

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOLUME 28

THE
Political Quarterly

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LEONARD WOOLF and WILLIAM A. ROBSON

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Middle East Aflame

IN the last issue of *The Political Quarterly* (published on October 1) we discussed the Suez Canal situation so far as it had then developed. We said that it was essential to resist Colonel Nasser's claims to exclusively Egyptian control of the Canal; but we also said that the way in which the British and French Governments began to resist those claims was indefensible, and that all military threats should have been omitted and the matter laid before the United Nations.

The events which have taken place in Egypt since the beginning of November are of enormous importance to the world. First came the advance of the Israeli army into the Sinai peninsula, where the Egyptian army was engaged in training a large number of troops to be used in invading Israel territory. The movement was highly successful from a military point of view. This was followed by a United Nations resolution, proposed by the United States, condemning Israeli aggression. This resolution was in our opinion quite unjustified having regard to the smouldering state of war which has been in existence between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states for several years. The United Nations has hitherto taken no effective steps to end this war. The Mixed Armistice Commissions can be regarded as little more than referees who blow their whistles when a member of one of the opposing teams is offside.

Shortly after the resolution the British and French Governments announced their intention of occupying Egypt in order to end the fighting between Egypt and Israel, and to maintain free navigation of the Canal. Neither of these objectives was the real purpose of the Allied action, which took the form of bombarding the Egyptian airfields, destroying their aeroplanes, tanks, and broadcasting stations, and landing a force in Port Said. The real aims of this aggressive action were to bring about the downfall of Colonel Nasser, to compel the Egyptian Government to accept some form of international administration or control of the Canal on the lines proposed by the London Conference, and generally to check Egyptian expansionist designs.

Fanatical Nationalism and the Response

The Anglo-French action has had disastrous consequences from several points of view. It has led to the United Kingdom and

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French Governments being censured by a vast majority of delegates to the Assembly of the United Nations. It has led to the most serious rift in the Commonwealth which has occurred since the adherence of its Asian members, who openly and strongly oppose the action taken by the British Government. Whatever internal reasons may have led Mr. Nehru to support the Egyptian cause throughout this dispute, it is quite certain that all the newly independent states of Asia will oppose anything which even faintly resembles—or can be alleged to resemble—military aggression, imperialism, or colonialism. But in any event it is obvious that the Commonwealth can survive only if close and continual consultation takes place between the members on all important matters. A broad measure of agreement on matters of war and peace and foreign policy is essential.

There is a widespread belief both in this country and throughout the world that the allied action was illegal, incompatible with the United Nations Charter, and politically inept. We share that view; but we certainly do not regard Egypt as a virtuous and innocent victim. Colonel Nasser has flagrantly contravened the international order. He has openly fomented military aggression against Israel and has supported the rebel forces in North Africa in many different ways. His seizure of the Canal was the expression of a fanatical nationalism. It evoked from the British and French Governments a response which was in a different way equally the expression of an outmoded nationalism. This in turn led to a theatrical display of righteous indignation on the part of the Soviet Government, combined with threats of military intervention which, if carried out, would lead to a third world war. The Soviet Union had itself been engaged in a far more brutal action in suppressing the Hungarian revolt.

The Incapacity of UNO

Neither the United Nations nor any of its members are really prepared to deal with situations such as those the world has recently confronted. The Security Council is hamstrung by the existence of the veto, which prevents it from acting whenever one of its permanent members desires. The Assembly is normally ineffective because it has no force at its disposal. In the Middle East crisis, the military action by Britain and France, and the occupation of the Sinai peninsula by Israel, literally forced the United Nations to find a substitute for the Anglo-French forces which the Assembly

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requested should be withdrawn. For this purpose an *ad hoc* international police force, drawn mainly from the smaller powers, was hastily raised and dispatched to Egypt. Whether it will succeed in preventing further conflict, ensuring peace between Israel and the Arab states, and in helping to bring about a reasonable settlement of the Canal problem, cannot at present be foreseen. What can be foreseen, however, is that the United Nations will continue to be incapable of dealing with grave conflicts in which the major powers are concerned so long as the veto is preserved, and UNO is not equipped with a permanent international force on which the Assembly or the Security Council can call in case of need.

The balance sheet, so far as it can be drawn up at the present time shows the following items. *Gains*: removal of the immediate Arab threat to annihilate Israel; a display of military incompetence by Egypt which may weaken her expansionist aspirations; a demonstration that it is not wise to provoke the more powerful nations beyond a certain point. *Losses*: an undermining of the international order; a loss of moral authority and political influence by Britain and France; a weakening of Commonwealth solidarity; the creation of deep discord with the United States. If there can one day be added to the gains an elimination of the veto from the Charter, and the setting up of a permanent international force, then indeed the balance sheet might on the whole prove to be a favourable one.

The Attitudes of USSR and USA

Something should be said of the Soviet attitude. There is, in our opinion, little ground for believing that the Soviet Government was "encouraged" by the Anglo-French action to impose its will on Hungary by a military massacre. It is, perhaps, at least as likely that the French and British Governments were "encouraged" to think they could get away with a military coup by the belief that the Soviet Government was too preoccupied with the Polish and Hungarian situations to be able to turn its attention or send its forces elsewhere. Even without these diversions, the USSR would not have ventured to intervene if Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower had not made it clear, for electoral purposes, that the U.S. was not involved in the Middle East dispute. But can any nation say that it is not involved in an international dispute if that dispute produces, or is likely to produce, a threat to the world's peace? The combustion of inflammable material cannot be delayed even by a presidential election.

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The divergencies of outlook and of interest on the Middle East questions are so great that the United Nations will find it exceedingly difficult to find a settlement of the Israel-Arab conflict and of the Suez Canal dispute acceptable to the countries chiefly concerned. The common interest is in peace; but as events have shown, several governments are not prepared to accept peace at any price. The international police force is scarcely likely to be able to do more than prevent breaches of the peace: it will certainly be unable to impose unacceptable terms on unwilling governments.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY UNDER EISENHOWER

R. H. PEAR

THE debate on the nature of the American Presidency, its theoretical and its desirable characteristics, began even before America had a President. In the *Federalist No. 70* Hamilton was already arguing the merits of a single executive over those of a possible plural executive such as might have resulted had the American Chief Executive become a "President and Council." In our own day prominent students of American administration have argued that the presidency, being a burden far too heavy to be shouldered by one man, should have its weight divided amongst members of the Cabinet, each taking his portion of the load and all bearing, corporately, the responsibility of executive government. In this debate it is useful to distinguish the approaches which rely on appeals to constitutional conservatism and political tradition from those which emanate from more detailed studies of problems of administration. But having indicated that such a distinction is possible, it must at once be recognised that, in fact, in a discussion of this type political leanings are difficult to disentangle from administrative principle.

One aspect of this discussion is however distinct; that of the "constitutional" versus the "leader" role of the President. However much party affiliations may waver or traditionalism be shaken by new problems in politics, the difference between these two views of the presidency goes to the root of political values. A strong leader in the position of chief executive assumes that position because of a belief that he is, in the office to which he is elected by a popular national vote, the organ that represents the popular national will. Congress represents "interests" and local factions; the Senate, because it is only one-third renewed at every presidential election, is not truly representative of either the states or the popular will. It follows that if there is and ought to be an expression of the national will, it is found in the presidential vote, and the President who does not recognise this is avoiding his plain duty—and his destiny.

* The author is Lecturer in Political Science at the London School of Economics & Political Science. Author of *American Government*.

The other side of this argument presents itself under the guise of a constitutional argument rooted in the U.S. Constitution. There the President is not a national leader with general political and administrative powers, but a chief executive whose duties are carefully described and whose opportunities for initiative in home and foreign affairs are limited to making recommendations to Congress, or entering into treaties with foreign powers which must be ratified by the Senate. Moreover, whatever the present result, it was never intended that the President should be the popular choice of the voters—it was intended that he would be the careful and responsible choice of the presidential electors in the Electoral College.

From time to time this somewhat academic discussion breaks out into the open country of popular politics as when the Supreme Court of the United States denies that there is in the presidency a residue of discretionary authority sufficient to allow President Truman to seize the steel industry (*Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 1952); or as when popular feeling gradually asserts itself to ratify the 22nd amendment to the Constitution which now debars a President from serving more than two terms of office.

In a general sense the idea of the "constitutional" President appeals to the conservative mind, while the "stewardship" or leader theory is the theme of the progressives. There are of course many reservations which ought to be made to such an assertion, as for instance, that Hamilton, a hero to most conservatives, was an advocate of an active presidency and the fact that the first Republican President, Lincoln, was a conspicuously non-"constitutional" President. In terms of scholarly as well as of popular history the great Presidents have all been leaders—Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt—and they were great precisely because they were leaders of the nation. One of the difficulties for the conservatives has been to discover a great President who was not a politically active leader and to explain his greatness in terms that could be easily understood. The task has not been easy; Washington was a little remote, but now there is Eisenhower. It remains to be seen whether world events will allow Eisenhower to continue in the lack of national political leadership in which he so clearly believes.

A second aspect of this discussion is the nature of the President's role as chief administrator. Debate on the efficiency of the presidency as the institution constitutionally responsible for the total supervision of the multifarious departmental and agency activities

of federal government, is now just over one hundred years old. In the present century we have had the Committee on Economy and Efficiency in the Federal government set up by President Taft (1910-1913); Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management (1937); and, with Truman, the (Hoover) Commission on the Organisation of the Executive Branch of the government, which was appointed in 1947 and reported in 1949. All these inquiries have been concerned with management questions in the main but each has paid attention to the size and scope of governmental operations in the period with which it was concerned. None have made political or constitutional proposals—these were not required by the terms of reference—but each laid emphasis on the contemporary nature of presidential administrative problems and underlined the burdens of the presidency. The slogan of the Committee on Administrative Management was "The President needs Help," while the theme of the Hoover Commission appears to have been a continual nagging on the lack of clear lines of authority from the President down to his subordinate civil servants; and the Commission stressed that the President's task is impossible without (a) a considerable regrouping of federal departments and agencies to form a smaller number of non-overlapping units, and (b) more skilled and continuous assistance to the President at Cabinet level to permit him to supervise efficiently the numerous government activities for which he is constitutionally responsible.

Important results of the 1937 Committee's recommendations were that in 1939 the "Executive Office of President" was created; the President was given six administrative assistants and a few important bodies—the National Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Personnel Management and the Office of Government Reports—were brought directly into the Executive Office of the President. The results of the Hoover Commission's recommendations cannot be dealt with here in detail, but progress has been made in the reduction of the number of departments and agencies reporting to the President, while *post* but not necessarily *propter hoc* President Eisenhower has equipped himself with devices which assist him in keeping up to date on current developments at home and abroad without himself having to attend to every detail.

A word may be appropriate about the importance attached to these changes by students of public administration. None of the changes suggested were revolutionary but that should not lead us to conclude that they were easy to make. Conflict between the Executive and Congress is traditional and—according to the

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American tradition—beneficial to the democratic process. No President can make changes, even in what might be considered the almost purely domestic "White House" aspects of his personal administrative methods, without the interest of Congress being aroused. It is an axiom that whatever increases the efficiency of the executive branch detracts from the authority of the legislature, and changes that would pass unremarked in a parliamentary-cabinet system will be resisted or prevented in the presidential-congressional conflict. Congress, as well as the President, supervises the activities of the administration and has frequently written into the laws provisions about administrative methods which the President cannot change at will.

Both the President's Committee on Administrative Management and the Hoover Commission drew attention to the burdens of the presidency, and both assumed that because the constitution puts the executive power in one man, that chief executive must be helped with his burden by devices rather than by other men. The plural executive is a foreign conception which has never appealed to Americans and there are constitutional arguments against its use in that country. From time to time it has been urged that a President could use his Cabinet more effectively to assist him with the terrifying weight of his duties but it has seemed unlikely that this would happen. The basic reasons for this belief were, I think, two. Cabinet officers are not popularly elected and thus have no moral or political right to any part of executive power; and, secondly, Cabinet officers not being first rank party politicians would have no interest in sharing the President's political burdens and no special experience or skill in managing political relations with Congress. In short, however much the President might wish to lean for corporate support on his Cabinet, one could not assume that, as the political fate of Cabinet ministers did not depend on the President's political successes (for Cabinet ministers not only have no political past they have no political future either), they would be willing to give him that support. It was every minister for himself, and the President took responsibility for his own and their shortcomings. In fact Cabinet solidarity in the British sense was entirely lacking, and the Cabinet as a formulator of agreed and binding government policy an academic proposition. President Truman (who was blessed with an iron constitution and fortified with a reading of orthodox histories of the presidency) said in the first volume of his memoirs that in the American system a President simply cannot,

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either constitutionally or morally, delegate his powers or share his burdens with his Cabinet colleagues.

