. Fishermen bought 18 million fishing licenses in 1953. There are, it is estimated, 18 million bicyclists, 17 million roller skaters, 20 million

bowlers, and 5 million horseshoe players. One estimate is that 4 million own power boats and a half million own sailboats. Golf, which used to be played only at country clubs by the well to do, is now played by persons in almost all income levels—4 million of them.⁴

These are only a few of the hundreds of ways in which Americans spend leisure time. Leisure occupations include amateur practice of all the fine arts; building, repairing, and decoration of houses and furniture; fabricating of products requiring special skills—though as a rule not for sale—like short-wave wireless sets, high-fidelity phonograph receivers, model boats and trains; unpaid social service and political activities; study in schools, colleges and adult education courses. There is an immense field here for social and psychological research which, though difficult to formulate and execute, might enlighten us considerably on the nature and tendencies of our culture.

VALUES IN FREE-TIME USE

In traditional economic analysis, the value of any marketable good or service is measured approximately and over the long run by its price—that is, in dollars and cents. This analogy does not carry over into the measurement of relative value in the use of time. A half hour of one experience may be thought worth more than a week of another, although both be freely chosen by the same person. People commonly speak of a “rewarding” experience; yet the measure is not in units of astronomical time, but is essentially subjective, though it may be, and often is, shared.

Is it possible to develop, or even to conceive, any unit of currency by which to measure the relative values of those experiences or pursuits for which people

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 358–66.

exchange their limited budgets of leisure time? Perhaps not, in any literal sense, yet common speech and individual reflection often imply that there is a rough scale by which any one person measures the values of his freely chosen experiences. And, since man is not only an individual but also a social animal, the culture in which he lives must play some part in this evaluation—at least to the extent of the kinds and the range of choices which it makes available to him.

It would be a calamity if choices were determined by social pressures, however subtle or disguised; but there can only be gain from a more general use of genuine and intelligent critical faculties in evaluating the relative worth of various ways of spending time. If, as seems probable, our society becomes one characterized even more by leisure than by work, the sharpening of such critical awareness by many individuals might even be a condition of its survival. Certainly, it would aid any possible flowering into a great society comparable with the golden ages of the past.

This realm of values is not one to be summarized in a sentence, a paragraph, or even many volumes. It involves innumerable, difficult, and subtle problems. The most the economist can do is to point out its existence and its significance in our history. Since Americans are proving by their choices that they increasingly prefer individually directed free time to time governed by the business discipline and bartered for purchasable goods and services, the problem of how free time is allocated, or might be allocated, is of crucial importance, both in the immediate experience of each person and in the attempt to understand the nature and direction of our society. It might be called a problem of meta-economics, in the study of which all the humanities may find a new dimension.

Population Changes to 1975

By CONRAD TAEUBER

Abstract: Within the next two decades American population will undergo substantial changes both in size and age structure. Persons in their twenties will increase; those between 35 and 44 will decrease; and those between 45 and 64 will increase. Large increases will occur in the senior citizens age group, and a sharp increase in the number of teenagers and children under 10 may be expected.

THE prospective changes in the population of the United States over the next twenty years will not affect all groups equally. Some age groups will grow much more rapidly than others; some may even decline in numbers. The interpretation which will be placed on the changing trends will vary, depending upon which group is at the center of interest.

The recent high level of births will be reflected by 1975 in an increase in the number of persons in their twenties. This age group is expected to increase by 14 million persons—a gain of nearly two-thirds over their numbers in 1955. The relatively low birth rates of the depression years will be reflected in a decline in the number of persons between 35 and 44 in 1975. For persons who are between 45 and 64 years old, there will be an increase of nearly 10 million. The senior citizens who are 65 or over will increase by about 6.5 million—from slightly more than 14 million in 1955 to somewhat over 20.7 million in 1975.

The persons who will be 20 years old or over in 1975 are already living. Projecting their numbers to 1975 requires simply an estimate of the prospective mortality rates and of the exchange of population with foreign countries. Mortality rates at most of the younger adult

ages are already so low that even if relatively large improvements were made, the prospective changes in the numbers of persons in each age group would be affected very little. The estimates of survivors for persons at the advanced ages may prove to be too low if there should be further rapid reductions in the death rates from the diseases that characterize these ages. The possibility of a dramatic break-through in the control of diseases affecting the heart or the circulatory system or in the diseases generally lumped under the heading of cancer, could, of course, have marked effects. Should such developments occur, the estimated number of persons 65 and over would be larger than the number shown in these projections. Such a shift presumably would have even more striking results for persons 75 and over who are expected to increase their numbers by about two-thirds—from 4.7 million in 1955 to 7.5 million in 1975.

Projecting the volume of immigration over a long period of time poses some difficulties, for the volume of immigration is subject primarily to legislative and administrative control. The levels may, therefore, be subject to some fluctuations over time. However, immigration in recent years has played only a very small part in the total population growth and it is assumed that its con-

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tributions to total growth are likely to continue to be small, at a level of approximately 250,000 per year.

The major question in projecting the total population to 1975 relates to the future development in the birth rate and the number of births. Recovery from the low level of births during the depression years was slow until the onset of World War II. At the close of the war the number of births reached an all-time high of 3.8 million in 1947. Instead of dropping back to earlier levels, the number of births has continued at a relatively high level and for 1956 it is estimated at 4.2 million. A part of this increase can be explained by the increasing proportion of women who marry, particularly of those who married at relatively young ages. There has been also some increase in the average fertility of married women as well as a decline in the number and proportion of women with extremely large families.

Obviously the number of persons who will be under 20 in 1975 depends primarily on the number of births that

occur during the next twenty years. Further improvement in death rates may occur particularly at the very young ages, but the major uncertainty relates to the number of births. Since virtually all of the increase in the total population of the country reflects the difference between births and deaths, the estimates of the total population in 1975 depend very largely on the estimates of the number of births.

POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR 1975

The Bureau of the Census has made a series of population projections for 1975. These assume that there will be no major war or other catastrophe; that immigration will continue at approximately the levels reached in recent years; and that death rates will continue at approximately the levels reached in 1956. For birth rates, four different assumptions are used.

Series AA: "Present" levels (1954-55) remain constant to 1975.

TABLE 1—TOTAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE AND SEX, IN 1955, AND AS PROJECTED FOR 1975
(In thousands)

AGE AND SEX	1955	1975			
		AA	A	B	C
TOTAL All ages.....	165,271	228,463	221,522	214,580	206,907
Under 20.....	59,989	92,163	85,222	78,280	70,607
Under 5.....	18,305	26,775	24,596	19,290	18,233
5 to 13.....	28,101	41,028	38,082	36,446	31,640
14 to 17.....	9,241	16,278	15,066	15,066	13,686
18 and 19.....	4,342	8,082	7,478	7,478	7,048
20 and over.....	105,282	136,300			
20 and 21.....	4,235	7,986			
22 to 24.....	6,540	11,295			
25 to 44.....	46,978	53,212			
45 to 64.....	33,460	43,152			
65 and over.....	14,069	20,655			
65 to 74.....	9,416	13,107			
75 and over.....	4,653	7,548			

TABLE 1—TOTAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE AND SEX, IN 1955 AND AS PROJECTED FOR 1975—Continued
(In thousands)

AGE AND SEX	1955	1975			
		AA	A	B	C
MALE All ages.....	82,016	112,682	109,134	105,583	101,662
Under 20.....	30,560	47,081	43,533	39,982	36,061
Under 5.....	9,324	13,671	12,556	9,842	9,301
5 to 13.....	14,337	20,976	19,470	18,633	16,176
14 to 17.....	4,698	8,310	7,691	7,691	6,987
18 and 19.....	2,201	4,124	3,816	3,816	3,597
20 and over.....	51,456	65,601			
20 and 21.....	2,129	4,047			
22 to 24.....	3,275	5,720			
25 to 44.....	23,077	26,671			
45 to 64.....	16,447	20,474			
65 and over.....	6,528	8,689			
65 to 74.....	4,470	5,711			
75 and over.....	2,058	2,978			
FEMALE All ages.....	83,255*	115,781	112,388	108,997	105,245
Under 20.....	29,429	45,082	41,689	38,298	34,546
Under 5.....	8,981	13,104	12,040	9,448	8,932
5 to 13.....	13,763	20,052	18,612	17,813	15,464
14 to 17.....	4,544	7,968	7,375	7,375	6,699
18 and 19.....	2,141	3,958	3,662	3,662	3,451
20 and over.....	53,825	70,699			
20 and 21.....	2,106	3,939			
22 to 24.....	3,265	5,575			
25 to 44.....	23,900	26,541			
45 to 64.....	17,013	22,678			
65 and over.....	7,541	11,966			
65 to 74.....	4,946	7,396			
75 and over.....	2,595	4,570			

Source: 1955, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 146; 1975, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 123.

* Totals for all ages based on the sum of figures for 5-year age groups.

Series A: 1950-53 rates remain constant to 1975.

Series B: 1950-53 rates remain constant to 1965, then drop linearly to roughly the 1940-42 level by 1975.

Series C: 1950-53 rates decline linearly to roughly the 1940-42 level by 1975.

The results of carrying forward the computations on the basis of these

assumptions are given in Table 1. Whether the total population will be 207 million or 228 million, greater or less than either of these numbers, or somewhere in between will depend entirely on how closely developments over the next twenty years correspond to the assumptions that were used in arriving at these totals. It would not be difficult to set up other reasonable assumptions

ESTIMATED CHANGES IN POPULATION By Age Groups: 1955 To 1975




FIG. 1. Estimated changes in population, by age groups: 1955 to 1975.

which would lead one to somewhat different results. These figures do give a basis for assessing foreseeable changes and provide a basis for planning action programs.

Changes by age groups are illustrated in Figure 1. It shows that if current fertility rates should continue through 1975, there would be sharp increases in the number of teen-agers as well as in the number of children under ten. The increase in the number of younger children over the 1955 numbers would be due to the fact that the relatively high fertility levels of the present period would apply to the large number of women in their twenties in 1975. Should the lowest fertility rates used for these computations prevail in the later years, the number of children under five might actually show a decline below the levels of 1955. In that case they would be the beginning of another cycle of a small-age group passing through the life span, much as the small-birth cohort of the early 1930's can be traced through these figures.

The number of teen-agers in 1955 was nearly 25 million. These computations indicate increases by 1975 of somewhere between 10 and 17 million; but as stated above, these numbers are subject to changes in the number of births during the next years.

School officials and all other persons concerned with education are aware of the large increase in the number of children in grade schools in recent years. It is not difficult to forecast when these large-age classes will enter high schools or colleges. The most dramatic change in the nation's population between 1955 and 1965 is the increase of the teen-age groups. Ten years later these persons will have reached the ages at which entry into the labor force and the establishment of households take place, and they will be replacing the relatively small numbers of persons who are the survivors of the depression years' births.

The record number of births of recent years apparently has assured that the average age by 1975 will be less than that in 1955. The median age at present is approximately 30, by 1975 it will have dropped to about 26 if the high level of fertility is maintained, or to less than 29 if the lowest level assumed in these projections is the one that prevails. The proportion expected in each major age group is given in Table 2.

Since women tend to live longer than men, the proportion of women 65 and over in the population is greater than that of men. The proportion of women who are 65 and over is expected to continue to increase.

TABLE 2—AGE COMPOSITION BY SEX, IN 1955, AND AS PROJECTED FOR 1975

AGE	MALE			FEMALE		
	1955	1975		1955	1975	
		AA	C		AA	C
All ages*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 20.....	37.3	41.8	35.5	35.3	38.9	32.8
20 to 24.....	6.6	8.7	9.6	6.5	8.2	9.0
25 to 44.....	28.1	23.7	26.2	28.7	22.9	25.2
45 to 64.....	20.1	18.2	20.1	20.4	19.6	21.5
65 and over.....	8.0	7.7	8.5	9.1	10.3	11.4

Source: See TABLE 1.

* Details may not add to totals owing to rounding.

ESTABLISHMENT OF HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES

The establishment of families and households is closely related to changes in the numbers of the population. The total number of households is likely to increase more rapidly between 1965 and 1975 than between 1955 and 1965. Projecting the total increase in households over this time span requires projection of marriage and remarriage rates, of rates of undoubling of households, and estimates of the tendency of young and older persons to maintain their own households. The number of households in 1955 was approximately 48 million; by 1975 it will probably be in excess of 60 million. A series of recent projections, allowing for differences in the factors affecting household formation, indicates that the number may be approximately 62 million or may rise to more nearly 67 million. The number of families consisting of husband and wife, with or without children, is expected to increase more rapidly after 1965 than previously. There were 36 million such families in 1955; the numbers for 1975 are given at 46 to 50 million.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE POPULATION

Projecting the regional distribution of the future population of the United States is even more hazardous than projecting the total numbers of that population. However, some major trends are apparent. For many decades the Western states have grown more rapidly than any other region. Since 1950 the West has grown more than twice as rapidly as any other region. The slowest rate of growth has been that in the Northeast. In recent years, as through most of the years since 1900, the South has experienced heavy migration to other parts of

the country. However, the excess of births over deaths has been greater than the net migration to other areas, and the population of the South has continued to grow. Whether states gain or lose population depends on many factors. Some of the states with relatively large rural population have had losses in the past and may well report losses in population again in the future. The continued expansion of industry and the shifts which may occur in the location of industry make it difficult to project population totals reliably for individual states.

There is, however, one trend in population distribution which seems firmly established and likely to continue for some time. Ever since the founding of the country, the cities have grown more rapidly than the rural areas, and there has been a marked tendency of the population to be concentrated in a relatively small number of areas. The 1950 Census recognized 168 standard metropolitan areas, that is, counties or groups of counties surrounding cities of 50,000 or over. These standard metropolitan areas in 1950 included 56 per cent of the nation's population. Since 1900 they have grown more rapidly than the rest of the nation. This more rapid growth in the metropolitan areas has continued with the result that by 1956 the proportion of the national population living there had grown to 59 per cent. Seven-eighths of the national population growth between 1950 and 1956 occurred in these 168 areas. Within these areas the growth in recent years has tended to be outside the central city. Between 1950 and 1956 only one-fifth of the population increase within the standard metropolitan areas occurred in the central cities. The remainder occurred in the incorporated and unincorporated areas outside these central cities. Some of the central cities may well have declined in population during that time.

Whether we are approaching the limit of development outside the central cities and whether proposed redevelopment will lead to greater population growth within the cities is not clear. What does appear to be clear, however, is that Americans have a preference for living in the relatively dense clusters of population of standard metropolitan areas and that their share of the national total will probably continue to increase. Con-

versely, the farm population, which has shown substantial decline in recent years, may be expected to continue to decline as the efficiency of agricultural production is increased and as persons now living on farms shift their attention to nonagricultural pursuits. Other rural territory may grow at a slow rate. Most of the growth which has occurred in such areas in recent times has been related to the growth of the metropolitan areas.

Future Metropolitan Growth and Planning

By JOHN T. HOWARD

Abstract: United States metropolitan areas are growing rapidly and are absorbing ever-increasing quantities of rural land. By 1975, two thirds of the United States population will live in metropolitan areas. Growth is rapid, sprawling, disorganized; it is creating a need for metropolitan planning still unmet. Planning concepts propose that new metropolitan growth be shaped into communities of healthful size separated by "green belts" which can also provide recreational settings in natural open space. Standards call for 20 acres of regional public open space per 1,000 ultimate metropolitan population; this space should be reserved now, but suitable lands are being engulfed. The challenge is urgent.

THE United States has become a metropolitan nation. As long ago as 1920 we changed from rural to urban with more than half of our population living in urban areas. By 1950, the census showed that 56 per cent of the American people lived in the 168 standard metropolitan areas ranging in size from Laredo, Texas with a population of 56,141 to New York with a population of 12,911,994. But even these figures do not suggest the extent to which the country has gravitated to the orbit of the big city. In 1950, 1 out of every 12 Americans lived in the New York area (which spills over into New Jersey and Connecticut). One out of 3 lived in the 21 metropolitan areas with a population of over 700,000.

This situation is the result of a trend which gained momentum in the postwar years—a period of rapid population increase which shows no sign of not continuing. It is estimated that between 1950 and 1957 when the population of the country grew by another 15 million, the metropolitan areas received 90 per cent of the total increase. If these trends continue—and everything indi-

cates that they will—the United States may have 225 million inhabitants by 1975, and over 60 million of the increase will swell our metropolitan areas to a total of 150 million. By that time two-thirds of the national population will be "metropolitan."

These figures, however, can create a false picture in the minds of those whose concept of "city" was formed a few decades ago. The words urban and metropolitan in their statistical meanings no longer connote densely built-up areas with most of the ground covered by structures three stories high or taller, where a tree is a rarity and grass a luxury. The pattern of metropolitan growth in recent decades has been occurring at progressively lower densities, bringing a marked change in character and even in structure. This change has significant implications for recreation.

Almost all of the housing built in post-World War II times has been single-family houses constructed on larger lots. In 1850 a standard city lot was 20 feet wide in many cities; it increased to 30 feet by 1900 and to 40 feet by 1925. For today's one-story

house, 60 feet is the minimum width and 80 to 100 feet is common. Every family provided with a new house today uses about twice as much land as did a new family only thirty years ago. This is as true for apartment living as for single houses; the buildings are lower and farther apart and less of the land is covered. However, a successively smaller proportion of the metropolitan population is living in apartments.

The implications for local community recreation plans and programs are obvious. In any district built up since World War II, public land for preschool-child play is much less needed than in older areas. In suburban areas where lot sizes range from half an acre to one, two, or four acres, even the playground for elementary ages becomes of questionable need and doubtful use except for organized sport like little league baseball. And the needs of parents with a garden to work in are different from those of adults living in elevator apartments.

There are, of course, other kinds of implications also bearing on the nature of recreation programs for the sociologist to identify. The growth has been typically large-scale, with dozens or even thousands of dwelling units built as a single enterprise. By the workings of the mechanics of the housing market, these "projects" are typically stratified as to economic level, age group, and even family composition and size; they are most certainly abnormal social groupings, whose problems are receiving attention currently.

From the point of view of metropolitan growth and change, however, the most significant feature of the new pattern is its low density. This applies not only to residential areas, but also to industry and business. The factory used to be stacked four stories high covering its whole lot and jamming several hundred employees onto each acre; now, it

consists of one story with a vast parking area and a landscaped setting and may average only ten employees per acre. The grocery store with its parking requirements now needs five to ten times as much land area as it did a few decades ago. Every component of our urban structure now uses more land to do its job, whether it be school, office building, or highway. (The automobile has been the implement of this change and to some extent its cause and effect.)

The first consequence of this complex of lower densities is a shocking shift in the land needs of urban populations. A century ago, when a city increased by a thousand people it needed to "urbanize" only an additional ten acres. Thirty years ago, thirty acres were needed. Today, each population increase of one thousand in a metropolitan area absorbs between one to two hundred additional acres!

Coupled with our meteoric metropolitan population growth, this factor has resulted in the metropolitan explosion that has taken place all over the United States, consuming rural land—urbanizing it according to these new patterns—at a rate comparable to that earlier explosion when we agriculturalized a wilderness. Never has our landscape changed so rapidly; never have we exploited a natural resource more irretrievably.

METROPOLITAN PLANNING OBJECTIVES

All the forces that have wrought these changes are still at work. Whatever is done to the obsolete central areas of our cities, the trends of dispersion and decentralization cannot—should not—be reversed. Our slums and blighted areas must be cleared, but they cannot rehouse more people than live there now, and in most cases, must displace many families. Therefore an even greater number than the future net population increase must be housed on new land. Our downtowns must be redeveloped to per-

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form the core "brain" functions for still bigger metropolitan hinterlands; but they can accommodate comparatively few additional office workers, fewer shoppers, and much fewer industrial workers than at present. Almost all of the new working places and retail services for the new population also must be taken care of on new land.

Gradually a recognition is growing that our present metropolitan complexes fall short of desirable and realizable goals: of efficiency and economy of operation, both for private enterprise and for government; of convenience and pleasantness of living; of social organization; and of opportunity for individual fulfillment. If the present situation is unsatisfactory, and if the recent trends continue, we have not yet seen the worst.

A movement for metropolitan planning is growing, not as a substitute for attacks upon the social, economic, and political problems besetting the metropolis, but in the hope and expectation that the guidance of physical growth and the improvement of physical environment will complement these attacks and will contribute to progress in these fields. Metropolitan planning as a public function is only as far advanced as was city planning a generation ago. But metropolitan planning as a technology is developing its concepts and objectives. These concepts have some bearing upon metropolitan recreation problems.

Metropolitan planning focuses most of its concern upon the new lands fringing the recently urbanized ring, the rural areas that must receive the impact of future growth. Its key problem is to devise a pattern and structure of growth to accommodate all of the urban functions for the future's vastly larger metropolitan populations. Although the planning is physical, its criteria are social and economic, and its implementation must be through political means. There is no adopted doctrine for metro-

politan planning, but there is a substantial concurrence of thought in the American planning profession on a number of aspects.

IDEAL METROPOLITAN AREA

The idealized concept of tomorrow's metropolitan area is of a constellation of communities—each incorporating many of its own services and working places, but all also strongly linked to the others and to the metropolitan core. This link will be formed by shared regional services and by circulation facilities affording a wide range of individual opportunities for choice of working place and for cultural, business, and recreation experiences.

An essential of this concept is that the communities should be limited to a size that fosters a sense of community and to a scale keyed to the individual person or family. This does not mean that all communities should be of the same size or have the same character; the objective of offering a varied choice would be impaired if they were. No optimum size has been proposed, nor probably can it be. The central core community should probably be smaller than the consolidated, undifferentiated centers of our present larger metropolitan areas. The new growth should and can be held to smaller aggregates, with perhaps some communities being as small as 5,000, a few as large as 100,000, and most in between. The classical garden-city size of 30,000 would still be a reasonable average.

Physical separation is an essential feature of this concept of community. Even if each were a distinct governmental unit, the political boundaries alone would not assure social coherence. An actual physical separation would seem to be necessary: at best, a range of hills, a body of water, or some such emphatic separation; but at least, a space that is different in character from

the urban communities themselves, a nonurban space of rural or otherwise unbuilt land.

There are, of course, a number of land uses essential to metropolitan life that can occupy these insulating "green belts." Airports, reservoir watershed protective areas, some kinds of hospitals and institutions suggest themselves. Agriculture may be the uniquely appropriate use of certain soils—orchards, truck gardens, dairy farms. But the most obviously desirable use for a large part of such area with the land left in its natural state is recreation.

The metropolitan planner, then, approaches the task of providing for future recreation space from two points of view: first for its own sake, as an essential function with specific requirements for land areas in particular places and of specific sizes; and second, as a potentially significant aid in shaping the form and structure of all other urban development.

METROPOLITAN RECREATION SPACE STANDARDS

At the metropolitan scale, the elements that compose a plan are only those that occupy large land areas. The fine scale of neighborhood design is another level of planning—the size and location of local shopping facilities, elementary schools, and churches, the layout of individual subdivisions. This means that the small local elements of the recreation system, the playground and the neighborhood park, are also lost in a metropolitan plan. They are not forgotten; they are counted in the rough calculations of the number of acres of neighborhood needed to house a given number of people. It is only the larger recreation areas which are a part of the metropolitan design and the size and location of which are problems—and opportunities—for metropolitan planning.

There are three main kinds of recrea-

tional facilities that fall into this large-area category: the large park, the natural reservation, and certain special-purpose areas like golf courses and beaches. These three facilities require major acreages to perform their functions. They share another characteristic; all require natural land—they cannot be practically redeveloped out of sites that have been urbanized. (Some beaches may be exceptions because they can be built by fill in front of previously urbanized shores.)

The two requirements—great size and natural site—make these recreation areas unique elements of a metropolitan plan. Almost everything else—residential areas, business centers, industry, schools, highways—can be planned for some intermediate future target date, say twenty or twenty-five years ahead. The sizes planned for these other elements can be scaled to the expected or desired population at that date, with the prospect of making them bigger when future needs require it. Perhaps this cannot be done easily, but certainly it can be achieved feasibly. The large park, the natural reservation, and the golf course are different. Land for these purposes must be set aside now in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the ultimate population!

And what will these needs be? Not only is it necessary to forecast the population itself, but also to establish some standard of area requirements per unit of population. Such standards exist, but they have been changing in recent years.

A generation ago, the total of all kinds of recreation space for a metropolitan area was proposed at a rate of 10 acres per 1,000 persons. Of this, 3 to 4 acres were of the small-scale or urban kind, leaving 6 to 7 acres for the big-space projects. Currently a standard of 20 total acres per 1,000 persons is being urged, of which perhaps 15 would be in

the latter category. This doubling of the recommended ratio has occurred during a period when leisure time has been greatly increased and when the use of these facilities has increased correspondingly.

The age of automation almost certainly will place a far greater number of leisure hours at the disposal of our urban populations. As the nature of work changes still further from manual to mental, outdoor recreation will presumably grow still more in its appeal. And as working days shorten, and highways improve, outdoor recreation can be sought at greater distances from home. Of course, a shorter working week may make possible recreation trips long enough to take people out of the metropolitan area entirely and so out of the geographical area with which this paper is concerned. But the prospect of a large proportion of people being able to maintain a permanent vacation house is surely a distant one. And families with school children, at least, will have no longer weekends than at present; welcome as it might be to the pupils, a four-day school week has not yet become a likely prospect.

There seems to be every likelihood, then, that if the current standard of acres per thousand persons is valid for the present situation, the future will justify a still higher standard. It would surely be prudently conservative to forecast that our metropolitan areas will need at least 20 acres of natural park and reservation land for each 1,000 inhabitants.

QUANTITY AND LOCATION OF METROPOLITAN RECREATION SPACE

What that ultimate total will be cannot be guessed now; the limit is more likely to be determined by the capacity of the area than by the reduction of pressures for growth. Capacity, in turn,

is a consequence of the development standards accepted. It has already been noted that in many metropolitan areas the addition of 1,000 inhabitants absorbs an area of 100 to 200 acres of newly urbanized land. For some metropolitan districts—Baltimore, for instance, hemmed in by Washington and Philadelphia—ultimate capacity can thus be estimated already. For other cities which can expand indefinitely in territory, the pattern of development becomes almost more important than its size.

Another aspect of a planning standard for large-scale recreation spaces is that of location. It is not enough to have an adequate quantity of land; it must also be in the right places and be accessible to the people it serves. This suggests, also, returning to the concept of limited urban development, organized into communities and insulated by "green belts." A half-hour spent applying elementary geometry will illustrate that, if all of the proposed natural-park and reservation acreage required to serve the populations of hypothetical square communities of 30,000 people were composed into "green belts" between these communities and the communities themselves occupied 100 to 150 acres per 1,000 inhabitants, the "green belts" would only be a third to a half a mile wide. This dimension is at once too small to insulate effectively, and too small to allow the recreation facility to function effectively.

The application of this type of geometry, artificial as it is, illustrates the point that the standard ratio suggested is, if anything, too conservative. In a real situation the communities would not be square, and the reservations would have to be located where topography, soils, and natural cover of an appropriate character exist. But it is clear that it is desirable to weave these natural public open spaces into the fabric of the new parts of the metropolitan area.

Here they can be directly accessible to their service populations and can also serve as major parts of a system of "green belts" giving form and shape to the pattern of urban development.

OTHER "GREEN BELT" FUNCTIONS

This green network could serve two other functions, both essential to the goals for the new metropolitan pattern. One is that of corridors for transportation facilities: express highways and parkways, railroads and rapid transit, airports and air-approach zones. Since these utilitarian functions are inconsistent with the recreation functions and could not occupy the same space, they would build up the total acreage requirement of the "green belts."

This other function would be to provide a change of scene, a change of pace as one moves about the metropolitan territory. One of the most serious criticisms of our recent metropolitan fringe development is its drab sameness—whether the lots are 6,000 square feet or 20,000, the mile after mile of undifferentiated urban or semiurban view is deadly in its monotony. Very much to be sought is a variety of landscape and a sensing of structure and place—a realization of moving from one place into another—to which these belts of open space would greatly contribute. This need is in a true sense recreational, and would be met for those who could see the green areas from the windows of their houses or offices, or of their cars, trains, or helicopters, even if they never set foot on the grass or walked under the trees.

The recreation function does not, of course, require that the land be in public ownership or use. Farms, wood lots, or other rural uses would fulfill the purpose. However, the problem is the as-

urance of preservation of such areas if they are not publicly owned. The pressure for development of private land is so great and especially in just those locations where the "green belts" are now needed—at the edge of present urbanization—that the most advanced types of zoning and tax policy yet devised may not be able to hold the line.

FROM PLAN TO REALITY?

This paper stops short of the crucial problems of implementation and effectuation of the kind of metropolitan planning that has been discussed. These problems are indeed gigantic. The direct method of achieving the recreation-space objective would be the immediate purchase by public agencies of the needed lands—needed thirty or fifty years hence by people not yet born. The cost would be enormous, for much of the land is already held at speculative prices as prospective subdivisions. The short-range alternative demands for limited public funds are all too apparent.

The challenge, however, is as tough as the problem. It is not only urgent. Metropolitan planning is proceeding in a limited and haphazard way in only a handful of areas. But metropolitan growth surges onward, the irreplaceable resource of nature is being consumed to meet these future but foreseeable recreation needs, is being despoiled by bulldozers. The shape of metropolitan urban environment is being crystallized in roads and structures that shape our children must live with for generations to come. The age of automation holds no bright promise of solution by electronic computer of these problems. The age that produces automation must have the ingenuity and imagination to devise political means to bring this kind of planning to reality.

Professional Education

By NORMAN P. MILLER

Abstract: The framework for professional education in recreation developed primarily from recommendations of national conferences on the subject. The trend is for increasing emphasis on broad general foundations in humanities and social sciences with opportunities for specialization in various aspects—hospital, industry, municipal, administration—to be centered in the upper division and graduate levels. Problems are: supply of potential leaders, organizational patterns, accreditation, institutional roles, professional standards. Needs are: more evaluation, more research, higher standards. Suggested guidelines are: cooperative effort, flexibility in approach, balanced offerings, and reflection of the needs of the profession and society.

THERE are a number of characteristics which are useful in identifying a profession. These characteristics also serve as criteria for evaluating the professional status that a field of human service has attained. When one considers that the recreation movement has been organized for little more than fifty years, it is apparent that by these criteria recreation is a relatively young profession. However, recreation has shown remarkable progress in recent years in one aspect, namely in the development of formal academic professional education.

In the early part of this century, the closest thing approximating professional education in recreation was the meager attention given to it by schools and colleges with physical education curricula. It was not until 1926 that the first real recreation curricula came into existence with the creation of the National Recreation School by the National Recreation Association. In the 1930's, professional preparation was introduced in a few colleges and universities. It was not until 1937, when the University of Minnesota

held the First College Conference on Training Recreation Leaders, that any real emphasis was directed to the professional preparation of recreation personnel and the responsibility of institutions of higher education for such preparation.

From this humble beginning the growth and expansion of professional education in the past two decades has been remarkable. In 1937 there were only five institutions offering recreation programs. By 1944 there were nineteen and by 1956 seventy, with thirty-four institutions offering graduate instruction and many granting advanced degrees in recreation. In some states, junior colleges now include introductory professional courses. For example, twenty-seven junior colleges in California now offer theory courses in recreation leadership.

The number of students engaged in programs of professional education increased steadily up to 1955 but now appears to have leveled off somewhat. In 1954, there were 1,721 students preparing for recreation careers. In the same

year 684 degrees were granted.¹ Comparing this with the estimated total of more than 25,000 full-time professional recreation positions throughout the country, one gains some perspective of the status of the recreation profession in relation to the need for leadership preparation. In light of a constant turnover in the profession, particularly among the women, it is obvious there is a considerable gap between recreation students and the increasing demand for professional personnel. There appear to be sufficient opportunity and insufficient supply.

NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TODAY

What is the nature of professional education in recreation? Upon what bases have curricula been established and to what goals? Much of recreation thinking and action has been guided by recommendations growing out of national conferences held on this subject. In 1948 a framework for desirable undergraduate preparation² was proposed, and in 1950 one for graduate preparation³ was prepared to assist in the evaluation of existing programs and to guide future developments. These conferences were followed by two more, in 1954 and 1956, and represented further steps in the effort to improve the professional preparation of recreation personnel by means of joint deliberations of college teachers and recreation ad-

¹ Gerald B. Fitzgerald, Elizabeth Williamson, and Donald Miller, "Recreational Education Institutions and Their Products," *The Bulletin of the American Recreation Society*, Vol. 8, No. 3, May, 1956, pp. 9-13.

² *Report on the National Conference on Undergraduate Professional Preparation in Physical Education, Health Education and Recreation* (Chicago: Athletic Institute, 1948), pp. 26-34.

³ *Report on the National Conference on Graduate Preparation in Physical Education, Health Education and Recreation* (Chicago: Athletic Institute, 1950), pp. 22-27.

ministrators. This process must be continued.

Several varying patterns of organization have characterized the development of recreation education. The first was the introduction of recreation education into the physical education curriculum. A major in recreation was created by the addition of a few new courses to the regular physical education curriculum, but with the limiting factor that it was still basically a physical education major. Recognizing this, educators experimented with an interdivisional or interdepartmental approach. The collection of existing courses in physical education was broadened to incorporate offerings available in other departments or schools and colleges of a specific institution. This method provided the advantage of broadening the concept of recreation from just a physical education base and permitted the wider use of institutional resources. A limiting factor in this pattern was the fact that other departments did not teach courses expressly for recreation education students. Thus, the interpretation of subject-matter areas in terms of recreation was indirect and students had to provide this themselves.

The next approach developed was based upon job descriptions of the various positions existing in the field. Curricula and courses were developed around the specific skills and abilities prescribed in civil-service job descriptions or as required by local recreation agencies. The advantage of this pattern was that the curriculum could be geared directly to demands in the field and for specific agencies or levels of leadership. However, in view of the rapidly broadening scope of recreation leadership opportunities and the limited number of recreation students available, it was impractical as an only approach. As the recreation profession itself grew, matured, and changed, the concepts of

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what is the leader's job changed. A course designed to fit last year's job description is not necessarily functional today.

The latest approach and one which incorporates sound curriculum planning practices and principles is the functional approach. Here the qualifications of the recreation leader are those required to perform his roles as a leader. Problems met by leaders are identified in relation to these roles. Then the competencies needed to solve the problems are identified and curricular experiences are planned that develop these competencies.

An inhibiting factor is the increasing interest in and utilization of recreation education courses by other disciplines and departments. This makes the development of course experiences strictly for recreation students somewhat difficult. Some examples are the addition of recreation education courses to the physical education credential requirements in many states and the requests for recreation group leadership and similar kinds of experiences in the preparation programs in home economics, nursing, elementary education, and social welfare. The following two sections describe the content normally found in undergraduate and graduate preparation.

UNDERGRADUATE PREPARATION

In general, the undergraduate program has three emphases.

First, there should be a broad liberal cultural emphasis encompassing a foundation in the humanities, social sciences, communicative arts, and the natural sciences so designed as to provide the student with a better understanding of himself and his relationships to others in a constantly changing society. In essence, this comprises the general education content that should be provided for every college student. Consensus is that approximately one-half of the curriculum should be devoted to such experiences

with opportunity to choose electives for creative exploration purposes.

Second, there should be a general professional emphasis designed to develop the qualities common for all leaders. Course experiences should develop basic understandings and competencies in educational psychology, human growth and development, evaluation and research, principles of supervision and administration, group processes, and similar related areas. Approximately one-fourth of the curriculum should be devoted to general professional education.

Third, there should be a specialized professional emphasis geared to developing the specific competencies required to perform the functions of a recreation leader. It is suggested this be done through: (1) foundation experiences in the history, principles, and philosophy of recreation and its contribution to the American way of life; (2) program areas and methods experiences in active games and sports, arts and crafts, music, dance and rhythms, dramatics, hobbies and clubs, social recreation, and outdoor recreation. The goal should be a basic understanding of all elements and a high degree of proficiency of leadership in at least two; (3) organization and administration experiences designed to develop abilities in planning, organizing, coordinating, evaluating, interpreting, and managing recreation areas, facilities, and programs in a variety of settings (agencies); and (4) directed out-of-class field experiences beginning with observation and participation early in a student's academic program, continuing throughout the curriculum with increasing responsibility and range of experiences, and culminating in an internship in which the student spends a specified period of time on-the-job under agency and institutional supervision. The remaining one-fourth of the curriculum should be devoted to this emphasis.

Specialization at the undergraduate

level should be minimized and consist primarily of opportunity for orientation to the problems, concerns, and scope of the unique settings for recreation—hospital, camping and outdoor education, industry, and others.

GRADUATE PREPARATION

The Père Marquette Conference⁴ recommended a framework for graduate preparation in health, physical education, and recreation education. This framework was re-examined in 1956 by the National Conference on the Professional Preparation of the Recreation Personnel. Comparisons were made of the progress of graduate study up to the present in light of recommendations made in 1950. There is real need for graduate study and research. In the years ahead increasing attention must be devoted to these programs by universities and other four-year institutions engaging in graduate education.

Primarily, the objectives of graduate education focus on the competencies required for higher-level-leadership positions in administration, supervision, teaching, research, and in special areas of concentration. Graduate preparation presupposes that the student already possesses to some degree competence in recreation leadership developed through undergraduate education, field work, and actual experience in the field. Graduate study should build upon this background to give deeper meaning to and provide increased insight in the theory and practice of recreation as an integral component of life. Consensus among educators and professionals in the field is that it should include three general areas.

First, there should be further emphasis in the foundations areas of the history and philosophy of American culture, the impact of leisure, the economic, political and social climate in which recreation

is a force. Second, there should be emphasis upon gaining understanding of the skills in use of the fundamental tools of evaluation and research and their application to problem solution in recreation. Third, there should be emphasis upon the processes of administration, supervision, and leadership with opportunity for developing competencies for specific positions or areas of specialization—hospital, industry, municipal, and others. Opportunity should exist for exploration into other areas of study and for the relating of recreation to other disciplines. An example is the creative potential in co-operative efforts between business administration and recreation to prepare students for the field of commercial recreation, either as private enterprise or as managers and operators. Field work at the graduate level is now being recognized as extremely valuable. Several public and private agencies throughout the country are co-operating in developing this phase through internships and supervised field placements.

The question of the amount of graduate education and the level of degree that should be offered is a complex one. Few positions except college teaching and research require the masters' or doctors' degree as a prerequisite to employment, although the masters' degree is being valued increasingly. The recreation profession itself must supply the answer to the question of which direction should graduate education move in terms of the type of degree needed. In view of the demand for professional education, it is apparent that doctoral specialization in recreation must be provided in order to prepare adequate teaching faculties and research specialists.

The problems and issues confronting recreation are similar to those other professions such as education, law, medicine, and social welfare are experiencing. Five of these deserve mention.

⁴ Op. cit. (note 3 *supra*).

RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION

The first of these is the problem of securing an adequate supply of leadership, the recruitment and selection of recreation leaders. It is estimated that there will be 3,000 recreation positions available in 1958 for which there are less than 500 students being professionally prepared at the present time.

The recreation profession is faced with the problem of needing literally thousands of professionally prepared personnel in the foreseeable future. However, existing methods of recruiting and selecting recreation leaders for professional education curricula are totally inadequate. If the philosophy that quality begets quality is adhered to, then high standards must be maintained and held, and yet the volume of students majoring in recreation must be increased.

ORGANIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

The second problem pertains to the organization of recreation education and its relation to other disciplines within a specific educational institution. There is increasing evidence that the close identification of recreation education with departments or schools of physical education and health education may have limitations. Actually, it does not matter where recreation is located administratively in a specific institution as long as the growth and progress of the program is not limited or inhibited by administrative policy decisions, or by a narrowing of the concept of the total scope of recreation education and its contribution to society. The belief that recreation education is merely part of physical education is as detrimental to both of these areas as it would be to conceive of health education as only first aid and personal hygiene.

Another aspect of the organizational

problem is that dealing with the degree of specialization necessary in undergraduate and graduate recreation curricula. This is a controversial question. The variety of settings in which recreation programs are conducted have implied to many in the profession that there is real need for specialized preparation in such areas as industry, hospital, camping, parks, and others. Pressures from agencies in the field and from professional organizations have prompted some institutions to develop separate curricula in such specializations. Fragmentation should be avoided.

What is the proper balance in curriculum content between skills and theory? The usual complaint from professionals in the field is that many students graduating from recreation curricula do not possess the necessary on-the-job program activity skills to assume leadership immediately. It does not seem reasonable to expect that a recreation leader can emerge from an institution after the usual four years of preparation with well-developed abilities in games and sports, art, music, drama, and the other program aspects of recreation. Time in the university should be devoted to doing those things which are best done at that level. The acquisition and development of a sound philosophy and an understanding of organizational principles which can be implemented in many ways and many areas is a far more basic education and should be more desirable than the acquisition of individual skills in a variety of activities.

ACCREDITATION

The third problem is the degree to which institutions seeking to prepare recreation leaders are qualified to do so. In the relatively rapid growth of recreation some institutions have initiated programs of recreation leadership preparation which do not possess all of the cri-

teria or standards essential for sound adequate professional education. Institutional requirements exist in terms of adequate facilities, professionally qualified instructional staff, breadth of courses, and adequate laboratory and community resources for field work experiences.

RECREATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The fourth problem relates to the place of recreation education in higher education. Recreation in its growth and struggle for recognition has striven to raise its standards so that a four-year collegiate major is commonly accepted as the minimum base for employment purposes. As a result, curricula for a recreation major have been developed in either universities or state colleges. Little attention has been devoted to the contribution of municipal and/or junior colleges. Lately, however, there has been increasing pressure to clarify the role of the junior colleges in the professional preparation of leadership.

Generally it is recognized that junior colleges make two contributions. The first is in preprofessional training for students prior to their moving to a four-year institution. The second contribution of the junior college is in its terminal education program. Many positions in recreation are not professional hence a two-year terminal curriculum can be adequate. These would include certain activity specialists, part-time leaders, equipment custodians, and technicians. When one considers that approximately 50 per cent of all students in higher education in America are in junior colleges, the potential for recruitment for professional education and the resources for part-time leadership are tremendous. Certainly this potential cannot be ignored in light of the demands that will be made for leadership

of all types—professional, technician, part-time, and volunteer.

Another aspect of the problem of recreation education in higher education is the need to clarify the respective role of the university and the state college, particularly in those states where responsibility for professional education in recreation has been assumed primarily by state-supported institutions. The traditional role of a university is that of a center for research and for professional training in the traditional schools of law and medicine. Occupational preparation usually is a responsibility of state colleges, particularly the preparation of teachers. This poses the serious question of whether recreation is really a profession or whether it belongs more in the occupational field. In light of the mass-enrollment figures being predicted for all institutions of higher education, it appears that state colleges will have to assume more and more of the responsibilities normally allocated to universities. Generally speaking, junior colleges should offer preprofessional training and terminal education for technician positions; state colleges should provide professional preparation for the basic beginning positions in recreation; and universities should provide graduate education, research programs and opportunities, and pilot programs of undergraduate professional education.

Another aspect of this problem is the need for higher education in general to recognize and accept the importance of recreation education as a part of education for life. There are people in responsible positions in some universities who question whether recreation is an area of professional endeavor. They wonder whether it meets the criteria of scholarship in the traditional concept. Such questions are indicative of the great need for better interpretation of recreation's goals and objectives and one

to which the total profession must give more emphasis.

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

The fifth problem pertains to the matter of personnel standards and the need for the profession to redefine or redelineate what are considered to be professional duties or functions. Although theoretical concepts of the role of recreation leaders have changed and progressed, unfortunately on-the-job performance has not shifted to the same degree. Observation of leadership in action still finds some performing tasks which by any measure cannot be classified as professional. Leaders can be found performing duties which could better be classed as clerical or janitorial, or of such nature as to be of the technician type rather than professional. Job descriptions and civil service flyers still list such duties as integral parts of the task of the "professional." This complicates and confuses the task of the recreation educator immeasurably. Should the curricula be based upon existing practices and demands in the field? Is the recreation leader an organizer or a teacher? Is he an administrator and manager or a counselor? If the profession can delineate what types of functions are really professional and can organize programs and leadership roles on such a basis, then professional education programs can more adequately prepare the leaders needed. Technician-type positions could logically become the focus of terminal education programs in junior and municipal colleges. Professional positions involve organization, administrative, and supervisory responsibilities as well as program and group leadership functions and should be the focus of major curricula in universities and state colleges.

Another aspect of the standards problem relates to the fact that of the more than 25,000 full-time personnel now em-

ployed in recreation, many have not had adequate professional preparation in recreation. Present leaders in recreation have been drawn from diverse disciplines and backgrounds and many need constant orientation and reorientation as the recreation profession moves ahead. In addition to this, there is a great multitude of volunteer and part-time leaders who man playgrounds and other recreation facilities in summer times and weekends. There will be an increasing demand for such personnel. This points up the need for increased emphasis on continuing education by recreation educators and the extension of services and curricular opportunities to include in-service education in a variety of areas. Professional education programs through workshops, institutes, short-term training courses, and conferences can render real service and assist the profession to upgrade and improve the standards of the many levels of workers needed in this field.

The foregoing analysis of the history, the nature, and the problems and issues of professional education suggest three major needs which could serve as directional goals for educators in planning and building for recreation's future.

DIRECTIONAL GOALS

The first need is for *more critical evaluation* of what is being done in professional education and why it is being done.

The second is for *more research*, with implications for the expansion and improvement of graduate offerings in recreation. The need for a research program to validate recreation's existing concepts, principles, and philosophy is vital. Recreation must be grounded upon basic research as well as applied research if the profession is to achieve mature status. This recreation must do itself.

The third major need is for *adherence*

to a high-standards approach. Recreation cannot afford to lower its standards in order to meet personnel needs if it is to achieve the growth and significance that it seeks and deserves. More screening and more selectivity is urged in the recruitment and preparation of those individuals who tomorrow will guide and direct the vast leisure-time programs evolving and developing in this country.

GUIDELINES

The problems confronting recreation education as outlined in the foregoing material should be solved by means of a team approach involving the total profession. For recreation educators to exist in their traditional ivory tower or in the theoretical vacuum frequently attributed to them without constant contact with and utilization of the professional resources in the field is inexcusable. If anything, one of the major goals for tomorrow should be for professional education in recreation to continue to implement and to strengthen the lines of communication and to support the exchange of ideas and concepts between the profession and the institutions concerned. Toward this end four major guide lines are suggested for action for tomorrow.

The first is that *there must be cooperative effort* between schools, col-

leges, and universities and the profession in terms of leadership in the field and the professional recreation organizations and associations. Second, *curricula and patterns of organization must be kept flexible* in order to be able to change as the needs and demands of the profession and society change. Third, *curricula must meet the needs of society and the profession*. They must reflect higher standards in terms of quality and range of experiences provided and competencies developed. And last, *curricula must maintain proper balance between general education and specialized professional education* in order that leaders may better understand the full meaning of leisure time and recreation on a broad scope and can interpret more meaningfully their role in people's lives.

Recreation's most unique characteristic is that it is so new that there are no set patterns, no set structures of how things must be done. There are no restraining hands to struggle against except those that would support the status quo. The need grows greater day by day for more articulate leadership that can change, improve, and enrich the leisure patterns of people and communities, for leadership that can and will reach out to develop new ideas in keeping with and in advance of our times. This should be the real role and objective of professional education.

Professional Association

By GARRETT G. EPPLEY

Abstract: The growth of the demand for recreation services has been accompanied by a movement toward professional consciousness. Numerous societies now need to consider their goals and study their overlapping membership and functions. To strengthen the professional voice of recreation, some consolidation is necessary.

THE growth of the demand for recreation services has led to the organization of a number of professional societies. It is the hope of many leaders within the various groups that all engaged in recreation may come to speak professionally as one voice through a single, strong, professional organization. How?

A comprehensive list of the professional organizations today shows the pattern of historical development as individual leaders and various groups have felt their way toward professional association. In part, this situation is accounted for by the diffuse functional demands made for recreation services. For example, recreation services, in greater or lesser degrees, are provided by such varied agencies as park departments, public school systems, agriculture, industry, voluntary agencies, hospitals, institutions of higher learning, religious organizations, and the armed forces. Recreation personnel employed in many functional areas have either formed national professional associations or become affiliated as sections with existing professional associations as recreation divisions. In like manner, workers have formed their own organizations.

SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS

Probably the first organization which deserves discussion is the National

Recreation Association. Although this service unit is not specifically a professional organization, it performs many functions common to professional societies. Membership is open to both organizations and individuals. NRA, as it is known, devotes its entire activity to the advancement of the cause of recreation. The Association was formed in 1906 as the Playground Association of America; its headquarters is located at 8 West Eighth Street, New York. An official magazine, *Recreation*, is issued. National Recreation Congresses and district conferences are convened for professional discussion. Organizations such as the American Recreation Society, the College Recreation Association, and the Federation of National Professional Organizations for Recreation hold their national meetings in conjunction with the NRA Congress. The 1957 Congress in Long Beach, California, marks a milestone of organizational co-operation and professional unity since it represents for the first time a co-operative project of numerous societies with the NRA. From its offices in New York, and through roving regional representatives located in district offices throughout the United States, NRA provides full-time professional consultation services. NRA seeks to co-operate with professional workers through a National Advisory Council and a series of advisory committees.

Some areas dealt with functionally are: recruitment, training, and placement of personnel; defense-related services; federal recreation; programs and activities; and research.

Professional organizations

The two major professional organizations concerned primarily with recreation are the American Recreation Society and the American Institute of Park Executives. The ARS grew out of the Society of Recreational Workers which was organized at Atlantic City in 1938 during the National Recreation Congress. Membership is open to all persons engaged in recreation and to students majoring in recreation. Various state organizations, student organizations, and a few metropolitan associations are affiliated with the Society. Sections of ARS which meet during the annual conference are concerned with areas such as armed forces, hospitals, and industry, as well as municipal, rural, and state recreation. ARS has thirteen standing committees and various special committees; it does not limit its membership to associates of various sections or to members of affiliated groups. Since July 1, 1957, the Society has employed an executive secretary whose office is in the national headquarters located at 1129 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington. The *Recreation Bulletin* is the official publication of ARS.

The American Institute of Park Executives originated in Boston in 1898. Its membership is drawn largely from the administrative personnel employed in park and recreation departments, as well as from zoological societies in the United States, Canada, and a few foreign countries. The broad membership base includes the faculty and students from colleges and universities, boards of commissioners, and commercial firms. The Institute has ten branches and affiliate associations and

twenty-eight committees. It conducts workshops and sponsors university research. Of significance is the fact that the American Institute of Park Executives is the only professional organization that maintains a section for board members. During the last several years, an increasingly large percentage of its new members has been drawn from the field of recreation. National conferences are held annually. The Institute maintains a national headquarters in Oglebay Park, West Virginia; *Parks and Recreation* is its official magazine.

The American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation is a multiple-area society designed to include many persons engaged in recreation. The history of the organization dates to 1885. In the early part of the century it was known as the American Physical Education Association; the word Health was added to its title in 1935, Recreation in 1936. Affiliated with the National Education Association (NEA), the Association maintains a national headquarters at 1201 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington. The *Journal of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation* is its publication. Recreation was added to the magazine's title in 1946. Seventeen organizations are affiliated with AAHPER. The Association has a vice-president for each of its three areas plus one for the area of men's athletics. The vice-president in the field of recreation is responsible for the programs of five recreation sections at the national conference. This conference is held independently of the Recreation Congress. In addition to its national conference, the Association holds district conferences and various workshops.

Other national professional associations concerned with recreation are the National Conference on State Parks, formed in 1921, with offices in the Union Trust Building, Washington; the American Camping Association, founded

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in 1924, with headquarters located on the Outdoor Education Area of Indiana University near Martinsville, Indiana; the National Industrial Recreation Association, formed in 1941, with offices at 203 North Wabash Avenue, Chicago; the Association of College Unions, organized in 1914, with offices in the Wisconsin Union, 770 Langdon Street, Madison; the College Recreation Association, founded in 1948; the National Association of Social Workers, 1 Park Avenue, New York; and the Society of State Directors for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation. With the encouragement of the Athletic Institute, the Federation of Professional Organizations for Recreation was formed in 1953. The Federation consists of the professional organizations discussed above with the exception of the National Conference of State Parks. The Executive Director of the National Recreation Association and the President of the Athletic Institute serve as consultants to the Federation.

POTENTIAL CONSOLIDATION PATTERNS

Both inside and outside the profession the continuing question is being asked: Why cannot all of the recreation associations be united into one organization which will represent the maturity of the profession? Must recreation continue to speak in many tongues through diverse professional organizations? Should not a central personnel organization be formed to represent *all* recreational personnel and to speak with a unified and more effective voice?

Such a goal, which may seem obvious to the casual observer and to many within the profession, in practice is difficult to realize. Vested interests, different concepts of recreation philosophy, divergent policies in membership requirements, dues, and scope of services, as well as historical roots and per-

sonal imperialisms, present difficult hurdles to be surmounted.

The movement toward consolidation might conceivably begin with the American Institute of Park Executives and the National Conference on State Parks. Many state park officials belong to the American Institute of Park Executives, and many local park executives belong to the National Conference on State Parks. Indeed, many persons prominent in each organization would like to combine the two societies into one organization. The National Conference on State Parks, the smaller of the two organizations, might become a division of the American Institute of Park Executives. It would occupy a position in the Institute similar to that of the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums. At the present time, the National Conference on State Parks and the American Civic and Planning Association share an executive secretary at their national headquarters located in Washington. This is done so that the executive secretary can maintain contact with federal legislation. To consolidate the National Conference on State Parks with the American Institute of Park Executives would disrupt the co-operative arrangement between the National Conference on State Parks and the American Civic and Planning Association. Officials of the National Conference have not as yet been willing to make this change. However, a consolidation of the two park associations within the next ten years appears possible. This consolidation should provide a strong organization of professional personnel concerned with public parks.

The American Association for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation has made great contributions to the field of recreation. In many of the smaller and in fewer of the larger communities the recreation program is administered by

the director of health, physical education, and recreation for the public schools. Many of the recreation courses offered by our colleges and universities are merely expansions of the physical education curricula. A large percentage of the recreation curricula are found in schools or departments of physical education. Close co-operation between physical education and recreation personnel is highly desirable. However, recreation is most effective when it has an identity of its own. Leaders in the three fields of health, physical education, and recreation recommend identity of the three fields in course listings and faculty titles. An accompanying concept holds that each of the three fields benefits from membership in a professional organization limited to its specific area. Such a separation should not preclude a discussion of each of these related fields as for example the association's professional conferences. The situation relative to health, physical education, and recreation is somewhat comparable to the situation relative to art, music, and the theatre. Though in some universities the school of fine arts administers these three areas, they maintain separate professional organizations.

To move toward consolidating the American Institute of Park Executives and the American Recreation Society presents many problems. Such a consolidation would appear desirable at some future date. There is a trend toward the consolidation of local park and recreation departments. The purpose of a park is recreation—in a broad sense. The leaders in the park and recreation fields are rapidly developing similar recreation philosophies. Each organization has affiliated societies, largely on a state basis. The Indiana Park and Recreation Association exemplifies the complexity of state society affiliation with national organizations. This Association not only is affiliated with both organiza-

tions, but also is a member of the National Recreation Association.

Leaders of these two organizations have discussed consolidation without making progress. Little possibility exists for such consolidation as long as the National Recreation Association holds its National Recreation Congress. A discontinuation of the Congress might result in a jointly sponsored national conference by the American Recreation Society and the American Institute of Park Executives. Such a conference operation would encourage consolidation. This type of organization should attract into its membership, as sections or affiliates, the College Recreation Association and the Industrial Recreation Association. It could draw as members all persons engaged in recreation as a profession. The organization could lend unlimited support to the program of the National Recreation Association. The formation of one national professional organization would be evidence of the effectiveness of the program of the National Recreation Association. The National Recreation Association performs many functions. Discontinuation of the Congress would enable the National Recreation Association to devote more time to field service, research, publications, and films; all of these are badly needed. Already an unofficial conference has been held between certain officials of the American Recreation Society and the American Institute of Park Executives for the purpose of exploring the possibilities and advantages of a joint national conference; beginnings toward co-operation were in evidence at the 1957 Congress.

A consolidation of recreation organizations needs not interfere with the major functions of the American Camping Association, Association of College Unions, and the National Association of Social Workers. An interassociation committee could be formed to acquaint

each association with the programs of the other.

SINGLE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The formation of one strong national professional organization will require considerable time. A long-range program accomplished through evolution and not revolution appears to be the best approach.

There is an immediate need for a strengthening of the Federation of National Professional Organizations for Recreation. Until one strong professional organization has evolved, the Federation might very well be the voice of recreation. The Federation should develop an interpretation of recreation acceptable to the various professional organizations concerned with recreation.

It could suggest co-ordination or consolidation of certain functions performed by more than one organization. It could suggest and encourage research.

The establishment of a strong professional organization may lead to consolidation of state recreation and state park associations that would develop a united front on both the state and national levels. The consolidation of local park and recreation departments has already brought about a unified front in many communities.

There can be no consolidation of professional organizations and no voice for the profession without compromises on the part of organizations concerned. The profession of recreation faces a tremendous challenge. To meet this challenge vested interests, traditions, and prejudices must be circumvented.

Recreation in the Educational Process

By JOHN L. HUTCHINSON

Abstract: A fundamental issue in education is how educated judgments about the use of leisure time can be developed. The future of recreation in education depends initially upon the acceptance of the leisure setting as a medium for carrying the learning process forward. Recreation becomes a challenge to any educational venture because of its inherent motivation, opportunity for understanding and reflective thinking, a chance for success or achievement, and the possible transfer or use of skills or knowledges.

EDUCATING people for leisure makes recreation an integral phase of the total educational process. The educative process does not depend necessarily upon being related to any particular type of institution or agency. Certain elements or structural aspects, however, exist in this process irrespective of the setting.

First, the individual participates because he is motivated. Motivation arouses bodily movement, directs or regulates effort toward a certain goal, and is determined by a person's background of experience.

In recreation, the drive toward participation stems from enjoyment and pleasures either anticipated or emanating immediately from the activity itself.

Second, a good learning context as structured in the educational process depends upon understanding. The individual must comprehend clearly what he is about in order to progress and to perform at capacity. Understanding depends upon the opportunities for exploration and investigation which are afforded the learner or participant. In addition, the opportunity to reflect and think through the process further aids the individual to comprehend. In fact,

it is common for many people to think reflectively about their leisure pursuits far more than about routine-work duties and other less creative tasks of everyday living. Leisure, therefore, may become a time for continuous exploration, adventure, and eventual understanding of problems and projects which people investigate.

Third, the educative process depends upon achievement by the participants. Achievement in this respect refers to gaining sufficient insight or a mental grasp of the undertaking to insure success. In other words, the barriers along the way toward accomplishment are devised so that an individual overcomes each hurdle as he progresses toward complete achievement. In recreation, the individual participates during his free time at his own pace, and furthermore, he sets his own level of achievement. If the completed craft object satisfies him, he is content and no one necessarily evaluates his project or requires him to repeat his performance.

Fourth is the importance of transfer in the educational process. Recreation comprises an untold number of activities in which people participate. Many of the skills and knowledges useful in one

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leisure activity may be applied in other similar pursuits also.

In analyzing the above four factors which structure a good learning situation, it becomes apparent that the learning process may function at its peak when recreationally oriented. Motivation, understanding, achievement, and transfer are elements of a sound learning process which exist naturally in most leisure activities.

What responsibility should educational agencies assume for educating people for leisure? The role of education appears obvious. For centuries schools and colleges have operated on the basis that it is possible to influence the habits and attitudes of people whether it be with regard to selecting reading materials or music or developing a nationalistic feeling or scientists. Education, then, needs to approach the leisure problem with these same convictions but with a full understanding of the peculiar factors involved.

In the educational setting, two emphases relating to recreation should be stressed and correlated. First, to be complete, the education of people includes learning which applies to the use of leisure as well as to vocational purposes. Success lies in developing understandings and appreciations, but not in regulatory restrictions.

Second, education should insure a voluntary offering which by example reinforces concepts about leisure participation. In some instances this places an added program responsibility upon the educators. On the other hand, it means that schools and colleges should help other agencies to coordinate their efforts to serve people better, regardless of their status.

PLANNING RECREATION ACTIVITIES

Certain accepted principles of teaching apply equally well to leadership for recreation activities.

First, recreation activities should have a clear focus on the designated goal or outcome: Can the participant see where activity leads? Is there a culminating day, an exhibition, a tournament, or a display? Does the pursuit lead to more interesting and complex activities? Clearly defining and setting a goal energizes effort and leads to a better visualizing of interrelationships.

Second, a properly planned context or setting helps develop new understanding and eventually more enjoyment of the recreation activity. The area, acoustics, equipment, facilities, tools, lighting, and, most of all, the leader combine to make the environment for the recreation activity.

Third, for the most part, recreation should be conducted in a group situation. The joy that stems from social activity in a group effort plus the stimulation naturally emanating from interpersonal relations makes this principle most important.

Fourth, recreation should be individualized to allow for the differences in the participants' purposes, abilities, and interests.

Fifth, recreation should be organized so that activities are provided in the proper sequence for participants. Because achievement is a characteristic of a good learning situation and because it leads to satisfaction and further participation, care must be taken to offer activities in sequence as the participants give evidence of a readiness for either new or more complex experiences.

THE POTENTIAL

The future of recreation in education depends initially upon the acceptance of the leisure setting as an excellent medium for carrying on the learning process. The inherent motivation, the opportunity for understanding and reflective thinking, the chance for success or

achievement, and the possible transfer or use of skills or knowledges in other situations all combine to make worthwhile recreation a challenge to any educational venture. As educators become more familiar with this less formal field, their ability to use recreation as another means for achieving educational goals will be reflected in the manner in which educational experiences are presented and the way leisure is used.

Secondarily, the application of sound and tested principles of teaching to the methodological approach used for recreation should do much to establish this area of concern as an important facet

of the educational process. When recreation employs sound leadership and methodological principles, the differentiations which some academicians like to make between recreation and education become quite nebulous.

Lastly, the life of the child, youth, or adult includes much leisure—free time which is put to some use. The early and continuous development of leisure attitudes, habits, skills, and knowledges leads toward developing an educated judgment about recreation. With this type of recommended approach, education for the full life—leisure and vocational—becomes a real possibility.

Administration of Recreation: Divided Opinions

By SAL J. PREZIOSO

Abstract: The administration of public recreation is a complex one. Many public agencies play an important role in its functions and as such want the authority to govern. Divided responsibilities and authority lead to duplication of efforts, poor economy, planning, and administration. It is essential that recreation responsibilities and authority be vested in one central public agency. The question before us is whether such an agency should be administered by a recreation commission, a recreation department working with a citizens' advisory council, or the school boards of education.

AMONG the many complexities in our present environment brought about by progressive sociological, economic, and scientific developments is the fight among many public agencies for the control of recreation administration. Involved in this complex situation are school boards, municipal recreation agencies, and park commissions. What the stakes are in such controls and to what degree the public is involved and affected should be questions of primary concern for all citizens interested in good government and economy.

The building of "brick yards" in many communities—numerous homes, apartments, and shopping centers without giving due consideration to open lands, parks, playgrounds, and playfields—is not compatible with our present-day way of life, one which permits people many hours of leisure such as they have never enjoyed before. If these extra hours of leisure are to be enjoyed by our people in a constructive, wholesome, and satisfying manner, then it becomes essential that the administration of public recreation be the responsibility of a single public agency. Should this responsibility be placed in the hands of boards of

education, a recreation commission, a recreation department, or the park commission? Responsibility involves not only the providing of recreation programs and services for all members of the community at all age levels, but also the development and maintaining of recreation areas and facilities and the coordination of the various efforts among the voluntary, public, and semipublic agencies. It also involves a continuous planning program for leadership, facilities, lands, budgets, and programs. Unless these services are properly administered the many leisure hours available to our people could well create chaotic conditions. Idle hours and idle hands yield to consequences exceedingly difficult to foresee.

LEGAL ASPECTS

Enabling acts have been introduced in almost every state in the Union. This legislation, with a respect for home rule, authorizes municipalities to administer recreation programs under any form of organization which they consider to be most appropriate and effective. It is therefore within the very foundation of its existence—the local community—that

recreation finds itself engulfed in a complex situation.

Related legislation concerned with expenditures of funds and responsibilities limits the recreation work of many boards of education. As a result, the recreation program is also limited in those communities where the responsibilities and functions of the school board are restricted to boundaries within the school district.

Inadequate provisions within the enabling acts, as they exist in some states, have also caused havoc in the suburbs.

Although enabling acts and related legislation differ from state to state, in general they are fairly adequate. However, with the heavy growth in population in many communities, America everywhere has begun to realize the inadequacies involved in our legislation.

PATTERNS OF ADMINISTERING RECREATION

A number of factors should be considered in selecting the pattern of organization—the attitude of the various municipal departments, the legal powers, the control of present recreation facilities, the relationships of the municipality with the schools and others interested in recreation, existing programs, the attitude of the general public, the ability to pay, the immediate needs and desires of the community, the willingness of the agency to assume additional responsibility, political considerations, the ability and willingness of the persons to be responsible for the program to get along with each other, the municipal boundaries or school district areas to be served, and the idiosyncracies of the community.

The freedom of movement permitted under the various state enabling acts is responsible for the various patterns of organizations that now exist at the municipal level throughout the United States. The following are some of the

patterns and combinations of administering patterns: recreation commission, municipal department, park and recreation commission, school administration, school-municipal administration, park commission, advisory boards, recreation council.

A sharp division of opinion exists between professional and lay people as concerning the three basic patterns which are most commonly used—recreation commission, municipal department, and school-administered programs. The underlying factors largely responsible for the variance of opinions are political implications, philosophies of recreation, professional jealousies, philosophical differences in public administration, the utilizations of lay people at the policy-making level, a greed for power among public agencies and officials, a resistance to change among public officials who have fallen into a vacuum, and geography.

Politics is part of our American way of life. We must learn to respect and understand it if we are to succeed in our objective of providing a proper administration of recreation. It is of concern to investigate the traditional political community patterns as they relate to recreation in order properly to make determinations and to know what marks the political parties who were in control left on the community. Any attempt to set up a pattern of organization without due regard to the political aspects involved is folly. This does not necessarily imply that one must conform blindly. The approach in attaining objectives will differ in every community. Proper timing and the educational process might well be utilized in attempting to set up a pattern of administering recreation. Since communities differ, objectives may be best attained by evolution, although in some instances revolution may well be the only course of action.

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FACTORS IN DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS

The recreation philosophies of the agencies involved, and people in general, vary to a marked degree. Since these agencies will all play an important role in the administration of public recreation programs it is essential to know, to understand, and to respect their beliefs in order to administer recreation properly. Recreation philosophies, therefore, must be considered for they do account for sharp differences among public administrators.

Fifty years ago the National Recreation Association had a difficult time in stimulating public officials to consider and to act on matters of recreation. Today, however, with its broad public appeal and acceptance, recreation is like a jewel. Everyone wants a jewel, and so it is with the administration of recreation among park boards, school boards, recreation commissions, city managers, and others.

The acceptance of either the recreation commission, recreation department, or the school-administered pattern must consider the geographical area concerned in setting forth the responsibility for recreation programs. Unless we do we may find ourselves in a divided house. The "divided house" is that community which because of local governing factors finds itself administering recreation for part of the community and excluding other interested and needy citizens' groups.

PHILOSOPHY OF ADMINISTRATION

City managers prefer recreation departments with possible aid from citizens advisory boards. "Hire the recreation superintendent and let him do the job," they say. The belief is that the recreation superintendent should be a department head reporting to the city manager. City managers believe that policy

matters should be left in the hands of people properly trained to do the job.

Another school of thought insists that by giving people a share in the operations, they will acquire a better understanding through participation. Informed people, therefore, will better protect and support recreation. The recreation commission, a policy making board, is utilized by many of the communities throughout the country. People who favor the recreation commission type of administration say: "Beware of placing too much power in the hands of the city manager; one man cannot properly appraise the recreation interests and needs of the people; further, most city managers are engineers concerned primarily with machines and not people." It is also argued that recreation commissions more properly represent the people. Others will hold that recreation commission jobs, though they are not paid, are nevertheless political plums given to ambitious people with political aspirations and aims.

A number of school superintendents believe that the schools should administer recreation at the local community level. School superintendents argue that most of the schools' properties are used to conduct recreation programs and that since most programs are geared for children the schools should administer recreation programs. On the other hand, others will point out that recreation is for all the people, not just school children; that the schools are only concerned with individuals within their school districts attending public schools; that legislation does not permit the schools to build recreation facilities outside the school district lines.

In the urban areas where park boards have been established, other peculiar problems arise. Park boards as a general rule believe they should be concerned with the development and maintenance of facilities while the partici-

pants themselves provide the leadership. This philosophy is very much opposed by recreation leaders who believe that more than facilities are required to do an effective job. To offset this sharp difference of opinion we find that a number of park and recreation departments are merging. However, it is not a matter of the control of the facilities that is of concern, but rather the general overall planning for community recreation. It is argued that park people are concerned with parkways maintenance and development problems and as such do not have the time nor the interest to concern themselves with programs, people, and general recreation planning. Further it is said that parks are but a tool for recreation people to use in providing recreation activities, and as such park facilities should be administered by the recreation agency concerned with the program. Park boards, however, having attained much control and political influence over the years, rather oppose the idea of relinquishing any of their responsibilities. In these varying differences of philosophy of administration the question, therefore, still remains—should recreation in our community be administered by the school board, a department of recreation, a recreation commission, or a combination of municipal agencies?

RECREATION COMES OF AGE

Our problem is brought about by growth: in population, in the needs for recreation, in the amount of leisure now available, in the appreciation of what recreation has to offer, in the additional responsibilities placed upon school and park boards over the years, in the vari-

ous complex situations facing public administrators, and in the need for a more efficient and economical method of administering recreation.

Experience over the years has shown that recreation is too big a job to be entrusted to anyone treating it with secondary concern. The school and park boards are much too concerned with other problems to do an effective job. To be effectively administered recreation must be the responsibility of one public agency whose primary concern is recreation. Only then can we be assured that the immediate and future recreation needs of the people will be met.

A recreation commission, together with a citizens' advisory council, may be necessary to operate recreation programs in urban areas. In the suburban areas a commission is desirable though not necessarily essential. A recreation department, under capable and qualified leadership, together with the broad representation of a citizens' advisory council could effectively administer any program in any unit of government.

Neither the schools nor the park boards can be entrusted with this responsibility. Their primary concerns of education and parks are much too great a public trust to endanger by overburdening them with further responsibilities. This does not imply that only the recreation commission should be concerned with recreation programs; all public, private, and voluntary agencies have definite program contributions to make. However, it is recreation administration with which we are concerned. A recreation commission, together with a citizens' advisory council and a qualified recreation superintendent, will best administer recreation programs.

The Adult Cycle

By HAROLD D. MEYER

Abstract: The gifts of leisure to contemporary society offer many benefits of recreation to our adult population. All social and economic factors indicate that this privilege will continue. Adulthood is not reaping the values available to it and often because of misuse and abuse of leisure there is individual and social pathology. The forces of organized recreation, public and private, have centered interests largely on programs for children and youth. Concentration should now be made, as equally and effectively, on services for adults. A good start is noted in the provision of recreation for our senior citizens.

ONE of the biggest stories of contemporary time is the gifts of leisure given to one hundred million adults. Much of adult happiness is going to depend on the wholesome uses of this leisure—one's off-the-job and away-from-housekeeping activities and interests.

Until now the focus of the recreation movement has been on programs for children and youths. The adult world has not, as yet, understood the potentials of this new phase of our culture nor have the organized forces of recreation, public and private, given it adequate consideration.

Adults need to establish a definite rhythm between work and recreation to balance vocational and avocational interests. Yet, too many lack the skills of recreation, thus making the attainment of this rhythm one of our major social problems.

The period of adulthood can be divided into four cycles: *young adulthood* from age 20 to 35, a time characterized by the introduction into the adult world of life work and individual responsibility—concern for vocational skill, establishment of family life, rearing of children, and home relationships; *middle years* from age 35 to 50—a period distin-

guished by adult and teen-age relations, prestige status in the community, vocational security and advancement, and a widening circle of friendships; *free years* from age 50 to 65—the period beginning with the children leaving home and ending with retirement, general economic security, and the acquisition of new leisure; *senior citizenship* from age 65 on, the cycle characterized by retirement, engagement in purposeful and satisfying associations, comfort, and enriched opportunities for services.

CYCLE 1: YOUNG ADULTHOOD

The transition from organized school life, home protection, adolescent friendships, mating, and marriage has occurred; and the young adults are busily engaged in making adjustments to the adult world about them. Going off to work to the first job, settling on a location, and establishing a home engage the young adults' full energy and interest. Soon appear the developmental tasks of family life through childbearing—with its primary concern in securing the family as a stable unit—and the blending of personalities. Then comes the time when the youngsters enter school and the family has reached its

maximum size. These are the years filled with family living as the children run in and out of the home; some projects are started, then changed, while others are carried out. The adults are busy keeping things in running order and following the youngsters out into wider and more meaningful contacts in the community.

These are active days for most families, and the adults are involved in dovetailing the many developmental tasks of all the family in harmonious and satisfying ways. It all has its rewards in a sense of accomplishment that comes from both individual and group achievements as well as in the creation of family solidarity. With this concentration of interest comes the tendency of the family to isolate itself. The adults do not have the time available to carry on the activities they followed prior to marriage. The focus of activity has changed and calls for effective adaptation to the new environment.

The young father is likely to be engrossed in the new job, is working and studying during off-the-job hours in order to advance and is sharing in the many duties and roles he can perform at home. The young mother is occupied with the manifold responsibilities of running the house and rearing the children. The children are preoccupied with their world and all of their inquisitive adventures at home, at school, and in the neighborhood. However, when the adults can relax and enjoy their children through shared activities, new vistas and fresh endeavors open up with child companionship and fascinating adventures into co-operative relationships.

Two aspects of recreation allied to this cycle are the revitalization of family recreation and recreation in the suburbs.

Family recreation

Recreation has a new role to play in relation to family life. While it is true

that organized recreation is largely community centered, the campaign to strengthen family recreation must go on. There is much to be gained by relating family recreation interests to those of the community, and the very setup of the family at this stage of the adult's life practically demands it.

Continuous, close contact should exist between departments of recreation, private agencies in the field, and individual families of the community. The more intimate these relationships, the finer will be the quality of services. Attitudes, interpretations, guidance, and general relations can be furthered and molded into effective action. Community recreation should recognize the family as a unit in its program. Provision can be made for special-events days, festivals, anniversaries, suggestions for parties, bulletin service of program schedule, equipment aids, guidance on areas and facilities, and training opportunities. Only where there is an adequate staff can this be done, for services to individual families or groups of families require considerable time and guidance. The recreation department may establish an effective public relations service to keep the families well-informed about all activities on a community-wide neighborhood basis.

Families can participate in the community recreation program in numerous ways. Family life should be represented on every community recreation commission, council, or board. Every council of social agencies, community planning council, or community council has the obligation to recognize family life in its administration and advisory organizations. The family should have full representation on all advisory groups and participate wholeheartedly in their work.

Suburbia

One of the significant phenomena of modern society is the rapid growth of

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suburban life in the metropolitan area. The concentration of people, the enhancement of economic opportunities, the centralization of industrial operations, the advancement of better means of communication, and the constant search of man to improve his standard of living are advancing this growth.

More than 40 million adults now live in the suburbs and the overwhelming majority of these are young adults. The picture is a spreading panorama of millions of small- and medium-sized houses clustered about a dense array of large buildings. These areas are growing six times faster than cities and stretching into the countryside. It is estimated that 80 per cent of the future growth of our population will be in the suburbs; people seem to like them since over a million new homes are built there each year.

Homes are smaller and space is limited both indoors and outdoors. The neighborhood development often becomes the center of activities. Space is provided for play, and here are also found congenial companions, good schools, shopping centers, and numerous community values. There are few slums and no wrong-side-of-the-track society relations. People come and go and the trend is toward a continual upgrading of homes, living in better neighborhoods, and acquiring more possessions. Our young adults have more money, shorter working hours, and can afford more of everything.

The family becomes a part of the larger neighborhood because of this process of integration. Pressure is put on the young adults to join many groups and organizations. There are also many informal activities available. Mother is involved in cooking for numerous events and making costumes for a festival occasion. Father ties in with father-son affairs through school, church, and youth-serving agency programs. This

relationship with the children makes life assume a more personal richness.

Young adults are seeking ways for individual and family recreation. Hobbies of all types, recreation clubs and associations, adult programs of activity, community recreation services, and co-operative recreation projects call for consideration and choice.

Community responsibility

Public or private recreation in the suburbs must be a part of the community recreation pattern. Regardless of the recreation services provided in the suburbs, the satisfying action of a great diversity of recreation appetites must lead young adulthood to seek community-wide support and opportunities. Recreation can be used as a co-operative force operating between the suburb and its surrounding neighborhoods. A study of organized recreation administration, public and private, readily shows that this relationship is one of the major problems facing the movement today. Problems of leadership, finances, areas and facilities, programs and administration abound. Adjustments can be found and well-working programs established. The road ahead demands solutions to these problems. The blending of responsibilities to provide adequate programs is the order of the day. A positive approach can bring a continuing richness to these new ways of life. A neglect or inability to make adaptations can only increase individual and social pathology. Recreation leadership joining hands with young adulthood can make the way forward one of progress with an ever-increasing abundance of wholesome recreation benefits and values.

These suburban areas must be served, and both public and private managing authorities need to center thought and action in building the best structures which will guarantee maximum results.


Recreation programs can be established by means of the following possibilities depending on local circumstances: the city agency serving the fringe areas through financial contract; creating a metropolitan recreation setup; providing

a county administration to serve a number of suburbs along with rural areas; linking several suburbs as a recreation district. Each setup has its advantages and disadvantages and through study and survey the local area can bring for-

RECREATION FOR THE ADULTHOOD CYCLE

ADULT CYCLES

YOUNG ADULT (20 to 35)
Concern for vocational skill and life work; marriage and own home responsibilities. — — — — —



FORM OF RECREATION

Community recreation should recognize the family as a unit in its program.

MIDDLE YEARS (35 to 50)
Vocational prestige, family life established; possess social status and community recognition. — — — — —



Adult recreation concerns the family relationship with the teen-age world and employee recreation.

FREE YEARS (50 to 65)
Toward retirement. Increased leisure; continuity and growth in social and individual interests. — — — — —



Blending of vocation and avocation; allows time for a broader community relationship.

SENIOR CITIZENSHIP (65+)
Retirement. Longer life span gives more time to revitalize social and economic status; past experience contributes to society. — — — — —



Individual recreation: hobby activities. Organized groups: opens new ways to happiness and companionship.

FIG. 1.

ward the best arrangement. At least, in this way we are on the forward march and may expect effective adaptations.

CYCLE 2: THE MIDDLE YEARS

In general adults of this cycle should be at the height of their lives—secure in a career, well on the way to utilizing their top capacities, possessing social status and community recognition. Characteristics of this pattern are the molding of friendships, the establishment of club membership and church interests, acceptance of family responsibilities, possession of good health, and increasing financial income.

The life of the married adults in this cycle is one of vivid changes, rapid action, comparisons and contrast, turmoil and quiet, success and failure, guidance and counseling. The children are now either teen-agers or in their early twenties struggling with a vocational decision, moving from dates with many to a "steady," determining within themselves to be independent and socially acceptable for what they are, dreaming and planning for the days ahead.

Two illustrations will in some measure portray the potentials of adult recreation for this cycle: the family relationship with the teen-age world and employee recreation.

Adults and the teen-age world

Community, as well as family, interests consume most of the leisure life of the teen-agers. Membership in one or more youth-serving organizations, activities at the youth center, high school extracurricular programs, and the young people's groups in religious denominations provide many busy and enjoyable hours. Adults should study these various opportunities and act as counselors in guiding teen-agers. Also, through participation in the programs as lay-adult leaders, many co-operative projects may result. Here the adult as a

guide and leader finds companionship with youth. Acting as Cub den father and mother, as Brownie leader, as Boy Scout master, as camp counselor, as troop committeeman and performing a host of other adult duties offer opportunities for service.

The programs of these groups also offer occasion to carry over many activities into family life. The family can work together on merit badges, on skills of various kinds, service projects, campaigns, and drives. Camping out, reading aloud, singing and playing musical instruments, and rendering many recreation services are examples of possible joint family pursuits.

Another aspect of this relationship is woven around the teen-ager at home. The "house" of the "home" is taxed to its capacity. Father and mother are pushed into the background of action but are extremely important as providers. It is a time when parents ask to use the family car and to relax in the living room. The television and radio are dominated by teen-age listeners. The cycle has been described as a period "when a man is dispossessed in his own home."

Combined with this picture are the many times when the family discusses together mutual problems, plans social activities, establishes agreed-upon standards of action, and works out community relationships. Co-operation becomes the basis of action.

Employee recreation

A major type of adult recreation serving persons in this cycle is industrial recreation—programs sponsored by manufacturing plants, business enterprises, and industrial organizations. Management and labor recognize the place of recreation in the industrial pattern through the provision for and by the workers of wholesome leisure interests.

The program generally benefits the in-

dustrial world because it breaks down barriers, relieves job monotony, builds friendships, helps to cut absenteeism, improves the general morale, strengthens public relations, and improves community relations. For the adult it provides a variety of activities and opportunities for individual and group enjoyment.

The industrial recreation program is similar to many other programs. Athletics and sports are very popular and within-plant, inter and intraleague events, tournaments, and contests head the list in participation and spectator attendance. Musical activities of all types and social recreation rank high in popularity. Arts and crafts and outing activities, especially camping, are expand-

ing. The company picnic is an outstanding interest of the worker's family. Motion pictures provided by the company are well received, although the workers in general prefer to attend commercial theaters. Dances of all kinds—social, folk, and square—are readily accepted and supported. Reading rooms are gaining in interest, and parties are well attended.

Management and labor can find common grounds in the recreation program. The objectives of recreation offer a pattern of procedure to industrial America. Good sportsmanship, wholesome socialization, and genuine fervor in group participation are elements closely allied to industrial relations. As recreation pro-

TABLE 1—RECREATION ACTIVITIES FOR ADULT CYCLES

	CYCLE 1 AGE 20-35	CYCLE 2 AGE 35-50	CYCLE 3 AGE 50-65	CYCLE 4 AGE 65-
SPORTS	archery badminton bowling cycling fishing golf hiking horseshoes riding roller skating tennis water sports winter sports	archery badminton bowling cycling fishing golf hiking horseshoes riding roller skating tennis water sports winter sports	bowling cycling fishing golf hiking horseshoes riding roller skating tennis—doubles water sports—boat, swim winter sports—ice skating shuffle board	cycling fishing golf—miniature hiking—walking horseshoes—quoits riding water sports—boat, swim winter sports—ice skating shuffle board
HOBBIES	animals antique cars collecting crafts do-it-yourself gardening geology historical trips hobby club models music photography reading sports cars study groups stamps vocational schools weaving	animals antique cars collecting crafts do-it-yourself gardening geology historical trips hobby club models music photography reading sports cars study groups stamps vocational schools weaving	antique cars collecting crafts do-it-yourself gardening historical trips hobby club models music photography reading sports cars study groups stamps vocational schools weaving	antique cars collecting crafts do-it-yourself gardening historical trips hobby club models music photography reading study groups stamps weaving
SOCIAL EVENTS	amateur theatricals dancing gym classes language study leadership: teach skill to Scouts, youth groups in church lectures music reclaiming toy projects	amateur theatricals dancing gym classes language study leadership: teach skill to Scouts, youth groups in church lectures music reclaiming toy projects	amateur theatricals dancing gym classes language study leadership: teach skill to Scouts, youth groups in church lectures music reclaiming toy projects	dancing leadership: teach skill to Scouts, youth groups in church lectures music reclaiming toy projects

grams are adopted by more and more industrial plants, finer and more workable human relationships should develop.

CYCLE 3: TOWARD RETIREMENT

While the focus of the first two cycles was on family life, the core emphasis in the last two cycles will be on leisure. Retirement from the family-centered cycles comes when the chief responsibilities of rearing the family are over and later when the adults retire. Thus, we enter the period of leisure when all the benefits of former working years and all the contributions for the molding of a leisure-centered life are offered to the individual. The road ahead should be one of opportunity to enjoy the many benefits of contemporary time.

As people launch out from the family-centered cycles, there is likely to be a feeling of disappointment. The big question confronting the millions of men and women placed in this situation is: *what to do with this newly acquired leisure?* There are still thirty plus years ahead and with a fresh approach the adult has a chance of enjoying this period with enriching experiences. As Edward J. Stieglitz has expressed in *The Second Forty Years*, "Success or failure in the second forty years, measured in terms of happiness, is determined more by how we use or abuse our leisure time than by any other factor."

This stage begins about the time when the last child has departed from the home and it continues on to the cycle of retirement. Normally, this may be considered as the first real period of relaxation between the time of rearing the children—with its very busy years of constant adjustments to changing conditions and situations—to that of retirement with all of its needed adaptations. There is a sense of achievement in having launched the children into their cycles of adult life and one of relaxation in the peace and quiet of the household.

The income of the adult is still close to its peak while expenditures drop sharply as the children leave home. Husband and wife are finding new satisfactions together and are renewing, in a mellow tone, the romance of mutual companionship of the early married period. They are reaching out into the community for new satisfactions and services.

Individually and socially the adult may store up memories of activities enjoyed, projects completed, and friendships made as safeguards against loneliness in the later years. The cycle offers a full complement for continuity and growth.

Some may fail to find success and happiness in this period of life. Middle age is the uncharted phase of the life cycle. Scientists have delved into the mysteries of childhood and youth, and gerontologists are exploring and making rapid advances in the study of the potentials of old age, but middle age remains an enigma. Sometimes this period is thought of as "the beginning of the end"—we know too little about its characteristics and its opportunities. This attitude must be combatted by all our social agencies. Proper interpretations of this cycle should make it a high point in our lives when maturity blends all of its characteristics for richer living.

Two aspects of this cycle deserve attention. The first is related to a new adventure of adults to provide a balance in the rhythm of work and recreation.

Rhythm of work and recreation

After some thirty or more years of hard work the individual has the opportunity to continue his job, but under less pressure. It is a time when the adult may blend vocation and avocation into a smoother rhythm of action. The time permits both the man or woman to move out into broader community relationships. Quite often these follow the patterns of activities indulged in during

earlier years. But there are many new and novel activities and programs available.

We may consider this pattern as partial retirement—a new frontier of retirement as a retreat from high power, long hours, and punishing jobs to a life where there is still plenty of work to do but where enjoyment of available leisure is possible.

Boredom

The second aspect is the situation brought about by those who do not know what to do with this new leisure. The scarcity of people who achieve a state of relaxed living indicates the hazards. Many who are stimulated by their work feel dismally disappointed when they give up any of it. There are those who in trading money for time simply change pressures. Thrown into these situations, some contract one of the worst diseases of life—boredom. Unless the individual senses this problem the disease will surely appear, and there is every reason to believe that the days ahead will afford a greater climate in which the disease may thrive and become more acute. Boredom robs the individual of dynamic living and often reacts unfavorably to social contacts. If allowed to flourish, it may end in the utter destruction of the individual. The best cure for boredom is to enter vigorously and wholeheartedly into various recreation activities. Medical science, especially psychiatry, is becoming alert to this situation as a factor in the mental health movement.

Recreation has a major part to play in this period. Recreation interests are closely related to all of life's satisfactions for the adults in this cycle. Yet, when the field is examined for organized programs we find that these adults are the forgotten generation.

Recreators have defined poorly what the individual can and should expect

during these years. There are few guides available, and it becomes timely and necessary for the field of recreation to assume its proper responsibility.

Recreation agencies, public and private, should enter here and indicate the road ahead. They can show these adults what is required of them, give them assistance in efforts to achieve, provide them with opportunities to share in the arts of leisure with others, and teach them abundant activities for the democratic process of choice. Thus the adults should arrive at a stage in this cycle where they can express their capabilities for their own satisfaction and for the enjoyment of their life with one another, their children, friends, and the community.

CYCLE 4: RETIREMENT

The findings of gerontology prove overwhelmingly that we *can* live longer. The life span is now 69.9 years and this may be further lengthened. While this lengthening of life is a real achievement, it is accompanied by a big question: How will we live the added years? If the privilege to live longer is ours, then attention must be concentrated on changing some of the existing negative concepts about this period of life. It becomes necessary to revitalize the social and economic status of the more than 14 million senior citizens and provide wholesome practices and procedures so that this period may be lived as richly as possible. Recreation becomes an essential asset. When properly correlated with health, work, religion, and the economic and social processes of life, it adds abundantly to the individual's well-being. A balance of these elements tends to produce the best type of personality and the finest environment in which to dwell.

Chronological age is a wholly unworthy criteria to apply to the aging process. Aging is growing, and there is

considerable disagreement on when one becomes "old." A person may be old at 40 or young at 75. The senior citizens cannot be placed under a banner of a single prototype. Here can be found every type of human being found in every age classification throughout the population. Through the years, the census has made chronological classifications. The age of 65 has been used to denote the onset of later maturity—it forms our fourth cycle.

It is well to designate this period as another phase of growth, not a penalty but an achievement—an unfolding progress toward a fuller life. The pattern for the future is in adopting a proper point of view, recognizing these years as a time for happy and productive living. It involves convincing oneself that this *can* be an entirely new, useful, and rewarding experience. It is at this period of life that men and women are, in a way, best equipped to make effective contributions to society because of experience and skill.

There are many elders who desire to solve the gift of leisure through their own resources as individuals. All through life they have cultivated hobbies and can carry them on into later maturity. The facts prove overwhelmingly, however, that the vast majority of our senior citizens do not possess a hobby and are totally lost as to what to do. It is a responsibility of public and private recreation agencies to teach these individuals hobby activities. These arts of leisure offer the individual a deep and continuing interest, and they are as varied as the field of human knowledge and experiences. They contain the elements of exploration, creativeness, and initiative which gives the individual a chance to discover himself and his world anew. They are means of relaxation, an enemy of boredom, and a vigorous release for emotions.

Organized groups

The majority of our older citizens, however, desire to belong to some type of organization or be with groups that provide wholesome opportunities for recreation. These programs assist the individual to satisfy some of the urgent needs of later maturity—maintain his physical health, fill his hours constructively, and open new ways to happiness and companionship.

Throughout the nation, public and private recreation agencies are establishing groups generally called Golden Age or Senior Citizen Clubs. Here the individual enjoys related interests in experiences, recognition, and in action. Recreation thus becomes an aid to growing old gracefully. It aids elders to remain young despite their years because of active interests that provide so many satisfactions.

The community should benefit greatly from a program of this type. The group becomes an active participating force. It provides many volunteer leaders, hostesses, chaperones, receptionists, special leaders, and the like. Many interested groups of all types offer abundant choices of action. Most of our senior citizens are interested in and try to do many of the things that other age groups undertake. What is important is to provide them with useful things to do—a program full of creative expression.

The challenge

The sum total of the cycles bespeaks the tremendous potentials for adult recreation in all of its aspects. The tempo of our time quickens. Inventions in the scientific world produce dazzling expectations of what *can* and may *be*! A mere mention of words indicates the exhilarating pace: automation, atomic energy, nuclear physics, jet propulsion, breaking the sound barrier, technol-

ogy, rehabilitation, therapy, socio-drama, group dynamics, mental health, physical fitness, do-it-yourself, suburbia, retirement to—not from. Thus today, when civilization offers the gifts of leisure to every person, there is the opportunity to enjoy a phase of culture that in the yesteryears only a few enjoyed.

Also today, because of this gift of leisure, man possesses the hours and tools for quick destruction. While recreation is not the sole cure nor cause of social and individual disorganization, its misuse and abuse contribute a major share in the sum total of negative living. Recreation illiteracy is dangerous—the ranks of the defectives, delinquents, and depraved indicate the seriousness of this situation. Every emphasis should be given to mend the broken elements in the social order and to balance the recreation opportunities within the unequal places.

Community planning and community action become the order of the day. The strength of this nation is found in its community dwelling, and the community is the focal point of organized recreation for adult interests. The essential growth of organized recreation depends upon its procedure on the local level.

A seven-point program is presented as a challenge to every community in

this nation and through it is offered the basis of a recreation program of far-reaching value to adulthood.

1. Establish a responsible local managing authority in every community of the nation.
2. Utilize all private and commercial agencies and organizations providing wholesome recreation programs.
3. Interpret to the people of this country what constitutes a well-balanced community recreation program.
4. Build the community program on a sound legal and financial basis.
5. Demand professionally trained leadership and the use of volunteers trained to do the job in effective organization and administration.
6. Provide a strong, dynamic, vigorous lay advisory committee backing the program.
7. Utilize resources, natural and technological, on a planned basis through efficient use of areas and facilities.

These seven points light a path for community responsibilities in recreation guided by professional leadership. Through these processes the adult population can take advantage of wholesome and abundant opportunities for recreation, thus assuring them of its values for better individual and group living.

Voluntary Youth Organizations

By WILLIAM H. BARTLETT and BERNICE BRIDGES

Abstract: America has a tradition of voluntary associations developed to provide constructive informal educational and recreation opportunities for youth in leisure time. A common goal of these organizations has been the person-centered programs to develop independent, self-directed, self-reliant, self-controlled, and socially responsible citizens. Recent decades have seen a growth in the number of organizations and of young participants and changes in practices. At a time when the nation's population outlook swells the number of potential members and decreases the age group from which leaders are drawn, circumstances require a reconsideration of goals and programs.

HISTORICALLY, the United States has generally maintained a climate in which voluntary associations have flourished. People have been free in their effort to help themselves and to improve social conditions, to create new organizations or to extend the purposes and services of an established organization as needed. Most major changes in the country have led to the formation of new associations or new services of old associations.

To want to offer a better way of life to their children is a tradition of the American people. The many youth organizations financed by voluntary contributions and served voluntarily by thousands of adults express this desire. It is a way of insuring constructive informal educational and recreation opportunities for young people in their leisure time.

The last several decades have been marked by a growth in numbers of organizations, numbers of young members and participants, and changes in practices within these youth services. The influence of the pragmatic educational philosophy which teaches that

children learn best by doing played a considerable part in these developments. An additional influence was the continuous attempt to translate into useful and manageable terms an idea which lies at the heart of democratic society: *concern for the individual*. From this effort has come the person-centered program. Today, although voluntary youth organizations have different specific purposes, they have in common a desire to help youth develop into independent-thinking, self-directed, self-reliant, self-controlled, and socially responsible persons.

These ideals, which have motivated and enriched the membership of each generation, constitute the philosophical core of voluntary youth organizations. Activities developing from such a philosophical framework are not ends in themselves: they constitute a means of achieving basic objectives. Thus for example, a recreation activity may have such combined goals as these: enjoyment of the participants, better health, help to children of different backgrounds in learning to work and play together. A service project may give a group of

young people the personal satisfaction of meeting a community need, while at the same time it offers them an opportunity for prevocational exploration.

The measure of the voluntary youth organization lies in its leadership. A partnership of able, responsible volunteer leaders and qualified professional workers is required to achieve organizational objectives. Most volunteers look upon their jobs, whether in program or policy making, as opportunities for their own learning and growth. Few are content to depend solely on a trial and error process in making their service contributions. Hence, one of the functions of the professional worker is to give leadership training and guidance to volunteers.

DESIGN FOR TOMORROW

While the availability of professional leadership becomes more acute, voluntary youth agencies are facing the changing social situation by thinking through their designs for tomorrow. Under the auspices of the National Social Welfare Assembly, national, voluntary, and public agencies affiliated with the Assembly met with local agencies to stake out present and foreseeable areas of work which would be appropriate to the times. Here are some of the points emphasized in these discussions:

... Population shifts from urban to suburban communities have led to developments greatly affecting membership and service pattern of agencies. Services are, of course, still required by people left in the "inner city." Those who have formed new communities need assistance in developing services. In general, it is the people of middle and upper income who have moved from the city, a group in which much agency leadership experience is concentrated. Area planning may be the solution to a more fair distribution of leadership skills and supporting funds. Children

and youth are growing up in homogeneous suburban neighborhoods, lacking experience in learning how to get along with people of different backgrounds.

... New approaches in program service are needed to involve hard-to-reach youth in constructive activities. How to coordinate community forces to work more aggressively toward alleviation—and eventually, elimination—of conditions fostering juvenile delinquency?

... The marked trend toward conformity today finds expression among teen-agers in extra pressure to conform to their own peer culture patterns. How can youth organizations help young people develop into the self-directed individuals needed in a democratic society? Young people are preparing for a future "working world" about which there are many unknowns. It is known that they will have more leisure time. What version of the agencies' traditional youth service in the areas of vocational exploration and constructive, satisfying use of leisure are now most appropriate?

... The leadership shortage is acute. What patterns can be employed to make best use of the available supply, and what methods to enlarge it? How can agencies help leaders become more dedicated to democratic principles and methods?

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

A current concern of the agencies, closely related to their basic common purpose of helping young people to grow in self-direction and social responsibility, lies in the area of education for citizenship. A study of nineteen youth organizations concluded that

apparently youth organizations have not yet discovered ways of communicating with and thereby reaching young people, or their programs do not succeed in meeting the needs and interests of the great mass.¹

This study recommended a broadening of the idea of participation within agency programs with emphasis on the

¹ Edward B. Olds and Eric Josephson, *Young People and Citizenship* (New York: National Social Welfare Assembly, 1953).

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qualitative rather than the quantitative concept. It also advised increased co-ordination among youth organizations and increased co-operation with schools, civic organizations, churches, labor unions, business, and political parties.

Professional and lay leaders feel that in our complex adult-controlled society, personal involvement in meaningful citizenship activities is difficult. Hence the problem for agencies may lie in offering young people a real share in experience which will enable them to contribute to

the general welfare of people while they are young and will prepare them for responsible citizenship when they are adults.

In an era of swelling youth population under economic and social conditions which are different in kind as well as tempo, voluntary youth agencies are working with deep concern and a sense of responsibility during this transition period. Out of the rethinking process will come even more effective patterns of service in the American tradition.

Penal Institutions

By GARRETT HEYNS

Abstract: All penal institutions in the United States have recreation programs, although they vary in extent because of limitations of space and facilities. Prison administrators recognize that well-directed recreation is vital to an adequate program for effecting the rehabilitation of the inmate. Progress toward securing sufficiently extensive recreation lags because of inadequate financing and is hindered because the public is apathetic to institutional needs in this respect.

TIME was when there was no recreation program in penal institutions. Moreover, the very thought of providing recreation in any form was frowned upon. A man was sent to prison as punishment for his evil deeds, and nothing should be done to lighten his burden. Opportunities for taking physical exercise, if any were afforded, were limited to marching for a brief time in the prison yard.

Like ape or clown, in monstrous garb
With crooked arrows starred,
Silently we went round and round
The slippery asphalt yard;
Silently we went round and round
And no one spoke a word.

The prison had no library, and the reading matter available was limited to tracts and religious literature brought in by kindly visitors.

Gradually, through the influence of more enlightened thinking concerning the treatment of the prisoner, a change was brought about in the attitude men had toward recreation in penal and correctional institutions in the United States. Today all such institutions have some sort of program for leisure. These programs are by no means uniform in scope or facilities, but even in their most circumscribed form they are a big

improvement over marching in the yard or sitting in idleness.

In practically all prisons and reformatories provision is made for outdoor games and competitive sports to replace the aimless and stultifying going "round and round." In institutions where the program is rather extensive one will find baseball, football, basketball, softball, handball, volley ball, shuffle board, horseshoe pitching, boxing, wrestling, weight lifting, track, soccer, and tennis. Facilities are available for indoor recreation: checkers, chess, cards, dominoes, table tennis and, occasionally, pool. Some institutions in the northern states have skating and hockey in season.

The extent of the program is determined more by the availability of facilities than by the desires and interests of the administrators. Space behind the walls is often too limited to provide much room for outdoor recreation, and in most of the older penal institutions, there is little provision for indoor play. Even today appropriations for the erection of gymnasias are difficult to obtain. Hence some ingenuity has to be exercised to provide makeshift basketball courts, and the like. Due to the lack of such facilities, little is done in the field of gymnastics and corrective physical education.

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Direction and supervision of athletic programs varies with institutions. In many where the activity is restricted, some athletically inclined inmate is placed in charge under the watchful eye of custodial officers. In others one finds a trained recreation director on the staff. He may even have one or two assistants. In such institutions the program is sufficiently varied and extensive that each inmate can find some recreation activity which interests him.

NONATHLETIC RECREATION

A vast amount of reading is done in prisons and reformatories—reading which is by no means confined to westerns and light fiction. Every institution has a library for the use of inmates, though some of them are woefully inadequate. In many instances stacks are filled with books of the type which were donated when Grandfather died and the heirs gave away the things which had no monetary value. The thrust, however, is toward securing libraries well stocked with acceptable books dealing with a wide range of subjects. Some of these libraries are of the open-stack type where the inmate may browse during his leisure time; in others books are ordered from library catalogues and delivered to the cells. In many there is a trained librarian on the staff; in others the management of the library is left to a chaplain, a teacher, or an inmate. Obviously, the better trained the library staff, the more is done in encouraging good reading habits and making proper use of the library's resources.

Music has a part in the recreation program of most prisons and reformatories. Many have bands and orchestras. Some have a staff director of music, and inmates have the opportunity to receive personal instruction on instruments of their choice. Choirs and other

singing organizations are found, though in smaller number. Where such organizations exist arrangements are usually made for occasional concerts and variety shows with inmate talent.

Also found are such recreation features as chess clubs, stamp clubs, discussion groups, Great Book clubs, Dale Carnegie classes, and the like. Dramatic clubs will present several plays during the year, using inmate talent. Practically all institutions have motion picture shows once or twice a week for the inmate body, and television is being used with ever greater frequency. Some administrators try to encourage wise use of leisure by providing opportunities for the pursuit of hobbies. In some prisons the products of hobby-craft shops are sold to the public for the benefit of the inmate who made them.

Such are the recreation features one may find in penal institutions in the United States. Many administrators will provide most of these; all will have some, for all recognize the need of some type of recreation program.

PRISON RECREATION AND PUBLIC OPINION

In some quarters a listing of so many kinds of recreation activities may give rise to grave doubts as to the wisdom of introducing them into penal institutions. Some critics may wonder whether penal administrators are not going a little too far toward making prisons less objectionable. There is no sense, so they may say, in making country clubs out of penal institutions. It is admittedly fair to ask whether so extensive a recreation program is largely due to inmate pressure and initiative, or whether it serves a useful purpose in the training and treatment of the prisoner.

One benefit of a good recreation program may be mentioned at the outset

because it is readily demonstrable, although it may not rate high in the list of justifications. Every experienced penal administrator will agree that an adequate amount of recreation activity, particularly athletics, makes the maintaining of order and discipline a far easier task. Withdrawal of the privilege of participating in such activity is an excellent means of controlling the inmate. One can cite numerous instances where the introduction of a program of recreation greatly reduced fights, stabbing and assaults, and other evidences of unrest. Sports and games act as a safety valve for the release of vim and vigor which might otherwise lead to disturbances.

It is true that many of these unwanted manifestations can be prevented through adequate custodial staff and eternal vigilance, but using recreation as a means of channeling potentially destructive forces into healthful pursuits is a far wiser and more effective way. Certainly cheerful acceptance of a regimen is far better than forced compliance—and much cheaper. Moreover, a program of harshness and repression would militate against achieving certain desirable results which must be secured if the inmate is to profit from prison discipline, and which a well-directed program of recreation can help to secure.

ROLE OF PENAL INSTITUTIONS

One of the primary functions of penal and correctional institutions is to protect the public from those who violate the law. However, society is protected from any individual criminal only as long as he is kept safely within an institution. As soon as he is released to go his predatory way, this protection ceases. It is only when a change has been brought about within the offender so that he goes back to the free world with his thinking and aspirations in accord

with those which are socially acceptable, that society is free from danger in his case. It is the duty of the institution to help bring about this change.

Setting up a program to assist the inmate in rebuilding his life requires making an analysis of his case. Such an analysis is necessary to learn what were the factors involved in his criminality in order to determine just what can be done to effect the desired changes. The acceptance of this program carries with it the obligation on the part of the institution of marshalling all of its resources toward achieving the desired changes in personality, thinking, skills, and aspirations with the object of bringing about a successful readjustment to living in the free world.

The problem of effecting this readjustment is approached in different ways by administrators. There are those, fortunately in diminishing numbers, who contend that maximum custody under strict discipline will achieve the desired result; others depend on education, academic and vocational. It is obvious, however, that if we are to aid the inmate in preparing for satisfactory social living, we must be concerned with all aspects of normal living: the ethical and moral, the economic and industrial, mental and physical health, satisfactory relationships with fellow men, and the wise use of leisure.

In accord with this thinking, institution administrators are introducing all manner of recreation activity and gearing them to the general program of furthering the rehabilitation of the inmate. Recreation is being emphasized not primarily because it will do its bit to alleviate the dull monotony of prison life and dupe the inmate into being reasonably well behaved, but because it can be directed toward helping him face and solve some of his personal problems. All wardens and superintendents now advo-

cate recreation for their institutions; however, at times their opinions as to the desirable extent of the activities are limited by what they are willing, with their custodial experience, to try.

THE ROLE OF RECREATION IN REHABILITATION

Among the inmates of correctional institutions there are many who have no knowledge or skills which will enable them to make acceptable use of their leisure. Most of them lack the avocational interests of the well adjusted. They cannot play, they do not read, they have no hobbies. In many instances improper use of leisure is a factor in their criminality. Others lack the ability to engage in any co-operative activity with their fellows; team work is something foreign to their experience. Still others lack self-control or a sense of fair play; they cannot engage in competitive activity without losing their heads. If these men are to leave the institution as stable, well-adjusted individuals, these needs must be filled; the missing interests, knowledge, and skills must be provided. They must be brought into contact with opportunities which will eventually lead to their seeking out wholesome recreation activities when they return to society. It is the carry-over of such interests which concerns the institution in its effort at effecting rehabilitation.

The recreation program in penal institutions should be designed to meet the needs and interests of all inmates. There should be provision for competitive games and the more strenuous sports for the benefit of those who are physically fit. For others who, for whatever reason, are not able to take part in such sports, quieter forms of recreation must be available. Each inmate must be able to find something interesting in the program; he must not

be forced into it, for then it ceases to be recreation. In addition to games and contests, provision must be made for an adequate library and activity in various clubs designed to help men develop initiative and accept responsibility. Opportunity should be given for the development of special talent, such as music and hobby craft. The program should, of course, include motion pictures, radio, and television.

To carry on an adequate recreation program successfully, there must be trained leadership personnel, such as recreation directors, librarians, teachers of music. If the program is to serve effectively both institution and inmates, the latter should be carefully observed while engaged in recreation. It is possible to learn much about an individual from the extent of his participation, his attitudes toward other participants, the way in which he plays, and whether or not he observes the rules of the game. In this way much information can be gained about his attitudes and his adjustment, his progress in overcoming problems. On the basis of such observations, prognosis can be made as to his adjustment in free life. It is only when such thoughtful evaluation is part of the scheme of things that a well-rounded program of recreation can serve effectively.

The cost of an institution's recreation activity is borne, as a rule, by the profits of the canteen. Usually, this income is too small to finance an adequate program. The extent to which such a program can be carried out in a penal institution will depend largely upon how fully the public recognizes the need for it. People must realize that recreation in penal institutions is not a luxury, that it is vital to a good program of rehabilitation. If citizens are apathetic and regard recreation as so much pampering of prisoners, institution heads

will be reticent about emphasizing the need for recreation and will not readily ask legislatures for the needed funds. Such administrators will not hesitate to ask for money for weapons or for custodial officers and will very likely receive a large measure of the money they request. Appropriations for recreation will, however, not be asked for in most instances, nor will they be granted until there is general recognition of the value of the program.

The public should remember that the reason many men are behind bars is due in no small measure to lack of adequate recreation facilities in the free world. Institution heads who are trying to succeed with individuals in whose cases society has thus far failed should not be handicapped because of lack of vital facilities. The public is often remiss in its efforts at prevention; it should not now be niggardly in the program of rehabilitation.

Religious Organizations

By ROBERT W. TULLY

Abstract: The three major faiths have made efforts to discover common ground and define common concepts of recreation in relation to religious organizations. Trends in leadership education, camping, family recreation, and co-operation in community activities indicate the vigor of the religious groups and their awareness of the values inherent in the use of the increased phases of leisure.

RELIGIOUS groups have been exploring the use of leisure to find the role of recreation in the life of their groups. Since the churchman places his religious concepts at the center of his circle, other activities of life must be adjusted to it, must be evaluated by it, and must be defined in relation to it.

Three major attitudes of religious groups toward recreation may be summarized.

1. *Recreation is no concern of a religious group.* As an activity, it lies outside approval or even disapproval.

2. *Religion as the central, controlling function of life has the obligation to speak for and against recreation.* The religious organization is not too interested in including recreation in its program. Rather, it suggests, dictates, condemns, or approves. Only incidentally do recreation pursuits become a part of the religious program. Many times these are camouflaged under different names or purposes: charity balls, festivals, church suppers, ladies' aid bazaars, fish fries.

3. *Religion is life; hence leisure and recreation are important parts of that life.* A religious group holding this point of view is concerned with recreation within the organization and lives of

its members and with the leisure pursuits of all members of society.

These views are held by some groups within each of the major faiths in the United States.

Almost every religious organization at some time or other has tried to state its position and concept of recreation, yet rarely in the history of the three major faiths have the representatives "lived together" to work out such a statement. Indiana University, in co-operation with the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National Jewish Welfare Board, and the National Council of Churches, conducted a Workshop in Recreation for Leaders in Religious Organizations.¹

The workshop drafted a statement of basic concepts. Although the participants agreed on the statement, the text does not attempt to state the official position of the co-operating agencies. The workshop group reported:

1. We recognize the fact that the Hebraic-Christian tradition provides a significant place for the pleasurable experiences of man in his religious life. Joy and happiness are essential to abundant living.

¹ *Proceedings, First National Workshop in Recreation for Leaders in Religious Organizations* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1952).

Wholesome recreation can bring that quality of life which enables him to know the rhythm between self-development and sharing with others.

2. Our religions embrace all things that will improve a person's stature spiritually, socially, physically, and mentally.

3. Recreation is the constructive, joyful, and voluntary use of leisure time wherein the satisfactions are gleaned from the activity itself as well as the product.

4. Recreation is a resource which can be used by our religious organizations to help accomplish some of our goals.

5. Recreation has religious value per se.

6. Recreation as a resource and as a value in itself contributes to:

- a. desirable fellowship
- b. co-operative living
- c. high moral standards
- d. creative expression and development
- e. appreciation and expression of the esthetics
- f. a sense of "at homeness" with the created universe.

7. Recognizing the spiritual, social, physical, and mental value of recreation, religious organizations are charged with the responsibility of establishing principles and of lifting the quality of recreation, so that all men, through this medium, may find their way to the most abundant life possible. In interpreting recreation as a part of religious growth, religious organizations need to present it as a re-creative process and as an integral part of their total program. Each organization must work through its own means and methods and through the leadership of re-creative persons.²

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNITY RECREATION

If recreation belongs to all people as an area of daily living, religious leaders must recognize the need for intercommunity team play. Often they ask, "What can our organization do?" Here is an

answer. First, each religious organization has a responsibility to build a recreation concept or philosophy in the light of its religious teachings and then conduct a recreation program for its own members. Second, the religious organization, if qualified and equipped, may aid in conducting a recreation program for the neighborhood. Often this is done in co-operation with one or more other community groups. Third, the religious organization should

aid the community in setting up a program on a co-operative basis by giving direct assistance to the development of a community recreation program when its ideals are consonant with those of the religious body.³

The need for good leaders, especially trained volunteers, has motivated religious organizations to conduct recreation training periods, institutes, conferences, and recreation laboratories. Many laboratories are conducted by a specific faith or denominational group while others are co-operatively sponsored. Each year thousands of recreation leaders secure insight and develop skills at these laboratories and practicums.

Several Protestant denominations have designated national directors of recreation. The National Jewish Welfare Board has its Director of Physical Education and Recreation. Catholic groups co-ordinate their leadership program through the National Catholic Welfare Conference. However, the failure of seminaries and other religious schools to move ahead rapidly in training professional religious leaders in the field of recreation leadership has held back the church and the synagogue in meeting the needs of their own people and especially in fulfilling their potential in the field of community recreation.

Present developments indicate contin-

³ *Recreation For Community Living* (Chicago: Athletic Institute, 1952), p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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ued growth and integration of the recreation program in and through religious organizations. The continued expansion of recreation laboratories and the increased number of persons, young and old, taking some training in recreation leadership indicate a growing core of trained volunteers. These volunteers are creating the desire for more professional and better trained recreation leadership. This demand may in time motivate the seminaries and religious-related schools to broaden their offerings in recreation leadership. Religious settlement groups and community centers are asking for full-time recreation personnel. Many churches are adding such personnel to their local staff.

There is a ground swell of co-operation with community recreation forces. Religious groups relocating in new communities are thinking of total services to that community, offering to it play space, club rooms, and fellowship halls.

At the same time they urge that public recreation authorities provide gymnasias, swimming pools, and golf courses as well as a unifying leadership.

Camping for religious groups, for example, was once aimed to develop leadership within the organization. The trend today is to provide conferences for such purpose with camping providing an outdoor living experience under religious leadership.

One of the most healthful trends in religious recreation is the rediscovery of the family—its strength and potential. Many groups in family education programs incorporate education in play and fun for the whole family. They are sponsoring family nights in the home and at church, family outings, and family camping. Each effort includes some emphasis on recreation. The popular slogan becomes: "The family that prays together and plays together stays together."

Industry

By DON L. NEER

Abstract: Recreation within American industry has become an integral pattern whose mutual benefits are recognized by employer and employee. Participation in recreation programs tends to improve physical and mental health, cultivate leadership, stabilize employment, strengthen community relations, democratize associations, relieve tensions in the factory climate, and strengthen morale. As leisure increases, management must become even more active in providing programs and facilities.