This, however, is precisely what Eisenhower has done, and Mr. Donovan's book¹ is one of the first accounts to appear of the "new look" in White House methods of administration. The President's illnesses have little or nothing to do with the new arrangements he has made for the conduct of presidential business. All was planned well in advance, so that when he fell ill his position as chairman of the Cabinet was taken over by the Vice-President—who was scrupulously careful to leave Ike's actual chair vacant—and the business was carried on as usual. Eisenhower is known to dislike the political side of politics, and the arrangements he has made fit in with his preference for smooth non-controversial administration of the country more or less according to the principles and policies bequeathed him by his predecessors. His non-political attitude, his "constitutional monarch" view of his presidential role as his opponents put it, apparently appeals to the great majority of Americans, but it does not necessarily appeal to the Republican Party; and that party, as we now know, does not appeal to the voters as much as the Democratic Party. Eisenhower has succeeded in putting himself above politics for the time being, and to some extent it looks as if he has been able to do this by making arrangements for the conduct of administration business which are successful arrangements both from his own, non-political standpoint, and from the point of view of administrative efficiency.

The core of the Eisenhower reforms is the Cabinet. Notwithstanding President Truman and other eminent students, he has made the Cabinet work, and work hard and effectively, to a definite schedule, and as a team. The Cabinet supports him, and ministers support each other in a way unknown in American history in the past.

Before assuming the presidency Eisenhower met with his shadow cabinet and made clear his thoughts on organisation. The Cabinet was to meet regularly for a start, it was to come to decisions, and these decisions were to be carried out. The fact that this does happen is remarkable by American standards, for in times past, acting on the correct constitutional maxim that the Cabinet is a collection of the President's servants, ministers frequently went to the President (or to Harry Hopkins) for a personal presidential approval of a policy they did wish to have discussed in a cabinet

¹ *Eisenhower: the Inside Story*. By Robert Donovan. (Hamish Hamilton.)

meeting. Eisenhower seems to have stopped all that. There appears to be no "inner-ring" of more important Cabinet members clustered around the President. In the Cabinet Mr. Dulles (whose office is senior to the others) appears to be closest to the President. Outside the Cabinet we get the impression that the President obtains guidance and advice from his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and from General Clay—now the chairman of the Continental Can Company. But no "inner Cabinet" and no "kitchen Cabinet" are apparent.

Eisenhower's known political beliefs are few. He wants to modernise Republican Party thinking by getting the Party to accept the facts of New Deal achievement. He wants to lower the temperature of domestic political controversy. He wants to restrict federal government activity to activity of the last resort when state and private efforts have failed. For the rest of political activity he has a distaste, and can stand on the principle that Congress, not the President, is the political arm of government. With these views made abundantly clear to a sympathetic Cabinet the way is clear for a life unencumbered by the trivialities of the presidential position—particularly as the President has made it known from the start that he will have nothing whatever to do with patronage questions.

Eisenhower regards his Cabinet as a forum for frank discussion and debate: just how frank that discussion is could not be revealed by Mr. Donovan who, although given exceptional facilities to produce his book, did not attend Cabinet meetings. The President has introduced the idea of staff officers (recommended by the Hoover Commission) to prepare the materials for Cabinet decision. He has encouraged the emergence of the Vice-President as a figure of full political and administrative stature. He has introduced greater formality into the deliberations of the Cabinet; questions of which notice has not been given cannot normally be raised in Cabinet; he has used the Cabinet as a means of preventing those inter-departmental feuds which have characterised previous administrations. Taking another leaf from the Hoover Commission's book he has had in regular attendance at Cabinets the chairman of the Civil Service Commission. To give more cohesion to its work a secretary to the Cabinet has been appointed; he works closely with Mr. Sherman Adams (the Assistant to the President) and for the first time in history the Cabinet works, each week, to a formal agenda prepared by the secretary to the Cabinet. The Cabinet secretary also briefs the President about questions which are coming up for Cabinet decision and circulates the agenda and supporting

papers to the ministers. As soon as the Cabinet rises (it meets every Friday for about three hours) the secretary puts the follow-up procedure into action. This consists of a meeting between himself and a group of sub-Cabinet officers (usually the executive assistants to ministers or assistant secretaries) whose duty it is to see that decisions made in Cabinet are acted upon by the departments.

The President asks for, and obtains, final agreement from the Cabinet on the questions before it, and in bringing discussion to a close makes it clear that his summing up is to be taken as a binding corporate decision of the whole administration. He has introduced from Army procedure the staff system "in which all functions and responsibilities flow in a more or less fixed order and sequence from the President on down" (to quote Mr. Donovan), and the key officer in this system is the President's Assistant, Mr. Sherman Adams, who acts as his political and administrative chief of staff. The general must be left to consider the major strategy of the political battle—or more likely to brood on how to avoid a battle—while the utmost height to which a routine political or administrative matter can rise is to the level of the President's Assistant. Mr. Adams is clearly a godsend to this system—and to this President—for he understands his job as being that of protecting the President from the boring and commonplace matters of day-to-day politics: and as befits a member of the great Adams clan he inspires respect and is prepared to take on great responsibilities. "Either make up your minds," Adams tells two squabbling department heads, "or else tell me and I will do it. We must not bother the President with this. He is trying to keep the world from war." The President signs documents marked "O.K. . . S.A." and is likely to query those not so decorated. Mr. Adams is a built-in permanent and institutionalised Hopkins, and not all are happy at such a reorganisation of traditionally inefficient procedures. It suits the President, who believes that Adams is the one man who really understands what he is trying to do. Senator McCarthy called Adams the "palace guard," but on the whole the system does not appear to have come under serious attack.

It can hardly be disputed that some such reorganisation of the presidential office was long overdue, and it is important to note that the direction of reorganisation has been that suggested by the Hoover Commission. The most important new features which could be carried over into future administrations seem to be those concerning the role of Assistant to the President, the secretary to the Cabinet, the orderly procedure of regular Cabinet meetings, and the

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follow-up to the departments. These could be carried over because they seem in themselves so obviously desirable and workable. Of the continued solidarity and corporate feeling of future American cabinets one cannot feel so certain. A great part of the new presidential role played by Eisenhower must be attributable to his own desire for such a role, to the respect in which he is held by his Cabinet colleagues, to calculations that he must be supported, this time and next time, because the Republicans have no other certain presidential winner. If the Cabinet does not follow along in Eisenhower's general direction what will become of the Republican Party? Can we be sure that with any other President, Republican or Democrat, these admirable new procedures would appeal either to that President or to his Cabinet appointees? If America once again became the battle-ground of great political issues could the new system stand the strain? A president who was an active party leader might find it more difficult than Eisenhower does to work with his Assistant and with his Cabinet colleagues. By temperament, background, and from choice, President Eisenhower has designed a system such as has long been urged on Presidents by experts in the problems of the presidency, but with the world as it is it might be rash to assume that the golden age of presidential political inactivity has now arrived.

The Cabinet held together and worked effectively during the President's long illness because its work was allotted to it by Mr. Adams; because it did not wish to hamper the President's recovery by a show of disunity; because, when it was possible that Eisenhower might run again, it was necessary to advertise the fact that there were no doubting or disloyal elements around the President; perhaps because, within the broad limits set by the presidential attitude, Cabinet ministers have never been unnecessarily interfered with in the running of their own departments; and almost certainly because the Cabinet never had any intention, with or without Eisenhower, of organising domestic or foreign crusades. But it is a debatable question whether the system could have worked either under President Nixon, who would have succeeded had Eisenhower's heart attack been fatal, or in that queer dusk of muted medico-constitutional controversy where a President, though living, is regarded as unfit to perform the duties of his office.

SOCIALIST UNIFICATION IN ITALY

NINETTA JUCKER

• WHEN insurrection broke out in Hungary many Italians thought that events in eastern Europe should hasten socialist unification at home. Asked to confirm this impression Pietro Nenni would answer ruefully that the relation between cause and effect was like setting fire to one's house in order to fry an egg. Since then the flames have spread and even the tiny Italian socialist egg is in danger of being charred. As things stand today either the two Italian socialist parties unite at once on a purely empirical basis, leaving the philosophical hair splitting to the future, or there is real danger of a relapse into some new form of Popular Front. The brutality and cynicism of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, without any attempt to cloak the naked *raison d'état* with a doctrinal socialist justification, has been the greatest shock to western socialists (and communists) since Stalin signed his pact with Hitler. All the same in 1939 socialists and communists recovered from that shock and under the pressure of events later renewed their joint action pact. Nenni, who was in France at the time, was deeply impressed by those events and most of all by the way in which the outlawing of the French communists served to reinvigorate the party. But for the victimising of French communists the Stalin-Ribbentrop Pact might have been fatal to western communism. Nenni, today, greatly fears a repetition of this mistake. He is genuinely alarmed lest anti-communist feeling in Europe should get out of control and, carrying all before it, sweep away the hopes of socialist unification in Italy. No good could come of this to socialism or to democracy.

In the last few months concrete steps towards unification have been taken by both parties, starting with the meeting between Nenni and Saragat at Pralognan. These moves are generally thought to be a direct consequence of the twentieth Soviet Communist Congress. Destalinisation and its repercussions have naturally affected Italian socialists in either camp, but the genesis of the unification movement is to be sought farther back. The first sign of an important change in the balance of political alignments in Italy came from the general election of June 1953. In that

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election the Christian Democrats lost their absolute majority in parliament (they had never had an absolute majority of votes) and the socialists re-emerged with 12.7 per cent. of the total of votes polled, while the Social Democrats' strength went down from 7.1 to 4.5 per cent. of the total. Signor Saragat's first reaction was to declare that "centrismo"—the middle policy pursued by de Gasperi—had failed, and to pull his party out of the government coalition. Only after various experiments in Christian Democratic minority government had broken down was he drawn back into uneasy alliance with the Liberals and Christian Democrats, first in Signor Scelba's government and later in that of Signor Segni, now in office. Throughout the period of the Scelba government the alliance was a makeshift arrangement kept in being by perpetually renewed promises of a "clarification." Later this word dropped out of Italian political jargon and was replaced by the term "qualificazione" which was meant to signify that each party in the coalition should stand forward in its true colours and that the Christian Democrats were to "qualify" themselves by choosing once and for all between economic socialism and conservatism. The discussions over the precise geometrical position of each party, group, and individual were protracted happily for over three years. They still go on and constitute a form of intellectual exercise indulged in with gusto and varying talent by all the party leaders and the whole community of politicians and political journalists. Academic hair splitting is also practised at local meetings of all the parties but more particularly by the old and younger generations of socialists. Outside the parties the mass of Italian citizens tends to become less and less interested in all this theorising and abstract argument and to be ever more indifferent to what goes on in parliament and in the parties. A gulf divides the nation from the caste of politicians who seem to think that they have endless time at their disposal and can protract their arguing for ever.

It was something of a shock to the politicians to discover, after the municipal and provincial elections last April, that things had moved in the country without their being directly responsible. The electorate had expressed itself in favour of socialist unification. The public will appeared very clearly from the fact that the Socialist Party gained most votes in the municipal elections where it stood by itself, while the Social Democrats gained most in the Provincial Council elections where socialists and communists stood together in joint lists. It was assumed that many people had given their vote

to the socialists in the municipal elections and to the Social Democrats in the provincial elections and that the votes given to the latter were in fact "lent" to them to encourage the party to go ahead with the unification programme rather timidly approved by its congress last January in Milan. The lesson seemed to be that the socialist electorate was moving faster than its leaders in the direction of unification. Many socialist and social democrat leaders continued, however, to think that it was for them to tell their constituents when they were ready to unite and not for their constituents to press them. Italian politicians seldom keep their ears to the ground. They tend to despise the electorate and to claim that the public is not yet politically mature. This is particularly the case with second ranking party men, the lieutenants and subordinate officers of the real leaders. One may suspect that this numerous and influential order of politicians is often tempted to raise difficulties over abstract points of theory in order to cloak its personal anxieties over such matters as the distribution of places and the losing of influence. In the case of the two socialist parties unification has certainly been retarded by the difficulty of sorting out the mosaic of personal interests, of weighing and measuring influence, and, in general, by all that side of politics which the eighteenth century called "business." It must be remembered in this connection that one of the parties concerned is in government and the other in opposition.