INDUSTRIAL recreation is one of the oldest specialized areas of recreation. Its development precedes even that of municipal recreation. Industrial recreation or employee recreation is the term used to describe the leisure activities enjoyed by employees of business and industrial firms. These activities may be provided by the company or by the employees themselves through employee recreation associations. These are made up of a group of employees of a particular business or industrial firm organized for the specific purpose of administering employee recreation activities.

There are two distinct types of company programs. In the more common one the individual company is primarily concerned with its employees and their families and is aided in its program by other recreation organizations. In the other program, that of the industrial towns characterized by the milling, logging, and mining communities where the company is the town, the recreation director is comparable to a municipal recreation director.

The earliest provision for recreation by an industry in the United States was that of the Peacedale Manufacturing Company of Peacedale, Rhode Island in

1854. By 1868 the Young Men's Christian Association had become interested in providing recreation for industrial workers. It assigned Robert Weidensall to arrange recreation activities for the crews constructing the Union Pacific railroad tracks across the United States. The Conant Thread Company sponsored company excursions to the shore resorts on Narragansett Bay as early as 1870. The Ludlow Manufacturing Associates opened a library in 1870. The Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company sponsored their first annual employee picnic on August 16, 1882.

The first employee recreation association on record is that of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York City, established in 1894. In 1891 the National Cash Register Company erected a building for employee recreation. In 1895 Oneida Ltd., Oneida, New York opened a nine-hole golf course for their employees.

With the turn of the century, activity in industrial recreation increased. In 1902 the Young Men's Christian Association organized a national industrial department. The Playground Association of America was formed in 1906. Both associations championed the cause of

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recreation and assisted companies to formulate programs wherever and whenever possible.

By 1913 a survey of fifty-one companies conducted by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed that 56 per cent of the companies studied sponsored recreation activities and considered recreation as an important employee need.

However, the post-World War I depression curtailed the activities of many companies, and the industrial recreation programs needed the impact of labor negotiations from 1922 to 1929 to again spur their development. Management then became interested in improving relations between employer and employee. With the advent of the depression of 1929, however, many companies had to curtail their programs. Perhaps the best endorsement of the value of employee recreation to American industry is that despite the severe financial retrenching that engulfed American business from 1929 to 1935, industrial recreation activities, although greatly curtailed, survived and rebounded with a flourish following the depression years.

PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

Demand for trained industrial recreation directors led Purdue University to establish a curriculum for the training of industrial recreation personnel. The program was established in 1938 under the leadership of Professor Floyd R. Eastwood.

The advent of World War II again focused attention on employee recreation, and on November 21, 1941, the Recreation Association for American Industry was incorporated in the state of Illinois as a nonprofit service organization with Dr. Eastwood as its first president. With the help of the Athletic Institute, a national headquarters office was established in Chicago, and a full-time executive secretary was employed.

On February 19, 1944, the name was changed to Industrial Recreation Association and later changed again, in 1948, to National Industrial Recreation Association as its membership increased throughout the United States.

Since World War II, industrial recreation has experienced a steady growth. Under the tutelage of the National Industrial Recreation Association, the YMCA, and the National Recreation Association, more and more industries have added employee recreation programs. Its entire scope has broadened considerably from one of just athletic activities for men to all forms of leisure programs for both male and female employees and their families. Approximately 25,000 companies now provide activities of some nature for their employees and will spend over a billion dollars in 1957 in support of their programs. A good employee recreation program has become an integral part of management policy in most companies.

BENEFITS TO EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE

American Industry values employee recreation programs because of beneficial returns in the following areas:

Physical Health: the increase in the number of deaths due to heart and circulatory diseases (810,000 in 1955), the overweight problem, especially of executives, increased working days lost from common head colds, and general lack of physical fitness have prompted the establishment of extensive athletic programs in plants.

Mental Health: boredom from routine jobs, noise, tensions, conflicts, and increase in mental illness have led to the provision of activities that check fatigue and relieve tension such as the coffee break, noon-hour recreation programs, and recorded music.

Leadership Training: recreation activities provide a means for employee recognition; new leaders are discovered and

developed who make a bigger contribution on the job.

Employee Stability: today's employee is choosy; he looks carefully at the company's benefits. Recreation activities are often an incentive for employment. Industrial recreation combats absenteeism and job turnover. It helps a firm to attract and hold good employees.

Community Relations: recreation is the backbone of good community relations which is typified in recreation activities for the family—Little League, Junior Achievement, Boy and Girl Scouting, picnics, and day camps. Every company wants to be known as a good place to work.

Social Relationships: in recreation activities all are equal. There is no race, creed, color, management, or labor distinction, and this leads to a better understanding of one's fellow employees.

Work Atmosphere: recreation offers an atmosphere which is conducive to developing friendships. In this day of the migrant worker it is essential to help the new employee to adjust and feel at home, meet new people, get acquainted, and find a wife or husband.

Environment: company programs with good leadership protect the employee from adverse commercialized recreation areas and exorbitant entertainment expenditures.

Democracy: the employee program, governed by employees, gives workers a voice in company activities.

Morale: the company appears human—it shows that employers are interested in the employees, their welfare, leisure, and chance to enjoy life both on and off the job.

Employers who want to increase the real wages of their employees are lessening their worries for the future; they are enlarging the opportunities for the worker to enjoy life through a balanced company recreation program. Progressive employers realize that economy

alone demands rapport between themselves and their employees and that their welfare is an integral part of production.

EMPLOYEE RECREATION ASSOCIATIONS

Perhaps one of the most significant developments is the part that approximately three-fourths of the member companies of NIRA have programs that are administered by the employees themselves through their own athletic or recreation associations on a voluntary membership plan. In many plants recreation programs have been adopted as a result of employee interest. Management in most cases matches employee contributions to the recreation fund and usually pays for most of the new facilities.

The increase in company recreation facilities is on the upswing. Over one hundred companies own their own golf courses, and one-fourth of the NIRA member companies have their own picnic areas. Many have swimming pools and bowling alleys and over half have their own athletic fields. Many, however, work harmoniously with local municipalities using their city and school recreation facilities.

A great help in financing the increased costs of programing has been the vending machine. Approximately 50 per cent of the 900 company members of NIRA rely on profits from their vending machines to help finance their activities. Complete subsidization of the recreation budget was reported by only 11 per cent of the members.

A study of the duties of recreation directors in industry reveals a close relationship with the personnel department. In addition to their recreation duties, many directors perform such services as handling the suggestions programs, blood banks, united fund drives, and employee anniversary banquets. In fact, although most companies with a full-time director refer to him as recreation director, a

better title might be employee activities director, because anything that benefits the employee is likely to fall in his department.

The scope of many employee recreation programs is indicated by that at the West Allis (Wisconsin) works of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, which has about 8,500 of its 16,000 employees participating.

In 1955, the company purchased an 18-hole golf course for employees. Over 4,000 employees and family members obtained golf privilege cards or permits to play last year. Intramural sports on an organized basis include: archery, bait casting, basketball, bowling, dartball, golf, gun club, baseball, riding, slow and fast pitch softball, table tennis, tennis, touch football, and trap shooting.

Hobby groups are: stamp club, sketch club, camera club, millinery class, and a toastmasters' club. There are an orchestra and a mixed chorus for those musically inclined. Social groups are the Allis-Chalmers' Girls Club, the Skat and Schafskopf Card Club and the Chess Club.

In addition there is a 670-member Allis-Chalmers Retired Employees' Recreation Club which meets every Tuesday and Thursday of each week except during June, July, and August. Oldsters see travelogues and movies and listen to talks on pensions, wills, Social Security, health, and such.

Industrial recreation offers a challenge to American business to plan for their employees' leisure as ardently as they do their productivity.

Organized Camping

By REYNOLD E. CARLSON

Abstract: Organized camping has shown phenomenal growth in the twentieth century and has achieved recognition for its educational values by voluntary agencies, religious groups, schools, and public agencies.

In our society, in which the working life is increasingly divorced from the soil, camping is of special value in re-establishing contact and familiarity with the out-of-doors.

Day camping, church camping, and camping for children with special needs have grown especially rapidly in recent years; and governmental agencies have increased their participation. Camp programs are vitally concerned with the welfare of individual campers and their adjustment to a democratic society.

INFORMAL camping is a way of life which emerged from the days of primitive man and which has been pursued throughout history by hunters, fishermen, explorers, and families. However, organized camping with educational objectives for children is relatively new. Originating in the United States about one hundred years ago, it has now spread to many parts of the world.

The growth of camping in the United States during the past thirty years has been phenomenal. In 1951, there were 12,600 camps—day and resident—serving at least 4,000,000 campers.¹ Evidence indicates that camping has expanded considerably since 1951, and it is estimated that today there are at least 12,000 resident camps alone serving 4,000,000 children. If we include day camps, many of which have been established during the past few years, we would add another 5,000 camps and another 2,000,000 children.

Organized camps have their greatest appeal for children from nine through fourteen years of age. The largest num-

ber of campers are found in the eleven-year-old bracket. Campers come from all economic levels. Although some private camps cater chiefly to children of the well to do, many of the social agencies provide camping for children from low-income homes.

Frederick William Gunn, Head of the Gunnery School for Boys in Washington, Connecticut, is generally recognized as the father of organized camping. In 1861 he took his students out for a two-week period during which the boys lived in tents and participated in outdoor activities; many were similar to those of the modern summer camp. In 1876 a private camp, intended to improve the health of frail boys, was begun by Joseph T. Rothrock of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. In 1880 a church camp was established by the Reverend George W. Hinckley. In 1881 Ernest Balch established a private camp with definitely stated educational objectives. The first summer camp still in existence was established in 1886 by the New York State Boys' Work Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association under the direction of Francis Dudley. It is worth noting that these first camps included all the types still in existence:

¹ Robert E. McBride, *Camping at the Mid-Century, A Census of Organized Camping in America* (Chicago: American Camping Association, January 1953), p. 11.

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private, agency, church, and school camps, and camps to serve special health needs.

Organized camping developed slowly at first, but its growth spurted after 1900 and has accelerated until the present. The founding of the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and Camp Fire Girls, all of which had programs which were outdoor-centered, gave a great impetus to the camping movement.

Camp directors early began to meet to exchange information, and in 1910 the Camp Directors' Association was organized. A National Association of Girls' Camps was organized in 1916, and in 1924 these two organizations combined to form the Camp Directors' Association. In 1935 the name was changed to the American Camping Association, the purposes were broadened, and membership was opened to all interested people.

Today the American Camping Association is the spearhead of the camping movement in the United States. Its members include all types of organized camps as well as individuals. It is concerned with the expansion of camping opportunities and the improvement of camping practices. During recent years it has devoted its efforts to the establishment of standards of health, safety, leadership, administration, program, and facilities. Camps desiring membership in the American Camping Association must meet its standards. Evidence of compliance with these standards is obtained through visitation and inspection.

CAMPING VALUES GAIN ACCEPTANCE

The first camps tended to be simple in facilities and informal in program, stressing outdoor living experiences under leaders of integrity and character. During the succeeding years, as the educational possibilities of camping became recognized, specific objectives were adopted. In planning and conducting programs, camps became concerned not

only with direct learning but also with improved social relationships and democratic participation by campers. Today, camping has become an integral part of the programs of practically all of the voluntary youth-serving agencies and of many religious groups—Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish—public recreation departments, and, more recently, public schools. Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Boys' Clubs, and 4-H Clubs are the principal voluntary youth-serving agencies with extensive camping programs.

The changing character of modern society, with its urbanization, mechanization, and decreasing home responsibilities for children, has been responsible in part for the growth of camping. An ever-decreasing percentage of our population is concerned with growing food and fibre. We are a people whose everyday life and work are divorced from the soil, and who, therefore, in our leisure feel the need for renewal of contact with the out-of-doors. Camping is in large part an attempt to give our children those invaluable experiences which modern urban life does not provide.

Organized camps, when well conducted, provide one of the finest educational institutions in which we place children. The favorable relationship of counselor to camper, the appeal of outdoor living, the co-operative planning and execution of projects, and the spirit of adventure that should permeate the camp all combine to provide an effective climate for learning.

The American Camping Association defines camping as "a recreational experience in the out-of-doors which provides special opportunity for education and for social adjustment through group living."² The following objectives of

² *Camp Leadership Courses for Colleges and Universities* (Chicago: American Camping Association, January 1949), p. 18.

camping are generally accepted by members of the organized camping profession:

The development of a sense of being at home in the natural world.

The development of skill in the arts of outdoor living.

Education for safe and healthful living.

Education for the constructive use of leisure.

Contribution to personality development.

Education for democratic group and community living.

The development of spiritual meanings and values.

EXPANDING FORMS OF CAMPING

Day camping has expanded more rapidly than any other form of camping during the past ten years. In day camping, children sleep at home and participate in camp programs during the day, usually in outlying areas within twenty to forty minutes' travel distance from their homes. For children not old enough to adjust to resident camp life away from home, day camping is an important intermediary step. It has distinctive values of its own: lower cost, the close relationship possible with parents, and the high carry-over value to community and home life of things learned.

Many religious groups have come to consider camping as one of the finest settings for developing attitudes and understandings of spiritual values. As a result, camping by religious groups has increased tremendously.

Greater participation by governmental agencies in camping is evidenced in several ways. First, there is the rapidly developing field of outdoor education by schools in camp settings. School camping has had its greatest development in the public schools of Michigan and Cali-

fornia, although excellent programs are also to be found in other states. The most common pattern of school camping is that of fifth or sixth graders going to camp with their teachers for one-week periods. The camp program emphasis lies in science and other outdoor-related fields, work experiences, social living, health, and outdoor recreation.

Public recreation departments participate in camping in several ways. A large number of them operate day camps. In the western states we find a number of family camps, such as those operated in San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles. Resident children's camps are also operated. For example, Detroit operates a boys' and girls' camp about forty miles from the city.

Public lands have become increasingly important as sites for camp development. Leases are given by the United States Forest Service and by state forest agencies to camping groups. State park authorities in many places throughout the United States make available fully equipped camping facilities to camping groups on a rental basis.

Camps serving children with special needs have increased in number. Among these are camps for blind, diabetic, cerebral palsied, orthopedic handicapped, and, in some cases, socially maladjusted children. Two reasons may be given for the establishment of these camps. First is the conviction that the handicapped, who are often denied opportunities available to other children, can benefit from the same adventurous experiences and opportunities for social living out of doors which normal children enjoy in camp. Second is the belief that camping may help children develop in a way that is not possible in town institutions. Children come to camp with mental attitudes which are receptive to education. Recent experiments with camps for children with behavior problems lead us to believe that

camping may be a rewarding approach to rehabilitation for many boys and girls.

NEW TRENDS

The following summary of trends is based upon evidence in the literature, visits to camps, and statements of camp leaders close to the camping movement.

Increased emphasis on programs related to the natural environment: many camp people feel strongly that the short period in camp should not be spent in duplicating activities of school, playground, or community center. The camp provides an ideal opportunity to become acquainted with the natural environment, pioneer skills, outdoor-related arts and crafts, and woodcraft. The camp that does nothing to relate its program to the natural environment is missing its unique opportunity.

Increased flexibility in program: camps today tend to adjust more readily to day-to-day situations. There are fewer formal classes and more activities planned for large blocks of time.

Increased democratic planning: counselors and campers have a part in determining some of the camp activities.

Concern for the individual needs of campers: emphasis is placed on understanding the child as a person and giving guidance to help him in personal and social adjustments.

Increased concern for the health and safety of the camper: this concern is evidenced by the provision of good food, sanitation, adequate rest, and balanced programs. It can also be seen in the growing amount of regulation of camp health and safety through state boards of health. Over thirty states now have separate codes regulating children's camps. These codes have tended to become more and more stringent in their requirements for safe facilities, adequate leadership, and provisions for sanitation and food services.

The development of standards by the American Camping Association and its camp visitation and inspection program have been designed to improve the practices of camps on all levels and particularly to insure improved health and safety measures.

Improvement in the quality of leadership in camps: the responsibility placed on the general counselor has increased the need for mature, trained leaders. Over two hundred colleges and universities now provide some type of camp leadership training. Some colleges have their own camp facilities and conduct their training programs in camp, often with actual practice leadership with children. Workshops and precamp training programs conducted by camps and camping agencies have multiplied many times over in recent years.

Unfortunately camp salaries have not kept pace with salaries in other fields, and many potential counselors cannot afford to give their summers to camping. Sometimes camp counselors accept positions primarily because of the value of the experience, particularly if they expect to be employed professionally in education, recreation, or other fields which serve youth.

In recent years there has been a recognition of the values of camping for children by parents, educators, and the medical profession. This recognition is in part responsible for the expansion of camping. The number of campers has been increasing at a considerably more rapid rate than the number of children in our population as a whole, and there is reason to believe that the coming years will witness the opening of camping opportunities to even larger numbers of children. Not only does camping make a strong appeal to children, but the educational values are such that, in a country of ever-increasing urbanization, camps will have an ever more vital function to perform.

Therapeutic Recreation

By VERNA RENSVOOLD, BEATRICE H. HILL, ELIZABETH M. BOGGS,
and MARTIN W. MEYER

Abstract: Application of the principle of "recreation for all" has led the movement to areas of service such as programs for the noninstitutionalized ill and handicapped, the hospitalized, the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill. Pioneering on these new frontiers, the recreation worker, a relatively new member of the team in these specialized areas, is called upon for an exceptional degree of professional maturity and staff teamwork. New staff positions being created must be filled by skilled and well-motivated professional personnel. While still in their infancy, specialized recreation services as discussed in this paper are beginning to develop coherent methodologies and a body of practices which bring not only personal refreshment of the spirit, but therapeutic and educational values as well. Uses of recreation in the treatment of the mentally ill, for example, indicate a recreation therapy which can favorably influence the predisposition and eradication of symptoms of nonorganic types of mental illness.

WHILE the public discusses the increasing abundance of leisure, recreation specialists have been extending new areas of service to segments of the population who may virtually be said in the past to have been condemned to endure time rather than to enjoy it. Applying the principle of recreation for all, the recreation movement is developing patterns of specialized service which are not only refreshing to the spirit, but therapeutic and educational in their outcomes. Four of these areas will be discussed.

THE NONINSTITUTIONALIZED ILL AND HANDICAPPED¹

Given only scattered and fragmentary attention for many years, the noninsti-

¹This section of the paper was contributed by VERNA RENSVOOLD.

tutionalized ill and handicapped are beginning to be provided with services. Members of this class come from all walks of life. They are rich, poor, young, and old. They are of all religions, races, and national backgrounds. They represent many forms of physical and mental limitations. They are blind, deaf, cerebral palsied, crippled, mentally retarded, diabetic, cardiac, and arthritic. But with all their limitations, they are still people with the same emotions, the same basic needs and desires for satisfactions, and the same right to a full and happy life. The community has the same obligation to provide recreation opportunity for them as for the rest of its citizens.

Kansas City, Missouri decided to develop its program of service to all the people. Since a survey showed that in

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the Kansas City area there were 14,000 orthopedically handicapped, a teamwork exploration was begun. This included the United Cerebral Palsy Association of Greater Kansas City; the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, Jackson County Chapter; the Jackson County Society for Crippled Children; the Department of Special Education, Board of Education, Kansas City; the Rehabilitation Institute; Community Studies, Incorporated; Goodwill Industries of Greater Kansas City; Muscular Dystrophy Association of Greater Kansas City; Arthritis and Rheumatism Foundation of Greater Kansas City; Multiple Sclerosis Association of Greater Kansas City; and the Polio Mothers Club.

Out of a co-operative conference of these agencies, there emerged the Kansas City Council on Recreation for the Handicapped with which the Jackson County Medical Society and the Kansas City Health and Welfare Council have since become associated. This Council, acting with the supervisor of special recreation, assigned by the superintendent of public recreation, has designed a program to meet the needs as indicated by the handicapped themselves, as follows: a visiting program for homebound children and adults, carried out by a corps of selected and trained volunteers; a club program for orthopedically handicapped adults; a similar program for orthopedically handicapped teen-agers; a training program in home recreation activities for orthopedically handicapped children to be given to parents of handicapped children and other interested lay people; and television programs directed to the orthopedically handicapped.

Thus, in one area, Kansas City is leading the way toward the acceptance by the community of its responsibility for providing recreation for all.

THE HOSPITALIZED²

To the hospitalized, recreation can bring a refreshment of the spirit as well as encouragement toward therapy. In illness the person is more receptive to nursing and medical treatment if he is happy and occupied within the physical limitations of his ailment or handicap. Thus, recreation can alleviate the boredom of living under the confines of hospital routine; it can minimize anxieties, abate loneliness, renew a sense of values; and supply the patient with healthful activities and motivation to get well. It can also make the hospital a community rather than a mere stopping-off place for medical care, surgery, and treatment. It can help to create new interests and develop present ones. These may be useful to the patient both while he is ill and after his discharge. Finally, as an integral part of the patient's treatment, recreation helps him to greater confidence in and a better relationship with himself, the hospital staff, and with his fellow patients.

Therapeutic benefits

Recreation has great value for and of itself, but there are specific patient categories in which it also supplies special therapeutic benefits. Here its ultimate purpose is to enlarge the patient's range of physical and mental activity and to assist him in his difficult adjustment to the limitations set by his injury or illness.

Thus, for example, the tuberculosis patient may retard his cure because of boredom, lack of mental stimulation, worry over personal matters, and, too often, because of a concentration on his own illness. Therefore, from a recreation viewpoint, it is essential to keep him

² This section of the paper was contributed by BEATRICE H. HILL.

occupied within the physical range of his ailment. Through recreation, the medical staff is afforded a useful opportunity to evaluate the physical and social tolerance of the patient.

For the chronic patient, recreation must make him feel useful and wanted again. For the neuropsychic patient, recreation aids the doctor in his efforts to help the patient return into group activities and community living. For the long-term patient, recreation is a morale builder, offering him methods and means of occupying his time with entertaining and interesting activities as he becomes physically and emotionally prepared for eventual return to community living. For the child patient, there is a particular need for healthful and happy play activities. For the patient undergoing rehabilitation, recreation can be instrumental in counteracting his discouragement and relaxing him after his strenuous day of treatments.

Since recreation in hospitals is a comparatively new concept, its further development requires it to cross many hurdles. This specialized area of recreation service, however, is making rapid strides toward maturity.

THE MENTALLY RETARDED³

Since for the mentally retarded, childhood is, in a certain sense, extended, the recreation worker has peculiar contributions to bring. The very incompleteness of the person's recognition of his developmental tasks cuts away much of his motivation. The inaccessibility of the young child to ulterior motivation, for example, is characteristic in varying degrees of the mentally retarded of all ages. It accounts both for the particular importance of directed recreation in their lives and for the extent to which

³ This section of the paper was contributed by ELIZABETH M. BOGGS.

recreation techniques may expediently be adapted by the teacher and incorporated into the training program.

On the one hand, the retarded child is led by the educator to learn through the motivation of play—an activity which is immediately pleasurable; on the other hand, and to a greater extent than with the normal—the recreation leader must be aware of and willing to utilize the opportunities for learning afforded the child through programs which have the earmarks, both to the guide and to the child, of recreation. Moreover, because all learning for the retarded is slow, it becomes more than ever important that all his experience contributes positively to growth.

Classification

The mentally retarded, or mentally deficient, suffer from a basic handicap which affects their medical, social, educational, vocational, and recreational status. For most of these purposes, it is found necessary to develop some functional grouping.

For recreation, perhaps the following means of classification will suffice.

1. There are those whose physical development is substantially normal but whose mental reactions, although somewhat slower and characterized by lack of ingenuity, nevertheless, enable them to engage in co-operative play. Statistically this group will show poorer motor and eye-hand co-ordination than the normal, and their ability to grasp the strategy or "fine points" of highly organized games will be noticeably inferior.

2. There are those who, while active physically, are less able to direct their activities in an organized manner. Thus, such a player may be hit by the ball before ducking.

3. There are those mentally retarded

individuals whose physical or neuro-motor impairment is so great as to constitute in itself an impediment to activity or effort. These children or adults are seldom found outside the home except in specialized centers, either institutional or community.

Goals of education

Today there is an increasing recognition of the role of recreation, not only for its values as seen by the retarded participant, but also for its effectiveness in promoting, unbeknownst to him, some of the goals of education. At the same time, among those joining the growing recreation profession, there is, as never before, a potent incipient comprehension of what it can mean to examine basic principles while standing face to face with a person who not only may not be able to speak the word but who also cannot even ingest the concept of recreation except through experiencing it at his peculiar level of competence.

THE MENTALLY ILL ⁴

Wholesome recreation can help solve some of the problems of the emotionally disturbed. If we examine the symptoms or predispositions of the most common nonorganic types of mental illness, we achieve some understanding of how recreation can favorably influence the predispositions and eradicate the symptoms.

What are some of these symptoms and predispositions? Difficulty in relating to other people, particularly in developing close relationships with one's peers; inability to live in harmony with other members of the family; dissatisfaction with one's job and inability to compensate with other interests to relieve some of the frustrations and disappointments

⁴ This section of the paper was contributed by MARTIN W. MEYER.

encountered in poor vocational situations; inability to live by the laws and mores of the local community; inability to control aggressiveness and hostility toward other members of society; a feeling of worthlessness and not being wanted; inability to love in its full meaning of considering the needs of others over one's own; inability to relieve tensions which build up from the normal frustrations of daily living; inability to distinguish at all times between reality and fantasy; inability to solve problems requiring objective thinking.

If we carefully scrutinize the predispositions to nonorganic mental illness and the effects of healthful recreation, it becomes increasingly clear that many of these symptoms could be counteracted by the efforts of recreation. Indeed, recreation as a possible preventative of mental illness is slowly gaining recognition. Psychiatrists, social scientists, educators, and a host of other professional groups are seeking some of the more direct relationships between recreation and mental health.

Three phases of treatment

Meanwhile, we are faced with the overwhelming number of people who are mentally ill and the problem of returning them to mental health. The treatment of mental illness is a multidisciplinary process which normally consists of at least three phases. The first is the relief of symptoms and its accompanying effects on the behavior of the individual. The second is the development of ego strength and ability to live more comfortably with the stresses and strains of normal living. The third, sometimes called rehabilitation, involves the education of the individual to live and work as a social being within the framework of the accepted behavior standard of the

community. Recreation plays a role in all three phases of treatment, but it is of particular importance in the final rehabilitation phase. Education for the use of leisure is an absolute necessity if the patient is to return to the community and live a life of happiness and productiveness.

Techniques of recreation for the mentally ill are developing into a substantial body of practices. Recent and dramatic advances in medical, psychological, and

surgical techniques have made amazing strides toward better care and treatment of the physically and mentally ill. But, as Dr. Louis Linn of Mt. Sinai Hospital, New York, says:

We must conclude that recreation is a necessity for the mental health of the patient, just as much as vitamins are for his physical health. Good emotional balance is usually not possible without the one, just as often as physical survival is not without the other.

Private Associations and Commercial Activities

By WILLIAM AND CHARLOTTE ASTOR

Abstract: A vast segment of recreation service is provided by agencies which operate without tax support; which provide their own personnel, salaries, and pensions; which maintain their own standards; and which have community outreach. Does not this pattern offer a way of expanding recreation services without adding to the tax burden?

ALTHOUGH leisure activity through private associations and commercial agencies constitutes one of the major segments of the recreation movement, the subject is generally given as little academic attention as a church organist gives to calypso music. We propose, therefore, to discuss a pattern of recreation which operates without tax support; which provides its own personnel, salaries, and pensions; maintains its own standards; and serves a vast public.

To demonstrate the pattern of the private association, we shall discuss three representative organizations: the United States Golf Association, the American Bowling Congress, and the Society for the Preservation and Encouragement of Barber Shop Quartet Singing. Each of these organizations operates on a national level as a membership service group seeking to advance the true spirit of the game or art; to adopt, enforce, and interpret rules for playing and participating; to provide tournament, championship, and contest performance; and to act as an authoritative national body for strengthening the purposes of the membership in the local, voluntary societies.

UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION

The constitution of the United States Golf Association is explicit in defining the kind of local groups entitled to

membership: they must be permanently organized clubs composed of "individual dues-paying members who manage their own affairs through officers and committees whom they select."¹ Thus, the United States Golf Association is an organization created by golfers for the benefit of golfers and controlled by golfers. Every player who walks the green is affected by USGA: in play regulations, handicapping, rules governing the marking of club irons, or the best methods of fairway keeping.

Since the organization was founded in 1894, the need for it has increased as golf popularity itself has grown. Many years ago it became apparent that a single club, acting by itself, could not do certain things: clubs must have unity in a national organization impartially devoted to the good of the game, else disorder will exist. By common responsible action, golf is policed to satisfy the deep needs of men for good fellowship and fair play. Thus, by affirming a high ideal of sportsmanship, golf helps to produce health and balance. USGA exists to conserve and advance the best interest and true spirit of golf; its chief concern is how the game is played. As Grantland Rice put it:

For when the One Great Scorer comes
To mark against your name,

¹ *Constitution*, Article III, Section 2(a).

Mr. and Mrs. William Astor are members of a well-known family of Basking Ridge, New Jersey, interested in civic and social affairs.

He writes—not that you have won or lost—
But how you played the game.

Under the leadership of this private association, golf has become an integral part of community living—self-supporting, self-respecting, and self-governing. Consider these statistics. In 1956, there were in the United States 5,260 golf courses spread over half a million acres and 3,680,000 golfers—men, women, and children—playing 65,700,000 rounds of golf. The value of land, courses, clubhouses, equipment, and furnishings was \$1,308,000,000. Golfers bought 38 per cent of the athletic and sporting-goods equipment—fishing and hunting equipment excluded—at factory-selling prices totaling \$51,262,963. Manufacturers sold 4,372,162 golf clubs for \$26,262,963; about 35,393,808 golf balls for \$19,142,906; and 570,140 golf bags for \$5,186,849. Clubs spend \$100,000,000 during the year to maintain courses and grounds. Golf stands as a witness to the constructive power of the private association.

AMERICAN BOWLING CONGRESS

In 1956, the American Bowling Congress, founded in New York in 1895, reported 2,000,000 members. Giving direction to a sport which has some 20,000,000 devotees, the Congress climaxes every bowling season with the colorful ABC Annual Championship Tournaments which annually involve from 25,000 to 40,000 bowlers. ABC has become the world's largest sports organization.

While ABC exists as a membership society, the majority of the bowling alleys are privately owned and commercially operated. Through the use of these alleys, bowlers spend more money than any other sports group in America. One reason for this popularity is that ABC has made the game into a sport by unselfish devotion to the rules and

their enforcement. Such respect for bowling did not always exist. For 200 years bowling was sorely beset by selfish interests and accompanied by gambling and excessive drinking. The game fell into such disrepute that three states legislated the nine-pin game out of existence. Over the decades and through sixty annual conventions, however, ABC demonstrated the democratic process at work by making a hundred changes in the constitution, the rules, and the by-laws. ABC has shown how a private association can provide American leisure activity and fellowship with a minimum of cost to the taxpayer, a minimum of public control and regulation, and a maximum of recreation service.

Only the right sport, the right organization, and the right leadership could by 1956 have achieved this performance record:

provided a powerful weapon against juvenile delinquency; banded 35,000 church teams into leagues for the benefit of these churches; taught the lessons of democracy and sportmanship through upwards of 20,000 business and factory leagues where employers and employees play together; reached in colleges, school systems, professions, banks, insurance groups, city, state, and federal bodies, and brought play into existence, thereby increasing morale within each circle; brought a "little bit of America" to over a hundred military bases abroad to thousands of men and women in service.

The achievement of ABC is witness to the integrity and service of the private association—we repeat—in self-supporting, self-governing recreation activities.

BARBERSHOPPING

Perhaps the Society for the Preservation and Encouragement of Barber

Shop Quartet Singing in America provides the clearest picture of a private society at work. Unlike golf with its greens and bowling with its alleys, "singing" makes no equipment demands. The SPEBSQSA, as the society is known, has some 26,000 adult male members organized in 630 local chapters for purposes of mutual pleasure in the art of "organized barbershopping." The Society publishes a quarterly magazine called *The Harmonizer*. Seeking to effect "a modern revival of a fading art" once popular in the age of gas lights in the "Gay Nineties," SPEBSQSA promotes fellowship through the cultivation of an art which is a part of American folklore.

Back in 1938 a Tulsa, Oklahoma tax attorney and an investment banker issued a half humorous letter to their friends. In part the communication read:

In this age of dictators and government control of everything, about the only privilege guaranteed by the Bill of Rights not in some way supervised or directed is the art of barbershop quartet singing. Without a doubt, we still have the right of peaceable assembly, which I am advised by competent legal authority, includes quartet singing. The writers have for a long time thought that something should be done to encourage the enjoyment of this last remaining vestige of human liberty. Therefore, we have decided to hold a songfest on the roof garden of the Tulsa Club. . . .

From the date of this letter, barbershop harmony began to flourish through the support of a private association. Barbershop harmony is a combination produced by four voices, unaccompanied, with a high harmony part consistently sung above the melody.

The Society declares its ideology in a code printed on every membership card:

1. We shall do everything in our power to perpetuate the Society.

2. We shall deport ourselves and conduct the Society's functions in such a manner as to reflect credit upon the Society and its membership.
3. We shall conform in all respects to the By-Laws of the Society and the rules from time to time promulgated by its International Board of Directors and House of Delegates.
4. We shall accept for membership only congenial men of good character who love harmony in music or have a desire to harmonize.
5. We shall exhibit a spirit of good fellowship toward all members.
6. We shall refrain from forcing our songs upon unsympathetic ears.
7. We shall not use our membership in the Society for personal gain.
8. We shall not permit the introduction of political, religious, or similar controversial issues into the affairs of the Society.
9. We shall, by our stimulus to good music and vocal harmony, endeavor to spread the Spirit of Harmony throughout the world.
10. We shall render all possible altruistic service through the medium of barbershop harmony.

This code has influenced the development of the barbershop character as much as the tunes, *The Old Songs*, the Society's theme, and *Keep America Singing*, the Society's singing motto, reflect its spirit of fun and fellowship. The lyric of these songs are:

The Old Songs, the Old Songs,
The good old songs for me,
I love to hear those minor chords
And good close harmony. . . .

Keep America singing all day long,
Watch goodwill come a-wing on a song,
Smile the while you are singing.
Carry, carry your part,
Keep a melody ringing in your heart.

Within the framework of the "barbershopping" art, the Society provides a schedule of roles which encourage responsibility as well as fun. On the chapter, district, and international level there are jobs: president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, chorus director, historian, librarian. There are many committee assignments for purposes of extension, publicity, programing, community and armed forces service, membership, and interchapter activity. The vigor of this self-supporting, self-governing private association is evidenced by three significant activities which deserve special comment, namely: public service, self-study, and psychological understanding.

Hundreds of chapters, for example, provide benefit performances for community enterprises. Thus, in Clayton, Missouri, barbershoppers raised \$2,000 for a children's park shelter. In Minneapolis they assumed responsibility for raising funds to purchase special equipment for the Heart Hospital of the University of Minnesota—contributions to this fund have totaled over \$37,000 in four years.

Psychology of the Organization

In seeking to understand the psychological roots of its fellowship, the Society asked Dr. Max Kaplan, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Illinois, to examine its operations. Professor Kaplan reported: "Don't underestimate what you can do for yourselves and your country. We are in the midst of vital changes in the organization of artistic and leisure pursuits." Then he explained:

Your organization is far more than a group of 25,000 men who sing together. It represents one answer to the decision which America is making during these decades, a decision which seeks to answer the ques-

tion, *first*, what will be done with art and music in this country, and *second*, what is happening to the men who are caught in a highly technical system which puts a premium on specialization, fragmented persons, and consumers of mass-culture?

The objectives upon which your organization really grew may have gone unexpressed. In the nature of things we do not go around making psychological or sociological analyses of our acts. "To preserve an American tradition," as you assert, is fine; this makes you into an *historical society*. But if you live and breathe and expand in more than numbers, then your objective has always been more than historical. Rather, the larger objective of SPEBSQSA has always been to assert yourselves as human beings; to find through song some salvation as persons with some integrity to seek fellowship with other men, not on a functional basis of buyer and seller, or producer to distributor, but as John and Joe. This view of things puts the primary emphasis on the social results of the quartet; social less in the sense of sociability than of men relating themselves to others as men rather than as functionaries in an impersonal set of actions. If SPEBSQSA continues to underestimate its significance in American life, then it will fail to realize its ultimate potential. That is, if the Society's fortune hinges on maintaining a single medium of choral or ensemble material and a single style of rendition, it becomes a force of *conservatism*. It looks backward. It will lose members and fail to attract new blood. If, on the other hand, the Society utilizes the "Old Songs" as an *entree* for men into the world of participation, fun, and creativity with others, then its humbler objective takes on infinitely vast perspective. In the second case, there will always be an interest in these old songs, but opportunity is also provided for men whose beginnings in creativity urge them on to larger experience. The urge in man to create, to invent, to paint, to explore new territories, to think new thoughts—is not a static thing. It seeks always to grow into a larger world.²

² Personal Report to the Barber Shop Organization by Max Kaplan.

OTHER REPRESENTATIVE SOCIETIES

We should like to continue with our discussion of the intrinsic power of the self-governing, self-supporting, private associations as they encourage personal satisfaction, provide for growth, and reach dynamically into the life of the community. We should like to describe the work of the American Rose Society, largest special plant society in the United States, 99 per cent of whose 16,500 members are amateur gardeners who grow roses as a hobby. Emphasizing as we do the fact that these private associations provide a service of fellowship without demands for tax funds or professional recreation leaders, we wish further to point out a few of the services which this representative group provides for the great fraternity of rose growers and rose lovers in every state and forty-five foreign countries. The Society issues an authoritative *American Rose Annual* and publishes the *American Rose Magazine* devoted exclusively to information on the culture and use of roses. It maintains a mail lending library, supplies information on rose questions, and grants research fellowships to worthy

TABLE 1—TEN MOST FREQUENTLY ENGAGED-IN LEISURE ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITIES	PER CENT OF MARRIED COUPLES*	
	MEN	WOMEN
Watch television.....	80.0	78.7
Read for pleasure.....	68.3	74.1
Repair things.....	51.3	21.6
Garden.....	33.4	35.2
Go to parties.....	27.7	36.3
Go to movies.....	31.5	30.4
Play cards, games.....	27.6	26.6
Work on hobby.....	17.8	17.2
Go to club meetings.....	12.7	13.8
Exercise at home.....	9.9	12.9

* Data by Alfred Politz Research, Inc., for the Northern American Newspaper Alliance.

graduate students. It maintains records on all subjects pertaining to roses and operates a name registration system. The Society sponsors two national rose meetings and two national rose shows each year. It also holds district meetings and shows. Training rose judges and setting standards of rose excellence is another contribution of the society. It grants awards for notable achievements in rose matters and for new rose originations adapted to American culture.

The National Council of State Garden Clubs is another representative private association. Through some 12,000 clubs with 390,000 members in forty-five states, it promotes the love of flowers as a hobby.

The work of Severino Montano is still another example of private associations. Under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, he returned to the Philippine Islands after studying drama at Yale University and organized some forty-two native arena theaters—all of which are self-supporting, self-governing.

From our discussion of the private, interest-centered society, we wish to turn to a discussion of the professional development of recreation facilities by private capital under private leadership.

COMMERCIAL RECREATION: A CASE HISTORY

In 1948 Professor Cecil B. Hollingsworth, Department of Physical Education, University of California, proposed to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors a program under which he would lease a park area overgrown with weeds for development as a golf course. At the end of the lease, he would surrender the facility to the county. Hollingsworth proceeded to build two golf courses, a complete club house with café, locker rooms, and golf shop facilities. Underwriting the development cost, the

professor and his associates made an immediate outlay of \$250,000 with final improvements adding still further to the cost. With careful bookkeeping which provides for amortization and payment of taxes, Hollingsworth estimates that the project, during the lifetime of the lease, will net the county \$375,000 in cash rentals plus tax payments to federal, state, and county governments. He will deliver the property to the county as a matured business, all expenses amortized, and without civil servants claiming pension benefits.

In 1956, golfers played 85,000 rounds on the courses at no expense to the county for the recreation service. Over 100 industrial, fraternal, religious, educational, and other groups used the facilities. Indeed, Hollingsworth's experience has demonstrated, as we see it, that the development and administration of facilities by private enterprise is sound and profitable both for the municipality and for the investor.

It is Hollingsworth's opinion that all services for which fees and charges are made should be operated under license. He further holds that if a municipality chooses to enter into the commercial operation of a recreation plant, it should compete on equal terms with private enterprise in all respects, including return on investment, efficiency of operation, standards of service, and payment into municipal treasuries of funds equal to all taxes paid by private enterprise on equivalent operations. He says:

If the municipality is to enter upon a commercial enterprise with taxpayers' money, the taxpayer should be entitled to a return equal to that invested in the hands of private enterprise.³

From his experience, Hollingsworth compares concepts of private and public recreation. Public recreation, he says,

³ Personal communication between Cecil B. Hollingsworth and William Astor, April 1957.

is primarily interested in recreation service of the highest quality for the greatest number of citizens of the community at a cost within the tax means of the community: it should not be interested in running a business. Private enterprise is primarily interested in recreation service of the highest quality for the greatest number of people it can serve at a cost within that community for reasonable profit on the investment and service rendered.

PRIVATELY SUPPORTED REGIONAL RECREATION PROGRAM: A CASE HISTORY

To complete our demonstration of the pattern of leisure activities carried on through private associations and commercial activities without tax support, we wish to discuss the program of Recreation Promotion and Service, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware. Known as RP&S and directed by George T. Sargisson, the program was established by a group of citizens in 1945 to help promote and service activities in northern Delaware. RP&S is financed entirely by membership dues and contributions from more than 857 members and by rental and service charges. It receives no money from the community fund, nor from city or county taxes. It works primarily as counselor to a host of private societies. In 1957, for example, its working list showed about one hundred special interests with such range as the Roosevelt Homing Pigeon Club to the Delaware Doll and Toy Collectors Club, and from the Delaware Field Hockey Association to the Gordon Heights Bag Pipe Band.⁴

⁴ For those interested in a specific example of the way the Delaware community works, we suggest a reading of the booklet *Wilmington Automotive Activities, Inc.* This brochure tells the story of how a community channeled automotive enthusiasm into a creative community activity.

By means of consultation, planning, organization, information, leadership, equipment, assistance, and co-ordination, RP&S provides a kind of community program on a regional basis which is self-supporting and self-governing. The program led by George Sargisson represents an original contribution to the alternative patterns from which Ameri-

can communities may select their own type of service.

We believe that the private association provides an instrument for great recreation service. Being self-supporting and self-governing, it bears a share of the responsibility for providing recreation service adequate for the age of automation.

The Armed Forces

By SHERWOOD GATES and HAROLD W. WILLIAMS¹

Abstract: Recreation has a firmly established place in the Armed Forces. As our military establishment has grown and become an important segment of our national life, recreation programs in the Armed Forces have also developed to the point where they are becoming accepted as an important but normal phase of the American recreation movement. Outdated philosophies of military recreation based on charitable considerations are being replaced by modern concepts of the function of free-time programs in military settings.

“**M**ORALE,” said Mr. Fosdick, “is as important as ammunition.”² Most students of military history accept the premise that in many circumstances proper recreation opportunities are important to good morale. That is the traditional justification for the publicly supported recreation system in our Armed Forces.

Today there is a broader justification. Virtually all of our able-bodied young men are required to undergo some sort of military service. Families, friends, teachers, and ministers recognize that military service can be either a constructive developmental experience or a period of moral and cultural retrogression.

World War I marked a period of great improvisation. Just as we were unprepared to fight a war, so were we unprepared to organize free-time activities for the men who fought it. The military leaders were concerned solely with improvising a fighting force. Civilians

stepped in to fashion organizations devoted to the welfare and morale of that force. For the most part these efforts were financed by voluntary contributions.

Ostensibly, the military services were able to devote their entire energies to the prosecution of the war, but this was not so. Mr. Fosdick reported that a special division of General Pershing's staff was devoted largely to settling quarrels among the various civilian agencies competing with each other for money and glory. Logically he recommended that the “leisure time program in the Army of the future can best be carried on by the Army itself.”³ The War Department accepted his recommendation, but it took twenty-one years for its Morale Division to be established in 1940.

The pattern for World War II was established in the Fosdick report. Everything on the military installation was to be handled by the military. Recreation in civilian communities would be handled by civilian agencies which were to be organized into a single nonsectarian organization. Mr. Fosdick made one other important and perceptive observation in his report when he declared that

¹ The views expressed in this article are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Department of the Air Force or the Department of Defense.

² “Report to the Secretary of War on the Activities of Welfare Organizations Serving with the A.E.F.” (June 1, 1919) by Raymond B. Fosdick, Chairman, War Department Commission on Training Activities.

³ *Ibid.*

Sherwood Gates, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Chief, and Harold W. Williams, Washington, D. C., is Deputy Chief, Office of Community Services, Personnel Services Division, Headquarters United States Air Force.

military personnel resented the charitable approach of the private agencies, especially the competitive publicity regarding what was done for them.

World War II marked a vast expansion in the recreation program of the Armed Forces. Large quantities of recreation supplies were bought. Civilian agencies mobilized on a comparable scale, and the federal government established the Office of Community War Services.

LARGE NUMBERS OF TRANSIENTS SERVED

The activities which resulted from these expenditures of manpower and money were built around large numbers of people who had to be served in an atmosphere of transiency. There was no time to waste in teaching, in organizing self-directed activities or in experimenting with leisure programs. Men had to have entertainment, a place to sit down in comfort, an opportunity to play or watch athletics, and some opportunities for approved social life. Measured by the needs of the times, many of the programs were successful.

In athletics, the Navy led the way by organizing a large sports program. Extensive programs of sports and entertainment were supervised by experienced civilian recreation directors who were granted direct commissions as welfare and recreation officers.

These vast organizations, like the rest of the components of the Armed Forces, rapidly demobilized in the period after World War II except within the Armies of Occupation where extensive recreation programs similar to those in effect during World War II were maintained.

By the end of World War II, practically everybody agreed that programs of some sort were needed during a war. However, this need was based largely on moral grounds. Civilians felt that they owed something to help the boys. Others felt that recreation programs were

needed to keep the soldiers out of the fleshpots. The place of recreation in the armed services in peacetime was not yet firmly established. There was little or no expressed understanding of recreation as a vital force in self-development and the art of living.

A big step forward was taken in 1951 when the President released the report of his Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces.⁴ It found that adequate opportunities to participate in wholesome free-time activities were essential from three important standpoints. First, they were important in shaping character. Second, they were important to national understanding and support of the Armed Forces. And third, they were important in increasing the efficiency of job performance.⁵

With the end of the Korean conflict and the settling down again to the alert calmness of a cold war, it became clear to many people in the Armed Forces that what a man does when he is not working, sleeping, or eating is a critical factor affecting many crucial military problems. Recreation in the Armed Forces is in a state of encouraging transition from outworn concepts, which date back to the Civil War, to new concepts which recognize the comparative stability and maturity of our Armed Forces and the impact which they have on our national culture.

PATTERN OF SERVICES

The one phase of recreation programming which is more or less common to all services is sports and athletics. Camp, station, and base leagues abound in virtually all sports.

Within the Army and the Air Force,

⁴ *Free Time in the Armed Forces: a Study of the Armed Forces' Special Services and Recreation Programs by the President's Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

the service club program traditionally ranks next to sports and athletics when one thinks of recreation. The service club is the direct descendant of the centers built on military installations during World War I by the religious agencies and a first cousin of the downtown Armed Forces club.

One of the biggest difficulties encountered in efforts to make the service club truly a community center has been the traditional feeling held by many senior officers, as well as by service club directors, that the service club is a haven for the lower-ranking enlisted man; and thus that any program which interferes with his desire to play pool, cards or ping-pong, or just sit in a comfortable chair must be excluded. This makes it difficult to schedule meetings and programs for groups with similar interests whose members comprise officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilians.

The service club program does not exhaust the nonathletic and nonsocial aspects of recreation on military installations. Although music is not as central to military recreation as it was in past days, various musical programs are still offered: music appreciation, vocal singing, including barbershop quartets and choruses, and instrumental programs. Arts and crafts and hobby programs are expanding every year, and most installations have facilities for woodworking, leathercraft, photography, modeling, and small crafts. An interesting program, particularly popular in the Air Force, centers around the automotive hobby shop.⁶

⁶ Since the authors are more closely connected with the Air Force than with the other services, many of the examples in this article are taken from Air Force experience. The reader should not automatically assume that similar examples could not be found just as readily in the other services. The authors apologize for any slights to the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps and assure all partisans of these services that such slights are unintentional.

All kinds of activities and clubs can be found on military installations, but for the most part they exist because of some interested and enthusiastic group, rather than because of a planned and systematic recreation program. Understandably, many military recreation leaders are calling for concerted efforts to encourage more of these groups.

Good libraries are prevalent throughout the military services, and although they are not always considered a part of the recreation program, they deserve mention because they provide almost every military person with an opportunity to indulge in recreation reading.

Entertainment, which is usually left to commercial sources in civilian communities, occupies a large portion of the energies of military recreation leaders. Soldier shows and talent shows are prevalent. Even more so, there is a great deal of activity in "booking" acts for clubs and messes.

Both the Army and the Air Force treat motion pictures as commercial entertainment, and profits from admission fees help support other recreation expenditures. However, the Navy considers motion pictures as an integral part of its recreation program especially aboard ship. Hence, it is forced to spend funds for this purpose which might otherwise be used in expanding recreation programs along different lines.

CENTERS FOR SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

For noncommissioned officers and officers, there are clubs or "messes" on virtually every installation which serve as a center for social activities, a place to dine and dance, and a meeting place for wives' groups and other activities. In many respects these correspond more to private clubs in civilian communities than they do to public recreation community centers; and yet they are closely related to Armed Forces recreation programs, providing a home for the major

portion of the free-time activities of many noncommissioned officers and officers as well as of their wives.

The service club for enlisted men and the clubs or messes for noncommissioned officers and officers contribute to a system of recreation by rank for the men in the Armed Forces and their wives. Since much of this recreation has traditionally been social in type, it is natural that this be true.

However, recreation and social programs for children of military families are sponsored without regard to the military rank of the father. Of late there has been recognition of the need for more extensive military interest in youth programs.⁷

Extensive recreation programs for patients in military hospitals are conducted by the American National Red Cross under the supervision of hospital commanders. These programs constitute a specialized phase of recreation in the Armed Forces.

Military chaplains play an important role in recreation for military personnel. Aboard Navy ships, they are often assigned major roles in organizing sports, tours, and informal games; in all the services they can generally be counted on to support and to help promote worthwhile recreation activities. Because of his traditional freedom of access to the commander, the chaplain plays an important role in calling the commander's attention to recreation inadequacies.

AMPLE FACILITIES PROVIDED

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to promote and provide a well-rounded morale, welfare and recreational program to insure the physical and mental well-being of its personnel. Adequate free-time facilities should be provided, operated

⁷ The Air Force youth program is described in *Air Force Manual 34-3*, "Recreational and Social Programs for Children of Air Force Families" (Washington, D. C., March 1956).

and maintained through financial support tendered by the Federal Government.⁸

With these words, the Department of Defense for the first time set forth a firm policy on the provision of recreation facilities for the Armed Forces. Prior to that time, such facilities had been built either by appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds, depending on the skill with which commanders could insert recreation facilities in the military construction program, or on the current state of the welfare fund treasury.

Currently, the over-all direction of recreation programs in the Armed Forces is largely in the hands of military officers. Both the Army and the Air Force hire professional civilian service club directors, largely women; and all three services hire a number of civilian athletic supervisors. In overseas areas, where exchange and motion picture profits tend to be higher than they are in the United States, there is a greater number of professional arts and crafts supervisors and other professional civilian recreation supervisors. Of late, the Air Force has begun to hire civilian youth directors, and some recreation directors have been hired to supervise the entire installation recreation program.

Lack of good leadership in its recreation programs is a recurring charge against the Armed Forces. Back in 1951, the President's Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces stated that qualified military personnel were not "available for proper supervision of the over-all aspects of the free-time program,"⁹ and that standards of recruitment and training were inadequate and career inducements insufficient to attract sufficiently high-caliber persons. Substantially the same charge can be made today.

⁸ *Department of Defense Directive 1330.2* (Washington, D. C., January 1953), paragraph 2.

⁹ *Op. cit.* (note 4, *supra*), p. 36.

Today county and municipal recreation departments are playing an increasingly fruitful role in providing normal, wholesome recreation experiences for military personnel and their families. Largely through the efforts of the National Recreation Association and its special defense related services, public recreation executives have come to realize that nearby military installations are just another community neighborhood. This new neighborhood has special characteristics, to be sure, but its residents can contribute much to, and benefit greatly from, public recreation programs.

LACK OF PARTICIPATION

Although the place of recreation in the military scene has been established, many problems remain. One is a disappointing lack of participation in military recreation programs. While published figures reveal a large number participating in military recreation programs, an analysis of these figures will show that an even larger number seldom, if ever, takes part in an organized recreation program. The Air Force made a study of the participation of 5,000 airmen in off-duty activities during the preceding two-week period. The research revealed that during this period not a single listed recreation activity attracted, not even once, more than half the people interviewed. Only 12 per cent went to school or to a library. Only 43 per cent participated in a sport despite the fact that the interviews were conducted during the summer months. If an individual went to the swimming pool once, he was considered a sports participant. Only 28 per cent went to a dance. Only 28 per cent went on a picnic. Only 20 per cent went to the service club.¹⁰

¹⁰ From an unpublished report on off-duty activities, morale, and performance of airmen, by Raymond F. Gould and Ernest A. Barth, August 1953.

Moreover, if the participation figures are low for such a popular activity as sports, it can be readily assumed that they will be much lower for arts and crafts, hobby, photography, music, drama, and other interests of this type. The fact that a large percentage of the Armed Forces do relatively little in their spare time is easily masked when many are concentrated in one place, and even a small percentage of participants will tax the facilities of a service club or gymnasium.

Recreation illiterates abound in the Armed Forces as they do in civilian life. The fact that so many young people, coming out of our communities and going into the Armed Forces lack many of the basic recreation skills should be a matter of concern for civilian recreation leaders.

RECREATION MANAGERS

There is evidence that military leaders are looking for more professionalism in those who work in Armed Forces recreation; that is, individuals for whom recreation is a profession. In the Air Force, there is a growing movement to place experienced and well-trained recreation managers in supervisory positions at base and command level in the confident expectation that these new people will bring to their jobs the accumulated knowledge of the best in civilian recreation.¹¹

These trends will bring better leadership to recreation in the Armed Forces with the result that programs will in-

¹¹ Colonel R. E. Sliker, Chief, Personnel Services Division, Headquarters USAF, told the field staff of the National Recreation Association, on September 27, 1956: "... money, materials and recognition are not nearly so limiting today as are effective organization and skilled management. . . . our basic problem [is] an integration of activities under trained direction toward the gainful fulfillment of leisure time."

crease in attractiveness, participation will go up, and greater satisfaction will be derived from recreation activities.

Intelligent self-interest should prompt civilian recreation agencies to give full co-operation in helping to improve the quality and variety of recreation experiences for personnel in the Armed Forces. Despite a growing trend toward manning our military forces with professional careerists, it is clear that for many years the Armed Forces will continue to graduate many young people into civilian life. These young people will be the parents, the participants, the voters, and

the board members who will influence the development of community recreation programs. Any attitudes, good or bad, which these military alumni develop toward organized recreation while they are in the Armed Forces should be matters of concern for the leaders in the American recreation movement. In the long run, the goals of recreation in the Armed Forces and the goals of recreation in civilian communities are identical. The methods for achieving these goals are gradually becoming similar, and the leaders will soon become interchangeable.

International Relationships

By THOMAS E. RIVERS

Abstract: On the international level there exists a fabric of functional societies concerned with recreation. Over the years the machinery for recreation co-operation and exchange developed piecemeal. Now the international recreation program is taking form as a comprehensive movement. The challenge still outruns the achievement.

THE interaction of peoples and the diffusion of culture have developed a nexus of shared recreation skills and a global fabric of interests mobilized through a multitude of international associations.

From the beginning of history, recreation pursuits grew out of the activities of daily life such as fishing, hunting, painting, drawing, ceramics, and archery competitions. They stemmed further, from adult development of childhood pleasures: running, leaping, jumping, and throwing. Music, dancing, declamation, and other manifestations of religious observances became a part of the culture of ancient times. Eating, drinking, banqueting, and conversing became leisure habits in Rome. For the aristocracy, sedentary games developed. It was in Greece that leisure came to be regarded as a goal of life. Said Aristotle: "... and the soul's well-being seems to be found in leisure."

In all the ancient civilizations, and especially in those which for periods spread over large parts of the known world, exchange of games and other recreation activities occurred. Today evidences of cultural diffusion are on every hand. One finds versions of tag and hide-and-seek games thousands of miles from their assumed birthplace. Tennis came from France; polo from Asia by way of English officers; lacrosse from the American Indians; basketball from Springfield, Massachusetts.

Development of Olympic games are the best-known example of international sports collaboration. Long before the Christian era, athletic competitions constituted a part of the Greek tradition, along with oratory, music, drama, and art. Under the Roman emperors the original concept of the Olympics was lost. The games deteriorated into professional carnivals and circuses until they were banned by Theodosius in 394 A.D. In 1894 Baron Pierre de Coubertin, of France, revived the idea of the Olympics and in 1896 enlisted nine nations to send athletes to the first modern Olympic contest. Since then, thousands of representatives from more than half-hundred nations have competed. In 1924 the games were expanded to include winter Olympic games.

Other international federations operate to stimulate competition, set standards, and give information and enthusiasm; a representative list follows. The International Amateur Athletic Federation, for example, approves world track and field records. The International Swimming Federation certifies world swimming records. In 1947 the Union Cycliste Internationale set up classifications for world bicycle racing records.

ROLE OF THE NATIONAL RECREATION ASSOCIATION

From its founding in 1906, the National Recreation Association of the United States (NRA) recognized the

Thomas E. Rivers, New York City, Director General of the International Recreation Association, has been a leader in the recreation movement for more than forty years.

importance of international collaboration. World travelers, promoting recreation in the United States, met and talked with leaders of many countries. Under the encouragement of NRA, L. H. Weir wrote the volume *Europe at Play*, while Herbert May and Dorothy Petgen made the study of recreation in Europe issued under the title *Leisure and Its Uses*. In 1930-31 the National Recreation Association brought L. P. Jacks, President of Manchester College, Oxford, to the United States to tour the nation and interpret the significance of recreation developments. The impact of Dr. Jacks's visit was great. Of his work, Joseph Lee said: "He lifted our sights as to the importance of what we were doing."

The First International Recreation Congress was held in Los Angeles in 1932. One hundred and one delegates from twenty-five countries attended it. In a closing word to the Congress, Howard Braucher, NRA Chief Executive, said:

The whole world seemed a more beautiful place. Each country drew very near to each other, and the boundaries seemed to connect rather than to separate. Something beautiful, priceless, was seen to lie at the heart of each country. The language of play and recreation activity proved fairly universal. The light in the speakers' eyes, the outreach of the human spirit, the music and song and dance of the various nations required no interpretation.

The warm friendliness and enthusiasm which characterized this Congress should have guaranteed a national development of recreation activities in all the countries represented. And indeed, beginnings in Japan, Mexico, South America, and Australia were actually made after the Congress. But the tragedy of war reduced both national growth and the opportunity for international co-operation. The current development of international recreation owes something to the events of the decade 1941-51; the

global dispersion of Allied troops served a historic purpose in exchanging forms of recreation. The new position of world leadership thrust upon the United States resulted in more inquiries about America on the one hand and on the other a widening awareness of the need for the United States to extend recreation consultation.

INTERNATIONAL RECREATION ASSOCIATION

At this moment of heightened interest, the National Recreation Association of Japan asked the National Recreation Association of the United States to send the present author as a delegate to the Japanese Recreation Congress and to conduct a series of conferences throughout Japan on the values of recreation. En route, he visited thirteen countries, conferred with leaders, shared concepts of recreation, and established channels for future mutual helpfulness. As a result of this exploration, the International Recreation Service of the National Recreation Association was established to provide a temporary central service agency for the assistance of recreation leaders, agencies, and associations in all parts of the world.

In 1955, the present author, under the auspices of the National Recreation Association, visited twenty-two countries. National recreation associations or comparable bodies were already active in Japan, England, Italy, Israel, Egypt, Sweden, Holland, France, and other countries. New associations were started in Iran, Pakistan, Brazil, Ceylon, and Germany. In other countries, government bureaus and private agencies were stimulated to further action.

CO-OPERATIVE EXCHANGE PROJECT

In 1956 the first International Co-operative Community Recreation Exchange project was undertaken. The International Service of the National

Recreation Association became the official host to nineteen leaders enrolled in the project. Under NRA leadership, communities across the nation extended their hospitality. It was not a one-sided affair, however. Representatives from Asian countries addressed local clubs, taught their national games and songs, built warm personal friendships in remote communities where a man from Iraq or Pakistan had never trod the streets before. These guests from other lands finished their four-months' professional experience in the United States by attending the International Recreation Congress held at Philadelphia. Delegates were present from thirty-one countries. A pageant of brotherhood, addresses by leaders from every continent, and many conferences expressed the unity of the world.

At this Conference, on October 3 1956, the International Recreation Association was formally launched. An International Advisory Committee was established, and partial support for the initial program for three years was provided. This voluntary agency, working with an independent international board of directors on the world level for the development of individual and community life, offers an opportunity for devoted leadership and philanthropy.

In 1957 the IRA at the request of the United States Department of State undertook the leadership of the Second Community Recreation Exchange project. It brought sixteen leaders to the United States from Asia, Central America, and Africa. The participants in the Co-operative Exchange Projects have gone back to their countries, fired with enthusiasm to translate their American experiences into programs adapted to the culture of their country and adequate to their needs.

Until recent years the machinery for international co-operation and exchange had developed piecemeal. Now that

international organization has become a part of the structure of the modern world, circumstances combine to advance the sense of international community by the development of a comprehensive recreation movement. Much has been accomplished, but the challenge still outruns the achievement. As General Carlos P. Romulo, a Vice-President of the International Recreation Association, says: "Safety and security are not enough. The fulfillment of the human potential remains today as it has always been the main business of the human race."

REPRESENTATIVE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SPORTS

Federation Internationale de Boules
Federation Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing
Federation Internationale de Curling
International Amateur Basketball Federation
International Amateur Boxing Association
International Badminton Federation
International Bowling Board
International Canoe Federation
International Cyclists Union
International Equestrian Federation
International Federation for Archery
International Federation for Camping and Caravanning
International Federation of Women's Hockey Associations
International Fencing Federation
International Football Association
International Gymnastic Federation
International Handball Federation
International Hunting Council
International Ice Hockey Federation
International Lawn Hockey Federation
International Lawn Tennis Federation
International Motorcycle Federation
International Roller Skating Federation
International Rowing Federation
International Shooting Union
International Skating Union
International Skiing Association
International Swimming Federation

International Tennis Federation
 International Volley Ball Association
 International Water Polo Board
 International Wrestling Federation
 International Yacht Racing Union
 Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne
 Union Internationale Motonautique

GAMES AND HOBBIES

European Bridge League
 Federation Internationale de Philatélie
 International Chess Federation
 International Stamp Collectors' Association
 Numismatic League

INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS
 DRAMA

International Amateur Theatre Association
 International Theatre Institute
 Union of Amateur Cinema

MUSIC

European Association of Music Festivals
 International Folk Music Council
 International Music Council
 International Society for Contemporary Music
 United Nations International Symphony and Music Institute

DANCING

International Council of Ballroom Dancing

LIBRARY

Federation of Library Associations
 Youth Library

ART AND MUSEUMS

International Council of Museums
 International Society for Education Through Art

MISCELLANEOUS

European Society of Culture
 International Committee on Open Air Education
 International Radio Union
 International Union for Protection of Nature
 Organizing Committee of the International Muslim Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Art
 UNESCO

WORLD FRIENDSHIP AND COMMUNITY
 DEVELOPMENT

Community Development Projects
 Cooperative Women's Guild

Federation for Housing and Town Planning
 Federation for Rights of Man
 Federation of Settlements
 International Association for Early Childhood Education
 International Conference on Social Work
 International Federation of Social Workers
 International Folk Schools
 International Friendship League
 International Help for Children
 International Union for Child Welfare
 Movement for Fraternal Union Among Races and People
 National Council of Women of Various Countries

Pan American Union Travel Projects
 Touring Institute
 World Alliance of YMCA's
 World Friendship Federation

YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

First International Student Conference on Cultural Activities
 Institute of International Education
 International Boy Scouts
 International Federation of Catholic Youth
 International Fellowship of Former Scouts and Guides
 International Union of Students
 World Assembly of Youth
 World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts
 World Federation of Democratic Youth
 World Festival
 World Youth Friendship League
 Youth Hostel Association

HANDICAPPED

Comité International des Sports Silencieux
 Conference of World Organizations Interested in the Handicapped
 European League for Mental Health
 Federation Internationale Médecine Sportive
 Society for Welfare of Cripples
 World Council for Welfare of Blind
 World Federation of Deaf

WORKERS

Federation of Workers' Educational Association
 International Federation of Workers' Travel Associations
 International Ladies Garment Workers' Union
 International Workers' Sport Association

Recreational Boating: The Nation's Family Sport

By JOSEPH E. CHOATE

Abstract: Thirty million Americans are participating in recreational boating as a major form of leisure activity. They will spend \$1,500,000,000 on a total of 6,500,000 pleasure craft this year. How did boating reach these fantastic proportions and what are the reasons for its growth, particularly in those years following World War II? Reasons are given for the rise of recreational boating as the nation's number one family sport.

THIRTY million American men, women, and children will have spent part of their leisure time during 1957 taking an active part in recreational boating. Two out of every eleven persons in this country have discovered the pleasures of the waterways and the healthful relaxation of life aboard a motor boat or sailing craft.

Heirs to a marine heritage of such titanic sailormen as Christopher Columbus, John Paul Jones, the Cape Ann skippers of the Yankee clipper ships, Oliver Hazard Perry, and Admirals Farragut and Dewey, the boatmen of modern America operate in the neighborhood of 6,500,000 pleasure craft of all sizes from six to upwards of one hundred feet on our oceans, sounds and bays, lakes, rivers, ponds, and streams. To purchase and maintain this fabulous modern leisure armada, the staggering total of almost one and one-half billion dollars will most probably be spent by the time the sands of time run out for 1957.

Recreational boating has come to be called the nation's top family sport. It is the most popular way for people from all walks of life to get out in the open air, to relax, to participate actively in that recreation, and to share in the fun with all members of their families. But it was not always this way. Back at the dawn of the twentieth century when rec-

reational boating was in its infancy, it was a sport for the rich only. The men who built huge fortunes in railroads, banking, and oil all had their private yachts—gigantic steamships hundreds of feet long, luxuriously equipped for ocean travel. They had their sailing craft as well—big topsail sloops and schooners manned by professional crews which they used for day racing, many times for wagers totaling thousands of dollars. The closest thing to what we know as the modern motor boat was the naphtha launch—a small, open craft, powered by cranky cumbersome naphtha-burning engines which gave off bad-smelling odors and cost a considerable amount of money.

The only persons who could manage to spend time afloat were the upper classes who had the money and could take the time that "yachting," as it was then called, demanded. Most Americans had to be content with sitting on the shore on a Sunday afternoon, watching the rich men's boats ply back and forth. A real boating treat for the young swain of the "Gibson Girl" era was to rent a rowboat and take his best girl out on the park lake for an hour or two.

15,000 PLEASURE CRAFT IN 1904

In 1904 when the recreational boating industry was just getting its start and

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banding together into a trade association, the National Association of Engine and Boat Manufacturers, there were only 15,000 pleasure craft afloat on American waters. Eleven years later this number had grown to more than 400,000; this is attributable in part to the promotional efforts of the young industry. The advent of the outboard motor in those years, first introduced by Cameron Waterman and then popularized by the team of Ole and Bess Evinrude, was also responsible in part for this tremendous gain in the total number of pleasure boats afloat.

The carefree, hectic, fun-seeking tempo of life in the "Roaring Twenties" sought new recreation outlets, and this quest for new thrills and spills had its effect on the nation's boating. Motorboat racing became a popular spectator sport, and nearly all Americans knew of Gar Wood and his Miss Americas. The pesky outboard, too, was adopted by speed-minded youngsters, and the sport of outboard racing got its start. Scott Matthews introduced the concept of the stock inboard cruiser—comfortable, beamy, and with ample living space for a small family. This was in direct opposition to the trend of some custom cruisers of the day which were being built long, narrow, and high powered for fast commuter runs or speedy trips to places like the Bahamas or Cuba where prohibition was not the law of the land. By the end of the Jazz-age decade, there were more than 1,500,000 boats in use.

When money was free and easy in the twenties and fun was the order of the day, boating was still very much a plaything for the rich. With the great depression of the thirties and the whole shift in values, America's boating was radically changed. People with little money to spend on recreation sought and found inexpensive craft for fishing or cruising. The outboard still was a cranky contrivance, but it did offer in-

expensive marine power for the fisherman and sportsman who wanted to get away from his cares and worries ashore and do a little forgetting by himself or with a friend in the peace and seclusion of quiet coves, streams, and bays. The small, comparatively inexpensive one-design centerboard sailboats made their debut during this period. The introduction of the Comet, Snipe, and Lightning gave the sailing man a low-cost way to go afloat. Inboard cruiser builders turned away from the lavish, fast craft of the twenties and offered the public small, but comfortable, seaworthy, and liveable sedan cruisers.

URGE TO DO, NOT TO WATCH

Boating was slowly ripening as a full-fledged mass recreation when World War II broke out, and boats and boatmen went to war. When the battle was done, the smoke cleared away, and men had come home, there was a new spirit abroad in the land. Many returning servicemen, filled with the pent-up desire to get the most out of life, decided that no longer would they be content to spend their leisure hours passively watching athletes perform on the diamond, the gridiron, or the basketball court. They were filled with an urge to do something themselves, and many turned to boating as a recreation in which they could take an active part. In that first full-buying year after the war, 1947, the industry did its best to meet what was a somewhat unexpected demand for boats, engines, and equipment. By the end of 1947, best estimates available indicated that there were about 2,440,000 pleasure craft in use in the United States.

But if the men wanted to participate actively in recreation, their wives did not want to be left out. The ladies had had enough of saying goodbye to their men, even if only for a few days or hours.

They became willing and eager to follow their husbands out on the water; to learn how to operate motor boats and sailing craft; to learn to cook in a confined galley on a fussy two-burner stove; to learn to fish, water ski, and a thousand other new tricks and skills just to be able to share their leisure with the men. The youngsters, too, welcomed the opportunity to get out on the water in the family boat. Given specific jobs of their own by the skipper, the boys and girls tried hard to earn his respect and approval, to develop their own sense of responsibility so that perhaps someday they would be permitted to take the family boat out themselves. As this trend built up in the late forties and early fifties, boating began to grow rapidly. Whereas in 1947 it was estimated that about 7,000,000 persons went boating, that figure had nearly tripled six years later when almost 20,000,000 men, women, and children used 5,023,000 recreational craft.

The definite pattern of modern family boating began to take shape in 1952. The Korean action had settled down to a stalemate, and the boating industry was able to obtain most of the scarcer materials it had been first denied when Korea became a household word for Americans. Aluminum for outboard motors and copper for fastenings and underwater antifouling paints were two of the more important items that had been in short supply in 1950-51. Since that time the outboard motor manufacturers have reported a steady gain in national sales with each year topping the previous one for new records. This same record-breaking growth is evident in the reports of boat builders, inboard gasoline and diesel engine manufacturers, and the producers of nautical accessories. The boating business has been booming steadily for the past six years, and indications are that there are still millions of Americans who will become

converts to this type of family recreation in coming years.

OUTBOARD RUNABOUT POPULAR

The most popular type of boat today in point of numbers is the outboard runabout. Costing considerably less than its inboard counterpart, this craft ranges in size from 10 to 20 feet, with the 14 to 16-footers leading all others in sales. Lacking the basic sleeping, cooking, toilet, and shelter accommodations of a cruiser, the runabout nevertheless affords man an opportunity to participate in boating at a comparatively low cost. A 14-foot runabout, powered with a 10 horsepower outboard motor and fully fitted with life preserver cushions, fire fighting equipment, lights, steering, and remote controls, should cost under \$1,000. A 12-footer with a 5 hp motor might cost less than \$500.

This boom in boating has forced the builders to consider the use of new materials and new techniques for mass producing sufficient craft to meet the demand. Reinforced fiberglass plastic and aluminum are two of the newer materials being utilized for small craft construction; molded plywood is another. Inboard gasoline engines have been engineered to give much greater horsepower and the weight to horsepower ratio of the engine has been lowered. Diesel engines have been perfected in much smaller packages designed to fit into boats as small as 22 feet, making the economical performance of these oil-burning power plants available to very small craft. A big step in the growth of boating has been the development of dependable, push-button starting outboard motors with steering wheels and remote controls. Another factor has been the mass-production of trailers designed specifically to haul boats behind the family car—mostly outboard runabouts, but in many instances such craft

as outboard cruisers, sailboats, and even inboards. In the past two years there has been a pronounced influence of what can be called automotive styling of motor boats, with such Detroit-conceived developments as the high tailfins, the wrap-around windshield, hard-top convertibles, and bucket seats.

What has caused this boom aside from the male desire to be active in a recreation and the female's intention to stay right with him? What other factors, if any, are in part responsible for the tremendous surge in boating? Two basic reasons for this growth are the five-day week and higher wages and salaries. Now, with two days a week to make use of a boat, budget-minded families are willing to make an investment in leisure that would have seemed extravagant when the head of the house had to put in a five-and-a-half or six-day working week. More money in the pay envelope means not only better food, clothing, and shelter for the average American family, but it also means more disposable income which can be applied to recreation. The horribly overcrowded highways have forced automobile drivers with jangled nerves and exhaust-filled nostrils to seek weekend recreation elsewhere.

The federal government has had a hand in this phenomenal growth.

Through its program of flood controls, land reclamation and hydroelectric power, the government has created thousands of new inland lakes where there was never enough water to float a toy boat before. Places like Lake Texoma on the Texas-Oklahoma border, Bull Shoals in Missouri; the Tennessee Valley Authority in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama; Lake Mead, Nevada; and Fort Peck, Montana today are boating centers just as much as Long Island Sound, Massachusetts Bay, Puget Sound, or the Chesapeake. For the inland boating enthusiast with a wanderlust who might feel cramped doing his boating on the same small lake all season, the inexpensive, easy-to-operate boat trailer has liberated him and provided the necessary mobility to give him as wide a cruising range as his fellow boatmen who live along the oceanic coasts or on the shores of the Great Lakes.

A desire to participate rather than to watch, the suitability of boating as an all-family recreation, the increased facilities for boats, the new materials and techniques of construction, the crowded highways, the five-day week, and higher salaries have all contributed to the phenomenon of the rise of recreational boating as America's number one family sport.

Travel: American Mobility

By JAMES L. BOSSEMEYER

Abstract: Americans, most mobile of all peoples, spend 25 billion dollars a year for travel. Reviewing the history of travel, the article discusses contemporary and emerging patterns. The plan for fixed Monday dates for major holidays is supported.

THE people of the United States travel for business and pleasure to an extent which is unprecedented in the history of the world. The most distinctive feature of life in the United States is its mobility. Our people have the freedom to travel, to go and come as they please. They have the facilities with which to travel via land, sea, and air. They have the competitive urge to travel, to expand their businesses. They have the leisure and the money with which to travel for recreation and pleasure. They have the genius for working together and exchanging ideas which leads them to travel to get together for innumerable meetings and conventions. The American people currently spend more than twenty-five billion dollars per year for travel at home and abroad. Of this amount, 18 billion dollars are spent for domestic tourist travel, 5 billion-plus dollars for business travel, and slightly less than 2 billion dollars for foreign travel.

Almost without exception the more than 63 million employed persons enjoy annual paid vacations of from one to three weeks duration. They are joined on vacation by members of their families. In addition, great numbers of retired people have sufficient means to travel. Hence, it is estimated that at least one hundred million people take one or more vacations each year.

Among those who do not have the time or inclination to take vacations, many travel extensively for business purposes or to attend meetings, and from this travel they derive some of the benefits of a vacation. Thus, at least two-thirds of the population of the nation engages rather extensively in travel during the course of a year.

The volume of time spent in travel by United States citizens has grown steadily since the nation was founded. In the early days, there was always new territory to be explored and settled. As the nation grew in size, the transportation system grew with it. At first Americans traveled via post roads and rivers. Few realize today how highly developed this system of transportation was before the despoiler of it, the railroads, came along to supplant it. But we can still stop to wonder at the old Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and similar ones throughout the eastern part of the country. And we can still enjoy the stories of the old post roads and the stirring saga of the river steamers which plied the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and other rivers.

But during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the iron horse came along and almost completely took over the transportation of both goods and people. By 1890 this conquest was complete, and until the middle 1920's the

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railroads dominated the passenger travel field. This domination was so complete that many of the railroads built and operated large resorts to provide suitable destinations for vacationers served by their lines.

By the middle 1920's, a great many people owned automobiles, and although there were no suitable transcontinental highways, nevertheless they strapped camping equipment to their cars and took off in all directions. These automobile tourists could not always get to a town, an inn, or a hotel by nightfall. To take care of them, towns everywhere established municipal tourist camps, and people camped out.

This unheard of phenomenon, the tourist and his automobile, was so persistent and the numbers increased so fast that something had to be done about it. Therefore paved highways were built everywhere. Many motels were built so the automobile tourist can always find accommodations wherever nightfall overtakes him.

Within twenty years, from 1920 to 1940, the railroads lost their supremacy in the passenger business to the automobiles and to other rubber-tired vehicles—the bus and the airplane. And the hotels were confronted with formidable competition from the motor courts.

CONTEMPORARY PATTERN OF MOBILITY

By 1940 some definite patterns had become established. The United States had become the richest, strongest nation in the world. Its greatness and prosperity depended on two principal factors—great industrial skill and capacity, and mobility.

In order to conduct business operations, businessmen had to move about to an extent unheard of in other countries. Meetings and conventions had to be held in greater numbers to speed the business projects and to provide for the

specialized organizations and trade associations which have developed as adjuncts to our highly complex and competitive business process. In their daily lives, people traveled long distances in going to the office or to work, in going to church, and in engaging in recreation pursuits.

From 1920, when a great number of people moved about in a pattern set by railroad tracks, to 1940, when a vastly greater number of people moved around a great deal more in all of their daily pursuits, the pattern had changed so that about 85 per cent of the traveling was done by private automobile and only 15 per cent by public carrier.

World War II did not greatly change the pattern. It did give great impetus to the development of air travel, and this has had effects which shall be noted.

Today Americans are the most mobile people the world has ever known. The traveling which they do has a profound influence upon their daily lives. Take the mobility away, or any substantial part of it, and economic and social collapse would almost surely follow.

The volume of travel has increased each year since World War II, with the exception of 1954. In that year, the volume equaled but did not exceed that of 1953. In 1955 the upward trend was resumed and has continued to date.

EMERGING PATTERNS

Some of the outstanding trends in travel which have developed during the last ten years are these. There is more year-round travel everywhere in the country. Air conditioning has helped develop hot-weather travel to all parts of the country. The summer season in Florida, for example, abetted by air conditioning and off-season rates, is now at least equal in volume to that of the winter season peak. Snow removal on northern and western highways coupled

with the further development of winter sports has created more travel in large areas of the country.

A greater variety of packaged travel programs are available—everything from a bargain weekend in a big city or a resort hotel to trips around the world. Where cost is a controlling factor, these package plans offer the prospective traveler outstanding bargains at a known low price which is very appealing.

As a result of the upsurge in both year-round travel and package tours, there is a marked tendency for individuals and families to take at least two vacations per year.

Another outstanding trend in travel is the development of participation activities in contrast with spectator activities or events.

Boating is an example. The number of families who own boats of all sizes and who travel extensively to get full use of them has grown phenomenally and the growth has by no means stopped.

Skin-diving is a new and fast-growing activity. Geiger prospecting is popular. "Rock-hounds" search for semiprecious stones and interesting rock samples of various sorts. The amazing popularity of photography continues. Many travelers now carry tape recorders, search for unusual sounds, and call themselves "tape-worms."

Events that were formerly of only local interest, such as county fairs or summer theatres, now draw visitors from throughout the nation. The various states and communities that know how to attract visitors foster these events. Their calendars of events are among the standard pieces of travel promotion literature.

Attractions which entertain and instruct visitors are on the increase. Disneyland is one of the latest of these developments, taking its place among colonial Williamsburg, Rock City Gar-

dens, Silver Springs, and similar famous attractions.

No recital of travel trends is complete without reference to the growth in travel to conventions, meetings, and conferences of various types. There are over two thousand national associations in the United States, nearly all of which hold annual conventions and several regional conferences. Add to these the patriotic, religious, agricultural, industrial, and sports organizations which hold national and regional meetings; and the importance of these meetings, travel-wise, becomes apparent.

The people of the United States, because of their prosperity and their forty-hour working week, have developed travel tastes in accordance with the money and the leisure available to them and in accordance with the wide-ranging requirements of present-day business operations. If automation leads to a shorter working week and sustained prosperity, travel and recreation officials believe that people will know what to do with their time. A foretaste of what may happen has been afforded by the campaign which the National Association of Travel Organizations is conducting whose goal is to change the observance of certain major holidays to Mondays.

MAJOR HOLIDAYS PLAN

The plan calls for the observance of Presidents' Day on the 3rd Monday in February, Memorial Day on the 4th Monday in May, Independence Day on the 1st Monday in July, and Thanksgiving Day on the 4th Monday in November. If the changes were adopted, these holidays along with Labor Day would insure each year five long weekends, well distributed throughout the whole year.

The plan has drawn enthusiastic support from the majority of individuals to whom it has been adequately explained.

It would do away with the disadvantages of the split week. It would provide opportunities for a short vacation. It would make it easier for family groups to get together. Each holiday would contain a Sunday in its span which would enable the churches to stress the spiritual and patriotic aspects of the holiday.

Opposition to the plan has come from those forces which tend to oppose any change; from those who feel that the holiday loses its significance if not observed on the traditional date; and from those who fear the holiday death toll on the highways.

The advocates of the plan have pointed out that the holiday death toll does not start from zero. It is not true, they contend, that say 480 persons will die in highway accidents next Labor-Day weekend because of the holiday. There is a normal toll of about 430 deaths on *any* weekend at that time of year. During some holiday weekends, recently, the death rate has actually been less than the normal rate because of the special warnings and pleas for caution made in connection with the holiday.

For the past two or three years, labor

leaders have stated that automation will inevitably lead to a shorter working week. But until recently, they would not predict just what form the shortened working week would take. But now, the United Automobile Workers is specific in pointing toward a thirty-two hour week of four eight-hour days. If this comes to pass and sets the precedent for other similar arrangements, Monday may become the new extra day of leisure. Every weekend would then be a long weekend and would permit vastly superior opportunities for recreation and travel.

Whether or not uniformity is achieved through the adoption nationally of Monday as the extra day of leisure, all indications are that automation and other forces will lead to a shortened working week wherein each individual will work four days and will have three free days a week.

Opinion is divided as to whether the social, moral, political, and economic results of a shortened working week will be good or bad, but the present-day capacity of the American people to make good use of their leisure is reassuring to those who are studying the probable effects of automation.

Go Now—Pay Later: Time Payment for International Travel

By WILLIS G. LIPSCOMB

Abstract: Despite the fact that 58 per cent of American families have less than \$500 in liquid assets, international time-payment travel plans have been proved successful. The majority of the travelers who buy air travel in this manner have average monthly earnings under \$400. They are chiefly government employees and skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers. The phenomenal growth of the "Go Now—Pay Later" idea indicates that the word debt has lost its old meaning; that buying on credit has become a way of life; and that leisure travel competes for the consumer dollar with such durable goods as television sets, refrigerators, and secondhand automobiles.

BACK in 1952 experts in international travel discovered an interesting fact. The figures for the previous year showed that the American public spent only 0.43 per cent of its disposable income on foreign travel—just over half of what it had spent in 1929 and considerably less than it had spent in the depression year of 1935 (0.57 per cent). Disposable income was up from 100 in 1929 to 216 in 1951, but per capita travel expenditures in the same period went only from 100 to 111.

Why did not Americans, with more money than ever before to spend, with the stimulus of World War II just behind them, and with a new feeling of internationalism permeating their lives make foreign travel a part of their rising standard of living to the degree they had before. Americans were buying cars, radio and television sets, refrigerators, and washing machines; they were spending a lot of money on entertainment and recreation.

A new kind of American buyer was being formed: a man to whom the word debt did not have its old meaning, and to whom buying on credit was more a way of life than a derogatory statement.

This new kind of buyer did not necessarily go into debt as the result of hardship: 62 per cent of the families with incomes between \$3,000 and \$4,000 were buying on installment, and 50 per cent of families with incomes above \$6,000 utilized credit. In some cases the American preferred to borrow as an alternative to accumulating cash; in others he feared to disturb savings; in still others he found himself temperamentally unable to save but able to expand his standard of living by buying on credit. Of the 21 billion dollars that these Americans owed as consumer debt, 15 billion were in the form of installment credit; 50 per cent of all major household appliances, one half of all new autos, 60 per cent of all used autos were being bought on time.

In short, there was a new attitude toward money—and hence, if you like, toward life. Perhaps as a result of the insecurities of the depression years followed by the disasters of World War II, the buying public began to attach less importance to accumulating savings as a means to purchasing durable goods—a television set, an automatic washer, a car—and inclined more favorably to

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time buying. Their earning capacity or credit had become the basis on which they were expanding their standard of living. Yet, 58 per cent of all families in the United States had less than \$500 in liquid assets; 78 per cent had less than \$2,000. Even among families with incomes over \$5,000, one third had less than \$500 available and 60 per cent less than \$2,000.

Obviously, airlines were competing with radios, television sets, and automobiles. A trip to Bermuda and return from New York cost \$99—as much as most radios. A trip to London and back cost \$522, a figure between the price of television sets, refrigerators, and second-hand autos.

After years of effort, tourist fares had won acceptance. This had helped bring foreign travel within the financial range of the average man. Transatlantic tourist passengers demonstrated that leisure and the traditional American vacation had been given a wider meaning for people with modest incomes. Aboard were secretaries and clerks, skilled and semiskilled workmen, salesmen, housewives, teachers—people of average earnings. Today about 70 per cent of the transatlantic passengers of one great airline are tourist passengers.

Yet in the year or two that followed the introduction of tourist service, it was felt that something more was needed to make foreign travel competitive with other pleasures and services Americans were adding to their standard of life.

Travel, compared to television sets and cars, was still hard to buy. Credit or installment buying made these other things easy to buy. Travel had to become easy to buy to fit into the new buyer's attitudes.

Immediately there were two objections: First, paying for travel on installment had been tried before and failed. Second, people would be reluctant to pay for an intangible such as a trip to Eu-

rope after the fact and would default in their payments.

The first objection was disposed of easily. Under the plans that had been tried before, the traveler who inquired about credit at the airline or agent's office was told to go to a bank. This he was reluctant to do; and most banks, for their part, were equally reluctant to lend money for pleasure travel. Thus the sale was blocked. The whole transaction had to be completed at the point of sale: at ticket counters or in agents' offices, and it had to be on a nationwide scale.

The second objection was more difficult to answer. A man who is paying installments on a car is using it every day. Would he feel the same about a trip he had taken a month, six months ago? Airlines believed that he would; that he would think he had had a worthwhile experience—and this faith, when it came to be tested, proved justified. The rate of default in payments—at 1% of one per cent—still remains far below the average for any other installment purchases.

The Pay Later Plan has proved successful. It has brought over millions of dollars of new business to the airlines. It has won the endorsement of travel agents, has been adopted by most airlines both here and abroad.

International air travel within the reach of the average man is a reality. Among Pay Later travelers by far the largest groups are local, state, and federal government employees; skilled; and semiskilled and unskilled workers. The average monthly income of the passengers is under \$600; the majority have incomes under \$400. And they feel, as proved by the very low rate of default, that their trip—whether to the islands of the Caribbean, to Hawaii or Bermuda, or to Europe, South America or the Orient—has been an experience they remember with pleasure and are willing to pay for after they get back.

The Structure of Public Leisure Agencies

By GEORGE D. BUTLER

Abstract: This article discusses governmental responsibility for recreation; describes the properties, services, and programs of several federal agencies; and indicates the state agencies providing recreation, their areas, facilities, and services. A major part deals with local recreation parks, facilities, playgrounds, indoor and community-wide activities, and leadership. It indicates the authorities responsible for local recreation service and describes co-operative planning methods.

TO MEET the rapidly mounting public demand in recent years, recreation facilities and programs have been developed by a great variety of public and private agencies. In characteristic American fashion, countless organizations have been formed to foster recreation interests, and huge commercial enterprises have been established to serve people during their leisure hours. Until late in the nineteenth century, federal, state, and local governments considered recreation primarily a private concern and with few exceptions spent no tax funds for recreation. A striking change in attitude during the last half century, however, has resulted in extensive recreation developments under governmental auspices.

Promotion of the general welfare, listed as one of the purposes of government established by the Constitution, affords the justification for federal activity in recreation. State and local governments likewise first accepted responsibility for providing recreation by using their general powers. The Congress of the United States, state, and local legislatures subsequently authorized the development of recreation fa-

cilities and services through enabling legislation and appropriations. Public opinion has not only supported such action, but is urging ever greater service. Recreation is therefore recognized in law, in public opinion, in court decisions, and in practice as a suitable and essential function of government, especially at the local level.

Government support of recreation is justified on several grounds, all of which presuppose that recreation is essential to a well-balanced life. A large percentage of our population would have limited recreation opportunities unless they were provided by public funds; public interest demands that all the people should have these opportunities. Parks, playgrounds, beaches, forests and recreation facilities adequate to serve the needs of the people can be acquired only by governmental action. Recreation under government auspices is comparatively inexpensive, is available to all, and is responsive to public opinion. Furnishing recreation for all the people is too big a job for a private agency and too important to leave to commercial interests. In fact, government cannot afford *not* to provide basic recreation

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services for it has been demonstrated that it is good economy to spend tax funds for this purpose.

FEDERAL RECREATION AGENCIES

The role of the federal government in the recreation field has evolved over the years, agency by agency, without reference to any over-all policy or pattern. Federal recreation functions can be grouped under three headings: operation of federally owned properties that contain facilities for public use; provision of funds or advisory services to states and other governmental units on request; conduct of programs and operation of facilities for federal employees, the Armed Forces, and personnel in federal hospitals and other institutions.

Extensive federal areas are available for public recreation use; some of them are developed as vacation and recreation centers. The National Park Service administers some 175 national, historical, military and battlefield parks, monuments, and other properties comprising nearly 24 million acres. The United States Forest Service controls 180 million acres of national forests which include both wilderness areas and properties developed for recreation use. Flood control and navigation projects of the Corps of Engineers comprise some 5,600,000 acres, of which about 3 million are in water. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Tennessee Valley Authority control other areas largely related to reservoir projects. The Fish and Wildlife Service administers 264 wildlife refuges on 17,500,000 acres. Public-domain lands under the Bureau of Land Management are sometimes leased for recreation purposes.

People visit the federal areas to enjoy their scenic beauty, observe the natural or historic objects in them, or use their recreation facilities. The most numerous and widespread use is of tent and trailer campsites, picnic areas, boat

docks, bathing areas, riding trails, and winter sports facilities. Hotels, lodges, and cabins—usually operated by private concessionaires—nature museums, fish hatcheries, organization camps, and summer homes are provided by some agencies. Policies with reference to the construction and operation of facilities on federal areas differ; some agencies provide facilities; others contract with other governmental agencies or private groups to do so.

Attendance figures attest the popularity of federal areas as weekend and vacation centers. In 1955 attendances at the Corps of Engineers' projects totaled 62 million; an equal number of visits were recorded at the national forests. Attendances exceeded 50 million at National Park Service areas; national wildlife refuges and fish hatcheries had more than 7 million visitors, and reclamation reservoirs nearly 10 million. Most popular activities are hiking, picnicking, fishing, boating, swimming, camping, horseback riding, nature study, winter sports, photography, and, in some areas, hunting. Activities appropriate to the environment are encouraged, while those found in city parks are discouraged.

Federal advisory services to states and their political subdivisions have expanded in recent decades. Through its Extension Service, the Department of Agriculture co-operates with the states in providing recreation programs in rural areas and small communities. The Children's Bureau has concerned itself with recreation needs of children and youth. The National Park Service affords advisory and consultative assistance in planning public recreation areas and is developing a co-ordinated nationwide recreation plan. The Office of Education conducts studies with recreation implications and extends services through workshops, curriculum projects, and field visits. The Public Housing

Administration provides funds and technical advice in planning recreation facilities with public housing developments. The Public Health Service furnishes information on sanitary problems to recreation authorities.

Among the federal agencies that provide recreation facilities and activities for their personnel are the Special Services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; recreation associations within the various departments; and recreation services provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Veterans Administration. The recent appointment by the President of a Council on Youth Fitness and a Citizens Advisory Committee on the Physical Fitness of American Youth indicates growing concern over this problem in which the provision of adequate opportunities for wholesome recreation plays a significant part.

STATE RECREATION AGENCIES

With notable exceptions, state governments showed little concern and accepted little responsibility for providing recreation before World War II. Programs in which recreation played a part were carried on by extension departments of state universities, and several state park systems had been acquired and developed, in many instances prompted by the availability of emergency funds during the 1930's. Like the federal picture, actions taken by state agencies were usually unrelated to any over-all recreation plan or policy. Today every state provides some form of recreation, and many have several agencies that serve recreation interests.

The diversity of approaches to the problem is illustrated by the wide variety of agencies under which recreation areas, facilities, and services are provided. The chief types of state departments or agencies reporting to the

*Recreation and Park Yearbook, 1956*¹ were: Park; Fish, Game, and Wildlife; Road or Highway; Conservation or Natural Resources; Agricultural Extension; Forest; Education; Historical; Library. Only three states report a Recreation Commission; three others, a Park or Forest and Recreation Department.

State land and water areas comprise an increasingly valuable recreation resource. According to *The Book of the States, 1956-57*² forests, parks, game refuges, and other state-owned areas total more than 39 million acres. Road-sides and waysides, though small, far outnumber other types. Recreation is the primary function of state parks. In 1955 they numbered over 2,000 with a total area exceeding 2.5 million acres. Many reservoirs, historic sites, museums, and special areas serve recreation needs, although many state forests do not.

Because of greater proximity to population centers, state areas are more heavily and frequently used, especially for day outings, than federal properties. Attendances in 1955 at state parks alone exceeded 180 million; this is double the number served ten years earlier. To accommodate visitors, picnic centers, beaches, nature trails and centers, tent or trailer camps, vacation cabins, recreation buildings, swimming pools, boating centers, organized camps, hotels and lodges, and winter sports facilities are provided. Activities most frequently reported are picnicking, fishing, camping, swimming, boating, and hiking. Water areas are a strong drawing factor. Increasingly, state park authorities employ naturalists for interpretative services, especially during the summer.

¹ Published by the National Recreation Association, New York. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics used in this article are taken from the *Yearbook*.

² Published by Council of State Governments, Chicago.

Significant contributions are made through state personnel employed for recreation service. The Agricultural Extension Service conducts training courses, sponsors state-wide conferences, provides consultant service to localities, and publishes resource materials. Similar services are rendered by some education departments, state colleges, and universities which also conduct local recreation surveys of various types. Library departments provide traveling libraries; health departments regulate and in some states give consultation service on the design, construction, and operation of pools and beaches; a few planning departments provide consultation service to localities and conduct local area surveys. Youth and welfare agencies in a few states and the three recreation commissions—in California, North Carolina, and Vermont—render several or all of these services. People in state institutions—hospitals, prisons, detention homes, children's centers, and others—are increasingly served through the provision of leaders, facilities, and programs. Growing concern over the state's responsibility for recreation has prompted formation in several states of an inter-agency committee on recreation, which affords a medium for the exchange of information, discussion of common problems, and co-operative planning.

LOCAL RECREATION AGENCIES

County, city, town, and other local recreation agencies benefit more individuals and afford a greater volume of service than those under federal and state auspices. They provide day-by-day opportunities for a large part of the population. Expansion of such facilities and services has been tremendous during the last decade, especially in the smaller communities. Parks and/or recreation programs under leadership are provided in some 3,000 municipalities. In most states home-rule enabling legislation au-

thorizes localities to acquire and develop lands for recreation, operate and maintain facilities, conduct programs, employ personnel, and expend tax funds for these purposes. In other states, municipalities perform these functions under special legislation or under general powers.

Taking the country as a whole, counties play a minor role in public recreation. Several counties have acquired and developed comprehensive park systems, mostly in metropolitan areas. Others have established county-wide recreation programs under leadership, particularly in the last few years. Considerable interest in consolidated or jointly operated county-city park and recreation systems is apparent today.

Parks, often extensive properties, were acquired by many cities before 1900; but they were primarily considered beauty spots, and few forms of recreation were permitted in them. Since 1900 the demand that parks be acquired, improved, and widely used for recreation activities has mounted continuously. Many park departments responded by designing their properties for diversified use and by offering city-wide programs for people of all ages. In other cities, a separate recreation department was established to provide a community recreation program frequently using park and school properties.

The city's outdoor recreation resources include a variety of properties. Some, like the neighborhood park, are primarily landscaped areas with few if any facilities for active recreation. Others, like the playfield, the athletic field, the golf course, and the large recreation park are developed for active, often diversified, uses. Some afford sites for a botanical garden, nature center, or zoological park. Large outlying properties, although kept largely in a natural state, contain facilities for boating, horseback riding, hiking, day camping, and other

appropriate activities. Parks and other dedicated recreation areas, not including school sites, number 20,417 and have a combined area of 748,701 acres. However, less than one half of the 1,907 localities reporting them increased their park holdings between 1950 and 1955; comparatively few have attained the widely accepted standard of one acre per 100 inhabitants.

Of forty types of outdoor areas and facilities reported in the *Recreation and Park Yearbook, 1956*, tennis courts are most numerous; they are followed by softball diamonds, picnic areas, horse-shoe courts and baseball diamonds. Other typical local facilities are: archery ranges, band shells, bowling greens, dance pavilions, golf courses, ice-skating areas, shuffleboard courts, spray and wading pools, stadiums and zoological gardens. Swimming centers, picnic centers, softball diamonds, outdoor theaters and zoological gardens attract the largest numbers. The installation of lights at outdoor facilities has greatly extended their periods of use. Types most frequently lighted include tennis courts, ball diamonds, ice-skating areas, dance pavilions, swimming pools, and other game courts.

Programs

Local recreation programs often started with summer activities at a few children's playgrounds; they still comprise the program in many small communities. Today a well-balanced recreation program consists of many activities serving varied interests: music, drama, arts and crafts, sports and games, nature, social and service activities. It is designed for people of all ages and both sexes, is carried on indoors and outdoors throughout the entire year, and provides activities for different periods of free time. It includes activities at various skill levels that carry over into

adult life and provide outlets for creative expression.

Major program emphasis is centered at neighborhood playgrounds and recreation buildings or indoor recreation centers most of which are school buildings. Most playgrounds are conducted under leadership during the summer only, although the number of cities with year-round operation is increasing. Designed primarily for children five to fifteen, playgrounds also serve the preschool age and adults. Program features are sand and water play, circle, running and team games, arts and crafts projects, apparatus play, simple music, nature and dramatic activities, a wide variety of contests, tournaments, quiet games, storytelling, folk dancing, hobby clubs, trips, outings, and special events. Some indication of the numbers regularly served is gained from the fact that 640 of the 1,956 cities reporting playgrounds registered more than 13 million individuals. Total playground attendances in 1,478 of these cities exceeded 420 million.

Indoor recreation programs were regularly conducted under leadership in 14,000 buildings in 1955. More than 4,000 were buildings used primarily or exclusively for recreation; others were schools, city halls, and churches. Recreation buildings vary from a shelter with one activities' room to elaborate structures with gymnasium, auditorium, game room, club rooms, craft room, bowling alleys, and swimming pool. A small percentage of the buildings were designed for a specific use such as a museum, sports arena, youth center, theater, or center for older adults. In some schools only the gymnasium is used; in others many rooms are used for activities. Attendances at the buildings and centers reporting total nearly 200 million yearly. Programs vary from a single activity to individual and team sports, hobbies, dancing, social activities, do-it-yourself projects, dog obedience

classes, discussion groups, art, drama, music, and craft activities.

Supplementing the service rendered at its indoor and outdoor properties, the recreation department provides city-wide activities. With other community agencies it plans and conducts holiday observances and community celebrations. It provides loan services in the form of game, party and picnic equipment, costumes, books, and visual aids. Increasingly it conducts city-wide programs in sports, music, drama, and other activities. Often these are for persons with exceptional interest or skill, as in the case of community orchestras or little-theater groups. Training institutes are conducted for paid leaders and for volunteers serving church, industry, school, club, and other organizations. Activities are increasingly arranged for physically handicapped, shut-ins, older adults, members of the Armed Forces, and persons in hospitals and other institutions. The recreation department, in other words, has become the recreation service center for the entire community.

Modern recreation programs require the services of competent, specially trained personnel varying from the department head to the junior assistant who works under direct guidance. Major leadership positions include administrators and their assistants, city-wide supervisors of special activities, indoor or outdoor center directors, specialists in specific activities and golf course, camp or swimming pool managers. The 8,500 men and women employed for recreation leadership on a full-time, year-round basis, which comprise the basic personnel corps, are supplemented by some 70,000 part-time or seasonal leaders. Additional personnel are employed for clerical, maintenance, and other duties.

Paid workers carry the major part of the responsibility but cannot do the entire job. Nearly 165,000 volunteers

serve recreation agencies; three out of five help directly with recreation activities such as junior baseball, storytelling, nature hikes, or hobby clubs; the others perform various tasks. Many volunteers find service in recreation a satisfying form of leisure activity.

Administration

As previously indicated, most local recreation programs are administered by separate recreation departments or departments with combined park and recreation functions. Of 2,660 public authorities administering parks or recreation or both, 923 are recreation departments, 920 administer parks and recreation, 343 are school authorities, and the others represent various agencies. However, authorities who employ at least one person for recreation leadership on a full-time, year-round basis render a large percentage of all public recreation services. Of 913 such agencies, 531, or more than half, are recreation departments; 282 are park and recreation agencies; and only 45 are school authorities. Few other agencies employ full-time leaders. Recent years have seen a growing tendency to combine recreation and park services under a single department.

Both recreation and park departments are predominantly administered by unpaid boards or commissions. Experience has demonstrated that they contribute to the effectiveness of recreation service. Advisory boards are less numerous; only one recreation or park department out of six operates under a single administrator with no board or commission.

School authorities are increasingly acquiring larger sites for their buildings and outdoor program and recognize these areas as community recreation resources. The park-school idea, under which city and school authorities jointly acquire, develop, and operate properties for both school and community use, is gaining

acceptance in many cities. Of 14,000 school sites reported in 1955, more than one-third were used for recreation during the year. The schools also contribute significantly to community recreation by teaching children and youth recreation skills and giving them opportunities to participate in a wide range of recreation activities. Large numbers of school personnel serve as seasonal or part-time leaders in the community recreation program.

The total expenditures of local governments for parks and recreation in the fiscal year 1955 totaled \$509,000,000.³ A large percentage of this amount came from tax funds; part was received as income from fees and charges.

CO-OPERATIVE PLANNING

The diversity and multiplicity of agencies providing some form of recreation result largely from unrelated attempts to serve specific groups or meet special recreation interests. Consequently, in some communities recreation opportunities are exceedingly limited while in others there is competition for the time, interest, and dollars of children, youth, and adults. Some

³ *Survey of Governmental Finances in 1955* (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce).

neighborhoods lack indoor and outdoor facilities, whereas in others several agencies provide overlapping services. The need for co-operative planning has been widely recognized and methods of achieving it have been devised.

Interagency committees at the federal and state levels were mentioned early in this article. Representatives of local recreation agencies, public and private, comprise the membership of recreation councils or leisure committees of councils of social agencies. Co-operative agreements have been reached between local park, school, recreation, planning, housing, and other departments to assure a maximum return from tax dollars. Community-wide committees are created to promote special features such as music, aquatics, or holiday celebrations. Many state and national organizations adopt uniform rules for various activities, classify participants for competition, sponsor tournaments and codes of action.

The task of providing recreation for the expanding leisure of the American people challenges our ability and resourcefulness. Co-operative planning and action on the part of all agencies that serve leisure needs are essential in order that all the people may enjoy opportunities for wholesome and satisfying leisure.

Recreation on The National Forest

By JOHN H. SIEKER

Abstract: Under a five-year recreation program known as Operation Outdoors the Forest Service is expanding its camping and picnicking facilities, ski areas, and back country campsites to meet a growing public demand. This article traces the development of the recreation use of national forests from the time the forest reserves were set aside to the present. It explains some of the problems that have come with the increased popularity of the forests and how the Forest Service has tried to meet them. Since the 1930's recreation has had a firm place in national forest administration and planning. The present program contemplates construction of enough facilities to handle 66 million visits to the national forests by 1962 without spoiling the forest environment which people come to enjoy.

RECREATION on the national forests predates the establishment of the forests as such both in the East and in the West. As early as 1819 Ethan Crawford was leading horseback trips from his house in the notch now bearing his family name to the foot of the rocky cone of Mt. Washington in the White Mountains of New Hampshire. The riders would climb the last mile to the summit on foot, sleep at a stone shelter he erected near the top, and return the next day. The present Crawford Path in the White Mountain National Forest follows in part the route he took.

In 1856 Brigham Young invited all Mormons to a picnic July 24 at what is now a famous ski resort—Brighton in Cottonwood Canyon in the Wasatch National Forest. People were instructed to leave by a certain time so that Brigham Young and his leaders could make sure all campfires were put out. These picnics became annual affairs and people traveled several days by wagon to attend them.

No mention was made of recreation in

the first administrative directives for the forest reserves which were established by Congressional Act March 3, 1891, from public domain lands and which later became national forests. The general administrative policy, however, was to continue public recreation use of the forests to the extent consistent with the conservation of the resources which the forests were designed to protect. Thus after the national forests were established, picnicking, camping, hunting, and fishing continued.

When the Forest Service was assigned the administration of the forest reserves in 1905, the Secretary of Agriculture encouraged all uses of the forest consistent with the public interest. He directed that lands be put to the use for which they were best qualified. If two or more conflicted on specific areas, the decision as to which should be developed would be made on the basis of the use or uses providing the greatest good to the greatest number of people. These basic principles still guide the administration of national forests, and today recreation is

recognized as one of their major uses.

Because it was of minor consequence recreation use of the national forests in the early days did not seem to need management or even a clearly defined policy. The national forests were inaccessible to most people; transportation was difficult. Mass camping and picnicking so common now were unheard of then.

The first legislative reference to recreation on the forest reserves was the Act of February 28, 1899 relating to the leasing of mineral springs for resorts. Then the Act of August 4, 1915 authorized term permits up to thirty years for summer homes, hotels, stores, or other structures for recreation or public convenience. By this time, the Forest Service, under the Weeks Law of March 1, 1911, had started to purchase eastern lands which were important for the regulation of navigable streams or for the production of timber.

The earliest (1924) count of recreation use showed 4.5 million visits to the national forests. Records do not reveal whether certain places were set aside for camping and picnicking because people were already using them regularly for those purposes or whether some foresighted forest officer saw their recreation potential and so marked them. Probably some recreation areas were born one way, and some the other. At any rate, those early areas had few facilities: drinking water came from streams; fireplaces without grates marked the camp and picnic sites; and a trash barrel and latrine or two provided sanitation.

Yet recreation use of the national forests grew steadily between 1924 and World War II. In 1934, 8,580,800 recreation visits were made to the forests. By 1941 they totaled 18,004,785. Several factors contributed to this growth, the most important of which was prob-

ably the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS AND RECREATION

The Civilian Conservation Corps, made up largely of young men able to work but unable to get jobs because of the depression, provided manpower needed to develop the national forest resources, including forest recreation and other facilities. The enrollees enlarged existing camping and picnicking grounds and built new ones. Planned recreation areas with adequate facilities for enjoyment and sanitation came into being in the national forests.

Professionally trained landscape architects planned and constructed recreation areas to make forest recreation pleasant and safe. Standard camp and picnic units—a fireplace with grate, a picnic table and benches, and a parking space for the car—were carefully spaced to preserve the forest environment. Several units shared trash-disposal cans, running water, and latrines.

In planning recreation areas, landscape architects included facilities needed to protect the forest and enable the visitor to enjoy it: landscaped entrances, picnic parking areas, seeded or sodded ground around recreation shelters. Where needed, lakes and beaches for bathing were constructed. Graded trails for hikers and horseback riders, scenic forest highways for tourists, and cleared vistas along both old and new roads were provided. Those were deluxe years for the camper—he could find firewood cut to grate length. Through careful planning the Forest Service kept the facilities simple in design and in harmony with the forest environment. Buildings were made of native material and were appropriate in design to preserve the forest atmosphere.

Though popular, the national forest

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campgrounds were seldom crowded except on long weekends. Some areas had a two-week occupancy limit, but in most areas no time restriction was necessary. Some people came with tents and spent the summer. A few large campgrounds became little villages with numbered tent sites and clearly defined streets. Neighbors got together around campfires, and the whole village gathered on a Saturday night for a community supper, a community songfest, or some other activity. The campers developed a semi-resort atmosphere. This type of campground was the exception; most remained small.

During this time, too, because of public demand the Forest Service developed organization camps for the use of young people's groups such as 4-H clubs, scouts, church groups, or underprivileged youngsters. These camps, now five hundred in number, include cabins for sleeping, mess hall, hobby shops, and a recreation hall and are operated by the respective groups under a special-use permit.

With Pearl Harbor, gas rationing, and young people in the Armed Services, the recreation development program came to a standstill as the CCC went out of existence. Recreation, however, was by then an established and protected use, taking its place among other uses of the forest: timber, water, forage, and wildlife.

LONG RANGE RECREATION POLICIES

With the planned development of facilities for recreation in the 1930's came the establishment of long-range policies. Guiding the development of national forest recreation are the following thoughts:

1. Recreation resources of the national forests are for public use and will be made available insofar as this is consistent with the over-all management of the forests for the greatest public good.

2. General public recreation values such as hunting, fishing, hiking, riding, and scenery are recognized in all resource management and steps taken to develop them wherever it is in the public interest to do so.

3. Enough public recreation areas and facilities should be developed and maintained to accommodate public demand in a safe and sanitary manner and without crowding except for peak holiday or weekend use.

4. Only minimum facilities for recreation in the forest—camping, picnicking, skiing, swimming, hiking, and riding—are to be provided. The Forest Service does not construct facilities for spectator sports and recreation such as golf and tennis.

5. Special services and facilities such as large shelters, amphitheaters, ski-warming huts, utility connections for trailers, hot showers, electric lights, stove-length firewood, and clothes checking at bathhouses ordinarily are not provided by the Forest Service at public recreation areas. A charge is generally made for these special services. Developments of this type are left for private capital to provide wherever feasible. The Forest Service supervises the concessionaire's operation, regulates the fee, and sees to it that the area is kept in first-class condition.

6. Organization camps for youth groups ordinarily will not be constructed by the Forest Service, but public, semi-public and nonprofit groups are encouraged to develop and operate such facilities under special-use permit.

7. Filling stations, restaurants, resorts, ski lifts, ski tows, and boat docks are not constructed or operated by the Forest Service. Where there is a public need for such facilities, individuals and organizations may develop them under paid permit. The fee is based on a percentage of the net sales.

In issuing permits for such facilities,

the Forest Service encourages moderately priced accommodations. The appearance of the buildings must be appropriate to the forest environment. Those applying to operate such facilities must be able to meet specific standards in order to serve the public.

RECREATION TAKES SUDDEN UPSURGE

In 1946 recreation visits to the national forests started a breathtaking ascent—at least that is the way the Forest Service felt. Total visits rose from 18 million to 27 million in 1950, and by 1956 they hit the 52.5 million mark. Last year national forest camp and picnic grounds bulged with 21,872,200 visitors. Designed to handle 17,600,000 man-days use a season, recreation areas received 27,102,600 man-days use, an overload of 39 per cent.

Under heavy use the recreation areas are wearing out. In some places the earth has been compacted from trampling. The roots of trees are exposed, surface erosion is bad, mature trees are dying before their time. Spreading forest humus and sawdust alleviates but does not remedy the situation. The 15- to 20-year-old facilities constructed by the CCC are deteriorating. Tables and benches are breaking down. Many grates have disappeared from the fireplaces. Whole sections of some recreation areas have had to be closed because of worn-out facilities. People fortunate enough to get into the planned camp and picnic areas are crowded by others using space in between which was not intended to be occupied. The forest atmosphere is vanishing as people wait to take their turn at a fireplace.

Late arrivals are forced to scatter to undeveloped spots to camp and picnic. They build their campfires without benefit of fireplace or grate and thus endanger valuable stands of timber. A single fire caused by one roadside camper

who could not squeeze into a developed area cost \$500,000 to suppress and caused damage running into millions of dollars.

Overcrowding of the developed areas and the use of unimproved areas endanger the water supplies of nearby towns and cities. The spread of human diseases can result from these conditions.

Facilities for other types of forest recreation also are deteriorating from overuse and the lack of adequate maintenance. Miles of trails are blocked by fallen trees and brush. Many trailside lean-tos are in such disrepair they no longer furnish shelter. Some roads are impassable.

ATTEMPTS TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM

The above problems have been ten years in the making. At the suggestion of Congress, in 1949, the Forest Service started to charge for camping and picnicking on large areas offering some special facilities. The charge was nominal—25 cents a carload for picnickers, 50 cents a carload per night for campers. Most areas were turned over to concessionaires who paid the United States a percentage fee and agreed to operate and maintain the area, clean up the trash, and provide adequate sanitation in return for the small charge collected from users.

Visits still increased and overuse with them. In 1952 Congressman Boyd Tackett from Arkansas introduced a bill in Congress to set aside 10 per cent of the receipts from national forests to improve recreational facilities and wildlife habitat. The Forest Service collects money from the sale of timber, grazing permits for sheep and cattle, and special land uses such as summer homes and water developments. The money is deposited in the Federal treasury. 25 per cent of the national forest receipts are returned to the counties having national

TABLE 1—PRIMARY PURPOSE OF
USERS OF RECREATION
RESOURCES ON THE
NATIONAL FOREST,
1956

PRIMARY PURPOSE	NUMBER VISITS
General enjoyment of forest environment.....	14,190,337
Picnicking.....	12,821,767
Fishing.....	9,498,709
Hunting.....	4,436,061
Camping.....	3,515,996
Winter sports.....	2,673,270
Swimming.....	1,609,753
Hiking and riding.....	1,352,599
Miscellaneous.....	673,210
Organization camping.....	659,977
Canoeing.....	412,309
Gathering forest products for pleasure.....	380,215
Wilderness travel.....	169,879
Scientific study and hobbies.....	162,002
Total.....	52,556,084

forest land. 10 per cent is to be spent on forest roads and trails. When the Tackett bill was first introduced, annual national forest receipts were about 56 million dollars, which would have authorized 5 to 6 million dollars for recreation. In subsequent years many similar bills were introduced. The Department of Agriculture did not favor such bills because officials felt that money for national forest recreation should be appropriated under normal procedure.

Increased appropriations in the fiscal year 1956 gave some relief to the recreation problem. A still larger appropriation of \$3,700,000 in 1957 has enabled the Forest Service to provide adequate sanitation and cleanup at existing recreation areas for the first time since CCC days. It has not, however, enabled the Forest Service to undertake all the necessary repairs to existing improvements nor the construction of new facilities needed to take care of the increased number of visits.

OPERATION OUTDOORS

In 1956 at the request of Congress, the Forest Service started an extensive survey of recreation use and needs on the national forests. Forests recreation specialists analyzed the increase in recreation visits and projected the rising line into the future. The projection looked too high to be possible, so they studied the reasons for the growth. The population is increasing. People have more leisure time, and they have more money to spend on leisure activities. More people have automobiles than ever before, and they travel farther afield. Also, people seem to feel an increasing need to get away from the noise and pressures of everyday living and the fast tempo of city life to simple forest enjoyments.

Although the study showed no reason for a slacking in the rate of rise of recreation visits, the analysts leveled off the projection a little. Their figures showed that by 1962 the national forests can expect 66 million recreation visits. Field men set to work to determine what facilities would be needed to take care of that number of visits without overcrowding areas except on peak holidays or weekends.

They found that 2,150 new areas with 40,500 family units would be needed in addition to the 41,400 units already in existence. They also examined present facilities to see what repairs and replacements were necessary. They considered costs of administering wilderness areas where trails and unimproved campsites are maintained and the cost of administration of roadside zones and other special areas. Adding maintenance costs for new and old developments, they decided the five-year plan would require a total expenditure of 85 million dollars.

To be specific, the supervisor of the Lassen National Forest in northern California found that ten additional camp-




DIAGRAM SHOWING RECREATION USE ON THE NATIONAL FORESTS

ing units were needed at each of five campgrounds. Two campgrounds with provisions for trailer sites were needed in the Lake Philbrook section. Camping spots were in demand in the semi-primitive High Lakes section. The 10 national forests in Colorado needed to rehabilitate the 429 camping and picnicking areas, add 190 new sites, create 9 new ski areas, establish 200 back country camps away from roads, and 200 camps in fishing areas. The Superior National Forest in Minnesota would modernize 43 campgrounds and 425 wilderness campsites. These are a few examples of the five-year plans.

Work starting July 1, 1957, under Operation Outdoors began a program largely of repair and rehabilitation, to meet public needs. The location of some new areas has been decided upon, and a few new developments may start. The forest supervisor of the Wenatchee National Forest in Washington, for instance, has included in his yearly plan

of work the reconstruction of 14 of the 91 campgrounds in his forest and expansion of those grounds by 153 units. The Nicolet National Forest in Wisconsin needs 5 new areas as soon as possible.

North Carolina forests—the Pisgah and Nantahala, which boast about one third of all recreation visits to southern forests—have examined the needs for the next two years. They include 9.7 miles of entrance or access roads, reconstruction of 6.1 miles of roads, resurfacing with crushed stone of 8.6 miles, and paving 12.6 miles; construction of 75,000 square yards of parking areas; construction of 5.2 miles of new trails at recreation areas, and repairing 4.4 miles of existing walkways.

To meet increased use of the national forests for recreation, the Forest Service finds expansion necessary. It will confine facilities, however, to types of recreation suitable to forests and will operate under its well-established and time-tested guidelines.

The Philadelphia Experience

By ROBERT W. CRAWFORD

Abstract: In a historic American city, political reform elevated recreation to an equal position among ten services reporting to the Managing Director. By the implementation of a broad philosophy of recreation through efficient management practices, Philadelphia has developed a program which sets a high standard for American cities. To cope with increasing quantities of leisure and new areas of service, imaginative planning, programing, personnel administration, and enlarged facilities are necessary. Further, co-ordination and correlation of community efforts must be achieved.

PHILADELPHIA, venerable city of brotherly love, long known for its homes, its interest in family living, and its rich cultural resources, has experienced a kaleidoscopic pattern in its administration of public recreation. In the 1950's an aroused citizenry with a sympathetic and progressive city administration showed a renewed interest and secured the organization of a separate department of recreation on a level with other accepted municipal services.

In the great American city where the Liberty Bell hangs in Independence Hall, where the Declaration of Independence was first publicly read, and where the Constitution of the United States was written, municipal recreation as a governmental responsibility did not begin until toward the end of the nineteenth century. In 1886 the Bureau of City Property opened the first municipal swimming pool; in 1889 several more community pools were added. Six years after the opening of the first municipal pool, a group of civic-minded citizens known as the Cultural Extension League became interested in play for children.

When Theodore Roosevelt was Police Commissioner of New York City, he explored the city with Jacob Riis, of Den-

mark, who had come to the United States to study criminology. Pointing out that "prevention was better than cure," Riis visited Philadelphia to speak to civic clubs interested in playgrounds and recreation centers. Motivated by his vision, a group of citizens proceeded to organize the Playground Recreation Association as a private society. In the summer of 1894 this association was instrumental in opening the first playground in Philadelphia operated by the City Parks Association.

In 1895 Philadelphia inaugurated a trolley system. As a result many children playing in the streets were hurt in accidents. This human tragedy awakened public sentiment for more playgrounds. A playground commission was formed with delegates from the Christian Endeavor, Baptist Young People's Union, Temperance Unions, Methodist Episcopal Churches, city missions of Jewish societies, and many others. School playgrounds began to open and City Council appropriated \$3,000 to provide supervision of the school yards. By 1898 the number of school playgrounds had increased. In addition to physical culture classes, a variety of games and handiwork activities were in-

augurated which required continuous effort in training leaders and special methods of teaching. A slum clearance project was started in a congested area so that the cleared area could be turned into a park. Money was appropriated to develop the park, but no money was made available to provide leaders. Juvenile delinquency was becoming a very serious problem in this section, and agitation developed to make the park into a playground.

The original playground commission, formed by private agencies, discontinued its services in 1902 due to lack of funds for supervision. In 1905 the City Council appropriated \$5,000 for the development of the playgrounds in the southern section of the city but neglected to appropriate any money for leadership. Therefore, it was necessary for private organizations again to supply leaders and raise additional money for their helpers.

In 1907 under the direction of the Superintendent of Schools, a group of citizens was called together to discuss playgrounds. At this time an organization was created called the Children's Playground Association of Philadelphia. This group opened playgrounds under the supervision of trained leaders and strongly advocated the public acquisition of small parks in various sections of the city.

In 1908 a citizens group felt that the most pressing problem was to obtain an executive. As a result a campaign was held for the purpose of raising funds. In May 1908 collections taken on "tag day" amounted to over \$20,000. During the following summer the Playground Association operated eight different playgrounds, some on city and some on private property. Meanwhile the Association conducted a public campaign to arouse citizens' interest in a playground program.

In 1909 the City Council made an ap-

propriation of \$5,000 for recreation purposes and authorized the Mayor to appoint a commission to study the playground needs of Philadelphia. During the summer the commission visited several cities and prepared a long and detailed report which was submitted to the Mayor and Council in 1910. As a result of their recommendations, at the request of the Mayor, Council authorized the appointment of a public playground commission which was responsible directly to the Mayor. The commission took over the playgrounds and personnel, formerly under the jurisdiction of the Playground Association.

By this time it was considered necessary to have the state Legislature give permission to first-class cities to establish departments of recreation. The law was signed by the Governor in June 1911. In July the City Council of Philadelphia authorized the establishment of a Department of Recreation and the Mayor appointed the five members of the Board.

The Department of Recreation established a number of new playgrounds by transfer of city property and condemnation of certain other sites. It gave general direction of the program until December 1919 when the Department was absorbed by the Department of Public Welfare in accordance with the new Charter passed by the Legislature in 1919. Supervision and direction under the Bureau of Recreation in the Department of Welfare continued until January 1952. It operated in a department with prisons, a house of correction, a home for the indigent, and children's welfare centers. Important as these services are to a large community, the concepts, aims, and objectives of a recreation service are not similar and thus recreation was not given the proper climate in which to grow and mature in a wholesome environment.

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CHARTER REFORM

On April 17, 1951 the citizens by referendum adopted a new Home Rule Charter. On January 7, 1952 a new administration took office, and a new chapter of the Philadelphia Story began.

The new administration brought the first change in the city's political government in sixty-seven years. Among the sweeping changes which this civic reform movement supporting the new Charter brought was a momentous progressive step for recreation—the creation of a separate department. The new Recreation Department was to be headed by a commissioner and made one of the ten service departments of the city directly responsible to the Managing Director. The functions of the department were in part to formulate a comprehensive and co-ordinated program of cultural and physical recreation activities; to manage and operate all city recreation facilities; jointly with the Fairmount Park Commission determine the new place for recreation facilities to be located in Fairmount Park and other parks managed and operated by the Commission; and to preserve, manage, and operate the city's historical shrines not under the management and operation of any board or commission.

Five departmental boards and commissions were placed in the Department by the Home Rule Charter: the Recreation Coordination Board, Fairmount Park Commission, Board of Trustees of the American Flag House and Betsy Ross Memorial, Board of Trustees of the Atwater Kent Museum, and Board of Trustees of Camp William Penn.

Never before in Philadelphia had there existed such a clearly defined expression of the principles desired for a total community recreation program centered under one management. Through the efforts of the Recreation Coordination Board, the recreation resources of the

city are being materially enhanced by securing the maximum co-ordination possible between the public and private agencies.

With the impact of the new Charter and the general interest of the citizens in recreation facilities and program, it seemed desirable to study and appraise what existed and what needed to be accomplished. Fredric R. Mann, the first Commissioner of Recreation and a successful industrialist, President of the Robin Hood Dell Corporation, tackled the assignment with enthusiasm. He had the courage and vision necessary to implement a philosophy of recreation aiming to provide up-to-date facilities, an enriched and expanded program, and well-trained and qualified leaders.

Commissioner Mann proposed that a study of the Department should be made by a nonpartisan group. He chose the National Recreation Association. Within three months the Association completed its study of the public recreation practices, programs, and interagency relationships in Philadelphia. The report dated November 1, 1952, outlined the steps necessary to provide recreation services of the type the citizens should expect. Philadelphia accepted the challenge.

In its pattern of living, the good neighborhood depends upon the adequacy of certain basic facilities: modern playgrounds, parks, camps, community centers, playfields and facilities for specialized purposes. A good recreation program is centered on the person, group, and community. Leisure opportunities are provided because they can and must make their contribution to the needs and interests of all people regardless of age, sex, race, religion, national background, or economic status. The new recreation program in Philadelphia has become a recognized force in preventing racial and religious tension, loneliness, waste of older citizens, multiple problems of

youth, frustration and helplessness of the handicapped and boredom of people in institutions.

Recreation program planning is based upon satisfying the needs people have for participation, achievement, adventure, social approval, recognition, new experience, and beauty. The pursuit of happiness through recreation and group experience involves the satisfaction of these basic needs. People grow through using these opportunities for the creative expression of inherent talents in art, music, athletics, camping, dramatics, sports, dance hobbies, writing, and social activities.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The implementation of this modern concept implies citizen participation in the planning, organization, leadership, financing, and enjoyment of the program. The role of the leader becomes that of consultant, teacher, motivator, and guide. Democratic participation in the achievement of these goals elevates community spirit and morale.

Citizen participation in the community recreation program takes the form of advisory recreation councils, parent committees, mother clubs, youth councils, interorganization councils, junior leaders clubs, classes, and teams. Civic organizations are supporting many more activities. Block organizations are springing up over the city to develop recreation programs for their children. The staff of recreation supervisors, leaders, and maintenance personnel is giving direction to this evolving, expanding, improving recreation program. A better understanding and greater appreciation of what a good recreation program is and can achieve for their home and neighborhood life have created a real demand for more and better services.

This condition did not occur by accident or immediately after the new Department of Recreation was created.

The program staff was reorganized under a Deputy Commissioner who had two general supervisors and eight district supervisors. The city was divided into eight recreation districts on the basis of population density, location of recreation facilities, and natural neighborhoods. District offices for recreation supervisors and maintenance foremen were established to decentralize administration.

A program of study and evaluation which involved the entire professional staff was established to determine staff and program needs.

The grass roots day-to-day program on the neighborhood level was given high priority; programs of cultural, physical, social, and intellectual activities were conducted daily at each facility. All playgrounds and centers were operated on a year-round basis and many on a seven-day schedule. The district and city-wide programs evolved from this basic neighborhood program. Holiday celebrations, dance festivals, drama tournaments, athletic leagues and tournaments, trips to historical sites and other places of interest, picnic kits, party service, arts and crafts exhibits, safety-play writing and festivals, string band concerts, swim-to-live campaigns, family nights at the day camps and swimming pools were added to the program. Concerts by the Police and Firemen's Band, play streets, street showers, Pocono Mountain camping, programs in schools and housing facilities, story telling and acting, church recreation, and recreation for the handicapped and institutionalized became features of the evolving comprehensive and co-ordinated program. The New Year Mummers Parade; Robin Hood Dell Concerts; support for the Philadelphia Orchestra, Philadelphia Grand Opera, Atwater Kent Museum, and the Betsy Ross House; football games, stock car racing and entertainment spectacles at the Municipal Sta-

dium were included. Recent additions to the expanding program include a mechanically refrigerated ice-skating rink and opportunities for appreciation and study of wild life at the recently acquired 140-acre Tinicum Wildlife Preserve.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OBJECTIVES

The objectives which the Department seeks are projected in a ten-year plan. Each year the goals are re-evaluated and include the long-range plans for program, leadership, maintenance, construction, and administration. The objectives for planning facilities have included improvement of existing playgrounds and recreation centers, construction of new recreation centers and swimming pools, improvement of parks and squares, acquisition of land for sites, construction of day camps, artificial ice-skating rinks, and construction of an outdoor civic auditorium, as well as the development of a wild life preserve and small boat-launching marinas.

The recreation program objectives have included recreation for the handicapped, older people, hard-to-reach groups and institutionalized citizens, industrial recreation federation, day camping to serve all neighborhoods, home recreation service, co-ordination of the department program with programs of schools, churches, voluntary agencies, and private organizations. Program objectives have also included water sports; information service on hunting, fishing, vacations, travel, outings and historical points of interest; music; ice skating; and dancing. Other objectives deal with improvements for the recreation staff, training equipment and supplies, community relations, maintenance and the over-all co-ordination of all agencies providing recreation and group association opportunities for the people of this city.

In addition to the normal program there are special events such as the

twenty-one free concerts at Robin Hood Dell for which the Department distributes over 400,000 free tickets. The Department also sponsors summer concerts by the Mummers Association in the various parks and by Police and Firemen's Band and other musical organizations.

COMMUNICATIONS

In selling the Philadelphia program, the most important requirement is that the recreation staff believes in what it is doing. Good public relations exist when the public attitude toward the Department is one of confidence, respect, and approval. Public relations is not mere publicity. Everything the Department does affects the public attitude toward its work. Periodically the relationships with other community groups are evaluated and revised. No recreation department can live in a vacuum today. The needs of people are vast and interwoven; organizations serving them must work closely together. No one agency can do the job alone. A multiplicity of different agencies, both public and private, must work together to meet the recreation needs of Philadelphia. The public must be given an accounting of the work so that people will be well acquainted with the services. That people will support a program which they feel is worthwhile and necessary is one of the major lessons of the Philadelphia experience.

One of the major vehicles of communication is the staff; it must have the ability to sell their product to the neighborhoods. The Department publishes *Centerviews*, a magazine designed to give news and to make everyone feel a part of the organization.

One of the most powerful avenues of communication is the community meeting. Before capital improvements for any facility are initiated, the people of a community are invited to attend a scheduled meeting to discuss proposed improvements. Between 1952 and 1957

the Commissioner of Recreation personally attended about 190 of these sessions. The Department invites the people to participate in the planning, to review programs which are being planned, and to criticize the projects constructively.

In addition to the community meeting, there are other media of communication. For example, the Come See Tour becomes a conducted exploration of facilities and programs for such various organizations as the Junior League and the Home and School Association. At the end of indoor seasons, parents are invited to inspect the work done by their children. Weekly radio and television broadcasts supply public information. In fact, the Commissioner appears on television shows with the Mayor or Managing Director to answer the public's questions.

A close relationship exists between the major newspapers in cosponsoring events such as the *Inquirer's* marbles tournament. The City Representative's office issues regular publicity releases. Neighborhood papers are supplied with local publicity of special interest to their communities.

Special attention is given to the dedication of new facilities. Prominent public officials are on hand to participate in the program. National publications such as *Life*, *Woman's Day*, and the *New York Times* print special feature stories.

The Department itself issues periodic and special reports. Its recent three-year report on progress and development received national acclaim. Staff members appear before civic groups; work closely with schools, churches, housing authorities, libraries, civic groups, and community organizations.

PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT

In the end, the quality of recreation services depends upon the quality of the staff's performance. Before 1952 there

was no clear understanding of the concept of professional recreation leadership in its full meaning. While titles of center supervisor and recreation leader were carried on official documents, the persons who actually occupied these leadership positions were referred to as principals, assistant principals, and teachers. The old system carried the compulsive atmosphere of the public school to the playground and placed inhibitions on the concept of leadership itself. The Department reclassified positions and job titles to connote the dignity and prestige which should be accorded to a professional class. It initiated a program to provide salaries on a professional level since before the Charter reform, Philadelphia recreation leaders' salaries had been far below the national average. Further, the Department introduced a system of rating and evaluation and devised a supplemental evaluation form designed to measure specific leadership qualities. It inaugurated a comprehensive in-service training program directed toward the cultivation of the well-informed leader and instituted modern training techniques such as institutes, workshops, clinics, and lecture courses. Other methods of personnel development include regularly scheduled staff meetings, monthly bulletins and instructional memorandums, professional-department library, opportunities to attend conferences and professional meetings, and publication of a monthly house organ.

The financing of a program which has an annual budget of over 3 million dollars requires extensive planning and control. Replacing the old councilmanic line-item budget, the Department has developed a lump-sum class budget and is attempting to devise budgetary practices which will give unit operating costs by recreation facility and activity.

The Department's sole source of operating revenue is from City Council appropriations from the general fund.

These monies are derived primarily from property, wage, and mercantile license taxes. Revenues received from activities conducted by the Department are deposited into the general fund and are not made directly available to the recreation program except through the appropriation process. This procedure is desirable because individual activities are not dependent for their existence upon the revenue they produce.

Citizen recreation advisory councils in the various communities have co-operated in administering petty cash funds for prizes and special events at the playground- and recreation-center level. This source of financial assistance has proven extremely valuable even though the funds are not directly administered by departmental personnel. The per capita operating expenditure for recreation services provided by the Department of Recreation and Fairmount Park in 1957 was \$4.39.

While the policy of not charging fees for recreation activities has been generally followed, the Department has found it desirable to place nominal fees upon certain special activities such as ice skating. From recent experience, the Department has found that a nominal fee is desirable for this activity since the fees collected tend to support the activity and provide a means of control without unduly limiting participation.

EVALUATION

Since request for support and recognition stands or falls upon the combination of objectives, program, method of administration, and results, the effectiveness of current operations and plans for new services must be evaluated by factual information from a variety of sources within the Department. Hence, weekly reports are required from each playground and recreation center, listing such information as daily attendance and program of activities by age groups, com-

munity meetings, and problems encountered. These reports with those from other operations provide a summary of activity upon which evaluations are made. In addition to periodic reports, records pertaining to fiscal, personnel, and other administrative areas must be studied and reviewed to determine the results of past operating experience.

Since the most costly and important asset of the Department is its personnel, it is necessary to measure how effectively the staff is performing its assigned duties. The supervisor has two basic formal evaluation tools. The first is a city-wide evaluation report which measures the general traits and characteristics of the employee. The second report measures personnel development by evaluating the effectiveness of staff meetings, workshops, institutes, clinics, and other training media.

Facility standards previously established on the national level are of little value for recreation planning in Philadelphia since population density differs from that of other communities. In certain areas of the city, as many as thirty-nine persons are living in houses originally constructed to accommodate one family. Thus, the need for revised and applicable standards is apparent.

Program standards have evolved from a limited concept of service to that of a balanced program serving all ages, interests, and abilities regardless of race, creed, or sex.

Facilities and programs are evaluated by weekly reports submitted by each facility supervisor giving an account of weekly operations. These reports are consolidated and supplemented by both the district and general supervisor. Periodic evaluations of each facility are made on an inspection and consultation basis.

In addition to the written evaluation report the Department uses citizen response. Communications from inter-

ested citizens, either a complaint or compliment, give an indication of the effectiveness of both facilities and program.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Although much progress has been made in the development and growth of public recreation in Philadelphia since 1952, the road ahead is arduous. Needs are much greater than the present resources can supply. A community climate needs to be developed in every neighborhood so that leisure needs and desires can be adequately served.

A community recreation program cannot remain static. Continuous planning and programming must be carried out daily if individual needs are to be met and efficiently maintained. In looking ahead, Philadelphia is thinking along these lines.

1. Community planning of services should provide not only for the normal person, but quite as much for those who have special problems. These groups are the hard-to-reach, the emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped people, people living in areas of tension and congested neighborhoods, as well as those who are home-bound and institutionalized.

2. The professional staff of the Department must serve as resource persons for the community and act as consultants to individuals and groups in the areas they serve. No stereotyped program can endure. Flexibility and variety must characterize the democratic relationships between staff and participants. No one agency or department can provide for all the recreation needs of the people. It will take the combined efforts of all agencies in the community to work in close harmony and accord.

3. Physical planning for recreation services is in its infancy. Recreation facilities need no longer be dull, drab, unattractive or an eye sore to the neighborhood. Philadelphia has built eighty

functional recreation facilities in the last five years which have an appeal to people of all ages. Although Philadelphia has spent approximately 30 million dollars in the last ten years for new areas and facilities, much remains to be done. There must be an acceptance of a concept of the community dollar which blends the tax dollar and the voluntary dollar into one. The city cannot afford overlapping and duplication of effort. Plans must be dovetailed into a basic over-all plan for orderly growth.

4. Program plans will include more services and facilities that require little supervision such as beaches, marinas, picnic areas, golf courses, cycling, horse-back riding, and trails for nature work. Increased opportunities for organized activities under leadership in the fields of drama, crafts, music, dance, sports, and social activities will be necessary. Cultural opportunities as provided by museums, libraries, theatres, orchestras, and choral groups must be strengthened and made accessible to more people.

5. More qualified and dedicated leadership is essential. The program must be under the direction of a professional staff assisted by qualified volunteers. Increasingly, more emphasis must be placed on citizens who volunteer their services. Greater stress must be placed on recruitment and training of these volunteers. Philadelphia, like all other recreation departments, has not tapped this community resource to the fullest.

6. Few cities in America have appropriated sufficient funds to accomplish a program such as that described in this paper. Philadelphia is no exception. The appropriations now made for operating budgets will not be sufficient for the increased services that are needed in the days ahead. Additional revenue must be made available if the Department is to fulfill its role in the life of the city.

7. Co-ordination and correlation of

efforts are the key to the goal of successfully meeting the leisure needs of the people. Formidable as the task is, it can be accomplished only by imagination, a well-defined plan, a willingness to work co-operatively, and a deep conviction that only by working together and going down the road hand in hand with all groups can we provide the highest possible quality and efficiency in the promotion of recreation services for the city. The public recreation agency must provide the base of facilities and services on which to build. It cannot be expected to meet all leisure needs, but it is conceded that it is a public responsibility to provide the programs of a city-wide nature. The voluntary agencies

can limit their membership and can promote a program along the lines of their stated objectives. Both types of agencies are desperately needed and a close partnership in which there is better joint planning, more mutual respect, and opportunity for sharing of facilities and leadership will no doubt result in greater services for the money expended.

Co-operative relationships must exist with other political subdivisions. A coordinating device which will cross inter-governmental and jurisdictional lines must be established if we consider planning and programs on a regional and state basis. Only by developing a clear-cut plan on the basis of a coherent philosophy can all this be accomplished.

A Bold Program for Recreation

By JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

Abstract: The shorter working day and longer retirement period, plus monotonous and often stultifying jobs in mechanized industry, have created a challenge for recreationists. New objectives and policies must be formulated, and a new jurisdiction must be carved out to supplement existing public education and public welfare programs. Recreationists must become more confident, demanding, and imaginative. They must disseminate the doctrine that the enjoyment of leisure is an end in itself, and that recreation skills should be compulsorily taught. Recreation should be a basic program carrying its own justification and should not be ancillary to correctional and therapeutic programs. On the practical side, the administrative base for recreation should be broadened; expanded recreation funds should be provided out of the education budget; emphasis should be placed on late teen-agers and old people; land should be acquired as quickly as possible; and the professional training of recreationists should be broadened.

BEFORE the industrial revolution transformed the work pattern and the family life of people in the Western world, the working day was longer and the labor more arduous than now, but occupations were more interesting.

At the time Thomas Jefferson was elected president of the United States, 94 per cent of the American people lived on farmsteads. A good, self-respecting farmer was proud of the fact that he had to be agronomist, soil analyst, carpenter, stone mason, veterinary surgeon, harness and furniture maker, fence builder, well digger, hunter, and defender against Indians. His wife was cook, spinner, weaver, clothes maker, preserver of foods, chicken raiser, and brood mother of a large progeny. Frequently one or both were amateur physicians and educators.

A hundred years later—after the industrial revolution was nearly complete, but before men and machines alike became automata—young men who learned

their trades in industry became rounded, skilled craftsmen and not handle pullers and button pushers. Thus an apprentice entering upon the four years of training to become a journeyman machinist began by chipping castings. Then he mastered the steam hammer and went from there to the drill press. By stages he became expert with planers, millers, slotters, and various kinds of lathes, and finally graduated to "laying out" his own work and using precision measuring instruments and a rough and ready kind of mathematics. After receiving the imprimatur of machinist, he was given an assignment and told to accomplish it *in toto*, from the initial planning to the machining of the last cap screw.

These farmers and machinists worked long hours, but they were usually absorbing and changeful hours; and the worker could see his work in its entirety once it was finished. With ten to fourteen hours a day and six or seven days a week of work, he had little or no lei-

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sure; and the only thing that saved industrial workers and farmers from the blind staggers of boredom was the variety and the recognizable creativeness of their work.

It is a nice question—whether long hours of relatively interesting work and no leisure are better or worse for the whole soul of a man than short hours of relatively uninteresting work accompanied by vacuous leisure.

It is a nice question, but only an academic one, for we are not going back to the farmstead proprietor and the journeyman machinist. As a practical army general once said, "We start from here," and "here" for recreationists means urbanism, compact living, stultifying jobs, long leisure hours, gadgets, and a residual heritage in our national ethos holding that recreation for adults is a sign of a weak and improvident character.

The leaders who preside over our industrial civilization are individualists and make no pretense of being architects of societies. They are neither trained nor motivated in the general public interest. Accordingly, civic-minded people, like educators and recreationists, must follow after the industrialists, assess the social and cultural effects of what they are doing, and periodically enunciate social programs to supplement or correct those effects.

Any competent social scientist—if sympathetic with the cultural, ethical, and spiritual aims of recreation leaders—would agree that social conditions are now such, especially in America, that recreationists should strike out on a bold new program to strengthen the philosophy of recreation and to extend existing programs both in scope and in depth.

The present writer, long a supporter of public recreation, has been invited to present what our Special Editors call "An Agenda for Recreation." This I am pleased to do in the hope that it will encourage friends and practitioners of

public recreation to be more confident, more demandful, and more imaginative. What follows is cast in the form of *statements of policy*, which are respectfully submitted for consideration and possible adoption by the spokesmen for American public recreation.¹

1. *The enjoyment of leisure should be an end in itself.*

Genuine recreation is genuine education and is its own reason for being. As such, both must be distinguished from training. If the chief objective of education is the Socratic one of *Knowing Thyself*, it can better be pursued by learning to do things than by watching what others do or by reading about what others have done. This does not mean, of course, that presently valuable educational exercises should be curtailed; it means that the individual is not fulfilled until he does something himself.

Which properly serves which? Whether the purpose of leisure is to prepare us for better work or the purpose of work is to make leisure more abundant—is a question heavily fraught with behavioral, psychological, sociological, and even theological implications. The Cavalier element in early American society never succeeded in being as vocal, literary, or powerful as the Puritan element; and it is recognized that those who now set out to demonstrate that the Puritans put the work-leisure sequence in reverse tandem are taking on a formidable assignment. The doctrine of work-for-work's sake has and has had many reputable adherents who point out that the shiftless standard of leisure-for-leisure's sake is subscribed to

¹ This "platform" is a statement of my own views on the subject; it does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the other contributors to this volume, those of the Special Editors, those of the professional recreation associations, nor those of The American Academy of Political and Social Science.

by few of the best people but by all of the loafers, drunks, and drifters.

Recreationists and educationists must nevertheless insist upon putting first things first. They must point out that birds do not live to make nests, oak trees to make acorns, fish to make food for bigger fish, and farmers to raise crops. All of these forms of life are what Aristotle and Kant have referred to as things-in-themselves; their adjectival pursuits and fates claim a paramount attention, but they do not explain the substance of the pertinent life.

Leaving religion aside for the moment, the purpose of life should be recognized by the recreationist and educationist as the fulfillment of all of the best potentialities of the individual. They must have the courage to pronounce that work-for-work's sake is philosophically bad and can only result in mortification of the spirit and the flesh.

In taking such a bold stand, we must concede that present-day Americans owe a great deal to our forebears who worked 70 to 80 hours a week, and who believed that the Devil found employment for idle hands. But our economic system has come of age. If we are not fatuously to conclude that we should work for machines instead of making machines work for us, we must consider all of the little and big iron men as our slaves and ourselves to be entitled to the demigodlike personal development of the Athenian citizens of the Periclean age.

2. *Recreation skills should be compulsorily taught all through the period of school attendance.*

In our educational system we do not stop at purely functional objectives. We insist on greater mathematical skill than is required to add up the grocer's bill or to compute our income tax. We compel youth to study literature and history; we are not satisfied when they have learned enough to read street signs and

the newspaper. Most people who derive great satisfactions from English literature were compulsorily introduced to it at a tender age, and they did not enjoy the initial exposure.

And so it is with a minority of our citizens who were pushed by understanding parents into the mastery of recreation skills. And so it can be with a majority of our citizens if the professional recreationists are as aggressive and imaginative in 1957 as the brave band of educationists were a little more than a century ago.

Recreation does not of itself make a whole man, but it is one of the principal ingredients. The ancient Greeks, who have never been excelled in the art of living, looked upon health and wisdom, in that order, as the human virtues most avidly to be pursued. And by health they did not mean merely fine muscle tone. The health of the mind and the spirit are more important than physical robustness, and they knew it.

Recreationists should heavily increase their emphasis on activities which evoke pride-of-doing, togetherness, human understanding, creativeness, *joie de vivre*, development of the mind and spirit. Soft-ball leagues, city play centers, and the like are doing well enough; and in any event, they represent the elementary level of recreation thinking.

In addition to this implied criticism of the present preoccupation with games and sports, several manifestations should be identified which are not only not good but are positively bad. These are the associated evils of specialization in sports and mass spectation. It is really sad when a coach discourages one of his gifted charges from participating in any other sport or game because such activity might imperil his championship pole-vaulting form. Whose interest is being served here—the boy's or the professional coach's? A coach would howl in dismay if it were suggested that a youth

should drop a particular sport as soon as he reaches a certain degree of proficiency and take up another. But that is what the youth should do. Sustained practice to push back the championship record a few notches is in no sense recreation—it is privation and grind of the hardest sort. And emphasis on championship performance is emphasis on vainglory and is not the highest type of recreation objective. If it be said that emphasis on winning develops competitive skills and stamina, two rejoinders are in order. The names of outstanding athletes are singularly absent from the annals of American professorial and managerial leadership. There is a negative correlation between successful athletic competition and eminence in the most highly respected activities in American life. Moreover, most social philosophers believe that we have a surfeit of competition in all aspects of life, intranational and international, and that we should inculcate co-operation instead.

The evil of intense specialization is associated with another—that of mass spectation. Thousands of people watch a few professionals perform, themselves discouraged from engaging in any recreation activity because they do not possess some skill in superlative degree. Herein dwells a dark threat to American democracy, for if people are trained to sit and watch professionals in sport and other recreation activities, they will also sit and watch while some ambitious busybodies take their government away from them and operate it. Mass sports spectacles in central Europe are not unrelated to recurring dictatorships there. And when the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, it was won by boys *every one* of whom was compelled to participate in games. The democratic way of life must be catabolic; spectation is anabolic.

As for commercialized mass spectacle

sports, the less said the kinder. Except for the degrading effect of the bloodshed, organized commercial baseball, football, hockey, boxing, and others, are not essentially different from and are no more elevating than the Roman gladiatorial exhibitions.

3. *Recreationists should not participate in ancillary correctional and curative programs.* The abatement of juvenile delinquency, for instance, is a problem for the social worker and the policeman. A positive program of youth development administered to the 97 per cent of boys and girls who are not delinquents should not be warped or thrown out of focus by preoccupation with the 3 per cent who are rotters. A recent study by a committee of the United States Senate reveals that the typical juvenile delinquent excels in leadership and in the kind of activity provided by conventional recreation programs. We all recognize that the juvenile delinquent needs many things, including, unfortunately, a better brain; but he does not need more emphasis on sports.

The therapeutic qualities of recreation for the mentally ill and retarded and the physically ill and impaired are well recognized, but the pertinent programs should be instigated and managed by the medical and psychological personnel involved. Professional recreationists are not competent to prescribe the appropriate game or exercise for feeble-minded or orthopedic cases and do not wish to be. For years to come, they will be fully occupied ministering to the general public.

In correctional institutions, games and hobbies are encouraged by the authorities to keep the prison population from exploding. Here too the public recreationist should have no part in the program, not only because he is not a competent penologist but because recreation is a primary, not an adjectival, program.

There is one related goal, however, to the attainment of which recreation may make a contribution—the integration of cultures and races. Recreation programs, no less than schools, can be depended upon to reconcile the multitudes of Old-World customs and mores still noticeable in the United States. The recreationist is wise to plan his offerings to accommodate these cultural differences, since enrichment of the mind and a broader and deeper understanding of other ways of life are results of which any recreationist can be proud.

4. *The administrative base for public recreation should be broadened.* Any American political scientist can at a moment's notice write an essay on the evils of fragmentation in American local government. Most health districts are so small that they can afford only a superannuated policeman—at \$600 a year—to serve as health officer. There are 2,500 school districts in the state of Pennsylvania alone, the majority of them so small that they cannot muster a school board of sufficient ability to understand the school code. Boroughs, townships, and villages are for the most part so small that they cannot hire even one policeman. Roads, sewage disposal, assessment of real estate for taxes, and water are handled—or mishandled—by local units too tiny to cope with them.

It should be said at the same time that mere bigness in government is not good. There is an optimum size of district for every public service. That size is determined simply by prescribing the minimum staff and equipment necessary for a particular service and by computing the minimum tax base needed to support them. For most services, including recreation, a population of about 70,000 is optimum. For places larger than 70,000, the cost of government rises more rapidly than the increase in population. It is a matter of general lament

in regional planning circles that many units of local government are too big, and that the great majority are too small.

In recent years there has been a phenomenal decrease in the number of school districts. Something similar is needed for recreation administration. Where consolidation is not feasible because of local jealousies, it has been found that jointures, or functional consolidations, have worked admirably in many areas.

An organization plan, adumbrated for the public recreation programs of the near future, should include, first, a state department of recreation with financial and legal status co-ordinate with that of the education, health, and highway departments. It should administer the central state programs, including the recreation use of the multipurpose parks and forests, and should also preside over minimum standards in local operations. To facilitate this combined stimulation, guidance, and control, it should control the pertinent subsidies. Below the state level there should be a regional or district organization, which in some cases could be coterminous with the county. The larger municipalities could be considered to be recreation districts. Small towns and townships should have no formal public recreation organization.

As with education, there is doubtless a basic difference of viewpoint as to the proper residence of the responsibility for a good recreation program. There have been many debates as to whether the education of children is the responsibility of the family, of the community, or of the state. There are many objectives sought in the establishment of a system of education, but if the elimination of illiteracy is the prime desideratum, the record of recent world history shows conclusively that the best arrangement is for the state to assume the responsibility.

Accordingly, earnest recreationists should exert pressure on every American state legislature to establish a department of recreation and to empower it to formulate and enforce standards for local communities.

In organizing the campaigns to institute a state-district organization, sponsors should avoid trying to convert recreation officers in small jurisdictions. If the history of administrative improvement in the United States reveals anything, it shows the futility of trying to persuade any kind of local officer to concur in his own official demise. The best resource is to enlist the support of highly placed civic leaders and the recreation officials in the larger jurisdictions.

5. Public recreation should be financed out of the public education budget. Public recreation should be a form of public education. In most places, however, the guilt complex harbored by many of the dour immigrants who founded the United States and who accordingly established our attitudes toward leisure fastened upon education a serious mandate to "improve the mind." Children were to be educated so they could be good workers and moral citizens. There was no factor in the formula called Greater Capacity for Enjoyment of Life.

Now if we ignore the hours spent by children in sleeping, eating, and bathing, we can readily compute that about half of the remainder is spent in schooling. This means that an equal amount of time is free time. Yet we spend billions annually in highly refining the regimen for the hours in the classroom and devote almost nothing in most communities to the free hours. From the most expensive tuition in the world the youngster is dismissed without rapport into whatever happens to be his environment,

however squalid it may be, however depraving.

It is not suggested here that a recreationist take over the minute the teacher leaves off and that the child be subjected to ten or eleven hours of regimented activity per day. It is suggested that the facilities be made available and the leaders be ready with a program. If such is the case, there will be no need to cajole or coerce any normal youngster. Nor will such a voluntary program affect in any way the discharge of proper parental responsibility for spiritual and ethical instruction.

It is submitted that the money for this extension of education-recreation can be found in the education budget. If there is to be more spent on character building and less on manual training and wire splicing, so be it. And the same for medieval history and irregular French verbs. French verbs are good for those who like them, and for such they will be provided; but they need not be forced down the throat of every oaf just because they are indicated for a few linguists.

6. Emphasis should be placed on programs for late teen-agers and for old people. There are two critical periods of life so far as recreation is concerned—the age of 18 or thereabouts, when the average youth leaves school and enters the community of industry or commerce, and the 60's, when the individual leaves his life's work. In the first period, the youth is separated from his play and work associations and is thrown into a world peopled by older workers, where he feels alien and alone. Unless he can fall back on well-established recreation patterns in his home neighborhood, he is likely to feel sorry for himself and to seek solace in unwholesome activity. He is not likely to be resourceful, for all of his life he has been told what to do by parents and teachers. In the second

period he is also likely to have a lost feeling after having been an employee for 45 years and having had someone else make the plans and decisions that have shaped his workaday life.

As a young man enters industry he should retain the social and recreation contacts of his school days, relinquishing them only gradually as he makes adjustments with new friends. By the same token, the older worker should retire gradually, developing more and more old-age pursuits and projects as he allows his interest and even his attendance at his regular job to diminish.

Now, unfortunately, most persons do not have the prescience to plan their lives in advance, so it is most important for recreationists to be ready with appropriate programs at these two critical periods.

7. Land for future recreation facilities should be acquired as quickly as possible. Demographers assure us that in 1975 the population of the United States will be 225,000,000, and that the increase will occur almost exclusively in the close environs of cities. The social scientists and regional planners who can solve the many problems arising out of this development will be the leaders of their guilds, for no phenomenon will be more arresting.

The lesson for recreationists in this connection is simple—get the land now! The longer the acquisition is postponed, the more expensive it will be. In this connection, recreationists should not depend upon city planners, for several reasons. First, most of them are architects rather than social scientists, and as such are preoccupied with maps and the design of sticks and stones. Second, they are uniformly cast in an advisory role, whereas recreationists should deal with officials who can make decisions. Finally, there is no such thing as planning per se; there is traffic planning, housing

planning, capital-projects planning, and so on. One of the most important of these is recreation planning, and it should be done by recreationists, not architects.

8. The professional preparation of recreationists should be broadened. Just as city planning will not achieve its full potential as long as it is dominated by architects, so recreation will not realize its full possibilities as long as most of its practitioners are physical educationists. A comprehensive, pervasive recreation program should contain elements drawn from all of the behavioral and related sciences.

Social psychology, educational methodology, cultural anthropology, American politics and government, social theory, European and American history, comparative religion, and city planning are the more obvious things a good recreationist should know something about.

A generation ago it was taken for granted that a city manager should be a civil engineer. Now city managers are trained in graduate schools of public administration. The change reflected the change in the manager's job—from construction and maintenance engineer to chief administrator who hires and supervises engineers as well as the other municipal employees.

Similarly, if the recreation program is to emphasize personal development rather than games for children, we shall need leaders who know more than is vouchsafed in a physical education major in the typical university. The national recreation organizations should persuade the large foundations to establish in three or four large universities a graduate training program. The program should include instruction in the collateral subjects mentioned above plus a core course in recreation planning and administration and concurrent field work.

Book Department

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

WILLETT L. HARDIN. *A Scientist Looks at World Affairs*. Pp. xviii, 281. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1956. \$3.75.

Although the title of this volume is justified, to many readers it may seem misleading. Dr. Hardin is a trained scientist who at the same time has a strong interest in world affairs. He does not, as one might expect from the title which his book carries, discuss the scientific aspects of international relations—the effects of the fall-out from atomic explosions upon human beings, the potentialities of atomic power in the development of underprivileged peoples, or even the relation of scientific inventiveness to national power. Rather, as a scientist, he has preoccupied himself with the same problems that perplex us all. He endeavors “to follow the scientific method in considering the problems bearing on human development and human relations,” and, therefore, to set himself “firmly and unyieldingly against many time-honored prejudices.”

For some twenty-five years, Dr. Hardin was the editor of *World Affairs Interpreter*, now published under the new name *World Affairs Quarterly*. The contents of this volume are a collection of editorials which he wrote in this capacity. They are arranged under four headings: Part 1, “The Role of Democracy in World Affairs”; Part 2,

“Guideposts from the Past”; Part 3, “Character and Moral Responsibility”; and Part 4, “Nation Building, World Organization, and World Peace.” The approach is not analytical nor critical; the author is concerned primarily with the preservation of certain values which to most of us would seem particularly real. He does not, for instance, point out the problems or pitfalls of democracy but rather dwells largely on the eternal verities which it embodies. He is less interested in the problems of world organization than in the idea. Throughout the volume, the reader can see behind the editorials a man of high character, strong moral proclivities, broad education, and high ideals for this nation and for the world.

The editorials presented are thoughtful, at times somewhat inspirational; generally they are written in a clear and interesting style. The reader would have been helped a great deal in his perusal of them, if they had all been dated; as it is, the date of their original publication can be surmised only from the context.

NORMAN HILL

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RAYMOND ARON and AUGUST HECKSCHER. *Diversity of Worlds: France and the United States Look at Their Common Problems*. Pp. xiii, 178. New York: Reynal and Company, 1957. \$3.50.

In March 1956, under the sponsorship of the World Peace Foundation, a group of approximately forty French and American business, labor, academic, and professional leaders met at Arden House, Harriman, New York to discuss common interests and problems of the United States and France. *Diversity of Worlds* is a summary of these discussions by two of the delegates who served as *rapporteurs*—Raymond Aron, Professor at the Sorbonne and contributor to *Figaro*, and August Heckscher, journalist and Director of The Twentieth Century Fund. Arnold Wolfers, President of the World Peace Foundation, contributed the Preface.

Either the level of discussion was uncommonly high for “conferences,” and skillfully directed away from trivial matters, or the *rapporteurs* did an extremely able job of separating the wheat from the chaff; probably both elements contributed to the excellence of the report. The members of the conference recognized but purposely did not stress misunderstandings that exist because of the image, real or distorted, that Frenchmen have of Americans and Americans of Frenchmen. “Their object rather was to shed light on the real problems, the authentic differences of opinion, which these emotions at once conceal and express.” The major areas of investigation and analysis were the Russian threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the German problem, divergent approaches of the two countries toward capitalism and colonialism, and the consequences of approximate equality between the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in atomic armaments.

The discussions produced numerous striking illustrations of how the citizens of two countries, possessing a genuine “traditional friendship,” conscious of common perils, and committed to the same general objectives, can endanger joint action through different approaches and different values placed upon policies desired in both countries. Space does not permit an examination here of the differences brought out in the discussions, differences both between the two national groups and within the groups. It must suffice to say that the report is penetrating and provocative throughout; it

will be a rare reader who is not forced to reconsider the importance of relationships between two allies that are disparate in strength, hold to values that are alike yet markedly dissimilar, and are torn between the necessity for agreement in the face of common dangers and the determination to stick to their particular views. The discussions could not be confined, strictly speaking, to relations between France and the United States or even to Europe. It is this “over-all dimension” that is used to defend the title of the book. Even so, *Diversity of Worlds* seems misleading and a bit pretentious as a title for the report.

JOSEPH J. MATHEWS

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Emory University

ARTHUR T. MOSHER. *Technical Co-operation in Latin-American Agriculture*. Pp. xiv, 449. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This is one of a number of monographs which together analyze and evaluate all aspects of technical assistance in Latin America. The “objectives of this study were three: (1) to advance understanding of the process of agricultural development in the Americas; (2) to define the appropriate functions of technical cooperation in agricultural development; and (3) to distill from past experience of technical cooperation in agriculture whatever insights can be gained for the conduct of future programs.” The evidence that Dr. Mosher accomplishes all these objectives well cannot be presented in a review of 400 words. The reviewer, therefore, chooses to present what is even more important—the author’s valid and sage observation on the whole program and process of technical assistance which he never fails to designate “technical cooperation.”

One of his most pertinent observations is that in many, if not most, cases an “underdeveloped” country’s greatest difficulty is not always the lack of good native technicians. It is in some cases a bad land situation—lack of irrigation or well-distributed precipitation, and large holdings of absentee landlords. It is nearly always absence of widespread elementary education. It is always the reign of traditional ways of doing

and ways of thinking. No matter how good a foreign technician has been in his own country, he cannot move into these conditions and disregard them. The author pointedly states this practical situation as follows: "To hear some people discuss it, one would infer that technical co-operation is an automatus exercise in which people are an unfortunate obstacle. On the contrary, technical co-operation is essentially a human activity. It arises because of certain human aspirations; it depends for its validity on the nature of people; both its means of success and its obstacles lie in human characteristics."

The human characteristics are not innate, but they are set deeply in cultural value systems and are institutionalized in educational differentials, land tenure systems, and political rule by the elite. Because these are stern facts, the author lists activities and methods which "facilitate change over time" as a kind of resource coequal with economic resources. He points to the oft-demonstrated fact that technical co-operation in agriculture is enhanced by support of other programs which obviously satisfy other than purely economic needs and desires. He states the profound sociopsychological fact that, "if people can gain confidence that they can reach their aspirations through their own efforts; this is of great importance to agricultural development whether every instance of such success is agricultural or not." It is only thus that tradition and class-bound groups become "self-generating."

None of these broad observations kept the author from making exhaustive analyses of all types and levels of technical aid, from well-adapted agricultural extension methods to basic agricultural research. He carefully analyzed the characteristics of foreign technical co-operators, their training, their foreign experience, and their periods of service, whether they were provided by the United States government, international agencies, or private agencies. His findings are too detailed to be reported here.

One of his final observations should be carefully noted; namely, that the trend in headquarters administration of United States bilateral programs appears to be

away from these patterns that contribute to success of the programs in the field. Development programs which must be long-time programs are hampered by "one-year appropriations." Employment of short-term technical personnel is imperative under such precarious financial support, and it is thus impossible to mobilize a corps of career technical experts. Part of the need for flexibility is the necessity of experimentation. This may be wasteful if not given time to prove itself, but it is imperative for long-time technical progress. Whereas headquarters administration is encumbered with political and interagency issues and institutionalization of administrative procedures, successful field operation requires flexibility.

CARL C. TAYLOR

U. S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C.

HERMANN LUTZ. *German-French Unity: Basis for European Peace*. Pp. xii, 257. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Company, 1957. \$5.00.

If a book be defined, as in the *New Century Dictionary*, as "a written or printed work of some length, especially on sheets fastened or bound together," this publication could doubtless be described as a book. But if a book is supposed to be a more or less systematic presentation of events, facts, or ideas relevant to the topic suggested by its title, then this is not a book. What it is I cannot say, for I know of no category of wasted printer's ink on cellulose into which it fits.

Hermann Lutz is identified by the publisher as "an active opponent of the Hitler regime," now living in Palo Alto, and author of "several books" and "many articles." He is identified by himself as a German who came to New York in 1948 and became a United States citizen in 1951, a recipient of a grant from a foundation (identity unspecified), and a researcher at the Hoover War Library. Having decided to write "a book on German diplomacy under Hitler," he concluded during his "research" that he should first write a book on German-French relations since 1870, to be followed by another on Nazi diplomacy, and

a third on Anglo-American foreign policies during World War II.

The first of these, here in hand, is an appeal for "the unification of France with the virile German people," according to the Preface. What it is, in fact, is five chapters, comprising 178 pages, respectively entitled "Changing Opinions," "The Peacemakers' Spirit, 1919," "Tribulations of the Weimar Republic," "Why Hitler Rose to Power," and "A Plea for Neutral Collaboration." Despite all the paraphernalia of "scholarship," none of these chapters, nor all of them together, has anything to do with the alleged subject of the book, nor do they add anything whatever to existing knowledge of anything. Insofar as these pages have any discernible subject matter, they rethrust the old straw of German "war guilt" in 1914 in a stale revindication of the Second Reich. There are two illustrations: first, Vickers-Armstrong ads in the *Militär-Wochenblatt* in 1932 offering armaments of all kinds for sale—what they illustrate is unclear. And second, an Appendix of twenty-one pages which "proves" that American corporations did not finance Hitler.

Seldom, if ever, has such a jumble and muddle of irrelevancies been printed and bound together and offered for sale as a book.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

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Williams College

RICHARD P. STEBBINS. *The United States in World Affairs, 1956*. Pp. xii, 426. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$6.00.

In the present volume, Dr. Stebbins and the research staff of the Council of Foreign Relations continue in distinguished fashion a series dating to 1931 and interrupted only by the war years, 1941–45. Neither experience nor skill in narrative could paint a cheerful picture. For the subject is one of leadership reluctantly assumed and accepted with increasing resentment. The text is enlivened by cartoons, well-selected and embodying the meaning of many pages.

The present reviewer, alert for editorial bias, is happy to say that he discovered none. The Western world presents a strain-

ing at the seams, almost a disintegration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To compensate, it would be needful to know much more of stresses and strains behind the Iron Curtain.

In the seizure of the Suez Canal and the Hungarian revolt, the United States faced vital decisions, the wisdom of which it is difficult to affirm or to deny. The efforts of Great Britain, France, and Israel to enforce their rights in the international waterway lacked support in Washington. Therefore, a decision to act without informing Messrs. Eisenhower and Dulles not only contributed to failure but induced the United States to act more favorably to the Near East than to the West. The remoter consequences of such a decision are incalculable. If there was morality behind the choice, it lay in a determination in no case to become involved in war.

In both the Suez and the Hungarian tragedies, the United States relied heavily on the United Nations which used token force at Suez but moral force alone toward Russia. In this reliance the United States emerges as less than heroic. And there will always be a question of how far the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were responsible for the desperate adventure. From its most severe test to date the United Nations derived a somewhat equivocal credit. The civilized powers yielded to it; the barbarians made no concessions but did lose some face with the neutralists, and even with Mr. Nehru.

The concluding chapter, "Facing 1957," declared that for the United States, "the fundamental task was to repair as far as possible the multiple damage which in recent months had all but destroyed the concept of a 'free world,' inspired by the humane principles which were common to all the great civilizations" (p. 392). With this verdict the enlightened citizen is certain to concur.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS

Professor of History, Emeritus
Purdue University

JOHN EHRLMAN. *Grand Strategy, Vol. V, August 1943–September 1944, History of the Second World War*. (Military Series.) Pp. xvii, 634. London: Her Ma-

jesty's Stationery Office, 1956. (Distributed by British Information Services, New York.) \$7.56 trade; \$6.05 library.

This handsome book, the most recent in the United Kingdom's military series on World War II, is the first published on the subject of strategy. The British official historians, like their American colleagues, wisely decided to put out books as they became ready rather than in chronological sequence.

Mr. Ehrman opens with the Quebec Conference which initiated planning for the great Allied offensive in Europe. With skilled clarity and easy balance, he carries the reader through strategic problems and solutions in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and Far East during the ensuing thirteen months. He concludes, after the great Allied victories in France and Italy in 1944, with the major strategic decisions in Europe and the Mediterranean made and executed. As Mr. Ehrman makes clear, the point of view is that of the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff together with President Roosevelt and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Little of the actual subject matter will be new to Americans who have read the series, "The United States Army in World War II," Sir Winston Churchill's war memoirs, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, or the various ex parte accounts by other American and British participants. But Mr. Ehrman's volume has the unusual virtue of stating with great clarity and sympathetic objectivity both the British and American cases in the complex disputes, discussions, and eventual agreements regarding OVERLORD, southern France, Italy, and the Balkans. He does not second guess; he has no axe to grind, no cause to serve save that of truth. He shows by implication that the Mediterranean questions were infinitely more complex than the ex parte accounts, which telescope problems and points of view, usually make them out to be. Although pointing out that Mr. Churchill's real aims in the Balkans have never been made absolutely clear, the author puts to rest the crude inaccuracy that Churchill wanted to invade the Balkans, instead of mounting OVERLORD, in order to forestall the Russians. If this gross distortion ever appears again,

it will be a clear case of blind faith overruling evidence and reason.

One source of Mr. Ehrman's strength, his unified and coherent presentations of the British and American cases, is ironically also a source of weakness. The general editor, Professor J. R. M. Butler, explains that "in accordance with the recognized British constitutional principle, the historians have not held themselves free to reveal individual differences of opinion within the War Cabinet . . ." (p. xii). This is as unsound historically as it is sound constitutionally, for British strategy thus appears as a monolith. Internecine discussions and arguments are not explored in the instructive way that American historians have dealt with the varying points of view of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Implicit in this excellent book is the fact that although coalition warfare is full of disagreement, the American and British leaders were absolutely determined to settle their differences, agree on a unified strategy, and win the war. That this process was somewhat painful is obvious from nearly all the memoirs, but especially from the recent Bryant-Alanbrooke collaboration.

JOHN MILLER, JR.

Office of Military History
U. S. Department of the Army

T. L. JARMAN. *The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany*. Pp. 388. New York: New York University Press, 1956. \$4.95.

This is an able historian's account of what he calls "one of the greatest dramas of history," the rise and fall of Nazi Germany. It is a well-told story which uses many personal recollections and telling excerpts from the vast accumulation of documents that have been made available since Hitler's fall. Professor Jarman discusses the causes of the rise of Hitler and the "German Enigma." However, he does not present any original ideas or new formulations. He is on solid ground when he attributes the phenomena to four "main factors which, operating together, made possible the triumph of the Nazis. They are: (1) the historical development of the German people, which was unfavorable to democracy and predisposed them to accept nationalist leadership and military adven-

ture, (2) the personality of Hitler, a demonic man of exceptional will-power and of more than normal influence over others, (3) the economic depression of the 1930's, which brought German discontents to the point of desperation, and (4) the failure of the Western Powers to build an international front determined and strong enough to check Hitler in time. Together these factors were powerful enough to establish in Germany a regime so extreme and fantastic, yet with such strength and attraction, that not only did it make the Germans themselves for the most part willing victims, but it stretched out its hands to link up with fifth columns in foreign lands. The Nazi regime was a new Lorelei turning those who looked to their doom."

Questions concerning the future of Germany are raised. Professor Jarman particularly considers the possibility of the rise of another regime similar to that of the Nazis. He is not sure of the answer. He says: "The truth probably is, indeed, that Germany is passing again through a period comparable to the years 1924-9." There are striking parallels in development. Professor Jarman thinks that a period of neutralization would be best for Germany now, but he sees little chance for this solution in view of Russian attitudes. He would also welcome the inclusion of Germany in a European community. This reviewer feels that there is nothing in Professor Jarman's account of the history of Germany to suggest that a revival of a drive for German domination would be rendered unlikely by either of these arrangements even if they could be achieved.

THEODORE ABEL

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Hunter College

AMERICAN HISTORY

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. *The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933, The Age of Roosevelt*. Pp. xiv, 557. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957. \$6.00.

Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who at twenty-eight years of age won the Pulit-

zer Prize for his *The Age of Jackson*, presents the first of four volumes of a contemplated work on *The Age of Roosevelt*. Certainly *The Crisis of the Old Order*, the first volume of Mr. Schlesinger's magnum opus, gives promise that *The Age of Roosevelt* will be one of the major works in American history of the mid-twentieth century. In previously published books, the author has established himself among the ranking historians of his generation. This book makes more secure that position.

Throughout the book, the reader is conscious of the meticulous research that went into its making. Having found the facts, the author knows how to relate them in an interesting manner. He writes in a superb literary style with many well-turned phrases. His narrative flows rapidly. When measured by such criteria as dramatic effect and literary style, Mr. Schlesinger has written history in its greatest tradition.

This is a provocative book. The story is not told from an objective point of view. In political philosophy the author obviously is liberal. Many who read *The Crisis of the Old Order* will not agree with the selection of details that he has made. Mr. Schlesinger has a tendency to see the history of this period as a struggle between good and evil. Practically all of the Republican leaders compose the forces of darkness; while the Democratic hierarchy constitutes the powers of enlightenment. The author repeatedly declares his complete distrust in the money men of our country. In contrast, he writes with unlimited admiration for the ne'er-do-wells, the paupers, and the underprivileged.

On some points the author contrasts the United States with Russia to the disadvantage of the United States. For example, after telling in condemnatory terms of conditions in America during the age of Mellon, Mills, and Morgan, he declares that Russia "became an image of intelligent planning and of unifying faith" (p. 212). Similar statements are to be found elsewhere.

Quite naturally the author has great admiration for Franklin D. Roosevelt. This first volume contains one of the best sketches of Roosevelt's early life that this reviewer has seen. Interestingly, the Demo-

the results of her scholarship will dispel the fog of controversy.

C. E. BLACK

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HOWARD K. BEALE. *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*. Pp. xxi, 600. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. \$6.00.

This book is an enlarged and revised version of the Albert Shaw lectures delivered by Professor Beale at Johns Hopkins in 1953. A close student of Theodore Roosevelt's career for many years, the author deals with TR's impact on American foreign policy from the days of the imperialist boom in the late nineties to the end of his tenure as President in 1909. As it stands, this work is one of the most important contributions to the history of American foreign policy written in recent years.

Professor Beale has drawn on the relevant manuscript collections, public and private, at home and abroad. He has examined the play of Roosevelt's foreign policy in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The structure of the book is developed in chronological fashion with subdivisions that concern Roosevelt's policy in these areas. Beale has provided a deeper understanding of such issues as the open-door policy in China, the Chinese boycott problem of 1905, and the Venezuela tension of 1902-03. Beale, moreover, evaluates Roosevelt's position regarding imperialism as well as his view of America's ties with Great Britain and the influence of the balance of power concept in his diplomacy.

In keeping with his stated purpose, the author fixes his attention on the thought and activity of Roosevelt as a symbol of the American outlook on world affairs in the crucial years before World War I. To judge by some of Beale's conclusions, he obviously has scrutinized one man who was the best of a poor lot. TR's vigorous personality and his highly individual handling of diplomatic matters are strongly emphasized; few men have surmounted the welter of foreign policy detail and formulation as he did. Even fewer men have demonstrated his facility in identifying the fortunes of the United States with those of

the nations of the world while yet retaining a strong grip on American national interest.

Roosevelt's outlook was strongly conditioned by his search for what he considered to be a useful mean in international relations. Professor Beale has so mastered Rooseveltian rhetoric that he is able to cite passage after passage in which the rough-rider's constant striving to establish and maintain the balance of power is clearly demonstrated. But Roosevelt's effort also reveals the emptiness of the balance of power notion in a world whose diplomacy was coming to be more and more dependent upon the processes of social change. In seeking the path of moderation, however, Roosevelt tended to assume the static nature of the extremes in world politics. His diplomacy exposed his reliance upon racial distinctions (qualified to some extent) and the democratic-republican tradition of the West which tended to regard itself as the steward charged with carrying out the "world's work." Even when he had misgivings about the potential power of the Russians and the backward peoples of the world, he fastened himself and American policy more firmly to the task of maintaining "civilization" rather than to take account of some of the future consequences of his actions. In this sense, it can be suggested that TR's moderation was, in the long run, an extreme view centered around an American image of what the rest of the world appeared to be rather than what it actually was—a world in flux.

Now with the passage of time and with the passing of the old slogans, Professor Beale's book clearly suggests that TR's affection for and his use of power in international relations bears out the contention that Roosevelt was one of the creatures described so well by Charles Beard in the revised edition of the *Economic Basis of Politics*.

Students, professors, the public, even the pundits and the policymakers, who are quick to reach for such phrases as "international responsibility" without questioning deeply the implication of the gesture, ought to read Professor Beale's book. Power assumed without an understanding of what it does to those who possess it as well as to those who experience its effects is a hazard-

ous thing. Power without sensitive and timely purpose in the vast field of world affairs in the twentieth century is worse. It can make a mockery of a life's work.

CHARLES VEVIER

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DONALD DAVIDSON. *Still Rebels, Still Yankees and Other Essays*. Pp. x, 284. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. \$4.50.

When this reviewer began to read the first essay in this volume, she was shocked to discover that she had agreed to review what appeared to be a volume on literary criticism, though her field of research lies in American History. The title, *Still Rebels, Still Yankees*, had indicated, she supposed, a study in Civil War history, which title had evidently also misled an editor of THE ANNALS. She therefore immediately turned to the table of contents to select certain essays for preliminary reading in order to gain a perspective of the subject matter. These sections (Part IV, "The South," and Part V, "Regionalism and Nationalism") revealed that Professor Davidson had combined some history, sociology, and economics with his literary criticism. In any case, after salving her conscience with the resolution to refrain from any comment on literary criticism, she found herself grateful for the assignment.

The volume consists of essays and articles, almost all of which have already appeared in print in various periodicals. In other words, it represents a collection of old material gathered into one volume, a reprinting which in this reviewer's judgment is justified. For there is an essential unity running through the essays. The general theme is the conflict between tradition and antitradition, present everywhere in modern society. The author views tradition as the living "continuum" which makes society and civilization possible; antitradition is the disintegrating principle destroying society and civilization. The South in its devotion to tradition naturally affords many examples of the conflict. The author scatters through the pages much of his own philosophy on this subject.

Some of the essays give glimpses into southern life scarcely possible for any but a native southerner to reveal. The custom of conducting a Sunday service by congregational singing from "shape notes," told in "Sacred Harp in the Land of Eden," and the contrast, as well as similarity, between the Vermont farmer and Georgia planter, told in "Still Rebels, Still Yankees," will almost certainly leave the reader grateful that he did not miss these two portions of the book.

One would expect from a professor of English a good style, an expectation justified by many happy phrases and turns of expression, and the Louisiana State University Press has turned out an attractively printed and bound volume with a frontispiece reminiscent of the Old South.

ELLA LONN

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CLEMENT EATON. *Henry Clay and the Art of American Politics*. (Library of American Biography Series.) Pp. 209. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1957. \$3.50.

To the student of American politics and history, the career of Henry Clay, whose life covered the period from 1777 to 1852, epitomized the American politician. In this lucid, succinct, and exceedingly well-written volume—one of the series of the Library of American Biography edited by Oscar Handlin—the history of the period is told in the political philosophy and program of Clay who held the political stage for half a century. It is also told in those of his illustrious contemporaries, particularly John Calhoun, Andrew Jackson, and Daniel Webster.

The radical change in the political mores of the American people can be seen in the success of one westerner, Andrew Jackson, and the failure of "Harry of the West" in achieving the Presidency. Clay, the apostle of economic nationalism, the political aristocrat, lost out to the new type of politics. This Jacksonian democracy, as it was called, brought about the rise of the common man into political power in the United States. Yet Abraham Lincoln was profoundly im-

pressed by Clay, his "beau ideal of a statesman." Not only did Lincoln support Clay's platform of the American system, but there "is evidence that Lincoln's views on slavery and colonization were strongly influenced by the views of the 'Sage of Ashland.' The closing lines of one of the Great Emancipator's speeches on Slavery were modeled after the peroration of Clay's speech of 1827 before the American Colonization Society." Clay's advocacy of the cause of the South American republics, later recognized by President Monroe, is probably the reason for the high regard with which Clay is held even today by Latin American countries.

In the art of politics, Clay increased the role of Speaker, in the six times he was elected to this position, from little more than a presiding officer to one of party leadership. He also made effective use of the caucus, a relatively new device in determining party strategy. Following the quiescence of the one-party period of the Monroe Administrations, Clay made his contribution to the development of a workable two-party system as leader of the opposition from 1829 to 1841 when his party was out of power.

However, as a master of the political art, he had one serious defect: "he talked too much and wrote too many letters." He certainly was not a "Silent Cal." He was an outstanding exponent of the golden age of American oratory yet abhorring demagoguery in his appeals as a popular orator. Unlike Calhoun, however, he was not an original political thinker. It was also a period in which conflict of interests between personal profit and the advocacy of a legislative program did not disturb Clay as indicated, for example, by his profitable connections following the chartering of a second United States Bank.

Whether it was Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, or Zachary Taylor, Clay was consistent in his opposition to military men as President. "I cannot believe that killing two thousand five hundred Englishmen at New Orleans qualifies (a person) for the various, difficult, and complicated duties of the chief magistracy."

Clay's great personal ambition to become President for which he made five attempts

between 1824 and 1848 was never realized. "But more important than reaching the Presidency, to which so many mediocre men have been elected, the greater glory was his—to save the Union."

The author adds a valuable final section of sources in which he notes as his principal source the extensive collection of Clay papers being assembled by the University of Kentucky.

BELLE ZELLER

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Brooklyn College

ROBERT FRANKLIN DURDEN. *James Shepherd Pike: Republicanism and the American Negro, 1850-1882*. Pp. ix, 249. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Some years ago a critic, reading some sketches in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, suggested that many minor personalities deserved full-length biographies. Perhaps such a thought passed through the mind of this author. For two hundred pages he delves into the little known past of this "radical Republican" from Maine. As a New York *Tribune* journalist, Pike "established his reputation as one of the northern extremists" (p. 16) and helped to form the new Republican party. Pike's antislavery feeling was not due to any love of the Negro; he despised the race as unworthy to associate with whites and favored the surrender of the lower Gulf states to the emancipated blacks as a "negro pen" (p. 35). Like the Garrisonian radicals, he was willing "that the Free and Slave States . . . separate" (p. 20), but once secession was accomplished, he opposed all compromise (p. 41). Lincoln and Seward filled the chief diplomatic posts with antislavery champions, and Pike received the diplomatic mission at The Hague where he twice protested visits of Raphael Semmes' *Sumter* to Dutch West India ports. While at first he doubted Lincoln's ability and condemned his conciliatory policy, in March 1865 he called the President "one of the most unalloyed bits of human nature to be found in history." He was the wisest and least selfish of all American statesmen (p. 111).

After the war, Pike joined the radicals in denouncing Johnson and opposing the readmission of the Confederates to Congress. This was the general position of the *Tribune* to which Pike returned as Washington correspondent. While he considered the Negro "ignorant, debased and totally unfit to exercise the duties of citizenship" (p. 164), he felt Negro suffrage a necessary means of keeping the Republicans in power. Appalled by Grant's corruption and believing that his reconstruction program had failed, he later bemoaned in the *Tribune* the placing of "300,000 white people, . . . composing the intelligence and property-holders of the State, . . . under the heel of 400,000 pauper blacks, fresh from a state of slavery and ignorance the most dense" (p. 187). In January 1873, Pike went to South Carolina to write a series of articles on the Negro government in that state. Interest in his articles impelled him to expand his material in a book, *The Prostrate State*. Many historians of the reconstruction period, particularly James Ford Rhodes, have drawn heavily on Pike for material. Dr. Durden feels that Pike was not an impartial observer. His "failure to seek out either Negro or white Radical leaders suggests an unwillingness even to attempt an impartial survey" (p. 211). Furthermore, according to Dr. Durden, there are discrepancies between Pike's journal, written on the spot, and his later published work. Pike's hostility to the Grant administration, which supported troops in South Carolina, "led him to distort his own findings" (p. 214). Pike gave no attention to the accomplishments of the Negro government, including the construction of a free school system (p. 217). He declared that in the "sun-splashed fields," the Negro was "the best of workers," implying that his place was in the field (p. 218).

Not only is the book well-written, holding the reader's interest throughout, but the eleven pages of bibliography seem to indicate that the research was exhaustive. Several recent historians, notably W. E. B. DuBois in *Black Reconstruction*, feel that the Negro reconstruction governments were not entirely without accomplishment. Dr. Durden's work suggests that perhaps historians should re-examine this period in the

light of Pike's uncritical study in *The Prostrate State*.

JOHN G. VAN DEUSEN

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Hobart College

JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK. *The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia*. Pp. xi, 347. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery, 1957. \$5.00.

The Citizen of Virginia is editor of the *Richmond News Leader*. The character of the book and the purpose of the author are clearly indicated by excerpts from the Introduction:

"May it please the court, this is not a work of history; it is a work of advocacy. The intention is not primarily to inform, but to exhort. The aim is not to be objective; it is to be partisan.

"I plead the cause of States' rights.

"My purpose here is first to examine the bases of State sovereignty; then to follow the State and Federal relationship from its beginnings under the Articles of Confederation through its refinement in the Constitution; next to review some of the comment on the role the States were expected to play. The place of the States scarcely had been fixed, it will be submitted, before advocates of consolidation began to whittle it down—first in the Chisholm case, which led to the Eleventh Amendment, and more memorably in the Alien and Sedition Acts, which led to the 'Doctrine of '98' and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of that year. It is proposed to follow this doctrine of the States' 'right to interpose,' in its various forms and applications down through the years, with particular emphasis upon the dangers of judicial encroachment and the need for State resistance against it. Finally, I have in mind to marshal some of the evidence which supports the case for the South in its immediate conflict with Federal authority, and to review other recent events that seem to me usurpations of the States' reserved powers.

"So much, then for the plan of this book. The political heirs of Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall will not care much for it."

The author has applied himself to his task in the spirit indicated and with a

hearty enthusiasm. The result is an emphatic and well-documented, if somewhat ex parte, presentation of the cause of States' rights from the time of the Articles of Confederation to the present. Mr. Kilpatrick shows in no uncertain manner that the South has had no monopoly in the championing of States' rights. Not surprisingly he maintains that the Supreme Court has assumed unwarranted authority and that the Fourteenth Amendment is really unconstitutional because of irregular procedure in its adoption. As regards the efficacy of the latter point, with priceless turn of phrase or inadvertence, he admits that "too much water has poured over the damn."

This book will have wide appeal in certain areas and with certain readers. Others may feel, however, that if he applied himself with the same energy and enthusiasm and selected his materials as carefully, Mr. Kilpatrick might produce comparable treatises in defense of slavery or in condemnation of democracy.

CECIL JOHNSON

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ROGER BURLINGAME. *The American Conscience*. Pp. xv, 420. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$6.75.

The American conscience is "the moral judgment of the people upon themselves." In times of crisis it awakens to lead us back to the Puritanism that remains the chief determinant in American individual, social, and political morality. Satisfied with both the progress of the Protestant Ethic and that which Puritanism has made against frontier wilderness and foreign ideology, the author ignores persons, groups, events, and ideals that do not support this thesis. He dismisses "other factors, such as the religious reformers and separatists whose migrations to America resulted in a shower of splinter sects. . . ." (Are Methodists, Presbyterians, Unitarians, and Congregationalists included here?) Also of no importance, except for John Locke, are "the so-called Great Awakening and Enlightenment, both stemming largely from overseas"; and he states (p. 7) that the events since 1900 were not only not instrumental

in forming the "basic American character" but that they "tended to confuse the native moral concepts."

Nearly a third of the book retells the religious history of Colonial America, spiced with quotations from Calvin, Winthrop, Bradford, and Mather. Next are twelve pages on "nature's God"—an inaccurate account of Deism, Locke, and seventeenth century empirical science. The author's view of the "revolutionary conscience" (the theory and the fact of independence, the conflict of sincere loyalties, the ties to Britain, and the crucial issues of slavery and federal government) is relatively well balanced and accurate. His analyses of the philosophical foundations of both the revolution and the new government are, however, weak spots. Good analyses of Paine and Burke are ruined by garbled irrelevancies about Jefferson and Franklin. The single reference to the *Federalist* says, "there is neither room nor reason" for discussing it. Also ignored is environmentalism, which combined the "new science," Lockean political theory, and Deism into a frontier philosophy that has been persistently influential through many modifications to the present day. The belief that the New World could breed a morally and intellectually superior "natural man" strongly influenced Jefferson and the advocates of agrarianism. Benjamin Rush, also ignored by Mr. Burlingame, blended science and ethical sensitivity into the first forward-looking proposals in American criminology. Eliminating Rush also avoids an important contrast to Jonathan Edwards, and the neglect of environmentalism portends the author's neglect of Social Darwinism.

The western frontier and slavery are on the whole well treated, although slanted toward a basic and enduring Puritanism. Alleged American disrespect for law and order is sometimes blamed on the Revolution but more often on law-hating immigrants unable to adjust to frontier life—this the author calls "populism." Mr. Burlingame lacks insight into the difference between the sense of injustice and the sense of guilt, and he does not distinguish between law as means and law as end.

After a Dickensian account of "urban morality" in the 1850's, the post-Civil War

era is covered in one hundred pages. There is no mention of Hawthorne, Thoreau, Emerson, Melville, or Whitman; nor of the late nineteenth century realists. The account of journalism is fragmentary, and there is no review of formal education. Through what media of expression and institutions of power the American people exert moral influence on each other, we do not learn from this book. The chapter on "reform" consists of eight pages on food and drug laws and four on the founding of the National Grange. American agriculture and its problems are otherwise ignored. There is no discussion of Populism, of the Progressive party and the elder La Follette, of the co-operative movement, nor of non-Communist left-wing thought since the middle of the last century. The book traces American guilt feelings through World War I, the Harding administration, and the depression; but again social thought and legislation is ignored in favor of thumbnail sketches of prohibition, Chicago's gangsterland, and the Fitzgeraldian lost generation.

SAMUEL E. GLUCK

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GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM S. WHITE. *The Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate*. Pp. xi, 274. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$3.75 trade; \$2.75 text.

One of the ablest of the Washington correspondents has written an extremely readable book on the Senate of the United States—an institution which he considers the "one touch of authentic genius in the American political system."

As might be gathered from this statement, there is a good deal of hero worship for the Senate, and indeed for certain Senators, in Mr. White's breast. There is a good deal of sentimentality. And there are certain prejudices which not all readers will share.

The author makes as his major political point the contrast between the Presidency, which stands for advance and for positive

action, and the Senate, which is essentially conservative and for conciliation. He goes further and suggests that the Senate is conditioned by the South that lost and the Presidency by the North that won, in what he calls the War between the States.

The permanence of the Senate, its unchanging nature since it began, and its intended representation of something other than population, are underlined. The small size of the Senate, combined with its power of disapproving Presidential appointments and treaties, gives it an almost excessive reserve potential, which it uses, usually with reserve.

Perhaps most Americans do not quite appreciate the rarity value of Senators. England has a House of Lords composed of some seven hundred members for a population of about fifty million. We have ninety-six Senators for three or four times that many people. We need not be surprised if Senators have a high opinion of their function, of themselves, and of each other.

Mr. White brings out some things that are not always recognized. The Senate is itself a club, but there is also an Inner Club. The Inner Club has a strong southern flavor: all of the Senators from the eleven states of the Confederacy belong by right; others belong only if they can get accepted. It is the Inner Club that controls the Senate and comes close to controlling the United States. Mr. White discusses the supreme importance of committees and of seniority. He gives a pretty good idea of how the Senate has acted on recent important questions—for example the Bricker amendment, the railroad strike, MacArthur, McCarthy—and he ends with three chapters on investigations.

The reviewer suspects that the author slightly overvalues the "institution" (as he calls it), but all in all this is a book no one should miss.

EUGENE P. CHASE

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Lafayette College

ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY (Ed.). *Essays in Constitutional Law*. Pp. viii, 429, vii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$5.75.

The Supreme Court is back in the trenches it so hastily dug in 1937—and for very much the same reason. It has had the temerity to run counter to certain powerful, if partly sectional, trends of opinion. Whether it will remain on the firing step or once again beat a Roberts retreat only the future can tell. However, we can all agree on one point—we have with us suddenly one devil of a controversial court.

Perhaps this is the ideal time for the appearance of Dr. McCloskey's collection. An Associate Professor of Government at Harvard, he has assembled thirteen essays and one judicial opinion. They were selected, I think, to convey the impression that the Supreme Court has, with only occasional falls from grace, properly become the protective buffer between John Q. and all levels of his power-conscious government.

If this be his objective, I could not agree with him more. Still basking in the warmth of the Jencks and Watkins cases, I tip my hat daily to the Warren Court and its recent civil rights decisions in which, at the cost of peace of mind, its majority has dared to say "no" to what it considered executive and legislative excesses. Whether this is what the framers of the Constitution had in mind (as implied by Charles A. Beard) seems immaterial. There must and ought to be a last voice and that it has turned out to be that of the Supreme Court has proved, at the very least, to be eminently workable.

Dr. McCloskey has divided his selections into two parts. The first deals with the nature and development of American constitutionalism; the second with such topics as segregation in the public schools and the "clear-and-present-danger" test, most of which are of rather recent vintage. This division, if not an inspired one, is an adequate frame for the editor's stated purpose, "a modern restatement of American constitutional premises." The essays, and in particular, Max Lerner's "The Supreme Court and American Capitalism" and the late Zechariah Chafee's review of Dean Meiklejohn's "Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government," are important adjuncts to an understanding of constitutional law. I cannot say the same for Learned Hand's

opinion sustaining Judge Medina's emasculation of the Holmesian "clear-and-present-danger" rule which the Court itself now seems determined to reinstate.

Dr. McCloskey prefaces each essay with a delightfully provocative analysis which is, in every instance, an adequate challenge to summer drowsiness and the lure of nearby beaches. I might even go so far as to suggest that where time and temperature call for some judicious self-censorship, it might be more profitable to make the essay the victim. If this be treason, I can only plead the defense of dilemmatic horns and await Dr. McCloskey's inevitable demurrer.

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER

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COLEMAN B. RANSONE, JR. *The Office of Governor in the United States*. Pp. xii, 417. University: University of Alabama Press, 1956. \$6.00.

The general literature on the state executive is meager. Aside from an excellent monograph by Leslie Lipson, *The American Governor From Figurehead to Leader*, materials on this subject are limited to a few individual state studies, periodical articles, little Hoover Commission reports, and similar special treatments. In the study here under review, Professor Ransone contributes to a correction of this deficiency.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with party politics in the election of governors, the second with executive functions, and the third with accountability. Part I adds significant information in comparing and contrasting gubernatorial politics in one-party states, in states normally dominated by one party, and in two-party states. Part II, which is the longest and which the author regards as central, stresses the relation of gubernatorial responsibilities and patterns of activity to policy-making, traversing material similar to that Lipson covered twenty years ago.

The author views the primary role of the governor as policy determination. This "... involves him in an attempt to mold the policies of his party ... to influence the policy decisions of the legislature ... [and] ... to promulgate policies which he hopes will guide the executive branch ..."

(p. 157). All of this is the concern of politically active groups and all state officials. The distinction in the case of the governor should be indicated by some measure of the importance of the program issues with which he deals. Such an appraisal is not made in this book.

The author does catalogue what the governor does, how he spends his time, whom he sees, the techniques he may use, typical gubernatorial views, and so forth. But the presentation is often too generalized, telling little about how governors have actually influenced particular policies. The author explains, for instance, that many governors now present an annual program to the public and the legislature, but he does not examine the content of such programs, their novelty and creativeness, nor the political struggle involved in their implementation.

One measure of the relative significance of gubernatorial leadership is suggested by the question: "How effective are governors in influencing expenditure policies?" In most states, to suggest a possible answer, the three programs which account for well over half of the total budget (education, welfare, highways) have been substantially removed from gubernatorial policy and management responsibility. In these program areas, such influence and control as most governors retain are residual, indirect, and infrequently exercised. By the expenditure measure, then, the policy role of many governors may not be impressive.

At times, in classifying states, the author fails to identify the members of particular categories, asserting merely that some states do this and others that. This contributes to an impression that some of the generalizations are unsupported. This impression is intensified by a sparseness of footnotes, a lack of a bibliography, and an absence of a description of the methodology used to gather data except at scattered points in the book and on the jacket.

Despite its shortcomings (which a review of this brevity overemphasizes) the work is important for students of state government and a useful addition to the literature on the governmental executive.

NORMAN WENGERT

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CHARMIAN EDWARDS TOUSSAINT. *The Trusteeship System of the United Nations*. Pp. xiv, 288. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, 1956. \$7.50.

This book had its beginnings as a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of London. It is described by the author as "an analysis of the legal and institutional aspects of the Trusteeship System."

The volume traces the historical background of the Trusteeship System, with appropriate emphasis upon the older Mandate System of the League of Nations. The theory and practice of trusteeships are reviewed, and the machinery for administering and supervising the arrangements for territories placed under this type of international supervision is evaluated. Some attention is also given to the non-self-governing territories as they are affected by the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Useful appendices carry texts of the parts of the Charter dealing with trusteeships, extensive bibliographies, cases decided by national and international courts, and lists of treaties and statutes cited.

The author believes that "... The importance of the Trusteeship System is that it complements, rather than replaces, national colonial administration. It tackles the problem of colonial rivalry between States and thus contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, it attempts to raise the level of the more backward colonial rule. This operates in three ways: by focusing attention on colonial areas it brings to light problems and conditions that might otherwise be overlooked; through international supervision it can bring pressure to bear on unwilling States to improve the lot of their subject peoples; and it provides an international standard of colonial treatment ..." (p. vii).

Three ways of exercising supervision over Trust Territories are explained. These are the annual report of the Administering Authority, petitions from indigenous inhabitants, and visiting missions sent by the United Nations. These, the author believes, have "operated relatively smoothly because they are specifically provided for in the

Charter." Less smoothness in trusteeship matters is to be found in areas where the Charter has not been specific enough.

Three categories of territories are mentioned in the Charter as suitable for inclusion as trusteeships, namely, territories formerly under mandate, territories detached from enemy countries, and territories voluntarily placed under this arrangement. Besides the more common points of discussion of trusteeships, the author includes an interesting analysis of how a trusteeship agreement may be altered or terminated. There is also a review of strategical trusteeships, illustrated by that of the United States over former Japanese C-type mandated islands in the Pacific. The special case of the former German colony in Southwest Africa which was mandated to the Union of South Africa is given due attention.

This excellent, well-documented study is one of the most complete treatments yet to appear on the trusteeship system after ten years of experience.

J. EUGENE HARLEY

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WILLIAM E. H. HOWARD. *Public Administration in Ethiopia: A Study in Retrospect and Prospect*. Pp. viii, 204. Groningen, Netherlands: J. B. Wolters, 1956. (Distributed by Gregory Lounz, New York.) \$4.00.

For nearly a thousand years, between the early seventh and the sixteenth centuries, the very existence of Abyssinia was as much a fable and a myth as that of the lost Atlantis. Somewhere to the east, beyond the pagans who had conquered Arabia, and Egypt, and Lybia, and proconsular Africa, lay a Christian kingdom. It was also known as Ethiopia, and its confines were sometimes held to be conterminous with those of the southern Sahara, sometimes with those of the Nile valley between the second and the fourth cataracts, and sometimes with plateau and desert country between the sources of the Nile and the Indian Ocean. Through the invaluable editions of the Hakluyt Society, we have now the text of the narratives by Alvarez and by Castanhoso of the first European Em-

bassy to Abyssinia in 1520 and of the Portuguese alliance with the King of Kings against Islam in 1541-43. Thus Europe came to learn, during the reign of Henry VIII, that the rumors about a lost Christian kingdom were indeed true; that the essential facts about Abyssinia were that it was a Christian land and that its ruler was known as a king over other kings. These facts have remained the most significant about Abyssinia and its administration from that day to this.

Dr. William E. H. Howard has published in his *Public Administration in Ethiopia: A Study in Retrospect and Prospect* a summary in less than two hundred pages of the survival of Abyssinia in spite of Mohammedans and Italians, in spite of the minor kings over whom the King of Kings ruled in theory more than in fact, and in spite of the persistence of a feudal tradition which makes it hard, even nowadays, for an efficient and centralized government to function. Some of the most timely pages in Dr. Howard's little volume deal with the relation of church and state in Abyssinia. The country is struggling to free its *Abuna* who functions as an Ethiopian Archbishop of Canterbury. He crowns the Emperor and "immediately afterwards has to make his submission and that of the Church to the Crown." The *Abuna* is named by the Coptic Metropolitan of Egypt, the Patriarch of Alexandria, and he has frequently been of foreign birth until recent renegotiations assured the naming of a local aspirant. The King of Kings today thus finds himself in a role familiar to students of English history from the days when Henry I opposed an Italian Archbishop of Canterbury in the person of Anselm.

Many feudal memories linger in the present-day problems of Abyssinia; it is only the present Emperor and his immediate predecessor who have lifted the kingship out of constant turmoil with the local lords or "kings" to whose power, as Dr. Howard points out, the lay of the land, with its deep valleys and isolated regions, contributed. Changing local authorities from independent medieval barons to faithful representatives of the central government has been one of the achievements of Haile Selassie. He is truly today the King of Kings.

Dr. Howard is most successful in summarizing the history of the country, in describing its geographical characteristics and possibilities, and in presenting the real drama of the relations between church and state in this land where religious beliefs have not ceased to be dramatic from the days of Athanasius and of the Monophysites. In his treatment of administration, perhaps his most interesting contribution is his analysis of the administration of justice in a country where litigation is almost a national pastime, and where due recognition has had to be accorded to regional variations in jurisprudence, as well as to separate jurisdiction for foreigners, Copts, and Moslems.

WILLIAM L. SMYSER

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FRANZ NEUMANN. *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory*. Edited by Herbert Marcuse. Pp. x, 303. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This book brings together eleven papers, including two previously unpublished addresses and one unfinished essay, by the late Franz Neumann, author of *Behemoth*.

Such basic concepts of political theory as power, sovereignty, law, and freedom figure prominently in this volume. The treatment of the history of legal and political thought is masterful, especially in "The Changes in the Function of Law in Modern Society" and in "Types of Natural Law." Some of the theoretical passages, it must be said, are unnecessarily abstruse. But there is a wealth of clear and general insights into the relations of social theories to their concrete historical settings. As with Max Weber, Neumann's grasp of both social history and social theory distinguishes him from most other modern writers on theory. The long and brilliant essay on Montesquieu (Chapter IV) is a good example of this point.

The great social theorists have generally addressed themselves to the key problems of their times. Many American scholars of today, unfortunately, have tended to retreat from this honorable but sometimes dangerous tradition. Neumann, however,

consistently redirects political theory to its normative task of clarifying and exploring the basic issues and conflicts of modern civilization. "The Concept of Political Freedom," for instance, traces the development of English and German political thought through its latest phase, the American loyalty-security program.

The last three essays in this book deal with current conflict situations. "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship" is a pioneering study of types, functions, and characteristics of dictatorships. "Economics and Politics in the Twentieth Century" is a comparison and perspective of European revolutionary movements during the past hundred years. "Anxiety and Politics" discusses alienation, conspiracy theories of history, and the roles of collective anxieties in mass movements. Psychological phases of political movements are analyzed without the one-sided tendencies that hamper American social psychology, particularly its "elitist" and its neo-Freudian wings.

This is an eminent work. Franz Neumann's approach to political science challenges many prevailing intellectual orthodoxies. Neumann learned much from Marxism. He related his discussion of social theories to their historical contexts. He took a dynamic view of political phenomena—process rather than structure tends to be his frame of reference. He dealt with great issues—power and freedom.

The humanism, learning, and insight of these essays speak not only to professional specialists but also to laymen seeking enlightenment of the devious realms of politics, past and present.

ARTHUR K. DAVIS

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BERNARD ROSENBERG. *The Values of Veblen*. Pp. vii, 127. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956. \$2.50.

Because of its breadth and diversity of thought, Veblenian socioeconomics requires far more systematic study than has been undertaken so far. Especially is this true in the light of cultural and socioeconomic developments these past four decades. In producing this critical appraisal of Thorstein Veblen's thought, Professor Rosen-

berg, who is in the department of sociology and anthropology at Harpur College, makes a substantial contribution to our further understanding of Veblenism and its theoretic worth in the contemporary scene.

Though the book consists of several chapters originally published in various periodicals, it is, nevertheless, well ordered and does realize the author's aim of developing critical insights into Veblenism through concentrated emphasis on Veblen's work, *The Higher Learning in America*. The author undoubtedly performs a service by showing the importance of this work for a knowledge of Veblenism in toto. He is correct in maintaining that Veblen's ideas are systematic in character and that the basic ones are crystallized in this critique of American education. As a consequence, Rosenberg succeeds in furnishing the bare outlines of the Veblenian system. However, for a more complete understanding of the system and its dialectical texture, the serious student of Veblen cannot simply rely on *The Higher Learning* or, indeed, on Rosenberg's particular approach.

This book is, of course, too short in compass and too selective to provide an approach that would adequately cover Veblen's consistent thought from the metaphysical level to the sociopolitical. Rosenberg's stress lies mainly on the sociological and psychological portions of Veblenism. The philosophical and the economic are inadequately treated. One can easily take issue with the author's contentions that Veblen was not scientific and that he was a "pragmatist." Adherence to scientific materialism is no necessary qualification for the scientific attitude nor is the fact that Veblen studied under Peirce, whom the author indiscriminately groups with James and Dewey, evidence in point of Veblen's supposed philosophical pragmatism. The philosophical weaknesses of the work are reflected in the chapter on scientific methodology where little if any internal discussion on scientific method can be found.

The account of Veblen's instinct psychology is sound. A different type of analysis could show, however, that the "instincts" are not only sociological, as the author holds, but also moralistic. In the economic area, enough factual evidence is offered to

establish the utility of the Veblenian orientation in the present. But if one seeks an account in terms of the technical problems of contemporary economic study, he will not find it. Many interpretations are subject to question and serious doubt, as, for example, the author's denial that Veblenism inclines toward a type of anarchism; his point that Veblen presents a blueprint for the good society; or that Veblen had to predict a socialistic order. In fact, each of these points, and many more, can be refuted on grounds of careful definition and close analysis.

Notwithstanding its limitations and several analytic defects, the work is a stimulating addition to the literature on Veblen. It is critical, incisive, wholesomely discursive, and constructive. Its general conclusion that Veblenism "stands up remarkably well" is satisfactorily supported. For productive thought in the social sciences today, we cannot have enough of such writing on Veblen.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

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EDWARD MCWHINNEY. *Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World*. Pp. xiv, 201. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956. \$8.50.

Professor Edward McWhinney is an Australian who has taught, among other places, at Yale and is now on the law faculty of the University of Toronto. His Preface records debts to Julius Stone, Jerome Frank, F. S. C. Northrop, Myres S. McDougal, and Harold Lasswell as former teachers and colleagues. He has written widely for the law journals and now, in this volume, gathers together significant strands of the comparative constitutional studies in which he has been engaged.

Judicial review as a phenomenon of the American system of government has been the subject of an untold number of books, but assessment of judicial review in other parts of the world has rarely received more than brief and essentially descriptive treatment. McWhinney describes—indeed he provides—a great deal of detail, but more importantly, he analyzes the several su-

preme tribunals in action, leading to very decided conclusions.

Professor McWhinney sees, in the practice of the "English-speaking" countries discussed by him—they include India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Eire, South Africa as well as England, Canada, Australia, and the United States—a common element: a "distinct bias towards civil liberties." This, he propounds, is due to the training and selection of judges. To be sure, the United States Supreme Court no longer requires recruitment based primarily on professional expertise. Since its jurisdiction has become largely discretionary, the private law craftsman is here no longer uniquely qualified, and selection can be (and is) based on general intellectual qualities which provide, in McWhinney's words, "the broadly pragmatic, policy-making approach that characterizes constitutional decision-making in the United States today." But here, as in England and the dominions, past and present, the respect for the rule of law is deeply ingrained.

Professor McWhinney prefers, however, the "judicial activism" of the Brandeis-Black-Douglas school to the legal positivism of the other systems discussed by him. He applauds the tendencies displayed by Justice Rand of the Canadian Supreme Court to become a conscious innovator and expresses the hope that that court may eventually follow in the footsteps of our own (post-1937) Court.

Dean Cecil Wright of the University of Toronto Law School writes a Foreword which, *mirabile dictu*, amounts to a dissenting opinion and thus supplies an added facet to this excellent volume.

FRANCIS H. HELLER

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GORDON GREENWOOD (Ed.). *Australia: A Social and Political History*. Pp. xii, 445. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. \$7.50.

The teachers of history in Australian universities have made two main contributions to the writing of Australian history. The first was the work of the generation of Scott, Wood, Roberts, Hancock, Shann, Bailey, and Alexander—a generation which

produced the Australian volume of *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* as a permanent record of its values and scholarship. World War II stimulated a revival of interest in the teaching of Australian history in the universities—and with it a revival of research: a revival reflected in the works of Fitzpatrick, O'Brien, the Butlin brothers, and Marnie Bassett.

In a sense this book draws together the fruits of teaching, research, and thinking over the last decade. It reflects quite accurately the type of thinking going on in Australian universities and learned societies about the past. A glance at any one of the eight chapters will show the reader that their university teachers still think of past, present, and future as the history of a European society. They still think of it too as the story of the transplanting of British institutions to the Antipodes—of planting parliamentary institutions, the Protestant and Catholic religion in a strange land—that the Laski discussion of democracy contained the root of the matter. That is to say, the book is written by men for whom 1776 and 1789 were the decisive events in modern history, that indeed Australian society was a society without pre-1789 antecedents. Dr. Crowley, for example, begins his chapter on the foundation of Australia abruptly in 1788, while all six authors stick closely to that alliance between protestantism and secular liberalism which fashioned Australian democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

So the book reflects in quality and temper the direction of Australian academic thinking on history. In this sense the academics appear to be lagging behind thinking in other fields—to be like men who are facing a different way from other people in the community.

In each of the eight chapters the authors arrange their material by topics. The reader looking for an outline of events must look elsewhere. The work has a very useful bibliography of works published since the Cambridge History bibliography of 1930. The two together make a useful guide to historical literature on Australia. The work is distinguished by two important essays—one by Dr. Gollan, and the other by Professor Partridge. In general it re-

flects a trend in university thinking which probably puzzles Americans and Europeans—that faith in the enlightenment has not been seriously ruffled in this part of the New World.

MANNING CLARK

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RUSSIA AND COMMUNISM

JOHN N. HAZARD. *The Soviet System of Government*. Pp. xi, 256. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$4.00.

This is a study in comparative government as well as an "attempt to portray the Soviet system as it operates and to indicate the pressures that may influence the development of this system in the future." One of the author's main themes is to show how in the Soviet system of government, on each level of government organization, and in each of its branches—legislative, executive, and judiciary—the forms are democratic, that is similar to the system of government in Western democracies. But because of the counterweights to democratic forms that are established in the Soviet system in each branch and on each level of government organization, the substance of the system is totalitarian, authoritarian, and dictatorial. In addition, the role of the Communist party in the Soviet system of government makes it rigidly centralistic and monolithic as compared to the Western system of government in general, and the United States system of government in particular.

The author discusses the Soviet system of government "as it operates." He begins with a short discussion of the Marxian concept of democracy. He then analyzes the Communist party, particularly controls within the party, selection of party members, discipline for party members, and internationalism within the party. Then follows a discussion of some party auxiliary organizations and of soviets and their uses by the party. He goes on to a discussion of voting procedures, control of expression, and use of terror. There is also a discus-

sion of the federal system, of the administration, of collectivization, of the armed forces, and of the judiciary. The author goes on to show how the government makes everybody economically dependent and how the government is able to interfere in the private affairs of its citizens.

As to the eventual changes of this system and its development in the future, the author singles out two pressure groups that are in his opinion of particular importance in this connection: the army and the intelligentsia. He believes that these two groups are pressing for more representation in the top party's policy-making bodies such as the Central Committee and its Presidium. According to the author, these groups might exert pressure for a relaxation of controls upon the choice of leaders within the party and for the elimination of the unpredictable purges. The author, however, argues that even if the circle of those sharing power will be expanded in future years, the essentials of the present system have been so well "ingrained in the minds of the leaders of the nation and of each local community" (p. 197) that the system is likely to continue essentially unchanged for the foreseeable future.

The author sees the Soviet system as one of leaderships, and he therefore tends to locate the main agents of its stability or instability in its leadership. In such a case, perhaps, it might be necessary to know more about the Soviet leadership, about the differences, conflicts, and rivalries between the managerial class, the military and the professional party leaders and cadres. It is important to know also about the differences between various groups and "types" of party leaders and cadres as a source of factionalism and internal struggle for power. The author, for instance, points out how the party leaders and cadres are being composed of intelligentsia in increasing numbers as contrasted to the numerical dominance of semieducated but well-indoctrinated professional conspirators of the earlier phases of the party's development. But even though the number of university-educated people is steadily increasing in the party, this does not preclude the formation of dedicated, fanatical, and internationally oriented elite of professional conspirators

determined to maintain monolithic unity and rigid discipline in the party and the state. The question may then be whether such an elite might not clash with the more liberal and more nationally oriented class of industrial managers and technological intelligentsia within the party leadership. It may also be questioned whether this may not open an opportunity for the armed forces to interfere.

To come to even some tentative conclusions regarding such alternatives for the future of the Soviet system more data are needed, and the author was limited to the available materials. He has given an able and authoritative discussion of the Soviet system of government based on the existing sources. His study will be useful for all students of comparative government in general and to the students of Soviet society in particular.

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STEPHEN RICHARDS GRAUBARD. *British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924*. Pp. 305. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$5.50.

The American author presents an acute analysis of the influence which the Russian revolution had on the British Labor party. Starting with a brief historical sketch of the Labor party, he shows how the Menshevik revolution in March 1917 was at first welcomed by British labor as well as by Liberals. However, soon the dangerous weakening of an ally to the war effort determined the British political attitude. Mr. Graubard skillfully brings out the dual policy of the British Labor party and its core, the trade unions. On the one hand, labor tried to protect the new experiment. It prevented the English government from sending military help to the White Army; it gave recognition to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics when the Labor party came into office. On the other hand—in recognition of the gulf that separated the Russian revolutionary from the Labor member of parliament—the English labor movement fought Communism at home. Labor saw no tradition in the policy of establishing official relations with Soviet Russia and

in being sympathetic to her government in foreign affairs, while looking at communism in England as the unscrupulous arch enemy of the working class.

The book contains many interesting and excellent political sketches such as the collapse of the Labor government in 1924 and the effect of the "Zinoviev Letter" which as Mr. Graubard proves has been overestimated in its disastrous effect. He deals with the rise of the Communist party, its rivalries with the Labor party, the relations between the second and the third Internationals, the Communists' challenge to the trade unions, and labor's interpretations of what the revolution meant. The book, which is based on a huge amount of information, drawn especially from records of conferences and the left-wing press, is a valuable contribution to the history of the British Labor and Communist parties.

FRIEDA WUNDERLICH

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LEON A. DALE. *Marxism and French Labor*. Pp. 273. New York: Vantage Press, 1956. \$4.50.

The history of the French labor movement is a complicated subject, the sources of which are difficult to find. Groups have formed and reformed so frequently and have left records of their changing objectives in such insufficient form that the organization of the subject leaves much room for conjecture. The author of the present volume has gone through files of labor convention records, union records, statements by labor leaders, press reports, and secondary sources, and he has done a commendable job of bringing order out of chaos.

Marxism and French Labor is an informative account of the fortunes of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) as it resisted and finally succumbed to Communist infiltration. The author shows in much detail the differing programs of the Force Ouvrière, of the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), and of other groups as they tried to carry on social reforms without being absorbed by Communists. He shows that the CGT had a program at several times that was parallel to that of the Communist Party in France—

as, for instance, its opposition to the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He decries the way in which the French Governments did not stand firmly against communism; not even the Catholic CFTC was single-minded against this influence. As for M. Léon Jouhaux, the big figure in the book, the author sometimes finds him in the valley between socialism and communism and sometimes over on the Soviet side.

The author calls for an awakening to the threat of communism everywhere. We read (p. 190) as follows: "In a period when fuzzy thinking seems to be the order of the day and the world flounders in a sea of neutralism, and the question is asked as to how neutral can you get, there are fortunately a few lucid statesmen, particularly in the American labor movement, who are aware of the increasing Soviet threat. They know that there can be no strong democracy without strong trade unions. That is why they support free labor everywhere."

To select the Communist intrusion as the theme of the study is good, but it does lay a person open to the charge that there was a motive behind the writing other than just that of productive scholarship. In this case, the author was not only a student of economics, but a worker in France for the American Federation of Labor on its anti-Communist program there. He writes not so much as a student as he does as a well-informed "capitalistic" laborite.

While the title of the book should be "Communism in French Labor" because this might closely express the author's chief concern, it is true that Dr. Dale judges that the Socialists have been about as destructive of free labor as the Communists (compare p. 204). He uses a wide brush when referring to those who favor the ideas of Karl Marx.

Close study of the text reveals some difficulties that do not at first appear in an otherwise easy-moving style. The order of events is often doubled back upon itself, thus confusing chronology; the outline of the book places some subjects in awkward places; and the injection of brief comments that are obviously sheer opinion interferes with the tone of objectivity. As to the adequacy of the content, the reviewer sug-

gests that hardly enough emphasis is given to the other factors that were a part of the labor scene, particularly from the Nazis and other rightist sources, to give a balanced story of the influence of communism.

The bibliography at the end of the volume is extensive and well-organized. It would have been helpful if the author had included critical comments to help the reader interpret the list. This volume supplements the studies by Val Lorwin, Dorothy Pickles, Gordon Wright, Henry Ehrmann, and others. All we can get on this subject is not too much.

W. HENRY COOKE

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THEODORE DRAPER. *The Roots of American Communism*. Pp. x, 498. New York: Viking Press, 1957. \$6.75.

As much as possible, historiography should have in common with science factual accuracy; yet like art, it should help the reader to experience the events it describes, to reflect upon them, and even to transcend them. By these criteria, Mr. Draper has written an excellent book. His style is vivid without being forced; his knowledge encyclopedic; his interpretations authoritative. One sees the forest and the trees.

I do not feel competent to judge the accuracy of all of Mr. Draper's details. Those I checked I found quite accurate. One can, of course, quibble with some interpretations. For instance, was Louis C. Fraina—interesting figure that he was—really as great a scholar as Mr. Draper appears to think? Perhaps this magnification is due to an illusion: *intra caecorum strabismus rex*; which illustrates how minor and doubtful is any issue one can reasonably pick with Mr. Draper.

The Fund for the Republic which sponsored *The Roots of American Communism* acquired an unenviable reputation for sterile, splashy, and obnoxious grants—even though these involved only a small proportion of its total expenditures. It is pleasant to note that the Fund has here supported an eminently worthwhile undertaking and entrusted it to very capable hands. Perhaps the success of this enterprise will encourage those who grant foundation money

to finance less busy-work and help capable scholars more. One very worthwhile project would be the writing of histories of Communist parties abroad by native scholars of Mr. Draper's calibre. The impact on communism abroad—where it plays still an important role in the life of many a nation—might be great and beneficial. Such a project might be more important even than this unexcelled history of the beginnings of American communism.

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DEMETRIO BOERSNER. *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917-1928)*. (Études d'Histoire Économique, Politique et Sociale.) Pp. xv, 285. Genève: Librairie E. Droz; Paris: Librairie Minard, 1957. No price.

In this monograph, Boersner tackles the large problem of how the Third International made use of the desire for national liberation as a means to achieve its ends. The stage is set by a survey of the views of Marx and Engels, who associated national liberation from dynastic rule in Central and Eastern Europe with the rise of the "bourgeoisie" to power. Since this victory of the "bourgeoisie" was an essential step on the road to communism, as Marx and Engels saw it, they favored nationalist movements wherever these aimed at the overthrow of "feudal" regimes. This was the case with the uprisings of the Poles, German-Austrians, and Hungarians in 1848, which Marx and Engels heartily supported. It was not the case with the contemporaneous revolts of the Czechs and South Slavs, however, for according to the Marxist interpretation these were directed not against "feudal" regimes but against the German-Austrian and Hungarian "bourgeoisies." Marxist support of national liberation movements was thus established as relative to the ultimate goal of a political revolution.

Lenin took up these ideas and translated them into active policies of the Comintern. Central and Eastern Europe now gave way to Asia as the main arena of nationalist activity, and in the immediate postwar period there appeared to be great oppor-

tunities for the exploitation of anticolonial sentiment by the Communists. Boersner shows how this revolutionary spirit had spent itself by 1922, and Soviet policy had to be content with a long-term co-operation with nationalist forces in Asia in preparation for new revolutionary opportunities at some later date. The victory of Stalin's policy of "socialism in one country" was accompanied by a decline in the independent activity of the Comintern, and this study ends in 1928 when this new Soviet approach to foreign policy took the lead.

Boersner provides a comprehensive account of the Bolshevik approach to the national and colonial problem in this period, and he emphasizes both its world-wide scope and its flexible adjustment to the changing needs of the times. At the same time his account has certain shortcomings. It is limited almost exclusively to the debates of the Comintern congresses, and the Soviet implementation of Comintern policy is discussed only summarily and on the basis of secondary materials. Also, Boersner uses no Russian language publications. For a study limited to Comintern debates this is not a critical shortcoming, as these debates have been published in several West European languages. It is, however, questionable whether the Comintern can be regarded as independent of Soviet policy at any time in its existence, and if this is true, the extensive writings of Soviet leaders both before and after 1917 would have to be studied in order to portray Bolshevik policy in all its complexity. The main lines of this policy, nevertheless, emerge in the Comintern debates. These Boersner presents in a clear and systematic form.

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SLOBODAN M. DRASKOVICH. *Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse*. Pp. xiv, 357. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Company, 1957. \$5.00.

The author of this book was at one time a professor in Yugoslavia. He spent four years in a German prisoner of war camp and came to the United States in 1947. He is at present editor of a Serbian newspaper published in Chicago. Although the author

has given his work a scholarly appearance by the use of extensive footnotes, the book is anything but an objective account of Tito and his policies. The author sees no difference between the Tito and Stalin brands of communism and believes that they both represent the same international Communist movement. He says that "the Communist world leaders" are merely "using Tito and Titoism to achieve strategic objectives which could not have been attained . . . by Stalinist spokesmen" (pp. xi, 284, 316-27). Those who believe that promotion of Titoism serves the security interests of the West are referred to as "Western Titoists" and accused of idolizing Tito "as a champion of democracy" (p. xiii). The author is critical of "the Western press" for allegedly glorifying Tito "as a paragon of human, military and democratic virtues" (p. 5).

The assumption that there is in the West a powerful pro-Tito movement cannot be supported by facts. It is downright silly to accuse the Western press of being pro-Tito, and it is equally preposterous to suggest that the Western governments are taken in by Tito. In this reviewer's opinion, Washington's policy toward Yugoslavia has been sound and realistic. American military withdrawals from Istria and Greece, the anti-Soviet disturbances in Eastern Germany, Poland, and Hungary were all to a large degree the results of American policy. The United States' encouragement of Titoism in the satellite states of the Soviet Union is, in the reviewer's opinion, a policy that has great potentials.

The author has no love for Tito not only because he is a Communist but also because he is a Croat. He sees in Yugoslavia's dictator a man who destroyed Mikhailovich and who is dedicated to the destruction of the Serbian nation. He equates Mikhailovich with democracy when in fact neither Mikhailovich nor Tito stood for a democratic solution of Yugoslavia's problems. The author endeavors to show that Tito rather than Mikhailovich collaborated with the enemy—a statement that is weakly supported by insufficient evidence. As to whether Mikhailovich collaborated, one need only read Churchill's memoirs or those

just published by Hermann Neubacher, and both men were in a position to know. It is true, however, that these unimpeachable sources may still leave room for a semantic discussion of what constitutes democracy and patriotism and whether Mikhailovich collaborated from ideological conviction or for military expediency. Despite overwhelming proof to the contrary, the author deliberately minimizes the enormity of Tito's resistance movement and its military effectiveness.

Many pages in the book are given to discussions of Titoism, communism, and recent efforts at Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation. The author has amassed a great deal of information, most of it coming from newspapers and secondary accounts, and even if the reader disagrees with some of the author's ideas, he may still learn something from the book. In conclusion, the author calls for "the resolute rejection of Titoism by the West." This, he believes, will "unleash everywhere forces of freedom which can change the course of history and make an end to communist conquest and . . . plans for world domination" (p. 315). Unfortunately, he does not tell us just how this would come about.

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ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

GEORGE LENCZOWSKI. *The Middle East in World Affairs*. Pp. xx, 576. 2nd ed. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. \$7.25 trade; \$5.50 text.

It is most fortunate that this book becomes available to the American reader at a time when his awareness of the profound involvement of the United States in Mid-Eastern affairs grows from day to day. Among the students of the area, which for an indefinite period ahead will remain one of the most dangerous focal points of world politics, Lenczowski is particularly well qualified to act as an interpreter of its importance. Years of diplomatic service during World War II (as a member of the Polish Legation in Iran) and personal contacts with the Mid-East in succeeding years

have given him a keen understanding of its problems. This experience has also sharpened his ability to examine Middle Eastern events not as separate incidents but as links in a chain of complicated sociopolitical processes. The work was first published in 1952, and the present volume represents a revised edition.

The Middle East remains a vague term for which there is no fixed definition. Hence it would be unwise to question whether the author is right in his interpretation of the term. For Lenczowski, the Middle East embraces three countries forming the "Northern Belt" (Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan); five countries of the "Fertile Crescent" (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan); and three countries of the Red Sea region (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen). One cannot help feeling that the picture of the Middle East drawn by the author would have gained in depth if Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, all deeply affected by most of the factors which underlie the Middle Eastern crisis, had been included in his study.

The reader finds in the book an objective analysis of such vital factors as the irresistibly rising tide of nationalism, the rapid decline of British and French influence in world affairs, and the relentless Communist pressure on the area. After an outline of the history of the Middle East before World War I, as reflected primarily in the destinies of the Ottoman Empire and Persia, Lenczowski examines the impact of World War I on the Middle East; it was in those years that the seeds of ominous developments which culminated in the present crisis began to sprout. The changes which took place in each country of the Middle East in the interwar period as well as during and after World War II are dealt with in separate chapters.

Of the various factors which have been prominent in the Middle East during the last decade, Soviet aggression is particularly menacing to the Western world. Many facets of Soviet policies in that area are traced in the book. The reader is reminded of the fact that the active interests of the Soviet Union in Mid-Eastern affairs is not a recent development; it is a part of the legacy taken over by the present regime

from the makers of Russian foreign policy in Czarist Russia. The first reappraisal of Soviet intentions in the Middle East was made at the Congress of the Peoples of the East held in Baku in the fall of 1920 under the auspices of the Comintern. Soviet diplomatic action in the Middle East which has the character of indirect aggression combined with a persistent ideological offensive has been carried out with unsurpassed fifth-column techniques. Among the many reasons which insured its success was the fact that its short-term aims—the ousting of the Western powers from the area and the denial to them of Mid-Eastern oil—coincide with the aims of Arab nationalism. Cynically opportunistic, the Soviet policy in the Middle East espouses Arab nationalism while it combats nationalism among the Moslems under its own rule. The author points up the flexibility of Communist methods. These vary in different countries depending upon the specific national, social, and political climate.

A particularly thorny problem in the Middle East is that of Israel, and this is given a great deal of attention in the book. Here again emerges the opportunistic nature of the Soviet attitude in that area; scarcely any other single policy of Moscow has helped the Communist cause among the Arabs more than its hostility towards Israel. Very revealing is the account of the intrigues and tensions among the Arab countries and of the breakdown of inter-Arab co-operation during the war against Israel, 1948-49—one of the principal causes of the Israeli victory.

Not overburdened with notes, references, and figures, the book is vividly written and eminently readable. It is too bad that the author had to write the final paragraph of this work before the dramatic events which followed the evacuation by the British of their military base in the Canal Zone to Cyprus. History is rapidly providing material for a new revised edition.

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Israel and the United Nations: Report of a Study Group Set Up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Prepared for the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. 322. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956. \$3.00.

E. H. HUTCHISON. *Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955*. Pp. xxvi, 199. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1956. \$3.50.

These two volumes present opposing views of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But comparison ends at this point, for the first is a thorough and documented work of scholarship, while Mr. Hutchison's book is a piece of propaganda.

Israel and the United Nations is part of a series of national policies and attitudes towards the United Nations. It was initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and conducted by a study group of highly qualified specialists under the chairmanship of Professor Nathan Feinberg of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

The book presents a masterly analysis of foreign policy problems and public attitudes as expressed in scholarly journals, the press, and other agencies of public opinion. The conclusions reveal that government policy has enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the population of Israel and that the early enthusiasm for and great hopes in the United Nations have yielded to disappointment and a growing pessimism, as the world organization has failed to bring peace to the Middle East. The final balance drawn by the Study Group reflects the realism and political maturity of the people of Israel. We are told that the latter as well as the government of Israel are aware that their own difficulties as well as the weakening of the United Nations are largely the effects of a deteriorating international situation.