Signor Nenni is a party leader of the old-fashioned type. His hold on the party depends on his remarkable capacity to divine, interpret, and guide the humour of the rank and file. So long as he is at its head, the Socialist Party and Pietro Nenni are synonymous terms. But Nenni has little talent for "business." He is not a true party manager like his adversaries Signors Togliatti and Fanfani, secretaries of the Communist and Christian Democratic Parties, nor even like his own late lieutenant, Signor Morandi. Nenni seriously under-rated the weight of the party cadres when he personally committed the party to unification in his first *tête-à-tête* meeting with Saragat at Pralognan. His colleagues deeply resented this initiative and complained of Nenni's "paternalism." A party secretary, they said, cannot commit the party on such a fundamental issue without at least consulting the Executive. It was the embarrassment caused by this *faux pas* which later induced Nenni, under pressure from his general staff, to meet Togliatti and sign the much deplored "consultation treaty" with the communists which was supposed to replace the old joint action pact, though the latter was never formally denounced.

In the affairs of the Socialist Party, perhaps more than in any other, personalities play an important part, for the party is very loosely organised and disciplined. Signor Pertini, the party vice-secretary and a typical socialist of the old anti-fascist generation, and Tullio Vecchietti, the young intellectual editor of *Avanti*, are the personalities who, up to the present, have pulled most heavily against Nenni's programme of unification. There is also a pro-communist set among the socialist deputies. Some of these are thought to owe their seats, in part, to communist votes and communist funds. (In the general election of 1953 the Communist Party had an obvious interest in the success of its socialist ally.)

Difficulties of a personal nature exist on the Social Democratic side. It is significant, for instance, that Signor Paolo Rossi, the present Minister of Education, and Signor Paolo Treves, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, have shown themselves far more implacably hostile to the unification than has Signor Simonini, the titular head of the party's right-wing and a veteran socialist.

In Signor Nenni's party hostility to the unification comes from the extreme left. Its opponents claim to follow the lead of the late Signor Morandi who was often unjustly branded, outside the party, as a crypto-communist. Nenni's task would certainly be easier had Morandi been alive. Morandi would either have supported the unification or opposed it, and there would have been an end of the matter, for he was the only man in the party whose influence rivalled Nenni's. As it is anyone can claim to speak in the name of a dead leader. In the Christian Democratic Party too every personality claims to be de Gasperi's political executor.

Nenni's political instinct tells him that since the two parties have decided, on general principles, in favour of unification the matter should be concluded as quickly as possible. Attention should be concentrated on the points on which the two parties are agreed and controversial matters should be left in abeyance. But after the experience of being jockeyed by Pertini and his friends into signing a new treaty with the communists and having been made to feel all the weight of party disapproval of his "paternalist" methods, Nenni has become cautious and has decided to give his staff time to work off steam in preparing the party congress scheduled to take place at the end of January. This, at least, was his intention on the eve of the Hungarian insurrection.

Since then outside events have assumed overwhelming importance and it is clear that the course of socialist unification in Italy will depend entirely on what happens in Europe and in

the world in the immediate future. The urge towards unification developed in a "climate" of East West *détente* and it may not survive a return to cold war conditions or worse, even though, at first sight, socialist indignation at the barbarous Soviet intervention in Hungary ranges this party on the side of western social democracy against the communists.

Events succeed each other with such rapidity at present that it is quite impossible to foresee their course during the ten or twelve weeks which have still to run before the socialists and Social Democrats hold their simultaneous congresses which are to sanction the great decision to unite. Nonetheless it seems fair to predict that any formal acts which may or may not be performed by either side will have but a marginal influence on the final outcome. Some socialists, for instance, would have the Social Democrats leave the government at once, although Nenni himself has never insisted on this point, which he considers immaterial. On the other side some influential Social Democrats are asking the socialists formally to renounce the new pact with the communists. Nenni himself is in favour of withdrawing the party from the organisation known as the Partisans of Peace, which has turned out to be nothing but an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. It is also believed that Nenni intends to give up the £10,000 of his Stalin peace prize and turn the money over to the victims of the Soviet repression in Hungary. In my opinion none of these acts or any similar gestures will have much bearing on the final result. Should anti-communist feeling take the form of political or even physical persecution and should the Communist Party be able to rally under the strain and re-organise itself on a narrower and more militant basis, the socialists may find themselves drawn back into another Popular Front unless very great forbearance is shown here by the non-communist and anti-communist parties and, first and foremost, by the greatest anti-communist force in Italy, the Vatican. At present only the most unprejudiced political observers seem to be aware of this danger.

Socialist unification has enemies on both sides: on the left the communists, on the right the conservatives (in whichever political party these may be camouflaged) and the Church. The Christian Democratic Party is necessarily hostile to the unification for the fortunes of this party are directly related to those of the communists. When the communists were strong and feared, the Christian Democrats obtained an absolute majority. When communist strength waned, the Christian Democrats lost the floating vote to the middle parties. At the municipal elections last April there was

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a swing to the left of the entire electorate from the MSI (neofascists) to the socialists. Each party poured off votes onto its immediate neighbour, but the swing stopped short at the Socialist Party and the communist electorate shifted slightly to the right. Today the Christian Democrats know very well that a united Socialist Party which went to the polls in an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the socialist cause could poll an enormous vote and would certainly be the second party in the country, not greatly inferior to the Christian Democratic Party itself. They know too that the fact of unification itself may be enough to determine the President of the Republic to anticipate a dissolution of parliament. The constitutional issue is uncertain for there are no precedents and the matter comes within the President's prerogative. A united Socialist Party in a new legislature would offer an alternative to a Christian Democratic or coalition government and for the first time since its restoration the Italian parliament would house a strong constitutional opposition. The weight in parliament of a united Socialist Party, whether in government or opposition, would be sufficient to put an end to Christian Democratic monopoly of the administration of economic and other reforms. The numerous "enti" created for planning land reform and pre-industrial programmes would cease to be vehicles for spreading the electoral influence of the Christian Democratic Party (like the Treasury in an eighteenth-century parliament). The socialists, on their side, have ceased to sabotage reforming legislation as they did, in blind support of the communists, when the Christian and Social Democrats first tabled their land and tax reforms. The Christian Democratic Party, whose own socialising left-wing is extremely powerful, would have to come to terms with a United Socialist Party either as an ally in government or as a constitutional Opposition in Parliament in a way in which it never needed to reckon with the communists.

The Church too prefers to carry on a dialectical opposition to the communists rather than find itself in immediate political opposition to the socialists. As long as they dare both the Church and the Christian Democratic Party will try to impede socialist unification, but an alternative policy is ready should unification get the upper hand. This policy was outlined by Signor Gonella during the Christian Democratic congress last October in Trent. If need be the Church will separate its responsibilities from those of the Christian Democratic Party leaving this free to make what agreements it sees fit with the "marxists." Incidentally the Church has

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never found any difficulty in countenancing the Christian Democratic alliance with a marxist of pure faith like Signor Saragat. Unfortunately at present it seems likely that outside events will tempt both the Church and the Christian Democratic Party to play the intransigent card. A holy crusade against the communists at home and abroad would find Italian Liberals and conservatives (these last have no party of their own but are lodged in the Liberal, Christian Democratic, Monarchist, and MSI parties) only too ready to join in, for they greatly fear the economic implications of the Christian Democratic Party's official programme, based on the Vanoni Plan. There is no doubt that either in alliance with or in opposition to a strong United Socialist Party the Christian Democrats would be obliged to develop their proclaimed industrial and agrarian policies which threatens "free enterprise" with the menace of a planned economy.

Should these conservative influences prevail with the Christian Democratic Party, and Signor Scelba has already made it clear that he is ready to lead the crusade, the result could be disastrous. The trade union sector, where Nenni's drive for socialist unification has encountered a far stronger resistance than from the party cadres, would be the first to feel it. Once the trade unions felt that the unity of the working classes was being undermined for conservative ends, there would be an end to all hopes of unification. Indeed, in the present world atmosphere of tension and unrest, there is no saying what the results might be. Last week Signor Bartesaghi, a Catholic Independent deputy, raised a murmur from all over the Chamber when he used the words civil war in connection with the repercussions at home of world events. Let us hope that by the time this article is published the words may seem even more inappropriate.

NEW PROSPECTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

PETER SELF

THIS summer the Government finally announced its policy for local government reorganisation. The white paper¹ which the Minister of Housing and Local Government presented to Parliament is a very cautious document—which is hardly surprising as it mainly consists of proposals agreed between all the local authority associations. To some the surprising thing is that Mr. Sandys got the associations to agree on anything at all. Nevertheless, apart from any interest it may have to a student of flyweight diplomacy, the white paper does offer an interesting starting point for a review of local government prospects. It puts the old, slightly stale issues into a somewhat new setting, one which, despite the Government's caution, can be seen to contain some far-reaching possibilities.

Superficially, the new white paper would seem simply to set the clock back to 1945. Now, as then, it is proposed to set up a Local Government Commission (or rather two Commissions, as Wales this time will get a separate one). Once again the Commission will have broad discretionary powers to propose the promotion, demotion, and amalgamation of local authorities and the revision of their boundaries, except that this time its authority will not formally extend to county districts. Once again, however, it will receive general guidance from the Minister which appears likely with one significant exception to be treated later) to be fully as restrictive as last time. But there will be one important difference in procedure. The last Commission was charged with the direct duty of making orders for local government reorganisation (subject, in the more important cases to parliamentary confirmation); the new Commissions will in effect function as advisory bodies, recommending to the Minister what orders he should lay before Parliament. This acceptance of ultimate ministerial responsibility at least makes the procedure more realistic.

The last Boundary Commission, deciding that piecemeal reorganisation was unsatisfactory, produced a comprehensive plan

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of its own for local government reform. The Government did not adopt this and the Commission eventually received its *congé* from Mr. Bevan after a spell of frustrated inaction. Will the new Commission suffer a similar fate? Or will it be forced to content itself with the kind of sticking and patching so decisively rejected by its predecessor as inadequate?

Counties and County Boroughs

The issues of local government reorganisation now seem to fall under three main heads. First there is the old conflict of county and county borough, which for the last Commission constituted the central problem. It worked on the reasonable assumptions that towns which were similar in respect of their wealth and population should enjoy a similar local government status, and that no group of authorities should possess powers for which they were now unfitted. The first condition could be met only by creating a lot more county boroughs—a device which would wreck county government—or alternatively by demoting half or more of the existing county boroughs—an approach which would be unduly and unnecessarily harsh. Consequently, the Commission favoured the creation of a new kind of urban authority which would discharge most, but not all, of the present functions of a county borough. This arrangement would both deal equitably and uniformly with the middle-sized towns (which present arrangements plainly do not), and would also adapt the nineteenth-century notion of the self-sufficient urban authority to modern requirements. Whatever its limitations in other respects, the Commission's plan was impeccably logical and reasonable in its treatment of the problems of county borough status.

No such logical rigour is found in the new white paper, which bears all the marks of a slipshod and defensive political compromise. Generally speaking, it leaves the questions of which towns (if any) should gain or lose county borough status, and which counties (if any) should be amalgamated or divided, to be settled by the new Commission. It does not lay down any clear principles for adjudicating between the interests of counties and county boroughs where these clash (as they frequently must); nor does it even mention the last Commission's proposal for squaring the circle by creating a new type of urban authority. The dominant note is one of considerable caution. It points out, for example, that "to deprive a county borough of its independent status would be a most serious step which should be contemplated only where it is plainly

necessary for efficient administration"; and in another place it states that unions of counties will need to be considered only in rare cases. This approach, and the absence of any constructive formula for breaking the county-county borough deadlock, can suggest only one conclusion: that (outside the main conurbations, which are dealt with separately) there will be relatively little change in the present structure of local government so far as the major authorities are concerned. The *status quo* will be generally preserved.