Commander Hutchison served as a United Nations Military Observer in Palestine from 1951 to 1954. He embarked upon his duties with barely a minimum of knowledge of the complex situation and plunged into the baffling problems of border clashes, with their inevitably conflicting charges and recriminations. He emerged with an intense hostility to Israel and a passionate urge to lead the Arab cause.

The failure to convert the truce agree-

ments into peace settlements has resulted in a state of half-war, punctuated by border clashes and mounting tension. The Arabs have refused to recognize the existence of the state of Israel and have insisted on the exclusion of Israel from regional bodies, even of the United Nations. Egypt has barred Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal in defiance of the Security Council. Infiltrators and marauding parties have penetrated Israel's borders, perpetrating sabotage and murder, and Israel has retaliated by organized reprisal raids.

Mr. Hutchison disregards Arab intransigence and devotes the bulk of his book to Arab-Israeli clashes. It may be assumed that in bitter border conflicts no one side is ever wholly in the right. Yet the author holds Israel entirely at fault. He selects his cases (p. 30), and one is left wondering whether the author's bias is the effect or cause of the selection. A few illustrations will reveal his partisanship.

The author includes photographs of victims of Israeli raids. He describes touching scenes of death and bereavement and recounts what was learned from interrogation (pp. 12-14, 44). But the murder of Israelis is passed over rapidly, and there are no photographs or vivid accounts of eyewitnesses. Where clashes resulted in more Arab than Israeli casualties, he allows the record to speak for itself (p. 45); where Israeli casualties were more numerous, he is moved to explain (p. 56-57). When the Security Council condemned Israel for a raid, taking note of Syrian provocation, he is at pains to explain the Israeli attack on broad political grounds (pp. 109-110). On Egyptian-Israeli clashes, he states that "both sides have been frequently condemned, with Egypt, no doubt, holding the lead." But he softens this slur on Egypt by assuring us that Israel was "far out in front in triggering the most serious incidents and inflicting the greater number of casualties" (p. 115). He describes Arab Bedouins as peaceful folk (pp. 31-33), but the book reveals no contact with Israeli villagers. He dismisses the repeated Israeli offers of peace as propaganda (p. 92). He apologizes for Egypt's pro-Soviet policy (pp. 129 ff.) and clumsily tries to insinuate that Israel harbors Communists (p. 125).

Mr. Hutchison would have us believe that the Arabs were co-operative in tracking down malefactors. After the massacre of Israelis in the Scorpion Pass, he sought with commendable vigor to track down the culprits. He discovered that a "Black Hand" organization of Arabs was operating from Egyptian Sinai, with confederates in Jordan and elsewhere. He went to Egypt and met with leading officials who put him into contact with Sinai sheikhs. He found the sheikhs colorful and gracious, and he discovered that they had "crystal clear eyes." But he did not get his man. The suspicion that they knew more than they were willing to tell flashed through his mind, but not the thought that the Egyptians might have given him the run-around.

Mr. Hutchison is, of course, entitled to his opinions and at liberty to express them. But one remark is inexcusable. He says: "The people of Jewish faith, the vast majority of whom are loyal citizens of the countries in which they live . . ." (p. 147). If the implication is that those who favor Israel are not loyal, the author's emotions have carried him too far. Even a zealot should not impugn the patriotism of those who differ with him.

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EDGAR O'BALLANCE. *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948*. Pp. 220. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$4.75.

The establishment of Israel was to a large extent forced upon the Jewish people by a number of factors. The first was the promulgation and execution of the British White Paper of May 17, 1939. This aimed to make the Jews in Palestine a permanent minority among the Arabs, a status that is becoming more and more unbearable for all minorities in Islamic Arab countries. The second factor was the refusal of both the democracies and the Soviet Union to do anything tangible to rescue the Jews from Hitler's genocide. These two factors combined after World War II to deepen the impasse of the Jewish people, particularly in Palestine. The British insisted on the continuation of the White Paper policy,

which in the eyes of the Jews spelled genocide, sooner or later. Moreover, the closed doors to Jewish survivors of the Hitler holocaust continued. In addition, Jews and non-Jews alike who were led in America by the Zionist movement came to the help of the beleaguered Jews in Palestine. Unexpected and unusual concatenations of events in international relations, a courage, born of desperation, by a disciplined people, and idealistic soldier-youth brought the Jewish state into existence; but not before the victory of Israel over seven Arab states.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 may well rank as one of the decisive smaller wars of our own times. This is because of the new factor it introduced in world affairs—the state of Israel. Major O'Ballance gives a clear narration of the military action which is only half the story, for the political maneuverings were inseparable from the fighting and are still to be fully revealed.

After a brief and none-to-accurate history of Palestine, the author divides the War into seven phases. It began on December 2, 1947 with Arab rioting in Jerusalem. It continued with the Irgunite-Sternists and the "Arab Army of Liberation" committing terroristic acts and attacks on a minor scale. These organizations, however, failed to achieve any noteworthy victories when it came to the larger fighting. Upon Israel's declaration of independence, following British departure, the invasion of the Arab armies commenced in earnest.

O'Ballance's explanation of their defeat despite their tremendous superiority in numbers and weapons has been recently confirmed in Sinai. The Arab "Allies" were not united. All the aid given to Egypt during operation "Ayin" consisted of a few shells fired by the Iraqis. Another reason was the lack of stamina on the part of the Arab soldier. A third reason worthy of greater stress was Arab overconfidence. Historical Arab-Jewish relations have impressed the Arabs with the inability of the Jew to defend himself. On the other hand, the Israeli soldier was fighting for his life, for Arab victory in Israel spells genocide for the Jews. This spirit combined with idealism, training, knowledge of the terrain, mastery of communications, conviction that victory lies in mobility, and offensive action

in a country where there is literally no place to retreat, proved decisive.

The book is on the whole factual, although the histories of battles and encounters are still being written up, and there is a large Hebrew literature on the subject. However, there is no lack of errors and misstatements. The reviewers are willing to overlook the dating of the destruction of the first Jewish Commonwealth as 588 instead of 586, or the notion that there was no military Jewish action after Bar Kochba's revolt until the 18th century. However, Major O'Ballance hears imaginary Haganah conversations over loudspeakers all over the place, busily evicting poor Arabs. British documents prove that such evictions were less frequent. Haifa is the best example. O'Ballance also overrates the actions of the Arab Legion and the neutrality of the British. On the contrary, the British forced the Haganah out of Lydda after it had driven out the Arabs. Aside from these strictures, the book is indeed an interesting and informative military narrative.

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NOBUTAKA IKE. *Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey*. Pp. xiv, 300, ix. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$4.00 text; \$5.50 trade.

This well-written and in a sense pioneering survey is most appropriate for review in *THE ANNALS*. Its approach is basically more of a political and social science amalgam than the other two recent books on the same topic (see Passin on Quigley and Turner, and Cole on Yanaga in *THE ANNALS*, September 1956 and May 1957 respectively). Such sociological subjects as social stratification, kinship, the structure of business, the labor force, agriculture, the intellectuals, the mass media, and public opinion polls have been examined for their political implications. Separate chapters are also devoted to the bureaucracy, political parties, electoral behavior, violence, and the decision-making process.

As Curator of Japanese Collections and

Associate Professor at the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, Dr. Ike has been able to keep abreast of and summarize the sociopolitical research by Japanese and American scholars in the postwar period. His recent sojourn in Japan gives a firsthand flavor to many of his apt descriptions.

Dr. Ike has been much impressed by "informal government" as distinguished from the formal political structure, and throughout Japanese society he finds that men on the lower echelons have usually been making the decisions, whether in business or in the government bureaucracy. He also finds that the emphasis placed on personal relations in Japan tends to undermine the functioning of government according to organizational charts. Instead, fragmentation takes place and often underlies what on the surface seems like unanimity. This results in the dispersion and even evaporation of responsibility. A striking example given is the Tokyo war crimes trials where only Tojo assumed responsibility for his acts; the others found easy refuge in the ambiguity of the Japanese decision-making process. Yet Dr. Ike sees advantages in the plurality underneath the seemingly centralized government structure, for it would enable Japanese society to survive even such a dislocation as the collapse of the central government. Furthermore, this fragmentation in a milieu of shared values is workable, accepted, and has provided remarkable stability.

The scope of the task and the handy size of the book probably preclude a more critical treatment of the conclusions and implications to be drawn from the crop of postwar studies which the book seeks to mold into a meaningful whole. The reader should, however, be aware that many of them remain as yet in the stage of hypotheses to be refined by further study and future developments. With this in mind, this survey can be recommended to layman, expert, and teacher alike for its concise comprehensiveness and vivid examples.

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HOWARD L. BOORMAN, ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, PHILIP E. MOSELY, and BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ. *Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains*. Pp. xxi, 227. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957. \$3.50.

The Soviet relationship with Communist China is a key question confronting the United States. This is because so much of United States policy toward China is predicated on the nature of Soviet political, economic, and ideological relations with that country. The Council on Foreign Relations has furnished the best discussion so far of the political, economic, and international aspects of the relationship between Moscow and Peking and what it means to the United States. Based on material presented to a Study Group of the Council on Foreign Relations, some five papers, two by Howard Boorman and one each by Alexander Eckstein, Benjamin Schwartz, and Philip E. Mosely, do much to push back the frontiers of ignorance on this question. The book has a thoughtful Foreword written by Arthur H. Dean who states that, "the Soviet leadership now appears to be giving Mao-Tse-tung and his deputy Chou En-lai a maximum of cooperation with a minimum of interference."

Mr. Boorman discusses deftly the nature of the Moscow-Peking pacts and analyzes in a comprehensive way the history of the political relations between China and the Soviet Union in the past ten years. Perhaps unexpected to Moscow has been the tremendous upsurge of power of the Chinese Communist state which has supplanted any dream Russia had of herself being the dominant power in Asia. That role is now played by Communist China. This has placed China in an expanding position in Korea and Indochina. The emergence of Chinese power is, according to Mr. Boorman, "advantageous to the Russians from the strategic standpoint."

In a very penetrating essay, Alexander Eckstein analyzes the degree of interdependence of the Soviet and Chinese economies. While one-fifth of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union is with Communist China and Communist China is considerably dependent on the Soviet Union for

its economic and industrial development, the two economies do not naturally complement each other. While Soviet economic assistance to China is not large, it nevertheless is not negligible; it consists primarily of machinery and industrial goods which are in critical supply in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Chinese exports to the USSR represent mainly items which the Soviet Union has neither great need of nor desire for. The ideological compulsion, therefore, to economically join the two countries together takes priority over need, even though such a relationship might be uneconomical.

Benjamin Schwartz, in a chapter on the ideology of the Sino-Soviet alliance, discusses very brilliantly the role of political power, social organization, and pure doctrine in explaining the relationship between Moscow and Peking. Dr. Schwartz believes that while the shared ideology between Moscow and Peking might become less strong, there is still a common core of Communist belief between them. The penultimate chapter written by Mr. Boorman delineates the problems of the border areas of inner Asia—Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang—as they affect this relationship. Philip E. Mosely who served as editor of this valuable collection of essays lends his trenchant pen in authoring the last chapter on the relationship between the Moscow-Peking Axis and the world political scene. Dr. Mosely believes that while there are differences in economic interest and divisions in ideology between Russia and China, the shared political and strategic aims of the two parties will transcend any of the differences which might tend to divide them.

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PETER S. H. TANŌ. *Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies*. Pp. xvi, 536. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$10.00.

Events have moved rapidly in Communist China since Mao Tse-tung achieved power in the autumn of 1949, and it becomes increasingly difficult for the outside observer to keep himself reliably informed.

In Mr. Tang's book, fortunately, the reader will find a careful description of the Peking regime both in its current setting and also against the background of Chinese Communist history and of Communist ideology as developed by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung. What emerges from this balanced treatment is a factual, unemotional analysis of Chinese Communist leadership, politics, propaganda, economic and social policies, party and governmental machinery, military system, and foreign policy. Altogether, the author has done an excellent job.

Formerly a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chungking, Mr. Tang also served for a time as an attaché at the Chinese (Nationalist) Embassy in Moscow and later received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. This combination of training and experience appears to have endowed him with a capacity for the meaningful analysis of communism in both its Russian and Chinese contexts and for the weighing of Chinese Communist strengths and weaknesses with a maximum of critical insight and a minimum of bias.

Roughly, the book falls into three parts: the ideological and historical background; the structure and functioning of the regime; and its role in the Moscow-Peking Axis, in Asia as a whole, in relation to the Soviet satellites, and in relation to the West. In terms of space, the author has placed his major emphasis upon the structure and functioning of the regime, and this part of the book will provide valuable references for the reader who is interested in hierarchical relationships, constitutional processes, judicial and police apparatuses and procedures, mass organizations, controls over art and literature, "brain-washing" techniques, party recruiting, the training of cadres and many other important complexities of the system. For an understanding of the regime as a whole, however, and for tentative estimates of its potentials and its relationships with the rest of the world the other two parts of the book are equally valuable.

In an effort to present a clear picture of the organizational complexities of the party and state structures and of statistical compilations, the author has included a number

of charts and tables. Unfortunately, "to avoid the proliferation of footnotes," he has also chosen to present the sources of quotations and of key information only in the text. Mr. Tang's research has been done carefully, and one does not question his accuracy, but a system of footnoting would have been of great service to scholars sharing some of Mr. Tang's interests and, if judiciously arranged, need not have encumbered the narrative.

Yet this criticism remains a relatively minor one. The book will be of great value to the general reader seeking an understanding of Communist China and of the role it is likely to play in international relations. As for classroom use, particularly in the field of comparative government, there is, in the opinion of this reviewer, no volume so adequate in the coverage of the Peking regime.

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SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

LEON FESTINGER, HENRY W. RIECKEN, and STANLEY SCHACHTER. *When Prophecy Fails*. Pp. vii, 256. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. \$4.00.

How do present-day cult movements arise and gain credence? What happens to their members when sacred revelations fail and prophecy proves untrue? Modern social research which dares anything and goes anywhere has attempted in this book to invade a strange sanctum sanctorum, the rise of what might have been a new religion.

Newspaper accounts of some few years ago told the story of a respectable housewife and a doctor of medicine who predicted the destruction of the world by floods, the rescue of believers by space ships from other planets, and the ultimate return of the cult to repopulate the world. What the news accounts did not tell was that this inner circle was infiltrated by four paid researchers who posed as believers and thus added to the intensity of the myth they set out to study. The whole story as

here set down is weird and enlightening. The cycle unfolds in the following fashion: automatic writings in the hands of Mrs. Kreech bring prophecies from out of space; the word is spread by Dr. Armstrong, and members are recruited. Following a long wait for orders of rescue from our doomed planet, four days of imminent salvation push the tension almost to the breaking point. When no space pilots arrive, the still elated prophet brings forth a new prophecy in explanation. This, however, cannot be repeated indefinitely; the reaction leaves the believers stunned and alone. Aroused neighbors demand sanity hearings and institute legal procedures to take the children away from the principals. The cult members disappear, not to be heard of again, and the new religion is stillborn.

What does this investigation show? The writers are not above suggesting a parallel to the situation of the disciples, stunned by the crucifixion of their Messiah, but the point is not pressed. We cannot conclude that the principals were psychotic, for this was disapproved in sanity tests. Are we to conclude that the Buck Rogers type of science is to become the new religion, the magic of the future? For these were good middle-class folk, college educated, who desired to operate in what they apparently felt was the context of modern science. Can ordinary people, seeking to be extraordinary, sustain all the stimulation they now experience without reaching for the crude explanations of a new supernaturalism? In this case, evidently not. The popular impact of atomic energy, "space science," and the imminent threat of total destruction here served the myth and made it function in a fashion that evolved new magic and new religion out of science.

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ÉMILE PIN, S.J. *Pratique religieuse et classes sociales dans une paroisse urbaine, Saint-Pothin à Lyon*. Pp. 444. Paris: Éditions Spés, 1956. 2,300 fr.

The author of *Pratique religieuse et classes sociales* holds the professorial chair of sociology at the Institute of Social Studies of the Catholic Institute of Paris.

In his approach to his subject matter, he treats of the human aspect of the lives, objectives, and manifestations of the parishioners of Saint-Pothin; he treats also of their religious practice of faith and rites as conditioned by cultural strata and backgrounds. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the co-operation of the parish clergy during four years of fruitful consultation.

Access to many thousands of documents was made possible by numerous agencies: the parishioners of Saint-Pothin, the Director of the city hospitals of Lyon, the Secretary-General of the Mayoralty of the sixth district, the Archivist of the city of Lyon, the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, the Director of the Institute of Sociology of the Catholic Faculties of Lyon, the Secretary of the International Conference of Religious Sociology, and the Professor of Ethnology of the Faculty of *Lettres* of the University of Lyon.

The review of this tightly packed book cannot possibly do justice to the details and intricacies of the author's organization and integration of his subject matter. The most that the reviewer can offer is a brief reflection of fourteen interrelated chapters with their numerous subdivisions.

Chapter I. Parish territory and equipment; social aspect; elections, labor, and commerce; ecclesiastical background; the Church of Saint-Pothin and other places of worship. Chapter II. Modern parish community; community celebration of the Mass; rites and sacraments from baptism to death; parishional reaction. Chapter III. Practices of age, sex, and family status; Sunday practice and family prayer; Saint-Pothin amidst the parishes of the city of Lyon. Chapter IV. Religious practice and geographical origin; community types. Chapter V. Statistical data on habitation; religious practice and living accommodations. Chapter VI. Categories of apartment dwellings; Sunday practice and types of apartment houses; new usage and indices of comfort; baptism and types of habitat; proportion of baptized; delay of baptism and types of apartment homes; religious burials; large percentage of dwellers disregarding Sunday, Easter, and the religious tithe; lodgers who, though voting the Communist ticket, nevertheless shun the denial of re-

religious burial. Chapter VII. Social and professional divisions; professions of heads of families; married women and other members of the household; social professional divisions and Sunday services; degrees of water supply and sanitary installations among social groups. Chapter VIII. Social classes and religious practice; education and culture; concrete determination of types; education of husband and religious practice. Chapter IX. Social classes, workers, and movements; internal and external activities of clergy, laymen, and groups; liturgy, sacraments, and methods of proselytizing. Chapter X. Confusion of believers; materialistic thesis: ideologies, the product of economic status; extensive system of questions posed by the author, answered by laymen, religious and otherwise. Chapter XI. Hypothesis of the difference between bourgeois and proletarian approach; value of popular consultation. Chapter XII. The Mass as a common function of priest and lay participants; personal and common prayer; role of organist and choir; community chant. Chapter XIII. Sacraments and social justice. Chapter XIV. Religious approach of bourgeoisie and proletariat.

The reviewer appreciates the author's deftly applied social and political approach as a means to serve his religious objective and, contrariwise, the effective religious directive as designed to facilitate the desired social and political behavior of the faithful.

Though a layman and "out of bounds" of the author's religious denomination, the reviewer cannot but respect the subject matter, masterful style, nomenclatures, technique, charts, diagrams, photographs, and indices. Verily, verily, *Pratique religieuse et classes sociales* is nothing less than a faithful scholar's sacrificial devotion *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*.

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GEOFFREY WILLIAMSON. *Inside Buchmanism: An Independent Inquiry into the Oxford Group Movement and Moral Re-Armament*. Pp. ix, 227. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. \$4.75.

This penetrating study traces the development of Buchmanism from its beginnings

in 1921 to the middle of the century. In its earliest history, the movement emphasized the "advancement of the Christian religion." In 1928 it came to be called the Oxford Group Movement, and in 1939 it was registered in England as the Oxford Group. Even earlier than this, however, the name Moral Re-Armament had come into use. Today all of its work is carried on under this name.

While the movement continues to emphasize "change" and divine guidance, the emphasis has shifted to such a degree that "the old talk of 'winning people to Christ'" has been dropped. Buchmanite literature today reveals "thousands of words about 'ideology'; but not one mention of 'the advancement of the Christian religion.'" This shift from an earlier apparently Christian movement to a moralistic movement outside the church is at least one factor causing Christian leaders like Samuel M. Shoemaker of Pittsburgh to part company with Buchmanism.

Buchman has staunch supporters of high standing in the intellectual and political world. Among the most illustrious of these are Robert Schuman, former French foreign minister, as well as the rector of the University of Zurich. Apparently many people of considerable means contribute to the financial support of the movement. Mr. Williamson, however, sees Buchmanism as an impressive façade with little back of it save a "playing at evangelism and dabbling in world politics." Apparently Shoemaker, a former supporter, would agree. For him the emptiness behind the façade is its failure to sink its roots into the historic Christian tradition. "We have gone about as far as we can in individualistic and egoistic interpretations of the meaning of Christ and the Gospel," he says.

Shoemaker also believes in an intensely personal religious experience and employs many of the techniques of Buchmanism, but he does so within the perspective and under the auspices of the Christian church: "We can almost test the soundness of any new spiritual awakening by the degree to which the leaders of the movement feel themselves part of the long line of Christian prophets and awakeners, or the degree to which they think of themselves and their

movement as something 'new'" (*The Experiment of Faith*, p. 31).

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M. BREWSTER SMITH and others. *Opinions and Personality*. Pp. vii, 294. New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall, 1956. \$6.00.

In 1947, at the Harvard Psychological Clinic, ten men were studied by the authors of this work and their collaborators, in order "to gain new insights into the relations of opinions and personality." The present volume reports on the findings of this examination and the ideas they have developed therefrom during the subsequent years.

A fairly detailed account of the opinions and personalities of the ten subjects comprises the bulk of the book. The personality findings are based on twenty-eight procedures which took some fifteen weekly two-hour sessions to complete and included interviews, standard tests, and test situations devised for the purposes of the study. The opinions to be related to these personality materials are the subjects' views on the Soviet Union and communism.

The relation between personality and opinion is primarily examined in the light of the following question: "What adjustive functions of personality are served by the formation and maintenance of an opinion?" The authors distinguish three adjustive functions of an opinion: (a) Object Appraisal: "the process whereby the person develops attitudes that are a creative solution to the problems posed by the existence of disparate internal demands and external or environmental demands"; (b) Social Adjustment: "facilitating, disrupting, or simply maintaining an individual's relations with other individuals"; (c) Externalization: which "occurs when an individual, often responding unconsciously, senses an analogy between a perceived environmental event and some unresolved inner problem. He adopts an attitude toward the event in question which is a transformed version of his way of dealing with his inner difficulty. By doing so, he may succeed in reducing

some of the anxiety which his own difficulty has been producing."

The discussion on these matters lacks clarity and rigor, but this does not prevent the authors from making a number of useful observations once they get into the concrete materials on their ten subjects. Enough data are provided to permit the reader to make some judgments of his own. Thus in the case of the subject Charles Lanlin, the reviewer had the distinct impression that several very perceptive remarks he made about Communist tactics and strategies and his outlook on policy toward the Soviet Union were influenced by his observations of Communist delegates at trade-union conventions. The authors, on the other hand, stress Lanlin's low score on information tests about Russia and apparently see no relation between his views and his direct contact with Communist functionaries (compare pp. 119-125).

Students of public opinion are indebted to the authors of this book and their collaborators. This work should help to break down the insulation of public opinion studies from social psychological theory.

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MARTHA WOLFENSTEIN. *Disaster: A Psychological Essay*. Pp. xvi, 231. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$4.00.

This book consists of a group of short essays arranged on the continuum of disaster time (preimpact, impact, and post-impact). It offers mildly psychoanalytic hypotheses to explain certain known modalities of behavioral response in disaster. Such tendencies as the administrator's fear of panic, the *belle indifférence* of the pre-disaster warnee, the disaster syndrome, the competitiveness of the rescue worker, and the sense of guilt of some survivors are briefly defined and described. They are illustrated by anecdotes and quotations taken from interview and observational material (largely the collections made by the National Opinion Research Center and the Committee on Disaster Studies of the National Research Council), and they are sub-

jected to a psychological analysis. This psychological analysis is based on a main hypothesis: that disaster is a symbolic realization of the individual's destructive fantasies, and that, therefore, the response to various phases or aspects of disaster represents in large part either the employment of suitable defenses against awareness of these fantasies or the consequences of tension reduction following their full (conscious or unconscious) satisfaction.

Disaster: A Psychological Essay makes a useful handbook of the descriptive behavioral pathology of disaster. It presents no statistical data, no testing of hypotheses, little consideration of the situational determinants of response, and little analysis of realistic problem-solving. It is unfortunate that with so much data available, so little effort was made to qualify psychological interpretations either with organized data or by reference to the findings of other disciplines (for example, the physiology of stress and the psychology of perception).

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JAMES H. S. BOSSARD and ELEANOR STOKER BOLL. *One Marriage, Two Faiths: Guidance on Interfaith Marriage*. Pp. vii, 180. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1957. \$3.50.

This is another in the interesting and significant Bossard-Boll contributions to a realistic appraisal and understanding of American marriage and family customs. After a brief account of some of the main developments in American life, which they feel account for the increasingly large proportion of interfaith marriages, the authors present six case histories. Each of these illustrates an outstanding feature or problem that has repeated itself again and again in the many case histories they have been collecting for a quarter of a century.

The authors show that prevailing ideas and patterns of marriage in American society affect interfaith marriages in many of the same ways that they do all marriages. This means that they, too, are measured according to group standards and are about

as likely to succeed or fail as other marriages. However, in addition to being measured by group standards, they are subjected to certain potential strains not automatically present in intrafaith unions.

Specifically, the interest of the church (even differing denominations of the Protestant faith) in marriage, and particularly its opposition to religious exogamy, is an especially powerful strain on interfaith marriages. Most faiths regard marriage and family behavior as their special domain, and, consequently, disapprove of out-marriage which they think threatens family stability. Because religious faith is regarded as sufficiently important to pervade and affect in many ways practically every facet of thinking and living, interfaith marriages, then, start out with the possibility that they may have somewhat less chance of success than intrafaith unions.

The authors use the six cases to illustrate several specific ways in which dissimilar religious affiliations contribute to tensions within the family. Among these are attitudes toward sex, birth control, choice of personal friends, food habits, and training of children. The six cases demonstrate that ideational disparities on these and other matters occur among families of differing faiths as well as among those affiliated with dissimilar denominations within the Protestant faith. Although the items vary considerably in importance, they are among the many essential components of daily family life and when differences—attitudinal or behavioral—appear in connection with them, the stability and serenity of family life are likely to be threatened. The authors discuss the "cycles" through which family life ordinarily passes and conclude that "each stage in the cycle is characterized by its own specific problems for the parents and children in a mixed family."

Despite the "cultural expectation" that interfaith marriages may not succeed, several studies indicate that many such unions do occur. On the basis of these studies, Bossard and Boll feel that it is "safe to conclude that about one-half of the church members who marry find their mates outside their respective churches." They are inclined, furthermore, to predict that in all likelihood this trend will increase. This

reviewer finds that in New Haven in 1955 interfaith marriages increased since 1950 only among the Protestants as contrasted with an increase of intrafaith unions among Catholics and Jews. This is not to say, however, that there has not been a steady decrease of religious endogamy among Catholics as well as Protestants in New Haven since 1870.

Bossard and Boll although cognizant of the problems accompanying interfaith marriages feel that they are not insoluble. Again, using the six cases, they show solutions which have worked, and they conclude that mixed marriages, characterized by problems peculiar to them, can succeed if potential strains are recognized and worked at: "Family happiness is an achievement. It results from effort, intelligent and co-operative effort." While this may be particularly necessary in mixed marriages, this reviewer is of the opinion that success might also be attained in larger proportions of all marriages if they, too, were worked at.

Finally, this reviewer, as one who does research in the field of marriage and as teacher of the subject, is impelled to express her gratitude to this team of writers for their continued research in marriage and family behavior through the use of real life histories which they subject to careful scientific scrutiny. She hopes that they will publish many more such analyses of marriage and family behavior in American culture.

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NEGLEY K. TEETERS and JOHN D. SHEARER. *The Prison at Philadelphia Cherry Hill: The Separate System of Penal Discipline: 1829-1913*. Pp. xvi, 249. New York: Columbia University Press for Temple University Publications, 1957. \$5.50.

In this volume, Professor Teeters, in collaboration with John D. Shearer, Director of the Eastern Pennsylvania Diagnostic and Classification Center at Philadelphia, continues his explorations of Pennsylvania prison history. In these endeavors he has already become a recognized authority, having previously given us *They Were in*

Prison, a history of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, and *The Cradle of the Penitentiary*, an account of the once famous Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia. To these earlier studies, the present volume is a welcome and worthy sequel.

On October 25, 1829, the first prisoner was placed in the newly constructed Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia. Known throughout the world as the "Prison at Philadelphia," this penitentiary has always been locally referred to as Cherry Hill because its site had once been a cherry orchard.

As the authors explain, "When this prison was built it was not merely a prison; rather it epitomized one of the most unique philosophies of penal treatment ever conceived by man. Its founders created this prison on the principle of separate, or solitary, confinement, by which each prisoner could be separated from all others. This was accomplished by providing an individual cell for each inmate in which he worked, slept, and ate alone. His only contacts were his keepers, the chaplain, and a few interested citizens from the city of Philadelphia, who, by law, were permitted to visit him."

In bringing us this exciting chapter in the history of penology, the authors have gone to the archives of the prison and effectively employed previously unused sources. The result is more than a mere account of architectural changes or a bare survey of the development of statutory and administrative regulations. Instead we are introduced to a colorful variety of persons who come to life and play out their roles at different levels in this famous experiment of a revolutionary new prison system. Among them are Dr. Benjamin Rush, "with his bold conception of a new approach to the treatment of prisoners," John Haviland, the English-born architect of the prison, wardens, chaplains, medical officers, inspectors, including the "powerful figure of Richard Vaux," distinguished visitors, including the Reverend Louis Dwight, "forceful champion of the New England-Puritan case for congregate work against the Quaker concept of reflection in solitude," Charles Dickens, who visited the prison and presented a bleak picture of it in his *American Notes*, and a mixed pro-

cession of prisoners, some of whom were "noteworthy for their bold attempts to escape from the impregnable fortress."

Although advanced in the spirit of humanitarianism by honest, courageous, and sincere men, who were violently opposed to the "schools of debauchery" that were prevalent in the local jails of the day, the Pennsylvania philosophy of penal discipline was almost sterile in its reformatory influences. It failed to recognize the fact, now made clear by the development of social psychology, that the human spirit, "however depraved, must communicate if it is to thrive in a healthy fashion."

The Pennsylvania System failed to win much support in the United States, but it was adopted, in principle, by virtually every country in Europe and in most of South America. Even Pennsylvania was forced to abandon it officially in 1913, when it became obvious to all that it had failed.

In their penetrating analysis of the rise and fall of the Pennsylvania System, the authors have presented us with a book which can be read with profit and enjoyment by the historian and the penologist, as well as by the layman who is interested in the development of American penology.

ROBERT G. CALDWELL

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L. RADZINOWICZ (Ed.). *Sexual Offences: A Report of the Cambridge Department of Criminal Science*. (English Studies in Criminal Science. Vol. IX.) Pp. xxvii, 553. London: Macmillan and Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957. \$15.00.

This is a remarkably objective book on a subject that is normally overburdened with subjective biases. Under the direction of Dr. Radzinowicz, the Department of Criminal Science of the University of Cambridge studied about one fourth of all the sex offenses known to the police in England and Wales in 1947; and, with a minimum of opinionatedness, the department presents its findings in *Sexual Offences*.

A mass of material, including scores of tables and many brief case histories, is delineated. Data are given on detected and undetected offenders, the characteristics of

convicted offenders and their victims, recidivism, the effects of punishment, the after-conduct of offenders, and the state of the sex law in England and Wales. Pertinent appendices on sex offenses and laws in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the United States are also included.

After painstakingly presenting the pros and cons of English sex legislation, the department finally makes some recommendations of its own. These, too, although they tend to be enlightened and liberal, are made with amazing dispassion.

The findings of the Cambridge criminologists are surprisingly in line with many of those revealed by several American studies which were done on rather different kinds of samples. Thus, the English investigators reveal that out of the nearly 3,000 cases in their sample which were known to the police, a large percentage consisted of minor or nonindictable cases; and 10 to 15 per cent of accused minor and major offenders were acquitted. A great many of the offenders actually had sex relations with willing or semiwilling partners; few used actual force or duress; many were disturbed individuals who seduced minors or mentally deficient victims because of their feelings of inadequacy and inability to have more adult relationships; more than a third of the heterosexual offenders were married; the great majority of the sex criminals were not highly educated; a good minority tended to be of subnormal intelligence; 40 per cent were under thirty years of age; and only 17 per cent were sexual recidivists.

One of the most gratifying aspects of this report on English sex offenses is that the authors fully recognize that sex offenders are not essentially different from nonsex offenders in their degree of emotional disturbance; and that, in fact, the two groups significantly overlap, since many nonsex offenders sooner or later commit sexual crimes as well. They therefore recognize that effective treatment of sex offenders involves planning for similar handling of general offenders.

All told, Dr. Radzinowicz and his associates have carefully done and clearly presented a major research project on sex offenses that should make all serious students of this area duly grateful to them for many

years to come. Their report is indispensable reading for all who are professionally interested in sex crime.

ALBERT ELLIS

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LOUIS WINNICK with the assistance of NED SHILLING. *American Housing and Its Uses: The Demand for Shelter Space*. (Census Monograph Series.) Pp. xiv, 143. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman and Hall, 1957. \$5.50.

Sponsored by the Social Science Research Council in co-operation with the Bureau of the Census, this information-packed study is one of the series of census monographs providing a detailed analysis of the most significant findings of the 1950 Census. The rich framework of other relevant knowledge and the author's imagination in pointing up the implications of the technical data for planning, policy-making, and further research make this small book stimulating reading. It is also an important, concise, and well-organized source of much basic housing information.

Measuring the utilization of housing, Dr. Winnick—long connected with Columbia University's Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies and now an economic consultant for the Office of the Mayor, New York City—uses the novel approach of the person-per-room ratio (PPR) instead of the traditional dwelling unit as the primary physical measure of the United States housing inventory. The statistical problems of this approach are fully discussed in the Appendix. In four chapters the author analyzes the 1950 distribution of housing space in relation to such distinctive, although often interdependent, factors as income, household size, value and rent, location and race. This is followed by a chapter on space trends. A final chapter is devoted to a comprehensive discussion of the changing household, with special emphasis on the growth and characteristics of the one-person household, "an almost revolutionary change in American utilization patterns."

It seems meaningless to summarize the numerous suggestive findings of this study, highly recommended for wide and careful

reading. City planners, housers, public health and community workers, and legislators will find it an essential tool for action.

HERTHA KRAUS

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Bryn Mawr College

BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE. *A History of Chicago*, Vol. III: *The Rise of a Modern City, 1871-1893*. Pp. xii, 575, xxxvi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$8.50.

When, nearly thirty years ago, Bessie Louise Pierce of the University of Chicago faculty began writing her monumental four-volume *A History of Chicago*, it is doubtful if she thought that her project would be anything more than an up-to-date and accurate historical narrative of what has often been called the "most American of American cities."

But now that her third volume has just been published, we have further evidence that her work is of much wider significance than that of merely being the story of a single American city. What she has actually done is to provide us with a model urban history; a type of book whose technique, whose approach to its subject, could be applied with equal success to any big city in the land, including New York.

In this respect Professor Pierce is as much a pathfinder as any of the Chicago pioneers she describes in her volumes. But unlike some of the more outstanding of these pioneers, she will not have to be remembered in future years by a statue in a public park. Her monument is already in existence—the sound, basic masterwork in history she has been laboring on for more than a quarter of a century.

A trained historian and now Professor Emeritus of American History at the University of Chicago, Miss Pierce is small, white-haired, energetic, and as patient as Job. She is that rare type of individual who, professional historian though she is, can still write like a professional author. Her style is simple, easy-flowing, human, colorful and shows that she has thoroughly digested her historical facts before committing them to paper.

In the third volume of her *A History of*

Chicago (which is uniform in size and format with the two preceding volumes), Professor Pierce deals with the two decades that skyrocketed Chicago into its position as America's second largest city. It began with a terrible disaster, the Great Fire of 1871, and it ended with a magnificent burst of glory, the World's Columbian Exposition of 1893.

It was also the period, as Miss Pierce explains, that witnessed the rise of such Chicago giants of American industry and commerce as Philip D. Armour, Gustavus F. Swift, George M. Pullman, Marshall Field, Cyrus H. McCormick, Potter Palmer, and others. Now in her sixty-ninth year, Professor Pierce is laboring as patiently as ever on the fourth and final volume of her *A History of Chicago*, a work that will bring the story of the great Midwest metropolis up to the middle of the twentieth century.

JOHN DRURY

Chesterton, Ind.

HUGH D. PRICE. *The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History*. Pp. xviii, 133. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

RUBY F. JOHNSTON. *The Religion of Negro Protestants: Changing Religious Attitudes and Practices*. Pp. xxvi, 224. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$3.00.

Florida and Louisiana are the only two Southern states which publish registration figures separately by race, and Florida is the only state which indicates party affiliation by race. A higher percentage of Negroes register and vote in Florida than in any other Southern state. In 1944, when *Smith v. Allwright* outlawed the Democratic white primary in Texas, some 20,000 Negroes, all Republicans, were registered to vote in Florida. In 1956, only 9,098 Negroes were registered as Republicans and 128,437 as Democrats, or 37.5 per cent of the registered adult Negro population. The phenomenal increase in the number of Negro Democrats was due largely to campaigns such as Senator Pepper's in 1950, in which Negroes had a direct interest, to President Truman's civil rights pronouncements, and to the reactionism of Dixiecrats.

But no Negro in Florida has as yet won election to a city-wide or county-wide office since the end of the white primary.

While there is some correlation between the percentage of Negroes in a community and opposition to Negro registration, other factors influence the percentage of Negro voters. "Within the area still dominated by the Old South way of life," the author observes (p. 41), "opposition to Negro rights apparently sinks to a very low level, but under different cultural conditions of peninsular Florida Negroes generally register and vote freely, even where they make up over forty per cent of the total population."

Contrary to the pattern in most Southern states, Negro political activity in Florida has not been limited to the larger cities. Thus, although nonmetropolitan counties account for all those instances in which fewer than 10 per cent of adult Negroes are registered, they also account for all the areas in which over 50 per cent are registered. The very low levels of registration in some counties are probably the result of apathy, low educational status, and lack of political leadership among Negroes, rather than white opposition.

For the immediate future, at least, Negro voters in Florida will have to continue operating under the complications of the one-party system in all state and most local elections. While the Supreme Court decisions on desegregation in public schools are strengthening, in most parts of the South, opposition to Negro registration and voting especially in the rural areas, "the long-run trends in the South are working strongly in favor of the Negro in his struggle for first-class citizenship" (p. 110). A real two-party system, not only in national elections, but also in state and local elections, may eventually permit the Negro voter in Southern states to exercise the balance of power as he does in some Northern states.

The Religion of Negro Protestants, particularly in South Carolina and in Boston, is an analysis of their beliefs and actions. The author studied three types of churches: the restrained, semirestrained and emotional. All these types were found in a single denomination, the Baptist or Methodist, for example. Education and economic status largely determined the degree

of emotionalism. Enlightened Negro pastors exercised only a limited influence over congregations of low economic status. Partly because of the emotional form of worship, some Negro Protestants became Catholics or Episcopalians. Others, however, joined cultist movements because they provided emotional expression in an exaggerated manner. The principle of retribution has more value for rural and elderly groups than for urban and youthful. The increasing scope of church functions in terms of community activities attests the emphasis upon values of this world. It will be interesting to compare the author's conclusions based upon the statistics for religious bodies for 1936 after the statistics for 1956 will be available.

RAYFORD W. LOGAN

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W. S. SHEPPERSON. *British Emigration to North America: Projects and Opinions in the Early Victorian Period*. Pp. xvi, 302. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Books on immigration only incidentally touch the significant phenomena of departure from the homelands. This book, however, deals primarily with British emigration in the early Victorian era.

Industrial unemployment, agrarian depression, political inequality, and religious dissatisfaction aroused discontent. Colonization journals, travel accounts, and emigrant letters fanned the flame.

After 1837, many farmers and farm laborers emigrated. City workers joined the procession, for to them a passage to America was a ticket to prosperity. Not only were agriculturists and laborers interested in emigration, but humanitarians and religious groups as well. These sent neglected children and youth to the colonies. One organization aided no one unless he had a criminal record, was single, and generally undesirable. Many urged and assisted women to emigrate to female-deficient America.

Many wished the departees well. But benevolent intent was not always uppermost; there was a tinge of selfishness in many philanthropic ventures. While there

was a desire to help needy children, the policy was that of "shovelling misery out of sight," rather than trying to eliminate destitution. Many encouraged the exodus for their own benefit. Unemployed laborers, ex-criminals, and poor children were ineffective customers in the market place. In addition, paupers were on public doles. Prosperous New World settlers, however, with their increased buying power would infuse new life into the whole British economy. As the volume of emigration increased, commercial houses, shipping companies, outfitters, insurance agents, and private promoters capitalized on the movement because it brought profits to them.

Not all, however, encouraged the movement. Landlords and employers were in opposition as they viewed the dwindling supply of cheap labor. Certain political malcontents considered encouragement merely a matter of throwing a bone to the proletariat to keep it from growling. Some radical groups, however, proposed constructive measures; they aimed at correcting basic evils by readjusting conditions to men, rather than sending out workers and adjusting the remainder to outmoded institutions.

For a long time, the government, dominated largely by a laissez-faire policy, paid little attention to the movement. The outward flow was unrestricted and virtually undirected. Freedom and not direction was the policy. Britain did not object but rather appeared content to have her subjects leave. At the same time, America did not protest. Rather it encouraged them to come.

This book makes a valuable contribution for, by presenting the picture of the homeland situation, we are better able to understand immigrant behavior and adjustment in our country.

WILLIAM C. SMITH

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Dana College

HAROLD STERLING GLADWIN. *A History of the Ancient Southwest*. Pp. xx, 383. Portland, Me.: Bond Wheelwright Company, 1957. \$8.50.

This is a general book on the development of the native culture of the Indians of the Southwestern United States. There

have been several others, but none more readable. In a book intended for the interested layman, this is of primary importance.

Mr. Gladwin, one of the most distinguished and productive amateurs of American archaeology, has assembled a vast amount of data. This is presented in a way that anyone who wants to learn a great deal about the rather complex history of the Pueblo Indians can easily understand. The chapters progress in clear chronological and geographical order, the maps are good, and the illustrations admirably supplement the text.

Readers familiar with Mr. Gladwin's *Men Out of Asia* know that he is a bold and original thinker, unafraid of the unorthodox. He has also been considered by some of his colleagues as overly inclined to invoke diffusion in the interpretation of the data of prehistory. Both of these tendencies are less apparent in this book than in *Men Out of Asia*, but they are not altogether lacking. For example, in considering the Basket Maker-Pueblo transition, from about 200 A.D. to about 700 A.D., Mr. Gladwin sees a clear case of immigration and attendant cultural diffusion. In this process, the people he calls Farmers move into the northern Southwest from the Plains with many new ideas and at least some traits of Asiatic origin.

In dealing with later history, he argues strongly against the orthodox view of the importance of drought as a factor in the abandonment of large areas and the grouping of populations in large, defensible towns. These facts are directly and exclusively attributed to the warlike incursions of the Navaho and Apache. In no case, however, can the reader fail to realize that differing points of view have been advanced.

Specialists in Southwestern archaeology will debate these and other facets of Mr. Gladwin's interpretations in professional journals. For the beginner, the well-versed amateur and the nonspecialist in the Southwest, this book should prove both enlightening and entertaining.

ALFRED KIDDER II

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University of Pennsylvania

HERBERT JOSEPH SPINDEN. *Maya Art and Civilization*. Pp. xliii, 432. Rev. ed. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$10.00.

This book reproduces two out-of-print works by Spinden. Part I is a photo-offset reissue of *A Study of Maya Art*, first published in 1913 as a Memoir of the Peabody Museum of Harvard University. Part II generally follows the text of the third edition of the original, which was published in 1928. A twenty-six page Epilogue entitled "Maya dynamic dating and the fallacy of time" contains the only new material. The original plates are included, with a few additions.

Part I suffers least from lack of recent revision. In this analysis, Spinden established certain stylistic changes in the Maya sculpture that have been largely confirmed and amplified by more recent work, especially by Proskouriakoff. He deals extensively with the human form and the serpent, and more briefly with the jaguar, birds and feathers, miscellaneous animals, bones and death, grotesque figures, the maize god, other divinities and astronomical signs. Figures illustrate these motifs at various Maya sites. There is a lengthy discussion of the "material arts," concentrating on architecture and with minor attention to ceramics, precious stones, metal working, basketry, textiles, tattooing, minor carvings, and illuminated manuscripts. Part I concludes with a presentation of the chronological sequence of Maya art development and influences traceable to adjacent areas.

In Part II, the tremendous advances made in New World archeology since 1928 often render even general statements superficial or inaccurate. The short summary of the Archaic Horizon is mainly of historical interest as representing the status of knowledge in 1928. The chapter on Maya civilization concentrates on art and religion, subjects that dominated the Maya field three decades ago. The chapters on the "Middle Civilizations" and the "Aztecs" are obsolete in the face of the tremendous increase in knowledge of the archeology of Mexico and Central America in recent years.

The Epilogue to Part II contains a detailed analysis of astronomical observations implicit in the development of the Maya

calendar. These indicate a long-term technical interest in astronomy on the part of the Maya which resulted in a degree of calendrical accuracy far in excess of that achieved in the contemporary Old World. Throughout this section runs a philosophical theme: that Maya achievements result from their avoidance of the Roman "fallacy of time," which "denies dynamics, the characteristic of life itself, and enthrones statics, where there is no life" (p. 379). Although the European and the Maya way of conceiving time may be validly contrasted, it requires more convincing argument than Spinden produces to accept the suggestion that the fall of Rome can be traced to the "Roman fallacy of time" (p. 379).

Reproduction of text and figures is excellent; the plates are slightly less clear than the originals but quite satisfactory. It is unfortunate that the up-to-date methods of reproduction are not correlated with an up-to-date text on a subject of great popular interest.

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REUBEN LEVY. *The Social Structure of Islam*. Pp. vii, 536. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$9.50.

All who work in the field of Islamics or Middle Eastern Studies will welcome the new edition of this basic reference work, long out of print and difficult to obtain. The first edition entitled *An Introduction to the Sociology of Islam* was issued in two volumes; the first appeared in 1931 and the second in 1933. The present edition, though in one volume, is substantially unchanged. One chapter, the first in the second volume of the first edition, entitled "The Religious Conceptions of Islam," has been omitted. Aside from editorial revisions and the addition of paragraphs here and there which bring statements about contemporary conditions up to date, there are no other serious changes. The order of the chapters has been somewhat altered, and they may be listed for the benefit of those unfamiliar with the work. After an Introduction sketching the historical expansion of Islam, there are chapters en-

titled "The Grades of Society in Islam," "The Status of Women in Islam," "The Status of the Child in Islam," "Islamic Jurisprudence," "Moral Sentiments in Islam," "Usage, Custom and Secular Law under Islam," "The Caliphate and the Central Government," "Government in the Provinces of the Caliphate and in the Succession States," "Military Organization in Islam," and "Islamic Cosmology and Other Sciences." In each chapter the subject is treated historically with some attention to regional variation in practice. Where relevant the provisions of the Shari'a, or Islamic Law, are sketched in. The work draws from a wide selection of primary sources and utilizes modern secondary work as well.

The author is a distinguished Orientalist but no sociologist; the strengths and weaknesses of the book are largely due to this fact. The reader who, on the basis of the title, expects a structural analysis of Muslim society will be disappointed. Not only does the author fail to make use of explicit sociological concepts, but on the whole he lacks that "feel" for structural analysis which some nontheoretical scholars possess in high degree. Nevertheless, the usefulness of the book is considerable, especially for social scientists who lack just the historical depth and familiarity with documentary sources which are the book's strong points. For such readers the book can serve as an introduction to many problems which only competent scholarship combined with sophisticated sociological analysis can begin to solve.

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ECONOMICS AND LABOR

PETER F. DRUCKER. *America's Next Twenty Years*. Pp. 114. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$2.75.

This is an exciting book about economic factors which will affect America during the next twenty years. Of the six chapters that comprise this slender volume, the first two are on "The Coming Labor Short-

age" and "The Promise of Automation." Drucker shows that the total population will grow very rapidly, whereas the working population will grow very slowly, if at all. Hence the basic problem will not be unemployment but inflation, which can be much more serious in its consequences.

Automation, Drucker thinks, will not cause large-scale labor displacement except in routine office work. Otherwise, it will involve only a considerable shift of men to new jobs for which better education will be required. This will lead to an upgrading of workers.

The antidote to inflation is increased productivity. This in turn necessitates vast new ventures with capital. Hence the importance of "The New Tycoons" (Chapter III), the managers of pension funds, investment trusts, and banks and life insurance companies which are the depositories of a large share of the savings of the people. Drucker argues that more of these savings need to be invested in sound common stocks in order to facilitate equity financing and industrial growth.

In Chapter IV, "Will the Colleges Blow Their Tops?", Drucker asks how the institutions of higher learning expect to finance their programs with enrollments trebled or quadrupled when they have trouble financing them now. He proposes a number of solutions, including federal aid, but he warns that "government finance has meant government control in every other country." This statement will come as a surprise to Oxford and Cambridge. These universities receive subsidies from Parliament yet pride themselves on their tradition of political independence and academic freedom.

As our economy grows, it will depend more and more on certain foreign countries for essential raw materials, hence the significance of Chapter V, "America Becomes a 'Have-Not' Nation." To help solve the problem, Drucker advocates a new international economic policy looking toward the rapid development of the raw material-producing countries.

The change from a nation with a surplus of raw materials to one with a deficit will affect American foreign policy and become one of the "Coming Issues in American Politics" (Chapter VI). Other issues which

Drucker thinks will be central relate to water, nuclear power, housing, schools and teachers, inflation, medical care for everyone, and demand for racial equality.

The style of writing is succinct and compact. Drucker has a knack for saying much in few words, and he is never dull. The reviewer, a sociologist, was much interested in Drucker's economic facts and interpretations but noted the absence of discussion of the impact of these basic economic developments on the family, the church, recreation, and other aspects of society.

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UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR EUROPE. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*. Pp. xii, 350. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. \$2.50.

This survey deals with the chief characteristics of economic development in both western and eastern Europe in 1956. There are also chapters which comment upon the current developments and problems in the Soviet Union, as well as upon the long-term plans (1956-60). In the latter instance, officials of the Economic Commission for Europe have made use of statistical handbooks or abstracts giving systematic series for a number of years. The published data in turn have been supplemented by other statistical material made available by the governments of Eastern Europe and by discussions with officials and economists within the countries themselves.

Officials of the Economic Commission for Europe readily admit there are "serious deficiencies" in the coverage and frequency of publication of Eastern European statistics. As evidenced by this survey, the improvement is gradual.

With respect to Western Europe, the basic characteristics of economic development in 1956 were the slowing down of expansion and the speeding up of wage increases. Price rises were substantial in the earliest part of 1956 in most countries of Western Europe. However, such rises generally slowed down or were halted altogether during the latter months. This was largely due to governmental action. The governments concerned had interpreted such

price rises as danger signals necessitating steps to curtail inflationary trends.

The survey points out that in a few countries only—France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium—further growth of output was recorded in 1956 to be coming up against such physical obstacles as the full utilization of capacities and shortages in the supply of basic raw materials. Nevertheless, it is noted that the demand for labor eased in most west European countries during 1956, especially when deflationary policies began to take effect. Such manpower shortages as did occur were limited to special sectors of the respective economies, for example, building and some types of skilled labor.

According to the survey, total imports into Western Europe continued to increase in 1956, although at a rate slower than that of 1955. This obviously reflected the slowing down of industrial expansion in many countries. Such a situation was true of all countries with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Here, imports were below their 1955 level. On the other hand, increases were particularly sharp in France, the Netherlands, and Finland. It was reported that here the pressure of demand on resources continued to be intense.

Western Europe's export situation was characterized by an increase of 7 per cent from the first nine months of 1955 to the same period of 1956. The increase in exports to the United States was particularly marked. With the glaring exception of France, all major exporting countries shared in the rise of exports.

It is the opinion of the Economic Commission for Europe that the future trend of overseas exports of Western Europe is largely dependent upon the development of import demand in North America and the production of raw materials in the overseas territories of key Western European nations. It is also revealed that the prospects for exports to the primary producing countries overseas appear "moderately" favorable as far as the overseas countries exporting mainly mineral products are concerned. Foreign exchange reserves have slightly increased in those countries, and the purchasing power of their exports continues at a high level.

There is much discussion of the agreement among Western European nations upon plans for freer trade in the form of a common market. (The agreement has been signed since the publication of the survey.) However, the contention is made, by a priori reasoning, that even with the formation of a common market, Western Europe will not be a single market in the same sense as is the United States. Among other differences, labor and capital are likely to be less mobile in Western Europe, even if formal restrictions on movement between countries is eventually abolished. Also, national variations in traditions and taste are likely to delay the development of a true mass market in some sectors of production.

On the optimistic side, the survey concludes that in spite of the tension in the Middle East and its resultant debilitating effect upon key Western European national economies, investment in oil storage capacity, tanker tonnage, and atomic energy development may be encouraged during 1957. In other fields, the problems of price stabilization may be somewhat accentuated for most countries.

There are twenty-nine tables of supplementary statistics compiled from primary governmental sources. These illustrate the exhaustive research on the part of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, now in its tenth year.

SAMUEL P. PERRY, JR.

The Boston Chronicle

G. D. H. COLE. *The Post-War Condition of Britain*. Pp. xxiv, 483. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.75.

In 1937 Professor and Mrs. Cole published *The Condition of Britain*. In this new book Professor Cole compares the current economic and social trends with those of the depression decade. He has compiled more than two hundred tables of official statistics, mainly for the years 1945-54. These bear upon national income, production, employment, consumption, health, housing, and many other related aspects of society. Because of the wide array of vital information, simply and conveniently arranged, this compendium should be an invaluable work of reference for social scientists.

Since World War II, Great Britain, like other major countries of Europe, has experienced a sharp rise in population. In June 1954, the population of the United Kingdom (England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) was a little more than 51 millions, an increase of 3 millions over June 1939. Both an increasing birth rate and a decreasing death rate have arrested the long run decline in population. The pessimists of the 1930's were estimating a decrease in British population from 40 millions to 36 millions by 1965. Needless to say, the recent increases have made the forecasters more cautious.

The larger population has supplied Britain with a working force of 23.8 millions, more than one third of whom are women. Moreover, the larger labor force is more fully employed than it had been before the war. In 1938 there were 1.75 millions unemployed in a labor force of 20 millions, but in no year since the war has unemployment reached a half million. In June 1955, for example, the number of unfilled vacancies exceeded the number of workers seeking employment. The achievement of full employment is surely the most significant social change that distinguishes the postwar decade from the prewar era.

A larger working force, more fully employed, has enabled Great Britain to increase its industrial production 50 per cent above the level of 1938. The rate of industrial expansion enables Britain, though lagging behind the United States and Canada, to keep pace with the postwar recovery of Belgium and France. A similar expansion of agricultural production has come only at the costs of rising prices to the consumer and larger subsidies by the taxpayers.

The most valuable part of this book is Professor Cole's reflections on the social conditions which he has carefully observed over a span of sixty years. "When I was young," he recalls, "both adults and children, dressed in sheer rags, were a common sight . . . Nowadays, on the other hand, it is impossible to tell by looking at a man—or woman—and by hearing them talk to what class they belong" (p. 41). Reluctantly, Professor Cole admits that "even

within the Labour Party and among its electoral supporters, enthusiasm for general nationalization . . . has noticeably waned" (p. 129). Such observations and admissions by the President of the Fabian Society will make the reading of this book a rewarding experience.

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KENNETH K. KURIHARA. *Introduction to Keynesian Dynamics*. Pp. 222. New York: Columbia University, 1956. \$4.50.

In this new volume Professor Kurihara gives us a resumé of some of the leading doctrines of Keynes. He approaches the matter from fresh points of view; his mastery of Keynesian thought is good, and the book may be recommended as a useful alternative approach to this subject for students.

Professor Kurihara also breaks new ground. Indeed, he may be criticized for attempting to bring more within the compass of Keynes's thinking than belongs there. He has, for instance, a useful discussion on the theory of the inflationary gap, when aggregate demand is excessive. In his discussion of hyperinflation he does not appear to lay enough stress on the importance of the vigor with which wage increases, claimed and granted, chase prices upwards. He says (p. 139) that "post war experience is replete with examples of 'out and out inflation.'" Is this so? The period after 1918 would be a better instance. He discusses the relation of "the multiplier" to the equilibrium of the balance of external payments. He discusses the problem of wage flexibility and what has become known as the "Pigou effect."

His final, and in some ways most interesting, section is entitled "Secular Economic Dynamics." He here defines three rates of growth called the "required" rate, the "potential" rate, and the "feasible" rate. The "required" and "potential" rates correspond roughly with your reviewer's concept of "natural" and "warranted" rates of growth. A separate "feasible" rate is deemed to be made necessary by the fact that capital goods are specific in character and that the

power to add to them is also specific. His treatment will probably be deemed insufficient to enable the reader to make a final judgment on the value of the concept of a "feasible" rate or on the validity of certain propositions which he makes about it. Prima facie one would suppose the specificity of capital goods to give rise to a short-period problem, unsuitable for inclusion in a section on secular dynamics, since an excess or short fall of specific capital goods can be adjusted to requirements. It would be more convincing if he related this third concept to the maximum possible rate of growth of know-how, which lies behind the provision of capital goods. If this were done, one would then have to consider whether the factors concerned in the growth of know-how could be subsumed under the "required" rate; the rate of growth of know-how may be regarded, like the rate of growth of general population, as an exogenous determinant of what is possible. Incidentally, Professor Kurihara writes (p. 211) that "the major problem facing all underdeveloped economies alike seems to be that of increasing capital accumulation." Is not this a wrong emphasis—not confined to Professor Kurihara? Surely much more important limitations are the lack of know-how and the lack of a sufficient diffusion of commercial integrity.

I am bound to add, although it seems ungracious to do so when Professor Kurihara gives us so much which is interesting and good, that I am in strong disagreement with a section that occupies a central place in the book, namely Chapter VI. A foretaste of the trouble occurs when he defines dynamics by reference to lags (p. 23). I am sure that the advance in theory will be held up so long as the presence of lags is regarded as a *fundamentum divisionis* between static and dynamic theory. Static theory is not concerned with an absolutely stationary state of affairs but is designed to show how an equilibrium position is affected by adjustment to a once-over change—of taste, technology, and so forth. There may be lags in the adjustment, such as those which give rise to a cobweb. The cobweb theorem belongs to static theory, provided that the central equilibrium position, around

which there is oscillation to-and-fro, is itself stationary. On the other side, there are not *bound* to be significant lags in a moving system. Suppose, for instance, that investment is growing steadily at the rate of 2 per cent per annum. There may, indeed, be a temporal lag between the placing of an order for a particular item of capital equipment, and the final availability of that item. But if orders are growing steadily at 2 per cent per annum and the availabilities are also growing at 2 per cent per annum, no significant lag is present. Lags only become significant (precisely as in static theory) when there is some disturbance to the steady rate of advance.

Accordingly, I hold that this book is not mainly concerned with "dynamics," save for the last section on secular economics already referred to. I hold that Keynes's *General Theory* is not dynamic, as I stated in my original review of it (*Econometrica*, January 1937). Thus "Keynesian Dynamics" is a misnomer.

It may be objected that there is not yet complete agreement about the usage of the word "dynamics," although in recent years an increasing number of authors have been using it in what I regard as the proper sense. But if one cannot unequivocally condemn Professor Kurihara on this count, one can at least do so for an improper use of the "acceleration principle." It is surely a firmly established usage to apply this to the relation to which Professor J. M. Clarke gave prominent stress, between an increase of output and the requirement for investment caused by it. Thus I would say quite flatly that the "accelerator" is wrongly defined (p. 88) as $\Delta I = b\Delta Y$. This should read $I = b\Delta Y$. In his numerical example (Chapter VI) Professor Kurihara considers the consequence of the inception of 10 billion dollars' worth of "autonomous" investment. Using Professor Hicks's concept of a supermultiplier, he supposes this autonomous investment to generate induced investment of 40 billion dollars. Consumption rises by consequence from 45 billion to 95 billion dollars, and total income from 50 billion to 150 billion dollars. He then supposes that investment (autonomous and induced), consumption, and income flatten

out at these high figures. But according to the acceleration principle, if consumption flattened out at this new level, the additional induced investment of 40 billion dollars would disappear, and we should run straight into a deep depression. I believe that this interpretation is in conformity with Professor Hicks's method of analysis, which Professor Kurihara appears superficially to be using. But he is not really doing so. I conclude that the whole of this chapter is fallacious. It is a thousand pities that he did not introduce some of the material from his last section into this part of the analysis.

There is an obscure reference (p. 16) to the "original quantity theory expounded by J. Locke, author of *On Money*, 1752." This is presumably intended to refer to the great philosopher, who is sometimes credited with the first exposition of the quantity theory. He died in 1704.

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CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH. *Regional Income: Studies in Income and Wealth*, Vol. XXI. (A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.) Pp. x, 408. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$8.00.

The ten papers in this volume make important contributions toward the understanding of differences which have determined much of the economic, political, and social history of our country. They were given in June 1955 at a National Bureau of Economic Research Conference held at Duke University. Contributors included the following: Werner Hochwald, Harvey S. Perloff, Walter Isard, Morris B. Ullman and Robert C. Klove, Frank A. Hanna, Abner Hurwitz and Carlyle P. Stallings, Edwin Mansfield, Lorin A. Thompson, John L. Fulmer, and Henry S. Shryock, Jr.

The first four papers define various aspects of the estimation of personal income by region in relation to the data available for making such estimates; three present and explain data from recent investigations

of interregional differentials; and three explain methods of estimating income for local area. All participants recognized the need for defining regions in a meaningful way. This may vary depending on the objective.

Frank A. Hanna's analysis of "Interstate Income Differentials: Theory and Practice" and the comments by Edward F. Denison, Robert M. Williams, and George H. Borts form the central core of the volume for the reader primarily interested in econometric analysis. It is clear that much still remains to be done in evaluating the effect on interstate differences in income, of distribution of employed workers by occupation, of earning levels among occupations, and of other factors. The three discussants differed as to techniques, but they agreed with Professor Hanna in his basic concept of the United States as a unified economy and in the value of his analyses of interstate differentials in income. From the point of view of this reader, it appears that a basic understanding of interregional differences in income will be advanced most by the development of regional input-output tables and measures of output per man-hour by region.

The Hurwitz-Stallings paper on interregional differentials in income performs a valuable service in summarizing with a broad sweep the data available on changes in consumer prices. Over-all estimates of such changes for each of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia are presented for the years 1929 through 1954 on a 1947-49 base. Also presented is an evaluation of each state estimate and a list of the localities for which separate price indexes are available for these years with the name of the agency responsible for each index. The estimates of change show a considerable uniformity in price movements among the states. However, as the authors of the article and the discussants, Nathan Koffsky and Margaret Reid, point out, this may in large part be due to the absence of adequate price data for rural areas. The largest variations show up in the war years when the greatest amount of price data was collected. The summaries highlight the need for increased federal-state co-operation in expanding the number of communities for which price series are obtained which

can be used both for temporal and inter-spatial comparisons.

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JAMES H. STREET. *The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy: Mechanization and Its Consequences*. Pp. xvi, 294. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Professor Street has used "revolution" in the short-time popular sense of "a rapid and widespread change." His "early revolution in cotton" in America was symbolized by the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, and his "new revolution" (which he believes was long delayed) by the recent development of cotton picking machines. Believing further that "to explain the delay is fully as important as to explain the change," he offers the present study "as a contribution to such an explanation."

He graciously acknowledges inspiration, suggestion, and moral support by such professors as C. A. Wiley, C. E. Ayres, and S. Kuznets, and he says, "the study relies for its basic conceptions primarily upon . . . the respective analyses of economic development of" Ayres and Kuznets. He cites the former's *Theory of Economic Progress* (1944) and the latter's early essay on "Retardation of Industrial Growth" in *Journal of Economic and Business History* (August 1929). It seems likely that he knew also Kuznets' *Secular Movements in Production and Prices* . . . (1930) and its reference to Julius Wolf's "Laws of Retardation of Progress," in *Volkswirtschaft der Gegenwart u. Zukunft* (Leipzig, 1912).

Professor Street has, in my opinion, belabored his explanation of backwardness and delay in the South in a way reminiscent of the apologists and calumniators. But I leave the evaluation of that to others and thank him for bringing together and studying intelligently an impressive amount of published material, including statistical sources, on the history, technological innovation, and socioeconomic aspects of the cotton enterprise.

He has given an admirable summary of the speedy readjustment, under stimulus of

good demand and high prices, immediately after the Civil War; the evolution of sharecropping for the Negroes and later for the poor whites; and of the local credit system based on liens and mortgages which hardened under the financial panics and depressions and stultified the cotton producers until about the end of the nineteenth century.

Surprisingly, Professor Street was obliged to take leave of professional historians and break new ground with contemporary studies, hearings, and reports about the turn of the century and World War I. He is perhaps at his best in the explanation mentioned above, that is in Chapter III, "Cotton Farming as a Distress Industry." This deals with the depression of the 1930's. "World War II Shakes Up the Enterprise" and "How Mechanization Took Hold" are also chapters of interest. He concludes with a stimulating review of the social consequences and "A Look to the Future."

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KARL POLANYI, CONRAD M. ARENSBERG, and HARRY W. PEARSON (Eds.). *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economics in History and Theory*. Pp. xviii, 382. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$6.00.

The editors, Karl Polanyi, the institutionalist; Conrad M. Arensberg, the sociologist; and their disciples (Professor H. W. Pearson of Adelphi College and others) devote about 178 pages to descriptive studies in anthropology and ethnology and 187 pages to theorizing about the nature and place of "the economy" and economics.

They favor empiricism and the "empirical economy"; they believe that in material things, at least, scarcity and problems of choice or value are unnecessary. They also believe that the institutional setup should not require us to economize. This suggests the scrapping of formal economics as a distinct discipline and the need to substitute "social planning," as in primitive economies or in advanced planned economies. Russia is mentioned in this connection (p. 256).

They suggest that by getting rid of the market system, and the economic theory based on it, we can eliminate the problems of scarcity and choice of means.

Incidentally, Aristotle is brought in as a witness, without disclosing his emphasis of the importance of *individual* wants as a standard of value and the basis for judging self-sufficiency.

Parsons and Smelser (*Economy and Society*) are criticized for suggesting a synthesis of all social interactions in terms of performance and function, or contribution and reward. The authors hold that the problem is to "institutionalize" economic processes, thus eliminating economics, the latter being caricatured as depending upon "dread of destitution" and desire for profit, without any conscious intervention of human authority (p. 68).

Their history is on the level of "stages" in the integration of land and labor: first by kinship, then by fealty to priest or king, then by exchange. They don't see that exchange occurs in all, the difference being in individual freedom of choice. Most of their "early empire" material concerns slave and caste systems. Here they find the "reciprocity," "redistribution," and status which they favor—an equal sharing in a common pool of resources.

Their position rests on sweeping assumptions of (1) the existence of "adequate" production processes and supplies of goods, *without either scarcity or surplus*, and of (2) institutions and exchange processes that are independent variables.

Back of all lies authority—central planning and control—and government determination of "ends." The authority is required to force the economy into an institutional mold devoid of economic motivation or economic rationality. Apparently, this would build up a "substantive" society to replace "the fading image of individualistic atomism" (p. 374).

The keynote is the receding concern about economy in the modern world which enables a "purposeful use of the past" to help get rid of economics and to institutionalize the economy (pp. xviii, 374). But the conclusion drawn from the part of the book devoted to the description of various strange economies (Mesopotamian, Aztec,

Berber, and so forth) is that it provides only a "slim foundation" for the theories propounded (p. 373).

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WALTON HAMILTON. *The Politics of Industry*. (Five lectures delivered on the William W. Cook Foundation of the University of Michigan.) Pp. ix, 169, vii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$3.50.

Walton Hamilton possesses one of those rare minds able to penetrate a maze of facts to discern the significant. In this brilliant study, written with good humor and wit, will be found an incisive and revealing analysis of our present-day national and international economy. It is reminiscent of such commentaries upon our institutions as those of Veblen, Laski, Beard, Arnold, and Berle, but it seems even more comprehensive in its reach than any of these.

"Politics of industry" is a broad term meaning the practices and policies by which men are controlled and by which they in turn control economic activities for profit. In this process economic institutions are created which in time come to rival and even surpass the state in their influence upon the destiny of man.

In the old order, men saw the market as the dominant agency of public control. When the economy consisted of petty trade, buyers and sellers, who were intent upon their own advantage, were relied upon to supply whatever regulation was considered necessary. In such days the great myth called "free enterprise" was born. The state and the economy were seen as separate institutions with the latter as the more important regulator of economic well-being. With the expansion of modern industry there comes a counterrevolution; the theory of a self-regulating economy is modified, and government is viewed as a necessary regulating force. Then ensues an era of regulation notable for its reliance upon a system of free competition. This in large part fails. It is noted that the intrusion of public authority into business is more often than not for the benefit of business enterprise. So come such devices as tariffs, patent and copyright protection, services in

aid of business, special subsidies, and, especially in preparation for war, such aids as government construction of plants, tax benefits of write-offs, amortization and depletion, grants for research, and an endless deluge of government contracts. Business becomes bigger and bigger, and the terms "free" and "private" applied to enterprise retain little significance. On the international level, the business economy with its corporate ramifications and system of cartels bestrides political boundaries and reduces national governments to minor roles. So is revealed the dominating force of business enterprise in Western society. It is upon this theme that Hamilton, in his inimitable style, weaves his sparkling commentary.

What is the ultimate solution of the problem? This he does not tell us, but he rejects any notion that it is a matter of choice between such vague systems as capitalism or communism. "Our economy is already too rich, too dramatic, too varied, too heterogeneous to present so simple a question. For better or for worse we are committed to the great economy. In the course of its development the industrial system will, as in the past, undergo a series of mutations. In some form or other the rivalry of men will continue to be employed as an instrument of the general welfare."

This is truly a very stimulating book.

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ADOLF STURMTHAL (Ed.). *Contemporary Collective Bargaining in Seven Countries*. (Cornell International, Industrial, and Labor Relations Report, No. 4.) Pp. ix, 382. Ithaca, N. Y.: Institute of International, Industrial, and Labor Relations of Cornell University, 1957. \$4.50.

This is a collection of nine essays dealing with collective bargaining and its effects in recent years in six western European countries and the United States. There are two essays on Italy, and the editor has contributed an essay on collective bargaining in France and a comparative analysis of collective bargaining methods and results in the post-World War II period.

Five of the nine essays were published

elsewhere, around 1950. These essays have been somewhat revised and brought up to date. The others are original contributions. The authors include three from America, two from Great Britain, two from Italy, and one from the Netherlands. Seven are professors, including Clark Kerr, the Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley. The other two contributors are foreign government officials. Nearly all of the authors have had practical experience in the adjustment of labor disputes. The entire book is oriented toward an American audience, but all authors have firsthand knowledge of conditions in the countries they deal with. The editor is a European by birth and education. For some years he has been connected with several American universities, including the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations of Cornell University, which sponsored the study, and Roosevelt University, with which he is now connected.

Each essay deals with a separate country, presents briefly the historical background, and then gives an extended description of the existing union and employer organization and legislation governing collective bargaining and wage determination. It also sets forth in detail the prevailing bargaining methods and practices and discusses the major current issues and problems in collective bargaining. Each essay also summarizes the available data on the extent and success of collective bargaining. In the final essay, the editor draws general conclusions based upon the preceding accounts and other data on the experience of free countries with collective bargaining.

The several "national" essays are mainly descriptive, but all draw some conclusions having bearing on the economic values and shortcomings of collective bargaining. But it is principally in the essays of Professor Neil W. Chamberlain of Columbia University on "Collective Bargaining in the United States" and in the editor's final chapter that there is extended discussion of the implications for economic theory and social progress.

This is the first compilation in nearly twenty years on trade unionism and collective bargaining in substantially all major countries of the free world. It will serve

excellently as a textbook for the growing number of university courses in foreign labor movements, and it is of value to all students of industrial relations and world developments.

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PAUL F. BRISSENDEN. *The I. W. W.: A Study of American Syndicalism*. Pp. xxii, 438. 2nd ed. New York: Russell and Russell, 1957. \$7.50.

This is a reissue of a classic study of an important episode in American labor history. Professor Brissenden's master's thesis, *The Launching of the Industrial Workers of the World*, was published by the University of California Press in 1913. His doctoral dissertation, *The I.W.W., A Study of American Syndicalism*, was first issued by Longmans, Green & Co. for Columbia University in 1919. A second edition, published in 1920, noted certain organizational developments in the union to the middle of 1919 in a new Preface. It also corrected one paragraph pertaining to Daniel DeLeon's theory of industrial unionism.

The 1957 version adds only a new Preface. Penned by the author in November 1956, it lists six important books bearing on the wobblies which have appeared between 1929 and 1955, and it gives some sketchy information on what survives of the I.W.W. fifty years after its formation in 1905. No evident changes have been made in the text from that of the 1920 edition.

The stature of Professor Brissenden's classic history of the I.W.W. is well delineated by J. S. Gambs in *The Decline of the I.W.W.*, published by Columbia University in 1932. This book brings the history of this union from the termination of Brissenden's text in mid-1917 to 1931. Dr. Gambs wrote: "Paul F. Brissenden's book on the I.W.W. . . . is the authoritative source to which all students turn. Since its publication nothing so comprehensive has appeared; nor has any work on the I.W.W. shown the same intimate knowledge of I.W.W. publications and history, or the same degree of personal acquaintanceship with leaders and members of the organiza-

tion. It is a work which has received universal commendation, even from the wobblies themselves, who are always suspicious of the academic robe. . . ."

This reviewer regrets that no further changes or corrections were made in the original edition for this reissue. For it would have corrected such an error as that confusing Frank J. Hayes, an international vice-president of the United Mine Workers, with Max Hayes. The latter was for many years the editor of the *Cleveland Citizen*, and as a delegate from the Typographical Union to American Federation of Labor conventions, he was a Socialist spokesman and leader of the criticism of Samuel Gompers. Max Hayes's attacks on the I.W.W. had been itemized several times in earlier pages of this history; it was Frank J. Hayes who was involved (p. 323 of the 1919 edition and p. 325 of the 1920 and 1957 editions of this work) in relating I.W.W. relations with the Mine Workers.

After forty years, some of the terminology used by Professor Brissenden seems strange to the reader today. For instance, the word "industrialist" has one major connotation now; when the I.W.W. was formed, apparently, it meant one who advocated the formation of industrial unions, a meaning which has since vanished.

If fault may be found with such a classic history, it might well be that Brissenden's methodology held him too closely to I.W.W. conventions. The stuff of union history is in large part what happens between conventions. It is not just what was reported by the officers to these annual conclaves, nor what the several delegates said and was reported in the journal, nor an account of what they voted for and against. Such a dramatic episode, for instance, as the evacuation of the little children from Lawrence in the great I.W.W. strike there is not even mentioned.

That the story should remain ended in mid-1917, as Brissenden concluded his original text, is regrettable. When he wrote, he was able to believe that the I.W.W. was still moving "onward and upward," with its best days still ahead. The World War I years, criminal syndicalism statutes, the Espionage Act, several crucial court trials, the flight of "Big Bill" Haywood to Russia while he was

"out on bail," and related developments in the years 1917-23 are not to be found in this book. These events were to prove most crucial for this organization.

Today's student of labor, however, and labor history has questions to ask of the I.W.W. historian which are not answered by this classic. To what extent, for instance, was the industrial unionism which was advocated by the I.W.W. reborn in the 1930's (as charged by certain champions of craft unionism), or was the industrial unionism of the Congress of Industrial Organizations a complete departure from what had been advocated by the I.W.W.? The story of the I.W.W. still remains to be told in its entirety by an academic labor historian. This reviewer would respectfully urge Professor Brissenden, in his retirement, to consider this assignment as a fitting one on which to embark.

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ALBION GUILFORD TAYLOR. *Labor and the Supreme Court*. Pp. 178. Williamsburg, Va.: Published by the author, 1957. \$2.00.

In his *Labor and the Supreme Court*, Professor Taylor presents in concise form a statement of the legal status of activities pertaining to labor-management relations as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. To a considerable extent, the author avoids technical and legal terminology and "aims" his remarks at the undergraduate political science major, at the leaders in labor and management, and at the members of the general public interested in this phase of the problem of government and the economic order.

The chapters of the treatise cover the entire gamut of the issue of labor before the Supreme Court: the contract, antiunion and collective, the right to strike, boycotts, picketing, featherbedding, unions and antitrust laws, injunctions, arbitration and seizure, discrimination and the non-Communist affidavit. In each chapter, after presenting a summary of the legislation involved, the author in chronological order objectively analyzes selected cases of the Supreme Court on the particular subject matter of the chapter. Extensive quotations from the

opinions of individual justices who concurred or dissented in the various cases are given. Although the author, at times, expresses his own convictions, the summations at the end of each chapter are the findings of the Court.

Professor Taylor's discussion of the issue of federal-state conflicts in labor law is very complete and effective. He considers first federal-state conflicts in labor-management legislation and its administration in the matters of union security rights, the right to strike, and seizure and compulsion arbitration rights. He places emphasis upon the respective rights and responsibilities of federal as against state legislative bodies, and the rights and limitations imposed upon state boards of labor relations and the National Labor Relations Board. The author also considers the determination of the rights and limitations of state courts in contrast to the rights and limitations of the federal courts in the issues of labor management conflicts involving torts, restraint of trade, picketing, unfair labor practices, and the legal effects of collective agreements. He also presents an objective analysis of cases involving the issue of jurisdictional rights of federal and state courts.

No doubt the author has accomplished his purpose. However, it is suggested that summations of earlier works on phases of his subject and the trends since each work was published might have been presented with profit.

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CONRAD M. ARENSBERG and others (Eds.). *Research in Industrial Human Relations: A Critical Appraisal*. (Industrial Relations Research Association Series.) Pp. x, 213. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.50.

The seventh research volume of the Industrial Relations Research Association is composed of thirteen essays. In them both advocates and critics have paused to take a much-needed inventory of the contributions and shortcomings of research and practice in the "noneconomic aspects of the organization of work," better known as human relations.

Organization of work is also evident in this study, for the essays have been arranged into four distinct and successive groups to help readers—or was it the writers—structure their thinking on human relations problems. Quite appropriately, the first essays deal with the origins of the human relations “movement” and the motivation and philosophy of human relations. The second and, to this reviewer, most interesting group of essays involves the industrial setting in which human relations are practiced; it reveals the increasing concern of the human relations people with the effect of environment on the growth of human relations and on the nature of the problems connected with them. Critics of human relations, upon reading these chapters, may well feel that their insistence on the importance of environment in shaping the relations of men at work has borne fruit—albeit in a somewhat unexpected place.

In the third group are reports of recent research in human relations, each of which also points the way to new avenues for exploration and study. The volume concludes with a trio of articles on human relations and unions. What may be the crux of this subject is revealed in W. F. Whyte's comment on the dilemma between the desirability from the human relations standpoint of local decisions in collective bargaining and the trend within unions toward centralized decision-making. Whether or not this particular problem is resolved, it suggests that the conflict of interest between the labor movement and the human relations movement may be deeper than is commonly supposed.

As do most such volumes, the present work suffers somewhat from variations in the level of analysis. Thus at one extreme, we find interdisciplinary analysis so broad as to be almost completely undisciplined; at the other, analysis so specific and detailed that all but the professional are apt to give up the fight before they reach the conclusions.

On the positive side, however, it is evident that the self-examination now taking place is leading the human relations people toward new approaches to the study of organization of work. It seems possible that

as human relations moves from the study of interpersonal relations to the study of relations between organizations, for example, between small and large groups, it may logically go on to the problems of relations between large, formal groups—specifically, to the problems of union-management relations. If and when this takes place the line between human relations and other approaches to industrial relations problems may disappear.

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F. LE GROS CLARK and AGNES C. DUNNE. *Ageing in Industry*. (An Inquiry Based on Figures Derived from Census Reports into the Problem of Ageing Under Conditions of Modern Industry.) Pp. x, 146. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$7.50.

The purpose of this book, *Ageing in Industry*, is to determine what number of workers are physically able to continue in their various occupations beyond their mid-sixties. An attempt is made to give an estimate of the number for whom alternative or modified jobs will have to be provided. No suggestion is made, however, of ways or means to meet this potential demand.

The inquiry is based on statistical material provided by the census reports of 1921, 1931, and 1951. It is limited to male workers in thirty-two selected occupations. The study is practical and is clearly written for the perusal and information of those who have to plan industrial policy.

A comparison of the census figures for 1931 with those of 1951 shows a decline in the number of men over sixty-five in the male labor force. This, at first sight, seems surprising in view of the fact that the population is ageing.

There are, however, various factors which may help to explain it. For instance, the increasing proportion of men who are today aged seventy or over, the influence of pensions and superannuation schemes, and perhaps also the changing methods of production.

The number of men employed in the thirty-two occupations chosen in 1951 was

4,004,700 or 25.6 per cent of the 15,662,200 occupied males in the United Kingdom. The number of men aged sixty-five and over was 174,000 or 25 per cent of the 695,300 occupied males of sixty-five and over in the country.

The writer claims that the sample is a sufficient one from which certain conclusions may be drawn. First and foremost, it confirms the generalization that the age a man is compelled to quit the occupation in which he has spent his working life varies from job to job.

By a comparison of the figures for various census dates, they have been able to estimate the number of men physically capable of survival on their jobs until the late fifties—not the number of those who actually do continue in employment. A listing of these survival rates follows. Those whose rate falls between 75–85 per cent include such occupations as makers of watches and clocks, workers in precious metals, and makers of musical instruments; those whose rate falls between 65–75 per cent include such occupations as farmers, agricultural workers, foresters, carpenters, and bricklayers; those whose rate falls between 55–65 per cent include such occupations as surface mine workers, welders, makers of boots and shoes, plumbers, plasterers, bargemen, dockers, shop assistants, and warehousemen; those whose rate falls between 45–55 per cent include miners who work below ground, makers of bricks and pottery, makers of glass, smiths, riveters, makers of tobacco, cabinetmakers, and compositors; those whose survival rate falls between 35–45 per cent include such occupations as foundrymen, makers of paper, drivers of trams, drivers of self-propelled vehicles, and bus conductors; those whose survival rate falls between 25–35 per cent include construction engineers; no occupations are listed for those whose survival rate falls between 15–25 per cent; and finally, those whose rate falls between 5–15 per cent include such occupations as coal face workers and signalmen.

There are some surprises in this list. For this reason, in its detailed study of each occupation chosen, the inquiry is valuable, and although based on evidence obtained in the United Kingdom is, nevertheless, ap-

posite and of real value to industrialists in the United States.

DOROTHEA RAMSEY

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CORRECTION

In the March 1957 issue of *THE ANNALS*, page 10, a “central labor federation” in the Philippines was listed as a present affiliate of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The reference probably pertained to the Congress of Labor Organizations which was Communist-dominated and was dissolved in 1951 in connection with the Huk revolt. At present there is no affiliate of the WFTU in the Philippines.

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
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


THE ANNALS

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METROPOLIS IN FERMENT

Edited by

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Metropolis Lost, Metropolis Regained

By MARTIN MEYERSON and BARBARA TERRETT

Abstract: In a period of deep concern for the condition of the American metropolis and amid questions which raise doubts about the continued viability of cities, the authors argue that there is an essential soundness in urban life which preserves cities and keeps them in balance over time. Within this argument, however, they examine some of the problems which need intensive investigation, and subtle evaluation, and which above all require discussion and understanding as a preface to planning and action.

EACH year more American communities grow to metropolitan size. As their populations increase and their activities expand beyond one political jurisdiction into one or more others, they assume many of the attributes of a crazy quilt. Like the quilt itself, they are both haphazard and planned. Every metropolis is characteristically a practical patchwork of income, race, and age; of private and public ownership; of the new and the old; of identical and of mixed land uses; of households, firms, and institutions whose interests converge, diverge, conflict with, and complement each other. Business and industrial establishments compete with each other in seeking those locations which promise to be profitable. Families compete in seeking out the most esteemed, or accessible, or pleasant residences possible within that portion of their incomes which they are willing to devote to shelter. Municipal agencies compete for tax revenue from other portions of the citizens' incomes. Political parties compete for the votes and patronage which can keep them in office. All of these competitions draw together, just as the patches do in the quilt, and provide a perceptible fabric. Compromises, conflicts, congruities, incongrui-

ties, agreements, and disagreements in behavior and interest come together in that colorful make-do, the metropolis.

Obvious though it be, the comparison to a crazy quilt is probably a good one. Who is to deny it its function, however imperfectly performed? Or its random beauty—purple taffeta stitched in among the drab homespun? Or its associations of history and sentiment? Or its sturdy claim to a place on the closet shelf even when the acrilan blanket comes from the discount store? We wish to press the point no further. We hasten to make it plain that the acrilan special attracts us mightily, and if it can be bought at a discount, all the better. We hasten to protest that we have no sentimental regard for the moth-eaten, or for our great-great-grandmothers' taste if it was ugly, or for the exasperatingly outmoded, or for the evidently inadequate. Thoughtful and articulate people all over the country have taken up the theme of improvement of American communities, and we of course applaud them and count ourselves among them.

SATISFACTIONS OF PRESENT URBAN SCENE

However, we reject the dramatic portrait of the problems and harassments

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of modern life which seems to show middle-class man floundering out of a slough of central slums and a tangleweed of traffic into a bog of chaotic suburban or exurban sprawl with a quicksand of municipal debt. We would like to suggest that the present urban scene is not altogether bad. To many of those who inhabit it, the modern metropolis supplies certain advantages which mitigate, although they can never obviate, its disadvantages.

To a society which sees prestige in a private free-standing villa—and all contemporary societies of the world seem to do so—even the economy house provided by a tract builder is a satisfaction. The man who owns it can point to such evident symbols of his status as four walls (detached) and a deed. He also has open space for his children and for his own do-it-yourself puttering. The huge new subdivisions may offend some intellectual and upper-income people aesthetically and even socially, but the people who live there seem to have satisfied many of their practical and symbolic needs. Whether or not the tract house is destined to become a future slum, and whether or not there has been social waste through the move from quarters in the central city, many individuals undoubtedly feel that their housing dollar is stretching along with their commutation ride.

It is true that real estate, particularly housing, deteriorates at a rate considerably faster than mere physical aging would produce. We may deplore this deterioration, particularly when a fixed real-estate plant fails to adapt itself to ever-shifting tastes. But this phenomenon may result more from changes in cultural values than from any proved disintegration of the urban fabric. In a country of high social and economic mobility, cultural obsolescence of structures can be expected to exceed physical obsolescence. Stress on newness

seems to be an attribute of our country: Americans presumably turn in their cars when the ashtrays are filled.

As for commercial and industrial establishments in urban areas, they seem not only to survive but to flourish. The specialty shops manage to find locations near the drawing power of the department stores. The small manufacturing firm near the downtown district succeeds, requires more space and raw materials, becomes dependent upon a rail siding, and in order to get it moves to an outlying location. A new job-printing plant wishing to be near downtown customers takes the space vacated by the manufacturing firm. Urban communities continue to provide a complex of labor skills, of access to market, of low-transfer costs, of related enterprises, of professional services, distributors, jobbers—an interplay which enables small enterprises to enjoy many of the advantages of large ones.

Urban communities not only continue to be the scene of this interplay but by their very diversity seem to encourage adaptation, birth, growth, transfer, or demise of activities as their importance rises or declines. If in the process the downtown gets choked with traffic, the phenomenon may be less an illness than the exuberance of a well-functioning organism. The proximity to each other of financial, office, retail, and entertainment functions is usually an asset, in spite of the fact that concentration, if successful, brings congestion. The very fact of congestion is proof that the downtown is alive. But at a certain point, an equilibrium develops in which the inconveniences of driving and parking are a sufficient deterrent to reduce the proportion of people willing to drive. Congestion is thus a rationing or allocative instrument, albeit a not very efficient one, which helps to balance the benefits of downtown concentration against the costs.

Many of the other so-called failures of urban life reflect the contemporary consumer's wants and preferences which, lamentably, do not always coincide with the urban critic's. A poor standard of public recreation and other community services can indicate simply that the householders have chosen to make do with what they can provide for themselves, rather than voting to tax themselves for municipal enterprises. Similarly, consumer choice largely explains the triumph of the automobile. It also illuminates other aspects of urban life: Who is to say that extra dollars would be better spent for a public library than for books at home, purchased directly by the household? Or for a vacation, or medical care, or helping send a son to college?

We are not completely dismayed by the mushrooming of development houses, the choking of downtown traffic, the abandonment of central city properties, the low level of municipal services, or the apathy toward the rationalization of metropolitan government. However, in our reluctance to accept what seems to us the extreme view that our cities are wholly lost to salvation, we do not wish to assert that all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds. Certainly the slum dweller or the Negro denied access to many of the benefits of urban life or the child maimed in a traffic accident would know better. So, too, would the father who moves to a new suburb expecting superior schools for his children, but who is obliged instead either to pay more taxes than he can afford or to accept no better schools than those of the city system he left behind. There *are* problems.

It is true that some observers fail to see any rationality in the crazy quilt of metropolitan characteristics, fail to see that many needs are being met. Some seem preoccupied with an urge for the

neat and orderly solution, forgetting that nature never imitates art. Some, liking to play God, are given to the notion that a central arrangement of functions and activities in urban areas is far more advantageous than a decentralized system of decisions.

However, such approaches are becoming fewer. Specialists in urban problems increasingly recognize the diversity of urban life and appreciate the benefits which do derive from it. Indeed, a tolerance of diversity in the economy, society, and physical form of metropolis seems to be gaining ground over absolute points of view.

FORECASTS FOR THE FUTURE

Although Cassandra still offers her dire predictions for the future of the metropolis, they are more and more being overshadowed by an optimistic outlook. Cassandra now seems to give way to Pollyanna. We suggest a careful look—albeit with a wary eye—at some of the most optimistic, or grandiose, predictions for the next twenty to twenty-five years. Despite the number and variety of forecasts that have already been publicized, no one has attempted to explore how far the existing catalogue of them may be mutually contradictory. For example, is a greatly increased amount of leisure compatible with a greatly increased level of income?

We should not be surprised if the current rash of predictions for each specific good or service piled one on top of the other would imply a gross national product so astronomically above the present level that it would be far beyond realistic reach. To be sure, of course, some of the forecasts have more validity than others. All of them have some value in that they represent various bids for the consumer's dollar. We present a number of them here—including

ing ones we view with doubt—because of the tremendous implications they have for possible change in the shape, the size, the aesthetic, the economy, and the social and political organization of the future metropolis.

This, then, is what the forecasters say:

The population of the United States will increase by at least 50 million people—an increase of one-third—to a total of about 220 million persons by 1975. The total number and age distribution of adults in 1975 can be closely estimated since this population has already been born.

Eighty-six million persons will be employed in 1975 and working but a 35-hour week. Nevertheless, per capita income will be about 50 per cent higher than it is today. Women will constitute a higher proportion of the labor force. For many groups, the fact that these women will be working wives will help to raise family income faster than per capita income. By 1975 the number of families with annual incomes of \$7,500 or more (current dollars) is expected to more than double and the number of families with less than \$3,000 in income to decline appreciably.

Another prediction is that by 1975 the gross national product possibly will go up to 740 billion dollars compared to the present 440 billion dollars. A trillion of today's dollars may be spent on construction in urban areas alone over the next twenty years.

There will be 118 million annual users of domestic air travel, 76 million more than in 1956, and 102 million motor vehicles on the roads, 39 million more than in 1956. If there are 88 million passenger cars by 1975, the average will be one for every 2.5 persons; the two-car and three-car family will be commonplace.

Forecasters also say that the demand

for water will have doubled, with more than 85 per cent of the demand coming from industries and cities. Requirements for water and sewers to 1967 run to a total of 26 billion dollars. Electric power capacity will be tripled by 1980, and 94 billion dollars will have to be spent for the new required capacity.

Forty-three million children, 13 million more than today, will go to elementary school by 1975. High-school enrollment will jump by more than 5 million. The increased school population will require 600,000 classrooms, not counting replacements. Seven or eight million young people—compared to 3 million today—will attend institutions of higher learning.

Trade association and public service groups are predicting that in the years ahead all Americans will possess much more of whatever commodity or service the organization is promoting. For example, one organization expects that whereas only 10 per cent of new houses have air conditioning today, all new houses will have it soon.

The collective image of forecasts such as these is more of everything. Similar forecasts have been confounded again and again in the past. Waves of optimism and waves of pessimism wash over the ranks of the demographers and others who make them. Optimism is the vogue in this country now and social science accommodates to it. If we assume that major war and major economic depression will be avoided, the above predictions, which are based on the continuation of present trends, may be roughly valid. If so, urban areas will be faced with having to adapt themselves to 50 million more people, 39 million more motor vehicles, and a doubling of water supply among other changes. However, human behavior may again confound the forecasters.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR ON FUTURE METROPOLIS

We have selected eight questions about future behavior, the outcome of which will shape the future metropolis. Some can be resolved individually and by private enterprise; others will be referred to community policy; and still others will become subjects for national debate.

1. *Will present tendencies in reproductive behavior continue indefinitely?* While there are certain constant elements in demographic change, there are also major unpredictable variables, among which is the birth rate. At times, increases in family income seem to have encouraged childbearing, at others to have discouraged it. A few years ago, critics of the city were pointing out that people in urban areas were not reproducing themselves in numbers great enough to maintain the city. Now it is apparent that people in urban areas are more than reproducing themselves. But the motivations behind reproduction are so subtle that it is entirely conceivable that birth rates will again decline drastically and that many urban areas may have to face problems of contraction rather than the expansion they now anticipate.

2. *If population increases, will the standard of living be raised or lowered?* The new optimism of our times has much too readily taken it for granted that a growing population is a benefit. It has assumed that population increase will lead to expanding markets for houses, cars, and other consumer goods and that expanding markets will in turn lead to more investment in factories, stores, offices, and other urban artifacts of a thriving economy. The relationship is not that simple. Population growth can deny capital to other uses. If the demand for the social capital required for schools, housing, hospitals,

sewers, and retail stores rises sharply, as one can assume it will with a markedly increased population, the result may be to divert essential capital from more productive sections of the economy. Continuous increases in population may keep us from attaining the standard of living which is within our technological grasp. At the same time, the demands of the population will require greater consumption of raw materials. When, for example, easily accessible deposits of high-grade ore are used up and it becomes necessary to import or to find substitutes for them or to process inferior materials, we may look for greater costs. The claims which a vast increase in population will make upon the country's resources of capital, labor, and raw materials may therefore have a depressing rather than an exhilarating effect on the standard of living.

Furthermore, the probable kinds of population increases in the years ahead will enlarge the numbers of the very young and the very old. It is estimated that the number of persons 75 and over will be two-thirds greater by 1975 than at present (7.5 million instead of 4.7 million) and that the proportion of children will rise. Thus the productive labor force may have to support more people, or the country will face a decline in living standards. This possibility alone makes a millennium of urban consumption far from a reality.

Even if productivity increases, how will the gain be divided between additional goods and services and additional leisure? From 1910 on, more than a third of the gain due to productivity has gone to leisure rather than to income. It goes without saying that choices between income and leisure will considerably determine the nature of city life and city facilities. Among other things, will there be more demand for industrial sites or more recreational uses of land?

3. *Will changes in the pattern of resources and in the technology and location of economic activity alter the concentrations of urban population?* A significant shift in the location of economic activities may result from the growing dependence of the United States on imported raw materials. The President's Materials Policy Commission five years ago foresaw the economic decline of many domestic raw materials. As the country becomes more dependent upon imports, accessibility of cities to ocean-going vessels may well increase in importance. Will urban economic activity in America then be further concentrated in four strips of population: The first along the Atlantic coast; the second, connecting with it, along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway; the third along the Gulf coast; and the fourth along the Pacific? These strips might prove to be the points of least cost for the transfer both of raw materials and of manufactured products to markets.

Another relevant factor is the impact of automation. In many industries capable of continuous flow processes, widespread introduction of automation will undoubtedly take place. Of even more importance would be the displacement of routine office and clerical workers now in the central business district should automation transfer their functions to outlying sites. Other things being equal, the smaller the labor requirements for a given economic activity, the greater the freedom of location. The insurance company which is reluctant to move to the suburbs because its office girls like the city may find International Business Machines' calculators more tractable.

The relationship between industry, jobs, markets, and the locations of people is highly complex. It may be that if income and education both increase, tremendous economic demand will be generated for cultural services such as

music, the theatre, and art. These services then will become an important economic activity, following in location an urban population distribution which may be very different from the one today.

4. *Will the acculturation of the Negro to middle-class norms be as rapid as his migration to metropolitan centers?* Assuming continued migration of Negroes from the South to northern metropolitan areas, how rapidly and generally will they adopt the norms of housekeeping and nonviolence of a white middle class? If they do adopt them swiftly, metropolises will find it easy to accommodate them because the problems of segregation and integration will have lost relevance. However, if the acculturation of the Negro to new norms is slower than his migration northward, either violence or a high exodus of white people from the center city may result, with tremendous consequences economically and politically. The authors hope for a notably improved *modus vivendi* between the races in the next twenty-five years because of such probabilities as the decreasing size of Negro households and an upgrading in educational attainment. However, such an upgrading in educational attainment will require a new orientation in school and other public policies.

5. *Will the relative decline in consumer expenditures for shelter continue?* We cannot overemphasize the basic fact that the face of the metropolis is shaped by the amount of money which consumers choose to spend on housing. In the past fifty years this sum has been a smaller and smaller share of their incomes. In 1909 it represented nearly 20 per cent of what they spent, in 1956 only a little more than 12 per cent. If utilities are included, the ratio is comparable: 24 per cent then, 16 per cent now. Will the consumer continue to allocate his income to housing in de-

creasing shares? If so, what downgrading of housing quality will result? Will consumers decide that they prefer private space, so to speak, to public space? That is, at what point will they choose the space within the four walls which they own or rent and can equip to their individual comfort and pleasure in preference to the space outside, where automobiles, mass sports, and commercial amusements take them away from it?

Will they choose homes in the city, in the suburbs, or in the country? Or if both income and leisure increase, will they choose two homes, one in the city and one in the country? What conditions of ownership or rental, of neighborhood security, quality of schools, and abundance of community services will determine their choice?

6. *Will citizens persist in their present reluctance to allocate personal income to local taxes for public services?* All of private enterprise competes for the consumer's income and bank account: For houses, for automobiles, for air conditioning, for appliances, for services. How consumers decide to allocate their income will have critical importance for the metropolis. If they choose to buy the 88 million passenger cars predicted or the 118 million domestic air trips predicted, then they may not buy the 600,000 new classrooms also predicted, let alone pay the salaries of the 600,000 more teachers who will be needed. We presume that the community will be seeking the individual's consent politically to be taxed for schools, highways, bridges, and tunnels, for police and fire protection. Many of these services of a local government will be in competition with the goods and services the consumer can get elsewhere. Since the end of World War II all indications have been that the consumer, as voter, often refuses to subject himself to further taxation even for the services he

wishes. Will this tendency continue? If it does, the community's standards may go down even though the householder's standards go up.

7. *If consumer income does increase, how much of it will be allocated to the special goods and services characteristic of downtown centers and to transportation to those centers?* Retail sales appear to be moving at an overwhelming rate to the suburbs. In 45 metropolitan areas in the period between 1948 and 1954, they increased in the suburbs by 32.3 per cent, but in the downtown areas by only 1.2 per cent or in real terms actually shrank. The suburban rate was considerably higher than the suburban population increase. What does this portend? Does it indicate only a passing adjustment, reflecting the extraordinary circumstance of postwar expansion? Will the future consumer be content with the limited selection of goods he can get in suburban shopping centers and will such centers blossom out, or will the downtown have a new opportunity for tremendous increases in trade to meet new and diverse demands of specialized consumption? Or will the consumer with his increased buying power ignore both and instead choose the great regional centers like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco for the purchase of luxury items selected from a wide range of offerings?

Of course, the decisions of consumers will interact with those of merchants and investors—center city and suburban—and with municipal decisions. Another major question lies in the consumer's willingness to pay the costs of keeping the downtown district accessible to private automobiles. Have we too glibly assumed that in the large city the public and private costs of the automobile are so high that only transit can solve the problem of downtown access? Given his predilection for the automobile, will the consumer be willing

to submit to a direct pricing mechanism in order to pay for the tremendous investment in new facilities, including parking, which would enable him to go downtown by car? What will be the consequence if in the process, parking space downtown exceeds floor space for all other downtown functions combined?

8. *How will the political identifications of citizens in suburbs and center cities change as the communities change? How will local political parties alter?* As the center-city resident moves to the suburbs and becomes a property owner, he commonly shifts his allegiance to what he regards as the party of property. Will that pattern continue, and if it does, will the subtle status and other distinctions which are said to attract him to the Republican party persist? Or will possible deterioration of his property, high taxes, and poor services lead him instead to what he regards as the party of protest?

In the past, it has usually been true that as racial and national minorities have felt more secure, their crime rates, consumer behavior, and politics have acquired the characteristics of the majority group. If this is to be true of today's minorities, and if they are to move more and more into the suburbs, will their political identification shift? In a period of high income, high education, and professionalized welfare is the political machine no longer able to offer these groups the time-honored rewards for votes—jobs and services? If the old machine is dead, will present and future municipal administrations develop new sets of incentives, not merely to maintain themselves in power, but also to give them the strength for fulfilling their promises for civic development?

CONCLUSION

It will be apparent that these questions are not ones which can be decided by experts or by local governments.

They will be decided ultimately in terms of the familiar paradox which is the central strength of the democratic system: The tug and haul, the assertion and compromise of parents, tenants, mortgagors, merchants, industrialists, politicians, labor unionists and professionals, the young and the old, the whites and the nonwhites. They will be decided by inaction as well as by action.

Some choices will have vastly more weight both in the market place and in politics than others. But even allowing for inequalities in the economic and political franchise, the metropolis is the product of millions of choices which everyday are exercised individually as well as collectively by the people who live in cities. If the competition among choices produces contradictions between the promise and the achievement of metropolitan life, there are nonetheless developments which offer hope that choice will be exercised in the future so as to lessen the contradictions.

One of these developments is the improvement in communication between and among those who make the key decisions in urban areas. In the past few years, there has been an increasing tendency for businessmen, including the local representatives of large national corporations, to join professionals and municipal officials in deliberations on civic problems and policies. Sometimes, communication is not able to bridge the distance between special interests. More often, however, it is the means of adjusting the objectives of the private entrepreneurial groups on the one hand and the objectives of the welfare and governmental groups on the other so that there can be agreement upon common goals. This kind of break-through in the interest barrier between seemingly incompatible groups is bringing about significant civic improvements in many cities throughout the country.

Another encouraging development is the growing stress on knowledge as the

basis for public and private decisions on urban matters. For example, it is the rare investor in new commercial properties who does not employ a market analyst or use the findings of market analysis to help him reach his decision on a proposed development. For another example, nowadays it is the rare local government that does not have a city planning agency. City planning has passed its proselytizing period and most municipal officials accept the planning function as an important source of specialized information on which to base municipal decisions. (Some times these same officials even criticize the planning agencies for exploring too narrow an area of concern. They ask that the analytical tools of planning be sharpened so that the decision process may be benefited by broader and deeper knowledge and by design alternatives for future courses of action.) And, finally, it is the rare university of major rank that today is not considering the expansion of its research activities on the urban community. Under the strengthening influence of many converging forces, not the least of which is the interest of business and philanthropic groups, a number of universities around the country are setting up centers for urban research. As a consequence, scholars are beginning to focus on fundamental problems of urban growth, structure, and politics and to provide fresh, new insights into local problems. From their work it seems likely we will have a new generation of specialists in urban affairs and a body of knowledge upon which to base a more satisfying set of urban decisions.

The urban experts who, like the proverbial generals, have been refighting the last wars, are beginning to move on to the future, not in terms of predictions which supposedly will come true in some automatic way, but in terms of ideas, designs, innovations and experiments introduced into, and sifted and chosen by,

of juvenile delinquency figures, the reader feels on safer ground in Chapters III and IV which deal with treatment. Not surprisingly, the local figures show differences in treatment practice nearly as striking as the differences in delinquency rates. One of the most interesting findings is that in low delinquency areas probation is often used while fines are rare, whereas in high delinquency areas the opposite is true. Even so, however, the author stresses that four-fifths of all juveniles live in areas where the treatment practice is not much different from the average. The most significant postwar trend is a shifting of emphasis from probation to fines. Naturally fines are popular where the courts have to cope with large numbers. Not content with such quantitative comparisons of treatment policies, the author has also arranged for the collection of material from 700 cases from five districts to see whether any variations in treatment policy could be explained by differences in the characteristics of offenses and offenders. He concludes that personal factors rather than the gravity of the offense seem to determine the choice of treatment as well as its effect. Nothing emerges to indicate what may be the best policy for serious forms of juvenile delinquency, and it is not without reason that the author concludes: "Juvenile delinquency is a field in which much discussion is going on but where few sensational new discoveries can be expected" (p. 118). Nevertheless, there is plenty of useful information and common sense in this unsensational study which was, by the way, carried out with the support of the Home Office and Oxford University.

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OSCAR HANDLIN. *Race and Nationality in American Life*. Pp. xiii, 300. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1957. \$4.00.

Professor Handlin is at present the most prolific source of books dealing with ethnic groups, and he may in time become the successor of Marcus Hansen whose promising career was all too soon cut off. However,

Values for Urban Living

By MARGARET MEAD

Abstract: Technologic change may take away from the cities of the future all the functions once made necessary by war, poor communications, and the need to concentrate populations for production and consumption. But the unique function of cities in providing for contact among many kinds of human creativity will remain, possibly to be met by cities that are centers for the new conference methods of multimodal communication.

IN this paper I propose to consider which of the values associated with city life in the history of mankind may be expected to depend on the continued existence of the city no matter how extensive the technologic changes of the future may be. As I shall be concerned with values, I shall ignore the dismal possibilities inherent in underground building as a defense measure in a world continually divided against itself.

With the present possibilities of technical advance, the communication and transportation problems which once made cities essential can be solved outside an urban context. The telephone and closed television circuits can replace aggregations of offices and agencies dealing with common problems. The transportation of goods, raw materials, food, and so on, no longer demand central markets which, in terms of modern transportation conditions, are in fact a liability. So it would seem that the city as a center of manufacturing, distribution, or administration is no longer necessary. But with the kinds of change and growth in patterns of production and consumption which we may expect for a long time to come, there will have to be either residential or work-centered mobility. That is, we shall have to think in terms either of

fairly stably placed populations, with each family tied to its house and garden and to the enduring personal relationships of a delimited neighborhood within which human personal values are preserved, with the work parts of life set up as movable—factories and offices being composed of interchangeable, dismountable, and easily constructed units. Or we shall have to think of a world in which residences can be easily interchanged, new ties formed quickly, and individual families moved rapidly and easily from place to place. In the light of our present understanding of human behavior, the overwhelming choice would be for the former condition—for moving towards a society so arranged that the impersonal and technical aspects of life were those within which the greatest change and mobility were allowed for, uprooting pylons rather than apple trees, and asking members of the working team to keep adjusting to new people rather than asking such adjustments of friends and neighbors, pupils, and teachers. In a world organized so that choice were possible, one might expect a self-adjusting relationship to develop between the preferences of individuals—both those who preferred to stay in one place and those who had learned to relish and so to seek the delights of new experience

—and the needs of society. The nice adjustments between the number of individuals who wished to live and work in the places where they had grown up and the productive use of their labor could, in an era of “free power,” be made in a new way, hitherto impossible to men who had to transport their fuels many miles on the backs of slaves, or hundreds of miles in pipe lines or on railways, or thousands of miles in ships over the sea. Instead, power could go to people; work climates and adequate vitamins could be provided on the spot. In a world adapted to our present knowledge of the importance of roots, of continuity in human relationships, and of many relatively autonomous, significant centers of local culture, there seems no reason to believe that work could not be so distributed that people could live near their work and could also maintain homes on which they expended a great amount of energy and affection. The city as a center for providing work for those who can no longer be accommodated in agriculture and in the extractive industries would no longer be necessary. And with more sophisticated standards for the use of leisure and with less fear of Satan finding mischief for idle hands to do, the present situation in which those who work in cities spend up to five hours a day merely in getting from residence to job and back again could change. The sterile, nonproductive, wasteful use of time that is a byproduct of the way life as now organized would, by a redistribution of factories, offices, hospitals, and schools, give way to a new situation in which the old-time relationships of the small town could be re-instated.

CITIES AS CENTERS OF CULTURE

A third *raison d'être* of cities is that of access to high level facilities in medical care, the arts, consultant services,

to help former Soviet scholars continue their work in this country and to make available the products of their research. It is another proof of the wisdom and skill with which the Research Program was directed.

For one reason or another, relatively little research has been done in this country on Soviet historiography. This volume is, therefore, particularly useful and illuminating, and Professor Black has contributed an important service to his fellows in the social sciences by selecting and editing these papers. As a group, they show clearly that historical scholarship has decayed markedly in Russia in the last forty years. Professor Black's introductory essay, which describes the relationship between the historical profession and politics in the Soviet Union, makes clear just why this has happened. The historians have faithfully followed the party line, in its twists and turns, to the distinct harm of scholarship and the profession.

The most interesting essay to this reviewer is probably that of Konstantin F. Shteppa, former Professor of Ancient and Mediaeval History at the University of Kiev and Chairman of the Committee for Byzantine Studies of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. This brief study of the “lesser evil” formula reviews the controversy which developed among Soviet historians after 1937, especially between 1948 and 1951, over the addition to the Tsarist “prison of peoples” of various national groups in the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. The most distinguished and original article is that of Ihor Ševčenko of the University of Michigan on Soviet study of Byzantine cultural influence upon Russia. Against a background of earlier Russian scholarship on this subject, Professor Ševčenko has demonstrated how the ultra-patriotic tone conquered in this field also, with distinguished Soviet scholars, including Grekov and Brunov, striving to prove the originality of Russian culture. The Soviet efforts to demonstrate that a Slavic script existed in the tenth century before Byzantine influence was felt and that St. Sophia in Kiev was built in the eleventh century by Russian builders are a sadden-

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dom of interchange which follows unexpected routes, permits individuals to make new contacts, to maintain or break old ones, and brings together in face-to-face, multimodal relationships individuals of diverse temperament and vocation. The seething intellectual and artistic life which has characterized some cities of the past at one period and not at another and the absence of such life in other large cities is evidence that merely living in a large city does not guarantee a high level of intellectual, artistic, or scientific activity. Small cities, when they have represented the focal point of a country in a period of great activity, have produced a level of thinking, painting, and writing quite disproportionate to their size. But although great size will not lead, automatically, even to the construction of beautiful hotels, stadiums, concert halls, schools, and hospitals, some concentration of a diverse population, of individuals who represent the high points and the growing edges of many fields, seems to be a precondition of cultural fertility. The limited contacts of the village—in which individuals have known each other since childhood and have adopted habitual, comforting, but necessarily rigid role relationships—need to be supplemented by friendships and working relationships based on adult choices among many different, diversely experienced people. The excellencies of the local arts or even the continuing productivity of a modern physics research laboratory or of a psychiatric clinic depends on the stimulation of contacts with the imagination and present experience of other artists, engineers, scientists, statesmen, and others. Just as the centers of developing civilization used to lie at the crossroads of trade routes where strangers met, so today and in the future cultural life may be expected to depend upon the freedom and stimulation of many kinds of con-

tacts and upon personal ties of choice rather than those given by kin, neighbor, or small, limited, one-industry or one-activity communities. Under present conditions, the *products* of the highest levels of activity can be brought to the remote countryside so that process as well as product can be sent far and wide. Thus TV can bring to the student of the tiniest school the great speech, the music of a symphony orchestra, the details of some laboratory skill, religious ritual, the particular brush stroke of a great painter, or the steps in the rehearsal of a theatrical performance. But the opportunity to meet and talk, to plan and confer, to argue and wonder in groups of the diversely gifted and experienced is still, in any present projection of practical technology, dependent upon a great many such people being together in one place. In such centers they can meet and part, talk formally or informally, listen to music or look at a play *together*, and learn—in an interchange which is dependent upon the alert use of all five senses—what the others think and feel, catching the half-fledged dreams of other men, which would otherwise die, and giving them life.

CENTERS OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE

If one looks at history, it is possible to see that the need for such centers has been met in many ways through the ages. When religion is a vital issue, great religious centers have grown up with men of many talents within them. Special arts have tended to cluster together in one city rather than another, permitting more interplay among different temperaments. The courts of kings, monasteries, the abodes of oracles, the great medieval universities, centers of medical lore in the ancient world, all became such concentration points of human talent. Individuals

came and moved freely in these centers listening, participating, drinking in an atmosphere which stimulated artist as well as thinker, statesman, explorer, physician, and teacher. At the present time, such institutions as the Mayo Clinic or Oak Ridge are struggling with the problem of concentrating particular kinds of talent away from our large intractable cities, but also of bringing in other kinds of talent to keep their gifted membership from becoming too narrow or specialized. The creation of these small centers of research and practice is complemented by the growth of the small conference, "the peculiar institution of widening communications in a shrinking world," in which the ideal conditions of intense, free contact between deeply involved individuals from different disciplines, different countries, with different points of view can, for a limited period of time, complement the isolation in which individuals work.

Such a conference as that held some years ago for the opening of the Corning Glass Museum, in which leaders in diverse parts of the culture were brought together to discuss ideas of leisure, is an example of a twentieth-century attempt to create temporarily the advantages of intensified, high-level interrelationships, of which the city has been the condition, but at best an unreliable creator, in the past.

For the stimulation provided by a city like New York today, the young scientist or artist has to pay a tremendous price in high rents or long hours of commuting, in exposure to smog, struggle, delinquency, dirt. He also pays in the continued contact with thousands of weary, distraught, and lonely individuals for his access to "interesting people," until, in the frantic treadmill of the actual physical difficulties of living, he often sees far less of the friends and colleagues he came to find than if he had remained at

The libraries, archives, and private collections of the Southwest contain an unguessed wealth of historical data, but only in works of this type is it made available to the general reader and student. It is a pleasure to see this study added to the bibliography of Texas history.

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RICHARD A. PRESTON, SYDNEY F. WISE, and HERMAN O. WERNER. *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*. Pp. viii, 376. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$6.50.

This is a concise, readable account of the notable developments in warfare over the centuries in our Western society. It begins with the Greek phalanx and ends, a mere 300 pages later, with the cold war.

For so brief an account of such a vast subject, the authors have done a most admirable job. The approach is modern-minded, with less concern for antiquarian detail than for the impact of weapons, tactics, and campaigns on society at large. The coverage is good, with more attention to naval warfare than is found in some books on the subject.

The authors' stated aim is ". . . to provide the professional military student with a background for his reading of military history, and to provide the civilian with an understanding of the significance of military developments in the evolution of society."

It is obviously the hope of the authors to lure at least a few civilian readers toward an interest in the historical background of the most important social problem of our time—warfare—by providing them with an account that is interesting and easy to read. In this hope they are joined by your reviewer.

Mr. Preston is Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada; Mr. Wise teaches at Queen's University; and Mr. Werner at the United States Naval Academy. Preston and Wise were World War II Air Force officers, and Werner is a Commander in the United States Naval Reserve.

finding an interesting dinner companion; streets on which one might meet any one of the exciting people from any part of the world; and conference facilities where every sort of group could meet to discuss science, art, religion, to brief newcomers, to work out together the next step in an idea. Cities would be representative of the growing edge of culture, of intensified high-level communication, filled always partly with people who only yesterday were strangers, partly with friends and colleagues from other parts of the country and of the world—places where people, and so human culture, would be free to grow.

Conferences like the Corning Conference, the Macy Foundation conferences, the work groups of the United Nations agencies, the conference for diplomats at Clarens, the meeting of poets at Bread Loaf are setting one part of this pattern; the growth of experimental conference centers like Arden House, the University of Michigan Center, the Statler at Cornell, the Pittsburgh Airport is providing a second attempt. Centers like the MacDowell Club, Yaddo, the Huntington Hartford Center, on the one hand, and complex settings for specialists like the Menninger Foundation, Riggs Center at Stockbridge, and Brookhaven, on the other, are a third approach, under modern conditions, to finding a distillate of what made urban centers of culture in the past—Athens, Paris, Elizabethan London—flourish and flower. The next step will be to recognize that all these scattered and exciting happenings—from a camp in the New Guinea mountains where various

kinds of scientists and explorers can meet, talk, and overcome the isolation under which they are working to the Harvard Salzburg Seminars or the Pittsburgh Airport—are trying to provide the one thing that remains the unique contribution of the city: A chance for rich, variegated, unexpected, easy, multidimensional human contacts in the flesh.¹

The city of the future—shorn of slums and smoke and of hordes of office workers pouring out onto hot pavements to stand in long meaningless queues or to push into buses and subways and trains—freed from the pressure of contact with strangers who would be happier somewhere else, a place to which people can go quickly and easily, and where they can move about without parking problems: Perhaps a weekend city, a vacation city, a conference city, will still be needed as a crucible of human imagination.

¹ For examples and discussions of this developing conference method, see, in the forthcoming issue of *Etcetera* and in *Conference on Small Groups*, edited by Mary Capes, an account of the conference held at Eastbourne, England, in 1956, under the auspices of the World Federation for Mental Health and the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation; "Conference at Corning," an article appearing in the August 1951 issue of *Fortune*; the series of Conference Transactions of the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation; and the reports of the World Health Organization study group on the Psycho-biological Development of the Child, J. Tanner and B. Inhelder, Editors, *Child Development* (New York: International Universities Press, 1957); also J. Soddy, Editor, *Mental Health and Infant Development* (New York: Basic Books, 1956), for a report of the conference held at Chichester, England, in 1952.

Production and Distribution in the Large Metropolis¹

By RAYMOND VERNON

Abstract: This is an examination of the present and future role of metropolitan areas in the fields of production and distribution and the problems that future growth will bring. Special attention is given to the implications of the outward movement of manufacturing activities from the central cities into the suburbs and open country beyond. The consequences of the relative growth of business services in metropolitan areas are also explored. These trends are related to the outward shift of populations in the metropolitan areas and some of the resulting problems are identified and discussed.

OUR purpose in this paper is to speculate on the problems and policies which are likely to confront the larger urban areas of this nation in the next quarter century as a result of developments in the fields of production and distribution. This calls first of all for economic projection. But to rely on economic projection, as Simon Kuznets has observed, is in some sense an act of faith. Projections are not true or false; they are simply more fully reasoned or

less so. And none knows more acutely than the economic analyst how often events may prove more subtle and more complex than the best reasoning and analysis could have anticipated.

When we speculate about the future role of the large metropolis in the fields of production and distribution, however, there is a certain seeming solidity in the factual background from which such speculations are launched. For the past fifty years or more, the growth patterns of the metropolitan areas of the United States have assumed a regularity calculated to gladden the heart of the forecaster. And as one inquires into the reasons for these patterns, he finds himself able to rationalize most of what he sees without wandering far into fields of pure fancy. To gain some sense of the future role of the metropolis, therefore, we shall begin by reviewing the main trends in their past growth; we shall then consider some of the significant shifts which have been occurring within the subareas of these large urban complexes; and we shall conclude by considering the problems and policies which these trends suggest.

Other essays in this volume will no doubt document the fact that our ur-

¹ This paper has been developed as a by-product of the New York Metropolitan Region Study. It incorporates some of the preliminary ideas of the author as well as his interpretation of some of the tentative conclusions of his colleagues in the Study. The Study, which is now winding up its first year, is planned for a three-year period. Undertaken by the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration for the Regional Plan Association and financed jointly by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, its purpose is to analyze the economic life of the New York metropolitan region and to project the region's future growth. Nevertheless, the observations contained in the paper should not be regarded in any sense as conclusions of the New York Metropolitan Region Study. Two years hence, the Study's participants will probably be both wiser and more cautious in their observations about the future of metropolitan areas.

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ban areas have accounted for a steadily growing share of the nation's population and the nation's jobs. In 1800, for instance, only 6 per cent of the nation's population lived in urban places. By 1850 the figure had reached 15 per cent; by 1900 it had climbed to 40 per cent; and by 1950 it was 59 per cent.² Part of this growth, of course, was simply due to the fact that many small towns and patches of open country during this period graduated into "urban places." But a considerable part of the increase was due to the fact that the large industrial areas—areas which were already urbanized by mid-nineteenth century—have persistently grown at a faster pace than the small towns and rural areas. For example, although the 33 largest industrial areas of the country accounted for only 23 per cent of the nation's population in 1870 they had come to account for 36 per cent in 1930;³ and 52 "standard metropolitan areas" which represented 32 per cent of the nation's population in 1900 had come to represent 42 per cent by 1950.⁴

Meanwhile, the number of persons on farms and in small towns has grown more slowly than in the larger urban complexes. Indeed, lately there has been an absolute thinning out of the people in some agricultural areas of the country. Our next step is to consider the reasons for some of the basic shifts.

OUR CHANGING DEMANDS

The overriding characteristic of this nation's economy in the past century

² On the basis of a new definition of "urban places," the 1950 figure would be 64 per cent.

³ G. E. McLaughlin, *Growth of American Manufacturing Areas* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1938), p. 53. There is some evidence that medium sized industrial areas have been growing even faster than the larger areas but the differences are not marked.

⁴ D. J. Bogue, *Population Growth in Standard Metropolitan Areas 1900-1950* (Washington: U. S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1953), p. 13.

has been the long-term growth in output per worker. This growth has been characteristic not only of manufacturing but of agriculture as well.⁵ And it has, of course, been matched by an increase in the per capita consumption of goods and services by the American people.

But as incomes have grown, wants have tended to change. The principal change has been a decline in the relative importance of the consumption of food and fibers raised on the farm and an increase in the relative importance of that heterogeneous collection of demands which goes under the heading of "services." As a result, with farm productivity continually growing, many sons of farmers have had to look elsewhere for jobs. At the same time, employment in such fields as trade, amusement, education, and medical care has expanded dramatically, providing some of the jobs which agriculture could no longer offer.⁶

Meanwhile, the kinds of skill needed for making and distributing goods have also undergone shifts. The relative need for unskilled muscle in production and trade has gone down, while the demand for professional and technical men and for clerks and similar office-bound workers has risen.⁷ As a matter of fact, one

⁵ Cf. J. W. Kendrick, "National Productivity and Its Long-Term Projection," in the National Bureau of Economic Research's *Long-Range Economic Projection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 67 ff.

⁶ From 1870 to 1950, workers in agriculture declined from 50 per cent to 12 per cent of the United States labor force (changes in definition of the labor force introduce slight elements of incomparability in the two figures). In the same period, jobs in government administration went up from 2.0 to 7.9 per cent; jobs in wholesale and retail trade rose from 6.1 to 18.0 per cent; and jobs in the professions increased from 1.6 to 6.3 per cent. See J. F. Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), p. 732.

⁷ Cf. "Nonproduction Workers in Factories, 1919-56," *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (April 1957).

should not overlook the possibility that the shift has been even more marked than any data on the manufacturing industries might suggest. For some of the business functions which fifty years ago were performed under the heading of manufacturing—to the extent that they were being performed at all—are being carried on today by a different type of work force in the advertising services, management advisory services, research organizations, wholesalers, and specialized repair and maintenance organizations—in short, in some of the so-called service industries.⁸

In a later section—a section devoted to the changing function of the city's core—we shall argue that this curiously mixed bag of business services and some of the fast-growing consumer services have demanded large urban locations and have contributed to the disproportionate growth of such urban areas. For the present, let us take this conclusion for granted, subject to later proof. Once granted, the trend to urban growth feeds upon itself. For urban living has demanded more services still: some of these services have arisen from the "diseconomies" of urban living, leading to more building inspectors, laundries, and purveyors of fresh vegetables; other services such as ball games and hospital care have come closer to contributing to the real consumption of the urban dwellers.⁹

The increased demand for services has

⁸ From 1910 to 1950, laborers declined from 16.8 to 6.9 per cent of the nonfarm United States work force; clerks and kindred workers went up from 7.9 to 13.9 per cent; and professional and technical workers rose from 6.7 to 9.9 per cent. G. L. Palmer, *Philadelphia Workers in a Changing Economy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956), App. Table 13, p. 161.

⁹ Cf. Colin Clark, "The Economic Functions of a City in Relation to its Size," *Econometrica*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1945), pp. 97-113. Clark appears to assume that the increased demand for services is entirely a reflection of changing household demands.

added to urban growth in still another way. In the past fifty years the real output per man of workers engaged in the service industries has not increased very rapidly—certainly not as rapidly as in agriculture and manufacturing. Accordingly, the share of the nation's labor force engaged in services has probably gone up even more than the share of the nation's output represented by services. And this has added further to the urban orientation of the nation's labor force.¹⁰

THE STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING

While jobs on the farms and in rural areas were declining in their relative importance and while service jobs were growing in urban areas at a very rapid rate, manufacturing jobs were being distributed between urban and rural areas in a pattern all their own. Historically, our large urban areas have harbored the majority of the country's manufacturing jobs. Yet despite this fact and despite the relatively rapid growth of the metropolitan labor force, the large urban areas' share of the nation's manufacturing jobs has undergone a gradual although moderate decline over the past thirty or forty years.¹¹ This means that manu-

¹⁰ This suggests that a rise must have occurred in the relative price of services which was not enough to stifle the increase in demand.

¹¹ Cf. Coleman Woodbury (Editor), *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 253. The 33 "industrial areas" comprising the nation's principal cities and their peripheries accounted for 58.3 per cent of the nation's manufacturing jobs in 1919, 56.2 per cent in 1929, 54.9 per cent in 1939, and 54.4 per cent in 1947. A group of 48 large standard metropolitan areas accounted for 59.8 per cent of the nation's manufacturing jobs in 1929, 58.2 per cent in 1939, 58.7 per cent in 1947, and 55.8 per cent in 1954. Compiled from E. M. Kitagawa and D. J. Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing Activity within Standard Metropolitan Areas* (Oxford, Ohio: Miami University Press, 1955), App. B, and

facturing jobs in the large urban areas have not kept pace with other jobs in these areas. Taken together these forces have reduced the comparative importance of manufacturing operations in large urban areas and have increased the importance of their office- and store-bound activities.

One is tempted to draw the conclusion from these facts that the pull of manufacturing establishments toward large urban areas may have decreased in the past fifty years. In a superficial sense, this is unquestionably the case. Half a century ago, when the railroad, the cart, and the boat were the principal means of moving people and goods, the importance of being close to transportation ganglia was critical for industry and commerce and for their labor force. Accordingly, large cities developed close to the ganglia and particularly at the nodes of the transportation system—at the juncture of the rivers and railroads—and industry and commerce competed for space close by these nodes.

The truck and the automobile loosened the bonds of manufacturing plants toward larger urban areas and allowed them to consider locations which were more distant from the center of urban complexes. In this sense, the tie of manufacturing plants to large urban areas can be said to have weakened. In another sense, however, we are inclined to suspect that the pull to large urban areas may have grown in importance relative to the pull of other factors in the locational equation such as the source of materials, the cost and availability of labor, and so on. Indeed, our working hypothesis at present is this: Over the course of time manufacturing establishments have been tending to group themselves about large urban areas, creating loose clusters of inter-related and interdependent plants. The

from preliminary 1954 Census of Manufactures releases.

clusters, though oriented to large urban markets, have been so loose that they have spilled over into the countryside surrounding the metropolitan areas.¹² Moreover, with the passage of time, the clusters surrounding these areas have grown more like one another in their composition. In the aggregate they have tended to increase the self-sufficiency and independence of the large urban areas for industrial goods and to reduce the relative role of trade in goods between such areas.

These hypotheses have been built up from a number of initial impressions. One of these is the view that the balance between transportation savings and savings involved in large-scale production—a balance which, as we shall shortly see, is critical in locational decisions—has been undergoing a gradual shift over the past century; and that this shift has tended to locate manufacturing plants closer to the markets they are to serve.¹³ Let us consider what this concept means.

LOCATION OF MARKETS

In the early period of American industrial history, manufacturing plants were typically located very close to their markets. Since the size of the market for any firm was circumscribed by high overland transport costs, our early factories and foundries had to make the best of local sources of supply and had to market their goods close to where

¹² Cf. D. J. Bogue, *The Structure of the Metropolitan Community* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1949), p. 41. The analysis indicates that as of 1940 persons engaged in manufacturing were less highly concentrated toward the center of metropolitan areas than persons engaged in services, retail trade, or wholesale trade. No analysis is available, however, with respect to the trend in such concentration over time.

¹³ Cf. C. D. Harris, "The Market as a Factor in the Location of Industry in the United States," *The Appraisal Journal* (January 1956), pp. 58-61.

they were made.¹⁴ But in the middle of the nineteenth century transport costs declined dramatically; at the same time, mass production methods gave a heavy edge in production costs to the larger firms over their smaller competitors. For a time, then, a new balance was struck. The new large-scale firms could afford to take advantage of superior materials, wherever they might be, and to ship their products for longer distances to their markets.

Then came the third stage: The relative fall of transportation costs which was so dramatic in the nineteenth century was arrested and finally reversed in the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, many local markets grew sufficiently large to accommodate plants with most or all of the cost advantages associated with mass production.¹⁵ As a result, the pattern of expansion of the large firms tended more and more toward the establishment of plants closer to their local markets.¹⁶

¹⁴ The pattern described above is clearer for some industries than for others; it fits reasonably well, for example, with respect to boot and shoe manufacture, flour milling, iron and steel making, and non-ferrous metal refining. Cf. E. M. Hoover, Jr., *Location Theory and the Shoe and Leather Industries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), p. 115 *passim*; M. S. Gordon, *Employment Expansion and Population Growth* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), p. 36; Carter Goodrich and others, *Migration and Economic Opportunity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), pp. 53-54, 305-9; H. F. Williamson (Editor), *The Growth of the American Economy* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp. 154-88, 432-509, 699 *passim*.

¹⁵ This implies that the optimum scale of plant had not been increasing during the period at a sufficient pace to offset the tendency toward market orientation created by other forces. For the present, this is in fact our working assumption.

¹⁶ Notice that this analysis neglects altogether the role which may have been played by regional differences in costs other than materials such as labor costs, power costs, taxes,

During the same period of 50 to 100 years, another force was weakening the relative attraction of raw material sources for industrial location and was increasing the pull toward markets. This was the constantly increasing degree of fabrication characteristic of products offered to consumers. As time went on, the products of farm, forest, and mine were subjected to increasingly complex manufacturing processes and to increasingly intricate assembly. Indeed, in some cases, "raw" materials were entirely displaced by fabricated materials such as artificial fibers and plastic products produced in establishments whose locational choice was not nearly so restricted as the sources of the displaced raw materials.¹⁷

Of course, if manufacturing firms had chosen to elaborate their processes solely through the expansion of their existing plants or through the creation of multiple plant structures at their original sites, the developments suggested above might not have shifted the distribution of manufacturing plants and might not have increased the tendency toward industrial clusters. But the increasing complexity of the processes meant an increasing complexity of "inputs" both of raw materials and of intermediate products. This increasing complexity

rent, and so on. That such factors did play a role in the regional redistribution of some industries such as textiles and radio manufactures, goes without saying. Preliminary results of various studies now under way, however, leave one with the impression that the forces of raw material location, market size, and scale economies have been more important on the whole in redistributing industry than changing regional levels of factor costs.

¹⁷ A crude reflection of these tendencies is found in the fact that between 1870 and 1950 the number of persons engaged in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining rose only 21 per cent while those engaged in manufacturing rose 589 per cent. Adapted from Harold Barger, *Distribution's Place in the American Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 4.

reduced the importance of the location of any one material in the locational calculus. Locations which might be unfavorable in the supply of one material were sometimes attractive in the supply of another. The question of materials location became less important and that of market location correspondingly more so, especially where the location of markets coincided with the location of industrial clusters capable of providing many of the needed intermediate "inputs."

What is more, there is an impression among some economists that the elaboration of manufacturing processes has led to the development and growth of new intermediate industries in the United States—industries devoted primarily to supplying other manufacturers with fabricated products for further construction or assembly.¹⁸ This trend seems to have characterized the faster growing segments of our industrial structure such as the chemicals and metal-working industries. And the advantages of large-scale operation by these new producers of intermediate products have commonly led to the location of plants near the larger, diversified, industrial markets.¹⁹

¹⁸ Cf. G. J. Stigler, "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (June 1951), pp. 187-91. Stigler's argument in support of the growth of specialization does not rely on the increasing complexity of the production process and is based rather on the effects of growth itself.

¹⁹ The reader is warned, if warning were needed, that the assumption of disintegration implied by this description is no more than an impressionistic conclusion for which statistical verification is so far lacking. The warning is especially important because there have been striking illustrations flatly at variance with the specialization and disintegration trends suggested above, motivated by the desires of some producers to maintain control over their sources of material or their distribution channels. Besides, in some industries, economies have been developed which are dependent upon the extent of integration of an installation, such

Still another force may be operating to attract manufacturing firms toward their markets. In many lines of consumer goods, there has been a pronounced tendency over the years to depart from a few staple lines and to offer wider choices in colors, styles, packaging, and accessories. The classic case, perhaps, is that of house paints, where a proliferation of colors, textures, and packages has had a major impact on the industry. The effect of such an increase is twofold: It reduces the economies associated with large-scale operations; and it also increases the size of the inventories which have to be maintained at points of distribution, since the difficulty of forecasting the sales of many small lines is much greater than that involved in a few large lines.

Both results appear to have reduced the advantages of larger and more centrally located plants, that is, to the extent that such advantages may previously have existed. The opportunity for the larger firms to profit from large-scale operations and longer runs has declined. And the need for such firms to maintain decentralized regional shipping points has increased. As a result, the tendency has been for paint establishments to move toward the market. Other types of producers assailed by the same pressures may well have followed suit.

This chain of reasoning completes the picture for the present. If the sketch developed in the preceding pages is consistent with the facts, we are a nation

as economies through the recycling of scrap and the avoidance of the intermediate handling of bulky products; the development of the continuous strip mill in the steel industry is a case in point. A crude test of the validity of the concept that specialization and disintegration are growing might be made through comparing the structure of interindustry tables compiled for different years over an adequate period of time; but even this approach has its pitfalls and uncertainties.

tending toward regional self-sufficiency in the production of goods. The plants in each region are developing increasingly complex ties with one another. And although they are not showing any increasing tendency to settle within the borders of metropolitan areas, nevertheless one of the major determinants of their location is the size and location of these metropolitan clusters.

POPULATIONS AND JOBS

We have already observed that in the past half century urban areas of the United States have grown much faster than the nation as a whole. But during this time, the area of fastest population growth in the typical large metropolis appears to have lain in a ring surrounding the city center—a ring whose distance from the center has tended to increase as the city has grown.²⁰ The great mushrooming of suburbs after World War II carried on this long term trend at an accelerated tempo, perhaps as a reaction to the prior fifteen-year interruption occasioned by depression and war.

The shift in populations from city to suburb carried with it an inevitable shift in certain kinds of jobs. One may readily assume, for instance, that jobs in the retail trades and in household service lines followed the drift of households to the suburbs.²¹ But solid figures

²⁰ The pattern is clearer for the larger metropolitan areas than for the smaller; see A. H. Hawley, *The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America: Deconcentration Since 1920* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 42-43. But this is probably due to the fact that the faster growing ring in the smaller metropolitan areas is usually contained within the political boundaries of the central city and is therefore not separately available from Census data.

²¹ Manageable data on this point are not available prior to 1939. For 1939 to 1947, see R. P. Cuzzort, *Suburbanization of Service Industries within Standard Metropolitan Areas* (Oxford: Miami University Press, 1955), p. 17, Table II-4; although Cuzzort's measure-

measuring the long-term shift in jobs between the periphery and the center of the large metropolitan areas are only available with respect to manufacturing employment. We shall begin, then, by exploring the movement of jobs for this sector of the nation's economy.

Manufacturing employment over the past half century has tended to grow at the periphery of the larger urban areas at a faster rate than at the center. The trend toward an outward redistribution of manufacturing jobs has been gradual but persistent, and it has characterized the overwhelming majority of the major metropolitan areas.²² By 1955, manufacturing jobs in the centers of those areas were no longer a major element. In New York City, for instance, only 24 per cent of the total jobs were reported in manufacturing whereas the ring counties reported 39 per cent of their jobs in the manufacturing category.

To understand these shifts, we must first of all explore the differences in function between these two portions of the large urban area. A clue to some of

ments unfortunately do not distinguish business from household services, they are reliable enough to indicate the shift. From 1947 to 1955, the experience of the New York metropolitan region illustrates the trend; counties outside the central city—New York City—recorded a rise in retail jobs of 41 per cent while retail jobs in New York City declined 6 per cent.

²² Of the total production workers in 33 industrial areas in 1899, 68.3 per cent were in the "principal cities" of the areas whereas the comparable figure by 1947 was 59.2 per cent; conversely 31.7 per cent in 1899 were in the rings of these areas, whereas the 1947 figure was 40.8 per cent. Adapted from Coleman Woodbury (Editor), *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), p. 253. Of total production workers in 48 large standard metropolitan areas in 1929, 66.5 per cent were in the "central cities" of the areas whereas the comparable figure for 1954 was 58.6 per cent. Compiled from E. M. Kitagawa and D. J. Bogue, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), App. B, and from preliminary 1954 *Census of Manufactures* releases.

these differences is offered by the fact that for large metropolitan areas, the manufacturing plants in the core of the area tend to be smaller than those located at the periphery. Part of this difference is due, of course, to the fact that the industries of the core differ in character from those of the ring. But part of the relationship is due also to the fact that even within any given industry the firms in the center are smaller than those at the periphery.

The situation in the New York metropolitan area in 1954 is typical. At that time, the average manufacturing firm in New York City had only 25 employees whereas the average for firms elsewhere in the region was 60 employees. This relationship held, industry by industry, for 19 of the 20 major industry groups into which manufacturing activity was divided; and spot-checks indicated that the relationship continued to hold for fairly fine subindustries as well.²³

There are various reasons why small firms in a given industry should have a greater affinity for a core location than their larger competitors. As one pictures the situation of a small manufacturing firm in competition with larger establishments, one of its chief problems is to approximate the economies which are available to its larger competitors because of their size. The small firm may solve the problem, to the extent that it can be solved at all, by subcontracting portions of its manufacturing or maintenance operations to specialists whose scale of operations allows them to achieve the necessary economies. But where a variety of subcontracting operations is a vital and continuing portion of the operation, the manufacturer will wish to

be physically close to his suppliers. His suppliers, in turn—being specialists who rely on a variety of such customers—will wish to be close to the greatest cluster of such customers. The equilibrium point for such an interrelated mass is bound to be close to the center of the urban complex.

"EXTERNAL ECONOMIES"

The same concept, in fact, may be applied *in extenso* to the wide range of "external economies" of a metropolitan area. The small firm in a given industry usually needs the fractional use of transportation facilities; it is likely to use less-than-carload and less-than-truckload transport to a greater degree than its competitors. In securing fractional transport of this sort the small firm can often obtain better service and better terms in the center of the large metropolitan area than either at the periphery or in smaller metropolitan areas. For the volume of business in the large metropolitan area develops enough specialists in this kind of transportation to introduce scale economies and to push down rates and service toward levels more nearly competitive with the rates and service available for carload and truckload lots.²⁴

The phenomenon of substituting "external economies" in the metropolitan

²⁴ Freight forwarders accounted for 14 per cent of the outbound carload rail traffic of the New York metropolitan region in 1955, compared with less than 2/10 of 1 per cent for the nation as a whole. Another reflection of these scale economies appears in the fact that the incidence of "commodity rates" as distinguished from "class rates" is greater in the larger metropolitan areas; "commodity rates," of course, are far lower than "class rates." A large shipper may have the bargaining power to compel carriers to initiate such rates for given commodities in locations outside metropolitan areas where they have not previously existed but the bargaining power of smaller shippers is proportionately weaker.

core for scale economies available elsewhere—more strictly, the phenomenon of securing the advantages of scale economies by buying from specialists in the product or service concerned—can be observed in a number of other production costs. Power, water, sewage, police, and fire protection can present similar problems for the small firm. Requirements which in a less populous area would involve a large indivisible expenditure, such as a power transformer or a plant policeman, may be satisfied in the city by a divisible service fee. And the service fee may reduce the small producer's handicap vis-à-vis his larger competitor.

The core of the metropolitan area offers opportunities not only to overcome the handicap of insufficient size but also to deal with the costs engendered by various uncertainties. The odds are that in any given industry small firms are more uncertain than large—more uncertain about their future sales, more uncertain about their future labor needs, and more uncertain about their future space needs. One way to meet such uncertainties is to control more inventory, more labor, and more space than is immediately needed; but it is a solution which does not recommend itself to the small typically capital-starved manufacturing firm. Another partial solution is to locate in rented quarters which are flexible in area and short-run as to commitment; to stay close by a large labor market from which temporary labor needs are readily mustered; and to be near sources capable of supplying added materials on short notice. These considerations have dominated the locational decisions of many small firms in the New York metropolitan region and have persuaded them to cling to a location near the region's center.

So far we have spoken of the large firm versus the small in some given industry. But the tendencies suggested

above are stronger in some industries than in others. There are industries, for example, whose product is continually subject to significant change and whose outlook accordingly is constantly colored by uncertainty as to the quantity and nature of the "inputs." Such industries tend to deal in unstandardized materials and to produce unstandardized finished products. Firms in industries of this sort typically must make their locational decisions with due regard for their need to draw on a variety of collateral sources for materials and processes and their need to examine directly the color, texture, or degree of workmanship of these collateral products and processes. In such cases, too, firms must plan to display their unstandardized finished products at some point convenient to the prospective buyer in order to facilitate the comparative shopping which is characteristic of the sale of unstandardized products.

Industries which possess these characteristics are typically dominated by small sized firms. Where raw materials are unstandardized or constantly changing; where the processes involved are in continual flux; where the end product is not standardized; in such cases, there are few economies associated with large-scale operations and large firms cannot readily dominate the market. This interplay among size and standardization suggests why "unstandardized" industries organized on a small-firm basis such as high-style dresses and hats, buttons, furs, toys, jobprinting, and magazine publishing have an affinity to the city's center.

FACTORS IN FIRMS' SHIFT TO THE PERIPHERY

If these are the functions of the core and the ring of urban areas, what accounts for the pronounced shifts that have been taking place between the core

²³ For 48 large standard metropolitan areas in 1954, the average manufacturing firm in the central city had 38 employees while the average manufacturing firm in the ring had 62 employees. In 1947 the comparable figures were respectively 42 and 77.

and the ring within such areas?²⁵ One element in the outward shift has been the movement of small firms graduating to larger size in some given industry. Numerous analyses have been conducted on the subject of plant migration, covering a number of areas and varying circumstances.²⁶ All the surveys are vulnerable, of course, in the sense that they have sought to classify and categorize a decision-making process—a process culminating in a decision to move—which at best is complex, obscure, and highly

²⁵ The explanation which follows places heavy emphasis on the cost side of the locational equation. But part of the explanation for the shift may perhaps be found on the demand side: Employment in the types of manufacturing which require a core location may be growing more slowly than other types of employment requiring this kind of location such as business services; see the succeeding section on the locational requirements of business services. Where central locations have been scarce, the latter group of demands may have bid space away from the former. This possibility needs more testing, however, before it can be seriously advanced.

²⁶ Cf. Business Executives' Research Council and Faculty Committee, *Chicago's Metropolitan Growth* (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1955), pp. 40-45; G. H. Ellis, "Why New Manufacturing Establishments Located in New England: August 1945 to June 1948," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, *Monthly Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (April 1949), pp. 1-12; J. I. Griffin, *Industrial Location in the New York Area* (New York: City College Press, 1956); R. M. Haig, *Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs*, Vol. I (New York: Committee on Regional Planning of New York and its Environs, 1927); W. N. Leonard and C. D. Stonier, *Industry Looks at Long Island*, Part I (Hempstead: Hofstra College, 1956); G. E. McLaughlin and Stefan Robock, *Why Industry Moves South* (Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1949); P. M. Reid, "Movement of Manufacturing Establishments 1937-1949 and Factors Influencing Location of Plants" (Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, 1949, mimeographed); School of Business Administration of Seton Hall University, *Reasons for Relocation of New Jersey Manufacturing Firms, 1955* (South Orange: Seton Hall University, 1955).

subjective in character. What is more, since the firms involved were usually interviewed after they had made the decision, their reasons before the fact and their rationalizations after the fact are probably hopelessly intertwined.

Yet the studies are astonishingly consistent in one respect. They show that in a high percentage of cases the triggering factor which led manufacturing firms to move away from the center of metropolitan regions was that they were running out of existing space at their central location. Second in importance was a variety of other asserted problems: high labor costs, high taxes, traffic congestion, onerous city fire and health ordinances, local graft, and so on. But none of these problems appears to have had primacy over the space problem.

The decision to move, then, appears superficially to be associated with growth. And this is precisely what one would expect if the hypotheses outlined earlier have any validity. For the growth of firms, according to our reasoning, reduces their reliance on otherwise indivisible inputs of labor and capital, such as a few hours' work on electrical wiring or the part-time use of a metal-stamping machine. At some stage in the firm's growth, it is in a position to take on these indivisible elements at a unit cost which compares favorably with the subcontractors' price. What is more, the growth of a firm probably reduces the level of its uncertainty as well, allowing it to plan its space, inventory, and labor needs with a surer hand and with less concern for violent fluctuations in these needs. As a result, the special pull of the center of the urban complex is greatly weakened.

As the outward movement of growing firms has progressed, the small firms which have sprung up to fill the resulting vacuum have not been sufficient to allow the growth of manufacturing employment at the center of our large

metropolitan areas to keep pace with the growth of the ring; indeed, of late, there has even been an absolute decline in manufacturing jobs at the center of many large metropolitan areas.²⁷ This has been due in part, no doubt, to the fact that the truck has displaced the dray horse; interplant hauling, therefore, may now take place in a wider area. But there is a strong probability that it has been due also to the fact that the periphery of many of these urban areas, having developed their own industrial complexes, can now provide many of the "external economies" once available primarily at the center. In short, fractional transportation and service facilities and the easy availability of added space, materials, and labor, so indispensable in some industries for the small firm competing with larger rivals, now are available over wider geographical areas.²⁸

The shift of the small manufacturing firm probably has not been the only factor contributing to the net outward movement of manufacturing jobs in metropolitan areas. The changing technical requirements of large firms also have added to the drift. Over the past half-century the tendency of large firms in many lines of manufacture has been to move from "batch" production to continuous production. Such a shift characteristically involves a basic change in the flow of materials inside the factory. In general, the shift consists of bringing the materials in a regular flow to fixed

²⁷ From 1947 to 1954, for instance, manufacturing jobs in the city of Chicago (not the "standard metropolitan area") fell by 8 per cent; in Boston by 6 per cent; in San Francisco by 8 per cent; in Cleveland by 3 per cent; and in St. Louis by 8 per cent.

²⁸ A striking illustration is afforded by the recent exodus of Alexander Smith & Co. from Yonkers, N. Y. The firm vacated 60 buildings on a 35-acre site with no obvious successor. But the space was taken up at once by a heterogeneous collection of small manufacturing firms.

stations at which machines and labor are located; it reduces the movement of labor and the use of movable machines in the plant. Since it is ordinarily easier to engineer a continuous flow of materials in a single-level plant than in multi-story structures, this development has encouraged a preference for horizontal layouts in large plants. As a result, large establishments tend to avoid cramped sites more than they did in the past; the overwhelming preference is for open sites where horizontal expansion in any direction is relatively unimpeded.

SERVICES AT THE CENTER

The slack at the center of large metropolitan areas created by the shifting locus of manufacturing jobs has been taken up in part by jobs of other types. Data which might afford a long-term perspective of this process cannot be had readily, but recent figures for the New York metropolitan region illustrate the trend. From 1947 to 1955, for instance, while manufacturing jobs in New York City fell by 42,000, the number of jobs in finance, insurance, and real estate increased by 28,000.

Some of the reasons for the attraction of business services to the center are suggested by our discussion of the location of manufacturing establishments. It is a small step from the proposition that "unstandardized" manufacturing operations are attracted to the core of our urban areas to an understanding of the core's attraction for such business services as central offices, advertising agencies, law firms, commercial banks, and certain types of salesrooms. Some of these services, like the manufacturing establishments just discussed, have the need to gather up a heterogeneous and constantly changing mix of unstandardized "inputs." For the central office, these "inputs" consist of the counsel of lawyers and bankers, the gossip of the trade, the advice of advertising agencies

and management firms, the major negotiated decisions of large suppliers or large customers; a varied, unstandardized mix requiring face-to-face confrontation with a wide variety of other entities. For the advertising agency or the publishing firm, one adds the materials obtained from free-lance writers and artists, the layouts of printers, and so on.

As we already intimated in our earlier discussion regarding manufacturing firms, it is the unstandardized nature not only of the inputs but also of the outputs which pulls the service industries toward the urban core. Purveyors of advertising space or high-style clothing, diamond merchants, and art dealers offer products which are unstandardized in character and which require face-to-face communication. The buyer of all these services or products will wish to see them and engage in comparative shopping before making a purchase. The seller whose service or product cannot be shopped at minimum cost to the buyer will be handicapped in the market, and his handicap will increase in proportion as the product is unstandardized.

FUTURE TRENDS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

At this point, a certain amount of recapitulation may be in order. We have argued that the larger urban areas have grown in their relative importance because there has been a shift in demand from agriculture to services, because the relative importance of raw material locations has fallen, because the manufacturing role of individual establishments may have tended to become more specialized and interrelated, and because local markets may have grown sufficiently to support more local plants enjoying large-scale production economies.

It would be helpful if one could attach some rough quantitative measure to each of these forces, distinguishing the highly significant from the inconse-

quential. But our research has not yet reached this level of exactitude; perhaps it never will. Yet this limitation does not prevent us from concluding that if these are some of the major causes of comparative urban growth, we have not seen the end of it. Of course, the decline of agriculture's relative position cannot go much further; the agricultural work force is now down to under 10 per cent of the nation's total labor force. But the rise in business services will probably continue. New techniques for the planning and control of the production and distribution processes are spreading; data-processing devices are developing rapidly; research activities are constantly increasing; and all of these elements seem likely to add to the "nonproductive" functions associated with the making and transporting of goods.

Moreover, as new raw materials may affect the location of industry, they are likely to orient manufacturing plants toward larger urban locations.²⁰ While atomic power should be just beginning to have an effect on location in the next quarter century, it will free power generating stations and heavy power users from their affinity to coal and oil sources. As for other raw materials, the more spectacular locational shifts are likely to be movements from domestic interior sources to foreign sources; and this should add to the growth of urban areas surrounding the ports which are in a position to handle bulk materials.

This leaves for consideration one more tendency suggested above—the increasing specialization of the manufacturing

²⁰ One should note the distinction, however, between an urban "orientation" and an urban "location"; the former might well be in the countryside several trucking hours away from the urban center. Indeed, we have been struck by the frequency with which firms outlining their locational requirements have stated them in terms of the number of trucking hours from New York City.

process. Here the crystal ball is murkiest, just as the history is most obscure. But if events prove to be on the side of theory, this development also could contribute to future urban growth.

The odds are, then, that insofar as production and distribution trends have a hand in the process, they will encourage growth in the metropolitan areas at a rate faster than our total national growth. This growth, of course, will engender all sorts of problems even while it produces all sorts of benefits. The other essays of this volume are sure to deal in full with both. A recapitulation of them here would only be needlessly repetitive.

But there is one aspect of this shifting pattern which will offer a particular challenge to the economist. This is the changing distribution of economic activities between the ring and the core of the growing urban areas. Our research so far suggests that the core of these areas will be exposed to a confusing tangle of conflicting tendencies—tendencies whose relative quantitative importance may be somewhat clearer by the time such research has been completed. On the one hand, some of the demands for space in the core will grow; the space demands of the service industries, for instance, may increase radically. On the other hand, major productivity increases in some of these activities, such as the data-processing function of offices, may place a damper on such growth since comparatively fewer people and consequently less additional space may be needed to handle the larger output.

Besides, only certain elements of these activities demand a central urban location, namely, the elements which involve unstandardized inputs or outputs. Thus, while the executive suite is likely to stay fairly close to a downtown location, the data processors may be placed in less expensive and less congested

space elsewhere. By the same token, though the showroom for high-style products may have to remain close to other showrooms for similar products, the manufacturing operations may well move to other quarters. Much depends on the extent to which industry and trade move in the direction of increased specialization, separating manufacturing from wholesaling.³⁰ Much depends on the rate of internal growth of the establishments involved and on their ability to make their overhead costs divisible: To separate the vice-president for finance, who demands a city location, from the cost accountant, who does not, and to separate the chief salesman of high-style dresses from the production supervisor.

"PROBLEMS" OF THE DECLINE OF THE CENTRAL CITY

The net effects of tendencies of this sort may differ from one urban area to the next. But some central cities are bound to lose on balance in population and in employment. Is this a "problem"? "Problems" are in the eye of the beholder. For some, any tendency which holds down the growth of the congested central city is not a problem but a solution; according to their lights, the psychic income from working and living outside the environment of the central city is so high as to offset other considerations. For others, street congestion or long journeys to work are minor inconveniences compared to the stimulation and rewards of the city environment.

However that may be, the decline of the central city where it occurs will be elevated to the status of a major prob-

³⁰ Note Stigler's view that there is a tendency for the wholesaling function to be more and more separated from the manufacturing function by specialization. G. F. Stigler, *Trends in Employment in the Service Industries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 144.

lem by city governments and city property owners and will command increasing attention from economists and political scientists. To arrest the trend, numerous proposals will be made to do something about the obvious irritations—to ease the suburbanites' journey to work and shop in the central city and to reduce the problems of downtown trucking traffic. Vigorous action on these fronts could slow the outward drift, no doubt; but if the hypotheses suggested above are valid, one wonders if relief on these fronts really gets at the heart of the problem.

If the "problem" as the larger city sees it is to arrest the outward job flow, its leverage might conceivably be greater if governmental action were directed to the provision of modern factory space at the core than if a similar effort were made in transportation, parking, and streets. From the viewpoint of the type of manufacturer who finds a city location most attractive, such space would be particularly desirable if it could be had on a flexible basis and a short-term lease; and it would be even more attractive if it could be organized in the type of clusters in which the unstandardized, disintegrated, smaller firm industries tend to arrange themselves. Such measures, of course, could exacerbate other "problems" for the city; they could load the streets with greater traffic and keep the use of commuting facilities close to their capacity. Yet they could well constitute the most effective approach to the "problem" of the city as the city conceived it.

The improvement of mass transit would probably have the effect of preserving some job opportunities in the central city. But the odds are that its greatest impact would be in slowing down the outward drift of the repetitive mass-production elements of the large-office operation. For the labor force involved in these operations—

young women marking time for marriage and older women returning to the labor force as the second breadwinner in the family—could well find the difficulties of an overburdened transit system too much to stand for the reward of a downtown working regime. If these were the jobs which the city were determined to retain, the leverage of mass transit improvement might be greater than any alternative.

But no two cities will put exactly the same priorities on their many "problems." And some may place a high premium on providing better job opportunities for the low-income groups—in the larger Eastern cities, for the Negroes and Puerto Ricans—crammed into the run-down private housing and the subsidized public housing bordering on the city's core. In these situations, the improvement of mass transit may be irrelevant, even inimical, to attaining the city's goal. For necessity is the mother of adaptation; and it could well be that employers who had no other choice would learn to staff their offices and their showrooms with the labor force at hand rather than to move their labor-using office operations to the suburbs. A great deal would depend on the training of these minorities, on the attitudes prevalent among employers in a given area, and on the speed of progress in office mechanization. But if the city saw its "problem" in these terms, the avoidance of mass transit improvement might prove, paradoxically, to be its most productive course.

FREIGHT MOVEMENT AND URBAN TRANSPORTATION WEB

Meanwhile, as manufacturing pushes its way into the suburbs, there is a considerable likelihood that new patterns of freight movement will develop. If regional self-sufficiency continues to grow and if the plants within each region continue to develop the extensive patterns

of interrelationship which our analysis suggests, truck traffic from point to point within each large urban area may grow considerably faster than hauls between points situated in different areas. This would mean that urban areas would have to accommodate themselves to more diffused crosshauling from one suburb to the next, rather than to radial movements to and from the central city.

As one examines the transportation web of some of our major urban areas, he is struck by their inadequacy for dealing with these developments. The transportation system of the New York metropolitan region, for instance, consists of a series of rail lines converging in a radial pattern on the New York port. While lighterage facilities afford a link between these lines in a limited area of the region's core, there is no quick and easy means for rail connection between plants dispersed in different parts of the region. The highway pattern also is largely radial in nature, converging on the congested core of the region; and while fragments of circumferential routes do exist at some points, the easy linkage of plants situated at far-flung points on the region's circumference is still far from being developed.

Boston presents a somewhat similar picture, but illustrates at the same time the extent of the pent-up demand for circumferential routes; the recent development of one such route around portions of the Boston metropolitan region produced a response of unanticipated dimensions in new plant locations and in added traffic. Chicago—to use another illustration—has overcome some of the limitations of a radial rail system through the development of various circumferential belt lines and rail interchange arrangements, but her highway system stresses the movement of goods in and out of the center of the region.

Although radial traffic in goods in urban areas may not grow as fast as the

circumferential flows, such traffic may create new problems because of an increasing shift to less-than-truckload lots. This should occur as wholesalers continue to move their warehousing operations to the periphery and as retailers grow increasingly insistent on smaller and more frequent deliveries to avoid the use of high-cost space for stocks. It might be prudent to plan for radial traffic, therefore, on the assumption that increasing proportions will be in small lots with frequent drops.

One last comment on a more general plane: The haul and pull between the city and its suburbs can be stated in terms of the rivalries of the sort which the paragraphs above have suggested. Or else they may be stated in terms of standards which look on the well-being of the metropolitan region as a whole as the planner's goal. It is not for the writer to make the choice; this will be made by the attitudes of the people in the region and by the political structure which they adopt. But for a long time economists have hammered home a point of homely wisdom which bears repeating in this connection. Different areas offer different opportunities for specialization which, when they are exploited, may add to the aggregate income and well-being of the region to which these areas belong. This creates a presumption that the land-using potentials of any metropolitan region are best exploited by a joint consideration of all the areas which go to make it up—not of the central city alone or of the fragmented suburbs. This is a presumption which may not stand up in the individual case; ineptness and corruption could be combined in a coalition of the central city and its suburbs, which would be more harmful than rivalry. But the presumption is still there, and it offers the safest starting point from which to view the economic problems of the larger metropolitan region.

Transportation

By WILFRED OWEN

Abstract: Looking backward from the city of 1982 to the late 1950's, we are struck by the tremendous progress that has taken place in transportation. The most far-reaching changes have occurred in aviation, but equally important has been the changing urban environment which has provided a setting in which ease of movement has at last become a reality. It is this combination of better transport and urban redevelopment and planning that has made urban life in 1982 so different from the blighted and congested city living in 1957.

THE urban resident of 1982, looking back over the past quarter century, has seen many startling changes both in transport and in urban living itself. Indeed, so great have these changes been that today's urban dweller finds it difficult to visualize the traffic troubles that beset the urbanized areas of 1957. Yet history tells us that as recently as the late 1950's cities were virtually strangling from congestion, and many people were suggesting a return to railroads and subways as the only solution. The automobile, they said, was strangling the city. A nation could not be urbanized and motorized at the same time!

If the remedies then proposed seem fantastic to us today, there is no question that the ills they sought to cure were real. The daily journey between home and work had become a nightmare. People who patronized public transit vehicles were jammed into overcrowded electric cars or buses, forced to stand for long distances, and subjected to slow movement and frequent delays. Those who provided their own transportation in private automobiles were hardly better off. Many of these vehicles were equipped with as much as 200 horsepower engines, yet thousands of these road monsters could be seen each morn-

ing and evening lined up for miles, crawling at a snail's pace along the most antiquated public highways. When they finally reached their destination many of them would be unable to find a place to stop. Even at home the vehicle often proved too long and wide to squeeze inside the garage.

There were many vain and costly attempts to combat the "traffic jams" of those days. Equally fruitless were efforts to "modernize" public transit and to persuade frustrated drivers to abandon their cars and ride the bus. All these efforts designed to improve transport conditions were bound to fail, of course, because the problem was not primarily one of providing better transportation, but of building better cities.

The basic trouble with cities in those times was that almost all available space was used up, and the density of both residential and working population was so great that no conceivable system of transportation could carry with efficiency the loads of passengers and freight that needed to move. Added to that, everybody insisted on moving to the same places at the same time. In the morning hours commuters would descend on the city in droves to work in the central areas they refused to live in. Closer

areas that would have been more convenient than the distant suburbs were marked by blight and decay, and their lack of light and air and open space compelled people who could afford higher living costs to flee to the newer suburbs.

Planless suburban development caused blight to spread farther into the countryside as this outward flight continued, and the journey to work lengthened as a result. Before long, one sprawling metropolis was running into another. No longer could our transportation provide us with the means of fleeing the intolerable living conditions of our cities. We were forced to stop and consider the basic cause of our difficulties—the thoughtless and haphazard design of our urban areas, their lack of beauty and open space, their disregard for the satisfactions and amenities of life that even in those days were sought by people in all walks of life.

Redevelopment of the older cities and planned development of new urban land have erased most of the urban scars of a quarter century ago. These changes have been accompanied by a rapid extension of urban living. Today we see a very high percentage of the entire eastern half of the country "urbanized." Along the West coast the situation is the same. Cities that were once dots on the rural landscape are now the landscape itself. But they are not the congested urban areas of yesterday, for they are dotted with frequent farms, forests, and park and recreation lands that wise people before us fought successfully to establish and preserve.

The dispersed pattern of urban living that has made all this possible has in turn been made feasible largely through the remarkable progress of transportation. Industrial location is no longer dictated by the availability or lack of transport. Man has learned not only how to overcome time and distance by swift and convenient movement, but he

has also learned to organize himself and his community to reduce to a minimum the amount of travel necessary. He has learned to build an environment for both enjoyable living and the effective conduct of economic activity.

In the 1950's we never quite grasped the fact that the basic solution to problems of moving in urban areas was to improve the livability of the urban areas themselves. We missed the obvious point that with a favorable environment the transport problem could almost take care of itself. We had at our disposal more advanced transport technology than at any previous time in history. Yet with all these methods of movement, however crude, it was a wonder that we were able to move at all.

Today, when travel to the moon has become a commonplace, it is strange indeed to think that those who came before us had such trouble getting to work. But it must be remembered that the great technical break-through in transport did not occur until the 1960's. Only then did we begin in earnest to design and plan our cities in such a way as to minimize unnecessary movement yet maximize the opportunity to move. This combination of technological innovation and a growing understanding of urban planning started us on the way toward the urban America we now enjoy.

KEY ROLE OF AVIATION

If one attempted to single out the most important influence on urban living in the past quarter century, surely it would be the progress made in aviation. To be sure, nuclear energy has also played a major part in the revolutionary changes during the fascinating 1960's and 1970's, but the application of this new source of power to transport has provided the most spectacular gains. These innovations actually began to be felt a quarter century ago, but it was

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much too early then to visualize the ultimate consequences for the city.

Some of our older readers will remember that the late 1950's saw the first nuclear-powered aircraft in flight and the first nuclear-powered merchant ship, tanker, and railroad locomotive. In the world of aviation, pioneers like Hiller, Kaman, and Piasecki were already at their drawing boards, dreaming of the safe, low-cost "flying automobile" that is now taken for granted. Direct-lift aircraft were also in use on a limited scale. Helicopters whirled incongruously over metropolitan areas with bags of mail and an occasional passenger.

But air service was otherwise limited almost entirely to long-distance travel in lumbering propeller-driven airplanes that had to be "grounded" when airports were "closed in" by weather. These awkward vehicles required great distances for take-off and landing and therefore enormous airports that were generally located as far as possible from where people wanted to go. On some trips, passengers spent more time on the ground getting to and from the airport than they spent in the air! Yet many minds were already at work on vertical take off and landing, and some crude models of today's convertiplanes were actually flying.

At that time private transportation was confined almost entirely to the ground. In 1957 there were 55 million passenger automobiles and only 85 thousand private planes. These latter vehicles were of limited utility since they were not operated to and from one's home, but were left quite inconveniently at an airport. Thus the inherent flexibility and convenience of private air transport were cancelled by this dependence on "flying fields," and the crude "fixed-wing" plane offered little of the ease and safety of travel that the popular helicopter models of more recent years have provided.

Yet in the space of only a few years the safety of flying one's own airmobile has far surpassed that of the automobile of the 1950's. At that time people were driving cars at speeds of 60 to 80 miles per hour along the ground with no electronic protection and with only a few feet separating them from opposing traffic. The owner of today's airmobile shudders to think of the hazards of travel that our parents accepted as a matter of course.

REVIVAL OF MASS TRANSIT

If air transport was still in its infancy in the 1950's, ground transport was largely the victim of old age. Some rail public carriers were using equipment forty years old. Working people were jammed into subway cars and buses in the morning and evening "rush" hours with resulting delays and discomforts that were apparently suffered without protest. Many will recall the decrepitude of public transportation and how people were forced to travel for long distances in steaming hot weather without air conditioning.

Local public transit in the 1950's was branded a "dying industry," and studies seemed to indicate that a continuing downward trend in patronage was inevitable. But all-weather local air service has completely changed the transit picture. With transit in the air as well as on the ground, the condition of public carriers is better than ever before. Just as the bus displaced the street car, the air bus has now relegated many a highway bus to a place in history. Today the heliport is as familiar to the urban resident as the bus stop was a generation ago.

The big multiengine all-weather helicopters furnish speedy and comfortable on-time service for up to 200 passengers on commuting runs. These air vehicles displaced railroad commuter service years ago, relieving both the com-

muter and the railroads. In contrast to rail lines that led to the city center like the spokes of a wheel, helicopter routes literally blanket the urban area. They serve a great number of widely separated destinations rather than dump their passengers, as the railroad did, at downtown stations generally removed from places where people wanted to go.

The economy of helicopter commuting has been greatly increased by the speed of these vehicles which permits them to make several round trips morning and night. This is in contrast to the single trip to which many rail commuting trains were limited. The freedom of an air vehicle from fixed routes likewise has permitted helicopter lines to engage in other activities in off-peak hours. Many serve as "school buses" or are used for such off-peak operations as sightseeing and recreation trips on week ends and holidays. Thus the transit industry has largely overcome the perplexing problems that resulted from the inflexibility of rail lines, the congestion of the highways, and the economic burden of high week-day peak loads and underutilization of capacity during off-peak periods.

STAGGERED HOURS AT LAST

Not the least contribution to the health of public transit (and the sanity of the working population) has been the staggering of hours of work. The possibilities of staggering hours of arrival and departure were resisted for many years by both employees and management. It was believed that staggered work hours would disrupt family life, requiring some workers to report too early and others to leave too late. And business offices needed to be open at the same hours, it was argued, to maintain necessary day-to-day contacts among companies.

Since then, of course, we have learned that most businesses do not need to op-

erate on precisely the same schedule as every other business; that the number of necessary contacts among industries are not as great as was supposed. Moreover, shorter hours of work have made possible considerable staggering without requiring too early a departure from home or too late a return at night. Industries that have elected to take their added leisure time in a five-day week of six-hour days have found it possible to stagger hours of arrival from 8 to 11 A.M. and hours of departure from 2 to 5 P.M. The effect has been to reduce greatly the load on the transportation system. The speeding up in commuter travel has further reduced the total hours per day that are consumed in earning a livelihood.

Where a four-day week with longer working days has been adopted, there has been a further staggering effect. Persons employed in these industries go to work earlier and leave later than those on the short day. The practice of staggering the week ends has also had a salutary effect both on working day traffic and on week-end recreational travel. Some workers take Friday, Saturday, and Sunday off; others prefer Saturday, Sunday and Monday, or Sunday, Monday and Tuesday. Thus one of the most important underlying factors in the street congestion of former times—the excessive peaking of traffic—has been largely eliminated, thanks to the increased productivity of modern industry.

COMMUNITY PLANNING

While staggered hours have accomplished the objective of spreading traffic over time, the regional planner can take credit for two additional accomplishments. First, he has helped to eliminate a large volume of unnecessary travel in urbanized areas. Second, he has helped to spread traffic over a greater area, thus

reversing the former tendency for traffic to converge on the "central business district."

Twenty-five years ago we were doing a great deal of talking about city planning, but very few people understood what master planning was and why the effort to achieve it was so important. The architect at that time confined his activities to designing separate buildings generally unrelated to their surroundings. No one knew how to design a city, and no one was given the opportunity to try. This made the problem of transportation particularly difficult, for the nature of the city established the character of the transport problem.

As recently as the 1950's land-use patterns and zoning regulations of urban areas had no relation whatever to the ability of the transportation system to move traffic. It was generally supposed that transportation problems could be solved simply by providing more transportation capacity. Effective solution, of course, called for limiting the demand for transport as well as supplying the capacity. Now we know that good transport service presupposes a balance between available transportation capacity and the traffic-generating uses of urban land.

In the great urban renewal efforts that have taken place during the past two decades and in the planning of new suburban growth, we have applied these lessons fairly well. We know now that parks and open spaces are needed for recreation and beauty and to make residential areas in densely populated areas more livable. We also know that they tend to counterbalance the traffic generation of built-up land. We have learned, too, that places of employment can be dispersed to avoid a senseless overconcentration of economic activities. And we have come to realize that it was the unattractiveness and lack of amenities in urban areas that led many of us

to "flee" to the suburbs, thus generating unnecessary travel and wasting time and energy in commuting. We have also learned, almost too late, that the only way to stop the sprawl of urban development is to reserve agricultural and park lands adjacent to the urban complex and to direct new growth into satellite communities.

These accomplishments of the regional planner would not have been possible without the assistance of new transport techniques that have furnished some of the most important tools with which to help fashion better urban communities. The history of transportation shows clearly how the radius of urban development has continued to lengthen with each succeeding transport innovation, from horse and buggy to street car, rail line, motor vehicle, and air vehicle. More recently it has been the direct-lift aircraft, of course, that has exerted the greatest influence in dispersing industry and population in the low-density patterns now typical. Equally important, however, has been the influence of the highway on the changing character of urban areas.

ROLE OF HIGHWAY TRANSPORT

To realize the full impact of modern highway transport on our urban areas we must recall that twenty-five years ago, although 65 million motor vehicles were already operating in the United States, most of the streets and highways on which they traveled were never designed for motorized traffic. In major cities there were fewer than 500 miles of motorways. Limited street space was shared by moving vehicles, pedestrians, parked cars, and trucks loading and unloading across the sidewalks. The old gridiron street pattern meant countless intersections that further impeded movement.

Traffic conditions in the new suburban areas that spread out in every direction

from the cities were hardly better. New highways were quickly lined with billboards, "gas" stations, used-car lots, and other developments that created a serious hazard for traffic and destroyed much of the beauty of the countryside.

Strict control of our roadsides and planned suburban satellite towns with their shopping centers and industrial parks have, of course, eliminated the roadside clutter we used to know. Redevelopment of the old slum-ridden cities, too, has replaced the plethora of inefficient streets with the present-day system of pedestrian esplanades with their benches and shade trees and outdoor cafes. In the 1950's we saw the city moving to the country. Since then there has been an equally spectacular reverse movement—the atmosphere of the country has moved into the city to achieve a blending of rural and urban living.

The design of roadways for motor traffic has also undergone very marked change to serve the dispersed character of the urban region. Not many years ago highway engineers stressed the need for six- and eight-lane "superhighways" in urban areas. These great arteries, as we later learned, were not the best way to provide free circulation. Some of them were necessary. But it soon became evident that high-capacity "superhighways" were causing traffic from a wide area to converge and thus create congestion. Getting on and off these traffic-attracting main routes also created heavy jams on the old street system that was supposed to feed traffic into the expressway and carry it off without delay.

In the city of the 1980's the remedy has been found in a reversal of the highway philosophy of the 1950's. Today we disperse traffic over an extensive network of less grandiose arteries instead of channeling it through a limited mileage of multilane "Interstate Highways." Thus

today's urban area is covered with a network of two-lane one-way controlled-access highways that serve all parts of the region and disperse movement rather than invite its concentration. This system enables feeder streets to function without being completely overwhelmed.

Now at last we can take advantage of the flexibility of motor transport instead of forcing the automobile into a strait jacket. Our penchant for building "superhighways" was apparently a throw-back to the "mainline" of the railroad. As history has demonstrated, however, the "branch line" that caused so much financial difficulty for rail passenger service has proved to be the salvation of highway transport.

AUTOMOBILES: THE NEW MODELS

The automobile, too, has undergone radical changes over the past quarter century to match the highways. Many readers will remember the automotive race of the 1950's when every manufacturer was trying to outbid the other with greater speed, power, size, and ornamentation. Even then the auto maker was subconsciously aware that one solution to congested traffic conditions was to get off the ground altogether. Advertisements in those days referred to strato-streak power, rocket engines, flight-sweep styling, high-swept fins, variable pitch dynafloes, turbo-glides, and push-button torque-flite. It was never clear who won the power race, but certainly it was not the consumer. His determination to await delivery of smaller European models ultimately persuaded the automobile industry in the United States to discontinue its emphasis on speed and to reduce power and size to conform more closely to what the majority of drivers operating in urban areas really needed. But an equally significant industry contribution has been the combination air-ground vehicle that many now prefer for longer trips.

One of the most interesting developments in local transport is the coin-activated car for local use when one has arrived by public transport and has no other means of short-run travel on the ground. The coin-activated car is in reality a combination of several ideas—the taxi, the rental car, and public transportation. Today one has only to insert a coin in the small drive-it-yourself car parked at the curb, proceed to destination, and leave it for the next customer. These cars remain fairly well distributed around the various shopping areas, although attendants must redistribute them from time to time. Moving sidewalks continue, however, to provide a major share of short-haul transportation in areas of relatively high-density development.

The achievement of safe motor transport is also a product of the 1960's. In 1957 it was predicted that we would kill a million people on our streets and highways in the next two decades. Aviation solved its safety problems early, but in highway transport no one had seriously tackled the accident situation. But a decade later the application of electronics to both the operation of motor vehicles and the regulation of highway traffic introduced an entirely new approach to coping with this nationwide problem. We saw in quick succession the development of automatic radar brakes, collision-free intersections, and all the other aids that have saved so many tens of thousands of lives in the past decade and a half.

REBIRTH OF THE PEDESTRIAN

When the automobile became established as a standard appliance in the American home, for a time it seemed that people would eventually refuse to walk anywhere. But as events developed, the automobile was probably the principal factor that directed attention to the plight of the pedestrian.

It all began with the suburban shopping center—a facility conceived as a means of accommodating business on wheels, but which actually forced the shopper to rely on his feet. The big shopping development excluded the automobile from its center by the location of parking areas on the fringes. Motorists were then expected to walk to the store, and architects, feeling somewhat sheepish about what they had done, put extra effort into making the walkways acceptable. They covered them to protect the pedestrian from the rain, just as the automobile some forty years before had acquired a top to furnish all-weather transportation. And they appealed to the aesthetics of the walker by planting trees and flowers to achieve something of the same visual excitement that Detroit had furnished the motorist with two-tone paint and chrome.

With this experience it was relatively easy for the architect and planner to take the bolder step of adapting to pedestrianism downtown. Sporadic efforts such as Penn Center in Philadelphia and Boston's Back Bay Center had led the way two decades before; and Fort Worth's redevelopment went even further in redesigning for the human being. One-third of a million people had been killed trying to walk in cities in competition with the motor vehicle before it became evident that these two methods of getting around had to be accommodated separately if the slaughter was to be ended.

The many "downtowns" of the 1980's are a far cry, of course, from the traffic-jammed centers of two or three decades ago. The superblock has eliminated many miles of unnecessary streets, and the construction of highways through the middle of blocks, and even through buildings, has helped to overcome the great waste of land for streets that never really provided the mobility we needed. The construction of cantilever sidewalks

at second-floor level has also been a boon to urbanites. A pedestrian can now walk almost anywhere in the built-up parts of the city without being hit, and the moving rubber belt walkway has doubled his speed.

THE BREAK-THROUGH IN PUBLIC POLICY

Although the ease of movement in the urban areas of the 1980's must be ascribed primarily to the combined impact of transport technology and regional planning, a third significant factor has been the introduction of public policies that have enabled us to establish the system of transport that technology has made possible.

One of the most significant public policy revisions has been the organization of regional transport facilities under one management. For many years a total approach to transportation development was impossible. Each form of transportation was handled separately. In the period of the 1950's and 1960's responsibility for transportation in a single urban area was often shared by private transit companies, bridge authorities, parking agencies, local highway departments, state highway departments, police and traffic departments, and railroad and taxi companies. There was no over-all management and no consistent pricing policy. By dividing the transport problem into many small parts we made it impossible to come up with anything like a complete answer.

Today departments of transportation are responsible for all forms of transportation in urban regions, including the provision of highways, heliports, bridges and tunnels, air and surface bus lines, belt conveyor systems, air and surface taxis, rail freight terminals, and parking areas for autos and airmobiles. These transport departments operate in accordance with over-all regional development plans and exercise the utmost care to as-

sure that locations and designs conform with densities and types of land use provided for in the regional development program.

The close relationship between transport planning and regional planning that we now accept as the only sensible approach to providing urban mobility is perhaps the most important of all the innovations in this field. It has helped us both to visualize more desirable urban development and to use transport facilities to implement plans for a more satisfactory urban environment.

Another area of achievement is in the field of finance. Today, with the problem of transport looked upon as one problem, the financial resources necessary to meet transport requirements are obtained through the contributions of all agencies of movement under the control of the transportation department. These include motor vehicle and aircraft taxes, bridge and tunnel tolls, transit and taxi fares, parking fees, and other transport charges. This total approach to financing transport facilities and their operation has made possible uniformly high standards of service. It has also eliminated the once universal tendency to neglect public transport services and to permit them to deteriorate to the point where their potential could no longer be realized.

Regulatory commissions with power to control the fares charged by public carriers were eliminated many years ago, and the pricing of transport services became one of the principal management tools of public transport agencies. Pricing policy is now aimed at assuring the necessary capital to keep pace with transport innovation in all fields and to maintain high-service standards throughout the system.

A SUMMARY VIEW

If the urban resident were to compare today's conditions with those of

1957, he would be impressed with the ease of movement, yet with the speed at which travel is accomplished. Despite this greater speed, traffic accidents are almost unheard of compared to the slaughter on the highways not many years ago. Part of the answer lies in the many applications of electronics to both vehicle and road and to the removal of a large volume of traffic to the air, where there is more room to move and even more positive control of traffic under all-weather conditions.

But in spite of these and many other innovations that previous generations would marvel to see, the most significant contribution to the vastly improved transport picture today comes from outside the field of transport. It is the redevelopment of our old cities and the bold planning of the newer urbanized regions. These great programs have enabled us to create an environment in which unnecessary movement has been minimized and necessary movement has been made easier and safer. Chief among the innovations of the planners has been the development of communities in which it is possible to walk with ease to work, to shop, and to play. This has been made possible by smaller self-

contained neighborhoods with conveniently located retail shopping areas, with employment opportunities close at hand, and with park and recreation facilities readily accessible.

In the evolution of urban communities toward an environment reflecting the needs of human beings, a basic goal was the reduction of population densities and at the same time the avoidance of sprawl. This has been accomplished by limiting the population and area covered by each community, and separating it from its neighbors by open space that performs a double duty. It provides nearby agricultural and recreational areas and at the same time permits ease of travel, on the ground or in the air, from one community to another. The resulting dispersed pattern of urban living makes it possible to enjoy the social, economic, and cultural advantages of urbanization without the crowding, congestion, ugliness, and deprivations of the planless cities of earlier times.

It is transport technology that has made this transformation possible. And it is the urban planner who has applied this technology to build the kind of urban communities of which Americans can at last be proud.

The Provision of Shelter

By PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK

Abstract: Dramatic demographic changes in the next twenty-five years will require housing production up to 2 to 3 million units annually. Maintenance of a high economic level will virtually eliminate poverty. Improved transportation will continue to expand the limits of cities. With these and other trends on the horizon, we can expect greater participation by the federal government in helping to finance the production of private housing, new forms of public housing, and large-scale renewal of deteriorated central areas. Tomorrow's houses will not be of markedly better design, nor will there be any drastic changes in methods of residential construction.

BEFORE writing this article, I paused for some orderly thinking, and to probe a great deal of uncorrelated data and experience. The effect for me was both exhilarating and devastating. I find statistics that are almost incredible. For those of us in the business of providing shelter, I find a challenge without parallel.

It is the sine qua non of the prognosticator to examine the estimates of all the others who gaze into crystal balls. But our national preoccupation with bigness tends to charm us with the magnitude of statistics and to distract our attention from the real issues. In the case of this article, refined accuracy is relatively unimportant; statistics are utilized merely to suggest proportions of the problem.

Demographic forecasts in the past have been consistently conservative. Paradoxically, a degree of caution is recommended now because the forecasters may have allowed too high a latitude for their past conservatism. Even with this grain of salt, the figures are startling. For example, large business enterprises are making plans for the future, on the basis of a rise in population from 170 million in 1957 to 195-205 million in 1967.

Some specialists believe that in 40 or 45 years our current population will be doubled to 340 million inhabitants. A well-known business publication predicts a population by 1975 of 218 million, of which at least 150 million will live in urban centers.

These estimates suggest that within 25 years our population very likely will be well over 200 million and perhaps as large as 250 million. They also suggest that the number of persons who will be living in urban centers in 1975 will equal today's population of about 170 million.

There are still other factors that are important to the housing outlook: A recent study estimates that by 1975 there will be 21 million persons over 65 years of age, one-third more than we have now. But there will also be more teen-agers and young adults, and thus many more families. Family income will rise. A leading business economist estimates that total personal income can be expected to increase in 10 years from the current 340 billion dollars annually to about 450 billion dollars. Correspondingly, he suggests that average family income will rise from about \$4,500 to \$5,500-\$6,000. He properly points out, however, that in-

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flation, anticipated at a rate of at least one per cent a year, will restrict real income gains to a more modest level.

One of the most stimulating statements that has come to my attention recently is made by another reliable economist known for his concern with social and human values. He foresees the virtual elimination of poverty in our national economy and society. With all of the caution necessary to such a prediction, he expresses the view that continuance of a high level economy for the next eighteen to twenty years will allow the United States to eradicate poverty, a goal which many nations have sought and none has obtained.

Obviously, any one of a number of things can change these expectations. A great or extended depression, which no one seems prepared to predict, or a destructive and cataclysmic world conflict, which authorities contemplate less and less, would shift the pattern. Even setting aside the two dreaded possibilities of depression and war, it is impossible in a single presentation to encompass all the possibilities for change.

FUTURE HOUSING DEMANDS

Barring the unpredictable, it is evident that we are only a few years away from the beginning of a new high in family formation. Yet we seem to be many more years away from the full realization of what reasonable forecasts and statistics mean to the production of housing.

What is the prospective total number of dwelling units for families that should be produced on an annual basis? We are closing a decade in which, except for 1957, the production of a million plus housing units annually has become habit. In the middle 1940's, doubters questioned this kind of potential for residential construction, although some men even then spoke of a future average of a million and a half units a year. More

important, however, is the fact that post-war housing production, huge as it was, made little inroad on the elimination of millions of substandard housing units. There have been times during this period when to sustain construction at a million plus units a year created obstacles of serious proportions. The rule is that production does not adjust itself to social need unless there is economic pressure and there are social and governmental agencies that react to meet the need.

If private industry alone is to provide a level of production consistent with the statistics of future demand, the need must be an economic one in which the profit motive is evident. The housing industry itself must go through a tuning-up period. This means material production, manpower availability, improved methods, and money. It also means, and these will be increasingly important factors, availability of land and the shoring up by government of the financial and economic structures that operate in housing.

Notwithstanding these complexities, I believe that within a twenty- to twenty-five-year period we will reach a production rate for housing in excess of two million units a year and a peak close to three million a year.

I am prepared for an avalanche of criticism in projecting this kind of estimate for residential construction. I recall the outcries over earlier prophecies of a million residential units a year. While it is doubtful that a production rate of two million units can be reached in the next five years, it is likely to happen in the next ten to twelve years. And if this be so, planning for it must begin now.

My estimate tends to raise a number of collateral questions. One of these is: What will be the government's role in tomorrow's housing program? Participation by the federal government had

its important beginnings during the depression. There have been marked changes since then in the extent and character of the government's involvement. But the general trend of government participation through grants, loans, mortgage insurance or secondary financing has been steadily upward. Even recent demands by private interests for a return of the mortgage banking business to them have had no consequential result. The tendency for government to be a stimulator and an innovator in home financing is increasing. This fact is true no matter how reluctant certain government administrators may be to have it so. In a democracy, people get essentially what they want from their government. If it is to survive politically, no administration can resist the continued pressure of unmet needs in the nation. This observation is not made from any philosophical point of view but as the deliberate conclusion of one who is in private industry but who has also administered government housing programs. My approach has nothing to do with ideology—it is the simple expression of a realist.

We can expect that the inflationary spiral will tend to increase the cost of housing production. The extraordinary demand for money for industry and related uses will tend to keep the cost of finance high. Combine these factors with a need for twice the number of dwelling units we now produce, and there is no escape from increased government participation.

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN HOUSING PRODUCTION

The forms the government's participation will take in the future are anyone's guess, although the most obvious one is evident. The longer term mortgage and the lower down payment are favorite instruments for absorbing the gap between the ability of people to buy houses and

the prices at which houses can be produced. The long-term mortgage and the small down payment are the mediums through which the private entrepreneur's market is enlarged and the participation of government in direct construction is reduced. Assuming a sustained high level economy, more and more evidence will reveal that conventional mortgage patterns are outmoded. The choice then will not be between perfect extremes but between undesirable alternatives; the search will be for the last undesirable. A utopian situation would be one in which the amount of housing, economically and socially required, could be provided by private enterprise at a cost which all could meet on a conservative debt program. But this does not seem possible. Confronted by the alternatives of large unmet housing needs or of increased government participation, the latter choice will be made. One need only remember when the federal government under "Title 6" liberalized its credit terms for war and postwar emergency housing. The great outcry against 10 per cent down payments, 5 per cent down payments, and no down payments was stifled by the number of housing units produced as a result of these stimulants.

The traditional arguments which relate the life of a family to the economic life of the house and which stress the need for a substantial down payment as motivation to pay the balance have a measure of validity. But they fail when viewed against the aggregate need. We have found that when a family wants to live in a house and makes no down payment on it, payments will be met regularly so long as the economy (the family income) permits. The exceptions are no more than exceptions. Therefore, the default record will support movements toward even more lenient terms and longer mortgages.

By the same token, experience has

shown that the effective life of a house, no matter how temporary the construction, is less dependent on mortgage terms than on maintenance. Witness the fact that some of the most poorly built temporary wartime housing is still about us. Finally, the suggestion that a family will not live to pay off a house ignores the modern trend that it is not one family that pays off the mortgage, but usually successive families. This fact is increasingly evident in the present era of great mobility when families stay in a given locale for only a limited number of years.

All of this is a detailed way of introducing a prediction which may not be accepted wholeheartedly by everyone: Home mortgages will go up to as much as fifty years and the no down payment feature will become the rule rather than the exception. To this extent, governmental participation through mortgage insurance will increase.

I also believe that government will evolve new methods to increase co-operative housing in order to reduce family costs per unit. Co-operative housing has only begun its role in this complex picture. Its whole vista will be enlarged in the years ahead so that it can contribute a substantial portion of future housing units.

In rental housing, the government already is beginning to refine its role. It will do even more to insure rental housing production and to decrease its own direct participation in its construction. Finally, since financing is the cornerstone in the housing picture, ingenious minds will discover new ways of inducing the government to play an ever-increasing role in this aspect of home production.

PUBLIC HOUSING

The function of the government in what has been known as public housing will undergo a major change. If prognostications have any merit at all, and

we are truly approaching an era of little or no poverty, then the government's role in public housing takes on a new coloration. I can almost hear the hue and cry from some of my old friends in public housing, yet this must be said: We have gone through a ten-year period of almost complete frustration among the public housing fraternity in which production has been kept low and new ideas have not been born. It has been a period in which our economy has undergone drastic change, but the impact of change on public housing has gone unnoticed. Some years ago, about the only thing which the late Herbert Nelson (of the National Association of Real Estate Boards) and Charles Abrams (housing spokesman for the Liberal party) agreed on was that there should be a built-in disposition program in public housing which would permit those who lived in it to become its owners as their economic position improved. In my judgment, the time is long past for a detailed exploration of this approach.

I urge rethinking in this field not because I feel public housing was not and is not necessary, but because I believe it must now play a different role. What we have called public housing is really nothing more than a method of subsidy and finance. When the program originated, there were few people who dared dream of a day when family incomes would be as high as \$3,500, let alone \$6,500. The elimination of poverty was a symbol, not a possibility in a generation ahead. Now, in many communities, the whole function of public housing is moving to one of special motivation: Racial needs and the problems of aged and disabled persons. Since nothing in the immediate future indicates we will be free of these requirements and needs, they should not be ignored. The fact that they may be reduced in number should stimulate us to meet the total need instead of the infinitesimal fraction

which was met in the 1930's and 1940's.

However, we must recognize that in a given community the totality of need can grow or decline rapidly. Thus, public housing programs should be flexible enough to withstand the pressure of being utilized for functions that are not public in character. To accelerate its new role, we must improve the architecture and livability of public housing so that it may compete with the totality of the market should that occasion arise. And we need to build into its financing structure a self-liquidating feature if the need for self-liquidation, in part or in whole, becomes patent.

Perhaps we need a new definition of public housing. There are conservative members of the banking fraternity who have always considered private housing with government insured mortgages to be public housing. In a sense, they are correct. But in the enlarged scope of government's participation, most housing will thereby have a public participation aspect. The only distinction is that some needs will be satisfied with mortgage insurance and such stimulations as secondary credit and aid in the acquisition of sites through urban renewal, while others will require short-term or long-term subsidy, depending upon the degree of financial, physical, or racial disability of the residents. In my judgment, in these next twenty to twenty-five years, we will turn to an approach that more nearly approximates this kind of thinking than the kind of divisiveness which has existed until now.

Having financed the housing, for whom are we providing it? One increasing group is the aged. Private social agencies and some public housing authorities are beginning to concentrate on some of their needs. The private entrepreneur must, and will, find a way to move into this area profitably. Another new group we must consider is the larger family. As some of the prewar stock of housing

begins to disappear from the market and as the size of families grows, the present emphasis on four-bedroom houses must be enlarged to cover five- and six-bedroom houses in the twenty years ahead. Perhaps the group most discriminated against in the housing market will be the increased number of young families that will inherit the major production of the early part of this decade.

URBAN RENEWAL

Where will this housing be provided? This is answered by the indication that in the period 1975-82 we will have as many persons living in the urban centers as we have now in the entire country. The pressure of growth will prod many of our present urban centers into full-scale urban renewal programs, not just pilot projects. I feel that perhaps the next decade, and certainly the second decade ahead, will see urban renewal reaching its fullest effectiveness.

I do not mean to imply that the apartment house or the high-rise building will be the complete answer in urban renewal. Quite the contrary. Except for areas like New York City, I anticipate that urban renewal plans will attempt to reproduce in the centers of large cities some of the suburban atmosphere which now exists in many of their satellites. The high-rise structure will play its role; but to reclaim our cities to cliffs alone would be the saddest mistake ever made. Urban renewal will attract the larger families back into the worn-out cores of our cities only if the replanning is calculated to meet the ground-level needs of their children. Here, again, the government's role in urban renewal is basic, a part of the evolving pattern that government activity will not be diminished but enlarged in the coming generation.

How large should our urban centers be? Can we continue to extend their boundaries—or have we reached the point of diminishing returns? In a

measure, we may have reached the limit. That is why, in my judgment, urban renewal takes on increased significance. But the final answer is not that simple.

It appears that the automobile will continue to be the principal means of communication and transportation and that the full effect of high-speed expressways in expanding boundaries beyond present limitations has not yet been tested in most places. The way to extended boundaries may also be opened because what we now consider suburbs are generally becoming more and more self-contained except for high-powered commercial and industrial activity and opportunities for cultural and related needs. Families will have less need to go to the central core as frequently as they have in years past. Recent estimates that the present 50 million automobiles will become 100 million within a generation are not unrealistic. On the other hand, the boundaries of our cities will also be determined in a measure by the effectiveness of helicopter transportation. The limited cost of helicopters suggests that inventive genius may yet make of the helicopter the public transportation medium that will solve many of our urban headaches and permit the greater utilization of land still more distant from the center of the city.

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

Whether it is by helicopter, expressway, or something else, the problem of public transportation will have to be solved to provide for the huge population growth in urban centers. The tendency toward subsidized public transportation is so noticeable that it can only be intensified in the years ahead. Without adequate transportation, our present urban centers cannot be properly reclaimed through urban renewal, the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the old, decaying districts of our cities.

But even though we do things slowly

and in disorderly fashion in a free country and a free community, the things that should happen normally tend to happen. It is therefore predictable that the boundaries of existing urban centers will spread further through improved transportation. It is also predictable that of the 170 million people who will be living in urban centers, a vast number will make less use of the core of the city as the tendency increases to make the suburban areas self-contained. Nonetheless, the urban core will have to be reclaimed and improved for living by the year 1975.

We have a saying in the building business that the easiest thing about a housing program is to build the house itself. The great problems are finance, land acquisition, and development of utilities and streets—almost everything but the house. The house merely becomes the means of staying in business rather than the end product of business. Yet the house itself is vital. It is the place where people spend most of their time. I wish I could predict that there will be great architectural advances in our houses. I doubt it. I see no great change in the attitude of the architectural fraternity that portends improvement in housing design. It is far more profitable for the architect to spend his time in other areas where fees are greater. This is not reprehensible; it is human. Of course there will be some limited improvement. The pressure of events and improved production techniques may clean up what remains of gingerbread architecture. But this will be more true in large buildings than in individual houses.

IMPROVED METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION

Housing production methods will continue to improve. The increased tendency to prefabricate more parts of the house will be accelerated, but I doubt whether prefabrication will replace the

conventional method of production. The weight of the house will tend to be reduced with new materials which achieve the same result with ounces instead of pounds. Prefabrication will find its greatest use in the future, as it does in the present, in small towns and areas where conventional construction is hampered by the lack of skilled manpower. (The possibility that fewer men will be attracted to the building trades could alter all my prognostications considerably.) If a "crash effort" is made to overcome our housing deficits in a short period of time or if we wait too long to build up our production in the 1960's, then prefabrication may play a dominant role. But, by and large, it is difficult to visualize how the large-scale, conventional builder can be replaced by the prefabricator with the kind of product that he is presently engineering and producing. The economic factors do not permit it. Perhaps we lost a great chance to try something effectively different when the Lustron-prefabricated-house episode ended in a debacle. I repeat, however, that more and more of the house will be preproduced in parts, and with new materials. Plastics and the metals are destined to come into their own in home production.

Improvements in basics such as plastering or the alternative, wallboard, painting, and roofing will take place. But these improvements will be imperceptible to the consumer. On the other hand, the livability of the house will greatly increase. Its internal safety and its facility for use will be revolutionized by the electronics industry and the gadget and appliance makers. In the course of the next generation, year-round temperature control in the house will be assured. Air-conditioning will become as natural to the new house as central heat was in the generation past. Dust-proof, well-lighted houses, in which the housewife will push buttons to meet the

needs of her family, should become the normal thing before the end of the next generation. Inevitably, such trends will accelerate obsolescence among existing housing, but we can count on inventive genius to correct some of it by creating measures of better livability for the old house.

CONCLUSION

This paper leaves many aspects of the future in housing untouched. What is expressed here are only the trends and possibilities of the immediate years ahead without reference or concern for political or ideological reasoning. Let me say that I have examined the problem with my eyes, not with my heart or conscience. Anyone who claims the capacity to see twenty-five years ahead and who stands on it as conclusive and undebatable would be a fool. I seek no such classification. If the reader disapproves of my prognostication, he is at liberty to pursue his own; he may be right, I could be wrong.

But we should both agree that in the development and redevelopment of our urban centers and in the production of shelter for a growing population, the most exciting days in planning are still ahead of us. What is needed is the kind of men and women who will interest themselves in this great and daring challenge; who will change what they do not like about prognostications such as mine, or, if they approve, will make them real.

In the final analysis, what happens in the next twenty-five years in housing, as in every area, depends on the character of those who will be in positions of leadership. Perhaps it is because I believe that the direction which our society is taking is one of growing concern for the needs of all of its people that I also believe the progress in housing will be a substantial multiple of anything that America has witnessed in any quarter century of the past.

Community Services

By NELSON N. FOOTE

Abstract: The common tendency to confine thinking about family services to the professional activities of public and private agencies ignores both commercial services and the functions which families perform for themselves. With their higher incomes, education, leisure, and competence for working out patterns of mutual aid with their urban neighbors, American families will probably rely less in the future on professional assistance and more on themselves. The role of the professional will remain that of remedying difficult cases, of setting standards of competence, and of training lay leadership in hygiene, child development, adult education, recreation, and counseling. There will be more emphasis on diffusing the means and knowledge of optimal development of capacities and less on minimal standards of subsistence and adjustment.

IN American society, there is a visible tendency for all institutions to overproduce goods and services for their markets and for any temporary shortages to be quickly remedied. Services to families that come first to the minds of city planners, however, do not appear, at least superficially, to overproduce for the market. These are the services of health, education, recreation, and welfare, and it is with regard to them that the activities of government and the so-called nonprofit agencies come into play. To understand these activities, a view of the matter must be taken which is broad enough to encompass all services to families. From such an understanding, a firmer prediction can be made of the changes that lie ahead in the provision of services to families during the next generation.

Each week the average urban family sees, and is served by, a much larger number of purveyors of goods and services than is generally recognized. Dr. William A. Koppe, a social psychologist at Union College, finds that the family of a representative General Electric em-

ployee in Schenectady has direct dealings in a single week with over forty different tradesmen, officials, and professionals. It is unlikely that such families average as many contacts each week with friends, neighbors, and relatives, but the reader may find it something of a revelation to itemize the series of such transactions regularly conducted by his own family. The great majority of the contacts involve a cash transaction, and most of the remainder consist of governmental services supported by taxation. The family may thus be conceived as lying at the center of an elaborate web of commercial, governmental, and professional services, for nearly all of which it pays.

How the various services are paid for affects their future as much as does their changing content, and the range of possible variations in forms of payment constitutes an important aspect of the context of each. At the risk of oversimplification, we may take as an axiom that need and means are rarely if ever in perfect proportion. The young and the old are less able to pay for what

they need than the middle-aged, the sick less than the well, the black less than the white, and the poor less than the rich. And need varies as much as means, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Many devices are employed to adjust one to the other, but no device is universally or permanently satisfactory.

THREE GENERATIONS OF COMMUNITY SERVICES

Again at the risk of oversimplification, let us speak of three generations: The one which came of age during the 1910's and 1920's, the one which came of age in the 1930's and early 1940's, and the one which has been coming of age since World War II. The basic moral and value commitments with which people enter adulthood distinguish them from preceding and succeeding generations. Every proponent or opponent of change knows that to have the greatest effect he must concentrate his effort on adolescents.

A summary of views on how the first of these generations believed need and means could be adjusted reveals reliance on two main devices: The individual family bought the goods and services it could with the income it had, with the result of a marked class difference in consumption; or if deserving, it received temporary charity from government or private sources. Other public services were minimal: They were primarily protective services provided by localities, and roads and schools provided by states.

By the 1930's, the assumed capacity of families to care for their own needs was greatly scaled down. The role of government in taking over functions both from the family and private institutions was greatly expanded and put on a stable basis, with some attention to preventive measures which went beyond simple alleviation of distress. Not only was the notion discarded that only the

deserving should be helped, in favor of eligibility on the basis of need, but, corollary to the latter, the assumption grew that all citizens were equally entitled to enjoy minimum standards of health and decency regardless of their means. From this view there has been no reversion; only two years ago the present Administration extended the coverage of Social Security to eight million or more self-employed citizens and domestic servants.

But with progressing equalization of real incomes ("the mass middle market") since the war, a third attitude is emerging, one which stresses a much more positive and autonomous form of organized self-help. As this attitude becomes incorporated in the outlook of the new generation, it is being coupled with a rich variety of devices for adjusting needs and means. These are loosely illustrated by such terms as "group insurance," "do-it-yourself," and "research-and-development." Thus without going back to the individualistic reliance of the family on its own possessions, we have moved away from the remedial orientation of the 1930's.

In its distinctive stance, the new generation is substantially redefining the meaning of "need." The emphasis is on optimal rather than on minimal standards for services to families. When their incomes do not suffice to make higher standards accessible through commercial purchase, families turn for satisfaction of their need to co-operative, nongovernmental agencies. To illustrate this fact for services of health, education, recreation, and welfare, we point to the typical suburban family which now may pay dues for an insect-control program, a nursery school, a swimming pool, and a child study group. Unless there is a serious downturn in the economy, this basic trend can be foreseen as extending some years ahead and manifesting itself in countless ingenious forms.

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It is essential that city planners speculate in more detail on the implications of this new definition of need for each of the four clusters of services—health, education, recreation, and welfare. But they must be aware that the main problems lying ahead seem to be those that arise from the political issues of redistributing means among people and over time. America is wealthy and suffers no lack of resources. The main burden in distributing our resources equitably and comfortably over time is carried by our major business institutions: Industrial corporations through their health and pension schemes, and commercial banks and insurance companies through relating credit and savings. Government taxes and services, especially at the federal level, are almost as important in this redistribution; but private philanthropy, even taking the foundations into account, handles only a minor remnant. The tendency for the corporation to develop into a "junior welfare state," as David Riesman calls it, is so strong that it is debatable whether city planners have half as much to say about the future of health, education, recreation, and welfare as corporation planners have. A few notes will therefore be indulged along the way about the potential contribution of business to the upgrading of standards of services to families. No unanimity exists in business, or in unions either, as to how many welfare functions the corporation should assume, so opinion is quite malleable.

HEALTH

The role of the medical doctor in protecting and improving health has been diminishing in recent years. The ratio of doctors per 100,000 of the population is dropping steadily, but the number of nurses, pharmacists, dentists, optometrists, researchers, technicians, sanitary engineers, and food inspectors is increasing rapidly. Altogether, employment in

the health professions far outnumbers that in any other profession, including teaching and engineering. Despite local shortages of physicians, the United States is abundantly supplied with medical personnel—when paid enough even nurses are plentiful. The high positive value placed on health by the public—as evinced in advertising, diet, drug sales, and popular reading—will probably cause further increases in paramedical personnel to occur faster than the growth of population.

Neither are there present or looming shortages of drugstores, medical apparatus, laboratories, students, insecticides, food, pure water, nor, except temporarily in boom areas, hospital space. The only obstacles to the best medical care in the world for every American family are lack of money or racial discrimination. Although disease and accidents still occur, our national average life expectancy is outstripped only by the Japanese. The relative statistical increase in chronic disease resulting from longer life can hardly be termed a disaster, although it defines an area for much future effort. And much can still be achieved in the pursuit of positive health among people of sedentary and otherwise hazardous occupations through diet, exercise, and more courteous driving. Gains depend more heavily on lay education and further research than they do on medical practice.

The vast growth of health insurance plans—both voluntary and employer-financed—(they will soon cover a hundred million people) coincides with a decade and a half of rising real income among families. Insurance purchases of all kinds rise with income, in the career of the individual as well as statistically among the population, while economic downturns reduce purchase of insurance and seem to increase the demand for government-sponsored protection. Even Social Security is basically an insurance

scheme. But while the financial contingencies of illness, accident, age, and death appear rather well provided for through the insurance medium, and while medical services are abundant, some issues remain of a rather political sort. It is far from clear to all Americans that physicians are the group best qualified to diagnose and prescribe schemes for financing medical and hospital care, or that when physicians control the schemes they drive the best bargain for their principals. Nonetheless, the respect paid their opinion is manifest. Besides the clients, the other health professions are involved too. On this account, it is likely that laymen who serve as trustees of health insurance funds will in the future play a more important part in governing the use of these funds than they have in the past. However, because the redistribution of money to adjust needs and means is a question of policy, political controversy is likely to continue indefinitely, with no one scheme triumphing completely over its competitors, nor any one group retaining exclusive control.

Meanwhile, popular interest in medical research is growing. Many individuals and foundations are readier to give money for research than they are for relief of actual suffering. This is based on the view that in the long run more suffering will be relieved that way and that the long run is not as long as it used to seem. Here the practicing physicians are barely involved at all; they utilize research findings but in general play no other part in the progress of knowledge or technique. Progress comes from the activities of universities, experiment stations, and commercial laboratories. The researches of scholars may be very far removed from the practice of medicine, yet the pursuit of knowledge can have the most direct consequences for families, as in the radical reduction of tuberculosis and vene-

real disease. Because everybody and nobody is the consumer of research, all modes of paying for it are collective—whether through government taxation, or what might be called commercial taxation of drug users to support pharmaceutical laboratories, or through pooled voluntary contributions to universities. In research we have a clear case of a service to families which can be pursued without limit, which in the conventional sense can never overproduce its market, and where co-operation in pursuit of its limitless aims will ultimately be worldwide.

In addition to research, education and recreation are contributing substantially to higher health standards for American families by making the practice of hygiene a nearly unanimous activity. Figuratively speaking, the positive pursuit of health seems as contagious as many diseases.

EDUCATION

Educators treat the financing of an adequate supply of educational services as a clear-cut financial issue, to be decided by the public which pays. Among this public, despite some differences of opinion, there appears to be wide consensus that the individual clients of the schools are not the persons best equipped or properly required to pay the costs. The burden of cost is redistributed in a variety of ways—taxation being only one—onto the shoulders of other segments of the community.

Higher education—roughly half private, half public—is becoming the level of major concern. Tuition fees bear only a fraction of the cost of maintaining our colleges and universities. And endowments, bequests, alumni gifts, fund drives, overhead charges on research and service contracts, and tax exemptions, fall shorter and shorter of meeting the constantly rising costs. In the case of the private institutions, industrial cor-

porations concerned with the training of future personnel apparently are expected on all sides to assume an increasing share of the educational expense.

Two or three years ago there was a looming shortage of classrooms and teachers at elementary and secondary levels. There is still pressure on this supply, and in some parts of the country the standard of education is lamentably low. But it became evident that when the public began to stir itself, it could rectify the scarcity of educational resources very rapidly. The same is likely to prove true for colleges and universities with the oncoming rise in demands for admission. Given enough funds, the higher educational bodies can expand their enrollments at as fast a rate as they did in 1945-47. The problem, in other words, is not basically one of a genuine shortage, but of the relative values of education and competing avenues for the use of this country's great wealth. How much do we cherish the development of children other than our own?

Two generations ago, education in the public schools was oriented primarily toward preparing the pupil for his future vocation. Steady criticism of this limited view of the purpose of education gradually expanded the curriculum. Although echoes of the old controversy are still audible, the protagonists of liberal education in the public schools beat on open doors. But only a few private schools would revive the aristocratic classicism which preceded the pragmatic emphasis; contemporary general education tries to prepare people for contemporary life.

A strong contributing factor to this shift in educational policy is the rapid rate at which skills become obsolescent. In the future, automation, research, and institutional differentiation will more and more require on-the-job training. The older worker's fear of displacement will

cause both personal and organizational strains, the most constructive reaction to which will be many new kinds of adult education. Some kinds will entail retraining on the job; others will stress the more familiar leisure-oriented activities.

As training for specific skilled vocations becomes obsolete within a relatively few years, general education will become a mandatory lifetime activity. The working members of the family in particular must keep up with the march of knowledge or face deterioration in their economic situations. Educational services to families will concentrate less in the public schools, although recreational services attached to neighborhood schools will increase.

At higher levels—large high schools and colleges—the shift away from vocational training is being accompanied by an increase—marked since World War II and showing evidence of growing strength—in functional courses in family living. These courses give students practice, vocabulary, and insight in handling real life situations. They put small stress on irrelevant facts and abstract principles. Professional family-life educators advocate appropriate kinds of family-life education for all ages. In Flint, Michigan, for example, an extraordinary foundation-sponsored scheme, which involves co-operation among a college, public schools, churches, hospitals, nursery schools, social agencies, women's clubs, and groups for the aged, offers family-life education from the cradle to the grave. If the trend continues, we can see a large future demand for group leaders and organizers rather than for traditional teachers.

RECREATION

During the depression, much righteous indignation was vented on those unlucky families on relief who violated their official budgets for necessities to go

the movies. Yet regardless of sanctions imposed on their expenditures of relief checks, the impulse toward some kind of relief from relief seemed irrepressible, and the more sophisticated social workers were ready to concede and abet its legitimacy. The current version of that old complaint concerns the number of television aeries in the poorer sections of our cities. Ignoring the fact that television affords more hours of entertainment per person at fewer dollars per year than any other entertainment available, the critics also ignore the fact that recreation is a necessity. If people are deprived of recreation they have learned to depend on, they will go to extraordinary lengths of sacrifice and discomfort to obtain its equivalent.

There is as yet no satisfactory scientific understanding of why this is so, although recreation is found by anthropologists even among aborigines living on the very margin of existence. The same prejudices which hinder recognition that lack of recreation is a genuine deprivation have probably operated to divert social scientists from analysis of its many forms, contents, and functions. Here and there in the universities some serious study of play is occurring, but meanwhile the time for leisure is outstripping the facilities for its constructive utilization.

Without prejudging what later studies will show, it seems reasonable to believe that some kinds of recreation are conducive to optimal development of participants, some kinds have little effect, and some are actually harmful. The kinds of effect also probably vary over the individual's life cycle and with his occupation. The exercise which stimulates the powers of an adolescent may be fatal to a man of forty. And the hobby which fascinates a boy may, when attempted by his mother, give her only an acute sense of failure. While some old people may enjoy knitting

potholders, most will regard such an activity as more suitable for children and feel insulted by attempts to interest them in it. Some people find sociability as unbearable as others find solitude. What is known to date is only crude and empirical. Sophisticated recreation specialists find it a wiser course to let their clients determine for themselves what is fun rather than to try to anticipate and end up being harmfully wrong. But if there is to be intelligent planning for recreational services, a theory for correct prediction is very much needed.

An example familiar to city planners is found in the history of parks and playgrounds. When cities were new, citizens fresh from the country, and automobiles uninvented, the parks and playgrounds movement went forward with a great shout. A number of formulas exist for comparing cities in terms of space for outdoor recreation, and an argument can be made for certain standards; nonetheless, some big parks in densely-populated areas—Washington Park in south Chicago, for example—are nowadays nearly deserted much of the time. State and national parks, on the other hand, are often so crowded that their enjoyment is impaired.

The risk taken by those who would leap forward to proffer their professional assistance in prescribing wholesome recreation for others bears emphasis. Anxiety and compulsion have ever been the enemies of play, and, conversely, the efflorescence of playfulness is a valid sign of the reduction of anxiety and compulsion. But where play is and where it is not are hard to distinguish. For some people, shopping is a lark to which they look forward and which they would not like to see eliminated by efficiency experts. For others, shopping in a big city is hard and harassing work of which the less the better.

Without essaying to generalize about

the preparatory, compensatory, or other functions of play, or their fitness to various players, it may be helpful to point out that the forms of play parallel in a representative way the range of serious activities. Each activity has its play form and its work form. As much variation can be expected in recreational services to families as in all others combined. Nonetheless, some crude classification is possible.

If we organize recreation under six major headings, we can sketch the appropriate roles of various urban agencies in furnishing facilities when neither the family nor the commercial institutions can satisfy the need.

Sports

Playing fields, camps, beaches, fields and streams, and scenic parks require intelligent allocation because they utilize finite space. The planning of highways and transportation must take into account the upward trend in movement to and from nonbusiness destinations. The trend toward use of high school gymnasias and auditoria by all family members during week ends and summers is accelerating and will have an important effect on the location and design of schools. The leading firms of school architects are already counseling that schools be built as community centers.

Crafts

The creativity released by public acceptance of home woodworking and painting, often by women, has had visible effects in the appearance of homes. The home workshop will become more frequent in plans for new houses, and it will furnish a medium for the restoration to the family of the productive function in enjoyable rather than onerous forms. The vocational courses into which the stupidest students used to be shunted are being taken up avocationally by the culturally alert do-it-your-

selfers, and evening shop courses are attracting large numbers of adults to the schools.

Sociability

The interest of the public in celebrations, festivals, fairs, and organized spectacles seems to have waned in favor of the private kinds of sociability: picnics, parties, week-end visiting, and just plain family living. The point at which public agencies can in the future do most to facilitate wider enjoyment of sociability, with the least hazard of stultifying interference, is through housing policy. The discouraging rise in the cost of housing runs counter to the strong revival of demand for adequate space for entertaining and for recreation for the entire family.

Revery

To enjoy solitude, which is as necessary as sociability to an environment conducive to optimal development, privacy is indispensable. Here again public policy can intervene effectively in the housing market to help make more rooms available to the family, including larger bedrooms where children can have a life of their own or receive friends. Particularly in cities, a notable contribution to family privacy can be made through more effective measures of noise control.

Intellectual interests

The relative decline of private philanthropy has hampered the growth of museums, zoos, and art galleries and is causing their boards to seek more public aid. Even with public aid, libraries have found it hard to hold their own in terms of patronage. The commercial mass media offer strenuous competition in providing appetizing intellectual fare. While this rivalry undoubtedly helps to raise the standards of intellectual recreation on an average basis, deep interests can be evoked but not seriously

pursued through newspapers, magazines, movies, and television. If travel via picture book, for example, were as satisfying as travel in person, half the reason for the federal road program would vanish. The keenest intellectual delights come from reading, reflection, and discussion. Many voluntary organizations are striving with some success to move these out from academic sequestration into the life of the community. They are still obstructed by the fact that too great a part of the public, which found education painful during its youth, does not recognize the potentialities of intellectual discourse for pure enjoyment. The fact that so many of our fellow citizens do not like to read a book is a major failure of our educational system. If recreational theory comes of age and permeates educational philosophy, it is conceivable that some entire generation not too far off will find delight in examining its own existence, a most auspicious state of affairs for any society to achieve.

Arts

In his informed and imaginative essay, *Music in American Life*, Jacques Barzun makes a sociological observation that applies equally to all the arts. The market for the professional artist has been shrinking, but the supply of aspirants has gone up and the level of technical competence has risen to unprecedented heights. Professional performances, both for spectator enjoyment and as models for emulation, are much more available to the masses because of the ease and cheapness of mechanized reproduction. The result is a vast multiplication of competent amateur performers. They dance and paint and act and write and play and compose for the sake of doing these things, or for the delectation of small nonpaying audiences of intimates. Instead of deploring in traditional vein the hard economic lot of the professional

performer, whose life is made harder by the mass marketing of reproductions, Barzun takes an optimistic view of the emergence of the competent amateur. When such a high standard both of appreciation and performance is being reached by the many, there is cause for exultation among those who believe that arts contribute importantly to human fulfillment and the development of civilization.

Some thinkers in the field of recreation are arguing for the inclusion in the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of an Office of Recreation comparable to the Office of Education. And some artists are urging the inclusion of an Office of the Arts, comparable to the British Arts Council. Without disparaging arguments for government aid to artistic education, which are compelling to the degree that the arts are as necessary as other pursuits requiring training, it is possible to debate whether public policy should extend to subsidizing performances by professionals, as it did during the depression. It might be wiser now to encourage the trend toward amateur performance in the arts and in other forms of recreation rather than to subsidize professional entertainment that is not commercially viable. On the other hand, that libraries should expand their services to offer their patrons artistic reproductions of the best professional performances seems as undebatable as that they should offer books.

WELFARE

When the city, state, and federal governments took over the responsibility of providing minimum subsistence to all families during the depression, private philanthropic agencies were deprived of their major previous function. It was then that they took up psychotherapy as their main reason for being. They did not, to be sure, assume the burden

of caring for mental hospital patients who had long been, and still continue to be, mainly a state responsibility. But they addressed themselves to the non-psychotic sufferers of personal and family stress whose unhappiness ultimately injures the community. They have carried forward this emphasis on the treatment of interpersonal disorders with vigor and devotion through varied devices and programs. Social casework is the commonest. They can probably claim credit, beyond actual cures, for educating the public to the value of early detection and treatment of such disorders, even if they have not been able to organize the public for their prevention. The time has come, however, when psychotherapy as such fails to attract younger personnel or even funds as it did before. A new direction must be taken by these private philanthropic agencies if they are not to be superseded by other institutions with a more timely orientation.

This judgment on the threatening obsolescence of family service agencies may seem harsh when the air is so full of discussion and exhortation regarding mental health, but several underlying statistics may vouch for its validity. Divorce, for example, has declined to half its immediate postwar rate. The reputed recent wave of juvenile delinquency turns out as usual to be the artifact of a wave of publicity. In a 1951 study, the Research Director of the Family Service Association of America came to this provocative conclusion about the declining case loads of member agencies:

The decline in case loads as agencies have withdrawn from the giving of financial assistance points to the need for review of current interpretation and for intensified effort to interpret casework services effectively to the community.¹

¹ Ann W. Shyne, *Analysis of Family Service Agency Operation* (New York: Family Service Association of America, 1951), p. 32.

On the positive side, it is evident that the social workers themselves are groping slowly toward a more developmental and less remedial orientation. Thus far their exploratory gestures have gathered mainly around the idea of family-life education, particularly parent education, and around extensions of family and marital counseling, with a few excursions into camping. A rising fraction of marital counseling is now offered not only to poor families but to middle-class mates and parents who pay fees. Unfortunately these ventures are still heavily dominated by psychiatric principles and personnel and fall very much short of serving the majority of families who could benefit from enlightenment on how to cultivate their own optimal development. The issue of a remedial versus a developmental approach, moreover, is deeply entangled with the formidable issue of professional versus lay leadership in group activities which aim self-consciously to realize the potentialities of human selves. In general, social workers discourage lay leadership, except in fund-raising or improvement in the training of lay leaders. The churches have done much better, especially the nondenominational community churches of some of the newer suburbs.

The external observer must take a pessimistic view of the prospects for social workers' throwing off the incubus of the psychiatrist and taking the initiative in community programs for family development. Indeed, several psychiatrists, like the late Harry Stack Sullivan, have gone further than the social workers in defining the perspectives for positive achievement in this direction. The majority, despite some contrary claims, seem to expect the permanent dependency of their clients on their ministrations rather than strive toward the kind of community organization where social workers and psychiatrists become almost unnecessary. Their attitude may be in-

evitable, but, if so, it portends the growth of more amateur groups which will go around professional opposition to raise higher the standards of family living.

Going back to the time of the depression, it is testimony to the basic desire of American families to depend on themselves that so many persons found the Works Progress Administration preferable to relief. The moral virtue of paying one's own way by constructive work, as against receiving aid, seemed deeply ingrained even among those who had most cause to expect help. Professor Talcott Parsons of Harvard has put forward an apt phrase—the denial of reciprocity—which nicely describes what most Americans object to in professional intervention in their personal affairs. Perhaps the impulse toward independence runs deeper and wider than American tradition and verges on human nature. Even children, who soon learn that they will owe to their children what they receive from their parents, show countless signs of wanting to do for themselves all things that their powers afford, while reserving the rights of choice and reciprocity in regard to those services which they must obtain from others. The tendency to elaborate the corporation into a junior welfare state—except as the various payroll deductions go simply to stabilize income—may thus be counteracted before it goes much further by the preference of families for money they can spend as they please over services they are not allowed to refuse.

CONCLUSION

To be free to pay for a service and to obtain it from more than one source are basic rights which morally justify the maintenance of a market for health, education, recreation, and welfare. Any scheme for the provision of services

which aspires to be the exclusive channel may accordingly be questioned at the outset. To the public, a profession wears a sinister aspect when it appears to reach for monopolistic control, as in the efforts to exclude clinical psychologists from the practice of counseling. Even from the technical standpoint, the more experiments that can be tried, the more channels of service there are. The assumption of superior professional competence as a justification for planning some unitary system of health, education, recreation, or welfare will not withstand the pluralistic bent of the families expected to be its clients. The better part for all those who are thinking about the future of such services, therefore, is to assume a profusion of vehicles. Such an assumption will make planning more complicated but in the end more workable. It also forces attention back upon means which can be put to alternative uses at the option of families themselves. Although such a plan cannot apply to space, which is fixed in quantity and must therefore be allocated through political decisions, it seems, offhand, to apply to all other resources needed by families.

The creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare brought together in one federal department a variety of old and new agencies. It is understandable that the Department should seek some unifying concept of its work, that it should find it in the family, and that the federal example should be influential among the states and cities. Instead of translating this unifying concept into planning of the old centralized sort, family-serving agencies from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare down to the local Parent Teachers Association will do well in the future to start from recognition that the family itself is a voluntary small group for cooperative self-help, the very prototype

of all schemes of mutual aid. Any notion of services to families that weakens rather than strengthens their capacities to help themselves contradicts its declared objective.

A good example of the quasi family character of small groups is co-operative babysitting pools. The capacity of people to evolve such neighborhood devices is proving more durable and adaptable than was believed possible by those who saw the city as obliterating all primary group manifestations. We are probably only at the beginning of the proliferation of a whole rainbow of small-group devices to provide families with services they cannot furnish themselves or which

they are unwilling or unable to seek from professional or commercial agencies.

Human needs are open-ended. As new ones emerge, we glimpse new possibilities for meeting them. Even for an activity as ancient and basic as the raising of children, today's research, innovation, and developments, such as the rising rate of employment among women, disclose new situations where we can advantageously reorganize our knowledge and resources, our means and needs.

The new generation is challenging its elders to move away from the remedial actions of professionals and help it find capacities for cultivating its own development as competent amateurs.

Metropolitan Organization

By LUTHER GULICK

Abstract: Metropolitan organization must now recognize unprecedented problems of dynamics and scale. Both have their effect on management, costs, and "democratics." In designing governmental changes to give us the required comprehensiveness and regional self-government we are controlled by eight objectives. Where existing government falls short of these goals, we must turn to political inventions. Four are suggested: The creation in each state of a new department of local affairs with a "metropolitan desk"; the drastic reconstruction of metropolitan counties; the creation of open-ended metropolitan service agencies; and the creation of an entirely new layer of regional government, the metropolitan council.

A STRIKING characteristic of the new metropolitan pattern of settlement in the United States is its amorphous structure, dynamism and unprecedented scale. The metropolitanized sections of the country now contain well over 60 per cent of the total population, while single "clusters" have three million, five million, or as many as 23 million human beings. In geographic extent the individual complexes run to as much as 18 thousand square miles.

The scale of what exists and is coming on top is so colossal that we are carried into a new dimension, a new world.

There are three aspects of scale and growth which must concern us as we think about the organization of government in the metropolitan regions. These are the management problems, the cost problems, and the problems of democracy.

From the standpoint of *management*, scale and dynamism are extremely significant. With large scale we can no longer rest back on simple, inherited, amateur, informal, and voluntary approaches to government. As in other

large-scale operations, we will be forced to define functions, divide the work, formalize structures and interrelations, professionalize the staffs, and institutionalize activities and communications. With growth also there will be more and more subdivision of work and in consequence a parallel development of integration through formalized co-ordination and control.

These shifts from the "beautiful simplicity of the past" to institutionalized management, forced on us by scale, are not all losses for the community. In most cases, there is at the same time a marked increase in the quality of service and the skill and competence of management.

There are those who think that our bigger cities are already "too big to govern effectively." A little analysis will show, however, that it is not the size that creates the "impossible" situation. The biggest cities are smaller than the states and nations of which they are a part, yet no one says the state or the nation is too big to govern effectively. The problem is not the size; the prob-

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lem is adjustment of management devices to the size which is forced upon us by events. And when it comes to this, it will be recognized that we now know how to deal with size. We have the organizational and managerial knowledge and tools. There is no reason for running away from scale.

As to the *costs of scale* it is generally believed that most per capita costs increase with size because people who live in big urban centers need more service and protection. Fortunately, there are also certain *economies of scale*. When quality and costs are compared, it is clear that costs of scale are partly neutralized by the economies of scale so that there appear to be no economic "laws" which will automatically limit the scale of metropolitan operations.

A great deal needs to be known also concerning the effect of scale on *democracy*. Particularly when we deal with local government it is fashionable to think and talk about little communities. Most of our "democratic dogmas," developed through our early history, sentimentalize over this kind of small-scale democracy. While everyone recognizes that with size we cannot have direct democracy but must move to representative institutions, they do so with nostalgic regret. However, no one has drawn up a clear statement of "the democracy of scale" nor given our people a dogma of big democracy by which they can authenticate their present-day institutions.¹ We still measure big democracies with the yardstick of the town meeting and test their democratic validity by the words of Jefferson and de Tocqueville. This is a philosophical blunder based on the scale fallacy.

Scale cannot be avoided now. Either we develop a clear philosophy and machinery for large-scale democracy or we

¹ However, a good start has been made by Paul H. Appleby in his *Big Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945).

inflict on our people and their leaders a painful sense of frustration and guilt. The truth is, the tests for ideal self-government in a large population which is widespread geographically, but knit together in a new structured web of economic, social, and communicational existence, must be radically different from the tests for small-scale democracy.

DOES THE METROPOLITAN AREA NEED "A GOVERNMENT"?

Every metropolitan area in the United States has many governments and much governmental activity. Many of the activities are federal, still more are state, and both operate through their several independent departments. In addition there are the activities of the cities, counties, "authorities," villages, towns, school, and other districts.

Even with all these governments severally at work, with the added influence of countless voluntary agencies, and with many intergovernmental arrangements and contracts, there are a number of clearly unmet requirements in most areas.

The unmet needs give a clue to what is required. They differ from place to place. In some areas the work which falls between the many jurisdictions is water supply; in others it may be waste disposal, pollution control, education or housing, health, crime or flood and fire protection. Generally, there is an imbalance of local financial resources with resulting luxury for some and tax deficiencies for others. But everywhere there is chaos as to the major circulation system and pattern including highways, railroads, air facilities, mass transportation, and provision for traffic.

It is now evident that there are inherent reasons why such problems cannot be handled effectively by bits and pieces, each in the hands of independent jurisdictions.

And when it comes to zoning, land use regulation, and the system for circulation and traffic, the underlying problems become impossible of rational attack unless there is a single center for co-ordinated analysis, planning, and action. It is inherently impossible to "solve the traffic problem" within boundaries which are less than those of the normal area of circulation, that is, the entire metropolitan area; nor by separate and competing jurisdictions; nor by ignoring the fact that land uses and the transportation system and pattern are two sides of the same coin.

This statement does not prove that there must be "a single metropolitan government." It suggests, rather, that there must be several new area-wide governmental activities.

Some of these might be assigned to the federal government. The minimum civilized standards might be set and enforced by various federal and state departments. The states might be required to take over the broader metropolitan regional land use controls and to develop and enforce the general pattern of the highway system, controlling federal and state highway funds to this end. Tax difficulties and imbalances may be dealt with through state aid and various equalization formulas. And where some special service is required, like a single great sewage treatment plant or an interjurisdictional bridge or transit system, an "authority" may be set up with its own sources of support from charges or tolls.

Thus it may be possible to design governmental machinery to deal with each and every present need of the metropolitan regions without setting up any specific "metropolitan government." This *ad hoc* approach with a separate metropolitan agency of some sort for each metropolitan job is possible.

What does such an *ad hoc* approach

lack? It lacks two very important elements:

First, the *ad hoc* approach lacks comprehensiveness. If we rely on existing state and federal departments each to take care of one or more of the area-wide needs of the metropolitan regions or set up special new agencies or authorities each to perform a specific service, it is evident that this arrangement cannot give a comprehensive or integrated treatment of the several metropolitan needs. Nor would fiscal resources be interrelated or pooled. There would be no possibility of over-all planning, integration, or mutual adjustment and compromise. Each activity would go it alone, and there would be nobody to hold things in balance or to tackle a new development not originally provided for.