This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the one specific proposal upon which the local authority associations have reached agreement and which the Government has accepted. This is that towns of more than 100,000 population should be regarded as having a *prima facie* case for the award of county borough status. In point of fact, only Luton plainly qualifies under this provision. Two or three other towns (notably Poole and Cambridge) might also qualify if (as the white paper quite correctly provides) the case for boundary extensions is simultaneously taken into account. In addition, there are a few other cases where an amalgamation of several urban authorities might produce a title to county borough status. (Examples are the Medway towns, which have already actively canvassed this possibility, and the seaside resorts in the Isle of Thanet.) The point to note, however, is that even as regards half a dozen cases that may crop up under this provision the white paper is ambiguous. As it happens, the elevation of Luton, Cambridge, and Poole would in each case make the respective administrative counties (Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, and Dorset) almost, or quite, unworkable. Will these counties then be amalgamated with neighbouring counties, or left to limp along as best they can? Or will these towns' claims be after all rejected (as they have been before) because of their effect on the counties? It is natural that the Government should wish to leave such ticklish individual cases for the Commission to decide. Yet the fact remains that the one specific provision which it has laid down will prove to be a lame guide even to the few cases which may arise under it.

It is also plainly illogical to confine the grant of county borough status to towns over 100,000, while allowing most or all of the thirty-five existing county boroughs which are smaller than this to retain their status. Yet this seems to be the Government's intention. In Sussex, for example, the seaside towns of Hastings (population 66,000) and Eastbourne (population 58,000) are county boroughs; the very similar resorts of Hove (69,000) and Worthing (69,000) are not. How can this distinction possibly be justified,

particularly now that a non-county borough is left with the mere rump of its former powers and importance? As already emphasised, the last Commission pointed out a way of overcoming these anomalies. It looks as if the new Commission will be expected to turn a blind eye to them. Theoretically (to take this particular example) it might propose county borough status for Hove and Worthing, since the White Paper does not specifically exclude the elevation of towns below 100,000, merely observing that there must be "a strong case" to justify it. But since this course would necessarily imply an equal willingness to promote county amalgamations (measures which, in the terms of the white paper, would need a great deal more justification), the Commission is hardly likely to take it. If, alternatively, it proposed the demotion of Hastings and Eastbourne, the objections (again in terms of the white paper) would be still more weighty.

The truth is that the Government, like the local authority associations, will simply not face up to the causes of the present deadlock. These are that the number of major authorities (sixty-two counties and eighty-three county boroughs) is already excessive and yet, given the premises of the present system, the claims of many more towns to become county boroughs are almost unanswerable. Only a constructive formula can break this deadlock. It is useless to review again the circumstances of particular areas without the aid of such a formula. This is precisely the lesson which the experience of the last Commission made abundantly plain. It is understandable that the local authority associations should fail collectively to produce a workable formula because of their deep divisions of interest. But it seems incredible that the Government should have failed so completely to learn from experience.

The Conurbations

The white paper might be written off as a document wholly barren of constructive ideas if it were not for its rather more positive approach to the second major aspect of local government reorganisation—namely the problems of the conurbations. Both the local authorities associations and the Government have now recognised for the first time that these areas require special treatment, and this in itself is a great advance. Indeed this recognition constitutes the main development in local government thinking since the war. The last Commission, though it made some interesting proposals for the Manchester area, failed to tackle this aspect of reform at all systematically. Its importance is underlined

by the fact that 40 per cent. of the population of England and Wales live in the six major conurbations distinguished by the 1951 census; moreover, the county-county borough conflict is at its most intense in these areas, in which altogether thirty county boroughs, fifteen counties and several hundred minor authorities jostle for position. If local government in these areas can be separately and satisfactorily reformed, then the weakness of the white paper's general principles will matter less.

The Government recognises that the luxuriant growth of local government flora and fauna in the few great urban areas is far from being conducive to administrative efficiency. For example, over fifty local authorities preside over the affairs of Greater Manchester; they include one large county borough (Manchester itself), six smaller county boroughs, two counties, fifteen non-county boroughs, twenty-nine urban districts and one rural district. (A more realistic definition of this conurbation than that given in the census would bring in two other counties, Derbyshire and the West Riding, and several more minor authorities.) As a minimal measure, the white paper suggests that the number of local authorities in these areas should be reduced and that county boundaries, which still follow the rural catchment areas of medieval days, should be adjusted to the industrial age.

The white paper recognises that bolder measures than this may be necessary, which would take the form of replacing the patchwork quilt of local government in the conurbations by a uniform system. It has two suggestions (very sketchily indicated) for achieving such a uniform system. Starting from the proposition that "the county borough is the normal form of government for a big town," but recognising that the conurbations are too vast to be administered by a single county borough, it suggests that "it might be possible to form a group of county boroughs which, between them, would cover the whole area." It recognises that this approach would still leave a need for some type of co-ordinating authority for the entire conurbation. This need might be met by setting up a joint body representative of the various county boroughs, although the white paper has doubts (very justified ones) about the effectiveness of such a co-ordinating body. These doubts lead the Government to its second suggestion which is that "a directly elected upper tier authority might be created to deal with all the services requiring joint action." This important proposition is baldly stated and gets no further elaboration.

One of the most urgent needs in each conurbation is to secure a really effective major authority able to plan and (in some cases) operate the important key services which concern the whole area. To set up a group of county boroughs, who would then be certain to defend to the utmost their independent status and rights, is hardly the best way to set about this objective, which calls for a great deal more than the creation of a mere joint authority.

The second alternative mentioned in the white paper would entail the extension of two-tier government throughout the conurbations and the creation of a new type of urban county. Wholly urban counties already exist in the shape of London and Middlesex; but neither covers anything like an entire conurbation (although London once did) and neither has the appropriate range of functions which a conurban county now needs to possess. There are also, however, more recent and more favourable precedents for this idea than can be adduced for the alternative "county borough" approach. After the war, a group of local authorities in the Manchester area (which included Manchester itself) proposed the creation of a Manchester County Council which would absorb parts of four counties and cover the area of sixty-five local authorities. With a total population of over 2½ million, the proposed county would cover a rather larger area than the conurbation defined in the 1951 census. This scheme appeared in an emasculated version in the proposals of the Local Government Boundary Commission, which cut down its scope out of deference to the hostility of the smaller county boroughs in the area who feared Manchester domination and did not wish to surrender any of their powers to the new county council. This Manchester scheme is temporarily in abeyance, but has considerable local support. Meanwhile, the first example of a successful scheme of unitary government for a large urban area has recently been launched in Canada, where Toronto and twelve surrounding municipalities have joined together to form a council for Metropolitan Toronto.

The interesting point about both the Toronto scheme and the proposed Manchester scheme is the extensive and novel (and very similar) range of functions allocated to the major authority. Under both schemes it is (or would be) responsible for water supply, sewage disposal, trunk sewers, and main highways; it determines the broader aspects of planning schemes and it has concurrent powers with the second-tier authorities in respect of housing; and it co-ordinates and helps finance education. In Toronto, the new authority also operates public transport, and under the Manchester

scheme the new county would be responsible for fire services and police. The extent to which these functions differ from those customarily possessed by an English county is significant. There is much more emphasis upon physical planning, housing, and public utilities—services which need close integration within the narrow and crowded confines of a conurbation. By contrast, there is less emphasis upon the social services, because in a crowded urban area the second-tier authorities are (or could be made) more capable of their administration than is the case elsewhere. In this field, the major authority's appropriate functions are those of co-ordination, financial aid and the provision of special facilities.

These schemes provide the key to a satisfactory reorganisation of local government within the conurbations. Its essential principle should be a novel distribution of functions between a single major authority and a regrouped array of second-tier authorities. The latter would be based on the existing county boroughs and county districts, but they would need to be made much more uniform in their population and consequent financial capacity than is now the case. To achieve this in a populous area presents no serious difficulties, because the smaller authorities could be amalgamated without the same danger of becoming "remote" as arises elsewhere. They could then be presented with a worthwhile range of functions in their own right, such as education and the preventive health services, subject to some degree of co-ordination. An opposite problem arises in the case of the largest provincial cities, such as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, and Newcastle, each of which contains between a quarter and a half of the total population of their respective conurbations. Should these cities be sub-divided, as could be done under these circumstances, without much loss of administrative efficiency and with a theoretical gain in democratic assessability? Probably not in view of their well-established civic tradition. It is, however, desirable that some part of their influence and prestige should attach itself to the new county council which would preside over the entire conurbation.

The major authority ought to be directly elected and not consist of representatives of the second-tier authorities as is the case under both the Toronto and Manchester schemes. The device of indirect election or representation was introduced in these cases to appease the existing local authorities. However, it is bound to inhibit the major authority from taking a broad enough view of its responsibilities.

The white paper proffers a slight hope that schemes of this type

might be introduced in the main provincial conurbations. So far as London is concerned, however, it deliberately runs away from the general arguments which it elsewhere propounds. It seems that the new Commission, like the last one, will be excluded from any effective consideration of the problems of local government in Greater London. The white paper indicates that the Commission should treat the existence and the boundaries of the counties of London and Middlesex as sacrosanct, although it will be allowed to review the remainder of the conurbation and to consider whether there are any functions which should be handled in some way for Greater London as a whole. This is an absurdly restrictive directive. Its basis seems to be that the Government cannot contemplate the prospect of any local authority larger than the London County Council, even one with more restricted powers.

The Future of Delegation

The third and last field for reorganisation concerns the position of the minor authorities—that is, the three types of county district (urban districts, rural districts, and non-county boroughs). There are altogether over 1,300 county districts of various kinds in England and Wales. Here, as the Conservatives are fond of saying, is local government at its most local (save, of course, for the parishes). Unfortunately, it is also local government at its most decayed. Under post-war legislation, the minor authorities have lost all their previous direct powers in the important fields of education (save for forty-four "excepted" districts), of the police and fire services, of gas and electricity, of the health services, and of town and country planning. As a very poor exchange, they have been handed back certain limited functions by way of delegation, most notably in respect of town and country planning. This has left the minor authorities with a very restricted range of functions and has deprived them in particular of participation in the important social services. The blow has been much heavier to the larger municipal boroughs and urban districts which previously enjoyed considerable powers, and the effect upon the quality of their councillors and staff has been considerable. The politically sensitive functions with which these authorities are now left are housing, town planning (in so far as this is delegated) and water supplies (particularly in the countryside). The recent abolition of the general housing subsidy is, however, likely to terminate the housing activities of most of these authorities, save for a little slum clearance.

The remedy most often mooted for restoring some of the lost

glories of these authorities is the further development of delegation arrangements. This idea is not specifically discussed in the present white paper, but proposals on this matter which have been agreed to by the local authority associations are under review by the Government. Something must be done to revive local government at its most local, and a Conservative Government—which is or should be particularly conscious of this need—may well be tempted to look to delegation as the politically easiest cure. It is therefore opportune that a book should have appeared, written by Mr. Peter G. Richards, which reviews experience with delegation to date.²

Mr. Richards' account indicates how often delegation arrangements have been introduced simply as a matter of political expediency. The possibility of optional delegation (usually at the county council's discretion) has several times been introduced as a means of reducing the resentment felt by smaller authorities at the loss of some power. Delegation proposals have also played an important part in the recent manoeuvres of the local authority associations. The County Councils Association has accepted the principle of extended delegation, less it seems from genuine conviction than from the need to get the support of the minor authorities in its controversy with the county boroughs. At any rate, Mr. Richards points out that many individual counties were opposed to this idea—particularly the medium-sized counties. (The small counties assumed that their areas were too small for much delegation, while the largest ones were more ready to shed some of their heavy responsibilities.) As finally agreed, the local authority associations' joint proposals call for the preparation of separate schemes of delegation for each county, to be worked out by a joint committee composed of county and county districts with disputes referred to the Minister. These arrangements would provide for a very necessary degree of geographical flexibility; but they would also make delegation schemes—once agreed—binding on the counties. They appear to foreshadow a considerable increase in the use of delegation if they are accepted by the Government. Clearly, however, it would be wholly wrong to accept these proposals merely to soothe the hurt egos of the minor authorities and to assist the counties in their political battle. It is essential to assess the value of delegation as an administrative and political device.

Though Mr. Richards himself defends (in a somewhat lukewarm way) the concept of delegation, his study does not suggest that it

works particularly well in practice. It is easy to lay down the right principles, which are that the county council should lay down general policy and approve the broad estimates of expenditure and then leave its agent ample discretion for detailed administration. However, the fact that the county pays the whole bill for the service (even though the money has been raised for it by the district councils) is a very inhibiting factor, particularly since county districts—particularly those which make a large contribution to the county rate—are sometimes understandably keen to recapture for their areas as much expenditure as possible. Thus, delegation seems to work best in a service such as town planning, where there is little spending at stake save for that met by the central government. Delegation also increases administrative costs and leads to a great deal of delay as matters are referred to and fro between the different levels of government. The long intervals between the meetings of county council committees adds to this drawback. It is worth noting that, in place of the old notion of mutually independent local authorities, an elaborate hierarchy, stretching from Whitehall to The Wallops, has now grown up in such services as town and country planning and education. For example, planning decisions are now made at the national level, the regional level, the county level, the area level (a sub-division which exists in some counties), and the district level. Partly, such arrangements reflect the increased complexity of the service, but partly they reflect the inadequacies of local government.

Delegation works best in a few large counties such as Lancashire and Surrey, where uniform and comprehensive schemes for a number of services have been drawn up which cover the whole area of the county. In most counties, however, delegation is patchy and its use often gives rise to frictions and jealousies. It appears to work worst in those many counties which contain one large non-county borough. The patchy use of delegation is marked also in the case of the divisional executives for education, which are hybrid bodies covering areas intermediate in size between county and county district. Altogether, 158 divisional executives have been set up, but two-thirds of them are in seven large counties and in half the counties there are none. The divisional executives have become sufficiently entrenched to form a national association, which has successfully resisted attempts by some counties to thin their numbers in the interests of economy. Delegation to divisional executives encounters special snags because these bodies have no local roots of their own and must largely rely on county staff. The most that

² *Delegation in Local Government* by Peter G. Richards. (Allen & Unwin.)

Mr. Richards can say for them is that they have provided a lay check upon the otherwise excessive power of the county education officer—but this comment is as much as anything a reflection upon ineffective democratic control at the county level.

Delegation will probably play a larger part in local government in the future than it has in the past. It is a useful device, up to a point, for combining the need for planning and financing some services over a wider area with the desirability of keeping its administration as local as possible. Nevertheless it is in many ways an unsatisfactory device, and it ought not to be relied upon as the main means for propping up the declining minor authorities. It would be far preferable to combine the county districts into units which would be large enough to discharge more functions in their own rights. The possibilities of pursuing such a policy in the populous conurbations have already been indicated. Moreover, there are, a number of sizable municipal boroughs and urban districts elsewhere which are already capable of discharging more functions than they now possess. It would be a great mistake simply to delegate further functions to such authorities, since this diminishes their financial responsibility and exacerbates their relations with the county. The proper course is to turn them into the kind of most-purpose authorities envisaged by the last Boundary Commission.

However, the prospects for an effective regrouping of county districts in the rural and semi-rural parts of Britain are more problematic. The white paper proposes that county councils should continue with their pre-war task of amalgamating (by means of county review orders) the smaller county districts. Moreover, it proposes that these powers of review should be extended so as to include non-county boroughs, whose position has until now been regarded as sacrosanct. There are quite a number of small boroughs (particularly in the West of England) which have become ineffective units and would best be united with the surrounding rural district. Some of these boroughs themselves desire this course. The white paper proposes that any changes of this kind should require the specific consent of the Minister.

If amalgamations of this type are to produce effective units, then it is probably essential that there should be a complete and thorough-going integration of urban and rural areas. This is the only way in which units could be formed that are large enough to be given appreciable new powers without becoming too extensive in area. The increasing pressure for uniform services in town and countryside, and the identity of interest between market towns and

surrounding rural areas, help to make this course acceptable. In any case, it offers the only hope for reviving the vitality of most small authorities. The new units would still have to rely upon delegation arrangements for some of their functions. For example, they might replace the divisional executives for education, although in highly rural areas some form of grouping would still be necessary. If this policy were followed, it would be only logical to drop the present terminology and establish the uniform title of county district. It might, however, be desirable to grade county districts according to population as a basis for allocating different functions.

In conclusion, it appears that the Government is once again going about local government reorganisation in a mistaken and slipshod manner. The new Commissions which are to be set up will have a thankless task. They will not be able at any point to step outside the framework of the present system. They will have to decide questions about county borough status without considering what functions should be awarded to unsuccessful or demoted towns; and to revise county areas without knowing what kinds of county district will eventually emerge. In the case of the provincial conurbations, they may be encouraged to act as a sounding-board for new ideas, but they cannot apply any remedies which entail a novel redistribution of functions or the creation of a new type of authority. Should they be driven to propose large-scale extensions of county borough or county government, they will be opposed (reasonably enough) on the grounds that more desirable alternatives were excluded from their consideration. Their effective work will be confined to some rather pointless sticking and patching.

This is inevitable so long as the Government fails to revise the statutory framework of local government. All the aims which are now widely accepted as desirable—such as finding a new locus for medium-sized towns, overhauling the status and functions of second-tier authorities, and creating a new system within the conurbations—call for the creation of somewhat different categories of local authority from those at present in existence. Once this basic revision has been accomplished, and amended principles have been introduced, it is sensible to entrust their application in particular areas to an independent Commission. Until then the only work which any Commission could usefully do is to make general proposals—perhaps relating to London or other problem areas—which would help the Government to make up its mind on the fundamental issues which it has continuously (and expensively) dodged ever since 1945.

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS

ERNEST DAVIES, M.P.

BECAUSE the bill to abolish capital punishment was introduced by a private member and reached the House of Lords, where it was rejected on second reading, there may be a mistaken impression that the influence of the private member on legislation is considerable and is increasing. This is not so. In fact, during recent sessions, the number of private members' bills that have reached the statute book has remained fairly steady except in 1954-1955 when the general election reduced the number. Sydney Silverman's bill received exceptional treatment and, but for provision of time by the Government, would have had no more than its brief airing when first introduced under the ten-minute rule, a procedure which enables members, at the commencement of public business on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, to seek leave to bring in a bill. The sponsor speaks briefly and one opposing speech is permitted. The Speaker then puts the motion and, if it is challenged, a division can take place. More often than not, permission is granted without a vote because the bill's chances of proceeding further are slight. Other procedures for private member legislation have to be resorted to if the bill is to proceed.

Government policy

On the other hand, no government can afford, in the long run, to ignore completely parliamentary or public opinion and, since more often than not, private members' bills reflect the demand for a change in the law, the government must take serious note of such bills and decide whether it would be in their interest to provide facilities for furthering their passage through Parliament. Where policy or principle is involved, the government will act accordingly, either positively or negatively. Instances of both arose during last session. A Licensing (Airports) Bill was first proposed under the ten-minute rule, then objected to on a private members' day, and so made no progress, but it was introduced by the Government the following session and passed. Whether the Government would have followed this course but for the private member's initiative is

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THE ROLE OF PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS

doubtful. On the other hand, a private member being fortunate in the Speaker's ballot, which is held early in each session and provides the fortunate winners with the right to introduce bills on six Fridays assigned for the purpose, introduced a bill to end the derating of industry. This received a second reading and, by clever tactics on the part of its sponsors, was successfully negotiated through committee. Since this was contrary to government policy, the Government "whipped up" its supporters and defeated it on third reading. The Labour government suffered a somewhat similar experience when a private member's bill was introduced which would have undermined its Transport Act in regard to the nationalisation of road haulage. In that case, however, the bill was killed in committee, which is the more usual method of destroying private members' bills which pass second reading but are contrary to government policy. Tory governments have an advantage over Labour governments because measures which get through the Commons can be killed in the Lords, as in the case of the "hanging bill." As yet the Parliament Act has never been invoked to enact a private member's bill. This is the first occasion since 1931 that the Lords have not passed a private member's bill that has passed the Commons.¹

By and large, except as regards very minor measures, governments do not assist private members' bills to reach the statute book unless they reflect government policy, or unless parliamentary and public opinion is clearly shown to be overwhelmingly in favour. Such was probably the case as regards the Small Lotteries and Gaming Bill I introduced when successful in drawing first place in the Speaker's ballot last session. Certain legal decisions had rendered illegal a large number of lotteries conducted under the Lotteries and Gaming Act, 1934, and had thereby nullified Parliament's intentions in regard to legalising lotteries run for purposes other than private gain, particularly by supporters' clubs organised by football and other sporting clubs, but political parties and charities were also affected. Opinion was obviously favourable to such lotteries being legalised subject to reasonable safeguards. Consequently, the bill received an unopposed second reading, and the Home Office gave the assistance necessary to enable it to become

¹ Since this was written the government has refused to provide special facilities for the bill's re-introduction to make possible its enactment under the Parliament Act. It chose to introduce its much more limited Homicide Bill. Nor was a member willing to re-introduce the bill fortunate in drawing a high enough place in the Speaker's ballot to enable it to pass through the requisite stages on the Fridays allocated for Private Members' Bills.

whereas the other procedure may result in no more than the printing of the bill.

The question remains as to the extent to which private members have succeeded in enacting legislation on their own initiative and whether the opportunity provided is as great as it could usefully be. Judged by volume in recent sessions, members have succeeded well in adding to the statute book. For the 1951-1952 Session, twelve private members' bills were enacted, of which three were introduced under the ten-minute rule; in 1952-1953, eleven bills were enacted of which two were originated under the ten-minute rule. In 1953-1954, thirteen bills were enacted of which one was under the ten-minute rule and one under Standing Order 35, and in 1954-1955 only four bills reached the statute book of which three were introduced through the ballot and one under the ten-minute rule; last session resulted in eleven private members' bills receiving the Royal Assent of which three were under the ten-minute rule and one under the Standing Order.

It is interesting to note that the actual number of such bills receiving the Royal Assent approximates to the number throughout all parliaments of this century, though in earlier years a far greater number of bills were introduced. The main reason is, no doubt, that the introduction of bills was previously more for propaganda purposes than in the expectation of effecting legislation. Highly controversial measures were introduced merely to enable debates to take place. Since 1948, when private members' time for motions and bills was restored, the tendency has been for members to act responsibly and to introduce measures which, though perhaps of no great significance, were important in their limited application and were non-party and not highly controversial. The list of successful bills reveals a large number of comparatively minor matters being put right by measures for which governments were unlikely to take parliamentary time to enact themselves. Private members have thus undoubtedly served a useful legislative function and it would be regrettable if their opportunities were in any way curtailed. On the contrary, the government might extend them to enable those measures which receive a second reading to pass through their later stages, even if the Fridays allocated are fully occupied with other measures. In particular, greater opportunity might be provided for bills successfully introduced under the ten-minute rule to be debated on other than the allocated Fridays and possibly there might be greater opportunity for debate on bills introduced under Standing Order 35.

With the increased party discipline and domination of Parliament by the executive, back benchers have limited opportunity for taking the initiative in Parliament. Private members' bills provide a useful relaxation of party discipline as the whips are off and free votes on non-party lines become possible. Members have ample opportunity for airing their opinions in the large number of debates that take place on motions and the like, but in regard to legislation their opportunities are more restricted. This may be consistent with the generally accepted view that Parliament should retain debate as its main function and it should act as a forum of the nation and through discussion influence government policy and its administration. Legislation is generally the execution of policy and as such must remain the responsibility of the government of the day. On the other hand, there are a number of issues that arise which governments have neither the parliamentary time nor the inclination to tackle. They may not be of major importance but such minor reforms may be of significance to large numbers of persons and affect their welfare. In addition, even the member who unsuccessfully promotes legislation, may educate and influence opinion and ultimately compel government action as did, for instance, Mr. Nabarro with his Clean Air Bill, which was withdrawn on the Government's promise to introduce a more comprehensive measure as it has since done.

In sum, while the unique nature of the British Parliament and the relationship of the Executive to Parliament necessarily restricts the private member's legislative opportunities, the limited function he performs is of considerable value. It counteracts oppressive party discipline, cuts across the normal rigid party lines and enables reforms of importance to individuals, but not to governments, to be both aired and, on occasion, to be carried through. Of the opportunities available to him, the private member takes full advantage. To encourage those who show such initiative, somewhat greater opportunity should be provided to enable those measures which initially receive parliamentary approval to run the full gamut of the parliamentary machine.

GERMAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL THEORY

DR. KARL SCHULTES

GERMAN state theory right up to the most recent past has been under the unfavourable influence both of ideologies and abnormal political situations. Autocratic state-forms, authoritarian trends, and the lack of a normal democratic development impeded the development of those sociological trends in theory which have long since won a place for themselves in the Anglo-Saxon world.

The optimism of socio-liberalism, the state theory of the Weimar Republic, died a sudden death under the onslaught of the economic crisis, which quickly broadened into a constitutional crisis. The fascist counter-revolution, using in Germany the alias "national socialism," came into its own.