Second, the *ad hoc* approach makes self-government by the people of the metropolitan area as concerns their own metropolitan problems impossible as a practical matter. The state and federal agencies are democratically but distantly responsible to their larger electorates, not specifically to the metropolitan area. In fact, metropolitan areas are markedly underrepresented in most state legislatures and in the national political structure. The *ad hoc* agencies and authorities are legally parts of the state government, though in fact floating around in a sort of irresponsible political limbo. Even if such *ad hoc* agencies were made responsible entirely to local electorates, they would confront the electorates competitively with unresolved problems of balance and priorities in a form with which large-scale constituencies cannot deal directly.

These two inescapable deficiencies of the *ad hoc* approach, both of which are greatly accentuated by scale, lead one to explore the possibility of designing one or more governmental "models"

planned to give the metropolitan area a government which is comprehensive as to area-wide matters and gives the region at the same time a large measure of local democratic self-government.

STRUCTURE OF REQUIRED METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

The design of such a governmental structure for any metropolitan area must be settled after functions and locale are known. But we need to keep a few central desiderata clearly in mind. These may be noted as:

1. The need to put together within a single viable political boundary the people and the territories which have to be together to work out the local problems of the metropolitan area. By this engineered strategy we make it possible for the people to think, debate, act, and work together politically as a community; and we create the political habitat within which responsible political leadership will arise.

2. The need to achieve geographic, social, and economic comprehensiveness so that the metropolitan government may not be confronted by the impossible task of building half a bridge, regulating traffic on one part of a through highway, controlling land use for one side of a street, or fighting to hold down crime in half of a slum.

3. The need to create workable joint and balanced action between interrelated activities like water supply and waste disposal; crime control, traffic regulation, and recreation; building permits and fire prevention; housing, health, and welfare; and especially to tie together in one package the control over developing land use and density and the control over the major pattern of circulation.

4. The need to create a governmental representative body drawn from the metropolitan area as a whole to which

may be given both the legal and the pragmatic power to consider each and every major metropolitan problem on an integrated basis, to devise remedial programs, to listen to all shades of opinion, to develop compromises and community agreements, and then to take action to carry out the decisions made and to require compliance with these decisions not only from individuals and private groups but from subordinate municipal corporations concerning area-wide metropolitan matters.

5. The need to protect the local communities, natural neighborhood subdivisions, and incorporated units against being swallowed up and destroyed by the metropolis and its government in the performance of their separable local activities and in the maintenance of their desired above-standard services and environments.

6. The need to develop a fiscal system for the metropolitan government in its own right, so that (a) the wealth, power, and credit of the area as a whole may be mobilized for the solution of the over-all problems of the area; (b) the sudden new wealth created through the activities of the metropolitan government may make a fair contribution toward the costs; and (c) the fortuitous tax resources of one lucky subregion may contribute to support the basic community requirements of another small subunit which has no such metropolitan windfall.

7. The need to equip the metropolitan government with suitable arms for (a) analysis, comprehensive and balanced planning, and compromise development; (b) policy decision-making; and (c) execution, management, and enforcement. And finally,

8. The need to remember that we are not working with eternal and fixed boundaries, but with volatile, dynamic, and expanding settlements; that we are always striving in the United States to

keep government and political decisions "close to the people."

There are situations in which these eight requirements may be met within reason without creating a new layer of metropolitan government. Where this is the case, it goes without saying that we should develop and adapt existing machinery to do the job, turning to new creations only where this is the best and only way out.

Approaching our problem from this point, it will be found that there are situations, as noted above, in which we can turn to the federal government, to the states, to the counties, and to existing *ad hoc* agencies or to interjurisdictional contracts to handle the activities now called for.

Where none of these devices is available or adequate to meet the requirements we have laid down above, we shall need entirely new political invention.

With this in mind, four such "inventions" are here sketched, with no claim that they are original with the author. These are:

1. The creation of a state department of local affairs with an independent bureau or "desk" for each major metropolitan area within the state.

2. The reconstruction of the county so that the county may become the metropolitan government of its region.

3. The creation of a new limited purpose metropolitan service agency with a built-in power to expand as to functions, finance, and representation.

4. The creation of a new layer of local government above the existing localities and below the state to be known as the metropolitan council of XYZ, having the authority and financial power to deal with broad but specified metropolitan activities.

These four inventions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though 2 and 3 would not be needed where a metro-

politan council is established. The four proposals are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

A STATE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS

The proposed state department of local affairs would take over responsibility for handling all general relations of the state with county, city, village, town, and special district governments, and with their officials. The new department would collect local statistics, especially financial statistics, make administrative surveys and financial audits, offer "efficiency" advice and assistance, and would carry on extensive officer training and in-service-training programs for local elective and appointed personnel. The department would work directly with existing associations of local officials, participate in conferences, and defend the interests of the local governments as a group before the legislature and with all administrative departments.

Such a state department would not take the place of the state department of education in dealing with the local schools nor of the health department, the welfare department, the highway department, the state planning department, the tax department, or any other functional department in its specialized and professional functions. But the state department of local affairs would be concerned with the general impact of these specialized departments on local governments as such.

Under this concept, it would be desirable to set up in the proposed department a separate "desk" for each major metropolitan area of the state and to appoint to this desk a man of broad experience and competence. He would not only "clear" all state activities concerning their combined impact on "his metropolitan area" but would work directly with the local governments of his area.

On occasion he would call their officials together for conference in order to develop the maximum co-operation and participation in the local solution of metropolitan problems and the fullest possible reflection of local needs and desires in all state decisions.

Co-operation in planning, the establishment of standards, and the development of services and compacts across state lines concerning metropolitan problems would be a responsibility of the "desk" and the department.

Under this plan, it would be most helpful if the local governments would set up voluntary regional councils like that developed in the New York tri-state region some years ago under the chairmanship of Mayor Robert F. Wagner.

THE METROPOLITAN COUNTY

A second possible approach is the complete reconstruction of the county government in densely populated regions so that it may add to its existing functions and become "the metropolitan government" of its area. Where the county already has an adequate geographical extent and a reasonable level of political responsibility and administrative competence, this might well meet the eight requirements stated above.

The major disadvantage of using the county as the foundation for metropolitan government is that the county is generally imbedded constitutionally in the state administrative, representational, and political structure. Its boundaries are most inflexible and its operation can be raised in managerial competence only with the greatest effort.

Wherever the county is used as the metropolitan government, issues of political representation arise as in the case of the new Dade County charter (Miami, Florida). Such a county falls into the same category as the great met-

ropolitan city, or the city-county, in terms of political representation. The governing body must, preferably, be so designed as to represent the voters directly either by election at large, by districts, or by some combination of these methods. The size of the county council must be articulated to the form of county government. If a county manager is used, the council would be small and representative. If the county mayor is elected and assisted by an appointive chief administrative officer, then the council can be designed more freely in regard to size and methods of election. However structured in detail, the design of such a federated county council should be based on the representative system already tested in our great cities and city-counties and tailored to the political needs of the specific area.

THE OPEN-ENDED METROPOLITAN COMMISSION

A third possible approach is the creation of a limited-purpose special "authority," service unit or commission designed to cover a large metropolitan area and to perform from the beginning some needed service, such as water supply or airport construction and operation, with the authority to add to its functions and powers by local action.

The recently enacted law in the State of Washington, the Metropolitan Council Act, is along this line although its possible added functions are rather narrowly limited. Presumably these could be extended by the state legislature in future years if occasion warrants.

Where this approach is adopted, it would seem important to establish something more than a small board of directors appointed by the governor, as is so often the case. If the board is to make extensive policy decisions as to planning, land use controls, and the general pattern of the transportation system, it

is not likely that a small specifically chosen board can be effective.

A NEW METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

A fourth approach is the creation of an entirely new layer of local self-government, what we may call a metropolitan council.

This would be, first of all, a legislative body. It would be designed to bring together officially and regularly all of the major local governmental interests and problems of the metropolitan area so that the regional governmental shortfalls may be fully considered; remedial and developmental programs may be evolved with adequate planning; compromises arrived at, and decisions made and carried out.

These are primarily "policy" assignments; they are the stuff of politics.

We know from much experience that such functions cannot appropriately be left to experts or bureaucrats working alone. This kind of work calls for politically sensitive and responsible "representatives."

We know also that the real essence of the problem is the laying of the political foundation for the development of the metropolitan community as a political reality with rising political leadership, political education, and political following. This alone will make possible effective and balanced political action and community commitment for the metropolitan area as a whole.

Because of scale, we must have representative institutions, and for these to work we must have political leadership and political action. It is to this end that we need a political entity coextensive with the area and consequently a metropolitan political constituency.

Furthermore, we know that it is generally safer to build political institutions on what we already have, rather than to

wipe the slate clean and start all over again.

From these considerations it follows that the membership of the metropolitan council should be made up initially from the chief elected officials of the local governments of the region which is being brought together. This would include, in most situations, the mayors of the larger cities and incorporated units and the chief elected official of each county comprised in the "metropolitan area." It might be desirable to add to this group a number of specifically elected representatives and a president of the metropolitan council to be elected at large, although these developments might well be postponed until the region is ripe for this type of leadership and direct representation.

The metropolitan council would establish a strong and well-staffed program development and planning unit, placing this directly under its chairman or president. The council would set up several special working committees for which the program and planning unit would furnish an appropriate staff.

The metropolitan council would do its administrative work, such as building a bridge or a water works or running a sewage treatment plant or a transit system, by using existing regional and local operating agencies as far as possible. Where no agency exists which can handle the operation, the council would by ordinance create such an administration. This could be done by setting up "an authority" or by creating an operating department under a manager to be appointed by the council president. Where one or more authorities or special district bodies exist already within the boundaries of the metropolitan council, these could be continued as they are, bringing certain of their powers under the supervision of the council.

Especially important is the definition of the responsibility of the metropolitan council. The effort would be made to assign to the council the over-all, inter-unit metropolitan matters and activities and to guarantee to the existing and underlying governmental units the responsibility to carry on their normal non-metropolitan local activities. This can only be approached through trial and error: With a general statement of this principle, the listing of the arrangements with reference to a number of the more obvious services where the division of work is required, and by authorizing the localities which so desire to protect their unique advantages and to have local services of a higher standard than those of their neighbors.

While many of the metropolitan services and facilities developed by the metropolitan council will be "self-supporting" on the basis of prices and tolls collected, the council should not be required to rely solely on such receipts.

As to metropolitan areas which extend across state lines, as is already true of more than a score of such metropolises, the metropolitan council would be set up by joint action of the states involved, presumably utilizing the interstate compact procedure. In such cases the original compact should provide for territorial extension and for functional and fiscal modifications without requiring congressional reconsideration. As to modifications which do not change the arrangement fundamentally, it would be desirable for the contracting states to leave these to the area concerned, rather than to require the state legislatures to review the arrangement again.

Each such interstate metropolitan compact will have to be tailor-made, primarily because of the required fiscal provisions. The present local government provisions, court decisions, and tax and debt systems are so diverse among

neighboring states, that a great deal of constitutional ingenuity will be required to develop workable arrangements in all cases. It may even be necessary to consider the in-state members of an interstate metropolitan council as a separate "municipal corporation" with the right to act concerning matters within its state along lines agreed on jointly in the metropolitan council.

CHARACTER OF THE COUNCIL

The metropolitan council as thus conceived is, first, an old-fashioned American "body of overseers" with authority limited to the over-all interests, concerns, and problems of the defined metropolitan region. It is democratically constituted from locally elected officials, with the eventual addition of directly elected members. As such it is also a federation of the existing local governments. The council is initially primarily a policy-developing and -adopting body; that is, a legislative agency. However, the council is given the authority, as are local legislatures generally, to develop such administrative units as may be required, using existing agencies as far as this is possible, or to create new units where necessary.

Under this proposal, the existing local governments—the cities, counties, towns, villages, and special districts—could be continued as they now are in relation to their local functions. Only the metropolitan aspects of functions would come under the oversight of the metropolitan council. At the same time, the existing local jurisdictions would be authorized to shift to the council by mutual consent any activities which they wish to handle in this way.

This proposal is not only elastic in its boundaries since it is not tied by definition to a specific set of existing city or county boundaries, but is extensible

across state lines, following precedents already well established in many jurisdictions for more limited activities.

Under this proposal, finally, there is brought into legal and political existence what is now evolving naturally as a matter of social and economic life; namely, the metropolitan community. With a representative council, this emergent community is given political being. The metropolitan area becomes a sin-

gle constituency for metropolitan representation, for metropolitan policy discussion, for metropolitan administration, and above all, for metropolitan political leadership and political action. While this in no way supersedes existing governmental organizations, it fills the vacuum and makes it possible for the rising metropolis to deal effectively and democratically with its now unmet metropolitan needs.

Metropolitan Financial Problems

By LYLE C. FITCH

Abstract: Exuberant urbanism, advancing technology, and rising incomes and living standards, all are expanding demands for urban government services, some of which can be most efficiently supplied or financed by metropolitan jurisdictions. Since metropolitan areas are the focal points of income and wealth, the financial problem stems largely from the lack of machinery. Many of the most pressing metropolitan needs can be appropriately financed by user charges, but these need to be carefully designed to produce the most desirable overall economic effects. Both property and nonproperty taxes should be administered by metropolitan-wide jurisdictions, leaving submetropolitan governments the power to set property tax rates for local needs.

CONTINUED urban growth, economic development, and rise of living standards almost certainly will require maintaining, and probably increasing, the share of the national product taken in the form of urban government services. The evidence of recent trends and existing unmet needs indicate the strength of the pressures for more and better services.

Expenditures of large cities rose by approximately 75 per cent between 1948 and 1956, and total local government expenditures in the corresponding metropolitan areas doubtless increased considerably more.¹

Developed central cities and mushrooming suburbs have faced, and will continue to face, peculiar needs. The central cities have had to meet demands arising from population shifts within their own boundaries, shifts which are economic and social as well as geographic. The larger cities are tending to become concentration points of low-income groups and require disproportionately large outlays for welfare and so-

cial development. Many cities are increasingly impressed with the necessity of large scale physical rehabilitation and redevelopment if they are to compete with the suburbs as places to live and do business, and if they are to avoid untimely obsolescence of private and public investment in their central areas. In the suburbs, rapid expansion requires enormous amounts of new capital facilities in the form of streets, schools, recreational facilities, and the like.

The advent of the metropolitan age and the concomitant development of modern urban culture are creating new demands for many government services and are raising standards of old services. Many of the emergent needs can be supplied only by new governmental agencies designed to operate on a metropolitan scale.

This is the root of the metropolitan financial problem: How to divert a larger share of resources to government use, or, more simply, how to get more funds than existing revenue systems will produce, without unduly impinging on private production. (The last qualifying clause is added because one main objective of

urban government should be to increase productivity of private firms by providing them with better educated and healthier workers, better transportation facilities, and so on.) Solutions, even partial solutions, require better fiscal machinery and broader fiscal powers, as well as organizational innovations, at the local government level. Above all, they require public education and political leadership. Most of these requirements are outside the scope of this paper. Other articles in the series, particularly Luther Gulick's, consider the task of organization of the metropolitan community for effective action; this discussion is concerned with equipping it with improved fiscal tools.

DEFICIENCIES OF METROPOLITAN FISCAL MACHINERY

Metropolitan financial problems arise primarily from the lack of adequate machinery rather than from any lack of capacity. Presumptively, today's large urban communities, being typically the focal points of wealth and income, have the resources to meet their urban needs.

The following deficiencies in the fiscal machinery characteristic of metropolitan areas seem to the writer to be the most important and the ones whose rectification will have greatest importance for the future.

1. Existing revenue-producing machinery is generally inadequate for the task of financing local government functions; this is true both of functions appropriate for the conventional (submetropolitan) local government and functions which can best be handled by metropolitan jurisdictions.

2. The extension of activities across jurisdictional boundary lines makes it more and more difficult to relate benefits and taxes at the local government level. In the modern metropolitan community, a family may reside in one jurisdiction, earn its living in one or

more others, send the children to school in another, and shop and seek recreation in still others. But to a considerable extent, the American local financial system still reflects the presumption that these various activities are concentrated in one governmental jurisdiction.

3. In many areas there are great discrepancies in the capacities of local government jurisdictions to provide needed governmental services. At one extreme are the communities which have not sufficient taxable capacity for essential services. The most common case is the bedroom community of low- and middle-income workers which has little industry or commerce. At the other extreme are the wealthy tax colonies, zoned to keep out low-income residents.²

Three main types of decisions must be made in setting up and financing functions on an area-wide scale. They concern:

The services and benefits which should be provided on an area-wide basis.

The question of whether services should be financed by taxes or charges.

The type and rate of tax or charge which should be imposed.

Some services and benefits, like health protection and air pollution control, can be provided efficiently only if they extend over a wide area and their administration is integrated; some, like hospitals and tax administration, are more economical if handled on a large scale.³

² See Julius Margolis, "Municipal Fiscal Structure in a Metropolitan Region," *Journal of Political Economy* (June 1957).

³ Results of two recent, as yet unpublished, studies indicate that the unit costs of government services may be less affected by the scale of operations than has been popularly supposed. Harvey Brazier's study (sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research) of general government expenditures in larger cities, the group exceeding 15,000 in 1950, finds little correlation between per capita costs of local government functions and city size. Werner Hirsch's study of municipal expenditures in St. Louis County for the St. Louis

¹ Reference is to the 41 cities with populations exceeding 250,000 in 1950.

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and some, like intrametropolitan transportation, can be controlled satisfactorily only by a central authority with powers to establish area-wide standards and policies and to resolve intra-area conflicts.

TAXES AND CHARGES

This discussion distinguishes mainly between general taxes bearing no direct relation to benefits of expenditures, like sales and income taxes, and charges, or public prices, which vary directly with the amount of the service provided, like bridge tolls, subway fares, and metered charges for water.

General taxes and public prices are at the opposite ends of the revenue spectrum. In between are benefit taxes, which are imposed on beneficiaries of a related service, with the proceeds being devoted largely or entirely to financing the service. Gasoline taxes used for financing highways are a familiar example; the real-estate tax is at least in part a benefit tax where it pays for services which benefit the taxed properties.

LOCAL TAXES

Local governments, within the generally narrow confines of state-imposed restrictions, have shown considerable ingenuity in tapping pools of potential revenue, however small; few things on land, sea, or in the air, from pleasures and palaces to loaves and fishes, escape taxation somewhere. However, most of the principal local taxes used today are loosely enforced or expensive to administer and dubious in their economic effect. Even the property tax is not exempt from this indictment, although its praises have long been sung and its vices excused on the ground that it is the only tax which can be administered successfully even by the smallest local govern-

ment. The fact is that it has generally not been successfully administered at all, according to most criteria of equity and efficiency. It is capricious and inequitable even in what it purports to do best.

Part of the typical difficulties of local taxation arise from smallness, both in size of jurisdiction and scale of administrative organization. These, of course, may be obviated by metropolitan area-wide administration. Efficient collection of most types of revenues requires an organization large enough to afford trained personnel, costly equipment, and professional direction and research. Geographically, the taxing area must be large enough and isolated enough to discourage avoidance of taxes by persons who move their residences or business establishments over boundary lines or who go outside the jurisdiction to shop. When imposed by several neighboring local governments, many taxes involve issues of intergovernmental jurisdiction and allocation of tax bases.

Where taxes are imposed on an area-wide basis, one issue of metropolitan area finance—allocation of government service costs among communities—is resolved; allocation is a function of the type of tax imposed. Area-wide taxes also eliminate tax competition within the area; however this may not be an unmitigated blessing if competition by offering better services also is eliminated.

To date, the principal revenue sources of area-wide public agencies have been property taxes and user charges, although some metropolitan counties in New York and California, for instance, impose sales taxes and occasionally other nonproperty taxes. The problems of granting taxing powers to metropolitan jurisdictions which extend over several counties remain largely unexplored. A bill introduced in the 1957 session of the California legislature to establish a multicounty San Francisco Bay area rapid transit district went further in

this direction than most legislative proposals by giving the proposed district power to impose both a property and a sales tax. The sales tax authority was eliminated in the version of the bill finally adopted⁴.

The difficulties of working out harmonious tax arrangements between metropolitan jurisdictions and state and already-existing local governments have been great enough when only one state was involved to block all but the feeblest beginnings beyond the one county level. They have thus far been considered insuperable where interstate arrangements are involved. For some time to come, interstate functions probably will be financed by user charges, supplemented where necessary by contributions from the state or local governments involved.

In the almost-perfect metropolitan area, we would expect to see metropolitan real-estate taxes assessed by an area-wide agency,⁵ with metropolitan levies for such metropolitan services as were deemed to be of particular benefit to property and additional local levies for local government activities. Only metropolitan jurisdictions would be authorized to impose nonproperty taxes. In general, the permissible nonproperty taxes would include general sales and amusements taxes and a levy on personal income. Business firms might be taxed, if at all, by some simple form of value added tax.

The following are among the taxes not used at the local level in the almost-perfect metropolitan area: Gross receipts taxes and taxes on utility services because of their excessively deleterious economic effect; and corporate income

taxes and such selective excises as gasoline, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco taxes because they can be much better administered at the state level.

Along with several others, the revenue sources mentioned above are now being used by municipalities with two exceptions: The value-added tax and the general income tax. The so-called municipal income taxes now imposed in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and a few other states rest largely on wages and salaries. Considerations of equity manifestly require a broader tax base, and the need for administrative simplicity suggests a supplemental rate on an existing base where this is practicable.⁶

The Real-Estate Tax

The principal justification for the real-estate tax, aside from tradition, convenience, and expediency, is that by financing beneficial services, it benefits property. Another logical function, which it performs very inadequately, is to capture at least part of the unearned increments to land values accruing by reason of urban developments. Special assessments have been widely used to recoup at least part of land values accruing from public improvements,⁷ but no means has been devised, at least at the local level, of recapturing land values not attributable to specific public improvements.

The enormous increases of land values which typically occur as land is converted from rural to urban use and from less to more intensive urban use constitute a pool of resources which can be appropriately utilized to meet the social

⁴ Tax revenues of the proposed district would be used mainly for service of debt incurred in building a rapid transit system and to meet expenses of the district board.

⁵ Personal property, with the possible exception of depreciable business assets, would not be taxed in the almost-perfect metropolitan area.

⁶ See Harold M. Groves, "New Sources of Light on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations," *National Tax Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1952).

⁷ As an alternative to the special assessment device, developers in many instances are required to provide for streets, sewers, water mains, and similar improvements which otherwise would be provided by public funds.

Metropolitan Survey, shows similar results for some 80 municipalities, most of them under 25,000 population.

costs of urban development, if taxes can be devised to tap the pool. Such land value increases, however, seem characteristically to be concentrated in the expanding sections, mostly the suburbs. Available evidence suggests that land values in many core cities have lagged far behind general price levels and in some cities have not even regained levels reached in the 1920's.⁸ In such cases, urban redevelopment, unlike the initial urban development, cannot count on pools of expanding land values; on the contrary land costs often must be written down at government expense if redevelopment is to be economically feasible.⁹

Clearly the real-estate tax must be adapted to the dynamic characteristics of the urban economy. The tax in its present form gives equal weight to the incremental values resulting from urban development, the values of land already developed, and the values of improvements. Several possible new features should be explored. Some of them are: A local capital gains tax on land value increments, special levies on property values accruing after the announcement of public improvements which benefit the whole community, and a differential tax on land values. Of these three possibilities, the last seems most promising, if only because the basic concept is familiar; it has been used in Australia, Canada, and elsewhere abroad, but by only a few cities in the United States.

THE ROLE OF USER CHARGES

There is a case for charging for a service instead of financing it by general

⁸ Such tendencies, however, do not necessarily reflect an absolute economic declining of the core.

⁹ In the long run, of course, one test of urban redevelopment programs is whether they increase land and other property values, relative to the value that would otherwise have obtained.

taxation if the following conditions are met:

1. The charge must be administratively feasible. Among the other requirements, the service must be divisible into units whose use by the beneficiary can be measured, like kilowatts, gallons of water, trips across a bridge, or miles traveled on a turnpike.

2. The immediate benefits of the service should go mainly to the person paying for it. This condition, not always easy to apply, means that if a person refrains from using the service because of the charge, the rest of the community suffers relatively little loss. For example, the community is ordinarily not much damaged if a person uses less electricity or makes fewer long-distance telephone calls. In some cases, an additional use by a few individuals may greatly inconvenience many others; for example, a few additional vehicles on a roadway may produce traffic congestion.

3. The charge should encourage economical use of resources. Metered charges, for instance, encourage consumers to conserve water and electricity by turning off faucets and lights.

One of the most important functions of charges is to balance demand and supply in cases where excess demand produces undesirable results. If the number of curb parking spaces is less than the number of would-be parkers, the space will be allocated on a first-come first-served basis, in the absence of any better device, and there is no way of assuring that space will go to those who need it most. In such cases, a charge may be the most efficient way of rationing space. This is frequently attempted by use of parking meters, although nearly always in a crude fashion. Meter systems could be much improved if the elementary principles of charges were better understood.

Conversely, a charge—or the increase of an already-existing charge—is not

justified if it results in the underutilization or waste of resources. For example, as an immediate result of the increase of the New York subway fare from 10 to 15 cents in 1953, passenger traffic declined at least 120 million rides per year, the bulk of the drop being concentrated in nonrush hours and holidays when subways have excess capacity. Not only did the community lose 120 million rides per year, which could be provided at little additional cost, but traffic congestion increased because former subway riders switched to private passenger cars and taxis, and downtown shopping and amusement centers suffered to an undetermined extent.¹⁰

The peripatetic propensities of metropolitan man and the fact that he may consume services in several jurisdictions while voting in only one have disjointed local government fiscal structures in several places. First, the separation of workshops and bedrooms may create disparities between taxable capacities and service needs. Second, the separation of political jurisdictions in which individuals are taxed and in which they require services handicaps the budget-making process; it makes more difficult a rational determination of how much of the community's product should take the form of government services. Third, the necessity of providing services to outsiders, particularly commuters, creates pressure for taxation without representation.

Market forces

These considerations argue for a policy of structuring metropolitan government-

tal organizations in order to allow as much freedom as possible to the play of market forces in determining the kinds and quantities of government services to be supplied, subject to the general principles previously noted (Section on the Role of User Charges).¹¹

The market system can operate at two levels: That of the individual or firm purchasing services or goods from a government enterprise and that of the group, for example, the smaller governmental jurisdiction, purchasing goods or services from a larger jurisdiction. The second level is exemplified by the city of Lakewood, California and several other cities which purchase their municipal services from Los Angeles County.¹²

One of the principal decisions respecting any government service is the quantity to be furnished. The important distinction between ordinary government services and services provided under enterprise principles lies in the nature of the decision-making process. Budgetary decisions affecting regular government services are political decisions, reflecting judgments of legislatures regarding how much of the services are needed by the community and how much the taxpayers are willing to pay. Not infrequently, decisions are referred directly to voters. The amount of service to be provided under enterprise principles is dictated by consumers, by the usual market test of how much individuals or firms in the aggregate will buy at cost-of-production prices.¹³ In other words,

¹¹ We can go this far without agreeing with Calvin Coolidge that legislatures should make it their business to discover natural economic laws and enact them into legislation.

¹² Another way of relating charges on particular areas to services rendered is the establishment of special service districts within a metropolitan jurisdiction which pay differential taxes for special services.

¹³ The question of price cannot be disposed of by the simple qualification "cost-of-production," but that question need not be considered here.

¹⁰ For a general discussion see William Vickery, *Revision of Rapid Transit Fares in the City of New York*, Mayor's Committee on Management Survey, Finance Project Publication, item No. 8, Technical Monograph No. 3 (New York, 1952); Lyle C. Fitch, "Pricing Transportation in a Metropolitan Area," *Proceedings* (New York: National Tax Association, 1955).

the question of how much is decided by following the simple rule that where demand exceeds supply, the service should be expanded, and vice versa.

Price-market test

The price-market test of resource allocation greatly simplifies the problem of citizen participation in the governmental process. Where services and goods are bought by individuals, each consumer takes part in the decision-making process by determining how much of the service he will buy.

Where purchases are by groups, decisions as to how much to spend must be political ones; but the issue of citizen participation can be simplified in several ways as compared with the situation where budgetary decisions are made by large political units. If the purchasing group is more homogeneous than the whole community, any decision is more wholly satisfactory to a larger percentage of the members. Even if the small group is no more homogeneous than the large, individuals may participate more effectively in small-group decisions.¹⁴

While user charges and the demand-supply rule can simplify the budgetary problem, they do not divorce public enterprise operations from the political process; political participation in many decisions is essential, including the crucial decisions respecting organizational form, investment policies, and integrating the particular function with other community services. For instance, the quantity of services to be supplied by a basically enterprise type of operation may be extended by public decision and public subsidy beyond the amounts which could be made available at cost-

¹⁴ This statement rests on the not uncomplicated assumption that the opportunity of participating in decisions of a smaller group is a positive value.

of-production prices.¹⁵ In some cases, public subsidies may be necessary to avoid waste of an already-existing resource. Public prices too often are fixed to achieve narrow objectives, such as meeting debt service on construction bonds, without regard for their over-all economic effect.

Some of the most urgent area-wide needs are appropriately financed partly or wholly by charges. They include the services which are frequently provided by private regulated utilities such as gas and electricity, water, and mass transportation and other transportation facilities, port development, waste disposal, many recreational services, and hospital services.¹⁶

BALANCING COSTS AND TAXABLE CAPACITY

There have been few studies of the over-all relationship of costs and taxable capacity in metropolitan areas—although endless attention has been lavished on particular functions, notably education—and the subject still abounds with unsettled questions. Brazer's analyses indicate that the relative size of the suburban population is an important determinant of local government expendi-

¹⁵ Even more basic is the question, not considered here, of whether enterprises in particular instances should be private or public.

¹⁶ A recent study of metropolitan government in the Sacramento area recommended that the capital and operating costs of water, sewage service, garbage pickup and disposal, and transit "be metered and charged to the new areas receiving them." Public Administration Service, *The Government of Metropolitan Sacramento* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1957), p. 144.

For discussions of transportation pricing see Vickrey and Fitch, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*); also Fitch, "Financing Urban Roadways," in *Highway Financing*, Tax Institute Symposium (Princeton: 1957); and Wilfred Owen, *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956), Chapter VII.

tures in large cities, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that cities assume considerable expense in providing services to suburban residents. Both Brazer's and Hirsch's studies indicate, moreover, that per capita expenditures on some functions—police, for instance—typically increase with population density; this may be due partly to the tendency of low-income groups to congregate in central cities. On the other hand, the worst cases of fiscal undernourishment appear to be in the suburbs.

This article has space only for several generalizations which may serve to indicate directions for further analysis:

1. Costs of essential services may be "equalized" over a metropolitan area, either by area-wide administration and financing, or by grants to local jurisdictions financed at least in part by area-wide taxes. Experience with state and federal subventions indicates that the subvention is a clumsy tool. On the other hand, putting services on an area-wide basis may deprive local communities of the privilege of determining the amount of resources to be allocated to specific services.

2. In many cases, the remedy for fiscal undernourishment may lie in area-wide planning and zoning; fiscal measures as such may strike only at symptoms rather than underlying difficulties.

3. Fiscal stress in the modern American community is often more psychological than economic. A common case is that of the former city apartment dweller who buys his own house in the suburbs and for the first time in his life is confronted with a property tax bill. It is not strange that he should resist

taxes while demanding municipal services of a level to which he has been accustomed in the city, nor that he should seek outside assistance in meeting his unaccustomed burden.

4. The point has been made that intercommunity variations in the levels of services should allow metropolitan residents to satisfy their preferences as to levels of local government services and taxes and hence promote the general satisfactions of the entire community.¹⁷ While the argument may be valid within limits, the limits are narrow; they may extend, for instance, to the quality of refuse collection, but not air and water pollution control.

5. Services rendered to individuals in their capacity of workers, shoppers, and other economic functionaries may in some instances be properly treated as a charge upon the business firm involved rather than upon the individual. Suburbanites, like other persons, create real property values wherever they work, shop, or play.¹⁸ This fact refutes the case for a general tax on commuters, although it does not damage the case for user charges where these would improve the allocation of resources. On the other hand, the maintenance of minimal service levels in poor communities and care for the economically stranded, wherever located, are the responsibility of the entire community.

¹⁷ See Charles Tiebout, "The Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 64, No. 5 (October 1956).

¹⁸ Margolis, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), "A priori, there is no reason to believe that the increment in the tax receipts of the central city accompanying the commuter is less than it costs the city to attract and service him."

Urbanism and Government, 1957-1977

By FRANK P. ZEIDLER

Abstract: Atomic attack may possibly destroy the American federal system during the next twenty years. Despite this threat, neither the American government nor the American people are willing to make the sacrifices necessary for survival or reconstructing our urban areas. If no attack occurs, the ills of our expanding urban areas will increase and with them will grow the influence of state and federal authority. The main problems inviting this dominating influence are the conflicts between city and suburb, urban and rural areas, labor and management, the criminal and delinquent and society, and between races.

IN a discussion of the impact of urbanism on government in the two decades from 1957 to 1977, the basic question of whether or not the United States will be at war or peace during that time must be answered. Two assumptions might be made—one, that there will be a war with the full or partial use of atomic weapons, and the other, that there will be peace, but with the continual threat of war in the background. To tell which of these conditions will result is too difficult for me, so that I must give two answers, based on each assumption, of the impact of urbanism on federalism.

The first assumption that seems most probable to me, despite its inherent pessimism, is that the United States government and the government of the Soviet Union will be unable to come to a decision of permanent peace. The result will be the devastation by nuclear bombs of the principal cities of the United States and Russia. The main reason I have for believing this is the condition that seems to exist inside of the Soviet Union. The leaders of that nation are not similarly responsive to public pressures as are American leaders. They are caught in the cage of Leninist ideas and all that system for

the seizure of power implies. Anyone in government who speaks softly toward the "enemies" of the Soviet system as conceived under Leninism cannot come to power. Anyone who ascends to power has reached it with the use of force and violence—a pattern of conduct which will not be shed upon arrival at the pinnacle of authority. It is not logical to assume that Soviet leaders will be any less given to using force and violence against other nations, particularly the United States which is the selected enemy, than they were against using such force and violence on their own people and comrades.

As a result, the public expressions of the leaders of the Soviet Union must of necessity be one of hostility toward the United States; or if the terms directed toward the United States are terms calling for co-existence, these terms must be so expressed that the party clique in Russia believes that their leaders are merely seeking to lull this country to a sense of security while they further improve the position of Russia to attack and destroy the United States.

The actions of the Russian leaders naturally bring a reaction in the United States; communism becomes the principal object of attack by many orators

—political, religious, and economic. The resulting continual denunciations of the leaders of each nation by the other over a period of time, in my opinion, must inevitably lead to an international conflict. This may be a gloomy view, but many current developments seem to point to a renewed struggle even if there is an attempt at disarmament.

The targets of destruction in an atomic war are the places from which a counterattack may be launched, important military installations, and urban districts where concentrations of people and industry are to be found. If tensions were to grow more severe and if disappointments in the disarmament program turn to bitterness people who have sought a disarmament program, it is inevitable that friends and enemies alike will start to think of the fate of people and structures in the urban areas. These areas are the most vulnerable parts of the United States and its federal system. It seems quite probable that a form of blackmail can be directed against a government such as that of the United States by threatening the destruction of its principal cities. It seems to me that we are in this situation at the present time.

VULNERABILITY OF URBAN AREAS

The existence of this threat has caused some thought on the part of urban and federal officials concerning the method of reducing the vulnerability of the urban areas of the United States. State officials have not paid much attention to this problem at all. It is my fear that by the time an atomic war may come, nothing of any great significance to reduce this vulnerability will have occurred. Some cities may have developed evacuation plans without the proper reception areas in the rural districts for the evacuees. It is my fear also that the rural districts will be poorly equipped to deal with the masses of a fleeing ur-

ban population at the time of an atomic showdown.

I suspect, therefore, that for the next decade there will be a continued concentration of people in the metropolitan areas who are attracted by employment and high standards of living available in such areas. I suspect also that very little attention will be paid either by industry, the federal government, or state governments to the decentralization of industrial establishments or to the reduction of the increasing vulnerability which is occurring in the metropolitan areas of the United States.

The increasing vulnerability of the urban areas has the gravest consequences for the nation; it could mean the destruction of the country and the end of our federal system. Herein lies the greatest weakness of federalism at the present time.

The role of the state governments in the protection of the federal system in atomic defense is most important. At the present time these governments are almost completely inactive about, or unaware of, the atomic threat. Since most state governments are dominated by small-town people acting in the name of farmers and since the rural animosity of the urban dweller persists as a foundation fact of each legislature, the legislatures will not take the proper action to protect the urban areas; and they see little danger to rural areas.

The ignorance and indifference of governors and state legislatures on the question of the atomic home defense of the United States are colossal. The primary reason for this is that the state parties vying for control in each state find no political value in civil defense or protection of the vulnerable urban areas. They carry on politics as usual as if the great scientific achievements that have occurred in the past fifteen years have never existed. The indifference to, and the hostility toward, the

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urban areas by state governments can conceivably be fatal to the United States federal system. It may bring us to our first major military defeat and perhaps destruction of the nation in our 181 years of history. The impact of increased urban growth on the United States in view of the weakness and inefficiency of state governments may probably cause a chain of events which will bring the federal system of the nation crashing down in an atomic war.

To reduce the vulnerability of the United States would require a decentralization of the urban population and of industry. Neither the states nor the federal government at this time is prepared to exercise the necessary power and authority to achieve this result; neither are the cities. One course of action requires an increase in federal and state taxation to provide the necessary shelters for people against intercontinental ballistic missiles. In another action, the state governments would necessarily have to re-create metropolitan regions, overriding both the central cities and competing suburbs in order to provide a master plan of development and growth which would reduce the vulnerability of the masses of population. In a third move, the state and federal governments would have to insist on the relocation of critical industry so that it is more evenly dispersed throughout the United States and so that a single massive blow directed at the country would not cause irreparable devastation and effect from which the nation could not recover.

LACK OF PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC WARFARE

To achieve all of these results, in my opinion, is beyond the capacity of either the state or federal government and also beyond the desire of the urban residents. When this public incapacity to act in self-protection is matched against

a hardened system such as that of the Soviet Union—which can order populations to move, force the relocation of industry, and reduce vulnerability—it becomes apparent that the American system of federalism has some weaknesses and maintains its position only because of its potential striking power. However, the lack of proper planning for the atomic age cannot be laid entirely upon the state governments nor upon the weakness of the leadership in the federal government. It is also due to the psychology of people who are weary of the sound of war, who desire luxurious suburban living, and who cannot as a group begin to exert themselves to perform the necessary but disagreeable tasks which would result from a proper plan for urban defense in the United States.

The major parties in power, reflecting the popular view, refuse to stare the prospect of atomic war in the face or to propose the necessary measures which would diminish the effects of an attack on this nation. Only in the urban communities do there seem to be pressures on the part of a few leaders to make the governments more effective in the defense of people. The action of urban leaders may bring some modification in the pattern of urban growth. It may result in a slightly increased urban pressure on the federal government to do something about urban problems as state governments fail to act. There will be, then, up until the time an atomic showdown occurs, some closer liaison between the urban centers and the federal government and some drawing away from the state governments by urban governments.

A condition of increased hostility between large cities and state governments may result. The voters in large cities, in the North particularly, may continue to follow the Democratic party while suburban and rural voters will continue

to follow the Republican party. Since rural and suburban voters may likely total the largest bloc, such a division will also increase the chances of the taking away from the urban areas of their proper representation in state legislatures. Also there will develop permanently in state constitutions the system which in Wisconsin is called the "Area-cat" form of government—namely, that form in which area rather than people is represented in the state legislature.

SUBURBAN VS. URBAN INTERESTS

I also look in this decade for increased state concern for some suburban areas in opposition to the central cities. This will occur largely because suburbanites will have considered their status and life improved to the point that they will leave the Democratic party and vote for the party of conservatism and the status quo, the Republican party. Legislation directed against the development and improvement of the urban centers will often be sponsored by wealthy suburbanites who make their living in the central area.

I also look for a continued migration of southern Negroes and southern white workers to northern cities. The core is the only part of these cities where they can go to live, and because of their numbers and poverty, this core will continue to deteriorate faster than local authorities, state governments, or the federal government can rebuild it. For political reasons, the state governments in this situation may try to lend their weight to increasing the density of population and making the minority problem in the central areas greater. They may do so because of their dislike of the central cities, their fear of the political philosophy held by people in them, and their desire to maintain the economic and class differences between the people of the suburban communities and the lower economic groups

that migrate into the cities seeking work.

Thus, because of these political divisions that exist between the people in the cities and the state governments there will be even less opportunity for the threatened peoples in the target areas to make their voices heard in the state and national governments.

In view of the struggle that is going on, therefore, between the United States and the Soviet Union—sometimes hot, sometimes cold—there is a likelihood that the disagreement may come to a head some time within the next decade. The result will be that both the Soviet Union and the United States will be devastated. I do not believe that the American people can live successfully under the tensions placed upon them by the Soviet Union. Neither do I believe that the Soviet leaders realize what they are doing to the people of the United States in keeping them at a boiling point with their intransigence and constant propaganda attacks which are reported in the United States' press.

Assuming that by 1977 an atomic attack will have occurred and a war concluded some years earlier, the year 1977 would undoubtedly see the cities engaged in rebuilding, some on entirely new sites and some in the older areas. The population of the cities, of course, would be much diminished, as would the population of the nation. Probably, there would be even a lesser number of people in the smaller communities of the United States owing to the ensuing starvation and epidemics that would take place if people were removed wholesale from the larger cities and if those cities were destroyed.

EFFECTS OF ATOMIC WAR

The result of an atomic war could not help but mean radical changes of government with people of diverse cultures and backgrounds scattered in new

locations. It is interesting to speculate on what changes would occur. It is entirely possible that the people of the United States could not resist the movements of people from more overcrowded parts of the world to settle into the nation in considerable numbers. In the matter of construction, such rebuilding which would take place would perhaps, in its initial phases, be more or less haphazard. As for transportation, undoubtedly there would be fewer automobiles since as a result of an atomic war, won or lost, the United States certainly would not enjoy the lion's share of the world's gasoline and oil resources. There is the probable increased use of atomic power, but even with this power source undoubtedly there would be a lower standard of living in urban areas and a considerable disarrangement of the transit systems which make large cities possible.

It is my opinion that a federal system of government would survive a world clash because the challenge to the powers of the states in the great urban areas would no longer exist. The disarrangement and chaotic conditions of the federal government as a result of atomic warfare would force more responsibility on state governments, at least temporarily. However, if the United States survived without being conquered or overrun either by an attacking enemy or by other nations which were relatively uninjured in an atomic war and which would seize control of a shaky government, then it is conceivable that the federal government might reassert its authority over the state governments. It is also possible that southern states faced with the inability to deal with the Negro question might seek to develop a regional government apart from the rest of the United States.

A course of action worth considering as a result of an atomic war is that the federal government might be-

come more seriously concerned about the great areas, and by constitutional change or other amendment take these areas away from the jurisdiction of state governments and make them responsible directly to the federal government. This would be done to provide proper planning, dispersal of population and industry, and proper construction in urban areas to overcome the defects which became plain as a result of atomic attack.

To sum up: Under the assumption that there would be an atomic attack, the present impact of urbanism on the federal system is to place a problem before state governments and the federal government which is impossible for these governments to solve because of political factors. This condition results in the vulnerability of the United States to the point of possible destruction of many of its people and their industries and to the possible end of the United States as an independent government.

EFFECTS OF THE COLD WAR

The second assumption we can make on the future of cities is that they will persist at least until 1977 without an atomic attack, but under a constant threat of such a condition occurring. Even under this threat, a great increase in population will occur in the urban centers of the United States; these centers will become much larger and more numerous. Many urban areas now separated by open country will become one continuous set of contiguous urban communities. The pressures of a large population and the need for critical services such as water and sewer in these areas will undoubtedly promote the creation of the metropolitan concept of government.

The unwillingness of state legislatures to face the growth of urban areas will impel certain urban groups to continue to seek grants in aid from the federal government. If the situation is bad

enough, there may be attempts to have the major metropolitan areas made special wards of the federal government for certain purposes. As the metropolitan growth occurs, it is likely that hostility between the state governments and the central cities may grow. The political cleavage between the two, urban areas and state governments, will influence elections of the United States during the next two decades.

The need for furnishing special units of government to deal with regional sewer, water and traffic problems will introduce great complexities into the laws of state governments. Since state governments do not desire to see the growth of the political power of metropolitan areas, they will persist in seeking to fragment the metropolitan areas into urban and suburban conflicting groups as a means of dividing and ruling.

One can expect, also, that there will be a continued stratification of population in the urban areas with the wealthy and the people of white ancestry moving to the suburban areas where a kind of economic caste system will develop. People of colored ancestry may continue to move from the rural South into the core cities of metropolitan areas. This situation, in which the bloc of Negro voters in central cities grows greater, will further promote the desire of the controllers of state governments to isolate the central cities in metropolitan areas and to choke off their growing political strength.

The possibility in some areas of central governments being greatly influenced by Negro voting blocs would undoubtedly materialize in many cities in the next two decades. The development of the urban areas, therefore, in the northern part of the United States will be directly subjected to the policies of the southern states with regard to migrating Negro minorities. The presence of such blocs will bring demands for

housing, fair-employment practices, civil rights, and welfare legislation. Other people, too, will continue to crowd into the cities to enjoy the convenience of living and the high wages that are to be found there.

WELFARE STATE VS. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

The growth of urbanism will also tend to promote the conflict between public ownership and social welfare ideas and the concepts of private enterprise. Large numbers of people who are wage earners without any security other than their physical strength will tend to promote legislation which will guarantee their welfare and their security even in times of unemployment. This type of legislation, being considered hostile by the rural and suburban citizens, will result in struggles between the urban and the rural forces in the state legislatures and will spill over into the Congress. This same ideological conflict carried on in the field of housing will mean that the opponents of municipal housing will continue to be vigorous. As a result, there will be a constant shortage of adequate housing for urban residents of the United States since private enterprise will not be able to supply the urban population with adequate low-cost shelter because of fence-me-in economic laws.

The creation of express roads through the major cities will foster the spread of suburbanism. Within these cities there will be a development, though on a limited scale, of homogenous, easily identifiable communities in the older areas. Some of these will be desirable; others will merely be unredeveloped slum areas bounded by trafficways which set them apart from surrounding communities. Out of each of these areas certain identifiable political yearnings will come. If urban redevelopment results in a mass dispossession of many small owners and the creation of a large

tenantry, it is possible that federal and state laws will reflect the pressure of the tenants against the landlords.

The great growth of population without a proper expansion of resources to feed it and to provide it with fresh air and water may cause a significant deterioration in the standard of living for many people. A difficult problem will arise in the attempt to tax for educational purposes because of the larger number of children. It is possible that a resistance to property taxes for education will become so strong that the educational program of the nation will have to be seriously diminished.

The increased use of mechanical devices will also bring a rash of laws necessary to curtail their deleterious effects. Laws against improper uses of motor vehicles, against noise, dirt, and unsanitary conditions will undoubtedly result in the further concentration of population. Most of these laws will be developed in state legislatures but only after a resistance from the rural people who cannot conceive of the need for such laws.

Partly because the urban needs will be so great and the urban communities will put pressure on the federal government to solve these needs, state legislatures may make grudging concessions to the urban problems. However, it is not likely that state legislatures will bow in any direction toward legislation which might be described as socialistic if they can help it. In addition, there will be constant agitation in state legislatures to dismantle all of the operations of the federal government except those dealing with the development of military forces for an attack.

The increase in population in the urban centers may also put a strain on the agriculture of the United States, and it is entirely possible that unless there is some better planning of agricultural development and water resources, the

urban areas may suffer shortages of essential supplies some time within the next two decades. Even without the threat of atomic warfare, it is entirely possible that there may be recessions in business which will have their repercussions particularly on the urban communities and bring forth from them a demand for federal social legislation rather than state legislation to alleviate the conditions of unemployment.

The total results, therefore, of the pattern from 1957 to 1977, if the nation lives at uneasy peace with Russia, will be to diminish the strength of the state legislatures and to increase the strength of the federal government because of the pressures of urban living.

GROUP CONFLICTS

Over the next twenty years certain struggles between different groups in the great urban areas will also have their reflection on the federal system. The first of these is the struggle between two economic groups which are able to finance elections to gain a dominant hand in the voice of the communities. The one is a group represented by owners and management, most of whom are suburban dwellers, and the other is that reflected in organized labor.

There will be an attempt by both groups to attain ascendancy in the government in metropolitan areas. Since most of the management people live in the suburbs, they will devote their attention particularly to changing state laws which will permit them to control the destinies of the central city by remote control or through special districts of government. In this action they will have the support of the rural legislators.

The labor movement will attempt to resist this move by maintaining control of the central cities independent of the legislatures. If the legislatures invade this control of the central cities too extensively, it is entirely possible that la-

bor-elected city representatives will seek relief and protection from the federal government.

A second struggle will take place on the part of organized supporters of vice, gambling, and crime to gain control of the central areas. The central cities are oftentimes regarded as "play spots," and there is a tendency for local officials to wink at organized vice and crime in certain districts of their cities. This leads to the flourishing of gangs and organized hoodlums; and in most cities these organized hoodlums, working either through the management or labor groups, and sometimes working through both, have been enabled to control city government with the resulting deterioration of government and wholesale corruption.

This type of struggle will be intensified in the future because some people's appetite for vice and gambling will not be appreciably diminished. If the organized criminal elements gain control of the cities, they will use the same tactics and techniques to gain control of state governments. They are completely impartial as to their connections and are equally at home among management representatives as with labor representatives. They will "work" either group to gain control as conditions may require.

In many places, the organized criminal elements are working in close liaison with so-called leaders of respectable business. In other places, they have worked their way into influential positions in the central labor bodies. Federal legislation may be directed to overcome this problem because the state governments are often helpless, unable to act, or unaware of the problem.

Migrating groups

The third major conflict which may find its reflection in the federal system

is the conflict between migrating peoples, particularly between peoples of substantially diverse cultural background such as the southern Negro and the northern white of European extraction, or the Puerto Rican and the northern white. The great influx of Negroes into the northern areas, for the present, may increase the desire of the northern political leaders to call for increased activity in civil rights and fair employment practices. But it is possible that in the long run there may be a segregated caste system developed as the northern whites seek to withdraw from contact with the Negro community. This withdrawal will occur when the mental image that the northern white has of a Negro as a harassed and relatively helpless person is changed to an image of the Negro as a brutal attacker of women on the streets, one given to the use of narcotics, a brawler, and a slovenly person. Thus, by a relocation of the Negro population from the rural South to the northern cities there may be a greater tendency in the North to follow the pattern of the southern states, and this in turn would have its subtle reflections in the federal system.

Another problem which may have its bearing in the federal government is the growing number of young men who, kept apart from useful employment or from honest work necessary to support themselves, may readily lend themselves to gang formations. These formations can be shrewdly mobilized as a political force, even as youth movements in Germany were organized by political leaders. Any depression, in which the younger person ~~arrived of money~~ for automobiles and pleasures which they are enjoying at the present time, might conceivably lead to a fascist development in the United States because many young people, unaware of the facts of economics, may follow a demagogue.

"Urbanism and Government, 1957-1977": A Rejoinder

By WALLACE S. SAYRE

Abstract: Urban and suburban electorates will find more political common-ground than divergence and will combine to make state governments more urban in outlook and policies. The national government will also increasingly respond to the political power of urban-metropolitan America, will deal more directly with cities and metropolitan areas, and will establish more bureaus concerned particularly with urban or metropolitan affairs.

MAYOR Zeidler is a realist, allowing himself only the barest traces of optimism in his grim prophecy of the next twenty years in urban America and in the federal system.

His first and his own favored prophecy—that before 1977 the United States and the Soviet Union will have engaged in a nuclear war of devastation—is one which deprives us of any useful frame of reference for discussing such a minor matter as urbanism and the federal system, as well as serving as a forcible reminder that none of us will be around to care. Accordingly, I pass quickly—though not without a parting shudder—to his second prophecy, leaving his first to the imaginative powers of some new Dante or Orwell.

If for twenty years we continue to have "cold war" or "hot peace," Mayor Zeidler's second prophecy permits us to survive, but through a time of troubles. In fact, some may view his first prophecy with more sympathy as his second unrolls its gray prospects—for he sees political and governmental wars, ethnic and racial turmoils, suburban snobbery in low alliance with rural lag, central city populations in poverty, hunger and thirst, the underworld

seizing new opportunities, unemployed youth marching upon the city streets in cadence to demagogues; brooding over the whole unhappy scene is the unenlightened malice of the state governments. A few rays of hope are allowed to break fitfully through the ominous overcast: The federal government has a benevolent potential, and metropolitan area government may advance rapidly from infancy to maturity. But we are not to be encouraged into any easier breathing, Mayor Zeidler reminds us, for the odds remain stacked against all those who failed to keep the family farm.

These dismal forebodings arouse a political scientist to summon up all his optimistic resources: The Constitution, the federal union, the political parties, the urban and metropolitan community, the rationality of voters, the initiative of elected chief executives, the expertise of the bureaucracies, and even the vulnerability of state legislatures to urban ingenuity. The remainder of these comments will be devoted to a prayerful consideration of the possibilities that Mayor Zeidler's second-prophecy apparitions in our urban future may respond to this optimism.

Mayor Zeidler's first premise is his most hopeful one. If I may paraphrase it, this premise runs as follows: *The urban centers will form an alliance with the national government in a political contest against the state governments and suburbia.*

If this should come to fruition—and there are many signs to support Mayor Zeidler's prediction—then a political scientist would be disposed to anticipate victory for the cities. They have the votes to influence mightily the nominations for the presidency in both parties and to affect critically the presidential elections. This fact alone gives the cities a high status in the national party system, an asset which Mayor Zeidler seems to underestimate. Favored access to the presidency and to the national parties—especially in their presidential manifestations—is an asset of inestimable value. It should, if cultivated by urban initiative, lead—if not to a United States Department of Urbiculture—to a greater flow of aid from the national treasury to the urban centers; to closer ties between the executive branch of the national government and the cities; even perhaps to the national government's recognition of the metropolitan areas, less as "wards" perhaps than as favored protégés. We might actually envisage, if we were to indulge our optimism as boldly as Mayor Zeidler does his pessimism, the national government-metropolitan area alliance—especially if assisted by a similar alliance by the river-valley regions—as the solvent which would lead to an urban federal system substituted for our present rural one.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

But Mayor Zeidler's second premise brings us back to the troubles closer home: He believes, if I may again paraphrase, that *the cities may be out-flanked in the states by an aggressive*

determination on the part of the state legislatures and the suburban governments to "isolate" the central cities by inhibiting the efforts toward metropolitan area integration, by increasing its fragmentation, and by resisting the cities' political strength in other ways.

These tendencies are visible, and Mayor Zeidler does not exaggerate their evident motivation. But perhaps he overlooks some urban resources and opportunities to protect the cities and perhaps even to envelop the opposition on its suburban flank. The first of these resources is the state governorship. The governor, like the president, is an asset of urban America. Urban influence is great in his nomination and election in every urban state; he cannot escape his urban commitments at home, and if he aspires to the presidency he cannot afford even the invisible wish to escape. The second resource lies in the fact that neither state party can afford to be caught in an overt alliance against the urban electorates; any such liaison would need to be a midnight affair. The staying power of such attachments is fragile in the daylight of political debate. Party leaders are among the most cautious and prudent of men when dealing with large electorates; they are not vindictive men; they are brokers. And for the third, the rural and suburban legislators typically work out their career aspirations within a political party whose leaders and "contributors" may live in the suburbs but mostly do their business in the cities where mayors and governors have the combined power to restrain, if not to humble, their exuberance. Further, the city government bureaucracies and the state government bureaucracies are usually in close alliance when "outsiders"—particularly rural and suburban "outsiders"—intervene; their influence will most likely be a moderating one, if not actively hostile to any effort to "isolate" the cen-

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tral cities. Finally, the urban-suburban hostility may have more surface than depth; as suburbia quickly becomes less than paradise, plagued by the same difficulties of urbanism as the central cities, its electorates may find more ties with the city electorates than with rural ones.

In short, the larger initiative in the states may belong to the cities. The suburban "third force" may come back home from its springtime escapade, anxious to be urban again even as junior partner in a metropolitan firm. In this event, the rural legislators rather than the central cities would be isolated.

Mayor Zeidler's third premise, if I may condense as well as paraphrase, is that *the central cities will be harassed by a rising tempo of ethnic and racial politics, by lower standards of living, by youthful unemployed, by an aggressive underworld*—with most of these related to a sharper conflict, on a broader stage, between the welfare state and the not-too-much-welfare state.

Again, I would read more favorable prospects into the future than does Mayor Zeidler. In the 1920's and 1930's, sociologists predicted the decay of the central cities, the flowering of suburbia—in the 1950's, thanks to the grace of federal urban redevelopment money and the urge of corporate America to work in air-conditioned glass-enclosed offices, the central cities are being reclaimed (for example, Clark's Philadelphia and Wagner's New York) faster than the slum dwellers can move to the suburbs. Ethnic and racial politics, juvenile delinquency, even gangsters are being distributed more evenly over the whole metropolitan landscape. To put the matter more soberly, ethnic and racial politics would seem to be moderating rather than intensifying (and they have always had their great solvent values as well as their irrationalities); the central cities are repudiating

their premature obituaries; and the signs of a return to McKinley in our politics and public policies seem largely oratorical and semantic. The platforms of 1960, one may anticipate, will be a reaffirmation of the narrowly competitive goals of Stevenson and Eisenhower, not an endorsement of Byrd and Taft.

CONCLUSION

In summary, then—having put Mayor Zeidler's first prophecy aside as too intolerable to endure even in speculation—I would look more optimistically than he does upon the prospects of his second prophecy. I believe the cities are on the move, and that suburbia will, however reluctantly at first, follow in their wake—for the suburbs, too, belong to urban America and must soon see that nostalgia is less satisfying than common sense.

What do these more optimistic interpretations forecast in terms of the federal system? If I, too, may be bold, they suggest:

1. A gradual but steady political and governmental transformation within the urban states: The urban and suburban electorates—neither ever monolithic and to become rapidly less so—combining to make the state governments more urban in policies and arrangements; the rise of metropolitan area governments or treaties buttressing this trend as well as accelerating it; the leaders of the political parties—especially in presidential, gubernatorial, United States senatorial, and "metropolitan" elections—responding to this urbanization of our politics.

2. An accompanying transformation of the relationships between these urbanized states and the national government: More direct dealings between the cities and the metropolitan areas, on the one hand, and the national government on the other—although the states

may continue as the formal channel; the growth of national government bureaus with urban or metropolitan assignments; the greater interlocking of the multilevel bureaucracies, those increasingly potent participants in all our decision-making; the presidency becoming more and more the political magnet and the governmental instrument of urban-metropolitan America.

When and if these trends are fully under way, who will need to worry about—how long can anyone forestall—legislative reapportionment in the states?

Who will say we cannot afford to indulge in the then largely symbolic debate about the virtues of suburbia versus the tensions of cities? Most of us would then even be willing to concede the values of preserving the traditional state boundaries as testimony of our rural past—including in our generosity toward institutions historic both "The Citadel" of the United States Senate, that most rural monument of our heritage, and the Office of Mayor in our central cities, overshadowed by the new Metrogovernors.

Creative Methods In Urban Political Change

By CARL J. FRIEDRICH

Abstract: Forecasting metropolitan development requires analysis of emerging governmental and political structure and procedure correlated with economic projections. The extended interview, conducted by experienced teams of researchers with men in key positions, should give knowledge of political issues, detect emerging trends, and indicate possible courses of action. Fruitful leads were obtained by initial work of this nature in New York.

IN his justly famous study on economic development, Joseph Schumpeter many years ago pointed out that all attempts at analyzing economic development, both past and future, must make allowance for the appearance of extraeconomic factors such as inventions and other kinds of creative innovations. Among these possible creative innovations those which occur in the political sphere are of particular importance and frequency in a free society. Since one of the main purposes of constitutional freedom is the liberty to criticize established ways in government and politics—as manifested by the extended attention given to the safeguarding of those liberties which make this possible—it would be surprising if it were otherwise. We have the proof in the United States before our eyes, where such innovation has become so largely a part of the established order of things that the only truly radical proposals appear to be those which would put an end to it.

In view of the key importance of governmental structure and procedure for the operation of a society and an economy—a fact gainsaid by the laissez-faire liberal in ostrich-like fashion until

recently¹—all social and economic development takes place within the conditions provided by this governmental framework (the reverse is, of course, equally true). All economic history is a striking demonstration of this elementary fact. The methodological problems of prediction are most clearly apparent, if one takes a stretch of economic history and asks oneself: What would I have had to know in order to foresee this development? Would any one question that the creative innovations in the field of government would be of central importance? But if one asks oneself how such innovations could be foreseen and hence could have been made part of an attempt at forecasting the development, seemingly unsurmountable difficulties appear to present themselves. For in this field, the arbitrary willful action of men conscious of their purpose plays a decisive role. Before facing the specific research tasks, let us consider some examples.

In dealing with the more specifically metropolitan problem, I would like to

¹ See for this range of issues my article on "The Political Thought of Neoliberalism" in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 509-25.

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illustrate the point with which I am concerned by referring to three important cases, namely, those of Boston, Puerto Rico, and London. In each one of these three urban areas, I think it is quite evident that any attempt at forecasting their development without taking into account the governmental and political factors involved would have led to very serious errors of judgment if it had been undertaken, say, in 1945.

Boston is an interesting case because, in 1944, a public contest was organized by Boston University and a number of leading civic groups for the development of a Greater Boston plan. These plans were, of course, not attempts at forecasting the development, but rather of indicating what would be preferable lines of development. Nonetheless, the interaction of forecast and prescription in the field of human affairs is so pronounced that a certain predictive value must be assigned to the several plans. While none of them, of course, has been realized in any strict technical sense, it is nonetheless true that the development of the Greater Boston area has followed certain lines indicated by the plans. But if one inquires why, in spite of the great amount of interest and support for these plans, they were not realized to any extent, and why the development, economic and otherwise, of Greater Boston remained correspondingly handicapped, one is inevitably led to the conclusion that this is largely due to governmental and political factors among which the absence of suitably organized metropolitan governmental authorities is of primary significance. To be sure, the fact that the metropolitan area of Greater Boston is under the jurisdiction of the State of Massachusetts, for which Boston provides the Capitol, did give to Boston a degree of concentrated legislative attention which has been lacking in certain other metropolitan areas. Bills for considerable improvement of the airport, the port, and

rapid transit could be put through because of this concentration of governmental authority and thus a substantial improvement in the potentialities of economic growth realized.

PUERTO RICO AND LONDON

The case of Puerto Rico is perhaps even more dramatic. Any attempt at forecasting the development which has taken place in that Island in the last fifteen years on the basis of economic trend factors in, say, 1940 would have ended in complete failure. Indeed, we have some not too precise attempts at such forecasting in a number of books, including Rexford Tugwell's well-known study on the island economy. The dramatic expansion of industrial enterprise and the resulting increase in the per capita income and consequent standard of living all are traceable to vigorous and, in many respects, carefully planned governmental activities which were directed towards these several ends. There is no object at this point in going into the details, but such matters as tax exemption, credit assistance, and governmental co-operation in securing the necessary labor supply are only three of the methods which were vital in fostering the growth and development in Puerto Rico in the last dozen years. All of these policies and activities are, in turn, related to the rise of a new and highly effective political organization, the Popular Democratic party, led by a man of extraordinary ability, the now Governor, Muñoz-Marín. It is extremely difficult to say whether any or all of these developments would have taken place without the appearance on the scene of Muñoz-Marín or of his party. It is, however, well to bear in mind that the Elective Governor's Act was not put through by the efforts of Muñoz-Marín, but rather without his active co-operation. If he had not been the first Governor, other men, perhaps not quite as gifted but actively sup-

ported by men of good will in Washington, would have accomplished some part of what has been accomplished in fact. Again, we see the dramatic significance of governmental and political factors in tracing the total development.

There can be little question that the same holds true for metropolitan London. The appearance of a labor government after World War II—surely not an entirely unforeseen event and one which gave fairly definite indications as to its economic implications—dramatically altered several of the key factors affecting metropolitan growth. If for no other reason, the Labor party would have made a very great difference in metropolitan London development over the last fifteen years by the initiation of central government planning. The whole development of “new towns” and all that is connected with it by way of industrial decentralization must be traced to the injection of this factor. We have it on the authority of none other than Professor William A. Robson, one of the leading authorities on this subject, that it was utterly impossible to forecast either the past or the future development of London without taking most careful account of the probabilities and likelihoods in the fields of governmental and political activity.

There is no particular reason to assume that the situation in many other metropolitan regions is radically different from these three examples. But only a detailed analysis and study of the political factors involved could provide the necessary data for making an attempt at correlating these data with the other information that would be of primary interest.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK

These three cases refer to situations in which we can, by looking back, see in broad outline the decisive impact of

governmental factors upon the total development. It may be interesting to consider in turn some concrete aspects of a task of projection which is now in progress.² This undertaking specifically seeks to delineate the probable lines of economic development of Greater New York in the course of the next twenty years. Obviously, the governmental set-up in this vast conglomeration of upward of fifteen million people is of crucial importance. This is true, if for no other reason, than because only a knowledge of this setup and its informal “corona,” the political dynamics of the regions, would make it feasible to determine what is “politically possible” or still more important what is “politically impossible.”³

Unfortunately, a preliminary study has brought out that the governmental and political factors operative in the New York metropolitan area are largely unknown except in their broadest outline. Careful inquiry has disclosed that there is no individual, let alone a group of persons, who is at the present time able to say what is the government of Greater New York or indeed what are its constituent elements. There are men who know the score as far as Manhattan is concerned, or Westchester County, or perhaps Newark. But these men have not been brought together; their information has not been pooled; and what exists in the way of check lists and the like is not very useful for the purposes here in hand. They are bare outlines of formal structure and in no sense disclose the actual dynamics of the po-

² The author has been associated in a consultative position with the New York Project discussed elsewhere in this volume by Raymond Vernon; reference is made specifically to footnote 1 of his paper.

³ For this problem see the paper by the author, contributed to a round table of the Mont Pelerin Society, meeting of September 7, 1957, to be published, together with papers by H. Schoeck, G. Schmolders and A. Hunold.

litical situation. And yet one finds as one makes inquiries that there are factors at work which men of real knowledge consider to be decisive. Thus I found, in a lengthy interview, that some of the key men expect the emergence of some kind of integrated metropolitan authority within the next few years.

There is no doubt that a more careful inquiry in the area would reveal the nature and number of such trends and provide the possibility for an evaluation of some of their significance. A very casual effort on my part, extending over a number of days and carried on with a variety of people, disclosed any number of leads which could be further explored. The interview is admittedly a difficult tool of social science analysis, especially where the interview cannot be standardized and applied on a large scale. But there are recurrent situations of the greatest significance in the political and governmental field where nothing else will do. As one brilliant social analyst has observed in a comparable situation where he built his analysis upon 200 interviews (repeated) with selected individuals:

Any attempt, in such a situation, to adhere to a rigid schedule of questions would have resulted at best in amusement, at worst in annoyance; in either case it would have hampered the work. The author would have had fewer and shorter conversations, and consequently less opportunity to find out what he sought to learn.⁴

He rightly observes that this kind of inquiry must be based upon the art of conversation which has become “atrophied,” that we have many excellent polls, upon the scientific nature of which their managers pride themselves, but few competent studies of the view of

men in key positions. Obviously only such men would be able to gauge with any degree of competence what is in the air in a particular metropolitan situation and only they would possess the kind of judgment worth bothering about. It is equally evident that such interviews could not be conducted with any hope of worthwhile results prior to one's possessing a reasonably adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the government of any particular metropolitan area. It certainly is little more than a truism to assert that trends in government and politics cannot be usefully studied without a knowledge of the existing state of affairs. Yet it is precisely this existing state of affairs, as in the case of New York, on which we do not possess adequate information. It is frequently, but quite unwarrantably assumed by students in the other social sciences that the government of a particular country or region is little short of obvious. This prejudice is due to old-fashioned notions about formal organization and hence to the idea, long cultivated by law-trained students of these matters, that all one has to do is to look up some constitutional charter or statute in order to inform oneself adequately. To be sure, such formal instruments are important—more important than some current fads are willing to admit—but they are only the first step in a study of how a particular place is governed. These elementary statements apply to any area; they raise particular difficulties with reference to great urban and metropolitan communities.

Metropolitan governmental pattern

The governmental pattern of the New York metropolitan area is probably the most complicated in the world. Set within the broad context of the United States government with its federal complications, it involves the government of three states, New York, Connecticut,

⁴ See Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders* (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson & Company, 1957), p. x.

and New Jersey. Of these, New York, being the largest state, is by itself a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, because of the deep-seated antagonism between the City of New York and the upstate urban and rural areas. Several counties of the State with an unusual pattern, operating under a legislative charter, especially Westchester and Suffolk, are within the metropolitan area, which all told is variously considered to contain up to twenty-two counties in the several states. The heart of this complicated congregation of political and governmental structure is the Borough of Manhattan, the center of the great metropolitan region and the commercial and banking center of the nation and the world. Likewise, the port of New York is the largest in the nation and one of the largest in the world. Various attempts at co-ordinating this welter of authorities have been made, but, on the whole, the threads binding them together are thin indeed, except for the underlying community of people and their economic and social relationships. Contacts between the governments of the three states, and, more particularly, their governors, seem to be few and far between. There exists no organized co-operation between the relevant committees of the several legislatures. The only wholly metropolitan governmental and political structure in the entire area is what is popularly referred to as the "empire of Robert Moses." At the center of this empire seems to be the New York Port Authority and the New York Power Authority. Grouped around them are a number of other bodies. It is interesting to note that this structure essentially rests upon the tolls collected from certain highways administered by the Port Authority, the Park Commission, and others. Deprived of these tolls, the entire structure would collapse. Unquestionably, a detailed and realistic study of this "empire" is one

of the most urgent research objectives in this particular area.⁵

EMERGENT TRENDS IN METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS

The emergent political trends in the New York metropolitan area are difficult to gauge at the present time, precisely because of our ignorance of the whole political and governmental order. They are no less obscure in Boston and a number of other areas. One clearly emergent trend is the increasing interest in metropolitan problems on the part of the federal authorities. The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations had a few things to say on these problems. More recently, there have been indications that a special presidential commission might be appointed to look into this whole situation. What is true of the federal government is to a more limited extent true of the state governments. They, too, exhibit an increasing concern. Along with these trends, there has been some anxiety voiced over the decline in popular control which the ever-expanding role of "authorities" of one sort or another—large bureaucratic bodies only loosely subjected to state control—signifies in relation to metropolitan problems.

Research itself is a significant emergent trend. There appear to be ever more numerous projects dealing with metropolitan problems and proposing to inquire into what is happening. The cumulative impact of such research activity may be considerable in a metropolitan area such as New York; this would depend somewhat upon the results of the research and the skill with which it is designed to illuminate crucial tension areas. In any case, there can be no doubt that such research activity constitutes a new factor.

⁵ It is well to know that the Columbia Project is planning to make a study of Robert Moses' enterprises.

Related to this research activity is the interest of foundations who may finance research as the safest kind of investment, but which may eventually become aroused by the result of such research into undertaking or financing large-scale action programs. The activities may be broadly metropolitan, or they may be focused upon a particular aspect of the metropolitan scene such as transportation, education, recreation, or police.

Nor should one neglect the potential impact of such enterprises as the recent series of stories in the *New York Times* (Jan. 27, 1957, and ff.). While the impact of a particular story may be quite limited, the cumulative effect may be very great. It is to be hoped—but also to be doubted—that the impact of these particular stories is being tested.

If such enterprises multiply, they may in due course precipitate widespread popular movements for effective political action. Political parties which have been rather standoffish until recently, may decide that the issue is becoming a live one, and jump on the band wagon. An exceptional political leader may "grab the ball" and create a dynamic situation in which a great many things may become possible which have thus far been merely hopes and dreams of limited groups of specialists.

At the present time, all this is highly speculative; and yet there is no question that all these emergent trends are in the offing and that a number of possible additional factors may presently enter the scene. How could one hope to assess them?

EXTENDED INTERVIEW METHOD

As already stated, it is my personal conviction, from a good many years' experience, that the only possible method for assessing emergent trends in government and politics is the "extended interview" method. The extended in-

terview is addressed to key persons involved in a given situation, and is not preconceived, but allows the novelty of the situation to mold to some extent the interview itself. This means, of course, that only experienced persons with mature judgment can hope to carry through such interviews. Any attempt to have them handled by junior (or inferior) research personnel is foredoomed to failure.

Such interviews, if based upon a thorough knowledge of the issues of governmental and political operation in the particular metropolitan area, cannot be detached from the question of possible action programs. To approach them with the intrinsically appealing idea of scientific detachment and "objectivity" means neglecting one of the key factors in the personality structure of the interviewees. Since it is now generally recognized among students of the interview method that the personality of the interviewee is of decisive importance, such neglect would be inexcusable. The factor in the personality structure to which reference is made here is that of "activism." Most of the political and governmental leaders interviewed cannot be expected to be led, in the course of such an interview, to confront a tension point or a breakdown situation, nor even an ordinary kind of "inefficiency," without "wanting to do something about it." The interviewer will himself be questioned as to what his ideas are. He will be expected to respond with alacrity and a sense of responsibility to any "results" that such an interview might produce in the way of constructive ideas about the situation. This means, of course, that there ought to be developed some preliminary, even if admittedly highly tentative, views as to how to "reform" the particular area under study.

Once this "activist" aspect of the interview situation is fully faced it be-

comes clear that such interviews cannot be conducted, as if one were operating in a vacuum. Men who are being interviewed are not a bunch of test tubes which one can place back on the rack after having "tested" their content. If the communication between interviewer and interviewee has been at all effective, the person interviewed will now have a somewhat changed outlook. This need not necessarily be a change in favor of metropolitan "reform." He may on the contrary have become more deeply impressed by or convinced of the difficulties in the way of such "reforms." What matters is that he will himself be different, and that therefore the "trends" which one sets out to ascertain will become changed in the course of such an inquiry. In short, no program of research can be reasonably undertaken unless the issues of a program of change are realistically faced.

All this means that for the effective utilization of the extended interview method it is essential that the persons engaged in it be periodically gathered in some kind of workshop or seminar to compare notes—the taking of extended notes of each interview is a crucial feature of this sort of research—and to discuss the possible shifts in the line the group feels justified in taking regarding the various issues involved. It may often be desirable to have the same key leader interviewed by two or three members of the team in order to eliminate any possibility of bias creeping into a particular report. Finally, such seminar or workshop can help to identify areas of research where other methods than that of the extended interview could be profitably employed. There are apt to be such areas. I should like to give an illustration.

In connection with the problems of metropolitan government and politics in Greater Boston, it is clear to all concerned in it that one of the greatest

obstacles to significant progress toward metropolitan government and integration is the notion entertained by many that such an integrated structure would be dominated by politicians of Boston. In other words, the core city is believed to be in a position of predominance, politically. But no one really knows whether this is true or not. In order to explore the issue, it would be necessary to analyze the election results of all the cities and towns to be included and to correlate the results to see what might have been the results of a metropolitan election. The author once initiated such an inquiry and even the very partial results suggested that the common assumption is a false one. Clearly, a thorough study would be of the greatest importance. I believe that many such supplementary studies would "turn up," if the extended interviews of an effective team were searchingly deployed.

CONCLUSION

To sum up this very brief sketch, the key argument is that government and politics are central to the problems of urban development and growth. Since in the last analysis government is nothing but a syndrome of institutions and arrangements for getting a community's work done, a metropolitan community obviously needs a metropolitan government. Actually, all metropolitan communities have *some kind of* government. But it is antiquated, inefficient and in many cases, including such crucial ones as New York, not even known. Hence the first and most important task of any planning for urban development and growth is to find out what is the political and governmental situation. It is fashionable at the present time to speak of this syndrome as the "power structure." But apart from the vagueness of the concept of power, it is more than

doubtful that power necessarily has structure. Perhaps one of the real troubles with metropolitan communities is precisely the lack of that structure which characterizes a developed power system.

The second task is to determine in what way this largely amorphous syndrome of governmental and political arrangements can be more effectively structured, or rather how it will be so structured. This is a matter of organizing effective teams of men of ripe experience who can distill the emergent notions as to how to go about the task of building metropolitan government from the as yet largely uncrystallized notions of the practitioners of metropolitan politics. Along with this inquiry there must come a developing understanding of what is "politically possible."⁵

The third and final task is to correlate the insights gained with such other data as the foreseeable economic

⁵ For the problem of democratic planning involved here, see the relevant chapters in my *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Company), 1950 and the literature given there. In the German (1954) and French (1957) editions, the theoretical statement of the issue is further refined.

projections made on the assumption that nothing would be changed in the governmental sphere. If that were done, one might eventually arrive at working alternative hypotheses as to the several possible patterns of development of specific metropolitan communities. And conceivably one might even arrive at a reasonably adequate calculus of probability, whereas an attempt at conditional projection of economic—or other—development without proper regard for the governmental and political factor is almost certain to end in failure, if extended beyond a very few years. The plea that only the quantified economic data are of "scientific" value reminds one of certain medical practitioners whose operations are so aptly described in the laconic statement: "Operation successful—patient dead." For it is not at all scientific to superimpose a standard of quantification and exactitude upon data which do not permit of such treatment. No true doctor would ever substitute the results of tests for the diagnosis of the disease—and that is probably what most metropolitan communities call for: A diagnosis in which the political and human factors play a very large role.

Plans and Programs

By WILLIAM HOLFORD

Abstract: City planning involves a multitude of people in a variety of fields. Architects, engineers, and landscape experts are responsible for the shell; social and political experts for the administration and management of the people living within the shell. In a democracy both resources and good will are necessary to make city-planning schemes a reality. Variations depend on whether one is dealing with an old-established settlement, a transitional one, or an altogether new town. Redevelopment is slower and more difficult than original growth, for it involves criticism and obstructionism. Change nevertheless does occur, and there is increasing emphasis on the advantages of comprehensive development aimed at securing co-ordination of all factors involved in the creation of the new environment. Today city planners have begun to realize that unlimited growth may not always be synonymous with progress and that planning must have some patterned framework rather than being structured in terms of an undetermined and expanding objective.—Ed.

THE making of plans for a city a generation ahead may seem an academic, if not a futile occupation; yet it has been going on for about 5,000 years. In that time the nature of the planning process has changed considerably, but the end in view is still the same—to create a place fit for our children to live in. It remains an act of statesmanship, first to envisage the kind of city by which we want to be remembered and secondly to bring it about.

Acts of statesmanship, which comprise but also transcend political action, nowadays are not the product of an individual. It must be clear from previous articles that the planning of a city or the redevelopment of an old one are activities which are not one-man deep, but hundreds-of-men deep. Architecture, landscape, and many different kinds of engineering form the substance of our ideas of urban environment. But it is the animal within the shell which brings it into being in the first place, adapts it, and transforms it,

even while its life is being to a great extent conditioned by it. What the plastic arts and sciences do for the shell, social science and political economy must do for the animal; that is to say, produce the techniques and methods of administration, management, and government in a rapidly changing world.

The question is not whether plans and programs can be made: They must be. The question is rather, on what scale and by what process. Shall the plan be no more than a set of referee's rules, and the program the minimum essential services without which the urban machine would start to slow down? Or shall the plan and program be comprehensive, in the sense that they represent a real investment of capital, of skill, and of local interest; running perhaps a little in advance of ordinary public opinion, but underwritten by the citizens nonetheless?

In a democratic country a plan is of limited use unless it can somehow marshal the resources and the good will

that will turn it into a reality. An ideal plan may influence men's thinking in every part of the world and yet be an obstacle to all sorts of improvements in its place of origin. At one end of the scale stands Haussmann¹ who transformed Paris under Napoleon III between 1853 and 1870 and who represents, with his efficient municipal—or, as we should now call it, metropolitan or regional—organization of the Department of the Seine, the type of successful marriage between administration and technique. Haussmann was the Town Manager par excellence; and although the results of his administration have been severely criticized on grounds of ethics and aesthetics, there can be no question of the comprehensiveness of his planning, nor of its success as a method of getting things done.

At the other end of the scale stand hundreds of those who have, so to speak, "shot an arrow into the air." Some of them had great names, like Alberti and Christopher Wren; and they left mankind in their debt in different ways. Others have put forward proposals which did not, and sometimes could not, command effective agreement nor the resources to carry them into practice. One of the most interesting of these is Walter Burley Griffin and his plan for Canberra, the federal capital city of the Commonwealth of Australia, prepared by him and his wife Marion (a former assistant in the office of Frank Lloyd Wright) at Chicago in 1911.

This plan is still the official plan of Canberra and is shown on the town maps which puzzle the visitors who come at the rate of 300,000 a year to see this capital city. But apart from the landscape and the trees, hardly any

of Griffin's monumental features have been carried out. The Capitol, the permanent Parliament House, the Civic Center, the lakes and the Washingtonian vistas that he planned forty-five years ago remain on paper. Only now, when the population is nearing 35,000, has the government set up a special National Capital Development Commission to promote and integrate the growth of the two extensive villages, divided by a flood plain, into a metropolitan and federal center. Griffin's plan, modified to meet new traffic conditions, may still be realized;² but the contrast between a competition drawing, however inspired, which has to survive local opposition or apathy, and a plan generated from within the social and governmental organization itself is most marked.

PLANNING ON A CLEAN SLATE

Ideas and theory seem to be moving fairly consistently in the direction of the decentralized regional city. But plans and programs will vary enormously according to the stage from which the plan starts, whether it is for an already old-established town or region, or for a town that is just becoming metropolitan, or for a new town altogether. The twentieth century is reasserting its capacity to build new towns on a clean slate, and some of them are of metropolitan scale. Chandigarh, the new capital of the Punjab, in India, is being planned for a population of 150,000 with a prospect of eventual growth to 500,000. Work began in 1951. Even larger in scale and resources is the new capital of the United States of Brazil, in the State of Goiás, which is being planned initially on the basis of a population of half a million. This comes very close to the program

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¹ See a recent biography by J. M. and Brian Chapman, *The Life and Times of Baron Haussmann* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1957).

² See, for example, the *Report of the Select Committee of the Commonwealth Senate, 1955*. Chairman, Senator J. A. MacCallum.

for a future metropolis, as it is expected to reach this figure in about twenty-five years.³ It is interesting to note how the plan and program for this new capital city on a virgin site is being prepared.

Provision was made for a new capital in the Constitution of Brazil as a Republic in 1889; but it was not until 1953 that a commission was appointed, under the presidency of Marshal José Pessoa, to determine its location. The Commission put in hand a technical survey of possible sites within the proposed federal district.⁴ This was begun in April 1954 and completed in 1955 and resulted in the selection of five sites all passing the test of topography and climate; rocks, soils, and water resources; drainage; land use, classification, and potential; transportation and power supply. Each had special advantages, and one was chosen as a result of this analysis.

It is a slightly domed site on the high upland plain, about 600 miles northwest of Rio and almost in the geographical center of the country. Two rivers converge at the base of the triangle chosen for the built-up area, and these will form a lake of nearly twenty-five square miles in area when dammed—for hydroelectric generation—at the eastern end of the site.

The President of Brazil has constituted a Development Corporation to build the capital city and manage it in its early years. While the site was be-

³ Urban population growth in Brazil is exceptionally fast; São Paulo is presently adding nearly 100,000 people a year to a population which is already over 2 million; and Belo Horizonte, no more than a village when it was inaugurated as the new capital of Minas Gerais in 1897, has grown by more than a quarter of a million in the last 20 years.

⁴ Report by Donald J. Belcher & Associates, Inc., Ithaca, New York, prepared for the Presidência da República: Comissão de Localização da Nova Capital Federal, Rio de Janeiro, 1955.

ing opened up, an airport of international size constructed, roads laid down, and camps built, the Development Corporation organized a competition of ideas among teams of architects, engineers, and urban geographers for the layout or "pilot plan" of the new capital. Twenty-six completed entries were submitted in March 1957 and were judged by an international jury. The competition program simply asked for the groups' conception of a capital city of the present day. A report and a plan to a certain scale were the only essentials, and other drawings and information could be added if desired.

The plans presented were so varied that judgment was made extremely difficult; but the jury put first things first and premiated a supremely simple and evocative scheme by the *doyen* of modern Brazilian architects, Lucio Costa, even though its presentation was very slight in comparison with some others. The most important thing about this design is that it is conceived in four dimensions—not in two. It is a true pilot plan, in the sense that without getting involved in technical detail it gives a comprehensive set of directions to those who will have the practical task of development. It is a policy-making and character-forming instrument, a unified complex of ideas to stimulate housing, transportation, civic development, landscape treatment, and services—the whole adding up to a capital city.

Almost equally interesting, and of course much more informative, were the pilot plans which *had* been developed in detail. Although they try to answer many questions which, at this stage in the city's history are either unanswerable or only to be solved in the process of development, they do give a foretaste of what the subsequent master plan and building programs will have to contain. One scheme in particular was a brilliant essay in the drawing up

of a complete agenda, including such subjects as administrative machinery, finance, agricultural economics, height and use zoning, road construction and traffic intersections, and recreational standards.

The Development Corporation now has, in the winning scheme and this one, a set of principles, a master conception, and a check list of details. They do not have on their backs a monumental framework which cannot be altered without disruption. This seems in fact to be the chief moral to be drawn from this astonishing attempt to devise a new capital city, on an open site, in the center of Brazil.

PLANNING FOR URBAN RENEWAL

There is a marked difference of motive in the preparation of plans for an existing metropolis and consequently in the processes adopted. Here the shell has already been grown—in the case of an ancient city, considerably more than one. Vested interests and attachments resist change; and the call to action is clearly heard only as a result of war damage or disaster, or of the creation of an "opportunity" such as the reclamation of the foreshore of Table Bay in the center of Capetown. It is heard in a more confused and muffled fashion as a result of traffic congestion or the fatigue of the daily journey to work. And the call is sounded, but seldom heeded, by the planners themselves who naturally wish to solve the urban crossword puzzle once they have set their hand to it.

For the rest there is indifference to planning and a rather grudging acceptance of even the most necessary planning controls. It is not unusual, however, for antiplanners to exhibit at the same time a lively interest in specific development projects such as an expressway, a bridge, a housing scheme, an airport. The mandate to plan for

the city or the metropolitan region as a whole stems from public attitudes at the time, expressed in terms of a political program. Redevelopment is therefore slower and more difficult than original growth; for there is more criticism and more time to organize opposition to a new proposal. A preservationist cult develops, using as a slogan the cautionary lines of Hilaire Belloc

So always keep a hold on Nurse,
For fear of getting something worse.

Despite all this resistance to change, change occurs. Some of it is planned; some guided; some merely controlled. A good deal can be anticipated; but much is unpredictable, not so much because the nature of the improvement could not be guessed at—mass transit, for example, or helicopter landings, or the staggering of working hours—but because the incidence of opposition, or economic crises, or world tension cannot be precisely forecast. So the timetable goes wrong. How far it is possible to plan ahead in the case of established cities is a matter of argument amongst planners. In Britain after World War II and the introduction of the "New Planning System" in 1947, it was thought that specific proposals, including condemnation and construction, could be made for a period of five years and general proposals for a period of twenty; and a quinquennial review of development plans, covering the entire country, was laid down in the Town and Country Planning Act. The general proposals have caused a great deal of uncertainty, of criticism, and of appeals to the Minister: For example, the intention stated in a development plan to construct a road between points A and B without giving its precise line.

The broad effect on property owners and the public has been a call for the elimination of such proposals from a plan, as being a sort of "dead hand"

held over the proper exercise of initiative and progress and the rights of owners to make their own development decisions, provided these did not cause public inconvenience or damage.

Comprehensive development

The effect on local authorities and planning agencies generally has been to emphasize the advantages of "comprehensive" development, that is, development in which *all* major decisions on accommodation and use, circulation, recreation space, and the location of shops and offices are taken by the one authority, either directly or by provisions in leases. In Britain now, "Comprehensive Development Areas," as they are called, are comprehensive mainly in the legal sense. They are brought under one ownership or under the more long-term control of a landlord owning the freehold reversion. But even in these areas there are features, both of design or administration, which are not comprehended within one directing plan. The study for the surroundings of St. Pauls, for example,⁵ had to go further than this in proposing a permanent managing body or trust, not only to develop the buildings, terraces, car parks, and open spaces, but to design and maintain street furniture, external decorations, tree planting, and advertising. Yet the St. Pauls' scheme, in respect to shop and office accommodation alone, is only about one-tenth the size of the Rockefeller Center in New York.

When the scale is enlarged to comprehend not merely the surroundings of a historic building, or a housing group, or a shopping center, but a whole district or the town itself, then comprehensiveness means something different.

⁵ "The Precincts of St. Pauls." A Report to the Common Council of the City of London by William Holford, March 1956. See also *Town Planning Review* (July 1956).

It must then imply a central planning and budgeting authority able and empowered to establish priorities and settle differences between the development agencies so as to secure real co-ordination of all the factors that go to create the new environment.

The most complete set of blueprints for the comprehensive redevelopment of a great metropolis were the three post-war plans for London;⁶ but no central or regional authority with really comprehensive planning powers has yet been devised to revise and carry out the proposals. The London County Council has achieved a notable success with its programs for comprehensive housing schemes, for schools, for the South Bank of the Thames, and a number of individual areas of urban renewal such as the Lansbury neighborhood, and the Elephant and Castle. Now they are on the threshold of establishing an entirely new satellite town to help further the housing of displaced population which began by the eight government-sponsored New Towns that have been growing round London since 1947.

But the big issues for the future of the metropolis, many of which are envisaged in these articles and which include decentralization coupled with central improvements, the establishment of a metropolitan road system, the unravelling of traffic ganglia, reduction in the length and cost of the journeys to and from the central business district, main drainage and the rehabilitation of the river, airport connections, rationalization of the wholesale markets—all these developments can only be recorded on the plans which are kept in the bottom

⁶ *The County of London Plan* by P. Abercrombie & J. H. Forshaw, 1943. *A Plan for Greater London* by P. Abercrombie (sponsored by the Ministry of Town & Country Planning), 1944. *The Redevelopment of the City of London* by C. H. Holden and William Holford, 1947.

drawer. They cannot be programmed. They cannot even be put on the table as an agenda because there is no comprehensive authority whose business it is to consider it. The constituent bodies in the region complain that they cannot afford these things. The professional planners argue that they cannot afford to do without them. One is reminded of the comment by a Traffic Commissioner:⁷ "We pay for good roads whether we have them or not; and we pay more for them if we do not have them." An essential prerequisite of planning on a regional scale is the existence of a body whose whole business it is to make just that type of decision.

THE ADOLESCENT METROPOLIS

As far as present evidence goes, the big city of today is self-perpetuating. The trend of production and distribution is to encourage growth in the metropolitan areas at a faster rate than in the country as a whole.⁸ Agricultural work forces are, in general, decreasing both relatively and absolutely; and the slight loss of manufacturing jobs in the big towns is more than made up by the increases in finance, insurance, real estate, and service employments generally.

But in addition to the new administrative center and the old-established city there is another contestant for future metropolitan status; and that is the young town, strategically located, which is on the verge of becoming a big city and which is in a position to profit by the example, and the mistakes, of its older competitors. In such towns—usually with a population figure be-

⁷ Thomas H. Macdonald: U. S. Traffic Commissioner of Public Roads.

⁸ For the argument as applied to the U.S.A., see Article 3, this issue of *THE ANNALS* on "Production and Distribution in the Large Metropolis." It seems to hold good also for Australia, South Africa, and Britain.

tween a third of a million and half a million—there is not always the resistance to planning,⁹ nor the formidable entrenchments encountered in the older cities; there is still a pioneer mentality and there is still some unity of civic form, function, and administration. If, in addition to this, there is imagination in the way the growth of the town is projected and enough citizen participation to back it up, a rapidly expanding town at this stage of its career may possibly achieve the new metropolitan character more quickly and directly than will be the case with altogether new or redeveloped towns. If so it will be due to a conjunction of factors, of which the most important and the least calculable is the generation of what can only be described as the communal will power to take action in this way. Whatever it is that wakes the dormant consciousness of a community, it emerges as a combination of technical design and invention with administrative capacity and vision. This combination is by no means limited to towns of a certain size, as witness recent changes in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and the proposals for Fort Worth; but it is undeniable that the older and bigger town has more to preserve, both of economic and historic interest, and is often weighed down by

⁹ To take 4 examples only:

- (1) Medellin, Colombia: plan prepared by Wiener & Sert (present population about 360,000).
- (2) Perth, Western Australia: plan prepared by Gordon Stephenson (present population about 380,000).
- (3) Pretoria, administrative capital of the Union of South Africa: plan prepared by William Holford and Norman Cooper (of the City Engineer's Office) (present population about 350,000).
- (4) Coventry, England: a war-damaged industrial town: plan prepared by the City Architects Donald Gibson and now A. G. Ling (present population about 300,000).

the sheer weight and density of numbers. The conversion of developed land into open space bringing no financial return, the preservation in the urban complex of other open spaces which still have natural beauty and character, the adoption of new air and ground traffic systems with adequate space for parked vehicles, and the planned distribution of vital centers of activity, both social and commercial, is certainly easier for the young metropolis than for the old one, despite the wealth and tradition which belong to it and which, short of atomic warfare, it is likely to keep.

For the making of all the significant development decisions, one guiding principle seems to apply and that is a clear

understanding of the limits of improvement, that is, the point at which increased size or population begins to bring diminishing returns. This requires a certain discipline in the ranks of local government because it is ingrained in most public mentalities that growth and progress are synonymous. Most planners are now beginning to realize that one cannot plan for an undetermined and expanding objective, whether it is a building, a neighborhood, the core of a town, or the urban community itself. If there is to be form, there must be a module and a pattern; and when the pattern is successfully established, one must start to think again.

In Pursuit of Urbanity

By WILLO VON MOLTKE and EDMUND N. BACON

Abstract: Daily decisions are made which determine the physical nature of our cities, and in most cases they are based on short-term economic and functional considerations. However, we can in our time design cities which are functional, ordered and aesthetically enjoyable. The sketches attempt to suggest how to achieve urban forms appropriate for urbanity.

MAN, who has become the master of so many things, even the uneasy master of the atom, is more than ever the servant of the city. His servitude often brings him great short-term economic reward but at the cost of his nerves, his health, and his dignity as man. Particularly in American cities, he is denied the satisfaction of his need for order, identification, participation, and aesthetic enjoyment that rests the soul or stimulates the mind.

In the future, when man is even more crowded into urban places, city planners, architects, and landscape architects must provide him not only with a more efficient urban machine but with a physical setting capable of meeting all of man's needs. In order to achieve this end, the city must have:

- Scale relative to his movement on wheels and on foot.
- Continuity of visual experiences.
- Forms which are varied, meaningful and memorable.
- Spaces which stir the senses.

Such an urban scene will encourage the growth of urban activities such as civic participation, sociability, cultural pursuits, and commerce. It will also con-

tribute to the revitalization of urban values, which is of great importance to the development of our culture.

The sketches on the following pages are not intended to portray "Tomorrow's City." Their purpose is to give the reader a visual explanation of how the design of cities can satisfy deep-felt needs of man for order, identification, participation, and stimulus in and from the urban environment. In building and rebuilding the metropolises of the future, designers must consider man's perception at all points: in the landscape approaching the city, when arriving at the threshold, in the individual structures, in the spaces, and in the artifacts that embellish the spaces. The designer must heighten their character and give focal points in the urban landscape, in neighborhoods, and in the linking of urban centers into metropolitan entities. The buildings and sculptures on the pages depicting "Arrival" are the same, but viewed from different levels to demonstrate a functional and aesthetically enjoyable solution to the concentration of arrivals and departures in the core of the city. The last two sketches translate the urban sprawl of today into an ordered pattern for tomorrow.

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
WITH HIS APPROACH

THE NEW CITY WILL BE
DESIGNED FOR THE MAN
WHO USES IT




IT WILL BE CONCERNED WITH
THE CONTINUITY OF HIS
TOTAL EXPERIENCE WITHIN IT

BY RAIL



BY CAR



THERE IS ONE SCALE OF DESIGN FOR MOVEMENT
ON WHEELS,

HIS ARRIVAL


BY RAIL



THERE IS ANOTHER SCALE OF DESIGN FOR
MOVEMENT ON FOOT

HIS ARRIVAL


BY CAR



THE THRESHOLD WILL ANNOUNCE THE NATURE OF THE CITY
• HOSPITABLE
• SENSITIVE TO THE ARTS
• FORMAL

THE TRANSITION FROM WHEELS TO FEET WILL BE
PLEASANTLY ACCOMPLISHED
THE RECEPTION WILL BE FITTING AND GRACIOUS,
INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS AHEAD.

HIS ASSOCIATION



ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER PEOPLE
 ASSOCIATION OF RELATED ACTIVITIES
 • COMMERCE
 • CULTURE
 • SOCIABILITY
 • CIVIC PARTICIPATION
 ASSOCIATION WITH THE SYMBOLS IN THE SPACES
 CREATED FOR THESE ACTIVITIES

HIS IDENTIFICATION




THE SAME DESIGN PRINCIPLES WHICH
 ANIMATE THE CIVIC SPACES DOWNTOWN CAN
 CREATE VITAL CENTERS, FOCAL POINTS FOR
 IDENTIFICATION WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD.
 THIS WILL FOSTER PRIDE IN THE AREA,
 LOYALTY TO THE COMMUNITY.

THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF EXISTING CONDITIONS



NEIGHBORHOOD UNDIFFERENTIATED

CONFUSION OBSCURES THE VALID SYMBOLS,
— THE INHERENT STRUCTURE.
MONOTONY DULLS THE SENSE OF BELONGING.




NEIGHBORHOOD ARTICULATE


OLD SYMBOLS GIVEN NEW STATUS AND RELATIONSHIPS
NEW FORMS COMFORTABLY ASSOCIATED WITH OLD ONES,
ESTABLISH CONTINUITY, GIVE NEW FOCUS.

ARTICULATION

OF THE WHOLE FABRIC



BRINGS ORDER TO THE METROPOLIS,
FULLFILLING A BASIC NEED OF ITS CITIZENS.
THIS WILL FOSTER SELF RESPECT,
IDENTIFICATION WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD,
PRIDE IN THE CITY, AND LOYALTY TO
THE REGION.



The Urban Aesthetic

By JOHN ELY BURCHARD

Abstract: The aesthetics of a great city is a combination of many sensory stimuli as well as the visual one. Most of these and even some of the visual effects are outside the control of the designer. Great cities have had fine approaches, fine magnets of general interest. They have historically been mainly for the slow pedestrian and for daytime effect. Now we must find a way to preserve or restore the approaches and the magnets of the city centers and to create them in the plasmodial periphery. And we must do this on a new time scale including the speed of the airplane and on a twenty-four hour basis. To do this while also retaining nature is the principal problem. It will not be solved by a few towering geniuses alone.

THE works of J. K. Huysmans are no longer fashionable, but makers of cities would do well to recall the experiences of his hero, des Esseintes. This man understood that the true aesthetic experience exacts the use of all of the senses, not the optical alone; and that this experience is more sensuous than intellectual.

So it is for the city of today, even though architects and planners seem often to ignore it. The character of a fine or a mean city is composed of its smells, its noises, even its taste as well as its sights. Its sights include people, their clothing, their conveyances, their flowers, trees, fountains. A city has an unseen history which also forms its aesthetic. A city is not architecture alone, perhaps not even principally.

Cities have noises. There are the shrill engine whistles at the Gare St. Lazare, the chants of the street peddlers of Naples, the bells of the betjaks in Jakarta, the horns in the fogs of San Francisco Bay, the subterranean rumble of the subways of Manhattan, the unmuffled motorcycle engines on the Corso.

Cities have people and people have tongues. Street voices do not sound the same even in a single country. The sharpness of Albany is countered by the softness of New Orleans, the flatness of Omaha by the twang of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. None is like the diapasons of Hamburg, the falsetto upturnings of London, the liquids of Rome or Helsinki, the wails or bleats of Bombay or Cairo. When they stop talking some people in some cities sing, some listen to sidewalk orchestras, some are silent. Thus cities do not sound alike.

Cities have smells. Wood smoke and manure provide the warm fall atmosphere of Bourges; coal gas cares for Lille, or Birmingham, or Washington, Pennsylvania; oil for Galveston; fish drying in the sun for Ålesund; coffee roasting for Boston; while, when the wind is in the southwest, Chicago knows the sick sweet odor of drying blood and recently ardent flesh. Mainz is redolent with honeysuckle. Thus cities do not smell alike.

Nor are all the visual motifs of a city architectural. People wear clothes: The

bizarre open shirt of Hollywood and Vine is not the careful gray flannel of Grand Central, or the big hat of Fort Worth, or the bowler of the City of London. The summer skirts of Stockholm do not resemble the kimonos of Kobe, or the saris of Madras, or the serapes of Bogotá.

People are carried about. Some cities have elephants, or camels or goats, many have mules and horses, some have rickshaws, some have sleds, and a few have sedan chairs even now. More have bicycles, and when you see many you can be sure you are in flat Amsterdam and not flat Chicago. Most common today, of course, are motorcars but even these do not look alike in every city; even the automobile scenery changes. You will not, praise be, see many swept wings east of Suez. Not yet.

Cities have history, at least great cities do, and historical spots have their own aesthetic. Some cities like Helsinki bear the formidable memories of many different occupations in architectural forms which have not been destroyed; some like Athens and Rome wear their proudest jewels in their magnificent ruins; some like Paris or London offer a wide canvas of undisturbed historical development. For many the historical aesthetic may be mainly an aesthetic of the memory: The door through which assassins sought to reach a Henry of Navarre; the ancient site of a wilderness fort such as Duquesne, or Dearborn; the pavement, long since replaced, on which a Crispus Attucks fell. Often the memory is served only by a plaque. But even such tremulous whispers from the past will cause the sensitive to prickle.

Some cities have sidewalk cafés and some do not; some have awnings, or umbrellas, or arcades and some do not; some are adorned with mosaic pavements and the result is different from

that of cobble stones or asphalt. Some have pleasant street signs or street lamps. Some support flowers everywhere; some have rejected plants. Some are best known for their chimney pots. Some have amusement gardens, but a Tivoli, a Skansen, or a Liseberg is quite a different thing from a Sutro's Baths or a Coney Island, to say nothing of a Revere Beach. Some have rivers, or canals, or lakes; some are moist with fountains; some are dry and hard.

All these things add to the aesthetic of a city, but most of them are the result of time and tradition. Few have been consciously created in the way a hotel manager might sprinkle an elevator in the Ritz-Carlton with perfume. Yet the city of the future will be incomplete if all these aspects of personality, while possible in an old economics of scarcity and overwork, are discarded as obsolete or impossible in the new economics of plenty and leisure. It would be ironic if the brave new city could sport no flowers because there is now no one left with time or inclination to tend to them.

THE CITY'S PERSONALITY

The city that we love or detest is the summation of all such things: Of its smells, its noises, its people, its voices, its clothes, its vehicles, its animals; it is the sum too of its markets and its sidewalks, of its trees, flowers, water, and sculpture, of its clean or grimy air, of its abundant or covered sun, of the color of its sky, of its terrain, of a way of life, and a history. When the city is lucky, and this does not always happen, it possesses an architecture which has understood and loved all these non-architectural considerations. When we synthesize all these, the image of a given city springs quickly to mind as any exercise in calling names will prove. Most of us will have immediate and moderately reliable responses to names

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such as Bangkok, Benares, Hong Kong, Kyoto, Katmandu, Nuremberg, Florence, Venice, Athens, Cairo, Caracas, or Honolulu as well as to the great world capitals like Rome, Berlin, Paris, London, Stockholm, Tokyo. In America a few cities evoke such images, but these are more likely to be New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, San Francisco, or New Orleans than Houston, Kansas City, or Buffalo. We can even conjecture reasonable images of cities we have not seen, cities like Samarkand, Isfahan, or Leopoldville. Happy the city that proffers such a positive image. Unhappy the city that does not.

There has been a decline in the number of positive images. Newly created cities like New Delhi or Canberra need at least time. But the lesser cities of the world look more and more alike every day, and at a slower pace as we know more about each other, as we adopt each other's conveniences and merge them with our own, the same thing is happening to the greater cities. Whether or not it is better for French health that Coca Cola replace Pernod, it is probably not better for the French aesthetic. A slow leveling process is going on all over the world. Of course, it is theoretically possible to level up as well as down, but an improvement in standards of sanitation is not necessarily synonymous with an improvement in aesthetic standards. On the aesthetic side it may be that Gresham's Law is at work in the world. The symbols of Western "progress," coveted in too many places, are not always pretty symbols. The symbols of the Soviet Union are, if anything, less pretty. Thus sanitation will remove the indigenous smells, mass production the indigenous costumes, mass communication the indigenous tastes, education the indigenous tongues. Mass transport will diminish the importance of indigenous materials. History can-

not be expunged quite so easily, but many people would like now to forget much of their history, and not all peoples recall the past with pride. The camel will not survive forever on the streets of Tashkent, or the llama in Lima, or the water buffalo in Rangoon. Skylines will change, not always for the better; architectural deviations will become less conspicuous. To the designer of American embassies, Copenhagen and Stockholm were unfortunately not different cities. But even where the city centers that provided the character have been well protected, they become engulfed by the anonymous and expanding peripheral suburb.

The life of man in the large modern city has so changed that the visual aspects of the old city he may once have known and cherished can have only a tangential effect upon his life. Thus in his own impression, they are not at all as his memory might recall them even when they have not been physically changed. Nor do they look to him quite as they may to a stranger. Once this was not important, but in the modern world nearly every one in a large city is, in a curious way, something of a stranger.

This is not to say that the city dweller thinks of himself as exotic. The exotic city so many of us want to visit is always over the range in Erewhon. We want to visit Erewhon and return to praise it, but the more important word is not "praise" but rather "return." In an increasingly nomadic world there can be fewer homes to return to, more determination to make every place like home, fewer exotic experiences. For the exotic and the indigenous are, naturally, the same thing only seen through different eyes. If the final world is to be one great Conrad Hilton chain, this will have some effect upon the aesthetics of the cities. The quaint Alice Foote MacDougall repetition of the pretty pic-

turesque will not do for modern men. We need not expect to hear muezzins calling from the minarets of Hilton-Mecca. As an incorrigible and sentimental romantic I may regret this, but I cannot ignore it.

Yet this leveling raises hard questions for the designer of new, as yet unbuilt, cities, perhaps even harder ones for those who will rebuild the old cities. The questions are even humiliating if he is sensitive enough to understand them.

The largest humiliation is that so little of the urban aesthetic is his to control. He cannot write the whole symphony. He will not, perhaps fortunately, be able to design the noises, the smells, the costumes, the vehicles, even the major elements of the terrain. He can neither select them nor expunge them, but he will be a bad designer if he ignores them.

UNDERSTANDING HISTORY

Nor can he remake or relive history. Yet he must be careful not to destroy it for there can be no great urban aesthetic which forgets history or tries to pretend that people have not trod the streets before. History offers particular pitfalls. It will not do, on the one hand, to wax sentimental about it and to create more Williamsburgs or Santa Barbaras. But it will not do to extirpate it either, and it will be wrong to destroy fine things for new projects. Boston without the old churches, the Bulfinch State House, Richardson's Trinity Church, McKim's Public Library, the Boston Common, and the Charles River Basin would not be much of a city. Solicitude for what has gone before cannot be limited to refraining from tearing them down. The designers of the two insurance buildings which destroyed the urban sky line of Boston were as much vandals as though they had torn down Trinity Church for a shopping center.

In America the willingness to refrain from encroachment is almost nonexistent for we have not even learned not to tear down. The bulldozer is in some ways more glamorous for us than the bricks it pushes into the earth. Yet we must somehow learn the truth. There may be a greater architect in America today than Henry Hobson Richardson ever was, there may be even two or three. But nothing that such a contemporary can design for Pittsburgh on the particular site of the Allegheny Court House and Jail will ever contribute as much to the aesthetics of Pittsburgh as this great stone monument from an earlier day and by another great artist. The Jail and Court House may become obsolete for their original purposes. They cannot become obsolete as part of the meaning of Pittsburgh. Cities are like human beings, and they cannot void their past experience. They should not even try. This is a lesson better understood in Europe than in America. A primary and inexorable problem for the modern urban aesthetic is to respect and understand history without being servile to her. For us of today there is less risk of servility than there is of disrespect. We must never forget that there were brave men before Agamemnon—or Le Corbusier.

Many otherwise great designers have not possessed this sensitive understanding of history. They have been willing either to tear down fine old buildings, to restore them arrogantly, or to enter into an unfortunate and juxtaposed competition with them. But even if history is understood and appropriately revered, there remain other humiliating limitations.

The designer will scarcely be permitted, for example, to design whole cities except in books. Frank Lloyd Wright must share Bagdad with Aalto and others, however much he may pro-

test; this is probably just as well, no matter how towering the genius. Cities take a long time to make, and order or consistency are not the only ways to a fine urban aesthetic; they may indeed offer the most limited way.

I have heard revealing debates about Broadway at night which will illustrate this point. Broadway is vulgar, strident, brassy, confused, and wonderful. Orderly minds perceiving the fundamental beauty wish that it might all be taken in hand by a single brain or at least by a group of sympathetic brains and brought into order, its colors subdued, its competitive excesses suppressed. But this would, of course, be exactly wrong. The greatness of this magnificent nocturnal honky-tonk is precisely that it is unbridled. There are other ways of using neon as the basin of the Charles River at Boston, also unplanned, will attest. But more liveliness on the Charles and more order on Broadway would simply downgrade both.

This produces the rather negative conclusion that, though there are some fine examples of beautiful cities with master plans that have been observed, there are more examples of beautiful cities in which no such order can be found. The problem is then how to achieve the fine effects of *laissez-faire* without the disadvantages, disorder, and excessive competition; or how to achieve the fine effects of master planning without the disadvantage of stodginess or pedantry. This is an impossible question, but to me it seems that a city is too big a piece of sculpture for any one man to carve, and I am still more apprehensive about sculpture by a committee.

URBAN AESTHETICS

The architect-designer must face one further humiliation. Some cities are most famous, not as cities but because

they possess individual buildings of the greatest consequence. But there are also cities of great beauty which own no buildings of the absolutely highest quality or in which the few such buildings as do exist have no dominant influence on the whole aesthetic. Two examples will suffice.

Old San Francisco from the Presidio to the Oakland Bridge offers one of the finest visual impressions furnished by any city in the world, an impression which cannot be diminished by the less elegant ensembles of the surrounding East Bay, Peninsula, or Marin County. The streets are badly planned and march their gridiron in defiance of the contours. The buildings lack individual distinction with hardly an exception. Here there is no Louvre, no St. Peters, no Forum Romanum, no Parthenon, no Hagia Sofia, no Taj Mahal. Not even the Coit tower or the belfry of the Ferry offers much punctuation. Anonymous and individually undistinguished buildings push their white walls up the hills to make one of the most beautiful cityscapes in the world.

The Götaplatsen of Göteborg, a handsome square, centers around one of Milles' finest fountains. As the Kungssportsavenyn slopes gently away from it towards the harbor, it leaves a square of excellent consequence, nearer to the Piazza San Marco than anything to be found in Stockholm, the so-called "Venice of the North." Yet not one of the three buildings which frame the square, neither the City Theatre, nor the Art Museum and gallery nor the Concert Hall adorns the square with a really fine façade. The façades, indeed, embrace great absurdities; but the relation of their walls, the rise of their steps, the quality of the pavements, and perhaps above all the tubs of flowers rising bank on bank combine to support the play of water on the colossal and archaic Poseidon and his humorous en-

SUBURBAN AESTHETICS

A troublesome question arises here. As believers in the possibility of better things we have to admire the occasional efforts to do something fine on the periphery whether it be at Baldwin Hills Village or at Vällingby outside of Stockholm. But when we are content not to be doctrinaire we must also concede that even the best of these, as of now, have failed to achieve something that was implicit in the old city and that is too fine to give up without a struggle. In terms of superior safety, health, convenience, democratic standards, indeed in terms of most social standards which are currently accepted, they represent a considerable step forward and not only in comparison to the slum. But something is still missing from this new suburban aesthetic: Something of beauty, something of humor, something of informality, something of surprise, something in short of nature.

No city is really beautiful, nor can any peripheral development achieve beauty, if nature is too much ignored. The hills, the rivers, the lakes, the sea, cannot be installed by man. But trees, flowers, fountains, pleasant pavements can. So can wide avenues, pedestrian walks, vistas, stopping points, other punctuation marks. New projects like Vällingby or even shopping centers like Northlands in Detroit have done fairly well with those things that can be made of brick, or stone, or glass. They seem to have tried but in pallid way to introduce sculpture and painting; but either they have not spent enough for their art or not enough contemporary artists are ready for the challenge as for example the fountain makers of Rome, Nuremberg, Stockholm, and Göteborg were, each in his different day. Probably it is a little of each. The flower beds are not abundant enough and luxuriant enough, and they do not receive

tourage to produce a remarkable overall effect. Would the effect be greater or less had the enveloping buildings been made by greater geniuses, had they more brilliance in their own individual rights? One should not be too quick to say. What can be said with confidence and with no denial of the great quality of 860 Lake Shore Drive in Chicago is that such a Miesian building would be utterly out of place on the Götaplatsen.

A great urban aesthetic arises not from a cluster of architectural chefs-d'oeuvre but from a sensitivity on the part of each successive builder to the amenities that are already there. No good architect would dream of destroying the beautiful natural terrain of an isolated site but would, instead, try to marry his building to the land and the vegetation, and the water, and the sky. It is easier to forget and it is common to forget that there is also an urban terrain and that this, too, is entitled to respect, even to love. Urban aesthetics are not to be made over as lightly as ladies' clothes.