It was the constitutional lawyer Hermann Heller who was quick to perceive the causes of the constitutional crisis, and saw that traditional thinking on the theory of state and law had been shaken to its foundations by the victory of the October revolution and the triumph of fascist dictatorship in Italy. He urged the abolition of the social anarchy of capitalism, whose political expression was dictatorship, and the introduction of social homogeneity as precondition and basis of political democracy. He criticised the thoughtless cocksureness of liberalism as bitterly as the national power state theories, based on Hegel, of fascist dictatorship.¹ But his idealistic conception of the state may have misled him into the assumption (cf. Ferdinand Lassalle's illusion) that the "state" could by itself intervene on the side of the labour movement to rescue democracy.² While he was still appealing to the reason of the German bourgeoisie—Thomas and Heinrich Mann were doing this at about the same time—the economic and political pace-makers of the bourgeoisie had already made up their minds to sacrifice democracy to fascist dictatorship and deliver up Germany to the Nazis. The tragedy ran its course.

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¹ Hermann Heller, *Die Krisis der Staatslehre*, Archiv f. Sozialwissenschaft, 1926, p. 289; *Politische Demokratie und Soziale Homogenität*, in Polit. Wissenschaft, Nr. 5, 1928, pp. 35 et seq.; *Staatslehre*, Leiden 1934, p. 30.
² *Europa und der Fascismus*, 2nd ed., 1931, pp. 158–159.

In state theory it was Mussolini's doctrine of the strong state, which he had copied from Hegel, which triumphed. This doctrine as applied to the contemporary political situation in a series of opportunistic versions leading to the absurd "theory of the National Socialist *Führer* State" by Carl Schmitt (not to be confused with the vice-president of the Bundestag, Professor Carlo Schmid), Otto Koellreutter, E. R. Huber, and others.³

After all this a fundamental overhaul of ideas was needed. Of necessity this was bound to begin with an examination of the origins of the state crisis of the years 1930 to 1933. The result would inevitably have been the realisation that it was no good restoring the relationships of the period before 1933, but that a social revolution was demanded, a reformation from top to bottom, a thorough transformation of the economic and social structure: that is to say, the abolition of irresponsible capitalistic economic power, the nationalisation of basic and key industries, the democratisation of governmental and economic administration, a revival of justice on the basis of safeguarding basic rights and freedoms, and a complete rebuilding of the educational system.

This type of approach made itself felt in both east and west Germany and found expression in constitutions of the provincial (*Länder*) governments. But a social revolution failed to materialise. The Occupation régime stood in the way from the start. Widely differing administrative measures were introduced in the four zones, which were still further split up in the federalistic rearrangement. In 1946–1947 it was still possible to hope that an all-German compromise could be found. But with the founding of the Federal Republic and the consequent setting up of the so-called German Democratic Republic the division of Germany widened so as to render reunification most difficult. Two state-forms emerged, which developed in completely opposite directions.⁴

In the Soviet zone of occupation the party dictatorship of the Socialist Unity Party, sheltering behind the Soviet Occupation Power, swept away the beginnings of social democracy. In the west a clerical-conservative-capitalist régime of restoration consolidated its position, and barred the way of the labour movement to political power. Communist domination in the Soviet zone carried through

³ See C. Schmitt, *Der Hüter der Verfassung*, München 1930; *Die Wendung zum totalen Staat*, in Europäische Revue, Vol. 7, 1930, 1, p. 241; Koellreutter, *Der deutsche Führerstaat*, Tübingen 1933; E. R. Huber, *Die Totalität des völkischen Staates*, in Die Tat 1934, Nr. 1.
⁴ See Abendroth, *Zwiespältiges Verfassungsrecht in Deutschland*, in Archiv d. öffentl. Rechts, Vol. 76, 1950.

a series of incisive changes on the Soviet Russian pattern, *i.e.*, by means of dictatorial compulsion. In the west no fundamental reforms have taken place. Instead one finds those dangerous half-measures of capitalist democracy which before 1933 led to governmental and constitutional crisis. The positions of state theory and political science in the two parts of Germany correspond to these political developments.

In the Soviet zone of occupation large private estates were abolished by an agrarian reform and large sections of the means of production were nationalised. The whole of social activity was subordinated to the state economic plan. Industry, administration, and justice were de-Nazified. But in place of the originally intended democratisation there emerged more and more clearly after 1948-1949 the dictatorship of the Socialist Unity Party, which appointed obedient officials to all key positions. The proportional vote was replaced by the single list system. Block-parties, trade unions, and mass organisations were brought into line. The basic rights and freedoms of the citizen ceased to be respected by the police state administrative system. Both the personal and functional independence of the judges disappeared. The democratic principles incorporated in parish and borough by-laws and provincial constitutions remained on paper only. They did not achieve constitutional actuality.⁵

In the field of state and constitutional theory Karl Polak and Ernst Niekisch handled the delicate theme of "Collectivism and Freedom." But just as with Lenin and Stalin the rights of the individual and the problem of genuine democratic organisation are ignored in favour of a one-sided view of the collective principle of party and class dictatorship, just as with Georg Lucacz the freedom of the individual became absorbed in the collective of class and Communist Party according to the slogan "He is free who wills what the collective wills," and just as freedom here really consists in the conscious subordination of self to the collective will, so it is in the writings of Polak, Niekisch, and other disciples of Leninism-Stalinism. They excuse themselves with the reflection that individual freedom is guaranteed by socialist planning, a thesis which postpones personal freedom to a distant future.⁶

⁵ Martin Drath, *Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungswirklichkeit in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone*, Bonn 1954.

⁶ See Karl Polak, *Kollektivismus und Freiheit*, in *Neue Gesellschaft*, 1948, p. 24; *Marxismus und Staatslehre*, Berlin 1947; Ernst Niekisch, *Zum Problem der Freiheit*, Berlin 1948; Georg Lucacz, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, Berlin 1923, pp. 312, 322, 323.

The realisation that one is a social being ought in itself to constitute the "leap into freedom." The treatment which this phrase receives, however, involves a complete reversal of the sociology of Karl Marx. What we have here is a Stalinist Neo-Hegelianism, which proclaims that what is, is reasonable, and which justifies the compulsion of the power state in terms of historical necessity. The theory of the state in such a system has sunk to a crude apologia for power.

In west Germany the nationalisation of heavy industry was prevented by the opposition of American and British Occupation Powers.⁷ De-Nazification by tribunals developed into a farce which for the most part hit the unimportant fellow-travellers of the Nazi régime without touching the chief culprits, the wealthy sycophants and beneficiaries. The administration was not democratised. With the help of the regulation putting into effect Article 131 of the Basic Law, 60 to 70 per cent. of the officials of the Nazi régime were taken over from the Third Reich. It is hard to discover what their beliefs are today.

In the Bonn Basic Law the economic constitution was not defined. What concrete shape the concept of the democratic and rule-of-law state will take is for the future to decide.

In the first years after 1945 in the West German provinces a strong left liberal movement could be observed, but after the currency reform and the reconstruction of capitalist monopolies the conservative "restoration" consolidated its position, so that real authority in industry and administration has come into the hands of the opponents of the labour movement—apart from isolated exceptions in the provinces. It is clear that rearmament, and the formation of new armed forces, which can obviously only be formed with officers and N.C.O.'s of the old Wehrmacht, must acquire great significance under such political conditions. They constitute a real danger to democracy.

The theory of state and law put forward in the universities is liberal-conservative. It moves in narrow specialist channels, avoiding political issues, or confining itself to a positivistic interpretation of the Basic Law and current legislation—again with few exceptions.

In the liberal democratic atmosphere of the first post-war years the origins of the failure of the Weimar Republic were attributed

⁷ A law on the Socialisation of coalmining, accepted by the diet of North Rhine-Westphalia in August 1948, was prevented from coming into force by the British Military Governor in Germany.

not so much to the economic system as to the constitution and the defective safeguards of the rule-of-law state. So the attempts at reform laid emphasis on the development of a division-of-powers constitutional system, on basic rights and on administrative and constitutional answerability before the courts. Theoretically this was a return either to Weimar or even further back.⁸ Thus Theodor Heuss's *Constitutional Law, Constitutional Policy* (1950) draws on the spirit of 1848 and 1918 and ends up with the drawing up of the Weimar constitution. Richard Thoma republished his *General Theory of the State*, written in 1925, almost unaltered in 1948. The *General Theory of the State* by Hans Nawiasky (1945) acknowledges, alongside a theory of the state, a social theory too, Rudolf Laun's outline of a *General Theory of the State* (published after 1945) is divided into sociological and judicial sections, to which an ethical theory of the State has been added. Laun persists in an abstract, formal sociology, which defines the state as a spiritual power.

Criticism, which begins about 1949, comes from two sides, just as in 1930 to 1932. In so far as the liberal renaissance yields to the conservative "restoration," so the earlier authoritarians become vocal again. They begin where they left off with their criticisms of the pre-1933 liberal democratic state, and apply them now to the Federal Republic. In opposition to this group are the social-democratic writers, who continue the work of Hermann Heller, and the supporters of social-state reforms.

On the side of the authoritarians, Carl Schmitt in his *Ex captivitate salus* appears in the penitent's hair shirt, already aggressive again, however, and calling in the name of Christianity instead of "the unique strength of the race."⁹

Koellreutter begins by taking sides, in company with Koettgen, Forsthooff, Wacke, Gerber, and Fischbach, against the democratisation of the civil service. He strongly attacks de-Nazification, and calls it a blot on the name of the German people. De-Nazification, not the Nazi régime, has destroyed the ethics of the civil servant and "deprived the German administration of its best minds," says Koellreutter. For him the essential is the strengthening of state power, and its protection from mass democracy. "The civil service, by and large, is the state," and the armed forces play "in the modern mass state a very important political (!) role," and must again become a "political power focus in their own right."¹⁰

⁸ Werner Weber, *Weimarer Verfassung und Bonner Grundgesetz*, Göttingen 1949; *Die Frage der gesamtdeutschen Verfassung*, München and Berlin 1950.

⁹ *Ex Captivitate Salus*, Köln 1950.

¹⁰ See *Deutsches Staatsrecht*, Stuttgart 1953, pp. 19-20, 311 *et seq.*, 318.

GERMAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL THEORY

Much of Werner Weber's criticism of the federalism and the state legalism of the Federal Republic is quite justified. But his criticism is clearly anti-democratic in its demand for hierarchical authority, which even goes as far as a glorification of constitutional monarchy. The sinister spirit of Carl Schmitt still haunts his whole argument.¹²

Ernst Forsthooff and E. R. Huber have learnt discretion in that they have now, in contrast to the period 1933-1945, turned their attention to administrative law. They put the emphasis in their work on technical matters. The modern state is responsible for production no less than for social administration, with the right and duty to intervene: this is the theme both of the *Textbook of Administrative Law* by Forsthooff¹³ and of *Administrative Law of the National Economy* by Huber.¹⁴ Montesquieu, the separation of powers, the civil service, the political parties, the rejection of political measures by the trade unions, these are Forsthooff's main themes, whilst the concept of the modern state and of the social administration state remains largely indeterminate. Although he notes that the barriers between state and society have gone, he seems to see in this a chance for the intervention of an authoritarian state rather than a process of democratisation. Forsthooff proposes that administration should be "neutralised," like state authority in general, and kept free from the influence of mass democracy.

E. R. Huber passes in silence over the Third Reich.¹⁵ As in 1932, he terms the modern state an "economic administration state." But he now gives more emphasis to the view that it must also be an "economic rule-of-law state," if the freedom of the individual and the autonomy of economic activity are not to be restricted in favour of discretionary and authoritarian administration. He attempts to institutionalise the dynamics of state and economic processes in a "protective order." Although Huber is in principle conservative in the sense of wanting to maintain private ownership in the means of production and distribution, he nevertheless cedes a large place to compromise solutions tending towards a mixed economy. Moreover, he gives an objective picture of the various forms of socialisation and co-operation, as well as the

¹² Werner Weber, *Spannungen und Kräfte im Westdeutschen Verfassungssystem*, Göttingen 1951, pp. 42 *et seq.*, 50, 54, 63 *et seq.*

¹³ *Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts*, 1, 1st ed., 1950, par. 4.

¹⁴ *Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht*, 2 vols., 1953 and 1954.