The qualification must naturally be remembered that when we speak of the beauty of a city we speak usually of only a small part. Beautiful San Francisco does not include what is happening on the eastern and southern ridges of the Bay or down in the erstwhile walnut groves and artichoke farms. When we speak of the charms of Göteborg we are not talking about the brutal array of multistoried tenements that accumulate on its periphery, tenements with perhaps less to recommend them than the Dudok-influenced apartments nearer town and of an earlier day which it is now the fashion to repudiate. Beautiful Philadelphia is not Levittown, and beautiful Sydney is not the string of abominable villas which line the coast for twenty-five miles toward the Pittwater.

enough care; the trees are too few and too small; the water runs through spouts that are ungenerous. Meanwhile the parks of the old center where the grass is deep and green, the trees opulent—these are now too far away from too many people. Of course new projects may mature with age, and of course it does take a longer time to make a tree than it does to make a flat; but when trees are destroyed in the making of flats, the pressures of obsolescence may see to it that a Vällingby never does mature. The suspicion remains that the tree, the moss, the fern, the flower, the water, and the sculpture are not greatly admired or coveted by the artists of the new complexes as they have ceased to be admired by most contemporary sculptors who may not be really competent now to produce a fine fountain if given the chance, and perhaps not very interested in the chance either.

In more concrete terms let me suggest five specific problems of the visual aesthetic of the modern city, the problem of preserving or producing the gateway, the problem of preserving or creating magnets, the problem of accommodating to new time scales, the problem of aesthetics around the clock, and the problem of developing individuality and character in the periphery.

THE CITY'S APPROACHES

As we think of old—or even new—fine cities we will often think of them in terms of a major approach or gateway: The spire of Chartres across the wheat fields of La Beauce, the towers of lower Manhattan as one steams up toward the Battery, the air approach to Chicago across the false front of the skyscrapers of Michigan Avenue. There are cities of hills and sea: San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, Lisbon, Sydney, Wellington, Oslo. There are cities that

rise from the ocean: Boston, New York, Copenhagen. There are cities of the big rivers or estuaries: London, St. Louis, Rome, Paris, St. Paul, Melbourne, Vienna. There are cities of the plains: Moscow, Salisbury, Lincoln in England or Nebraska. All of these, except perhaps the cities of the plains, have a particular appearance that must be seen from a particular direction, and historically there has been one dominating approach which has established the image of such a city. This overriding and individual image is not unimportant for the aesthetics of a city. The ancient approaches to such an image were leisurely and from the level of the street or the surface of the sea or river. One had time to see the image grow and change, to watch its details emerge from the mass. One looked up at the spires, not down. Each skyline had a regional and an identifiable characteristic. Thus the gateway to the city was visually as well as strategically important. As cities grew they developed other approaches: Those of the railroads were somber, dingy, and desolate; those of the automobile roads strips of chaotic vulgarity; those of the aeroplane utterly unpredictable and dependent upon the wind direction at the time of arrival. Yet through all this, great cities possessed and still possess a dominant visual approach whether it is that of the Battery, the Great North Road, the Bois de Boulogne, or the Golden Gate.

Very often the most glamorous approach became the way of the visitor, not that of the native. But for a long time the native had his own, if more bucolic, way. We can see vestiges of these still in Philadelphia, Boston, New York, London, or Paris. Here there was a continuous change of scale and pace and texture from countryside through village, to park-like suburb, here reaching some main theme of the city such

as a great river or lake, then parks, boulevards, and thus to the heart of town which truly was a heart, not a series of disconnected and independent blood vessels. To be sure this experience with its morning crescendo and its evening diminuendo might soon come to be reserved for the few who lived in the park-like suburb or even in the country. To be sure the experience was quite different for the many who might have to approach Paris via the Porte St. Denis, or London via the Isle of Dogs, or New York across the petroleum-perfume of Bayonne and the piggeries of Secaucus. But this did not alter the fact that other approaches had been possible and might have been available to all. It did not alter the even more relentless fact that urban "progress" instead of making the best available to all tended rather to take it away even from the few. There is hardly a city left in the world to reach which is not only a frustration to all of its citizens, but a visual abomination as well for all those who have not forgotten how to see. The doughnut stand, the drive-in movie, and the used-car lot have outmoded the tree—hardly a tribute to the aesthetic contributions of "small business." At a higher level Le Corbusier's written sketches for the boscage of Chandigarh seem more literary than arboreal.

The question of the approach ought to be a dominant one today, complicated though it is by the fact that the approach must now be made from so many directions and at so many different speeds. A cityscape can no longer be a bas relief; it must be a sculpture in the round, elegant from all points of view, from above as well as from below. It must be compatible with many speeds of approach and viewing, say from three miles an hour to more than three hundred. This means that scales and details have to

agree on two quite different sets of coordinates. If the experience of the gateway is to be satisfactory the problem of reconciliation is gigantic and it may be a small wonder that the failures have been herculean.

THE CITY'S MAGNETS

Once one had reached the older city he found internal and localized satisfactions, usually, though not always, on a more intimate, more human and personal scale. These were the parts of the city I call magnets. Some of them might be for purely utilitarian purposes: Markets, exchanges, public buildings, even the rostrums of Hyde Park. Others served specific pleasures: Concert-hall or opera-house squares, circuses, or specific spiritual needs such as the parvis of the cathedral. Some were for general recreation: A zoo, a botanical garden, a pond in the Tuileries for the sailing of toy boats, the lakes of Stockholm for grown-up boats, the promenades for strollers. We all know how fortunate is the city which has many such magnets, how dismal the city with none. They may be monumental like the Place de la Concorde, or of normal scale like the Place Vendôme, or intimate like Gramercy Park, open like the Presidio, closed like Grosvenor Square before the Americans came. Best of all the city could provide a range of scales. Not all these magnets needed to be important.

At the corner of Fifty-Ninth Street and Fifth Avenue in New York is a tiny such square, hard by the Plaza Hotel, a kind of pendant period to Central Park. Surrounded by undistinguished buildings, adorned with small trees and benches, this square, principally this cube of open air, enriches a region of several blocks. Had such spaces been multiplied every five or six blocks throughout Manhattan Island

This is the way sanity lies. The greatest lesson some European cities today could teach American city planners and architects—and traveling citizens—is that every pleasure does not lie at the other end of a ride in an automobile. The misfortune is that the lesson seems to be going the other way.

That the metropolis is necessary if only to support the great magnets like the symphony orchestra, the topflight opera, the diversity of tastes is evident. But that the periphery must supply the other magnets seems equally evident. It will not do to say that a varied personality on the periphery is impossible because the general taste craves uniformity. History does not suggest that it was ever very different, and it is the task of the planner and the city designer not so much to dictate public taste as to seek incessantly to find the best of this taste and to encourage it to thrive. The public taste is not as bad as hucksters make it appear to be.

I must leave it to others to decide whether this will come about and how it is to be brought about. I can only suggest that it will not appear, I fear, through the actions of a few dictatorial master planners, however talented they may be. I doubt that there is any human genius which is individually able to comprehend or provide the whole urban aesthetic. The results can be expected only at the hands of many men in many places, individual men and not men of committees, but architects, and sculptors, and painters, and planners

Francis Henry Taylor, *The Taste of Angels* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), Appendix C, p. 617.

working in consort and even sometimes in opposition. Their common qualities should be those of a respect and even an affection for the past, a solicitude for the future, and an understanding of the present. These qualities should transcend their desires to be known as dominant and famous individual personalities or their hope to create *the* architecture of the present against which the work of all other men will be measured and found wanting. The wise young men of our time will not be those who slavishly follow one great master whether Miès, or Wright, or Le Corbusier, or even Aalto—who in these matters might be the best to follow—but rather young men who can see that these great men have in no case found a classic answer to our problems but have made enough suggestions upon which to build a great future, and that their ideas, moreover, are not altogether mutually exclusive. But equally essential will be a sensitive concern not only about one's own buildings but also about the buildings of the past, and so far as possible the buildings of the future, buildings of others. We shall need a new band of sculptors more interested in delight than in their own despairs, more interested in materials other than metal, more interested in life processes as well as intellectual ones. We shall need designers who are not pessimists, who respect curves as well as straight lines, who can still see and admire and partly understand a sunset, the waving of a reed in a lake, the budding of a flower, the music of falling water, the sawing of the cicadas in the hot dusk at the close of a sultry day.

The Suburban Dislocation¹

By DAVID RIESMAN

Among aristocratic nations, as families remain for centuries in the same condition, often on the same spot, all generations become, as it were, contemporaneous. A man almost always knows his forefathers and respects them; he thinks he already sees his remote descendants and he loves them.

... As the classes of an aristocratic people are strongly marked and permanent, each of them is regarded by its own members as a sort of lesser country, more tangible and more cherished than the country at large. As in aristocratic communities all the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above another, the result is that each of them always sees a man above himself whose patronage is necessary to him, and below himself another man whose co-operation he may claim. Men living in aristocratic ages are therefore almost always closely attached to something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget themselves. It is true that in these ages the notion of human fellowship is faint and that men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice themselves for other men. In democratic times, on the contrary, when the duties of each individual to the race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed.

Among democratic nations new families

¹ This is a publication of the Center for the Study of Leisure at the University of Chicago, established under a grant from the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation. I have drawn for this article on research conducted by Rolf Meyersohn, Research Director of the Center, and Robin Jackson, Research Associate; and I am indebted for helpful suggestions to Nathan Glazer.

are constantly springing up, others are constantly falling away, and all that remain change their condition; the woof of time is every instant broken and the track of generations effaced... the interest of man is confined to those in close propinquity to himself.

Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America

THE suburbs have become so characteristic of life "among democratic nations" that some of our most acute social observers in the post-World War II years have seen in them the shape of the egalitarian future. William H. Whyte, Jr., in his *Fortune* series on "The Transients" has emphasized the poignancy of the relaxed yet inescapable bonds in the new suburbs, notably Park Forest.² Others, too, have been struck by a kind of massification of men in Levittown and other housing developments such as was once postulated for the endless residential blocks of the cities created by the industrial revolution.³ Even in a Canadian suburb, where one might expect slightly more hierarchical traces, a team of social scientists has found "the track

² *Fortune* (May, June, July, August 1953); also *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956), part VII. See, also, an unpublished master's thesis on Park Forest by Herbert Gans done in the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.

³ Compare Frederick Lewis Allen, "The Big Change in Suburbia," *Harper's Magazine* (June 1954), pp. 21-28, and (July 1954), pp. 47-53; and H. Henderson, "The Mass-Produced Suburbs," *Ibid.* (November 1953), pp. 25-32, and (December 1953), pp. 80-86.

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of generations" barely visible.⁴ In the light of these commentaries, the emphasis on status in *Middletown*, *Yankee City*, *Elmtown*, or the New York suburb which marks for Charlie Gray in Marquand's novel the point of no return—this emphasis on graded ranks seems almost archaic. In contrast, the new suburbanite appears to suffer, less from exclusion, than from a surfeit of inclusions.⁵

Yet this is impression, based on a few soundings in a few perhaps strategic and surely highly visible locations. We know very little about the relatively settled suburbs, especially those leapfrogged by the waves of post-World War II growth; and so far as I can see we know almost nothing about the suburbs (old or new) surrounding the smaller cities. The new developments which have altered the physical and moral landscape so strikingly may betoken a trend or a blind alley. They may fascinate us out of our contemporary fears for the loss of liberty and individuality; and intellectuals, seldom unambivalent about the suburbs—whether or not they make them their own domiciles—may generalize from them too readily to middle-class life and leisure as a whole.

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

Such considerations led me to a review of what sociologists have recently written, at their most empirical, about cities, suburbs, and the urban-rural fringe. Much of this work is based on

⁴ See John R. Seeley, R. Alexander Sim, and E. W. Loosley, *Crestwood Heights: The Culture of Suburban Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1956); and the perceptive discussion by William Newman, "America in Subtopia," *Dissent*, Vol. 4 (1957), pp. 255-66.

⁵ As in the witty but unrevealing novel of exurbia, Max Shulman's *Rally Round the Flag, Boys!* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1957); see, also, the slight topographical variations in exurbanite status dissected by A. C. Spector, *The Exurbanites* (New York and Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1955).

census data or on such repeated explorations as the University of Michigan's Detroit Area Survey or the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey. Such studies tend to put a brake on extrapolative generalization. They indicate, for example, the presence of urban elements in rural areas, and vice versa.⁶ The city is not necessarily the seat of urbanism, and the suburban way differs from the city way only at the polarities of each and is based on variables not entirely dependent on ecology or visible from a helicopter.⁷ Hence these investigations do support the common-sense observation that can find suburban styles in many cities and urban ones in many suburbs; that an urban fringe is growing which is neither country nor city nor quite bedroom suburb in the older mode.

If this is so, then it means that the differences which divide Americans today depend less and less on where one lives, what one does, or who one is in terms of lineage, but more and more it depends on style and social character. Of course, some self-selection will occur towards places to live and towards occupations—especially between the two sectors of our "dual economy" I shall describe later. However the sorting at any given time reflects chance and idiosyncrasy and scarcely predicts the life

⁶ See Albert Reiss, Jr., "An Analysis of Urban Phenomena," in Robert M. Fisher, Ed., *The Metropolis in Modern Life* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1955), pp. 41-49; Morris Janowitz, *The Community Press in an Urban Setting* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952).

⁷ See, for observant commentary, Gregory P. Stone, "City Shoppers and Urban Identification: Observations on the Social Psychology of City Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60 (1954), pp. 36-45; also Wendell Bell and Marion D. Boat, "Urban Neighborhood and Informal Social Relations," *Ibid.* Vol. 62 (1957), pp. 391-98, and references there cited; Sylvia Fleis Fava, "Suburbanism as a Way of Life," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 34-37.

cycle of individuals.⁸ Occasional studies of suburban voting and a few intimations concerning suburban worship shed tangential light on such major questions of attitude. On the whole, however, it seems fair to say that empirical investigations—including those recently done on problems of zoning, planning, and recreational needs; on the location of industry and the journey to work; and on problems of suburban and regional administration—scarcely connect with the kinds of writing cited at the outset. Thus, we cannot link nation-wide data on changes in metropolitan areas with Whyte's descriptions of how Park Forest feels toward its pro tem inhabitants. This is the characteristic situation in sociology today—that research in the macrocosmic and in the microcosmic scarcely connect, scarcely inform each other.⁹ At any rate, this is my excuse, or my opportunity, for dealing in this paper with quite general themes only illustratively and sporadically pinned down in empirical research: I speak for a point of view—at best for a seasoned subjectivity.

PLANNED UTOPIA

The other day I went back to read that remarkable and neglected book, *Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life*, by Percival and Paul Goodman.¹⁰ This book includes a com-

⁸ See the forthcoming book of G. E. Swanson and D. N. Miller in which they distinguish within the city of Detroit and within the middle-income strata between "bureaucratic" (inner-directed) and "mass-society" (other-directed) families.

⁹ I may, of course, be unaware of important work in this area—work, for instance, of the scope of G. A. Lundberg, and others, *Leisure: A Suburban Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934).

¹⁰ Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947; now out of print; cf. my discussion in "Some Observations on Community Plans and Utopia," *Yale Law Journal*, 1957. Reprinted in *Individualism Reconsidered* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954).

mentary on utopian community planning in the past and some suggestions as to potential utopias within the American scene of our day. It makes strange and disturbing reading now on at least two grounds. In the first place, it is easy to forget how much enthusiasm there was, during and immediately after World War II, for creative planning and reorganization of communal life, both here and in Europe. Ten years later, the air is sodden—as if a fall-out over intellectual life had already occurred—the cold war absorbs much of our political energy; and we struggle, not to plan, but even to register what is happening to our fantastically expanding economy, population, and metropolitan malaise.¹¹ In the second place, it is curious how many of the Goodmans' then-utopian suggestions have been incorporated into our lives, ten years later, without planning and with fundamental change coming about interstitially only. We have come much closer to approximating their first ironical plan for a city of efficient consumption, although our shopping centers are suburban rather than urban: Certainly, our advertising is more "efficient" now than in prewar times, and our waste more exuberant.¹² Their second plan, for the decentralization of work and life, has come about in some measure:

¹¹ The countries of Western Europe do not appear to be greatly in advance of America in these respects, but instead to be trying to enjoy with prosperity our new problems as well as their traditional ones—a far cry from, for example, the radically reconstitutive hopes expressed in the French Resistance press during the German Occupation. Cf., e.g., the interesting book by Karl Bednarik, *The Young Worker of To-day: A New Type*, Renee Tupholme, Translator (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956); and see also recent articles in *Encounter* on "This New England" and "The Younger Generation" of the Welfare State.

¹² We buy more services than the Goodmans allowed for, which lowers our efficiency in production and distribution—and absorbs what would otherwise be a labor surplus.

Through turning the home into a do-it-yourself workshop, through some degree of suburbanization of industry, and through greater labor mobility; but the quality of this plan, aimed at minimizing central political and economic control and at making work and leisure more meaningful, seems further away than ever. Their third plan, which aimed at a subsistence economy for security on top of which a luxury economy would be reared, has come about in an utterly paradoxical form. We have now a dual economy; one part is luxurious, pays high wages, lives in handsome plants, and generally engages in "conspicuous production"; the other part lives as if on another continent, paying low wages, not practicing Harvard Business School techniques, and seldom financing itself out of retained profits and quick depreciation accounts. The Goodmans' third plan was intended to minimize government regulation and private price-administered regulation. Our dual economy, however, depends on continued war preparation, suitable tax and credit policies, and agreement between labor and management in the high-wage economy to let the consumer, and sometimes the stockholder, pay the costs of private socialism and creeping inflation.¹³ Yet the consumer also benefits from the dual economy if he works for the high-wage, managerial side of it, or if, while working for the underprivileged economy, he can somehow use the former as leverage or "host" for raising his own income without the corresponding in-plant efficiencies and extra-plant responsibilities of the managerial side. Moreover, as Whyte makes clear in *The Organization Man*, the new neatly

¹³ I am indebted to Eric Larrabee for stimulating discussions of the "dual economy." The concept is analogous to that of the dual state described by Ernest Frankel for Nazi Germany and resembles the contrast of controlled *i.e.*, abundant and free *i.e.*, pinched sectors in a totalitarian economy.

assembled suburbs, with their handsome school plants and their neighborly fraternalism, are the consumption side of the managerial economy, valuing a similar "social ethic" and suffering from a similar lack of ultimate goals. Likewise, the residual but still immense slums to be found in both country and city are the domestic or consumer side of the low-wage, non-expense-account economy.¹⁴

This latter economy lacks the subsistence security at which the Goodmans aimed—rather, it remains the principal arena in which one is allowed to fail or to make a very fast buck. And the luxury economy exercises a ceaseless pull, both in its styles of production and in the spread of these, via the expense account, into so-called private life.¹⁵ Thus, private life gets further and further from even the possibilities of a subsistence minimum. At least it does so apart from the possibility, conceivable but unlikely, of a Savonarola-type revolt against high standards of living and dying and the economic and social structure that accompanies these.

UTOPIA AND REALITY

Perhaps the most significant difference between the Goodmans' book and the present state of the American ex-

¹⁴ To be sure, there live in the slums Negroes and other migrant groups who have jobs in the high-wage economy but have not yet had a chance to adopt, at least in residential pattern and usually also in family style of life, the suburban concomitants. And the slums also contain many elderly people, only rarely at work in the high-wage economy, whose skills and tastes antedate the spread of the dual economy both on the production and the consumption side.

¹⁵ The low-wage economy has its expense accounts, too, and being mostly small business and small government, these have often more gravy if less finesse than those in the luxury economy; but they are confined to the boss and his nephews and friends: They are not institutionalized.

perience and imagination is that the latter are encased in an additive or extrapolative mode of perception. When we have a problem, we have a standard remedy: More. We add a road, a wing to a school, a new department or government agency. Seldom do we rearrange the givens so that they become taken into a new configuration—as was done, for notable examples, in the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Marshall Plan. This is not merely the old American formula of "bigger and better" or the old American optimism, now in any case considerably attenuated. Rather, it is something which goes deeper into the way Americans structure their very image of physical and social reality. In his perceptive essay, "What is American about America?", John Kouwenhoven gives many illustrations of the additive principle: From the land-grant section to the reiterative beat of jazz, the roll of film, the highway grid of our cities, the added stories of the skyscraper or high-rise apartment, our soap-opera serials, our assembly lines.¹⁶ Dorothy Lee, on the basis of linguistic studies, has shown the lilt and drive of analogous tendencies in the changing patterns of American English.¹⁷

One could argue that these are no more than minor American variants of Western dualism and the decimal system and other similar categories which govern our perception and communication. But America is today, as in Tocqueville's time, freer for better or worse of alternative perceptions rooted in feudal or ecclesiastical history—even the South is being rapidly colonized. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, planning has become almost a specialty of

¹⁶ *Colorado Quarterly* (Spring 1954) reprinted in *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 213 (July 1956), pp. 25-33.

¹⁷ "Freedom, Spontaneity and Limit in American Linguistic Usage," *Explorations*, Vol. 6 (1956), pp. 6-14.

the large corporations which are committed to the additive principle by the very nature of their annual balance sheets, tax returns, and inventories—just as government agencies can seldom plan for more than one or two years by the nature of our budget and electoral systems. While federal expenditures and hence capital investment are held on a plateau by past wars and the present strife of the services, and while states and local governmental units seek to keep up with yesterday, big business has at least some opportunity to look ahead in terms of capital spending and, where financially backed foresight has monopolistic support, as with Bell Telephone and General Electric, even to look further than the next annual report.

LIMITATIONS OF PROPHECY

Forecasting, however, is almost always wrong, in part because it is confined to certain parts of the society; it assumes that other things will stay the same—they never do. In earlier generations, when America was an underdeveloped country, the limits of prophecy could always be set by reference to England or some other fully industrialized and urbanized place, but now we have become an overdeveloped country and have outrun our models. (We use the Soviet Union in this capacity whenever they will oblige.) Thus, we turn to our own past for a model and go on extrapolating. For instance, it seems generally to be assumed by business planners—some government officials are less sanguine—that a larger population will produce and consume proportionately more than a smaller one despite the friction its very size may create and the possible loss of much of its potential productivity through inadequate schooling and low morale. The inadequate schooling will reflect, *inter alia*, the much smaller energy for foresight that civic and educational institutions

society, we are witnessing a tremendous but tacit revolt against industrialism. It is a very different sort of revolt from either that of the machine smashers of the early nineteenth century or that of the various anti-industrial sects—socialist, anarchist, agrarian, etc.—of an earlier day. Large manufacturing industry is increasingly moving to the luxury side of the “dual economy,” and back-breaking toil and harsh physical conditions are vanishing (except in industrialized farming and the service trades) with the coming of electricity, full employment, unions, and personnel men. But the luxury, which is often used to make the work more gregarious and less of an effort, is seldom used to make it less monotonous.²³ Naturally, men treat their work as delinquents treat school though schools are less likely than plants to pioneer the partial truancy of the four-day week, escaping and sabotaging when they can. Managers and foremen try in vain to restore the “old school spirit” to their employees and, failing, seek through automation and quality control to make up for the deliquescence of the “instinct of workmanship” once so painfully built into the labor force. Observers of factory life have repeatedly pointed out that status within the plant is no longer gained by hard work and craftsmanship, but rather by one’s consumer skills outside. Men dream, not of rising in the factory, but of starting a small business such as a motel, gas station, or TV repair shop in the shabby

²³ Cf. Peter Drucker’s discussion of job enlargement and related measures in *Concept of the Corporation* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946). Union leaders who once were in the forefront of the drive to make work less exhausting—often an extrapolative matter of lowering hours, slowing the assembly line, lessening dirt and noise—have seldom moved into the more difficult area of making it less uncreative. (According to Nelson Foote, they have eliminated the former grim silence that suited a Puritanical management.)

and open-shop underside of our dual economy.²⁴ For youngsters from subsistence farms, for hillbillies, and Southern Negroes, a Detroit or Gary factory is still glamorous or at least a liberation from drastic poverty and insecurity; but for second- and third-generation factory workers, it no longer holds much meaning other than as a (hopefully temporary) source of funds and fringe benefits.

To be sure, there is a new industrialism of electronics, plastics, aviation, and so on, which retains a certain appeal that the older industries have so largely lost. However, the new firms, increasingly located in suburbs or where people want to live: California, and the Southwest and Florida, speed the movement out of heavy industry and merge factory and suburban life in a blend Patrick Geddes would probably disown. But we see in these industries precisely the form that the revolt against industrialism has taken today, namely to partially incorporate the “enemy” so that industrialism is not compartmentalized but rather, in muted form, spreads into all parts of the culture. This is, of course, what happens in so many social struggles: One defeats the enemy by becoming more like him.

LIFE AND WORK VALUES

Let me pursue this further by looking at what is happening to the older form of industrial and commercial metropolis. When, a few years ago, I studied interviews done with several hundred college seniors at twenty representative universities, asking them what they would like or expect to be doing in fifteen years, I was struck by the fact that the

²⁴ Cf., e.g., Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1955), and, on older patterns of work morality, Eugene A. Friedmann and Robert J. Havighurst, *The Meaning of Work and Retirement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

great majority planned to live in the suburbs. They expected to be married, and in describing their prospective spouses they hoped for what we might call station-wagon types: educated, companionable, civic-minded, and profoundly domestic. There were few who recognized some incompatibility between focus on suburban life and focus on big-city ambitions (for instance, a senior who wanted to go into advertising, yet not live in or near New York). They were—with some exceptions especially among the Southerners—willing to sacrifice the heights of achievement, though not the plateaus of the luxury economy, in favor of their goals of suburban domesticity and peace. Those who hailed originally from the suburbs suffered from no disenchantment and wanted to return to them—often to the same one—while both city-bred and small-town boys also preferred the suburbs. I assume that some of the latter in an earlier day would have wanted to leave Main Street behind and make their mark in the big city, whatever lingering agrarian fears and suspicions of it they still harbored.²⁵ The city today, for many, spells crime, dirt, and race tensions, more than it does culture and opportunity. While some people still escape from the small town to the city, even more people are escaping from the city to the suburbs.

The successful book and movie, *The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit*, dramatizes these values quite explicitly. The hero chooses unromantic suburban cosiness, with (in the movie version) a not altogether inspiring wife and progeny, in preference to a high-pressure but po-

²⁵ Cf. “The Found Generation,” *The American Scholar*, Vol. 25 (1956), pp. 421–36; see also Eric Larrabee and David Riesman, “Company Town Pastoral: The Role of Business in ‘Executive Suite,’” reprinted in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, *Mass Culture* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 325–37.

tentially exciting business opportunity.²⁶ The head of the business is portrayed as having destroyed his family life and as virtually alienated from all human contact. Very likely, some of his junior executives would describe the company as a “mink-lined rattrap,” thus explaining and justifying their withdrawal of affect from the work itself, while recognizing that they are still competitive. A recent fragmentary survey presents evidence that managers are less satisfied with their work even than unskilled workers, and it is conceivable that the middle-class occupations in general will soon be regarded as sources of funds and of periodic contacts and activity, much as the working-class occupations are now largely regarded.²⁷ If work loses its centrality, then the place where it is done also comes to matter less, and the access to variety in work that the central city provides may also come to matter less. Indeed, so much is this the case already that advertising for engineers in *Scientific American* and in trade journals looks more and more like the vacation advertising in *Holiday*. Minneapolis-Honeywell offers seasons and skiing as a counter-lure to the aircraft and electronic suburbs of the Far West.²⁸ In this regimen, white-collar and blue-collar move towards one another, as each group now emphasizes the consumption aspects of life.

²⁶ There is an equivalent rejection of a wartime love affair with an Italian girl. The business in question is broadcasting—typical for the luxury economy and far removed from traditional industrialism.

²⁷ See Nancy C. Morse and Robert S. Weiss, “The Function and Meaning of Work and the Job,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 20 (1955), pp. 191–98. It should be noted that many men in the professions (the study included only men) and many in sales express great satisfaction with their work.

²⁸ An occasional ad is more work-minded and will feature opportunities for responsibility and creativity along with the suburban fringe benefits.

SUBURBAN WAY OF LIFE

This life, as just indicated, is increasingly focused on the suburbs which, since World War II, have grown so in quantity as to change their quality. For, although upper-class and upper-middle-class people have lived in the suburbs of our great cities since the 1880's or earlier, the cities before World War II still retained their hegemony: They engrossed commercial, industrial, and cultural power. The city represented the division and specialization not only of labor but of attitude and opinion: By discovering like-minded people in the city, one developed a new style, a new little magazine, a new architecture. The city, that is, provided a "critical mass" which made possible new combinations—criminal and fantastic ones as well as stimulating and productive ones. Today, however, with the continual loss to the suburbs of the elite and the enterprising, the cities remain big enough for juveniles to form delinquent subcultures, but barely differentiated enough to support cultural and educational activities at a level appropriate to our abundant economy. The elite, moreover, tend to associate with like-income neighbors rather than with like-minded civic leaders, thus dispersing their potential for leadership beyond township boundaries. Ironically, these people sometimes choose to live in communities which might be almost too manageable if millions of others did not simultaneously make the same choice.²⁹

Indeed, the suburbs are no longer simply bedroom communities but increas-

²⁹ This is somewhat analogous to fad behavior, for individuals no longer live in suburbs as, so to speak, statistical isolates, but live there with recognition of the suburban style as theirs and their country's. Cf. Rolf Meyersohn and Elihu Katz, "Notes on a Natural History of a Fad," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 62, No. 6 (1957), pp. 594-601.

ingly absorb the energies of the men as well as the women and children. The men, that is, are not simply being good providers while still attached to the values of the industrial system: They are seekers after the good life in the suburbs on their own account. Early marriage and the rise in the birth rate are so many rivulets of individual, only barely self-conscious protest against the values inherited from industrialism and the low-birth-rate middle-class metropolis—so many decisions to prefer companionship in the present to some distant goal, and so many mortgages of the future in the benevolent shadow of the luxury economy and its escalator of slow inflation, promotion, and protection. Whereas men once identified themselves with commerce and industry—with its power, its abstractions, its achievements—and forced women to remain identified with domesticity—save for those women who broke through the barrier and became man-imitating career girls—now, as many observers have pointed out, a growing homogenization of roles is occurring. Women take jobs to support the suburban menage periodically while men take part in its work (do-it-yourself), its civic activities (Parent-Teachers Association, and so on), and its spirit. Rather than delegating religion to their womenfolk, men go to church in increasing numbers, occasionally as in an earlier day to be respectable or to climb socially, and occasionally out of a genuine religious call, but more typically because the church, like the high school and the country club, has become a center for the family as a social and civic unit.

DECENTRALIZATION OF LEISURE

All this brings with it an increasing decentralization of leisure. Just as the suburban churches tend, within the boundaries of the "three faiths," to an

amiable syncretism, ignoring doctrinal or liturgical differences, so too the other leisure activities of the suburbs tend to reduce the specialized differentiations possible in a metropolis. What I mean here can be illustrated with reference to music. A metropolis has enough music lovers to organize highly differentiated groups: Mozart lovers may split off from Bach lovers and would never encounter lovers of Wagner, while in the suburbs the music lovers—if they are to support communal activities at all—must in some measure homogenize their tastes and hence create a local market for "classical music." Indeed, they will be exposed to a good deal of community pressure to support the musical activities of their friends in return for having their own enterprises supported. The same holds, *pari passu*, for the other arts—just as it does for the differentiation of specialty stores, churches, and museums found in a large city. By the same token, the suburban activist can feel that his own contribution matters, as he would likely feel in the big city only when he is very rich, very active, or very influential. People brought up in the suburbs may not realize what they are missing, and they may relate their emotional ties entirely to their locality, not going downtown to shop or to visit friends or to go to the theatre.³⁰

Suburbs differ, of course, in what they make available, and so, as we noted at the outset, do central cities; thus, Morris Janowitz showed that many people who, to the visitor's eye, live in Chicago actually live in a small neighborhood that might as well be a suburb.³¹ Moreover, central cities are increasingly influenced by suburban styles of life:

³⁰ I am indebted to unpublished work on the performing arts in the suburbs done by Philip Ennis at the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University.

³¹ *The Community Press in an Urban Setting*, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*).

People trained to a suburban attachment to their cars drive downtown even when good and commodious public transportation is available, and they wear the casual dress of the suburbs when they do.

The suburban dweller believes, in fact, that he has the best of both worlds. In the interviews with college seniors I referred to earlier, in which such stress was placed on suburban domesticity, many students also emphasized their wish not to lose the cultural amenities they had enjoyed in college.³² Some of these amenities will certainly be distributed in the suburb though frequently in diluted doses: Piped in through television and radio and high-fidelity sets; the suburb may even support a theatre group and, in a few cases, amateur chamber music; the local high school will provide entertainment of a sort, as well as facilities for adult education.

However, as the radii lengthen on which people move away from the city—as they must with the crowding of the suburbs leading to the jump to the exurbs—people either learn as in California to drive great distances for dinner or confine themselves to their immediate environs: The central city as a meeting place disappears—a process which has gone further in Los Angeles and Chicago than in Boston or New York. The neighbors make up little circles based—as William H. Whyte, Jr., showed for Park Forest—largely on propinquity.

³² Colleges themselves make the same claim that the suburbs do. I recently had occasion to go through a large number of college catalogues as well as the descriptions colleges give in brief compass in the *College Board Handbook*; all but the huge urban universities did their best to present themselves as near the advantages of a large city, but far enough away for suburban safety and charm. (Correspondingly, some teen agers, raised in safe suburbs, find glamor in going downtown, at least for a time.)

LOSS OF HUMAN DIFFERENTIATION

The decentralization of leisure in the suburbs goes further than this, however, as the home itself, rather than the neighborhood, becomes the chief gathering place for the family—either in the “family room” with its games, its TV, its informality, or outdoors around the barbecue. And while there are values in this of family closeness and “togetherness,” there is also a loss of differentiation as the parents play pals to their children and the latter, while gaining a superficial precocity, lose the possibility of wider contacts. At worst, there is a tendency for family talk and activity to seek the lowest common denominator in terms of age and interest.

Some of these matters are illustrated by an interview with a housewife who had recently bought a house in one of the wealthier suburbs north of Chicago. Her husband had been transferred to Chicago from a southern city and had been encouraged by his company to buy a large house for entertaining customers. Customers, however, seldom came since the husband was on the road much of the time. The wife and three children hardly ever went downtown—they had no Chicago contacts anyway—and after making sporadic efforts to make the rounds of theater and musical activities in the suburbs and to make friends there, they found themselves more and more often staying home, eating outdoors in good weather and looking at TV in bed. Observing that “there is not much formal entertaining back and forth,” the wife feared she was almost losing her conversational skills; yet she felt that her family had been pulled closer together by the shared activities, in which the husband joined on weekends, around the home. After listening to her list and discuss the friends made at church and golf, it became evident that her immediate environment just missed providing her with people close

enough to her in taste and interest for intimate ties to develop.

One interview, of course, proves little, and many factors are obviously involved in choice of friends; suburban location in an older, nonhomogeneous suburb is only one of them. I recall obtaining such interviews in Kansas City, too, among people who had lived there all their lives and had potential access to wide strata in the metropolitan area. Nevertheless, there seems to me to be a tendency, though not a pronounced one, in the suburbs to lose the human differentiations which have made great cities in the past the centers of rapid intellectual and cultural advance. The suburb is like a fraternity house at a small college—or the “close propinquity” to which Tocqueville referred—in which like-mindedness reverberates upon itself as the potentially various selves within each of us do not get evoked or recognized. For people who move to the suburb to live when adult, of course, matters are different than among those who never knew another milieu. And, to be sure, creative human contact need not be face to face but can often be vicarious, through print or other mediated channels. Certainly, highly differentiated human beings have grown up in locales which gave them minimal support. Moreover, though the nonneighborly seldom seek the suburbs,³³ a few doubtless manage to survive there. Ease of movement, in any case, permits periodic access to others, although as these others themselves scatter to the suburbs, this process becomes more difficult.

ROLE OF THE AUTOMOBILE
IN SUBURBIA

Indeed, at least until each of us has his own helicopter or rocket, this pat-

³³ Cf. Sylvia Fleis Fava, “Contrasts in Neighboring: New York City and a Suburban County,” in William Dobriner, Ed., *Reader on the Suburbs* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons).

tern of life requires us to spend a great deal of time in automobiles, overcoming decentralization—but driving is itself a terribly “decentralized” activity, allowing at best for car-pool sociability, and at worst mitigated by the quiz-bits, frequent commercials, and flatulent music of AM radio. As compared with the older suburbanites who commuted by train and read the paper, did homework, or even read a book, the present and increasing tendency to travel to work by car seems aggressively vacuous and solipsistic.³⁴ Whereas in preindustrial cultures and in the lower classes in industrial society, people sometimes just hang on a corner or sit vacantly, it is striking that in a society which offers many alternatives, people will consent to drive vacantly but not refreshingly—woe betide the careless or unspry pedestrian or bicyclist who gets in the way of industrial workers pouring out of the factory parking lots or white-collar workers coming home on a throughway. The human waste here is most important, but the waste of resources and land, the roadside *dreck*,³⁵ the highways which eat space as railroad yards even in St. Louis or Chicago never did, are not negligible even in a huge rich country.

Where the husband goes off with the car to work—and often, in the vicious circle created by the car, there is no other way for him to travel—the wife is frequently either privatized at home or to escape isolation must take a job

³⁴ To be sure, driving may offer some commuters a change of pace and a chance to be alone. Cf., for a general discussion of the elements of irrationality hiding under slogans of convenience in driving to work in the metropolis, see David Riesman and Eric Larabee, “Autos in America: History Catches up with Ford,” *Encounter*, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 26–36.

³⁵ A few superhighways have been designed to refresh the traveler and increase his sense of visual possibility as well as to speed him on his way; the Taconic State Parkway in New York is a fine example.

which will help support her own car. Whereas the rental courts of developments like Park Forest provide companionship for the stranded wives—companionship which, given the age and sex homogeneity, is sometimes oppressive—other suburbs are so built and so psychologically “unsociometric” as to limit neighboring and leave many women to the company of Mary Margaret McBride and Arthur Godfrey. Indeed, in a few instances of interviewing in the morning in new suburbs south of Chicago, I have been struck by the eagerness of the housewives to talk to somebody (and not only to a man!) who is not a salesman—once they can be weaned away from the TV which amuses them as a kind of vicarious baby sitter. It is not only the visiting intellectual who finds the lives of these women empty, their associations fragmentary. My colleagues, Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl, speak of the “parasocial intimacy” they attain with the celebrities of the TV variety shows.³⁶ The women themselves, if at all sensitive or well educated, complain of having their contacts limited to their young children and to a few other housewives in the same boat. And, as a result of efforts to understand the extraordinary philoprogenitiveness of the suburban middle classes (a theme recurred to below), I have come to entertain the suspicion that, once started on having children, these women continue in some part out of a fear of the emptiness of life without children and of the problems they would face of relating themselves to their menfolk without the static, the noise, the pleasures, the “problems” that the presence of children provides.

The children themselves, in fact, before they get access to a car, are cap-

³⁶ See Horton and Wohl, “Mass Communication and Para-Social Interaction: Observations on Intimacy at a Distance,” *Psychiatry*, Vol. 19 (1956), pp. 215–29.

tives of their suburb, save for those families where the housewives surrender continuity in their own lives to chauffeur their children to lessons, doctors, and other services which could be reached via public transport in the city. In the suburban public schools, the young are captives, too, dependent on whatever art and science and general liveliness their particular school happens to have—again contrast the metropolis, with its choice of high schools, as most notably in New York.³⁷

UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF LEISURE

Let me stress again that the themes I am discussing are peculiar neither to the United States nor to the twentieth century. Just as cities are older than industry so are suburbs, their splendors, and miseries. It is the democratization and extension of the phenomena I am describing, and the resultant constriction of alternatives, which give them a new and cumulative quality. The modern suburb is the product of the car, the five-day week, and the "bankers' hours" of the masses. As hours drop further, we can anticipate that still fewer families with children will willingly live in the city. Exceptions would be cities like Minneapolis where the inhabitants can focus their leisure around their cottages on nearby lakes. But the same developments which have reduced hours for those white-collar and factory workers who do not go in for "moonlighting" or extra jobs have in turn put

³⁷ I doubt if even the most superior schools of Scarsdale or Winnetka are as good in the arts as the High School of Music and Art, or in science as the Bronx High School of Science—or at least this was so when New York City was not yet a slum for the Southern and Caribbean migrants. The suburban schools, of course, can hardly cope with the crowding their very advantages have brought about—just as the suburbs, to which people go to escape the city's dirt, suffer from a water shortage and may shortly not be able to wash away their own dirt.

additional pressure on the still limited leisure of certain professional groups. These latter, in one way or another, cater to those whose enhanced income and leisure time allows them greatly to increase their consumption of services. People, that is, can now afford both the time and money for better medical care, more professional advice (therapeutic and otherwise), additional schooling, and so on. And the professions and service trades that supply these wants do not benefit from automation. Thus, the very developments that have increased the leisure of the masses have greatly reduced that of certain of the classes: Doctors, civil servants, teachers, school and college administrators, and some groups of managers and intellectuals work almost as long hours as steelworkers did in the nineteenth century. While some of these cadres, notably the doctors, have enough of a monopoly position to earn high incomes in partial revenge for being overworked, others, notably the civil servants and teachers, are poorly paid both in money and time. It is these groups who are becoming the principal victims of the anti-industrial or leisure revolution.³⁸

Yet these victims, too, live in the suburbs where they are exposed to the styles of life of neighbors with at least equal incomes and a far easier schedule—neighbors, moreover, who need never bring work home at night. This developing pattern of uneven distribution of leisure has not been channeled into political slogans. We do not hear cries for the doctors of the world to unite and throw off their patients (a good many of whom have no better or more socially mobile ways to spend their time than by absorbing doctors' time!). Few to-

³⁸ Cf. the thoughtful comments on an "administrative depression" among white-collar workers in Harvey Wheeler, "Danger Signal in the Political System," *Dissent*, Vol. 4 (1957), pp. 298-310.

day would begrudge the masses their claims both on the landscape and on services; but few have asked what this portends for the leisure of the servicers. Even now, school superintendents sometimes poignantly say they should never have gotten married and had children, for they must continuously serve other families and other children. Nor can such a group partially make it up to their families through the status and ease that money can buy as, for example, do busy surgeons or top executives. Ministers and rabbis, too, are victims of the suburban style in "belongingness"; and they are likewise unprotected by celibacy from having their own families wish they were in some other line of work.

THE DILEMMA OF PROFESSIONALS

How do people feel who live in the suburbs without the comforts and indulgences the ads tell them they ought to have—and not only the ads, but the "propaganda of the deed" of their neighbors and their neighbors' children? Visitors to the metropolis have often been struck by the contrast of Gold Coast and slum, of majesty and misery. Suburban contrasts in housing and decor are less stark; majesty rides less high and misery less low. Yet, just because the suburb doesn't present poverty and deprivation as a given, the less self-evident lack of privileges must sometimes rankle and smolder. This is true even though some middle-class suburbanites, weary of the time on their hands, no doubt envy the doctor his busy rounds and his unquestioned usefulness.

Thus it would seem that a polarization is occurring between those who are dispensable to their jobs, and who therefore have a lot of time off, and those who, precisely as a result of this development, have no time off. A hundred years ago, doctors took it easy. In those days few could afford their serv-

ices or were educated enough to recognize and discover symptoms; today illness is felt to be arbitrary, not one of the givens of life. A hundred years ago, civil servants took it easy: Their jobs were sometimes sinecures for impecunious writers. Today city and suburban officials, planners, highway engineers, and National Park personnel struggle in vain to cope with the problems created by mobile masses of Americans. The struggle is similar to that of a permissive mother with a brood of willful, well-fed, and not wholly socialized children. In the novels of Trollope and other nineteenth-century novelists we glimpse this vanished world in which professional people led a leisurely existence. Today this is available only to those who can turn a deaf ear to importunate clients and customers, to colleague pressures, and to their own ambitions.

Of course, I have minimized in this account the fact that doctors and other professionals are often among the happy few who enjoy their work. They like the constellation of activities they perform; they find their colleagues and sometimes their clients stimulating; in the best case, they regard their work as play, with the freedom and creativity of the best play. We cannot speak of "overwork" where the task and the pace are freely chosen—even if there are included some inevitable marginal increments of boredom and compulsion.³⁹ Yet we must also recognize both that many intellectuals and professional people have entered their careers under some compulsion—even though their horizons are wider than those of most farmers and factory workers—and that the developments here discussed have

³⁹ We must recall that, although play is by definition more freely chosen than work, it has also marginal compulsions: To finish the rubber, the sociable evening, the set of tennis—even, for many of us, the novel.

sometimes trapped them beyond the point of no return. Their image of the career may have been formed on an older, less harassed model. Furthermore, they may have chosen their careers, in part at least, out of such factors as a distaste for business and industry and ethical, ideological, or snobbish scruples against big business rather than out of a positive pleasure in, for example, scientific work. They may find themselves, then, in a quasi-big business of their own, but with none of the protections big business can give. They may retain the illusion of setting their own pace whereas in actuality the traffic sets it for them. In rejecting industry and commerce, only to be plunged right back into it as is the case with many professors and physicians, they resemble the suburbanite who flees the city and has it catch up with him.

SUBURBIA'S POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS

Our Center for the Study of Leisure has been conducting studies of limited scope in several Chicago suburbs in an effort, *inter alia*, to see what happens to people who leave the city for the suburbs in terms of new commitments and new demands. We have also done a very inconclusive study of how people in the city spend their week ends. We have the impression that the suburbanite, tied to his house as the doctor is to his practice, may actually be less likely to take off for a week end in the country than the urban dweller whose janitor can look after his apartment and even the cat. Indeed, it is the city people, freed by industrialism from long hours of grinding work, who (along, of course, with an ample supply of untied suburbanites) make up a large proportion of the outboard population of our lakes and rivers and of the thirty-five million fishermen—more than twice the number

of those urban sportsmen, the bowlers. Although air-conditioning makes even the most humid and dirty city potentially habitable, people can't wait to leave town on week ends and during the summer, even though in many parts of the country it means spewing the city into the countryside and fighting with like-minded crowds for space on roads, lakes, and at motels.⁴⁰

As I have indicated, I believe that snobbery and imitation of the rich play a declining part in this exodus to the suburbs and that the quiet revolt against the city and industrialism plays an increasing part. I would argue that there is often less "front" in the new suburbs than in equivalent sections of a metropolis, and less pressure for a lace-curtain life concealing back-stage scrimping and meanness than there once was. People do not usually learn the idea of a garden suburb either from British models or Mumford or Clarence Stern: The idea, in its uncomplicated forms, is an omnipresent dream, carrying overtones of the Bible, peasant life and folk imagery. The urban wish for contact with nature has been crystallized for many Americans around the habits of the British gentry and their middle-class imitators. But, more modest than the aspidistralovers of the London suburbs, we prefer not to give fancy names to our own "villas" but to let this dumb show be done for us by the realtors. In the Chicago area, for instance, a great many

⁴⁰ It is, however striking how much of this movement, though largely "private" and unorganized and unideological, is determined by fashion—in this respect, resembling residential location itself. On warm winter days Central Park and its rowboats are often nearly deserted, as is Jackson Park in Chicago; likewise, the Atlantic beaches such as Coney Island, in their off-season magnificence, are as unpopulated as the Labrador coast. People feel it is arbitrary to be cooped up in the city on a summer week end because they so largely accept the definitions of "living it up" provided by the media and conversation.

suburbs have either "Park" or "Forest" in their names, and two of them have both! Furthermore, social mobility means that many, perhaps most urban dwellers will have suburban relatives or friends. The mass production of suburbs, especially in the postwar years, has made them accessible to almost everyone. Only in the rural and impoverished parts of the South and Great Plains farming regions are we likely to find many people who do not know anybody who lives in a suburb and have never had occasion to visit one. Beyond that, the vicarious socialization of Americans into the experiences of consumption they are about to have is the continuous task of the mass media. Many of these, and at a variety of income levels, are devoted to expounding the suburban way of life directly in ads and features; other media are indirect vehicles for suburban styles in the homes pictured in stories, the sport shirts worn, and the idols of consumption portrayed.⁴¹ The whole American ethos, which once revolved about the dialectic of pure country versus wicked but exciting city, seems to me now aerated by the suburban outlook. This produces an homogenization of both city and country, but without full integration.

While on the whole the lower-middle- and middle-income suburbs sponsor the relaxed life, there is one area where they impose an imperative which many city dwellers have not met, namely that of having some sort of garden—less as a cultural amenity than as a minimum contribution to civic decency: A kind of compulsory outdoor housekeeping. Indeed, in the study of gardening in two Chicago suburbs conducted by our Center for the Study of Leisure⁴² we

⁴¹ Cf. Leo Lowenthal, "Biographies in Popular Magazines," in P. F. Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton, Eds., *Radio Research*, 1942-43 (New York: Duell, Sloane & Pearce).

⁴² For a full report on this study, see Robin Jackson and Rolf Meyersohn, "The Social

gained the impression that garden clubs were not extremely active in either one (though we have found very active and prestigious clubs on the North Shore); garden clubs are much more characteristic of older communities, where they represent a familiar activity of some of the established families, rather than of the new suburbs, where gardening must compete with many other hobbies and activities, both outdoor and indoor. We found in Fairlawn, a new developer's suburb, for example, that to many housewives the garden was simply one more chore. It represented neither a contrast with the asphalt jungle of the city, nor a pleasure in growing things, nor a rage for order. It was rather a tax imposed by neighborhood consciousness—the neighbors often being interpreted as more concerned and censorious than they, for the most part, were. Thus we find that many people who have moved newly to the suburbs to escape the city come without awareness of the constraints they will find—or mistakenly interpret—in the suburb. Like the appointment in Samara, they meet pressures they had thought to leave behind, though altered in form and impact.

One of these pressures, already adverted to, is the metropolis itself; its traffic, its ethnic minorities, and its tax rates tend to catch up with them. The waves of succession within the city proper do not halt at its boundaries, and many old and established suburbs are finding themselves cut in two by

"Patterning of Leisure," address to the Annual Institute of the Society for Social Research, Chicago, May 30, 1957. I also draw in this paper on a study, now in the field under the direction of Professor Donald Horton (with the assistance of Robin Jackson) which is concerned with the conflict in styles of leisure in one of the North Shore suburbs, and with the ways in which the institutions of the suburb, particularly the high school, become the foci of that conflict.

(quite apart from the similar activities of the rest of our small planet). In interviews done in Chicago suburbs by Louis Harris before the 1956 elections, he asked potential voters how they felt about a part-time, golf-playing president. Many were indignant, saying they would play golf too if they had such problems—though when asked to name serious problems facing the country, they could often get no further than high taxes. Plainly, Ike's complacencies mirrored and supported their own (Eisenhower, of course, like most anyone in Washington, is far less complacent than these constituencies), and their defenses against untoward apprehension were too great to allow thought for the morrow.

THE AIMLESS QUALITY OF SUBURBAN LIFE

In the days of Lincoln Steffens and later, people emphasized the "shame of the cities," and in the 1920's major novelists emphasized the constraints of small-town and occasionally of small-suburban life. Today, the comparable worry, in the books dealing with the suburbs, is conformity—*Point of No Return*, with its concern for place and competition, strikes a somewhat older note; writers point to the uniformity of the ranch style, the ever-present television antennae, the lamp, if not the crack, in the picture window—which usually provides a view of the nearly treeless street, the cars, and someone else's picture window. Actually, uniformity and conformity are quite different matters as Georg Simmel has observed in his essay on "Fashion."⁴⁷ The former may dictate to men only in inessentials, whereas the latter involves some psychological mechanism. And the conformity of the new suburbs

is, in some important ways, far less stringent than that of the old; if it is not quite the case that "anything goes," lots of things do go which once would, if known, have brought ostracism. If one does not seek to force the new suburbanite back across the ethnic tracks he has just crossed, he is quite tolerant, even bland. If he is political at all—rather than parochially civic-minded, tending to a "garden" which includes the local schools and waterworks—he is apt to be an Eisenhower Republican, seldom informed, rarely angry, and only spasmodically partisan.

No, what is missing in suburbia, even where the quality of life has not overtly deteriorated, is not the result of claustrophobic conformity to others' sanctions. Rather, there would seem to be an aimlessness, a pervasive low-keyed unpleasure. This cannot be described in terms of traditional sorrows but is one on which many observers of the American scene and the American visage have commented, notably Erich Fromm in *The Sane Society* and the Goodmans in *Communitas*. For millions of people, work no longer provides a central focus for life; and the breadwinner is no longer the chief protagonist in the family saga—just as Saturday night no longer provides a central focus for festivity. In fact, the decentralization of leisure in the suburbs is not only spatial but temporal, as evenings from Thursday through Sunday are oriented to play rather than work and are not individually accented or collectively celebrated.⁴⁸

At the same time, leisure has not picked up the slack—as, in earlier writings, I was too sanguine that it might.

⁴⁸ I sometimes consider the drive-in movie the archtypical symbol of decentralization where people go to the theater not in stalls which permit circulation of elites but in cars which keep the family or the dating couple together with no sense of the audience or any shared experience outside the sedan.

Whatever balances of work and play might have been possible for preindustrial man, postindustrial man is keyed, as I remarked earlier, to greater expectations. He has learned more "needs" and cannot in any case reconstitute the institutions industrialism destroyed. It is almost inconceivable, for example, to imagine a reconstitution of the folk arts which everywhere—in Nigeria as in New Orleans, in Damascus as in Tennessee—prove fragile in the face of mass-produced music and imagery. In *Communitas*, the Goodmans devoted much ingenuity to suggesting how, in their New Commune, work could be made more varied and interesting: By job rotation on a grand scale, by alternating supervision and apprenticeship, by scrutiny of all work in terms of means as well as ends. But automation as presently interpreted moves us yet further away from such a re-examination of work routines, even though, were our values different, it could provide an opportunity for eliminating monotonous work and bringing far more variety and spark into it.

THE FUTURE OF LEISURE

I recently had the opportunity to talk about the future of leisure with some thoughtful union leaders and adult educators. They were looking forward, in dismay as much as in hope, to a far shorter working week and a less demanding working day. They were asking specialists on leisure how these vacua of time and energy could be filled with more creativity and less boredom. They were saddling leisure with the burden which indeed it did carry for a small minority of the leisure class in some aristocratic eras—the burden of supporting life's total commitment and significance. Suggestions were made for better adult education courses, even for sabbaticals for everybody or short periods of residence

in an Aspen-like setting. And one leader spoke of efforts to link workers possessing underused craft skills with groups such as nursery schools possessing substandard facilities—groups which could greatly benefit from the energies and capabilities of people who would in their free time build jungle gyms, chairs, or other needed equipment. But it was clear from the tone of the meeting that these notions, valuable as they were, could not even claim the status of palliatives. It was not that they could not (given workers as they now are) complete with commercial recreation or polishing the car, but also that they did not provide the "moral equivalent of work." We can see in the bored teen-agers who don't like school, and are already sated with sex unmitigated by love, what leisure is like for most people when life lacks the accent and structure given it by work—not simply stand-by "work" but some effortful and periodically challenging activity.

In the studies of unemployed men made during the great depression, the observation of the demoralizing nature of being without work was often made, but it was sometimes assumed that this was mostly a matter of status and of poverty which forced the unemployed man to hang uselessly about the house. And in the studies of men who have retired, the same theme recurs. They are demoralized because the job gave status and income, and also because they grew up in a work-minded era and were not prepared for the age of leisure. I myself had thought that when a whole generation had been reared which was not driven to work by the agreed-upon motives of hunger and gain—often unconsciously driven because work-mindedness was instilled, so to speak, with mother's bottle feeding on schedule—such people could retire more comfortably than the elderly now do because

⁴⁷ The essay, which originally appeared in *International Quarterly*, Vol. 10 (1904), pp. 130–55, is reprinted in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 62, No. 6 (1957), pp. 541–58.

they would have been preparing for it all life long. Presently, however, I am inclined to believe that work is still necessary because our inventiveness has not found ways of relating masses of men to creative activity or to each other outside of work. Though the artist, of whatever sort and for whom there is no real division between work and play, indicates what may someday be possible, even the artist, whatever his ideology of *l'art pour l'art*, needs usually to feel he is being of some use—if only in acting out a counterpoint to Philistine utilitarianism.

With these considerations in mind, I asked the union leaders whether they might not do more for leisure by increasing the pressure on management for meaningful work—that is, for reorganization of the factory along the lines sketched by the Goodmans in the New Commune—than by direct focus on leisure itself. I argued that if work were more demanding (without being, other than occasionally, totally exhausting) leisure would present slightly less unmanageable prospects. It could at least begin to be seen as discontinuous with work and could be enlivened by the vigor and play of mind and muscle at work. If men, instead of standing at a row of dials or on an assembly line, could have the freedom of the plant that maintenance men have, and their opportunity to set their own schedules; if they could work under pressure at times, without being charged with rate-busting, they might then leave their work without feeling resentful of industrialism, only to pepper away at deer with elephant rifles, or to seek a second job sometimes allowing independence from a boss without diminishing monotony. I stressed this because of my belief that the boundaries which once separated our problems from each other (as other boundaries separated city from coun-

try, men from women, middle class from lower class, sociology from politics, and economics from anthropology) have been disappearing, along with many forms of parochialism and isolationism.

City planners are, of course, among the few people who are forced to know this already, try as some of them do to act like highway engineers or administrative efficiency experts. Some of them know that the motives which once gave structure to both work and leisure, and the interchanges and journeys between them, have also been disappearing, even though millions of people, shorn of other rationales for activity, still go after money. At present they do this not in the form of capital but in the form of consumer goods. Our new middle-class large families are, in part, an effort to fill this gap. Similarly, our suburbs are an effort to build a life not based on work but instead on the family and on voluntary associations. It is surely an advance to prefer children to capital gains, and suburban *Gemütlichkeit* to urban pavements (though, as British planners discovered in building the New Towns and as writers for the *Architectural Review* have insisted, there were values concealed in the most seemingly depressed urban conglomerations which were lost in the move to the more hygienic and aseptic planned communities—much as farmers for a long time failed to realize that worms and other “varmint” were essential to a well-nourished soil). But the advances cannot be consolidated unless they are made on a broader front; otherwise, people may quickly oscillate again towards such apparent security as industrialism gave them. Faced with the mounting depreciations of the crowded suburbs and aware of their own powerlessness, they may turn to strong authority which promises to clean up the

already foreseeable mess. Even now, drivers in a traffic jam, frustrated by each other's presence, are not the most amiable of men. This, despite the fact that, once on the move again, it is largely the sense of moving rather than anything they actively do or enjoy which gives them pleasure and release.

TENSIONS ON THE SUBURBAN SCENE

One of the findings of our gardening study comes to mind here, and it may serve as a coda to these adumbrations. I have remarked above on the tendency for families in the new suburb of Fairlawn to assume that their neighbors, who were in fact quite tolerant, were putting pressure on them to have not merely a passable garden but a good one. Actually, the neighbor's visual sense was not that highly developed, nor their emulative sense either. They were tolerant of each other's gardens as of each other's life in general. I asked myself then what was the source of the extensive misinterpretation which led to such comments as the following by a Fairlawn housewife. She described to the interviewer an ambitious plan for a rose garden and large beds of flowers all around the house as follows:

I really hate gardening; we both do. My husband never plays golf any more and we do nothing all weekend but work in the garden. I mean work.

I recalled analogous comments made by students who were working allegedly to prepare for an exam which their intelligence told them they could not easily fail; I recalled other such comments by business and professional men who created anxieties in their work in order to give it drama and bite. I realized that, since we are not really attached to anything we are doing, we look for spurs when life no longer automatically provides them. Perhaps the

housewife just quoted cannot make herself (or her spouse) work at all without picturing dire consequences for failure. Or perhaps she has in this case simply projected her own moralism or malice into her neighbors—possibly also as a part of an internal family argument with an indifferent or indolent husband. Games, the arts, conversation are all activities which have institutionalized short bursts of effort as the price both of pleasure and performance. The suburbs, however, in seeking to take the place of the city, provide insufficient comparable agendas, and housewives such as those we saw who gardened with neither pleasure nor skill still clung to the demand that neighbors and nature seemed to make.

I have lost any sanguinity that they will learn better simply by sticking it out; they may only get more bored, more destructive. Their pleasure in flowers, or in the arrangements of nature, cannot be very intense if they put up, as they seem ready enough to do, with the visual blight of so much of our suburbscape, the roads that take them there, the cars they drive in. I am not speaking of “taste,” in the sense of high taste, but rather of the quality with which visual experience is assimilated. And I am certainly not speaking of the uniformity of the Levittowns as such. The row houses in Baltimore or Philadelphia are often handsome in ways which our suburbs, varied in a most studied fashion, fail to achieve. In the course of the industrial revolution and the rise of the middle classes, both elite taste and traditional taste declined. Today, despite frequent improvement in advertising and magazine layout, in interior decoration, and in corporate and public building, the sense for visual imagery of Americans remains stunted, and the children of the suburbs grow up accepting the neat, the new, the

derstood. It is because the population *in transition* between rural and urban ways of life appears to suffer most acutely the effects of rapid social change that the United Nations has decided to concentrate attention on the problems of this group for the time being. This distinction may make much of the information elaborated here less relevant to American metropolitan problems; but, on the other hand, the sharp lines with which the picture is drawn may also reveal something of value.

In the pages which follow, attention will be drawn mainly to the *problems* arising along with urbanization. It is necessary to say, therefore, that this treatment is not intended to judge whether urbanization is good or evil. One can find much literature to support the concept that civilization and city life go hand in hand. The economic, social, and cultural values of the city exercise a pull for millions of people in every generation. And many of the "evils" of urbanization, on closer study, appear to be only a transfer of rural poverty to the cities and failure of the migrant to adapt to new patterns of life. What seems sure is that the process of urbanization is not likely to be reversed in our generation and that it is a part of a larger process of economic and social change which is affecting the countryside as well as the city.

DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF URBANIZATION

The rapid growth of cities, especially large cities, is a striking feature in most of the economically underdeveloped countries today. Professor Kingsley Davis, who has studied the question historically as well as statistically, points out that the rate of urban growth has been accelerating since 1800. In Asia, the population living in cities of 100,000 or more mounted from an estimated 19.4 million in 1900 to 105.6

million in 1950—a gain of 444 per cent—and in Africa from 1.4 million to 10.2 million—a gain of 629 per cent.³ In terms of its impact on population structure in these regions, the rate of urbanization is not as striking. In Asia, for example, the percentage of *total population* living in cities increased only from 2.1 per cent to 7.5 per cent between 1900 and 1950.

One cannot, of course, consider these population data and estimates only on a regional basis since there are wide variations within each region. For example, the percentage of population living in localities of 20,000 or more in Latin America varies from 5 per cent in Haiti to 48 per cent in Argentina; from 8 per cent in Pakistan to 42 per cent in Japan; from 15 per cent in Turkey to 29 per cent in Egypt.

One of the interesting features of the demographic picture is the comparison between the more industrialized countries and the less-developed countries in the rate of urbanization. Between 1930 and 1950, France, the United States, England, and Wales all showed a marked slowing down or even regression in the rate of urbanization. This is partly due to the shift of growth to the suburbs, as a result of improved transportation and of congestion within the city limits proper. On the other hand, as noted in the introduction, Puerto Rico and the USSR have shown a remarkable increase in urbanization since 1930. India appears to be entering an initial stage of acceleration as does the Federation of Malaya.

The wealth of demographic analysis available on changes in population

³ Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz, "Patterns of World Urbanization" to be published by Macmillan & Co., New York. See also "World and Asian Urbanization in Relation to Economic Development and Social Change," by Philip M. Hauser, Rapporteur for the Joint UN/UNESCO Seminar on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region to be issued by UNESCO.

structure, mortality and fertility, and other points of difference between the rural and urban populations cannot be included here. But two points need to be made for their general social significance: In North America, in Europe, in Oceania, and in Latin America, females predominate over males in the urban areas; in Asia and in Africa the picture is reversed. In all regions, cities have fewer persons under 15 years of age in relation to the productive age groups than do the rural areas.

URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The most striking conclusion of the United Nations research on this question is that rapid urbanization in many countries is outstripping industrialization. This is contrary to the commonly held conception that industrialization comes first and draws people from the rural areas. Obviously industry does draw people from the rural areas, but many other reasons for going to the city or for leaving the rural areas seem to be at least as powerful. This imbalance between urbanization and industrialization in most of the countries we have studied gives rise to a host of economic and social problems. From this point of view Asia, Africa, and Latin America may all be said to be "overurbanized."

An historical review shows that the role of the cities themselves in economic development has been a varied one. In many Western countries the city has been generative of economic development, but in many of the regions we are studying today the great city is parasitic. It is well known, of course, that many of the great cities of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa have been administrative, cultural, and commercial centers; but they have seldom been the real economic hub of the country; they have lived off the country.

One of the phenomena we find today is that the increase in trade in many of the cities of the underdeveloped countries is more related to the economic development of the industrialized countries than to the economic development of their own country. In the United States as well as in Western Europe we find an integrated growth of the cities within the country with various cities performing different functions; but in the underdeveloped countries often the cities provide no real support for the kind of economic development we are trying to promote. At the same time, these cities may show a modern pattern of consumption because the people have been introduced to goods from the outside and made these goods a part of their standard of living. In this economic field we see most clearly that the underdeveloped regions do not necessarily follow the pattern of growth of cities in the West. There are persons in key administrative and economic posts in the governments of these countries today who see clearly the implications of these facts and the importance of planning for balanced development of the rural and urban areas.

Closely aligned to the general question of urbanization and economic development is the question of training of labor for such development. The Director-General of the International Labor Organization has stated that

The cityward migration is typically unorganized and haphazard; the worker is unskilled and remains unskilled; he has no experience of industrial work. Frequently he leaves his family behind in the village and retains close ties with them and a feeling of belonging to the land. There is a continual drifting back and forth between countryside and city by an unskilled, unstable labor force which brings no lasting benefit to industry, to agriculture or to the worker himself; not to industry because of the instability and high rate of absentee-

ism and labor turnover, not to agriculture because the worker is not on his farm long enough or continuously enough to farm well, not to the worker because this drifting back and forth costs time and money and prevents him from establishing himself anywhere with a degree of permanence.⁴

Along with these problems of the male worker must come the problems of women and children who go with or follow their husbands or fathers to the city. In many areas child labor is an important and depressing problem because patterns which seemed adequate in the rural setting when children were working with their own parents on the farm are highly dangerous when transferred into the urban setting. The child is often working in street trades, in domestic service, or in other trades which are harmful to his education and general well-being. The child who was supervised by members of his extended family in the village finds himself without supervision, spending much of his time in the streets of the city.

The women workers, too, in many areas are playing a large role in the labor market in the city because their husbands cannot provide a sufficient income for the family. They are playing a larger role in Latin America than in Africa or Asia because of certain traditional patterns, but throughout the world we find a much higher proportion of female labor in the market and often in occupations which are definitely harmful to health and to the well-being of the community.

The conclusion from this part of the UN and ILO studies is that the general solution of the problems of an unstable and underemployed migrant labor force must involve long-range measures which

extend to the countryside, affecting the education and vocational training of rural youth and the orientation of potential migrants to the city.

EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION ON HOUSING AND HEALTH

One of the conclusions of the Report on the World Social Situation of 1957 is that the world housing situation has probably deteriorated in the past five years in much of the world. This is due in large part to the rates of population growth and to rapid urbanization. The shanty towns of the Middle East, the slums surrounding most of the Asian cities, the "favelas" of Rio de Janeiro, people sleeping in the streets of Calcutta all give a vivid image of the housing problems connected with urbanization in our day. In many of these regions we find a city with three distinct zones: A modern commercial and upper class area; the old city with its narrow streets and winding stairways; and a peripheral city with huts and shacks made of mud, paper, and bits of wood. There are many variations of this pattern, but it is so common a feature and its effect on family life is so important that many experts feel that measures for better housing as well as better town planning must take a very large part in coping with the problems of urbanization.

The United Nations has not reached conclusions on the best methods for tackling this gigantic problem. It seems certain that public construction cannot keep up with the tremendous flow of migrants to the city. The Social Commission laid a good deal of emphasis on the use of self-help methods for housing even in urban areas. There were reports that the USSR and Czechoslovakia were experimenting with such methods in their own urban areas. In addition to the problems of construc-

tion, there are, of course, a whole series of questions concerning the income levels and the education of the tenants and the relationship of housing programs to other economic and social measures.

There are many indications that before the twentieth century, people who moved to cities were generally worse off in health terms than the people who lived in rural areas. Today the improvement in public health measures in general in the underdeveloped countries has changed the situation in many nations so that the health of people in the major cities at least is often better than the health of the country as a whole; for example, the degree of infant mortality in the cities is an important indicator of the situation. At the same time we are aware that with the great movement of migrants to the city, many of the diseases of the countryside such as trachoma and malaria are being transferred into the city and affecting the whole of the city population. In most countries diseases such as pneumonia and venereal diseases are more prevalent in the urban than in the rural areas.

Evidence on nutrition is somewhat conflicting. On the one hand, there is some evidence that people are getting greater education about nutrition in the urban areas, but also they may find the food stuffs more difficult to obtain and find themselves worse off nutritionally than before they moved.

URBANIZATION AND FAMILY LIFE

Along with the great movement towards the city, a change in family structure is taking place in many underdeveloped countries. There is much evidence that the extended family is giving way to the smaller two-generation family. This, again, cannot be said of every country and every place, but certainly the tendency is there. The

extent of positive disruption in family life, however, varies tremendously from country to country. The experience in Japan, for example, indicates that the disruption in family life may not be so great under certain circumstances. In that country, the rural-urban distances are short and the traditional family ties are strong. The divorce rate actually fell during a period of rapid urbanization and industrialization in Japan. Recent studies among the Yoruba in Western Nigeria and in Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo lead to the conclusion that African societies have an amazing capacity for maintaining kinship ties and other traditional institutions in spite of urbanization.

It is clear that the migration of young men to the city without their wives and children certainly is a disrupting factor. These changes in family structure are undoubtedly related to changes in the functions of the family. The rural family in the economically underdeveloped regions of the world is usually a productive unit in agriculture and in handicrafts. It also has wide responsibility for the care and protection not only of children, but of the aged, the handicapped, the unemployed, the mentally as well as the physically handicapped. But in the city, both the economic- and the social-security functions of the family tend to be more limited. These changes in turn affect the position of each member of the family.

Perhaps the most striking change is in the status of women. Without entering into controversies about the working mother and her responsibilities toward her children, there can be little question that the greater independence of woman in the urban industrial societies has changed her role in the family and in the community. When she is left in the village with her relatives and children, of course, her situation is quite

⁴ "Report of the Director-General to the International Labor Conference," International Labor Conference, 39th Session, *Record of Proceedings* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1956), Report No. 1, p. 64.

recent years industrial growth has been fairly rapid in many Latin-American cities and tremendous in a few cities like São Paulo and Mexico City. Throughout most of the countries there exist a common language and common religion, which eases transition problems.

According to most indices—literacy rates, food consumption, and infant mortality—the Latin-American countries enjoy a higher level of living than other less-developed regions. In spite of generally bad housing conditions—which exist both in rural and urban areas—there is some evidence that movement into the cities which are industrializing, means some improvement in level of living for the majority of migrants.

A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

Projections of present trends over the next twenty-five year period are not likely to reveal much more than the author's particular bias. When one adds regional and country differences to the usual number and complexity of variables in any social situation, predictions become precarious indeed. However, since notable demographers like Davis, Hertz, and Hauser have already committed themselves and the United Nations Population Branch also subscribes to the view that large cities around the world are going to continue to become larger and to include an ever-increasing percentage of the world's population, I may safely begin with that assumption.

At what stage the rate of urbanization may level off in the less-developed countries is a much more difficult question since it may depend more on the rate of economic development generally than upon demographic factors. No doubt the present rapid expansion of primary education in nearly all of the underdeveloped regions will have its

short-run effects at least in an even greater increase in migration to the cities.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that the growth of the planning concept—economic and social as well as physical—may have more influence on urbanization in the next twenty-five years than it has had upon Western development. In the Asian region, for example, most of the major powers have planning boards which are acutely aware of the relationship of their demographic to their economic development problems. There is apt to be a conscious effort to direct the location of industry into smaller or medium-sized cities as well as to develop small-scale industry in rural areas in order to help solve problems of rural underemployment as well as to meet needs for consumer goods. At the same time, there is an enormous interest among official circles in city and regional planning, partly in response to the unprecedented rate of growth in their cities and partly in imitation of techniques which have been late in coming in the West. Asian, African, and Middle-Eastern countries have all requested technical assistance in city planning for their capitals through the United Nations and other programs. A number of Latin-American countries already have a corps of their own town planners and are training more in regional as well as North American and European institutions. There is a reasonable hope that some of the costly mistakes of the West in this field may be avoided in some degree by the underdeveloped regions.

The outlook in terms of social welfare for the millions who will migrate to the cities in a haphazard way in spite of measures for rationalization does not seem to me very optimistic. While many countries are building up their health, education, labor and welfare departments, the resources available both

in finance and trained personnel are so meager that the major job in welfare will inevitably still be left for voluntary and untrained efforts. The loss in real social security due to the change in family structure is apt to grow worse in most of the regions discussed here before the adjustment to new forms of social organization takes place. Resources for the forms of social security now available in modern industrial societies are not likely to be forthcoming in countries which are concentrating first on investment for industrial production. The growth of education, which will undoubtedly include health education in most countries, is, of course, a hopeful factor in the situation. The emphasis on self-help and mutual aid at the community level now

visible in some underdeveloped countries also has great potentiality for helping to solve some of the human problems of urbanization. The changing role of women and youth may also release additional energies for improving the social situation of new urban dwellers.

The challenge for the United Nations and for all technical-assistance agencies in the next twenty-five years is to find answers to the social- and economic-policy questions which rapid urbanization is bringing to all parts of the world. This is not an area in which we have ready-made formulas to pass from one country to another, as in industrial or agricultural technology, but a whole series of problems for which we are mutually engaged in finding solutions.

Innovation and Evolution: Bridge to the Future Metropolis

By PAUL N. YLVISAKER

Abstract: The metropolis of 1980, like the metropolis of 1957, is constantly in the process of becoming. Where the one leaves off and the other begins is a study in the continuous development of ideas and techniques—which is what the following projection attempts in the guise of retrospect. The tenses used are the simple present and past of an obscure future as a contemporary historian might one day write them.

IN or around 1957, not quite a generation ago, Americans became aware of the city. Really aware of it in the sense that they finally accepted the fact that life in an urban environment would be their permanent destiny. They had tried to dodge the fact for a full half century after the signs had become unmistakable, and they had done so with all the ruses to which humans resort when escaping what they may fear or dislike. Americans had closed the frontier in 1890 without inquiring what it was that they may have also opened. From then on they made a fetish of rustic culture, studiously preserved the rural domination of their governing institutions, homesteaded suburbs with the spatial abandon of Prairie settlers, and fled the core city as frontiersmen before them had fled the civilization of the crowding seaboard.

It took a host of things to convince Americans that they were to be a nation of urbanites. One of these was that wherever they went, the city caught up with them: Farmland became exurbia; exurbia became suburbia; and suburbia became part of the metropolitan core. Another factor was the imperialism of urban culture: The little

red schoolhouse gave way to consolidated television; Chataqua moved from barn to park and plaza; universities became principal shareholders in urban real estate; and novelists began finding their heroes, not in the outlander's garb of swamp or wasteland, but in the colorless clothes of a colorful Manhattan.

Still, in the period 1955–60, most of the change in American attitude was accomplished by a single statistic. Its origin is obscure; almost certainly, it was put together by some anonymous census tabulator merely doing his duty. But few statistics have ever wrought such results. For during those five years, it became *de rigueur* when writing an article for a journal, or making a speech to a Rotary Club, or submitting a proposal to a foundation to begin with the solemn statement: "In the next 20 years, 60 millions will be added to the American population; and almost all of them will live in and around our major cities."

A shot fired at Lexington convinced a band of villagers that they were to be a great nation. Some bombs at Pearl Harbor brought that nation face to face with its destiny as a great power. A statistic awoke that power to the fact

that it had become a nation of great cities.

BLIND ACTION

As it happened, the statistic was not entirely accurate—the birth rate dropped when Americans started getting the bills for raising 320-acre families on half-acre lots. However it was accurate enough to do its work, and dramatically. A riptide of activity was mounted, much of it—not surprisingly—phrenetic and frustrated. People began talking nervously and incessantly about "problems"—problems became as numerous as devils had been in the Middle Ages, or witches in Salem, and just as elusive. Academic and civic posses were hastily organized to track them down; philanthropists loosened their purse strings to post and pay suitable rewards; office seekers, experts, and consultants gathered at every street corner to signal the search parties that the "problem" had gone "thataway."

The sad, comic truth was that no one was exactly sure what the problems were, or whether, indeed, there were any; let alone, anyone knowing precisely what to do about them.

It took some time for the adrenalin to wear off, and in retrospect it was just as well. Energy and brain power were unleashed; a spate of leads were followed, a rash of experiments tried; the garland of academic and civic prestige came at last to those who labored in the urban vineyard; more than all this, some ideas and institutions took root and flourished. Out of commotion emerged progress.

The ideas, as ideas will, came as rationalizations of what was first done without anyone knowing precisely what eventual purpose was being served, or what the long-run implications would be. But again, as ideas are, they were no less effective for having arrived late.

For if they did not bring about the first round of developments and institutions, they explained them and controlled the events and decisions which followed.

The first two ideas which appeared might be called insights. One released power and gave rise to action; the other laid on action the restraints, and sometimes the block, of understanding.

The first: *Problems may not exist at all, except as prejudice or point of view may create them.* The most potent expression of this insight—and it came hard to most Americans—was the revolutionary thought that the nation might be the better for being urbanized. The city was a problem as long as Americans thought it one and spent their working and leisure hours grudging its advances. It began to fade as a problem as Americans decided that they had to live with the city and began to see and perfect it as an important agent of civilization. Thinking that the city might be a blessing, made it the more so. This insight was a fragile one at first, then gathered strength and became a philosophy.¹ From then on, it was applied in a variety of specific settings. For example, declining land values in central city had been a critical problem for the old retainers; for the new, they presented the opportunity which made it possible to plan, construct, and finance a functional center for a more cohesive metropolitan community.

The second insight merely brought to urban affairs a sophistication about life which for some mysterious reason had long been absent: *The statement of one*

¹ Some trace its origins to the publication in 1959 of a rather impertinent doctoral dissertation. The thesis held that 87 per cent of all writings and research on the city between 1850 and 1950 came from the pens of country-born persons. Further, content analysis of these same writings revealed an underlying hostility to the city, expressed either as an attempt to limit urban development or to cast it in rural form.

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problem may hide or harbor another; the solution of one problem may create another. Not all urban problems disappeared with rethinking them. Quite the contrary, a whole crop of even tougher ones broke through when the new crew of urban researchers touched their analytical spades to the city's surface. Thus, on further exposure, the "critical shortage of leadership" turned out to be a three-pronged problem: An inability at this early stage of dealing with the metropolitan problem to formulate meaningful questions for research and political debate; an absence of ideas, answers, and programs which corresponded to these questions; and a growing ignorance which afflicted "organization" society of the mid-century about how to proceed in the unstructured circumstance of political life.²

There were other examples as well. The problem of "urban transportation" led ultimately to the universal question of the role of the automobile in modern life, and this became a venture as much in politics and philosophy as in public finance and traffic engineering. The dingy lofts of central city proved to be something more than an obvious target for razing and redevelopment; by providing a cheap assembly-point for labor, shop, and new ideas, they served nothing less than the "ease-of-entry" function which the literature of economics held vital to the productive scheme of a free and dynamic economy. So the usual fate awaited the inquiring mind: Complications proved easier to

² How urbanization led to a suffusion throughout society of the values of "political" (i.e., a premium on debate and on the art of acting assertively in a setting which is without set roles or fixed objectives) rather than "organization" man is a separate but highly significant chapter in the intellectual history of the twentieth century. An ironic twist, perhaps, but it meant that the city took over the role of the frontier in preserving American individualism.

come by than solutions. In the problems of the city, one caught hold of the towering questions of life and civilization by the toe.

ENLIGHTENED PASSIVITY

For a time, in fact, it looked as though the initial period of blind action might be superseded by one of enlightened passivity. A whole new school of urban conservatism emerged during the early 1960's, preaching a doctrine which had all the systematic elegance and appeal of *laissez faire*. "There is an inner logic to urban development, an invisible hand," they argued, "... a sort of market mechanism ... a natural order."

Inquiry had produced new understandings; understanding had produced new appreciations; appreciation had reproduced a classic doctrine.

There followed a great debate between the "Let's-Act-Nows" and the "Not-So-Fasts." Like all great debates, it seems in retrospect to have been waged with hyperbole and vast insignificance, much like a fist fight at twenty paces. Still, it left a legacy of great papers and gave the study of local government at last a theory upon which it might respectably build.

And it did more than that. As the debate wore on, a third force appeared—the same unlikely coalition of pragmatist and idealist, politician and intellectual with which history generally allies itself during critical periods. On the common ground growing between the receding extremes, this new coalition found the further elements of thought they needed to build their city of the future. To understand their origins, ideas, and accomplishments is to gain a vision of the latter-day metropolis.

This new coalition sprang up not in one place but in many: It emerged spontaneously in one metropolitan area

after another and gradually gained control in state and national legislatures. Crisis—the usual device by which history introduces a new era—was one factor in producing the coalition, but it was not the dramatic sort which alarmists of the 1950's had predicted. There were no massive transportation failures, no uncontrollable waves of race or juvenile violence, no total bankruptcies of central city—technically and politically, Americans were too resourceful to let such obvious problems become that bad. The crisis was rather one of a rapidly growing discrepancy between what Americans wanted and what they could pay for or get. This happened in two different contexts: First, their cumulative demand for goods and services—including schools, parks, health, highways, and national security, as well as houses, cars, and electronic gadgets—began to outstrip their collective income. Second, the vision Americans came to have of the new city seemed always to lie beyond the competence of planners and politicians to realize. The need was urgent and the community long past ready for something more than the partial, the one-shot, or the panacean.

THE COALITION

It is hard to date the emergence of the coalition since at this point it is almost impossible to distinguish the charter members from their antecedents. But surely the types are clear: The statesman-mayor whom Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Denver, St. Louis, and New Haven—among increasing others—set before the nation as a working model. The university president and professor, who recalled again the genius of Aristotle and returned the classroom to the community. The party leader, who recognized that if there were anything more powerful—and necessary—than a

vote, it was a vision. The man of industry, who recognized the relationship between his own profits and the community's welfare, the parallel need for private and public decisions based on adequate research. The man of labor, who saw that orderly urban development was more than another fringe benefit. The liberal, who after the New Deal seemed to have no place to go and found in the city the prospect of renaissance. The conservative, who on the urban level could yield to the obvious need for more planning without surrendering his birthright of local self-government.

Each of them, of course, had an "angle" and a self-interest; for each of them the future metropolis had a gilt edge—for the politician, a larger stage and a larger bloc of votes; for the academic, an instructional laboratory and a source of continuing donations closer to home; but there is no further need to elaborate the obvious.

The stability and success of this coalition can be attributed to the perspective with which they consciously established their goals and the pragmatic way they went about achieving them. One can see now that these goals were roughly analogous to stages in the development of American national government (and one can hear in the background the political biologist chanting softly "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"). There were three such goals; all to be added to the stock of ideas which have governed urban development during the past generation.

The first goal was *to make the urban community fully conscious of itself over its whole area and over the full range of its problems*. In a fragmentary way, the early rash of research and pamphleteering had produced some of this awareness. The problem now was to bring these findings and preachments into focus, to provide the missing links

of new circumferential development. Now in 1980, we are beginning systematically to take the measure of other than economic forces. Continuing inventories of social and political behavior are being conducted with some interesting first approximations as to how a marginal but effective influence can be exerted upon them.

The second example is the degree of social control we have achieved over technological development. Some of us shudder when we look back upon the city of 1957, victim without recourse of automotive engineers who built billion-dollar traffic jams in elongating units, of railroad and transit engineers who discouraged passenger jams by developing nothing at all. The situation cannot have been so bad since the city survived; our judgments must be overdrawn because Americans kept buying longer and more expensive cars and abandoning rail equipment, whether old or new.

But about 1965, circumstance changed. Almost imperceptibly—but with as unmistakable an effect as a regular rise of mere inches in annual rainfall or in the level of the sea—technology was set to work on an agenda of research and development set by the social scientist and statesman. The ingenuity which heretofore only industry and the armed services had been able to commandeer was mustered into the peacetime service of the public and was unleashed against urban problems: Transportation, air pollution, sewage disposal, housing, and civil defense. Blight and building costs declined together as radically new methods and materials were introduced. The appearance of hybrid transit—a cross between the automobile and a latter-day London tube—cleared both streets and operating deficits. Of course, new problems were created—not the least is the classic one of deciding when to commit ourselves to production of a

technical solution which in the order of things will quickly become obsolete.

There is one final accomplishment to be recorded: The development of a long-term budgetary process which affects both private and public decisions. It came as a response to the great problem of post-World War II, that of dealing with continuing inflation, and with the burgeoning demands upon available resources. The process was worked out in conjunction with the Council of Economic Advisers and is now being administered co-operatively at metropolitan and federal levels. It began as no more than a reporting device, with all sectors of the community submitting data on their projected capital and manpower requirements. A second stage was reached when metromayors began framing public programs and budgets expressly in terms of the data provided and on the basis of conclusions drawn from them. By now, this budgetary process has become the focal point of community and national planning. It is being given all the importance attached to the budget in British government without the somber overtones of austerity and control. Controls are present which are directed at the most productive use of the community's resources; but thanks to the long inquiries of economists and the art of operations research, they build on systematic appraisal of alternative uses, not alone on arbitrary choice.

THE CITY OF 1980

By now, it will have become apparent that the course of urban development since 1950 has not been one of uninterrupted progress and that the city of 1980 is still no utopia. We are still mortals living in a precarious world, always wondering whether this year may not be worse than the last, whether next

year may not bring on the twilight of civilization.

What about some of the problems we survived but did not solve; and what about today's unfinished business? The race problem was one we never solved—at best we outgrew it. If Negroes are no longer confined to the ghettos of the mid-century metropolis, it is not because public policy suddenly became enlightened and suburbs voluntarily abandoned their restrictions. Rather, the Negro was too American in his instincts to submit; and the demand for manpower at all levels was too great to keep him from "stretching out" economically and socially. The Negro, like the white, developed a distinguishable class system based on ability and income; and in doing so, produced cross-ties of interest which helped as much as anything to break the residential color line between the central city and the suburbs. Increasingly, the Negro population is being diffused throughout the metropolitan community, living where it chooses and in circumstances reflecting its steadily diversifying income, tastes, and ambitions.

Another problem which we outgrew but did not solve was that of juvenile violence and adult delinquency—at least in the ominous proportions to which it mounted at mid-century. The epidemic was at root a product of urban society in doubt and transition. The gradual ordering of the metropolitan community was a stabilizing force; just as gradually and just as surely, the pattern of social behavior evened out. And Americans, in their enforcement and judicial systems, finally learned how to administer firmness without the blind heat of moral indignation and the punitive extremes of self-righteous wrath.

Nor have we ever really solved the problem of demagoguery; we have merely survived and outnumbered the ones we have suffered. For a time,

there was some question whether we would manage to do even that. That was back in the 1960's when metropolitan governments were coming into being and before a tradition of leadership or a body of actionable programs had developed. Into the vacuum moved a variety of tawdry characters: Peddlers of panaceas, masters of the soft-sale, agents of provocation. Time and experience have cut down their numbers considerably, but enough still exist to give concern.

Nor have we eased all the pains or ironed out all the frictions of intergovernmental relationships; if anything, these have become more pronounced with the emergence of metrogovernments. Old rivalries have been exaggerated—metromayors and state governors are now about equally matched in the race for prestige and the Presidency—new rivalries have been created. One of the most delicate of these rivalries is the competition among metropolitan areas: For new industry, for a bigger share of federal aid, for water and land—especially in the linear developments on the West and East coasts—for skilled labor, and professional public servants.

And finally, we have not solved the problems of "beauty" and of "community." Granted, our individual and civic sense of taste has improved—gone are the neon lights and billboards and much of the blight which used to scar the urban landscape. Granted also, that we have given form to the metropolitan community by developing a recognizable core within a fringe of identifiable satellites and have vastly expanded the cultural facilities available to the metropolitan public. But the dynamics of our social and economic system have kept us from developing the timeless beauty of Rome, of Paris, of London or the intimacy and profound sense of belonging of the Greek

yet, there is no real consensus on the respective roles of public and private investments for development.

Stressing the fact that a meeting of minds is more essential than a preponderance of votes for effective co-operation, international agencies often help to catch "the golden moment when the key governments themselves are willing to subscribe to a standard of behavior or a code of conduct that is not only better than any they were previously willing to subscribe to, but more exacting than what they would accept a few years later" (p. 510). A major share of the United Nations work involves moral commitment. The International Bank, for example, "has made a place for itself as much for the principles it has espoused and the approaches it has explored as for the capital it has provided."

The drafting of international conventions has not proved to be a major function of the Economic and Social Council. "... Acute doubts have arisen concerning the value of conventions designed to universalize standards that do not depend on multilateral acceptance in order to be meaningful within particular areas" (p. 511).

Circumstances appear to favor a relative growth in secretariat influence, but there is little danger that secretariats will become too powerful.

The verdict in summary: "a basis for qualified optimism about the future."

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KARL W. DEUTSCH and others. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Pp. xiii, 228. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$4.75.

This book is the first report of a large-scale interdisciplinary inquiry into the problem of building a wider political community. It was conducted under the auspices of Princeton's Center for Research on World Political Institutions. The authors have attempted to draw, from a series of historical case studies of successful and unsuccessful efforts at integration,

those conditions which appear essential or favorable for the development of such an international community. They then seek to evaluate the progress of the North Atlantic area towards integration in the light of this historical experience and to offer certain policy recommendations.

They define the goal to be sought as a "security-community"—a community in which there is real assurance that the members will settle their disputes by nonmilitary means. Security-communities may be of two kinds: "amalgamated," in which two or more previously independent units have formally merged into a single unit with a common government, or "pluralistic," in which the separate governments retain their legal independence. Historical studies of amalgamated security-communities, such as the United States or England-Wales-Scotland, and pluralistic security-communities, such as Norway-Sweden or the United States-Canada, indicate that some fourteen conditions have been essential or helpful for the establishment of political integration in the past.

Measuring the North Atlantic area by these conditions, the authors find developments to be favorable in eight of the requisites for integration: compatibility of major values, a distinctive way of life, strength within the core area, superior economic growth, a wide range of mutual transactions, a reluctance to wage "fratricidal" war, an outside military threat, and a broadening of elites. Two of the other six conditions are believed not to be essential to either type of security-community: strong economic ties and ethnic or linguistic assimilation. However, the authors are perturbed at the low standing of "responsiveness"—the ability of governments to respond promptly and effectively to needs and interests of governments and peoples outside the national borders—a condition which they feel may be essential for any security-community. Other conditions which are weak or lacking are an expectation of joint economic reward from integration, free mobility of persons, and unbroken links of social communication.

The authors conclude that pluralism offers the more promising approach to inte-

gration at the present time. They believe that in pursuing this general goal it would be best to concentrate on the development of noncoercive institutions rather than on a strong international police force: "These findings tell us to beware of considering NATO as a purely military alliance, and to be sure that rewards like security and prestige balance as nearly as possible such burdens as taxation and the military draft. They support the policy of those who would strengthen the political, economic, and social features of the Organization." In this, the authors agree with the recent report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

All in all, this is a pertinent, interesting, and valuable approach to a serious problem; the authors are well aware of the difficulties inherent in the historical method and consequently modest in their interpretations. The book is, in a sense, incomplete in that the historical evidence on which the conclusions are based is not included, although there are many references to the case studies. But this was unavoidable, and we may wait with anticipation the publication of a promised second volume presenting final conclusions and a greater body of supporting historical detail.

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BERNARD C. COHEN. *The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement*. Pp. x, 293. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This seventh in the series of studies published for Princeton's Center of International Studies is a revealing analysis of the many domestic considerations affecting a particular act of foreign policy—the Japanese peace settlement. It is Dr. Cohen's basic assumption and his concluding hypothesis "that the climate of public opinion in the body politic, organized and unorganized interest groups, and the media of mass communications are integral and important parts of the political process of foreign policy making." This is true not

only of foreign policy decisions but also, Dr. Cohen stresses, of the process through which decisions are reached. The author argues that policymakers are often inhibited from creating and pressing new policy ideas by "an artificial web of constraints," a web that results from insufficiently broad and exact information on what public opinion is and how it affects policy.

The merit of *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* is its breadth and exactness. It weighs the impact on the Japanese settlement of the general climate of opinion, the articulate opinion of special groups, the coverage of the press, the role of John Foster Dulles, the deliberation and debate in the Senate, the strategy of the Executive branch of the government, the relations between the Executive branch and the Senate, bipartisanship within the Senate itself, and specific pressures concerning fishery rights. In arraying these various evidences of opinion, Dr. Cohen presents not only the historical record but also the findings of a large number of public opinion polls and statistical analyses of the content of speeches, newspaper articles, committee hearings, and Senate-floor debates. The result is a picture of the interaction of policy opinion that is probably the most panoramic yet drawn. The result is also an historical account that is rewarding to read.

The book, in short, makes a significant contribution to the work of policy-making. In making this contribution, however, the book raises the question whether the work of policy-making is more art than science or more science than art. Dr. Cohen aims at factual, concrete, and statistical data of a sort which lend themselves to system and analysis and thus to a labor that is more science than art: convincingly so as regards the Japanese peace settlement. Dr. Cohen notes, however, that the settlement, despite the complex of agreements that constituted it, was a relatively simple and noncontroversial matter. On more-involved and controversial issues ranging from China policy to disarmament, it might be that the data appropriate for system and analysis would be most useful in helping policymakers "play by ear." Needed, perhaps,

is a second study by Dr. Cohen as penetrating as this one.

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HERBERT AGAR. *The Price of Power: America Since 1945.* (The Chicago History of American Civilization Series.) Pp. xi, 199. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$3.50.

This lucidly written little volume comes from the pen of the distinguished former editor of the Louisville *Courier-Journal*. The reader who picks it up is unlikely to put it down without finishing it. The book is a brilliant, forthright, "injudicious" (to borrow the adjective chosen by Daniel J. Boorstin, the editor of the series) commentary on American foreign policy during the ten years, April 1945 to April 1955—from the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations to the Bandung Conference at which "the white man had no spokesman." Bandung, concludes Mr. Agar, "was the beginning of a new age and the end of the age that had begun with the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century" (p. 173). He tries to end on a hopeful note: "Why not attempt new thoughts for our world?" he asks, but one wonders whether he really believes that "new thoughts" are possible. Mr. Agar is a male Cassandra, and his book suggests an imminent *Götterdämmerung* for the West.

It would be easy for a professional diplomatic historian to find fault with Mr. Agar's neglect of the orthodox methods of scholarship, to point to flaws here and there in the text, or to complain of his bibliography. But such criticisms would be irrelevant and out of keeping with the spirit of the book. Mr. Agar is too well read in American history and too incisive an observer of his own times to be treated in this fashion. His interpretation of American foreign policy reminds this reviewer of a remark made by a French scholar in a book which he reviewed for *THE ANNALS* in 1949. The United States, acknowledged this Frenchman, was now the directing power, but its international behavior was an unknown quantity. Mr.

Agar, with the benefit of nearly a decade of additional observation, regards America and its leaders as bewildered, to which the French essayist, M. Lambert, would doubtless say Amen.

The book is full of bons mots and wise counsel, and it would be hard for even the unfriendly critic to deny its historicity. There is a stimulating correlation in Chapter IV of the Hiss trial, the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek, and the coming of McCarthy. There is also a judicious analysis of the character of Eisenhower as a "Whig" president while filling the American national longing for a "father-figure." Here and there Mr. Agar hints at his awareness of certain deep and permanent American national characteristics—the lack of a sense of history or indeed of any real interest in history, anti-intellectualism and democratic religiosity, the established preference for stereotyped phrases, and the vague misuse of moral terms which de Tocqueville criticized over a century ago. The reader is left wondering how Agar (and de Tocqueville) would regard the much touted "Eisenhower doctrine" as a substitute for policy.

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HUGH GAITSKELL. *The Challenge of Coexistence.* Pp. viii, 114. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$2.50.

To the author the challenge of coexistence involves more than avoiding a third war, learning to solve international disputes peaceably, and conducting an ideological struggle against communism. It is concerned also with bringing "to those people who do not now enjoy them the benefits of liberty and self-government." Starting with this definition of the subject, the author, in this excellent little volume, relates the problem of coexistence to the United Nations, to Europe, and to the uncommitted areas.

With remarkably few words, Mr. Gaitskell lays bare the essential strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations, concluding with a strong endorsement of the Charter as "a code of conduct" which at least

the democratic states should observe. At the same time, no country should use the United Nations as an excuse for avoiding the development of a constructive foreign policy.

The limitations of the Charter encourage collective defense pacts between countries which feel threatened. What these pacts do is to try to maintain the balance of power, a principle which the author does not look on as something evil.

The Atlantic Alliance must be maintained and encouraged, requiring a genuine willingness to consult not only on European problems but also on issues arising elsewhere which affect the interest of North Atlantic Treaty Organization members. If NATO fails it will probably come as a result of differences between its members over non-European questions.

By word and deed, we must recognize the great importance of our relations with underdeveloped countries, bearing in mind their intense feelings on subjects related to their ex-colonial status.

Because the author, as leader of the British Labor party, may one day be his country's Prime Minister, what he has to say should hold considerable interest for all his readers as possible guides to future policy. Some items of interest are as follows:

1. The international force now employed in Egypt is "a very remarkable achievement," and it is worth exploring whether a more adequate force with broader purposes and means could be devised and made available to the United Nations.

2. NATO is a necessity and a reality and "has made resistance to aggression certain." It is basic to the realization of coexistence.

3. If the intercontinental ballistic missile reduces America's need for European bases, will this country still desire the alliance? Gaitskell has little doubt about the answer. "I have always held that United States policy was not determined so much as some people think by self-interest alone . . . no American Government would really sacrifice Europe."

4. In view of economic and political trouble in the satellites and assuming arms control and a multilateral European se-

curity pact, it may be possible to negotiate the gradual withdrawal of Russian forces to their own borders and a retreat by NATO to the Low Countries, France, and England.

5. Although committed to the military defense of Western Europe, there is little chance that England would join a Western European Federation.

6. "As a serious realistic policy for Britain, colonialism is dead and can never be revived." There is no future for the point of view of those who would retain colonial territories against the will of the people.

7. Economic assistance to underdeveloped countries is necessary but must be extended without military strings or insistence on expressions of gratitude. Such aid might overcome most of the political resistance it encounters in the assisted country if it were extended through an international body.

What Gaitskell has to say he says succinctly and clearly. He covers effectively a wide range of important problems in a very few pages, and this reader finds himself wishing that the author may have the opportunity to take pen in hand again.

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CARL J. FRIEDRICH and SEYMOUR E. HARRIS (Eds.). *Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1956*, Vol. VII. Pp. 415. Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, 1956. \$5.00.

This book is a rich "smörgåsbord" of thirteen articles squeezed into four categories: foreign and international, planning and legislation, monetary and fiscal, and totalitarianism and defense. Emphasis leans slightly toward monetary and fiscal problems, and there is a balance between theoretical considerations, precise historical dissection of policy problems, and some detailed analysis of specific administrative problems. The authors underestimate the full impact of complicating human events.

Reporting upon Asian policies, R. N.

Rosencrance says that "failure of the policy of the anti-Communist military alliance is absolute. . . ." There is neglect of the fact that communism has been contained or at least checked. John N. Plank's detailed study of the American Committee on Dependent Territories invites attention to proposed termination of vestigial Latin American colonialism which awaits decisions from London, Moscow, or Washington.

Peter Gutmann's review of investment planning in Great Britain illustrates that to have collected facts, to have known objectives, to have devised regulatory devices was not sufficient; the British economy did not respond adequately. Furthermore, in spite of Ajit Sen Gupta's examination of theories of international trade and Arthur I. Bloomfield's economic discussions of the problems of backward economies, such theories have to be adjusted to unexpected variables. Similar comment must apply to Werner Baer's remarks on the dollar problem or J. Stefan Dupre's review of postwar fiscal issues in Canada.

Y. Dror's excellent repolishing of previous theories of planning or Joseph Cooper's illuminating study of the legislative veto deserve better treatment than they will get in practice.

Seymour Harris' rigorous demonstration that taxes collected and disbursements paid by the federal government penalize rich states does not establish criteria by which to judge redistribution of income; nor tell whence residents of richer states derived their taxable income.

Readers will enjoy the section on totalitarianism and defense. The ghosts of Italian politicians cannot testify concerning fascist Italy's totalitarianism, but Dante Gelormino delineates fascist Italy's drift to Carl Friedrich's definition of totalitarianism. Richard Medalie's study of the Russian take over in the satellite countries illuminates, perhaps oversimplifies, the steps of Communistic penetration. The authoritarian wolf could not be kept out of east European nations by legislation or effective administration; the forces of idealism needed troops.

"Midway" by W. Barton Leach expresses the hope that our leaders will study the

military mistakes of the defeated Japanese militarists.

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ASIA AND AFRICA

G. WILLIAM SKINNER. *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History*. Pp. xvii, 459. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. \$6.50.

The literature of the last two decades on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia is voluminous. For example, Victor Purcell's *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (1951) is a monumental compilation. For Thailand specifically, Kenneth Landon published for the American public his *Chinese in Thailand* in 1941. It is a tribute to the present author that he has been able to invest a well-worked subject with so much freshness, particularly since the vitality of his book cannot be attributed to either his literary style or his organization. The formal structure of this volume runs in a rather pedestrian way through an early historic sketch (Part I), migration and population growth until 1917 (Part II), economic position and assimilation until 1910 (Parts III and IV), nationalism and demography (Parts V and VI), and Chinese society in prewar and postwar periods from 1938 to 1956 (Parts VII, VIII, and IX).

The wealth of this new volume lies in a number of factors: the writer's knowledge of both Thai and South Chinese culture; his command of sources in western European languages and in Chinese (though apparently not in Thai); his field work among the Chinese of Thailand (about which he tells us too little); and his use of broadly varied social science concepts and methods. The result is an eclectic study that should interest historians, economists, political scientists, comparative sociologists, and anthropologists. There are excellent passages on topics such as the role of opium and gambling, farming as an aspect of state financing, the relation of immigration policies to assimilation, the differences in Chinese and Thai value pat-

terns, the background of Thai government policies in the last century and a half, religion and nationalism as factors in acculturation, and the homeland status of the migrant Chinese. These are but a few of the topics that struck this reviewer. The book is often dense reading because of the wealth of its documentation and the absence of any one overriding theoretical or problematic position. The advantages that accrue from this act of scholarship are that many others will want to cull it carefully for data relevant to their particular theses, and that the author should be able to provide our journals with a series of summarizing statements for some time to come. For the present, if one overriding lesson is to be learned from this volume, it is that the overseas Chinese do not inevitably form enclave communities, as has so often been sweepingly claimed, and that the Chinese were assimilating to Thai society in the nineteenth century. It was in the twentieth century that the process halted. It is clear that the factors facilitating or impeding acculturation and assimilation of the Chinese as well as other peoples must be studied by sociologists and anthropologists in the context of economic and political forces acting over time. These must be considered on a base broader than "the community" and face-to-face relationships.

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HUGH TINKER. *The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence*. Pp. xiv, 424. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957. \$6.75.

Historian Tinker set out "to present a survey of the whole Burmese scene during the first eight or nine years after the attainment of independence in January 1948." He has succeeded admirably in fulfilling his purpose of providing, as he indicates, a sequel to the work by John L. Christian entitled *Modern Burma*. The book is divided into thirteen chapters devoted to the historical background of independence, the civil war, politics, government, eco-

nomics, culture, religion, education, social welfare, communications, defence, and foreign relations. A glossary of Burmese words, a useful biographical index, a modest bibliography, maps, and an index are included. In a brief review one can at best call attention to the merit of this work and at the same time select out a few issues for limited comment.

Tinker, in writing about the Burmese nationalist hero, Aung San, the architect of Burmese independence, graciously acknowledges that "it is not easy for an Englishman to see the attainment of this young man free of all prejudice" (p. 27). His indictment of Aung San's conduct is as sharp as his respect for his "remarkable achievement." Whatever the degree of prejudice in the perception of Aung San, what is more at issue is Tinker's estimate of British policy. The Burmese nationalists were no political angels waiting in the anteroom for the British Raj to announce its pleasure. But likewise few in Burma believed or had cause to believe that Britain would not oppose "the demand for independence" or that "self-government was implicit in the British programme from 1922 onwards" (pp. 27-28). Tinker is critical of American studies of Burma because they "lack any kind of depth" (p. 369), but he is either unaware or unwilling to accept the fact that with possibly two exceptions American studies on Burma—as well as studies by the Burmese—do not find the evidence to support his interpretation about British policy.

Differences on the foregoing crucial issue will continue. They multiply when joined with one's interpretation of the nationalist group in Burma who "made the revolution." The latter selected the name *thakin* (master = Indian, Sahib) because they no longer regarded the British as masters or *thakins*. Tinker in commenting upon them finds "a strong Communist element" in their midst at or about the time of the 1936 elections. He also alleges that Aung San among others was "strongly drawn to Nazi concepts of power through force and uniformity." He supplies no evidence for either of these allegations. My own researches show a mixed Marxist group in Burma—perhaps more Laski and Left-

Wing Book Club than orthodox Communist, at least until 1939. At that time a mixed Marxist party was formed in which some *thakins* called themselves lower-case communists. A Communist party did not get formed until late 1942 or early 1943. Not without irony it received considerable support and encouragement as a "resistance movement" from the British forces in India.

Having admitted to some possible prejudice on these points, Tinker supplies a considerable amount of thoughtfully gathered data on the main subject headings of his chapters. Here and there he reveals some of the irritation currently noticed in the relations between England and the United States. As an example, he mentions that the Americans who came to Asia in "sudden crowds . . . have blown in like a keen, fresh, bracing wind . . . but perhaps too cocksure of the rightness of all that is American, too anxious" to sell their way of life, too apt to become impatient, and so forth (p. 110). Or again, "some American" (unspecified) universities "have adopted a double standard, with only nominal requirements for Asian students. . . . Should 'America-returned' scholars come to form a dominant majority in [Burma] . . . it is likely to lead to a further softening of the standards" (pp. 210-211).

When Tinker finished his book in June 1956, U Ba Swe was still Prime Minister and U Nu was to return to that office in 1957. He then wrote that for Ba Swe "to hand back his stewardship will not be easy. To be required to give up the premiership after only twelve months of office would be a severe test for a man with much less than Ba Swe's ambition and self-confidence. If he, the protagonist of Marxist Socialism, does quietly leave the chair, as it were, as his term expires, this event will constitute a most convincing demonstration that parliamentary, non-revolutionary methods are really established in Burma" (p. 387).

It is satisfying to report, and I am sure that Tinker shares this satisfaction, that Ba Swe did leave office. He resumed his former post as Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister; U Nu reassumed the Premiership; and Burma, as Tinker pre-

dicted, continues to give a convincing demonstration of parliamentary, socialist democracy still led by the cadre of *thakins*, the so-called extremists of the 1930's.

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AMRY VANDENBOSCH and RICHARD A. BUTWELL. *Southeast Asia Among the World Powers*. Pp. vi, 336. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This discussion of the political, economic, and international problems of the Southeast Asian area is based on a wide acquaintance with the growing literature of the region. The senior author has contributed materially to this, and the work is supplemented by recent personal investigations within the several countries. The book contributes much in a sober, realistic fashion to the understanding of an important and highly complex situation in which the interests of the United States are heavily involved. An initial chapter describes the general aspects and significance of the region as a whole. A discussion of the six main political units follows. One chapter is devoted to each country. Two concluding chapters cover the international relations of the area as a whole and the relevance of the many factors involved to current United States foreign policy.

The substantial value of the book is derived from the high level of candor and clarity on which the treatment proceeds. Minor weaknesses stem from the authors' relative unfamiliarity with several of the countries, notably Thailand and Burma. Interestingly enough, the illuminating presentation of the situation in Indonesia and Malaya is more pessimistic than the less perceptive generalizations regarding Burma. President Sukarno's vacillating leadership is adjudged inadequate to halt the economic decline and the particularist unrest which plagues the island empire. Hatta is suggested as an abler alternative leader. The situation in the Philippines is carefully and competently handled. The crux of the international crisis is clearly located in South Vietnam where Premier Ngo Dinh Diem is struggling with formidable problems, one of which is the political embarrassment at-

tending his dependence on American aid. The authors are somewhat overconcerned about the chronic political feuding at Bangkok. They are also unduly worried over the allegedly serious contradictions between socialism and Buddhism in Burma, where the basic problems are the continuing refusal to accept governmental authority and general administrative incompetence to operate a planned economy. A number of other political and economic interpretations regarding Burma are subject to challenge.

The interpretation of the international relations of the area, which constitutes the principal theme of the book, is both informed and judicious. Nationalistic sentiment and the lack of capacity for mutual assistance will hinder any effort to achieve regional integration, while the all-pervading fear of renaissance imperialism will tend to strengthen the trend toward neutralism. American policy since 1951 comes in for temperate but searching criticism. Washington's preoccupation with the cold war has meant neglect of considerations of local concern and a consequent failure to enlist the essential co-operation of the peoples of the area. Most South Asians dislike American policy toward Formosa and Red China, and they are becoming increasingly apprehensive over Japan's rapid recovery of economic and political influence. America's overlong collaboration with unrepentant French imperialism in Indochina, periodic official threats of massive (nuclear) retaliation, and the United States' assumption of the protector's role in the absence of Asian co-operation have aroused genuine concern that a new imperialism may be in the making. This is an earnest and a sobering book which deserves serious attention.

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B. H. FARMER. *Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon: A Study in Asian Agrarian Problems*. Pp. xxvii, 387. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957. \$8.80.

This is a masterful job—perhaps the best modern book on Ceylon yet published—which fully lives up to the broader implications of its subtitle. Mr. Farmer is University Lecturer in Geography at Cambridge. His book is a lucid and highly literate account of the history, problems, and prospects of the large-scale attempts to resettle land-hungry peasants in the extensive areas of unused land in the Ceylon dry zone. The book also deals with the efforts being made to make this land productive—mainly through irrigation—as it was under the ancient Sinhalese kingdom, and to contribute toward a lessening of Ceylon's growing food deficit. It is a pleasure to read such an absorbing story, and the book carries—for the most part lightly—a very large bulk of painstaking research, detailed information, and careful analysis. As "a geographer interested in a general ecological study," he logically deals, *inter alia*, with social and economic factors. This is done with uncommon understanding, not only of Ceylon but of "underdeveloped" societies generally. Students of Ceylon should be grateful for his widely ranging competence in the tangled ramifications of official policy, the complexities of Ceylonese society and economy, and the technicalities of climate, soils, irrigation, and land use. All of these are essential to an adequate study and may appropriately be applied as a coherent whole by a geographer.

Faults are hard to find. The book does, however, seem too little concerned about the low Ceylonese rice yields which are especially characteristic of the new "colonies." The excellent discussion of mechanization, of farm size, and of its implications for intensiveness may be set against the unquestioning acceptance of Grist's questionable assertion (perhaps overly influenced by Malayan or South Asian experience) that evidence on the efficacy of manuring for raising rice yields does not allow of a firm conclusion (pp. 243-44). The problem may lie in inadequately developed strains of *Indica* rice; Japanese experience of the past sixty years suggests this as a top priority project. It is also a little surprising that Mr. Farmer pays such scant attention to the possibility of de-

veloping unirrigable land for grazing. This is worth more examination and might become significant if and when traditional Buddhist prohibitions weaken in Ceylon. But the colonization schemes are unlikely ever to keep pace with population increases. Mr. Farmer performs a major service in delineating in detail the not very distant physical limit on the amount of dry zone land which can be irrigated and on the numbers who could be supported on it or on unirrigable land. At best, the colonies might provide food by 1960 for one-third of the annual population increment for Ceylon as a whole. Thereafter, with present growth rates, the proportion would fall. This will merely retard the rate at which overpopulation makes worse rather than solves the problem, as has too often been hopefully assumed in Ceylon. Ceylon still has an economic margin and a share of empty land which distinguish it especially from India. Mr. Farmer gives, with authoritative scholarship, the dimensions of this breathing space, and by a careful examination of the factors which affect it and the record of past and current experience he suggests pitfalls to be avoided and fruitful lines of future use. This is of high value not only to Ceylon but to the many other areas with similar problems. Several of these are referred to in detail. This is certainly a distinguished and welcome book.

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V. P. MENON. *The Transfer of Power in India*. Pp. 543. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$8.50.

This is the second of the two volumes which Mr. Menon promised his chief, the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. It supplements *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* after independence with the story of the process whereby independence was achieved. The work may be briefly described as a constitutional history of India from August 1939 to August 1947. It begins with a fifty-page summary of political and constitutional development in India from the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 to the outbreak of World

War II. Mr. Menon served the British Government of India throughout this period and, as the constitutional adviser to the Governor-General after 1942, had exceptional opportunities not only to observe events at close range, but also to shape them. The final plan of transferring power to two governments on a "dominion status" basis through appropriate adaptation of the India Act of 1935 owes much to Mr. Menon's imaginative inspiration and administrative experience.

This volume differs from the study of the integration of the princely states in that far more of what the author has to say is well known to students of Indian affairs. Only in a few episodes, notably the intimate accounts of the Simla conference of 1945 and the fashioning of the partition plan in the hectic weeks of Lord Mountbatten's viceroyalty, does Mr. Menon break new ground. The chief merit of the book lies in the excellent, clear, and concise summary of constitutional development in India during and immediately after World War II. Like most treatments of this subject for earlier periods, it deals more with measures than with men, and it has been written primarily for readers with some knowledge of Indian politics and of the roles of the leading political personalities. A shorter, condensed, and simplified version which could be issued in both Hindi and English at a far cheaper price would be of great value and would be far more widely read both in India and abroad.

As might be expected, Mr. Menon has striven to be impartial, judicious, and objective; his primary purpose is to tell what happened as he saw it without letting his own emotions influence his account. Regret that India could not enjoy both political unity and independence is naturally implicit in his thinking, but it does not blind him to the impossibility of preserving unity in the last stages of the struggle. His restraint in writing about Jinnah is most remarkable, for it is clear that his patience was often sorely tried by Jinnah at the various interviews and conferences which are here reported. Volumes such as this show how much India owes to servants of the old regime who were also

architects of the new and happily looked forward to closing their careers in its service. One lays this book down with the hope that Mr. Menon is writing more memoirs of this period which will surely be of great value to posterity.

HOLDEN FURBER

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W. H. MORRIS-JONES. *Parliament in India*. Pp. xii, 417. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. \$8.50.

The outlook for democracy in most of the countries of Asia seems dim at the moment. This is not surprising. In those countries of the West in which democracy operates successfully it took centuries to develop. Democratic institutions and traditions cannot be developed overnight. Colonialism, even with the best of intentions on the part of the foreign rulers, is not conducive to developing democratic government. Even in many Western countries representative government is fragile.

The free world has much at stake in India's effort to make democratic government work. The two greatest countries in Asia, China and India, are both determined to raise the economic and social welfare of their peoples. The first is attempting it with totalitarianism, the latter by democratic methods. Should India fail and China succeed, the cause of freedom in Asia would receive another severe blow. Communist prestige and influence might become irresistible in all of South Asia.

In this book we have a full-scale study of India's political representative institutions by Morris-Jones, Professor of Political Theory and Institutions in the University of Durham. He first examines the background in which these institutions must work. He does this under three topics: the unity and diversity of India; attitudes towards authority; and levels of politics. While there are forces making for unity, there is much diversity—religious, social, linguistic, and economic. Faction is an outstanding characteristic of Indian politics. This is due to the pres-

ence of so many strongly competing loyalties. Moreover, Indian politics takes place "at two different levels or in two distinct modes, the one Western and secular, the other religious and Indian." It is in this complex environment that Indian political institutions must operate.

After having examined the nature of Indian politics and the coming of parliament, he discusses the membership of the representative bodies, its behavior and attitudes, party organization in parliament, procedure and privilege, officers and committees, and finally, the achievement of parliament. He concludes that a pattern of parliamentary politics has emerged in India. While parliament is in origin a Western institution, in India it has taken on a character of its own; it has become an Indian institution. His final conclusion is that parliament in India is unmistakably successful.

This judgment might have been given a provisional character. The achievement so far is impressive, but parliamentary institutions in India are still very young, and the country faces many and formidable problems. Nevertheless, this early study is welcome, and it constitutes a significant contribution to the study of comparative government.

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F. C. JONES, HUGH BORTON, and B. R. PEARN. *The Far East, 1942-1946*. (Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946.) Pp. xiv, 589. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955. \$14.00.

With a wealth of detail and excellent footnotes, but in a very readable manner, the early chapters tell the oft-told tale of Japan's conquest of the Chinese mainland and the countries of Southeast Asia and of her control of them through puppet regimes or Japanese advisers. They clearly demonstrate that while she did not succeed in realizing her ideal of a Greater East Asia under Japanese hegemony, her activities stirred up local nationalist sentiment, shattered the old order, and made it

His documentation is often weak (as when he selects such a dubious authority as Karaka to reveal the true Nehru and quotes from Nehru himself only to show him as an apologist for allegedly oppressive practices). But the reader will appreciate Sir Alan's compilation of evidence to support the claim that "colonialism" is not a fundamental issue in human affairs. Poverty, bad housing, ill-treatment of indigenous peoples, and racial discrimination are fundamental issues—in both colonial and independent territories. The important question today, in both cases, is how much attention is being given to these problems and to steps toward genuine self-government. "The difficulties that face governments," says Sir Alan, "could better be overcome by sympathetic cooperation than by mutual recriminations."

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Canada

DOUGLAS COPLAND and RONALD BARBACK.
The Conflict of Expansion and Stability: Documents Relating to Australian Economic Policy, 1945-52. Pp. 795. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1957. (Distributed by Angus and Robertson.) 67s. 6d.

This volume, covering the important post-war years in which modern economic policy was outlined in Australia, was prepared by the former Australian High Commissioner in Canada, Sir Douglas Copland, and Professor Ronald Barback of University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. It summarizes the main official and nonofficial documents relating to Australian economic policy in the period 1945-52, with special attention devoted to full employment, immigration, national development, and international economic relations.

A perusal of the extracts included in the collection reveals that Australia emerged from World War II with a much more highly developed industrial economy than she had ever previously possessed, and with a deeper understanding of her position in the international economy. She was influenced by the emphasis many companies were placing on economic stability

and security in internal and external affairs but aware, also, of the need for a rapid growth of population and development.

As other countries, Australia has been faced with a number of crises during the years of uncertain peace. Some of these culminated in the balance of payments crisis of 1952, but there have been fairly continuous serious problems of a fiscal nature. By 1952, when the present volume concludes, the pattern of Australia's post-war economy is seen as one of growth which involves an inevitable conflict between expansion and stability.

This review is written in Sydney, where Australia today is "riding high on the sheep's back" in a period of great prosperity. However, the "milk-bar economy," a term applied to 1949 conditions, is still somewhat in evidence. Conditions in 1957 are much the same as Copland and Barback describe them in 1952. Primary production is lagging behind industrial expansion, there is still too great concentration on bulk sales in the British market for guaranteed prices, too little recognition of the fact that the market for expanding exports lies outside the sterling area, and too much acceptance of the premise that the development of secondary industry reduces the demand for imports.

The most serious long-term problem that Australia has to face, to quote the authors, "is how to sustain her rate of development without such incidental controls, as may be necessary, conducing to the establishment of a cost structure that is uneconomic for the world in which she has to live and trade." Australia assumes this risk with her highly ambitious development program and immigration policy. The success or failure of her economic experiments was not clear in 1952, and it is equally unresolved in 1957. Although the Copland-Barback volume provides an invaluable review of the seven years to 1952, the authors' contemplated second work, to cover the next five years or more, should be even more important. This second volume will seek to define "the extent to which the Australian economy has been capable of enjoying the adventure of economic expansion on the grand scale while

enduring the restraints that are necessary for its success."

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JOHN BOND. *They Were South Africans.* Pp. viii, 224. Cape Town, London, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$3.69.

There is a tendency in South Africa at the present time to regard those who do not conform to the racial and other dogmas of the National party as "unnational elements," to question their patriotism, and to deny their right to be regarded as South Africans in the fullest sense. Afrikaner nationalism has tended to write its history round the Voortrekkers and to portray them as perpetually engaged in an heroic struggle against barbarism on the one hand, and British injustice and interference on the other. Moreover, the history of the Afrikaners is often identified with the history of South Africa as a whole, and many young South Africans are growing up in the belief that it was Afrikaners, and Afrikaners alone, who brought civilization to Africa.

Without belittling what others have done, John Bond, himself an English-speaking South African from the Eastern Cape, tells the story of the English and Scots men and women who made South Africa their home and of the noble part they played in shaping its destiny. They were always only a small minority, but as bearers of a rich and creative cultural inheritance they exercised an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Their advent at the end of the eighteenth century revitalized the 250-year-old white settlement.

The author tells of the fortitude, endurance, and heroism of the British settlers which has earned them a South African title every whit as good as that of the Afrikaner. Some were farmers on the frontier who fought side by side with their Boer neighbors to protect their homes from the onslaughts of barbarism. Some were soldiers, judges, and administrators who advanced the frontiers of law, order, and stable government. Some were journalists and citizens who fought for and se-

cured the freedom of the press and representative government.

The British immigrants made an outstanding contribution in another sphere, for some were missionaries who devoted their lives to the service of the indigenous African tribes. As missionaries and teachers these greater pioneers blazed the trail into the interior years before the Great Trek, and they went not to secure white supremacy, but in the name of Christ, the Saviour of all men. Twelve years before the first trekkers crossed the Vaal, the Broadbents preached the gospel and built a little church in the midst of warring tribes at Old Maquassi. Here "Mrs. Broadbent was safely delivered of the first white child to be born in the Transvaal." In constant danger and privation they, and others like the Hodgsons and the Archbells, preached love and peace, cultivated the fields, and opened schools, while they struggled to master the Bantu languages and commit them to writing. We read how the first book in the Tswana language was printed in 1826 on a portable press on the banks of the Vaal.

John Bond also tells of the engineers, road builders, educationalists, traders, and industrial pioneers whose labors have established in southern Africa the most progressive and developed society in the whole continent.

The book is well timed. For the last half-century a desire to conciliate the Afrikaner and a sense of guilt arising from the Boer War have inhibited the British South African from the bold assertion of his faith, but there are signs of a renaissance. This book should remind them of their liberal heritage and of the courage and fortitude of their forefathers. It is a book that should be read by all South Africans and by those others who desire to understand our problems.

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NICOLA A. ZIADEH. *Syria and Lebanon.* (The Nations of the Modern World Series.) Pp. 312. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.50.

This volume by Professor N. A. Ziadeh, a native of Damascus, is indeed very timely. It gives serious background discussion for an explanation and understanding of two Arab neighbors: Syria, the larger country, is now being drawn into the Soviet net despite her protestations of "constructive neutrality"; little Lebanon, along the Mediterranean Sea to the south of Syria, is politically and culturally oriented toward the Christian West.

Following an historical background account of Syria and Lebanon in the first chapters, the second half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the government, political parties, economic life, human society, and problems and prospects, of these two countries—chapters which are indispensable for an understanding of the confusions and complexities of the recent years.

In the current history of Syria and Lebanon, several matters seem inexplicable to the Westerner, and especially to the Anglo-Saxon. The author has rendered a service with his descriptions. In public affairs Syria is weakened by an addiction to violence, army interference, and frequent *coups d'états* which prevent continuity of policies; Lebanon, on the other hand, has with great restraint and patience utilized other methods which will not involve the army. The Syrian rebellion in 1952 against President Shishakli, for example, resulted in his overthrow, and perforce he fled the country; when opposition mounted against President Khouri in the Lebanon, also in 1952, he resigned. He did not, however, leave the country nor was he brought to trial, nor harmed. He simply retired to private life. And in another area there is contrast between the two neighbors. Syria has persistently refused our Point-Four aid, ostensibly on the grounds that it was designed to study projects rather than execute projects awaiting action. The Lebanese government has used Point-Four and French economic experts to study "increasing productivity, expanding cultivation, utilizing water power, and intensifying industrial enterprise." Other contrasts exist.

The author discusses in considerable de-

tail the fields in which these states have made marked progress since World War II and the attainment of their independence. This progress would have been much greater had it not been for the earlier ill-advised policies under the French mandate and the turmoil into which the Middle East has been thrown in the last decade. This has been due largely to the unwise policies of the Great Powers with respect to the area. The internal party system is very complicated due to the traditional influences of religious confessionism on constitutionalism and nationalism, especially in the Lebanon. Here a balancing of religious sects seems important. There have been advances in industry, social life, social services, and public administration in both countries.

Syria and Lebanon have definite problems peculiar to themselves, as well as in their relations with other Arab countries. As long as feelings of fear and suspicion exist between the Arab states, there will be slight progress, in the opinion of Dr. Ziadeh, in the solution of problems or in real progress toward Arab union in any form. This is shown in the reactions in different quarters to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact and to the American-inspired Jordan Waters Plan which the author describes ably. On one matter the Arabs are understandably and inseparably united: bitter fear and suspicion against the state of Israel. Syria and Lebanon are here at one with the other states of the Arab world. The combined aggressions of Israel, Great Britain, and France against Egypt (late in 1956) confirmed and deepened these feelings.

The material in this volume is not at times as logically arranged as it might be, but this is doubtless due to a desire on the part of the author to parallel his description of the two countries. This volume is one in a series of books entitled "The Nations of the Modern World." It is especially timely and helpful in the present international situation.

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BERTRAM D. WOLFE. *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*. Pp. 322. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$3.95.

Mr. Wolfe thinks that Khrushchev's "Secret Report" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is perhaps the most important document to come from the Communist movement, the most revealing indictment of Communism ever made by a Communist, and the most damning indictment of the Soviet system ever made by a Soviet leader. This may be putting it a little too strongly, but there can be no doubt that developments of very great significance caused the present head of the Communist party of the Soviet Union to cut down, without entirely destroying, the reputation of the man who had been his patron and upon whom he and his friends had heaped what Khrushchev calls "the most dissolute flattery" and "the most loathsome adulation." Wolfe suggests several possible reasons why, three years after Stalin's death, his heirs decided to downgrade him. For one thing they could not hope to fill the shoes of the colossus they had helped to build up, so he had to be cut down to their size. The growing political influence of the army and the need for its support may have persuaded the heirs to restore the reputation of the officer corps which Stalin had accused of treason. The strength of anti-Stalin feeling in the country perhaps convinced Stalin's lieutenants that the best way to keep their positions of leadership and preserve as much of Stalinism as possible was to take the lead in anti-Stalinism. Khrushchev did not criticize the system of totalitarian dictatorship which made it possible for Stalin to commit his crimes. Khrushchev, in fact, used this system to liquidate "the Beria gang" and later to eliminate his rivals Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. Because Stalin's heirs have kept the system, the essence of which is "an unending war on its own people . . . and on the rest of the world," these anti-Stalin Stalinists are not likely, in Wolfe's opinion, to give peace to their own people or to the world.

In addition to the full text of the "Secret Report," Mr. Wolfe includes in this volume other documents distributed to the members of the Twentieth Congress plus the text of Bukharin's *Notes of an Economist* (1928) and a report by a French Socialist Senator of a conversation in which Khrushchev is alleged to have said that the members of the Presidium of the party decided that Beria was guilty of conspiracy though they did not have enough evidence to convict him. They therefore shot him immediately. The documents in this book are useful, and their usefulness is greatly increased by notes and comments based on Wolfe's great knowledge of the history of the CPSU and the USSR.

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JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE (Ed.). *Les Frontières Européennes de l'U.R.S.S., 1917-1941*. (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.) Pp. 354. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1957. No price.

As a result of World Wars I and II, Soviet Russia, by the very nature of its Socialist system, developed a flexible conception of frontiers. At the end of World War II, new frontiers appeared within the states of the Soviet Union as well as on the periphery of the Western Soviet block. It was the periphery of the Western Soviet block that Churchill dubbed the Iron Curtain.

From 1917 to 1921 the façade of the Russian bolshevized West was kept unstable by the advances and recoils of German armies. This was true in the Baltic states even after the armistice. From 1921 to 1939 apparent stability prevailed. Still, a slow but steady build-up of the Soviet Russian army and power explains the birth and growth of an instability leading inevitably to the march of events which ensued.

Parallel with the growth of Russian might, Nazi aggression asserted its force. To be sure, France defended Poland in a fashion, as England to a degree chaperoned the Baltic countries. Thus there was the double phenomenon of the attempt to pro-

tect the frontier countries and to preserve their neutrality in the ideological and political conflict between an aggressive Germany and an astutely manipulating Russia.

The book starts with an introductory theoretical chapter by Jean-Yves Calvez, a specialist in Russian international law, on the subject of frontiers of the Soviet Union. The main body of the work is divided into two parts. The first concerns the Baltic states and the second contains three studies covering the rest of the countries involved. These last are less known to Western historians and less exposed than the Baltic states.

Part I of the main text is devoted to the Soviet Union and the Baltic states and was written by Stuart R. Schram. In Part II, Chantal Beaucourt deals with the Soviet Union and Finland; Benjamin Goriely with the Soviet Union and Poland; and Mlle. Beaucourt with the Soviet Union and Rumania.

Authors Beaucourt and Goriely participated in the editorial work on the subject of Finland and Poland. Mr. Schram assumed the unfolding of the politics of the Baltic countries.

In the common project, editor-in-chief Jean-Baptiste Duroselle accepts for himself a modest share—that of defining the general objective of the composite enterprise; of harmonizing the individual contributions to the mutual plan; and of avoiding interferences in the shaping of an over-all product amply supplied with indispensable factual subject matter.

The book has fifteen small type pages of bibliography, a five-page index of names, and four auxiliary charts.

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LUIGI ALBERTINI. *The Origins of the War, Vol. III: The Epilogue of the Crisis of July 1914: The Declarations of War and of Neutrality*. Translated and edited by Isabella M. Massey. Pp. xv, 772. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$11.20.

With this third volume, Isabella M. Massey has completed the translation of *Le Origini della Guerra del 1914*. The

work originally appeared in Italy after the death in 1941 of the author, the famous Italian editor and senator. As with the previous volumes, Miss Massey has checked the sources and has occasionally altered the original text. She has shortened it in one or two places and amplified it elsewhere to include recent revelations, especially those of the captured German foreign office documents. Thus this volume represents a revision of some important points and not merely a translation. It is the latest available study to deal with the opening of the war of 1914.

Since there is no sharp chronological break between the second and third volumes of the work, the two must be read together. The second volume (reviewed in *THE ANNALS* in May 1954) ended with the Austro-Hungarian decision of July 31 to mobilize generally. The third opens with deliberations in Berlin on July 30, and in its topical treatment—notably of the Schlieffen Plan, the British entry into the war, Belgium's position, and the decisions of Italy and others to remain neutral—it goes even farther back to examine events or discussions important for understanding the actions finally taken in August 1914. Throughout, copious quotations from original sources and from interviews by Albertini himself and his assistant, Luciano Magrini, again give the work the character of a combined analysis and source book.

In this third volume, Albertini's thesis that Germany was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war is less obvious than it was in the second. He sees July 30–31 as the turning point from peace to war at both Berlin and Paris, as well as at St. Petersburg and Vienna—discussed in the second volume. Beginning on those dates, the statesmen and generals of the four great powers sought not to preserve peace but to take action that would give them an advantage in war. As for Britain, he quite convincingly insists that Sir Edward Grey could have stated Britain's position earlier and more forthrightly than he did, even with the cabinet divided, and thus might have averted war. In his judgment, Belgium was pro-German almost to the last moment, and the German accusa-

tion of its siding with the Entente was groundless.

What makes this third volume unique among the general studies of the origins of World War I is Albertini's attention to the lesser states and the neutrals. More than a fifth of this volume deals with the Balkan states (a separate chapter for each) and the attitudes of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Japan, and the United States. The author has failed, however, to draw general conclusions as to why war came in 1914, and he leaves them to the reader who will find here an abundance of material, perhaps an overabundance for all but the specialist, on which to base his own judgments. Moreover, despite the difficulty of following the very detailed and involved story, often recounted from hour to hour, even the nonspecialist will recognize the author's critical acumen which makes this not just another book on the subject, but a shrewd and challenging interpretation of events and especially of the personalities concerned. The value of the work has been enhanced rather than diminished by the excellence of the English edition. This includes a map of the Schlieffen Plan and a full-length list of primary and secondary sources on the prewar crisis.

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GERARDO ZAMPAGLIONE. *Italy*. (The Nations of the Modern World Series.) Pp. 282. London: Ernest Benn, 1956. 30s.

This is a new volume in "The Nations of the Modern World Series." It is designed for the general reader as a brief survey of Italian affairs since 1815, with special emphasis on the last thirty years or so. The author is a former journalist and teacher of English. He fought on both sides during World War II and after the war joined the Italian diplomatic service. His writing shows traits of journalistic smoothness and superficiality without much evidence of journalistic verve, vividness, and pungency; and his thinking is frequently of a soft, soapy, and oversim-

plifying kind. All in all, this volume fails to maintain the generally high standards of "The Nations of the Modern World Series."

The introductory first chapter on "Italians and Their Land" (pp. 9–29) provides some basic facts of Italian history, geography, economics, literature, and civilization in a skillful and concise manner. The impact of his writing—as throughout the whole book—suffers from the fact that the author constantly exhibits a naïve and admiring attitude toward Italy and the Italians—but without any signs of scholarly criticism and detachment. Thus we learn (p. 14) that political unification of Italy was long retarded by the other European powers; this is not completely untrue, but it overlooks the other half of this half-truth—Italian shortsightedness, political incapacity, and selfish fratricidal strife. Italy's people, the author writes, "have been creative and inspiring, and their response to life emotional, intellectual, and practical. Unfortunately, she has received little in return and her aspirations have often been denied" (p. 29). Throughout this general chapter on the Italian character, there is no mention, much less any discussion, of its shortcomings. Like other humans, the Italians, too, must be imperfect in some respects, but one would not suspect this after reading Signor Zampaglione's book. Also, his whole view of Italian history—that the Italians have only given to the rest of the world without having received anything much from it—is hardly in accord with the facts, and it illustrates the author's unsophisticated national chauvinism.

In his treatment of fascism, the author expresses his general viewpoint in the statement: "Although the fascist methods of maintaining power must be condemned, certain solutions it gave to public problems were of advantage to the nation" (p. 113). His assertion that Italy improved economically under the fascist regime (p. 114) will be widely contradicted by many professional students of the era. Concerning Mussolini's alliance with Hitler, the author considers it as a mistake, inasmuch as Mussolini failed to heed Machiavelli's advice not to make an alliance with a much

stronger partner. The moral issue involved in the problem of an alliance with Hitler is not discussed by Signor Zampaglione. Similarly, the author interprets Italy's entry into the war in June 1940 as an error of calculation on the part of Mussolini, who thought the war would end in a few days or weeks at most. Italy's entry into the conflict at that particular time, which looked to many people throughout the world—not only to the French and British—as a stab in the back of France, is not even mentioned in the author's detailed analysis of Italy's part in World War II. Although the author explicitly states his opposition to fascism, there is an implicit undertone in the book that is pervaded with the very elements of amorality and cynicism so characteristic of the essence of fascism.

In his discussion of Italy after World War II, the author rightly stresses the positive role of Italian political leaders in building the new supranational community of Western Europe. Despite the large Italian Communist party, Italy has made remarkable progress economically and politically, and the problem of population growth, too, seems nearer to a satisfactory solution than in the past. Toward the end of the book the author devotes two special chapters to the problems of land reform and the South which are among the most valuable in the entire work.

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ROGER E. DE SMET and RENÉ EVALENKO.
Les élections Belges: Explication de la répartition géographique des suffrages. (Collection de Science Politique.) Pp. 176. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1956. 325 Bfr.

This study correlates Belgian voting behavior with the social, demographic, religious, and linguistic structure of the country. It is based, on the one hand, on the election figures for the different parties in the parliamentary elections of 1950 and 1954 and, on the other hand, on the official census of 1947 providing the break-

down of the population by sex, age, and occupation. The information about religion (a question census takers could not ask in Belgium) is derived from the estimated number of those who regularly attend Sunday mass (those who don't are agnostics, as there are practically no other denominations in Belgium). All figures are computed for each of the 211 electoral districts. They are shown in color on the twelve well-drawn maps which are included in the separately bound "statistical, graphical, and cartographical appendix."

A careful statistical analysis leads the authors to the conclusion that the parties of the left (Socialists and Communists) draw their support from the nonbelievers among industrial workers and employees, while employers and farmers, including farm hands, tend to vote for the conservative parties (Liberal and Christian Social). In addition, Catholic workers in Flanders vote for the latter party. A comparison with previous election and census figures indicates that these correlations have hardly changed since universal suffrage was established in 1919.

This analysis should prove of interest to students of political behavior generally, not because of its general conclusion (considered a well-known fact in Belgium), but because Belgium constitutes an ideal laboratory for this type of "electoral sociology." It has a voting population of only five million, and voting is compulsory. This eliminates the problem of how to interpret the behavior of nonvoters. In contradistinction to the unwieldy number of parties in France and the two or one party system in the United States, there are just four parties in Belgium, each representing a fairly well-defined ideology. On the other hand, the religious structure consists of two groups only, Catholics and free-thinkers. Finally, Belgian society is essentially stable, especially when compared with the mobile population of the United States.

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FREDERICK HERTZ. *The Development of the German Public Mind: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, As-*

pirations and Ideas. Pp. 524. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$6.00.

Since good books in English about Germany are few, this volume deserves attention. It fills the need for a modern survey of earlier German problems and is the first of a series planned to explain the German mind. The author shows skill, competence, and imagination in handling the complex and frequently confused course of German history. Among the chief merits of the book are its clarity of exposition, balanced organization, and rigorous adherence to the development of a theme.

Germany of the Middle Ages failed to achieve the unity characteristic of her western neighbors and rivals. The persistence of old Germanic customs and the forces of nature explain in part the particularism so long dominating her fate. Hertz shows how attempts to maintain traditional freedoms and at the same time to avoid anarchy have baffled Germans from the beginnings of their history and are a problem still unreconciled for the German mind. He also emphasizes, in a telling fashion, the peculiarities of German Christianity and unique characteristics of the German church—both problems basic to an understanding of German attitudes throughout the ages. His discussion of Hohenstaufen issues, theories of empire, and of the impact of social and intellectual change during the later Middle Ages in Germany is excellent.

It is advantageous to have the analysis of the Reformation and of the Counter Reformation appear as the second part of the book, for one senses easily the continuity from things medieval to those that distinguish the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One is by contrast conscious also of the appearance of new elements making for change. There is a richness of detail in this part of the book notable for novelty of selection. Here there is no pleading of a cause; and warring factions, split by doctrinal, moral, and political attitudes, are each given their due. Virtue and vice were not evenly divided between reformers and adherents to established beliefs; nor were they always on opposite sides.

Bibliographies are provided for each chapter, and more general ones are given as introductions for each of the two parts of the book. These are helpful for those who read German, but almost useless for others. Works of English authors are occasionally cited, as are a few written in French. Those of American scholars are unfortunately neglected. To write today about Luther demands reference at least to Bainton and Schwiebert. An index of two pages is hopelessly inadequate for a book of this sort.

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KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER. *Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century.* Pp. xxvi, 250. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Conservative sentiment always tends to become stronger in the wake of radical upheavals. The classical example is the attempted restoration of the European pre-revolutionary order after the Napoleonic wars. Sometimes the conservative counter-wave rises simultaneously with, or even ahead of, the revolutionary crest; one speaks then of a counterrevolution. If it succeeds, it may slow down or even altogether arrest the advance of radical tendencies. More often than not, the conservative practitioner will have to acknowledge the inevitability of change; he will share, or pretend to share, although for vastly different reasons, the revolutionary's revulsion against the old regime. The fact that he may be obliged to borrow ideologies and techniques from the revolutionary competition makes it rather difficult for him, as well as for the critical observer, to draw the line severing the radical from the "conservative revolution." And that task becomes almost impossible, for instance, in the case of Germany between the two world wars. Here both revolutions were directed against a republic which itself had been the issue of a merely halfhearted, abortive revolution. Professor von Klemperer whose study is the first account in English of that period—not, as the title

might suggest, of post-Hitlerian Europe—successfully resisted the temptation of discovering clarity and intellectual neatness where there was none. Assisted by Professor Sigmund Neumann who wrote the wide-ranging historical foreword, the author managed to be charitable toward the romantic self-delusions and confusions of the minor prophets and sectarians; those who were dreaming of a Third Reich, both noncapitalistic and nonsocialistic. Some of them really believed that they could outwit and use Hitler, only to discover that he had been using them to soften up those educated Germans who would not accept his own *Vulgata* as the revolutionary gospel. Professor von Klemperer, in reviewing the various coteries of the “conservative revolution,” knew of course that their activities, for all practical purposes, amounted to little more than drawing room intrigue. That those small groups could play a noticeable role at all, was due to the total breakdown of the parliamentary and social mechanisms; in a time of complete political deadlock and group atomization, a few brain trusters and plotters could look bigger than they actually were. Not that the author overrated the significance of their *ideas* (he did not), but the reader, unfamiliar with the very practical issues that were at stake, may fail to gather from the text the very “earthy” quality of neoconservative *politics*. For those men, too, had set their hopes upon dictatorship. Their savior was to be a dictator, of the gloved-fist type, to be sure, but a dictator just the same. Their first find was a gentleman on horseback (von Papen) and their last, a Machiavellian general (von Schleicher). But it was too late for subtle solutions; the time for the “terrible simplifier” had arrived.

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DAVID WIGHTMAN. *Economic Co-operation in Europe: A Study of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe*. Pp. xi, 288. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. \$5.00.

It is still too early to expect a definitive estimate of the early years of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Until such an estimate becomes possible, Mr. Wightman's study will be a most useful analysis of those aspects of European economic co-operation with which the Economic Commission for Europe has been concerned. Winner of the Carnegie Endowment's first prize competition for studies on problems of international organization, this monograph is essentially a series of case studies—carried down to the end of 1954—of the work of various ECE organs in fostering intra-European co-operation in such fields as coal, steel, agriculture, timber, electric power, and inland transport.

Mr. Wightman begins his study with a discussion of the origins of the ECE and an illuminating dissection of the reasons Marshall Aid was not channeled through the United Nations. On the whole, he takes his stand with those who have held that the Marshall Plan, in its final form, might well be called the “Bevin Plan.” While he recognizes how crucial was Soviet miscalculation in forcing a program of close economic collaboration upon the nations of western Europe, he does not hesitate to outline the reasons for regret that the fullest diplomatic endeavor was not employed to persuade the Russians to participate. Although the emergence of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation inevitably reduced the potential role of the ECE, the United Nations body, as the author more than adequately demonstrates, nevertheless played a significant part in dealing with certain areas of intra-European economic collaboration.

The core of this study is in its consideration of the work of the ECE's various Technical Committees. Each has had its own peculiar methods and problems, so that success has depended upon the particular complex of variables involved. Thus, in the first few years, the Coal Committee and the Steel Committee had rather striking success in meeting “bottleneck” and allocations problems largely because Allied Occupation authorities were willing to permit the ECE to determine the distribution of German supplies of coal and coke. In

the case of the Timber Committee, on the other hand, the sources of supply were in the hands of producers in a strong bargaining position. Consequently, the ECE's effectiveness was limited even where it provided a useful forum for European timber traders.

In any event, Mr. Wightman follows up his case studies with a general discussion of efforts to stimulate East-West trade; demonstrates the paralyzing effects of the cold war at least down to the end of 1952; and assesses the economic consequences of the ideological chasm which gaped between East and West. His analysis shows that after 1953 there were indications of a relaxation of some of the economic, if not the political, barriers whose existence was as crippling to western as they were to eastern Europe. One of the conclusions that forces itself upon the reader is the vital role played by the Executive Secretary of the ECE, Gunnar Myrdal, in the maintenance of the slender bridge between East and West on matters of economic importance to both. Positive, courageous, sometimes tactless, and often controversial, Myrdal has made his mark as one of the really outstanding international servants in the history of twentieth century international organization. Altogether, Mr. Wightman has performed a most useful task. Carefully and dispassionately, but without timidity in pronouncing judgments which appear to stem from his data, he has given us a capable study of the ECE which will be welcomed by students of the contemporary international scene.

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CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN. *Parnell and His Party, 1880-90*. Pp. ix, 373. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957. \$7.20.

This is a valuable and original book somewhat misnamed. It ought to have been called “Parnell's Party,” for while it provides the first authoritative description of the party as a party, it tells us relatively little about Parnell himself. Indeed, the picture it presents of that great, romantic, enigmatic figure is so drab and, in some ways, so shadowy that the stu-

dent who takes this book as his introduction to the Parnellite period, and who knows but distantly of the emotions that have surged around Parnell's name, will still be left wondering what all the fuss was about.

This was not the author's intent. Rather, where he deals directly with Parnell, he has been at pains to supply a realistic and sensible corrective to the standard romantic portrait. He sets out to show that Parnell was a politician first; and a demigod about eighth (if at all), and that most of what lies in between can be explained in common political terms. His argument is everywhere backed with sound research, firm common sense, and a firm disinclination to take any explanation, no matter how venerable or attractive, for granted. In every chapter he treads new ground. He traces the development of the party from Parnell's accession as leader to the Split of 1891, discusses the nature and social character of its personnel, and shows how interestingly it broke new ground in the arrangement of party discipline and party finance. The general background also comes in for fresh treatment—long wanted. Since the book links up with F. L. S. Lyons' *Irish Parliamentary Party, 1890-1910*, the student of Irish or British history can now, and for the first time, follow the party's history coherently and intelligibly for a full twenty-two years, and not have to guess at it from the fragmentary accounts provided by the biographies of Parnell and the conflicting memoirs of his erstwhile lieutenants. For this relief much thanks!

Yet the book does not replace or displace any of these older sources, for all of them, positively or negatively, are deeply concerned with the fact that Parnell was an extraordinary man who somehow managed to join together, and on occasion even unite, the queer lot of opposing interests and cross-purposes that constituted Irish life at that time. No one before Mr. O'Brien has explained successfully how Parnell managed it. Mr. O'Brien is dead right in his demonstration that Parnell was well and ably abetted by the party, abetted more ably than the biographers have been willing to admit. I would hazard, how-

ever, that we still do not know how Parnell did what he did as long as he did.

At any event, from now on no one can discuss the question without constant reference to this fine book.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

BERNARD SCHWARTZ. *The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect*. Pp. vii, 429. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1957. \$6.50.

One who writes about the role of the Supreme Court of the United States in our government must face the fact that it is physically impossible for a human society to have a "government of laws and not of men." The only realistic question is, by what men shall we be governed? Professor Schwartz's book recognizes, of course, that the last word in our government, on many questions of fundamental importance, is the word of the men of the Supreme Court. He does not stop to remind those who would have it otherwise that they would then have to decide in what other set of human beings this vast and ultimate power should be lodged.

Professor Schwartz's thesis that a Constitutional revolution has taken place in the last two decades is adequately demonstrated by his book. So far as the revolution affected economic and socioeconomic problems, the country was, in 1937, ripe for the revolution. When the *Jones and Laughlin* case was decided, no new Justice had been appointed by the Executive who took office in 1933. Yet a majority of the Court approved the statute in question and gave it an interpretation which vastly enlarged federal power at the expense of state power. There was little protest from industry and, of course, none from labor which was the beneficiary of the statute and its interpretation. There was no serious effort to induce Congress to repeal the statute or reduce its coverage.

The author discusses the Court's decisions in relation to the Congress, the President, the Administrative Agencies, the Courts (largely the State Courts), the States, the Individual, the War Power, and the Cold War.

As to the Congress, the author concludes that the Court has, in the decades under discussion, acted with much more restraint than did the former Court in determining whether Congress had exceeded its Constitutional powers. As to the President, the author's discussion centers largely around the important steel-seizure case decided in 1952. The question of the status of treaties and executive agreements as domestic law is also discussed.

The Administrative Agencies which enjoyed broad leeway until Congress, in the Administrative Procedure Act, subjected them to more judicial restraint, and the Court's adherence to the spirit of that act are well covered in the book. In the Chapter entitled "The States," questions of federal-state conflict relating to the Commerce Clause and the taxing power are discussed. The author is critical of decisions, particularly in the field of labor relations, in which the Court has held that federal legislation disabled the states from acting, though it did not itself regulate the conduct in question.

The Chapter on "The Individual" covers the following headings: Firstness of the First Amendment, Freedom of Speech, Press and Censorship, Church and State, Equal Protection and the Negro. It is regrettable that the book was published just before the important decisions of the spring of 1957 relating to the Constitutional rights of the individual. It is interesting to surmise what the author would have said about some of those decisions.

The Chapter on "The War Power" discusses, of course, the insoluble problem of the extent to which laws and rights must give way to the exigencies or supposed exigencies of war. And in the Chapter on "The Cold War," the *Dennis* case under the Smith Act, the decisions concerning Restrictions on Aliens, and the Loyalty-Security Program are critically discussed.

This is an excellent book. The writing is literate and lively, and the book is full

of ideas, with most of which the reader will, upon reflection, agree. It is a scholarly book in that at least the minimum necessary background of English and American history is set for the reader. The book should be particularly useful for one who is interested in our governmental institutions but who is not a specialist in Constitutional law.

As this review is being written, there is a storm, of large and perhaps growing proportions, about recent Supreme Court decisions. The Executive is not excited, as in 1937, but the Congress may be more disturbed than it was then. Like other storms which have buffeted the Court, this one will, no doubt, blow itself out. In a democracy, no one is above criticism, but we do not lightly change our institutions.

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HANS KOHN. *American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay*. Pp. xi, 272. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$5.00.

With a scholarly European background, some twenty-five years of productive scholarship in the United States, and a long and intensive interest in nationalism, Professor Kohn's qualifications to present this "interpretative essay" are unimpeachable. He does not claim to offer a history of American nationalism but rather has selected five problems that appear to him to be most characteristic of it. The problems are: the origins of American nationalism; its relationship to the mother country; its federal structure; its multiethnic character; and its position within the community of nations. There is a chapter on each problem. Although the late Professor C. E. Merriam, and others, long ago stressed the point that one of the principal causes of the American Revolution was the denial by England of the colonists' rights as Englishmen, it is refreshing to see in the well-documented statement of a later authority that "the Anglo-Americans fought England not because they felt themselves un-English but because they were English. . . . They were upholding English constitutional

rights . . . against their distortion by the arbitrary actions of the English government of the day" (p. 7).

The author traces the development of cultural nationalism, particularly the growth of American literature, to its eventual attainment of a sort of parity with English culture. "American culture today," he says, "is not English culture but a branch from the same tree, distinct and yet inseparably connected with it as the younger Canadian and Australian cultures are" (p. 88). In his chapter on "A Nation of Many Nations," the best chapter in the opinion of this reviewer, the author explains that the "mighty influx of non-Americans did not diminish American nationalism. On the contrary, it strengthened it and acted from the beginning as a cementing force. For the immigrants did not feel bound to any of the traditional American sections or states. They came . . . to become Americans" (p. 136).

Professor Kohn cites numerous authorities, both American and European, makes liberal use of quotations, many of them from authors not well known, and his notes are entirely adequate. The text is well balanced and fair. But the book is not easy to read. This reader had some difficulty at times in determining what point or points the author wished to make. It may be that Professor Kohn writes in a hurry and that he could make his presentation more effective by giving more attention to the organization of his material.

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DONALD C. BLAISDELL. *American Democracy Under Pressure*. Pp. v, 324. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1957. \$5.00.

Pressure politics is a popular topic these days. Everyone seems to have something to say about it one way or another. Studies of pressure groups and of political and propaganda techniques are popping up all over the place. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to say something new on the subject. This little book is a case in point. It was written by a competent political scientist with several years

experience in government service. However, there is very little in the entire volume that has not been said before.

Perhaps the best justification for the book is its brevity and its simple, clear, straightforward style. In this respect it will be a useful analysis for undergraduates. Even so it suffers somewhat from oversimplification. This is particularly true of the chapter on "Political Parties Outside Congress." Here the author definitely undertakes to do too much in too few pages. Moreover, the book suffers somewhat from poor organization. For example, the chapter on lobby regulation should follow rather than precede the two chapters on the techniques of lobbies. The chapter on mass media might more logically be presented before the chapter on the bureaucracy. This reviewer also believes that the three chapters on the making of public policy—one on legislation, one on administration, and one on adjudication—get badly bogged down in a superfluity of illustrations. The references in these chapters to dozens of concrete cases completely familiar to specialists are likely to be largely meaningless to most undergraduates. This is not to say that the book is without value.

It will make an excellent text for short courses on pressure groups, as supplementary reading for combination courses on political parties and pressure politics, and for courses in American government. Undergraduates will find the discussions of "public interest" and of the consequences of pressure politics particularly enlightening. Moreover, if the author continues the project with similar studies of other countries the comparative analyses should be real contributions.

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KARL HELDEN. *Mr. Bureaucrat: An Inside Story of the Federal Civil Service, 1932-1956*. Pp. 188. New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1957. \$3.00.

This is the autobiography of a man who entered the federal service out of desperation as a "mail classifier in the file room of a New Deal agency" in January 1936.

After twenty-five years, he is in the classified civil service in an agency that is "small but good," apparently in a middle-bracket post. He served in rural rehabilitation during the New Deal and in the Division of Psychological Warfare during the war. In the latter he was advanced from "file clerk" to "news analyst, although only on a modest scale." "Nobody was expected to emerge from a file room to any position of respectability."

The author succeeds in his purpose of recording the experiences and emotions of "the generation that lived through the Great Depression." He does this both through his own life story and through copious quotations from "White House mail" that passed across his desk—the pathetic calls in extremis from the submarginal farmer, his wife, or child to the man in the White House who had given them new hope.

He reminds us, too, of the mixed currents of the early New Deal days: the starry-eyed reformers, the theoretical program planners, the slick information officers (all of whom he detests) as well as the "able technicians and forthright administrators" who took over after "the reformers and emotionalists were gradually eased out of their policy-making functions." He etches vitriolic portraits of the "empire builders" who appropriate the work of their subordinates, who climb by glibness and by telling the higher authorities what they want to hear, instead of the "truth." He does well to remind us also of Mr. Farley's imposition of the need for "political clearance" for appointment, lest future generations think of the early New Dealers as a band of dedicated social reformers.

Perhaps the most revealing portrait is that of the author. Since it is written in heart's blood, it is entitled to respect. It is the story of a lad hired out as a farm hand in Scandinavia, an adolescent immigrant to South Dakota, with admitted difficulty in making social contacts, who worked his way desperately through a western state university and emerged with a Ph.D. from a great eastern university in 1932. When he finally found a haven in Washington, the twelve clerks in his file

room included eight college graduates, more than half with postgraduate training.

After twenty-five years he finds his work "interesting enough." "Often he had the satisfaction that comes from handling jobs he could call his own. But he was never quite at ease or without apprehension lest his services be terminated by fellow workers or others who could bring pressure to bear upon the head of the agency"—the "empire-builders" who "have working for them a spoils system that operates under the benign protection of the Civil Service Commission."

It is well for those concerned with strengthening the career service to note that it also includes unhappy persons like the "John Outremer" ("overseas") through whom the author tells his story. What are we to do for them?

CHARLES S. ASCHER

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MAX M. KAMPELMAN. *The Communist Party vs. the C.I.O.: A Study in Power Politics*. Pp. xv, 299. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.00.

In *The New Men of Power* (1948), C. Wright Mills wrote, "It is said there are racketeers in the AFL and that the CIO has Communists. Both statements are true." The same year Eli Ginzberg announced in *The Labor Leader*, "The structuring of power is the problem of the twentieth century. Unless we succeed in learning how to secure the benefits of group activity and at the same time learn how to protect ourselves from its excrescences, we are doomed." And he called for the courage to use what we garner through study.

Max M. Kampelman has come up with significant conclusions derived from study for his Bachelor of Laws and Doctor of Philosophy degrees and years as former legislative counsel to Senator Humphrey. "With the birth of the CIO . . . the Communist party made a serious and successful bid for entry into the fabric of the American labor movement for political purposes." By 1938, the Communists "had obtained positions of trust, responsibility, and authority giving them complete or

partial control in at least 40 per cent of the CIO unions. . . ." They dominated 12 to 15 of the 40 international unions. The Congress of Industrial Organizations "did have a serious Communist problem." Some 200,000 workers are still in Communist-led unions, despite expulsion from CIO; yet the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations includes no unions under Communist control today. Senator Humphrey thinks that "The Communist infiltration of the CIO was a direct threat to the survival of all of our country's democratic institutions" (p. viii).

Barrister Kampelman has made his case. What, we may ask, must be rewritten in the light of his summary from CIO union expulsion testimony, congressional committee hearings, and Communist periodicals? Quite a bit.

Edward Levinson wrote in *Labor on the March* (1938) that "Communist influence in the CIO is a figment of imagination. . . . American Communism, in or out of the labor movement, is most frequently a red herring used by political or economic demagogues. . . ." Millis and Montgomery, *Organized Labor* (1945), conclude, "The Communists did not succeed in capturing the C.I.O., nor was there ever any real possibility that they would." Numerous locals and a few officials oscillated or "were possessed of more or less sympathy with Party purposes," but "the grossly exaggerated popular notion of the extent and power of Communism within the C.I.O. was a handicap of no small proportions that organization had to sustain." Like these, many textbook summaries also need revision.

Rewriting of the story of the CIO versus the Communists will be worthwhile. But when will our responsible writers begin to restore the shattered reputations of the anti-Communists, the conservative politicians, and the doggedly uncompromising employers of the 1930's and 1940's who often had their facts on Red unions straight all along? Rethinking and at least some courageous rewriting would seem to be in order.

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FLORENCE CALVERT THORNE. *Samuel Gompers: American Statesman*. Pp. xi, 175. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$3.75.

This short but pithy book is a noteworthy addition to the information that we have about Mr. Gompers. The first few pages are, at first reading, somewhat disappointing. This is because, from the title, the reader expects more, perhaps, than the task that the author set for herself. But the reader is soon aware that the author is describing Mr. Gompers' philosophy of the labor movement and the ideals that he set forth for himself and for the trade unionist generally. These make up, in substance, what she means by statesmanship as they work themselves out in the activities of the great union leader. The author adopted a clever device for presenting these abstract subjects. She has utilized a series of quotations from the speeches and writings of Mr. Gompers which are then brought together under subject headings and interwoven with explanatory material. The author's interspersed remarks and explanations are interesting in themselves since she was for many years his editorial, research, and writing assistant.

The reader should not expect to find criticism, or much of an evaluation of Mr. Gompers' career. There are many statements about his personality, his firmness of mind, his ability, and his farsightedness; there are few indications of his failures or of his limitations. But this is perhaps to be expected in a book written to remind the general reader and the trade unionist of Mr. Gompers' contributions to the labor movement.

Nevertheless, the reader is able to derive from these speeches and writings some of the excellent qualities and limitations of Mr. Gompers. He represented in America in the 1880's what the Junta in England did in the 1860's: a middle-class point of view, emphasizing individualism, freedom, and democracy, and with these a fervent belief in the trade union way of life. But unlike the Junta, which cracked up in the 1880's, Mr. Gompers went on to lead the American Federation of Labor until 1924. We may discern three periods in Mr.

Gompers' active life: first, 1881-1900, when he was seeking the acceptance of his type of trade unionism; second, 1900-1915, when he sought co-operation with the large employers; third, 1915-1924, when he sought co-operation with the government. Each of these periods saw a basic change in industrial technique and organization which Mr. Gompers had the genius to analyze before it fully matured. His great limitation was perhaps in the type of organization which he led, and which was unable to adapt itself readily to the changing thought of its great leader.

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JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS. *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox*. Pp. xvi, 553. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956. \$5.75.

This is the author's fifth and best book. Written in an interesting style, it presents a penetrating analysis of Franklin Roosevelt as a political leader. At times the President was as courageous as a lion; on other occasions, he was as cunning as a fox.

Professor Burns seeks to explain how Roosevelt became a master politician, taking into account "his political, social, and ideological environment, the way he shaped his society and in turn was shaped by it." There emerges not only a brilliant portrait of one of American history's most controversial personalities, but a richly detailed picture of the chaotic period of the New Deal.

Coming to the presidency in the darkest days of the depression, Roosevelt's leadership was courageous, powerful, and full of action. The author's description of the first One Hundred Days vividly recreates the flavor of the times. The Chief Executive exploited to the limit his constitutional powers and proved to be a master of the art of government.

Soon after his re-election in 1936, Roosevelt became a lion at bay. With the attack on the Supreme Court, breaches appeared in the coalition of the President's supporters. Soon Congress was wallowing in confusion, and the President lost control. The bitter political battles of the

second term were fought under the shadow of the steadily worsening situation in Europe. In his discussion of these fateful years, Professor Burns points out a good many flaws in Roosevelt's leadership.

Feeling that an adequate treatment of the war years would make his book much too long, the author gives a twenty-page synopsis of this period in an Epilogue. The story really concludes with Roosevelt breaking the third term precedent in 1940.

History students will regret the absence of footnotes in this scholarly book. There are, however, fairly adequate chapter bibliographies and a basic book list. While in no sense a definitive biography, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* is one of the best studies yet published on Roosevelt.

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ARTHUR S. LINK. *Wilson: The New Freedom*. Pp. ix, 504. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

Since this book of 500 pages is by the greatest living authority on the career of Woodrow Wilson and deals only with the period from November 1912 to November 1914, it may well be considered to have achieved its author's purpose of presenting one section of a nearly definitive biography. The years covered are those in which Wilson fought for a lowering of the tariff, a change in the banking system, more control over the trusts, and other reforms. The principles which he so successfully carried out were presented beforehand in his campaign speeches and collected in a little pamphlet called *The New Freedom*.

Link's volume contains a great deal of history as well as pure biography; but this is almost necessary as a background to explain the reasons for the development of Wilson's foreign and domestic policies. The author's style is straightforward and simple, and he relates events which sometimes become rather complicated in a way that makes them readily comprehensible.

Professor Link denounces the self-righteousness of Wilson but recognizes that "what saved him from pedantry was the enormous activity of his mind." Wilson was tender in his family relationships but

demanding in his friendships "a loyalty that never questioned, always understood and inevitably yielded to his own will."

These are excellent and just descriptions of outstanding features of Wilson's character, yet the book as a whole lays stress upon the growth of Wilson as a practical politician rather than upon his personal life and the idealism in his nature. Except for a few vigorously expressed opinions, such as the statement that Wilson's greatest achievement was strengthening the office of President, the author presents few sweeping judgments; he is more inclined to relate the facts and let the reader draw his own conclusions. But sometimes specific facts lead to more general facts, as when Professor Link says: "In contrast to Wilson's fair promises stands the record of American interference in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean region from 1913 to 1917, unparalleled before or since in the history of the western hemisphere."

The methods by which Wilson used the power of his office to push measures of reform through Congress, and the ways in which his political and economic ideas developed until by the end of 1914 they led him to espouse "an advanced progressive solution" for economic problems, are presented in this volume with erudition and charm.

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DONALD W. RIDDLE. *Congressman Abraham Lincoln*. Pp. vii, 280. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957. \$4.50.

In August 1846, Abraham Lincoln was elected to the national House of Representatives from the Seventh Congressional District in Illinois, a Whig stronghold. He took his seat in December of the following year and served one term, the only experience in a national office that he had before he became President of a dissolving Union in 1861. Lincoln's Congressional career has, of course, been treated by all his biographers, but no writer has gone into it as thoroughly as Professor Riddle does in his *Congressman Abraham Lincoln*. Mr. Riddle is also the author of a background study, *Lincoln Runs for Congress*.

The picture of Lincoln that emerges from these pages is that of an ambitious politician who was actuated primarily by partisan consideration and who was willing to go to extreme lengths to embarrass his opposition. Probably Professor Riddle, exhibiting the common tendency of academicians to ignore the practical requirements of politics, is a little unfair to Lincoln in some places. At the same time, it is undeniably true that at the time of his Congressional experience Lincoln had not risen far above the stature of a local politician. The author devotes a major portion of his book, and a major share of critical attention, to Lincoln's opposition to the Mexican War and to his attempt to stigmatize President Polk for starting it. Lincoln's course, says Mr. Riddle, was not very principled and not particularly smart. The war was popular in Illinois, and Lincoln's stand seriously damaged his party and his own political future. As a result of Lincoln's action, the Whig candidate for Congress in the Seventh District was defeated in the next election, and Lincoln had to retire from politics for several years. The author writes that "Lincoln for the first time in his life was completely mistaken in his estimate of a political situation."

On the positive side, Professor Riddle finds that Congressman Lincoln "demonstrated ability, and exhibited industry, attentiveness, and devotion to duty." He also concedes that in handling patronage matters Lincoln showed more attention to fitness and character than was customary with Congressmen. The author denies the accepted notion that Lincoln voluntarily abandoned interest in politics after 1849 and was only brought again into the arena by the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Lincoln never lost his interest in politics or his ambition for political office, Mr. Riddle states, and his retirement was forced because of his unwise war views. A concluding section of the book deals with Lincoln's attempt to secure the office of Commissioner of the General Land Office and his rejection of the governorship of the Oregon Territory.

Lincoln's Congressional episode is a minor but important aspect of his career.

It needed to be studied, and it is fortunate that the task fell to as competent a scholar as Mr. Riddle.

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HENRY WHARTON. *The Life of John Smith, English Soldier*. Translated by Laura Polanyi Striker. Pp. 101. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Virginia Historical Society, 1957. \$4.00.

This handsome slim addition to the controversial literature concerning the veracity of Captain John Smith's extraordinary travels and adventures is especially welcome during the 1957 celebration of the founding of Jamestown. Both Wharton's *Life* and Dr. Striker's erudite introductory essay testify for Smith. Indeed, it was his military and geographic knowledge and experience that made him especially sought after for his role in the Virginia adventure.

In spite of the debate over Smith and the 1685 date of Wharton's biography, the Latin essay remained a manuscript in the library at Lambeth Palace. Recently, however, a microfilm copy of it was made for the New York Public Library. In the nineteenth century, Francis Walker Gilmer intended to publish Wharton's *Life*, but Gilmer's project ended with his death and the disappearance of his copy. It is only now that we have this fine translation and addition to American historiography.

Dr. Striker is a careful, thorough investigator. She discusses various facets of the Smith controversy and presents a plausible case. Henry Wharton (1664-95) is introduced as a gifted restoration scholar and divine, whose scholarly production before his death at the age of thirty-one was tremendous in volume and scope. Wharton's knowledge of manuscripts suggests that he worked from a no longer extant text of Smith's *Travels*, a thesis which Dr. Striker tries to prove in her examination of the Smith literature available when Wharton undertook his scholarly crusade.

John Smith's feats, especially his adventures while fighting the Turks, are so fabulous that they seem more fiction than truth. Of special interest to the Smith

debate is Wharton's testimonial, given in a preface to the *Life*: "I pledge my honor that this entire story is true" (p. 35). For various reasons, including the idea that "John Smith's renown was thwarted from the start by his being a commoner in an aristocratic venture" (p. 7), Wharton championed Smith and through scholarship sought to establish him as an authentic historic hero.

The case for Smith is strengthened by Philip L. Barbour, "Captain John Smith's Route through Turkey and Russia," *William and Mary Quarterly*, July 1957 (pp. 358-69). Drawing on his geographic and linguistic knowledge, Barbour traces Smith's movements during his Turkish captivity and builds a sound case for Smith. The Smith controversy will probably continue as additional books and articles appear, but it is appropriate that the hero of the Jamestown venture should fare so well in this attractively illustrated translation of Wharton's *Life of John Smith, English Soldier*.

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HENRY C. HART. *The Dark Missouri*. Pp. xvii, 260. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957. \$6.00.

Numerous authors who in recent years have written about the Missouri River and its valley have stressed the color, complexity, and historical importance of this section of the United States. They have written about the "Wide Missouri," the "Dammed Missouri," and the "Muddy Missouri." Now comes *The Dark Missouri* by Henry C. Hart.

Mr. Hart, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, has produced the best analysis of the economic and social problems of the Missouri Valley yet written. He would object to having his book called a definitive study; for to him "the ways of the Missouri are a little dark," and the Missouri Basin is "next-year" country where environmental conditions are constantly shifting.

Given these characteristics of the river, the author analyzes the historic and geographic meaning of water to the people of the Missouri River Basin. Iowa and Missouri get enough water or too much; Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana get too little water; and the in-between states such as North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas get barely enough water most of the time.

Since water takes on different meanings as it flows from mountain to plain to bottom land, a plan which would fill all these diverse needs must be devised. However, the history of water development in the Missouri Basin has been little short of chaotic. Mr. Hart vividly describes the phases of river planning which have focused on flood control, on irrigation, and on power development. These plans have been sequential in time rather than complementary and simultaneous. The conflicting plans of the Reclamation Bureau, the Corps of Engineers, and the Agriculture Department have never been joined politically, administratively, or technically. It is to this problem that Mr. Hart directs his recommendations.

The approach to governing the water resources of the Missouri Basin suggested by Mr. Hart is new and worthy of careful consideration. He suggests that the first thing to be done is to acquire a "steady" view of basin potentialities for proper resource use; secondly, the demands of the basin population must be regulated by self-controls which can be derived from local institutions rather than by federal restraints. He says what the basin needs is not integration of water and land planning but a relationship between the two; it needs not "a plan" but a variety of planning done for known interdependencies.

He feels that the basin program should integrate the programs of flood and pollution control, navigation, irrigation, municipal water supply, and hydroelectric generation. The water-planning process needs to discover its interrelation with land use and electric utility service. He says: "The permanent works in the river, perennially functioning for flood control, power, irrigation, and the continuous minor uses, provide a stable base from which to

project research and the accumulation of recommendations for the use of moisture on the land against the day when the need is felt in the rare but overwhelming crisis of drought. The men who plan the river need to know the Plains, and the men who plan for the Plains need to use the more predictable resources of the river. But the two are not one."

He indicates that the Missouri River Basin needs a "charter of representation" through an appropriate combination of state and national elections, and he proposes an organization of government for the development of water and land resources which includes a federal-state council built around the governors of the basin states, a federal water conservator, a basin water-development account, and a basin budget unifying all state or federal resource development projects within the basin.

The Dark Missouri is well written. It is beautifully printed and illustrated with end-papers and photographs. It holds the reader's attention easily. It is most carefully documented, although this reviewer was disconcerted to have to turn to the end of the book to read either the author's further comment on a subject or to check a source. I would strongly recommend this book to regional economists and especially to those interested in river basin development. Naturally, it is a must for Missouri River scholars.

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EDWARD DANFORTH EDDY, JR. *Colleges of Our Land and Time: The Land-Grant Idea in American Education*. Pp. xiv, 328. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$4.50.

The basic premise of this interesting description of the land-grant idea in American education is that the colleges and universities involved grew out of and constantly reflect a truly democratic concept. This premise is well supported by a clear analysis of the changing curriculum and services, from their origin to the present day. There is a brief chapter on the 17

land-grant institutions attended primarily by Negroes.

It has frequently been stated that the land-grant college movement was largely the product of the Morrill Act of 1862 and developed as a protest against the failure of the then existing institutions of higher education to meet national needs. The author clearly indicates that they evolved as a result of the interaction of the developments of the times and the traditional patterns of higher education both in Europe and the expanding United States. This constant interaction has been a fundamental characteristic of our land-grant colleges and universities.

Michigan in 1857 established the first institution which aimed to promote "intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvement." It reflected a growing movement in other states where an expanding need for education in "agriculture and mechanical arts" was recognized. The Morrill Act, vetoed by President Buchanan in 1859 but signed by President Lincoln in 1862, thus gave significant emphasis and financial support. At first this was done largely through grants of public lands to the states, in response to a movement already restlessly evolving throughout the states. Supplementary legislation has increased federal support and expanded the original concept, but this again is only a reflection of the adaptation of the land-grant colleges to the changing needs of the nation.

By means of concise and interesting descriptions of the development of these institutions, the author clearly demonstrates the following fundamental characteristics. Their primary goal is to serve the individual. Early institutions were little more than secondary schools, and it was not until this century that educational opportunities for youth interested in agricultural and mechanical arts were such as to make it possible for land-grant institutions to drop their college preparatory courses. Another characteristic has been their adaptation to changing needs. Their two original fields have been expanded to include home economics, engineering, veterinary medicine, and others. The institutions have also reflected the growing demand for general education, and there is a constantly

increasing recognition that generalization and specialization are equally essential in the education of youth for life in our increasingly complex social structure. A third characteristic is that the land-grant colleges and universities have retained their concept of basic service to the people. This has been achieved through extension programs, the services of country agricultural agents, experimental stations, and other activities. Only one other characteristic can be indicated. Although supported in part by the federal government, these institutions have remained free of federal control and have enlisted an ever-larger support from the state and from private sources.

This story of the land-grant college is interestingly related and effectively told. It is more than a history of one segment of American higher education. It is an interpretive analysis of the cultural history of our nation.

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RALPH L. BEALS and NORMAN D. HUMPHREY. *No Frontier to Learning: The Mexican Student in the United States*. Pp. xi, 148. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. \$3.25.

With skill and commendable caution, a contribution is again made to the underworked field of cross-cultural research and the empirical knowledge of the processes and effects of exchange. This time it is done with influences from the anthropological backgrounds of the principal investigators. It is good to repeat the fact that "foreign students provide a challenging array of research problems whose solution requires a variety of approaches and the use of tools from all the social sciences." This the Social Science Research Council Committee on Cross-Cultural Education tried to do as illustrated by the present monograph. Here culture contact phenomena are emphasized, and "great caution in using psychological concepts cross-culturally" is suggested.

I will skip an analysis of the explicit shortcomings of the volume in order to note more of the provocative observations.

The study suggests that Mexican students differ significantly from students of other cultures. This is partly because they are relatively familiar with our ways. The Mexican student, who generally seems anti-American, rejects American materialism and is convinced that Mexican culture offers a deeper meaning and provides a more satisfactory pattern of social relationships. But, "the differences between the average scores of Mexican and American students on a belief and ideology test proved less than the differences within each group from its estimate of the ideology of the majority of fellow nationals."

Most of the Mexican students who were studied would have preferred to go to Europe. They were at least as successful academically as American students.

"The ideological and socio-cultural position of Mexico influenced the areas in which favorable student responses were most apt to occur and . . . to be maintained after return." If the objective of an exchange program is "the creation of binational understanding or some vaguely formulated concept of good will, it is doubtful if an adequate basis for selection can be made." However, the authors conclude—a little grudgingly perhaps for the sentimentalist—that such exchange remains one of the most effective ways of creating understanding and friendship and maintaining contacts between cultures.

The authors note that the Mexican student "arrives in the United States with extensive knowledge of his own culture and society." I do not deny this. But while I cannot prove it, I doubt the possible implication that he is any better equipped than American or other foreign students on this score.

A good book and very worth reading.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL

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WILLIAM P. TUCKER. *The Mexican Government Today*. Pp. xii, 484. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. \$6.50.

Mexico is the second largest and most densely populated of the Spanish-American

countries. For the United States, it is also a neighboring country. Our studies of it have been increasing, and this first general survey of our neighbor's government is to be welcomed. There has long been a need for such an analysis, and Professor Tucker has filled it with general competence.

The study is broader in scope than most textbooks on foreign governments, for it endeavors to set the organization, structure, and functions of government and political parties in a context of land, people, and economy. Political analysis in such a context is more meaningful, and the usefulness of the work is correspondingly enhanced.

The treatment of the structure and functions of the Mexican federal government, and its relations with state and municipal governments, is clear and realistic. The functioning of the official party is realistically described. Less satisfactorily handled are the army and the labor movement and their impact upon Mexican political development. The role of the army is given far less than its due. The chapter on labor provides a convenient summary of labor history, the federal labor law, and the organization of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, but what one might call the "ticking relationships" of labor and government and of the army and government—the interplay of influences of the one upon the other—do not emerge. This kind of perception can develop only from sustained residence and personal observation in a country, such as enabled Lord Bryce to deal acutely with the American Commonwealth.

Professor Tucker has benefited from the accretion in the United States of Ph.D. studies of Mexican political development. Many of these are unpublished but are happily available in microfilm. Able monographs and short studies on details of Mexican government and politics such as those by Frank R. Brandenburg, Leon V. Padgett, and S. S. Goodspeed—some of which have been field studies—have turned up the kind of detail which contributes to the realism of an over-all study. Thus, what has been a serious handicap in research on Mexico—a scarcity of accurate and realistic material—is now being slowly

corrected. There still remains a vast scattering of material within Mexico itself, and there remains the need for a research center in that country which could assemble and retain materials now scattered in many diverse and obscure places with no central index to guide the researcher. The intrepidity of Professor Tucker in essaying such an over-all study is, therefore, to be commended quite as much as the usefulness of a study certain to enlighten without offense. All in all, it is a most desirable book for students of Mexico to have at their command.

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ECONOMICS

MILTON FRIEDMAN. *A Theory of the Consumption Function*. (National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 63, General Series.) Pp. xvi, 243. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$4.75.

Among the many controversies issuing from the "Keynesian Revolution," that relating to the "consumption function" has been a continuing and crucial one. Keynes's notion that the level of consumption and savings is mainly determined by income ("as a rule . . . a greater proportion of income . . . [is] saved as real income increases.") has had a tremendous impact both on economic theory and policy. In seeking verification of this hypothesis, many economists have unearthed evidence seemingly both confirming and denying Keynes's generalization. Such contradictory findings have led necessarily to more complex explanations than that savings and consumption are determined mainly by current income. Various explanations relating relative income or wealth to consumption have been offered in attempts to fit the data. In the work being reviewed, Milton Friedman presents another provocative hypothesis explaining the relationship between consumption and income. He feels that his generalization is "potentially

more fruitful" and "more general" than these other explanations. Its aim is "to combine the relation between consumption, wealth, and income suggested by purely theoretical considerations with a way of interpreting observed data. . . ."

Friedman develops his hypothesis mathematically and relates it for consistency to numerous budget studies and time series which other economists have developed. He emphasizes the importance of the way in which income is viewed. For his purposes, he finds that there is an important distinction between "measured income" (income as recorded) and "permanent income" (income to which consumer behavior is adjusted over a period of about three years). This last is not operationally defined by Friedman. Both permanent income and permanent consumption are inferred from consumer behavior. Put succinctly, his hypothesis states that permanent consumption is a proportion of permanent income determined not by the size of permanent income but rather by such factors as the interest rate, the proportion of nonhuman wealth to income, and tastes which are affected by such things as family make-up, age, variation in income, and so forth.

In effect, Friedman has posed two questions to which he answers yes. One is, do consumers with different incomes spend the same proportion of "permanent income," and the other is, do the explanation and prediction of consumer behavior improve if the income period is as long as three years? The affirmative answer to both questions has important policy and technical implications quite different from the simple Keynesian consumption function and many of its more complex variations.

While some economists feel that Friedman's permanent income hypothesis explains the relatively high level of savings in the recent past no better than other statistical formulations of the consumption function, his theory ought to play a significant role in clarifying an understanding of the relationship between consumption, saving, and income, as well as other variables. The validity of the permanent income theory will be widely tested as new constructs arising in the testing come into

being. Valid or not, the hypothesis will stimulate advances in a major area of economic science.

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DOUGLAS H. K. LEE. *Climate and Economic Development in the Tropics*. Pp. xii, 182. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957. \$3.50.

Among middle latitude peoples who have seen motion pictures and read novels and travel books about the rainy tropics, the idea is widespread that such lands are occupied by luxuriant and enormous forests—often true. They believe that these forests must certainly grow upon rich soils and that such lands offer promising opportunities in the future for the production of food crops and fibers—perhaps not true.

Among the *well informed*, there are few more controversial subjects than the possible suitability of the wet tropics for natives and whites alike. Certainly there has been no dearth of literature dealing with the problem, but many of the questions have had to remain unanswered or inadequately answered. There are the so-called "cornucopia boys" who claim that the tropical climate countries are the lands of the future. Then there are the pessimists who rule out such countries as having no future whatsoever. Both sides can boast of well-informed and brilliant scholars; yet when all is said and done, it must be admitted that as of now no one possesses the answer.

The editor points out that it is common knowledge that heat and damp can be enervating, that disease and decay thrive under such conditions, "but," he asks, "does this mean that large parts of the earth's surface can never achieve significant economic advance? Should the people who live in these parts of the world be told that they can never hope to attain a modern standard of living? Or are there ways of overcoming the obstacles posed by hot, wet climates?"

No one will doubt the significance of these questions. Because of their impor-

tance, the Council on Foreign Relations, which sponsored the project, asked a group of scientists to work together and explain the bearing of their knowledge on the problem. It was not a project based upon field and laboratory work; rather it involved the exchange of views and the interplay of thought among well-informed men. The group which became known as "The Study Group on Climate and Economic Development in the Tropics," consisted of climatologists, geographers, pedologists, doctors and public health specialists, architects, engineers, businessmen, physiologists, economists, and others. Dr. Douglas H. K. Lee acted as chairman of the group.

The book being reviewed may be said to deal with the effects of tropical climates on men, materials, animals, plants, soils, and industrial products. It particularly deals with the effect of climate upon economic development.

There is an excellent conclusion in eight parts, contributed by a small committee, which is worthy of very careful consideration by every person interested in the wet tropics.

The book is a genuine contribution to our knowledge of the wet tropics. Since middle latitude countries will trade—in fact must trade—with the rainy tropics, it is imperative that businessmen, economists, industrialists, transportation and communications men, and others learn more about these lands. International bankers and government representatives, for example, employees of the Import-Export Bank, Point Four Program, and others, should know much more about the relation of the rainy tropics to human affairs than they do. But this holds for people in all walks of life.

The volume is well written and thorough in its scholarship. The presentation is straightforward, and the style is clear, easy, and pleasing. There are several maps showing world climates (after Köppen), climatic regions of Africa, of Australasia, and of tropical Latin America, and there are two charts—all of these are genuinely helpful to the reader.

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ROBERT TRIFFIN. *Europe and the Money Muddle: From Bilateralism to Near-Convertibility*. (Yale Studies in Economics, No. 7.) Pp. xxvii, 351. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Professor Robert Triffin's volume is an over-all analysis of Western Europe's monetary policies. It deals with the inflation of the immediate postwar years, the financial crisis of 1947, "whose economic consequences threatened to topple [Europe's] political and economic structure," and the monetary rehabilitation and "near-convertibility" of the more recent period. Presumably based largely on official sources of information (there is no bibliography) and on the author's long experiences as a government monetary expert, the book makes a serious contribution to the literature on postwar international monetary problems. Although it cannot be recommended to the layman, this book will be found stimulating and provocative by economists, particularly those directly concerned with European monetary questions.

Triffin opens his investigation with a controversial chapter on the world dollar shortage. This serves as a frame of reference for his subsequent analysis, and in it he criticizes the dollar shortage school. But it is doubtful whether his arguments against its "theories" will convince many readers, especially in view of Sir Donald MacDougall's recently published exhaustive work on *The World Dollar Problem*. It rather may be anticipated that the position of this school of thought, which, as Triffin points out, has exerted an enormous influence "on the academic thinking and government policies of the postwar years," will be strengthened.

In the subsequent chapters, the author first analyzes the national monetary developments and policies in postwar Europe; he shows that the 1947 monetary crisis could not be solved "by national policies aiming at the restoration of over-all internal and external balance in their own economic system. The utter collapse of the international framework for trade and payments had made bilateral bargaining power, rather than national balance, the

major regulator of each country's external transactions. The restoration of a multilateral trade and payments system was a task which lay far beyond the reach of any country's national policies." He then discusses (often in excessive detail) the failure of the early attempts to restore a world-wide multilateral trade and payments system through the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the restoration of sterling as a key currency. He deals with the spectacular success of regional co-operation, first through bilateral trade and payments agreements and later through the European Payments Union. Finally, he examines the current prospects for an early return to currency convertibility and presents his own position as to the proper methods to be used in the reconstruction of a workable system of international trade and payments.

Triffin is very critical of the policies of the International Monetary Fund and its failure to affect to any significant extent the course of events in the postwar world. Pointing to the futility of the Fund and to the substantial achievements of the European Payments Union, he opposes the Fund's position for a full-fledged return to world-wide convertibility, and he argues for the preservation of a proved and workable regional system of multilateral trade and payments. Although one is inclined to agree with Triffin's views on the matter, his optimism—expressed in the text and in the "Postscript" before the recent currency disturbances—regarding the actual return to international convertibility is questionable.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER

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ALVIN H. HANSEN. *The American Economy*. (Economics Handbook Series.) Pp. xv, 199. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957. \$5.00.

This rather slight little book, much less broad in scope than its title would imply, could more properly be described as a political review of some recent American economic issues. The general slant is more or less that made familiar by Americans

for Democratic Action, and only a very uninformed reader will encounter much that is new.

I have reviewed the basic problems here so often—notably in my "Adventure or Routine," *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1955, and "Open Secret of Economic Growth," *Fortune*, November 1956, to say nothing of numerous technical books and articles—that I do not think any great purpose would be served by threshing it all over again. A few brief comments may, however, be in order on the factual and historical material here presented.

Professor Hansen tells us (p. 15) that "wages were held down" in West Germany. The facts are, of course, that *real* wages have nearly doubled. Which does the worker enjoy most—paper or bread?

On page 19, apparently in reference to the "Scandinavian countries, Holland and Great Britain," he says: "Investment by and large has a record in those countries equal to and in some cases better than that of Germany." Only in the next paragraph does it emerge that investment in Great Britain and France was "unsatisfactory," and the reader is left to find out for himself the undoubted fact that Great Britain's investment is substantially less than that of West Germany.

On page 51 Professor Hansen quotes Professor Pigon with approval as saying: "No one can any more contend that a general cut in wages is not deflationary." The fact that Keynes himself specifically admitted that a general wage cut *need not* be deflationary has been forgotten. (See for example *The General Theory*, p. 265.) These are samples of a sort of general hastiness of style that runs through the book.

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EDISON L. BOWERS, PAUL G. CRAIG, and WILLIAM PAPIER. *Financing Unemployment Compensation: Ohio's Experience*. (Bureau of Business Research, Monograph No. 89.) Pp. xix, 314. Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Business Re-

search, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University, 1956. \$4.00.

Unemployment insurance in the United States is completing its second decade. During these twenty years it has become abundantly clear that the benefit payments to the involuntarily jobless provided by the state unemployment compensation laws constitute the most significant method of protecting the living standards and purchasing power of the unemployed that our society has developed. At the same time it is equally clear that since benefits became payable in 1937 and 1938, our unemployment insurance system has operated under conditions of relatively "good times"; it has not been subjected to the financial strains which would be imposed by an economic decline more severe than the recessions of 1949 or 1954.

Accordingly there was urgent need to study the financial experience of unemployment insurance and to project that experience into the future on the basis of reasonable assumptions as to employment and rates of unemployment, benefit costs, and reserve requirements. In brief, it was necessary to evaluate the liability which the state unemployment insurance systems must be prepared to meet.

The Bureau of Unemployment Security in the United States Department of Labor is to be commended for stimulating such studies in a good number of states. As a result we now have more adequate data on benefit costs under a variety of assumptions than we have had before.

The study by Professor Bowers and his associates is probably the best of these research reports. It is a scholarly work appraising the financial operation of the Ohio unemployment insurance law and projecting its financial needs and reserve requirements to 1962. It reviews the legislative and financial history of the Ohio system. As was found in other states, the authors discover that in Ohio, unemployment insurance tax rates have been repeatedly lowered, since under the employment experience and resulting benefit claims the law was overfinanced. They have also found that the Ohio reserves "are probably the most adequate of any

industrial state"; that in relation to living costs and average weekly earnings, weekly benefits payments were lower in Ohio in 1953 than they were in 1939; that the reasons for disqualifications from benefits have increased and the penalties have also become more stringent; that in spite of lower tax rates and increased benefits, the reserves have increased in all but two years; and that as of June 1952 the reserve fund was large enough to provide benefits for over ten years—a far larger reserve than in most other comparable industrial states.

Again, as was found in the studies made in other states, the Ohio study concludes that the unemployment insurance system, as we have developed it in the United States, "is designed for and best handles the unemployment problems of a relatively prosperous economy which experiences only minor recessions." This is a correct and significant conclusion. It suggests the limited character of unemployment insurance which is probably ill-designed to deal with serious depression types of layoff. The British learned of this many years ago and supplemented their unemployment insurance plan with a national public assistance program. Such an undertaking is still to be provided in the United States.

This reviewer is impressed with the authors' finding that if the wage cancellation feature adopted in 1952 and the disqualification of persons who voluntarily quit work without just cause or are fired for cause were abolished, the volume of compensable unemployment would not be increased substantially. Many have suspected that the more stringent disqualifications which have been imposed in recent years and which have created considerable inequity do not result in most saving in benefit payments.

This report urges a system of contribution rates which will maintain continuity of the program at a given level of benefits without curtailment of benefit and without borrowing. A "level premium approach designed to balance costs over the space of an average business cycle of seven to ten years is preferable to any scheme which attempts to balance costs and revenues on a year to year basis, and is pre-

ferable to a tax rate which varies in counter-cyclical fashion."

The volume contains an excellent discussion of the technical problems involved in making the estimates of costs and of the economic assumptions on which they are based. A novel feature, not present in other state reports, is a chapter on the "Effects of Wage Guarantees on Unemployment Compensation." This is largely an examination of the economic aspects of the Guaranteed Annual Wage proposal rather than the relation between the GAW and unemployment insurance, which could have served a more useful purpose for this volume.

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SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

ARTHUR KOESTLER. *Reflections on Hanging*. Pp. xxiii, 231. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$4.50.

Many writers have written about capital punishment, but Arthur Koestler is unique in two respects: he is one of our ablest writers, and he spent three months awaiting his own execution. The result is a powerful book that will appeal to a large number of readers and impart some of Koestler's own sense of outrage.

Although the book deals mainly with hanging as an English practice, it makes excellent use of data from all over the world. No reader, sincerely seeking information about the supposed necessity of the death penalty as a deterrent to murder, could fail to be convinced by the evidence assembled by Mr. Koestler. Many countries and systems along very well without deliberation. Cold-bloodedly killing a few human beings every year. Nor is there any proof that the abolition of the death penalty has anywhere been followed by a rise in the homicide rate or by any increased danger to law enforcement officers.

Koestler also makes out a convincing case against the death penalty on the basis of the ever-present possibility of hanging

the innocent. Unhappily there can never be a comprehensive treatment of this subject. Dead men cannot prove their innocence, and their families usually lack the means to seek a hopeless vindication. Responsible government officials certainly have no incentive to exhume their own mistakes. Consequently, the only executions which can actually be proven to be miscarriages are those which are uncovered by accident or by a rare and persistent public interest. As Koestler points out, the existence of even a few such instances is strongly suggestive of the innocence of a much larger number of men and women who went to their death vowing their guiltlessness before God and man.

Perhaps the most unique contribution of *Reflections on Hanging* is its devastating exposure of the utter imbecility of the highest English judges when they discuss the death penalty. Since the days when Lord Ellenborough solemnly predicted the direst consequences if hanging were abolished for the crime of shoplifting to the value of five shillings or more, these great judges have continued to warn of disaster on each occasion when Parliament has considered modifying or abolishing the death penalty. Their solemn pronouncements have invariably ignored the experience of mankind and even the history of penology in England. Despite the fact that their opinions have rested upon a vacuum of evidence, their high judicial office has lent them a factitious authority which has impeded the efforts of their countrymen to modernize the English penal code.

In the 1948 debate in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor (Jowitt), smarting under the imputation that the "Judges" were inhuman, referred to "Lord Romilly" as one of those "great Judges since Ellenborough's time" who did so much to "restrict and limit the death penalty." Now Romilly was not a Lord, he died before Ellenborough, and far from being a Judge, he was notoriously an opponent of the Judges during much of his mature life. A lawyer who dared to handle pertinent facts before Lord Jowitt in such a grossly negligent fashion would have rightly earned a stern reprimand. What possessed the

Lord Chancellor to utter so much misinformation on British judicial history? What impels able men trained in the value of evidence, like the English judges, to ignore the record when they orate about the death penalty? Perhaps if we understood their motivation, we would also know why it has been so difficult to put an end to homicidal penology.

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FRANK J. COHEN (Ed.). *Youth and Crime*. Pp. xiii, 273. New York: International Universities Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This book consists of a series of addresses on juvenile delinquency delivered before law enforcement officers attending a four-day Law Enforcement Institute at New York University in July 1955. Most of the twenty featured speakers were persons in daily contact with delinquents: youth agency heads, probation officers, and judges. It was the Institute's purpose to present a systematic introduction to the problems of delinquency. Consequently, the Institute's eight sessions (consisting of two or three talks each) proceeded in logical order from an appraisal of the extent and nature of delinquency to a consideration of causative factors, enforcement and procedural principles, and concluded with prevention and treatment.

The speakers, unfortunately, were so loosely reined that their statements varied widely not only in length and quality but also, in this reviewer's judgment, in their capacity for communicating with their audience. The officers were exposed, for example, to a long and discursive talk by psychiatrist Laurretta Bender, who presented a neo-Freudian analysis of delinquency; they also heard sociologist Harry M. Schulman deliver a sociopsychological assessment. Besides being heavily freighted with technical jargon, no effort was made to synthesize the two approaches for the listeners.

Many of the papers, however, were well suited to the Institute's educational purpose. Among them was a summary by Sophia Robeson of problems encountered in measuring delinquency; Professor Paul

Tappan raised questions concerning possible violations of the civil rights of delinquents by courts and other public agencies; the "aggressive social work" of New York City's Youth Board was described by its director, Ralph Whelan; the principles which should govern police juvenile units were presented by Frederic F. Schneidewind of the Children's Bureau.

An especially provocative paper was Joseph Shelly's outspoken discussion of the poor relationships existing between public and private agencies. The tendency of the latter to "fly solo," to be dictatorial, and to be jealous of their autonomy and power make co-ordination of efforts difficult—particularly vis-à-vis public agencies, which are usually held in low esteem by the private groups. He also accuses them of maintaining intake policies which virtually guarantee a high rate of "success" in handling cases, for the really tough problems are often denied admission and eventually end up on the overburdened rosters of public agencies. The low "success" rates of the latter are then used to further substantiate the private agencies' contention that public agencies are inherently inefficient and unprofessional.

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D. H. STOTT. *Unsettled Children and Their Families*. Pp. 240. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$6.00.

This is a book about human behavior and its aberrations. It also deals with the causes of these aberrations, their diagnosis, and treatment.

Its theory is that social maladjustment is a result of unsatisfying personal relationships, primarily "unreliable" ones with the family. Delinquency occurs only after experiencing such relationships over a period of years. Prevention depends upon recognizing predelinquent behavior as a natural protest against circumstances and upon correcting those circumstances before antisocial attitudes produce a rigid pattern of feeling and behavior. The natural protest is instinctive, an "executive-reaction" to the denial of basic biological needs.

In discussing research Dr. Stott stands firm against the statistical approach for uncovering new knowledge of human behavior but finds it helpful for testing direct observation. He believes that new leads must come from insightful people who have a true interest in human beings, are in direct contact with them over a long period of time, and are in the habit of recording their observations and putting them together into a system. He believes that the executive-reactions are identifiable by such means and that the causes for them can also be identified through "everyday facts and bits of gossip" from the people observed. From such observations of his own, the author has classified both the patterns of adjustment to emotional deprivation and the family situations that caused them. The classifications are presented as guides to diagnosis and treatment.

Concerning these, Dr. Stott is emphatic. The Intelligence Quotient test is a meaningless or detrimental device where emotional problems are concerned. He decries the direct cross-examination treatment as well as the anything-but-direct treatment of the psychoanalyst (for nine-tenths of all troubled children). He is middle of the road in the chapter on "The Handling of Cases"; radical in suggesting that *all* people, with or without clinical experience, who deal with children may be of help to them; and reactionary (in view of much current social work) in pointing out the importance of the "total environment."

Lest the above make this book seem dogmatic and offering only panaceas, that is not the case. The author is revealing old fallacies and new convictions. But he offers his own techniques with humility, to be applied as they are helpful, or until they are revised in the light of future observations.

Depending upon the interests, or vested interests, of the reader, *Unsettled Children and Their Families* will be praised or tossed aside in irritation. This book is not run of the mill. It is challenging, thought-provoking, and unsettling.

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DONALD E. SUPER. *The Psychology of Careers: An Introduction to Vocational Development*. Pp. x, 362. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$5.75.

Mr. Super's volume on *The Psychology of Careers* makes a thorough survey of the data available from the research experimentation of many psychologists, educators, sociologists, and others in the field of personal adjustment.

The author makes the point that the practice of vocational guidance has followed pretty closely Parson's older statement of it as a study of the individual, a study of the occupation and "true reasoning" thereon, or counseling. This has been pretty much a process of matching man and job. It is good so far as it goes but not good enough. It omits what another approach might provide. This is the study of a life pattern or career, and it calls for a long-time view of the individual's past and probable future activities and his business, social, and personal relationships as well. The first is based on what the author calls the trait theory of vocational guidance; the second, the theory of life patterns.

The discussion of the life pattern theory emphasizes the reactions of the individual to his work and implies that he should have the opportunity in his vocational choice to "express his interests, use his abilities, achieve his values and meet his emotional needs." The two theories are not really exclusive nor should they be put into opposition. The author makes it clear again and again that good counselors use both methods, and he presents the term "vocational development" as including and emphasizing the combination of the two theories. He admits, however, that this concept in many respects is the "wave of the future" for vocational guidance. Much research and experimentation are needed to develop the knowledge and techniques necessary to make clear and validate the theory of life patterns and to show the two theories in relationship in the actual guidance process.

The book is very complete in its coverage of the field. It begins with a survey of the world of work, its complexities, and

the need for help on the part of young people and others in understanding this world, entering it, and getting ahead in it. The course of the working life is covered from entrance to retirement. The author gives us a very careful coverage of the factors affecting vocational choice and success. Lastly the organization of the material for personal adjustment and vocational guidance is presented.

This is not a book for the general reader. It is for "graduate students of psychology, education and related fields." The scholarship shown is detailed and comprehensive. If it has a defect, it is in the lecturer's atmosphere that makes it read like classroom notes. It also has in it no counselors as such. They are referred to, but one gets the feeling that they are practicing or "researching" psychologists. There are good counselors who have the knowledge and use the techniques of good counseling. The author knows such a man, and he knows good counseling too. It would, therefore, have strengthened the presentation if he could have been presented in action and apart from a study or a research.

JEROME H. BENTLEY

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PAUL LAFITTE. *The Person in Psychology: Reality or Abstraction*. Pp. x. 233. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$6.00.

The author sets out to shatter to bits the sorry scheme of psychological things entire. Certainly he is fully armed for the task in hand. First he has an enormous ax to grind. Then there is the overweening ambition to remold psychology nearer to his heart's desire—to ennoble his own vocation of industrial counsellor and to make the sun of scientific psychology revolve around his earth of practical preoccupations.

Psychology, he cries, is too specialized, impersonal, and abstract. Mostly it is confined "to the study of quizzes, muscle tremors, and puzzle boxes" (p. 220). Vigorously Dr. Lafitte tries to check the assimilation of psychology to the natural sciences. "In its nature, psychology is not a science but a history" (p. 221). The

author intends especially to destroy the vaunted objectivity of psychology. Though he says the objective in psychology is insufficient, his argument that physiological psychology as well as animal experiments is irrelevant to psychology at large (p. 32), clearly indicates how thoroughly he would like to see the established experimental and theoretical psychology cleared away and replaced by his own direct study of life and ordinary behavior. Only a preoccupation with a person and his involvement with himself and his society is psychology.

What, then, would be the character of the remolded personalistic psychology? To begin with, it would abandon the distinction between science and life (p. 23) and would deal with the wide and complex area of ordinary behavior (p. 100). "The psychologist is, first and last, someone who sits down with somebody else and engages with him in a specialized kind of common task" (p. 226). And theory? That would be of the literary type "corresponding to the plain language generalizations of common experience" (p. 7). This does not mean that there would be no specializations, no abstractions, no formulae. On the contrary, all that the author requires are his own versions of these escapes from life. Nothing is easier for him than to specify the two general characteristics of the entire life of man. Everyone expands himself—enhances his ego; and at the same time contracts himself—retreats from his environment (p. 48). More abstractly, the reality of the person in psychology is to be founded on a mixture of nonphysicalistic philosophy (p. 10) and sociology—called social psychology (p. 200). Granted that despite his hyperbole Dr. Lafitte has pinpointed some weaknesses of scientific psychology, there remains still the question how much such revelations can support his own views of reality and professional status.

J. R. KANTOR

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LEONARD BROOM and JOHN I. KITSUSE.
The Managed Casualty: The Japanese-American Family in World War II.

(University of California Publications in Culture and Society, Vol. VI.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956. \$4.50 cloth; \$3.50 paper.

This study analyzes the adjustment of selected Japanese-American families to the mass evacuation (without even a hearing), the assembly and relocation "center" life, and return to society. The administrative policy to evacuate the Pacific Coast Japanese-Americans in family units underscores the importance of the authors' focus. The first three chapters summarize the sociocultural background; the administrative policies and consequences; and the ways the families reached group decisions. Ten representative family histories, with interpretive analyses, constitute most of the book. Case studies were begun with the outbreak of the war and continued to approximately 1949. In assessing the published cases, there are a number of important factors which readers should keep in mind. First, it is necessary to be aware of all the extraordinary pressures on the families; and second, one must realize that these cases, illustrating the various types, include a proportionately greater number of *Kibei* (the small Japan-educated minority) and others with contacts in Japan than are found among the general *Nisei* population. Unfortunately, the lack of funds limited the scope of the research and the number of cases. Nearly every family mentioned lived in southern California and returned there afterwards. One may wonder how similar families elsewhere on the Coast fared, and more particularly, whether the evacuated families who settled permanently in the middle western and eastern states were not on the average more acculturated and better educated than those who returned to California. They stayed in the East because they found greater professional opportunities or felt more at home. Inadequate finances and the family emphasis also discouraged the investigation of "broken" families for possible contrasts. Furthermore, in other instances, although the grown siblings went their individual ways, they retained affectionate ties with their families which, according to American values, are actually not "broken," but rather "successful,"

families. They also differ from the published cases.

Professor Broom has published other monographs on the evacuation (we hope for more on this crucial subject), and this study reflects his broad knowledge and understanding. Laymen and specialists will find new insights into family, ethnic, and community relations as well as civil rights problems. The study also includes some interesting data on acculturation. Any person may appreciatively read this lucidly written book (a contrast to the bad English often encountered), but those familiar with the background will naturally find it more meaningful. Readers are referred to *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* by Jacobus tenBroek, E. N. Barnhart, and F. W. Matson and *Americans Betrayed* by Morton Grodzins for accounts of the evacuation which many high government officials regard as the greatest American wartime "blunder."

T. SCOTT MIYAKAWA

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MARTIN B. DWORKIS (Ed.). *The Impact of Puerto Rican Migration on Governmental Services in New York City*. Pp. 74. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$2.50.

This exceedingly useful little book, which is short because much is presented clearly in a few words and statistics, is the work of a study group of graduate students who thus fulfilled the requirements of research and thesis writing. The high quality of the concepts, judgments, data, and clear rapid style all suggest first rate students and, I am sure, excellent editorial assistance by the faculty. The success of the enterprise recommends the method, especially when one recalls some of the dismal Masters theses which claim library space better used otherwise.

As a handbook for all those who are working with the Puerto Ricans in New York (and for any worrying and writing about them too), the study presents clear, up-to-date, and wanted information. The migration will continue so long as high wages are available in New York and while, in Puerto Rico, wages are much less, even

for that half of the labor force having full-time employment at standard wages. They crowd the inadequate, unplanned housing of the city and suffer outrageous conditions for which they pay high rents. For example, 249 persons inhabit four houses built in 1899 for one family use, and the landlord received monthly over \$4,000 or \$57 per room for the space. Most of the migrants find jobs, and nearly all jobs are unskilled positions in needlework industries or service trades. They work hard, and, in these jobs, they are not discriminated against. They do utilize welfare services, but many are either too proud or uninformed to use them, and few stay for long times on the welfare roles. Being poor and coming from another culture and climate, many fall ill (especially of tuberculosis), and they need both care and health education. Both youths and adults are engaged in crimes, the former probably more frequently than others of equal age and economic situation; the stress of swift change to the new environment is unsettling, but exact comparisons are not available. The major impact of the migrants, to which the authors devote almost a fourth of their space, is the impact of the Spanish-speaking children on the public schools. The problem is nearly self-evident. The children do not understand English, and their parents, who work and live under poor and crowded housing conditions, in any case do not understand the environment and its key norms well enough to teach their children. To do this would be difficult in their own language, but in English the task is nearly impossible. Special orientation and language classes have been established for the Puerto Rican children. There is the system of pairing them with more language-and-custom-adept Puerto Ricans of longer residence in the city who can help them, and special officers of many kinds have been appointed to ease the strains of the situation.

The metropolitan conglomeration of more than eight millions, in space and buildings gravely insufficient and almost entirely unplanned, has created social problems of a dangerous weight and complexity. Life itself, let alone good life, is increas-

ingly hard to get in such places. For the Puerto Rican migrant, the hazards and stresses are greater; he learned a different culture and language on a warm Caribbean island, and he is poorly prepared for New York. The wonder, and this book shows it often, is the hardness of the Puerto Rican, his dogged survival and improvement in New York, and his adaptation. The equal and hopeful wonder is the hospitality of New York's agencies and their perhaps grim but unending inventive efforts to accommodate the new residents of the city.

MILLARD HANSEN

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ROBERT A. DIVINE. *American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952*. (Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany 66.) Pp. viii, 220. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. \$4.00.

This is an account of the development of American immigration legislation or, more broadly, of American immigration policy from the Immigration Act of 1934 to the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. After an introductory chapter surveying the growth of restrictive policy up to 1924, the author describes in detail the principal later developments. These include the controversy over national origins that preceded and did not altogether end with the application of the national origins quotas in 1929; the discussion of the treatment of particular national and racial groups (Western Hemisphere, Philippines, China, India, and so forth); immigration problems of the depression period; the treatment of refugees and subversives; the displaced persons question; and finally the postwar policy debate that preceded the 1952 act.

Without attempting to write a technical legislative history, the author nevertheless gives a summary account of debate and action in Congress. The principal focus, however, is on the complex interplay of conflicting interests and objectives that has always surrounded and shaped our immigration legislation. Here the author is especially successful in giving an under-

standing of the direction taken by immigration policy. Four underlying policy considerations are distinguished: the economic, the social or racial, the nationalistic, and the foreign policy or international consideration. It is shown how sometimes one, sometimes another has predominated during this recent period. For each major bill in recent legislative history a valuable account is given of the various pressures and interests within and outside Congress; and an attempt is made to identify or infer underlying motives. Among the many points brought out by the author which would deserve fuller mention if space permitted are the persistently conservative temper of Congress with respect to immigration, the liberalizing influence of international considerations in the wartime and postwar periods, the tendency of voting to follow more persistently regional rather than party lines, the greater role at times of the executive branch of government in the determination of policy, and the change in the position of organized labor during this period.

Very useful bibliographical notes are appended (pp. 195-209). Although outside the range of treatment that the author sets for himself, it is perhaps useful to add several titles for students of immigration history interested in the actual wording of immigration laws and treaties or in the administrative regulations. These titles include Frank L. Auerbach's *Immigration and Nationality Act* (Common Council for American Unity, 1952) which is an analysis of the 1952 act, and his authoritative *Immigration Laws of the United States* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), with supplement; *Immigration and Nationality Laws and Regulations* (Government Printing Office, 1944), with supplements; and *Laws Applicable to Immigration and Nationality* (Government Printing Office, 1953), with supplements. The latter two give the text of laws, presidential proclamations, treaties, and so forth relating to immigration, together with relevant portions or references to Title 8, *United States Code*. More specialized are the several volumes of *Administrative Decisions Under Immigration and Nationality Laws* which go back to August 1940.

As a final comment it should be noted that the author has apparently tried, without being uncritical, to give fair treatment to both the liberal and the restrictionist sides of the immigration controversy and that his treatment of the subject is exceptionally well balanced and impartial.

E. P. HUTCHINSON

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LYMAN CROMWELL WHITE. *300,000 New Americans: The Epic of a Modern Immigrant-Aid Society*. Pp. xiv, 423. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$4.00.

The great migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved movements of individuals only. Whatever assistance the newcomers received came through sporadic voluntary philanthropic efforts elicited by the difficulties of the crossing and by the hardship of adjustment to American life.

These conditions changed after 1924. The imposition of a rigid quota system and the growing complexity of governmental regulations both in the countries of emigration and of immigration soon put an end to the day of the individual migrant. Thereafter the proponents of immigration were on the defensive and labored under an obligation to make the conditions of movement as regular, easy, and favorable as possible.

The special conditions under which the refugees of the 1930's arrived, confirmed the shift in emphasis. Here was a group of prospective newcomers of a type most often considered deserving in the past—victims of political and religious persecution, endowed with considerable skill and with cultural attainments that readied them for adjustment to the life of the United States. Yet at the same time, a negative immigration policy and the social strains of depression and mass unemployment made the United States most unresponsive to additions to its population. Under these circumstances, those interested in furthering immigration labored under the compulsion to make the process of settlement as easy for the receiving society as possible. In addition, the refugees were

not, as had been the case in the past, unskilled peasants and laborers. They were people with professional skill and capital, unwilling simply to be lost in the industrial labor market.

American Jews assumed the obligation for assistance with particular earnestness. A large percentage—though not a majority—of the refugees of the period from 1933 to 1954 were their co-religionists. Furthermore, most American Jews were themselves immigrants or the children of immigrants and had an understanding of the problems involved in the crossing. A succession of agencies therefore emerged to guide the newcomers on their journey, to take care of their reception in the New World, and to assist their adjustment to the problems of life as they became assimilated. Out of these agencies grew the United Service for New Americans.

Dr. White has chronicled the history of these organizations with care and competence. A thoughtful account of the development of the various organizations that were ultimately drawn together in USNA is followed by a detailed analysis of the techniques of service to the immigrants at every stage of the transition. The whole is carefully and thoughtfully put together. It is a useful work indeed.

OSCAR HANDLIN

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PETER O. STEINER and ROBERT DORFMAN.
The Economic Status of the Aged. Pp. xx, 296. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Steiner and Dorfman have broken valuable new ground in their stimulating and significant study. They point out the likelihood that the proportion of the population sixty-five years and older will decline between 1980 and 1990. This may change somewhat the longer run problem of the so-called "burden" of the aged. By showing that there will be many more aged women than men, and that at the present time the economic status of aged women living alone is worse than either men living alone or couples, they indicate both an

immediate and longer run area in which social policy requires us to set priorities in order to more effectively deal with the problem of the aged widow.

They also rightly point out that to ascertain the economic status of the aged requires a classification of the aged in several different categories: by couples and unrelated men and women; by urban and farm areas; and whether or not they are living with children. Moreover, by use of three types of budgets and four categories of "support" status, they indicate the complexity in establishing the "dependent" and "independent" status of the aged.

They have produced an aggregate income of the aged in 1951 by major sources which this reviewer hopes the Social Security Administration will develop into a regular part of its series of reports on the aged. By analyzing sources of receipts from any source, one or more major sources, and a principal major source, Steiner and Dorfman have made it possible to analyze important differences in the sources of income of the aged.

Their evaluation of census data shows that the main causes of withdrawal from the labor force are poor health and obsolescence of skills, frequently in combination. They indicate that the limited possibilities for increased employment of the aged in the immediate future is largely in part-time work. They suggest re-education at an age long before sixty-five rather than concentrating on employment opportunities for persons now over sixty-five.

Most of the economic data in the book relates to the years 1951 and 1952 and, as a result of the important improvements in the social security program in 1952, 1954, and 1956, is now out of date. However, the conceptual and methodological suggestions made by Steiner and Dorfman will have permanent value, and they merit more detailed attention and critical review.

The concluding chapter is suggestive, but it is brief and inadequate for the magnitude and scope of the challenging problems discussed. The authors make an excellent suggestion which would be worthy of study by Secretary Folsom's staff. This is that the size of social security benefits might be made to increase with the length of

covered employment and the age at which retirement occurred. An "incentive" element would therefore be included in the insurance program. Their suggestion that the retirement test be reconsidered, since it serves "merely to limit the total income of persons receiving benefits" and "incomes of beneficiaries are low enough," does not appear, however, to be drawn from any analysis of their own data on employment possibilities of aged persons. The problem involved in the major liberalization or repeal of the retirement test is that it would primarily benefit those who would continue to work after sixty-five anyway, such as executives and professional persons. Nor is their brief statement that "mere computations that show, for example, social security payments as a percentage of payroll, only cloud the essential issue" of "drain on the economy," (p. 151) a very meaningful contribution. Without further elaboration, it is not a useful comment for helping to guide public policy. It indicates little appreciation of the world of practical reality in which employers, unions, and politicians have to operate in attempting to adapt social security costs to a complicated and dynamic economy.

Despite these and other minor deficiencies in the book, which limitations of space prevent discussing, the Steiner-Dorfman volume is the most significant piece of university research on the economic status of the aged to appear in recent years. It is to be hoped that it will be followed by more university research in order to keep up with a very complex and changing area of study.

WILBUR J. COHEN

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Administration
University of Michigan

WILBUR J. COHEN. *Retirement Policies Under Social Security.* (A Publication of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California.) Pp. xiii, 105. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$3.00.

This book can be described as an historical account of the development of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance program

with special reference to determination of the 65-year eligibility age, disability retirement, and the retirement or work test. Professor Cohen's eyewitness account is indeed what he claims it to be, but it is much more. In the reviewer's judgment, its real value lies in the analysis of current opinions and arguments on whether or not the eligibility ages should remain as they are, and whether or not the work test should be further liberalized. In these connections, he sets forth current and projected costs (that is, Social Security tax payments) under the present provisions of the Act and under various proposed revisions. An interesting feature of the account is the identification of interest groups and their alignments with the changes which have been made in the Act during the past decade and to those now under discussion.

The presentation is limited to the features of the program which are closely related to retirement from work. It is to be hoped that Professor Cohen will be called upon to write a companion volume dealing with such questions as the effects of including groups not hitherto covered; the effect of employment of beneficiaries on wage rates; the reason for assuming that a widow can get along on a three-quarter benefit; the relationship of the program to private pensions; problems arising out of efforts to integrate the program with Civil Service, Railroad Retirement, military pensions, and other publicly managed programs; and the effects of the program on the economy now and in the future. Mastery of the materials in the present volume by readers of THE ANNALS will be rewarding in giving them a clearer comprehension of several of the issues involved, but similar treatment of additional issues will be desired.

CLARK TIBBITTS

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U. S. Department of
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Trends and Differentials in Mortality. Papers Presented at the 1955 Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund. Pp. 165. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1956. \$1.00.

This volume maintains the high standards established by previous proceedings of the annual conferences of the Milbank Memorial Fund.

The papers fall into three broad divisions relating in order to "Underdeveloped Areas," "Highly Developed Countries," and "Research in Mortality."

The contributors to the first section include Bourgeois-Pichat and Pan (as joint authors), Stolnitz, Balfour, and Gordon. These authors seem to agree: (1) that there has been a real and spectacularly rapid decline in mortality in underdeveloped areas; (2) that this decline has been more rapid than that historically experienced in Europe; (3) that it is due to advances in medicine and public health, not to a rising standard of living; (4) that present gains will be held and further progress made, perhaps not so rapidly as in the recent past (unless major improvements in environmental sanitation follow the quick gains from cheap application of insecticides and antibiotics); and (5) that most underdeveloped countries will have to contend with enormous population growth, much more rapid than occurred in Europe at a comparable period of economic development.

In the second section on "Highly Developed Countries" Spiegelman analyzes the emergence of degenerative diseases as the chief cause of death. His judgment of prospects for future improvement in the expectation of life at the upper ages is cautious, and perhaps unduly so. One may hope that new therapies for cancer, for example, might radically alter the picture in the next few years. Moriyama and Guralnick bring together interesting comparative data on occupational and social differences in mortality but admit the impossibility (with present data) of distinguishing between general economic and strictly occupational factors.

In a paper on "Factors in Morbidity and Mortality from Cancer" Dorn analyzes the incidence of cancer by its site of occurrence and by sex and race but does not attempt to review materials on the various etiological agents, including the smoking of tobacco, that have been alleged to be responsible for increased incidence of lung cancer. Marks summarizes the extensive

literature on "Mortality Among Impaired Lives" in an especially well-documented article.

In the third section on "Research in Mortality" Coale challenges the common-sense view that the widespread reduction of mortality has increased the *proportion* of old people in the population. The pattern of mortality declines has been such as to increase the *number* of aged but not their percentage in the total.

In the article on "Standard Age and Sex Patterns of Mortality" Valaoras presents a series of model life tables from observed experience. He is, however, cautious on the use of such tables for purposes of population projection, except where recent census and vital statistics are not available.

The final article, by Vance and Madigan, describes the design of an interesting study on differential mortality among male and female religious (brothers and nuns) in an effort to segregate biological and social factors determining the widely observed differences between male and female mortality in the general population.

The modest price and paper cover should not deceive potential readers as to the important scientific contributions and technical excellence of the publication.

DUDLEY KIRK

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WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR. *The Organization Man*. Pp. 429. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956. \$5.00.

Wherever people brush elbows there is some organization, under formal rule or in habit. Family discipline and community training everywhere aim at limiting clashes among individuals and at meshing individual acts in joint enterprise. Sometimes they encourage individual striving for excellence. Mr. Whyte, showing full awareness of this broader reference, chooses to concentrate on the organization man in the business corporation (whose blood brothers, in a "generation of bureaucrats," he sees in numerous other types of organization).

The author's focal organization men are not those we usually call workers or clerical workers. Only a few, he says, are or ever

will be top managers. "In a system that makes such hazy terminology as 'junior executive' psychologically necessary, they are of the staff as much as the line, and most are destined to live poised in a middle area that still awaits a satisfactory euphemism." Nevertheless, he thinks that they are furnishing "most of the first and second echelons of our leadership" and that it "is their values which will set the American temper."

They may talk of "the treadmill," the "rat race," or "inability to control one's direction"; but actually they have "no great sense of plight." Indeed, they see ultimate harmony between themselves and organization, and they are building "an ideology that will vouchsafe this trust."

Officially, Whyte says, we hold to the Protestant Ethic of individual salvation through hard work, thrift, and competitive struggle. But the harsh facts of organization life do not jibe with these precepts. In the midst of group pressures, individual frustration, and anonymity of achievement, the organization man seeks a faith which will do for him what the Protestant Ethic formerly did, that is, "satisfy him that what he must endure has a deeper meaning than appears on the surface."

A coalescing body of thought, which Whyte calls a Social Ethic, appears to do this. It "makes morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual." Its major propositions are a belief in the group as a source of creativity, a belief in "belongingness" as the ultimate need of the individual, and a belief in the application of science to achieve this belongingness. Such a body of thought could not find peaceful harbor in an author who believes (to the extent of providing his own italics) that people "rarely *think* in groups"; that extension of the team to fields where it does not belong has obscured the role of the individual in creation and discovery and, within the organization, is obscuring the function of leadership; that there is an "ideological drift in organization life—toward (1) idolatry of the system and (2) the misuse of science to achieve this"; that any real change is up to the individual and he "must *fight* The Organization."

Many of the past or prospective readers

of this book will feel, even if they are reluctant to ask, questions regarding the author's report on the organization man's ideology; the training, recruitment, and testing of the organization man; the position of the organization scientist; the organization man at home in suburbia—until the next move. Is the ideology so well jelled and so prevalent that escape from one organization to another is no escape? Do the personality tests (outside their legitimate place in the mental health clinic) pry unjustifiably into personal privacy, becoming essentially tests of potential loyalty to the organization? Are the colleges—especially schools of education and schools of business administration—going so far in emphasizing the how, neglecting the what and the why, failing with respect to the fundamental disciplines? Are many educators abasing themselves to please grant-givers? Are the foundations mostly defaulting on aid to individuals? If the organization men in suburbia show rootlessness, what provides the underpinning of stability of organization?

This reviewer's hunch is that Whyte will not object to such questions if we can muster sufficient freedom from organization pressures to think on them as individuals.

J. P. WATSON

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PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

HANS Kelsen. *What Is Justice?: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays*. Pp. 397. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$7.50.

This volume contains fifteen separate essays by one of the foremost living philosophers of law. With perhaps three exceptions, all of these essays have been separately published before. The essays do not appear to have been written as segments of a projected larger work. This book, therefore, lacks the unity and internal structure which would be expected

otherwise of a work by Kelsen. But the discrete character of the separate essays in some sense is an advantage, or at least may be so viewed by readers who find more wisdom in Kelsen's penetrating analysis of major problems in the field of philosophy than in the subjugation of these problems in terms of the structure of Kelsen's pure science of law. For such readers, the moving and graceful essay on "What Is Justice?" based on Kelsen's farewell lecture as an active member of the faculty of the University of California, the discussion of Aristotle's "Doctrine of Justice," the two articles on the natural law and the inquiries into absolutism and relativism and the place of value judgments in the science of law make this volume a meaningful addition to the literature of jurisprudence.

Two themes dominate the essays. One, as is to be expected, is a concern with methodology and the position among the sciences and humanities of different approaches to law such as the pure science of law and the sociology of law. The other theme involves an analysis of the opposition between absolute truth and relative values—a theme developed in the essays in terms of numerous formulations and with a scepticism, penetration, and faith reminiscent of the works of another great contemporary philosopher of law, Morris Cohen. Kelsen poses the problem of the meaningful character of a relativistic philosophy of justice. The existence and acceptance of many, to some extent competing, values need not result in no value or in the acceptance of the arbitrary. For an age which has been shaken by the claimed justice of arbitrary systems, which have constituted legal systems, the need to develop a formulation of the different relationships among values is crucial. This volume helps to clarify the approach to this difficult problem.

EDWARD H. LEVI

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ANDRÉ BONNARD. *Greek Civilization: From the Iliad to the Parthenon*. Pp. 199. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$6.00.

This introductory book is an astonishing blend of wit and solemnity, of illuminating analysis and moral disapproval. Professor Bonnard seems torn between his admiration for things Greek and his passionate belief in the progress of man. Applying this nineteenth century doctrine to the past, the author is deeply troubled by three aspects of Greek life: the prevalence of warfare, the degradation of women, and the existence of slavery. Unfortunately his convictions, justified or not, lead to some curious distortions. While the Iliad, the Odyssey, Archilochus, and Sappho each receives a full chapter in this ten chapter book, Hesiod, "that grumbling old peasant" (p. 127), is played down. And he is played down because the author regards him as a misogynist. So strong are his feelings that he wrings his hands over Simonides of Amorgos, "who grossly insults the sex in a poem which is only too famous" (p. 127). But surely Simonides should be read with humor! Was Chaucer a misogynist because of Chanticleer's "mulier est hominis confusio," or Shakespeare because of *The Taming of the Shrew*?

But Bonnard has his admirations. In a most interesting chapter on Aeschylus he remarks: "The tragic hero fights in order that the world may become a better place or that, if it must remain as it is, men may have more courage and serenity to live in it" (p. 152). This reforming zeal betrays the modern sociologist, but it would have perplexed Agamemnon. Later we are told that the Athenians, too, had "faith in progress" (p. 171).

Bonnard is against war, and he is, therefore, an enemy of Pericles' imperialism. Accordingly, when Athens forces deserting members back into the Confederacy, they are "brutally" repressed (p. 181), or when Pericles puts down rebellion in Euboea, he does it "harshly" (*ibid.*). That other great imperialist, Cimon, he calls a "frivolous coxcomb," but not without misgivings on the part of the translator (p. 176, note 1).

But so well-written a book deserves to be read. There is a freshness about his statement that: "At Delphi in fact the priests of Apollo maintained a kind of

information service for foreigners" (p. 73); or when he writes: "Compared to Odysseus tossed about over the empty wastes of the Ionian Sea, Lindbergh crossed the Atlantic in an armchair" (p. 137).

The thirty-two full-page illustrations including a generous selection of vase reproductions are beyond praise.

TRUEDELL S. BROWN

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BASIL MITCHELL (Ed.). *Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology*. Pp. v, 222. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. \$6.50.

This book is composed of an enlightening Introduction by the editor and eight essays which grew out of an informal Anglican discussion group. The participants included six fellows and an advanced student from Keble, Trinity, Wadham, Merton, Balliol, and Christ Church Colleges. Since the issues are current and all caused by the new science, it is unfortunate that the scientists are not directly represented in the debate.

The first fifty years of our century have witnessed a change in the relationship between philosophers and theologians. The main reason for this is the conflicting attitude toward science. Formerly, philosophy and theology were allies or at least competitors. Today no self-respecting philosopher would regard himself a rival of the theologian but a critic. For he deals with *verifiable* statements only. Dogma as such has been *spurious* *versunken*. The active enmity of yesterday has become the indifferent, so-whatever attitude of the present time. There is nothing to refute; the most sympathetic mood is one of pity or possibly an attempt at understanding the hard lot of the theologian. He can only guess or sing the hymns of the past assurance, knowing full well that the conflict between theology and science has gone against him. As Professor Gilbert Ryle has put it so brilliantly: "In our half century, philosophy and theology have not been on speaking terms."

Professor A. J. Ayer in his *Language, Truth and Logic* has pointed out that a

statement to have meaning must be either analytical or empirical—true by definition (for example, logic and mathematics) or verifiable in sense experience (for example, scientific hypothesis and common sense statements). Propositions of metaphysics, ethics, and theology are "dismissed by Ayer as non-sensical pseudo-propositions." This is a very formidable attack on theology since Hume permitted an appeal to faith.

The authors think their book will be an attempt at mediation and will have three results. Philosophers will no longer put forth a world view or philosophy of life (it is no part of the philosopher's task); philosophers will not rule out theological statements from the start on the grounds that they are meaningless; and philosophers will ask the same sorts of questions about theological statements as about other statements. They get no favors or special treatment. Philosophers will be neutral.

A beautiful quotation from Plato's *Republic* closes Hare's penetrating analysis of Religion and Morals: "In the case of those things which we see by the light of the sun, the sun is the source, not merely of the possibility of our seeing them, but also of their very coming to be, their growth and their sustenance. But it is not itself a coming to be. And in the same way in the case of those things which we know by the light of the Idea of the Good, it is the source, not merely of the possibility of our knowing them, but also of their very being—for from it their being comes. *Yet the Good itself is not a being, but rather lies even further off, on the yonder side of being, excelling it in majesty and power.*"

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MORRIS GINSBERG. *On the Diversity of Morals: Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Vol. I. Pp. xiv, 329. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$4.00.

This first of three volumes of Professor Ginsberg's writings contains eighteen essays previously published, almost all of them in British journals. They range in time of original publication from 1932 to 1955 and

to be intended for the person who feels a professional need to increase his store of detailed factual matter pertaining to nuclear energy. To the reader with such a motivation, the book may well be considered a gold mine of information; to the casual or cultural reader, who needs a narrative quality to carry him along, the book may be one of those which somehow never gets finished.

Dr. Wendt has gathered an enormous amount of information from publications of the United States government, the United Nations, and from many other sources. References to these are carefully cited at the ends of the chapters. As just one example, he gives details about every reactor which has been authorized or built, both here and abroad: technical description, cost, expected performance, companies involved, legal tangles, terms of license, probable cost per kilowatt hour, and so on. The amount of material presented suggests that the author has either an extraordinary capacity for assimilation or that he has the help of a staff of industrious library researchers. There is a rapid-fire presentation of technical, economic, legal, and political data, and the policy is completeness rather than selectivity. Passing tribute is paid to the story of the human struggles leading to success in atomic energy, but what is given is too abbreviated to capture the interest of the reader. The author's own comment and opinion seems to be incidental to the presentation of data, and it is pretty much the stereotyped lyrical talk about the "great new age."

There is a bibliography filling the better part of a page at the end of each chapter, and a good index, covering both names and subjects. There is also an eleven-page glossary of nuclear physics terms. All of these qualities make the book more useful as a reference work than as a bedside reader, and it should be a good addition to the libraries of persons whose professional lives are touched directly or indirectly by atomic energy developments.

Dr. Wendt's experience is wide: professor and dean in universities, science editor, author of books, science columnist, lecturer. He is now Director of the Insti-

tute for Atomic Developments in New York.

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
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