¹⁵ In *Quellen des Staatsrechts der Neuzeit*, Vol. II: *Deutsche Verfassungsdokumente der Gegenwart* (1919-1951), Tübingen 1951, the time of the Nazi régime is not mentioned at all. See on this: E. J. Cohn in *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 16, 1954, p. 266.

functions of the trade unions, co-determination rights, and constitutionally determined industrial relations.¹⁶

Forsthoff's *Administrative Law* and Huber's *Business Administration Law* are without doubt important works of high professional quality. Their basic assertion that the modern state is in essence a business administration state is sound, and so is the demonstration of the vast scope of social obligations. Their criticism of outdated liberalistic concepts has much in common with the views of the trade unions and social democrats. But the important role of the government implies the necessity of its democratisation and control.

The publications of the social democrats are especially important and valuable. Let us mention here in particular the historians and sociologists like Ludwig Bergsträsser, Alfred Weber, A. Gurland, K. D. Bracher, Otto Stammer, Heinz-Dietrich Ortlieb, and Gerhard Weisser, and the lawyers Gerhard Leibholz, Wilhelm Grewe, Hans Peters, Helmut Ridder, Egon von Turegg, Carlo Schmid, Hermann L. Brill, Martin Drath, and Wolfgang Abendroth. A detailed discussion of the importance of their work for the theory and practice of social democracy in Germany would go beyond the scope of this article. We do no more than indicate the contributions of Brill, Drath, and Abendroth to political theory.

Hermann L. Brill's experience under the Nazi dictatorship and the Soviet régime have caused him to place human rights, and their juridical safeguarding in state, administrative, and international law, in the foreground of his theory and its practical political application. Moving away from orthodox Marxism he adheres to juridical and sociological pluralism, strangely linked with Kant's *Erkenntnistheorie*.¹⁷ It seems to me that he has gone too far in separating state law theory from economics and the problems of class structure; his view that state theory ought in future to consist only of state law theory is premature.¹⁸ Harold Laski, to whom he turns for support, subjected his pluralistic views of the twenties to a Marxist revision after 1933. Brill's positive contribution to democratic political and administrative theory consists above all in his proposals for the reorganisation of the provinces (*Länder*) and the reform of internal administration and the civil services, which in part have been incorporated in the legislation of Land Hesse.

Martin Drath carries on the line which runs from Georg Jellinek through Max Weber to Hermann Heller. He treats

¹⁶ *Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht*, Vol. 1, 1953, p. 20; Vol. 2, 1954, pp. 141, 355, 471 et seq.
¹⁷ See *Die Freiheitsrechte und die menschliche Gemeinschaft*, in *Recht-Staat-Wirtschaft*, Vol. 4, Düsseldorf 1952, pp. 24-25.
¹⁸ *Die Problematik der modernen Staatstheorie*, Berlin 1950, p. 9.

political theory as a social science and remarks that a comprehensive political theory has not so far been developed in Germany. Drath rejects the two-sided conception of the state—on one side sociological, on the other juridical. He subordinates the latter to the former.¹⁹ As he rightly says, the attempt to make the separation of powers an isolated axiom of public law can only be an obstacle to social scientific observation and must therefore be antidemocratic in effect. The effects which a separation of powers theory, conceived under the sign of the "restoration," has had on the Bonn Basic Law, are clearly shown up by Drath. Here it led to a strengthening of the executive and of bureaucracy in government and administration, at the expense of parliamentary rights which goes far beyond what is acceptable to a social democracy.

Drath reproaches traditional, positivist conservative political theory for seeing only one part of the subject, but not the totality in its social context. On the other hand, a social theory of the state must not only recognise the "unity of the total social order," but also its internal conflicts in a class society. An idealistic overall view tends to overlook these contradictions. The important thing is to get rid of class contradictions and to create social homogeneity.

Hermann Heller's argument is taken up with special emphasis by Wolfgang Abendroth and given precise formulation in the context of the political contradictions of the Federal Republic. We owe a debt to Abendroth for placing the experience and doctrines of Laski in a particularly intelligible form at the disposal of German political theory, for there are large gaps to be filled in this field.²⁰

Abendroth regards the transformation of the Federal Republic from a formal to a social democracy as the prime task of the German labour movement at the present time—not only because the Federal Republic has reached a decisive turning point in its development, but because it is only as a social democracy that the Republic can become a model for a united German democracy. In its present "restoration" form it cannot serve as such a model. Nor is it in this form an alternative to the communism of the Soviet zone. Only a living mass democracy, which is at the same time a social rule-of-law state, can provide this.

Abendroth points out that the Basic Law does not close the road to such a rule-of-law state. The Basic Law does not imply the permanence of the existing order of society: it aims at achieving a

¹⁹ Martin Drath, *Zur Soziallehre und Rechtslehre vom Staat*, pp. 41, 49 et seq.

²⁰ See *Demokratie als Institution und Aufgabe*, in *Neue Gesellschaft*, 1954, pp. 34 et seq.

truly democratic and social rule-of-law state.²¹ This is the task of the labour movement. The first prerequisite is that the political awareness of the labour movement be awakened. This can only come about by the participation of worker organisations in the administration of the state and industry. Thus it is necessary to exploit all the opportunities offered by the co-determination law and the law relating to works councils; and, further, to awaken the sense of responsibility in the masses by political means.²² This is the only way of ensuring that a turn in the direction of the authoritarian state is prevented, and the transition to social democracy successfully carried out.

Alongside the democratic parties, the trade unions have a leading role to play in the transformation of society. They have a privileged position among democratic mass organisations, as Alfred Weber emphasised, because in them group interests can be merged most completely in a common interest whose aim must be the democratic organisation of society and the exclusion of privileged special interests from the control of industry and the state. They can only secure the economic interests of their members if political democracy is maintained and expanded to social democracy. "They must of inherent necessity make democracy their aim, if they do not wish to sacrifice their own very essence." They are, as Abendroth declares, a great school of the common weal, and as such a corrective to the party system and the party state. Only they can hold the state on the road imposed on it by the basic law—the road of democratic and social development.²³

The policy and state theory of social democracy will only find a really firm base when German unity has been established, and a Germany created in which the working masses, disillusioned with communism, stand together with those who reject the capitalistic "restoration" and have gone beyond it in the spirit of social democracy. The division of Germany furthers on both sides the tendency towards autocracy. The two makeshifts, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic, must be replaced by an all-German democracy, in which socialist planning and a rule of law inspired by freedom are combined in a forward-looking synthesis.

²¹ Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates im Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Festschrift für Ludwig Bergsträsser, Düsseldorf 1954, pp. 279 et seq.

²² See Abendroth, Zur Funktion der Gewerkschaften in der Westdeutschen Demokratie, in Gewerkschaftl. Monatshefte, No. 11/1952.

²³ Alfred Weber, Staat und Gewerkschaftliche Aktion, in Gewerkschaftl. Monatshefte, 1952, p. 480; Abendroth, Die Gewerkschaften, Weg demokratischer Integration, Heidelberg 1954, pp. 94 et seq.

THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN FEDERATION: THE WEST INDIAN BACKGROUND

GORDON LEWIS

THE London Conference of 1956 on the proposed federation of the British Caribbean possessions is the climax of a dream that goes back for nearly a century. The first recorded suggestion for uniting the territories was made, a bare generation after Emancipation, in an appendix written in 1860 to the *Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies* delivered before the University of Oxford by Herman Merivale, of the Colonial Office, in the years between 1839 and 1841. Despite its cautionary character, however, it foundered on the rocks of island jealousies. There followed, a generation later, Mr. C. S. Salmon's scheme for the union of the fifteen British islands, Dr. de Verteuil's plan contained in his book on Trinidad of 1884, the late Lord Elibank's lecture of 1911 before the West India Committee in London, writing in his capacity at that time as Administrator of St. Vincent, and Dr. Meikle's book of 1912 suggestively entitled *Confederation of the British West Indies versus Annexation to the United States of America*. There is an equally rich background of official and quasi-official conferences. The Royal Commission of 1882 recommended an administrative union in areas like the civil service, collection of rum duties, taxation, customs duties, justice, and telegraph and postal communications. The Commission of 1894 advocated union along similar lines, while that of 1897 proposed a less ambitious scheme for placing the islands of the Windward group under the Government of Barbados. The late Lord Halifax's Report of 1920 on the region foresaw federation as a necessary but distant goal. The 1933 Report of the Closer Union Committee suggested a combining of the Windward and Leeward Islands groups into a colony under a single Governorship, but the separate regional allegiances of Antigua and Grenada killed the scheme. The West Indian Conference at Dominica in 1932 drew up a further plan for federation, much of it, in its details, being far more liberal than the arrangement based upon the London

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Plan of 1953. The Moyne Commission Report, published in 1945, carried forward the idea. The dispatch of March 14, 1945, of the Secretary of State for the Colonies gave the final impetus to the dream. The subsequent Montego Bay Conference of 1947 accepted the principle of a federation in which each constituent unit was to retain complete control over all matters save those specifically assigned, after the Australian model, to the federal government. Out of those recommendations the Standing Closer Association Committee, headed by Sir Hubert Rance, was later set up to draft the outlines of the federal structure. The London Conference of 1953 witnessed the formal agreement of the territories to accept the contract of federation. The Migration Conference of 1955 held in Trinidad settled the delicate issue of the movement of persons within the federation. The final touch was added by the decisive steps taken by the London Conference of 1956.¹ What remains after this is the formidable task of undertaking the transition from the old to the new régime, and the establishment of the federal government in all of its branches. The nature of that task is analysed in the reports of the three pre-federal Commissioners.²

It is, on any evidence, an adventurous enterprise. To federate some fifteen units that are island societies separated throughout a vast archipelago by hundreds of miles is no mean task and gives to the federal group a peculiar characteristic unknown to previous federal undertakings. The present scheme has only been made possible by the remarkable growth of the commercial airliner in the last few decades. All of the islands are notoriously insular in attitudes and have a jealous regard for their rights. Separate economic development, combined with tariff controls and poor transport facilities, have so far effectively paralysed the growth of a powerful regional sentiment. The pull of economic interest directs the local attention to the large metropolitan countries, whether it be Canada or the United Kingdom or the United States, upon which trade and commerce largely rest, rather than to the island neighbours. Much of inter-island travel is still restricted, in effect, to the visits of

¹ *West Indies. Report of the Closer Union Commission*. London, April 1933; *British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee Report*, London, 1948-1949; *Report by the Conference on West Indian Federation*, London, HMSO, Cmd. 8837, 1953; *The Plan for a British Caribbean Federation*, London, HMSO, Cmd. 8895, 1953; *Report on the Conference on Movement of Persons within a British Caribbean Federation*, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 1955; *British Caribbean Federation. Report of the 1956 Conference*, London, HMSO, Cmd. 9733, 1956.

² *The Plan for a British Caribbean Federation. Report of the Fiscal Commissioner*, London, December 1955, HMSO, Cmd. 9618; *Report of the Civil Service Commissioner*, London, December 1955, HMSO, Cmd. 9619; *Report of the Judicial Commissioner*, London, December 1955, HMSO, Cmd. 9620.

officials or touring cricket teams. One exacting test of federation will be its power to help such smaller islands in their desperate economic plight. West Indian society, as a result, is fiercely localist.

To all this must be added the fact that federation has frequently been regarded as a Colonial Office device to shift responsibility from imperial to West Indian shoulders, a prejudice still met with; West Indians have presumably not forgotten that Gladstonian liberalism, in the shape of conscientious colonial civil servants like Sir Henry Taylor, viewed the colonies as a millstone around the metropolitan neck. The public opinion behind the new move, as a result, tends to be a small middle-class opinion and there is little evidence that so far it has captured the public imagination. Nor is there any larger enthusiasm for the dream of dominion status claimed by some to emerge as the logical result of federation.

Only a bare generation ago a perceptive American traveller could observe that the working classes of the islands appeared to favour the idea of American annexation in the vague belief that the American system considered working-class aspirations more generously than the British, saving doubts concerning the "colour bar."³ That may not be the case today, after some years of Colonial Development and Welfare spending has revealed a growing awareness on the part of the British people of their imperial responsibilities to the "backward" areas. West Indian suspicion of the Treasury mentality, nevertheless, is still widespread. Mr. Adams's warning that West Indians must be careful lest federation means giving themselves over body and soul to the United Kingdom Treasury is evidence that, for many of them, the federal experiment will be judged less by its specific political advantages than by its economic advantages.

Caribbean isolationism is reflected, in turn, in the complex mosaic of its political and constitutional arrangements. Constitutional and political development has been markedly unequal in the different units. As a result, there is a wide disparity in the levels of political sophistication in the region. In Barbados, the reserve-powers of the Governor-General are limited to an inoperative and unused veto, in the Leewards Islands federation they are far more of a real thing. Recent constitutional advance has been rapid in both Jamaica and Trinidad, yet whereas ministerial government has proceeded far in the former island since the 1944 constitution, the latter is still crippled in its politics by the old system of a quasi-representative

³ Harry A. Franck, *Roaming through the West Indies*. (New York. The Century Co. 1920. pp. 485.)

Legislative Council which prevents any one leader from speaking with decisive authority above his colleagues. The adoption of universal suffrage during the last decade has gone some way to rectify the notorious weaknesses of the Crown Colony governmental system. Many of those weaknesses remain, nevertheless, e.g., the inescapable conflict between more or less popular legislative houses and official executive councils; the evil of the system of the nominated member, which almost automatically robs a political leader of any mass-following once he reaches that position; the public abuse of appointed officials; the encouragement of perpetual and irresponsible opposition. Some critics of federation have urged that the passage to federation should be accompanied by, or even preceded by, the grant of full self-government in at least the internal affairs of the colonies. That has been the heart of Dr. Eric Williams's criticisms from Trinidad and, in part, of Mr. Manley's Open Mandate "seven points" memorandum from Jamaica; for to establish a federal government with large and ill-defined reserve-powers for its Governor-General at a time when the office of the Governor-General in the Crown Colony system is gradually being reduced to a sort of constitutional monarch in a democratic country is a glaring anomaly in the draft constitution.

Despite all of the prides and prejudices of the island life West Indians will finally have to yield to the logic of the federationist argument. History, economics, communications, all reinforce the lesson that, in a way, the islands must either hang together or hang separately. It is true that a reading of the various debates on the topic in the legislative assemblies since 1945 reveals much painful evidence of selfish insular thinking. Logic, nevertheless, is surely on the side of the optimists like Mr. Gomes of Trinidad. The West Indies is not a richly endowed area. No one island is large or rich enough to maintain by itself the level of economic and technical effort required to gain a real improvement in productivity or economic stability. The regional economy as a whole is weak and vulnerable. It is suggestive, therefore, that the health of the major crops—sugar, coffee, citrus, bananas—depends upon preferential trade agreements with the United Kingdom, and equally suggestive that in securing guarantees of prices and markets for their exports the islands have been able to do so, as in the citrus talks of 1955, only by concerted regional representation.

In a number of ways such co-operation has been growing among the Caribbean dependencies. The work of the Regional Economic Committee of itself since its inception in 1949 has shown the need

for federal bodies, for without its devoted effort there would not be in existence today a Trade Commissioner for the West Indies in London, a West Indian Shipping Service, and machinery for negotiation with the United Kingdom Government. In practically every important sphere new forms of functional collaboration have grown up. The Development and Welfare Organisation in Barbados has provided a centre for research into common problems, especially in education and social services. Currency standardisation has finally been attained through regional action. Research organisations like the Sugar Cane Breeding Station in Barbados and the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad, have worked for the region as a whole. The new University College at Mona is certain to become, in the coming years, a nursery of statesmanship for the federal government. What is now needed, above all else, is a governmental structure with both the willingness and executive power to translate knowledge into policy, to apply the recommendations of experts that have deluged the West Indies for so long.

II

Forms of government, however, follow functions of government; for in politics, as in nature, it is function that must determine form. The ends that the new West Indian governmental structure should pursue, therefore, are of paramount interest to the discussion. "The state," wrote Burke in one of his most famous passages, "ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such other low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties." Much of West Indian discussion on the federation project has tended to commit the vulgarity against which Burke so nobly protested. It has been acclaimed as the means of rehabilitating local economies or creating a single trading *bloc* in the world market or attracting more capital for investment. Economic health is, of course, an important ingredient of the good life. Yet much of the idealism and large opportunity will be lost if it is not seen, in all its fullness, that the establishment of the new form of government merits, as its ultimate purpose, nothing less than the fundamental reconstruction of the West Indian society.

For ever since the publication of Professor MacMillan's prophetic book, *Warning from the West Indies*, some twenty years ago, the sickness of Caribbean society has been a recognised fact. Its

peasants and workers live in a massive poverty relieved only by tropical sunshine. Chronic sickness and endemic disease, rudimentary housing, low educational standards, especially in the rural areas, a high incidence of unemployment and underemployment, are characteristic features of their existence. The classic heritage of slavery—the identification of manual labour with degraded social status—still survives, so that the regional agricultural industries are to a great extent crippled by occupational preferences on the part of the island workers for “respectable” “white-collar” jobs. Extremes of wealth and poverty have produced, in Plato’s sentence, not one society, but two, so that in every island it is possible to pass almost immediately from Georgian estate elegance to unlovely shack-villages.

As a result, the West Indian proletarian has been driven to the rum-shop and the race-meeting for refuge and thereby acquired personal and social habits which not even the Victorian prestige of the churches in the islands has been able to break. The average West Indian labourer, indeed, as the Moyne Commissioners noted, has been more strictly confined to his own island than the English labourer was tied to his parish in the most rigid phase of the Settlement Laws, and one result of that fact is the sense of bitter frustration the traveller notices, especially among the class of young men of adventurous disposition. Because little has been done to raise the communal living-standards the social atmosphere of too many of the islands is one of a depressing apathy which accepts the absence of promise in life as almost a law of social nature rather than as a function of social arrangements. Towns like Castries, St. Lucia and Kingston, St. Vincent are not much more than shoddy little commercial centres controlled by the trader and shopkeeper, while to stay for any length of time in a decayed society like that of Antigua is to feel the lethargy that can engulf an entire community once it has lost the sensation of hope.

In large part, of course, all this is a legacy of West Indian history. It is not exaggeration to say that the present discontents of the region go back to the historic transformation worked conjointly by Emancipation and Free Trade in the nineteenth century. Emancipation destroyed the slave-foundation of the plantation economy, while Free Trade deprived the planters of the favoured position they had held for some two centuries in the world sugar markets. Mr. Curtin’s book on the post-Emancipation period, *Two Jamaicas*, shows how the mutual distrust of uprooted white and uprooted black perpetuated disharmony in a society in which only

perhaps the class of mixed coloured felt in any real sense at home. The freed slave, as a natural reaction to age-old exploitation, relapsed into work-habits it was only too easy for the whites to denounce as negroid laziness. The employer-class, in its turn, used their still potent power to sabotage the social elevation of the native by the introduction of the East Indian indentured labourer, with disastrous consequences for the social patterns of West Indian life. Little was done to help the peasant believe that the institutions of government existed for his benefit. The English governing class in the colonial administration set up standards of devotion and incorruptibility which will be of incalculable value to the new federal government. But, as a class, they have always remained aloof from those they have governed. The end-result of all this has been, still largely is, the absence of any positive approach to the reconstruction of West Indian life along democratic lines. The well-known comment of Lord Harris in 1848—“As the question now stands, a race has been freed but a society has not been formed”—remains still as a challenge to West Indian leadership. There can be little doubt that the main task of the new Federation will be to shape some large answer to that challenge.

The issues are plain. There is, first, the need for a bold programme of economic planning to deal with the problems of monocrop culture, land-tenure methods, soil conservation, migration and, perhaps most important, industrialisation. There is, second, the need to tackle the notorious disintegration and disharmony, both of class and colour, in West Indian society as a whole. And there is, finally, as recognition of a new phase in Caribbean history, the need to encourage the growth of a new West Indian collective consciousness which will throw off the subservience to a West Indian concept of British culture belonging to a Victorian past. The task is, admittedly, an enormous one. Powerful vested interests, strong social and psychological forces, stand in its way. Economic interests have so far shown little concern for their worker’s welfare, and if much literature on West Indian economics has emphasised the crudeness and the irresponsibility of its typical trade union leaders, it is too often forgotten that those qualities were the perhaps natural response to a sugar-capitalism whose owners and managers have never really seriously relinquished the white master-black worker complex. The West Indian worker has never been encouraged to feel that the institutions of his society, the government, the law courts, the town councils, were his institutions, working for his interests.

One outcome of that feeling is a general attitude to government which regards it either as an irritating taxing body or as a distributive mechanism from which perquisites may be extracted. That explains, in turn, why only too many radical movements in the area have emphasised the essentially distributive character of the state. It is significant that the far-reaching recommendations of the Fiscal Commissioner in his Report for a sound tax-structure for the new Federal government, based upon the truth that since the establishment of older federal systems like the American and the Canadian the field of taxation has been much more fully cultivated, were defeated at the London Conference on the plea that the new organisation ought not to be identified in the West Indian public mind with an increase in the tax-burden of the citizen. If Caribbean reconstruction of any seriousness is to be carried out it will require a large revolution in the popular concept of government. It must see the political state as a necessary and active agent in the shaping of a new life, among whose purpose will be the effective enlargement of the productive processes of the region as a whole and the growth of a new sense of social service.

Even more. For the best part of their history the West Indies have been regarded, by rulers and ruled alike, as corners in a foreign field that are forever England. From the beginning an insistent Anglophilism imposed upon the subject-society moral standards quite inappropriate to its different ethnic and social conditions. The educational system has been patterned upon English models long since obsolete in the United Kingdom. At the level of the elementary school that has meant an illogical and wasteful system in which a country predominantly agricultural has sought to suit pupils for "white-collar" careers in which opportunities are dimly tiny, while at the level of higher education it has produced the notorious maladjustment that the West Indian scholar who has gone to Oxford on scholarship feels once he returns home. England has been set up as a model, irrespective of the applicability of its standards to local situations; it is not surprising, consequently, that this gives rise to an exaggeration of those standards which fails to prepare West Indian migrants, for example, for a British colour-prejudice against them of no mean proportions. Or it produces, again, efforts to "clean up" native folk recreations like the Trinidad Carnival or to eliminate the widespread habit of concubinage among the lower classes without realising that this is a question not so much of conscious immorality as it is of local cultural value-patterns related to expectations uncongenial to the Puritan

ethic. The middle-class school-teacher and politician have sought to raise their people by imposing upon them, altogether, ideals of Victorian middle-class respectability upon which they themselves have been but precariously balanced; and they have been encouraged, in turn, by English colonial administrators who have assumed that any colonial problem could be solved by a better understanding of the British way of life. In that way aristocrat and peasant have been fatally divided by the middle-class ideal.

All this, finally, has been bedevilled by the terrible complexes of colour-psychology in West Indian life. The inheritance of slavery hangs like a Damocles's sword over all facets of inter-personal relationships in that life. It is true that the barriers between the whites and the other races have not grown, as in other colonial areas, into rigid caste-lines. The disease of racialism takes on other and more subtle forms. There is a value-system that emphasises skin-colour and ethnic affiliation as the badges of social status, badges that have been taken over from the upper white class. A system of social stratification encourages, indeed compels, a vast and disproportionate volume of personal thought and effort to be used up in the search for acceptance by the white and lighter-skinned groups. The search is evident in a variety of phenomena: the importance of light skin in the choice of a wife, especially for the dark professional man; the discrimination, even within the family, against children of "bad" complexion; the sensitivity of "shades" within the coloured group itself; the organisation of discrimination within the social "clubs"; the preferential employment methods that make jobs in shop and office and bank almost the monopoly of the light-skinned girl; the development, perhaps most significant of all, of compensatory activities which will relieve the black West Indian "of the grief of being a negro."⁴ The social life of Government House takes on, likewise, symbolic importance, for an official invitation there becomes a recognition of status. Bitterness, frustration, chauvinism, all in all, become part of too many private lives. An aggressive individualism becomes so widespread as a personal defence-mechanism, as almost to become an essential part of the West Indian character. Energy and talent that should go into positive and creative social endeavour are wasted in the personal struggles of men and women who have been taught, by everything in their society, to be half-ashamed of their colour.

⁴ Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification in Trinidad: A Preliminary Analysis," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 2, Nos. 2 and 3, October 1953, p. 123.

And this is tragic. Societies like Trinidad and British Guiana, that could have been centres of an eclectic and charming cosmopolitanism, are torn asunder, instead, by racial and group fears and suspicions. The task of West Indian statesmanship in the future will be to lead its peoples into healthier forms of communal co-operation based upon a multi-coloured society, as in modern Brazil, freed of the white complex. "The balance of refinement, morals, education, and energy," wrote Governor Smith of Barbados to the Colonial Office in 1833, "is chiefly in favour of the brown and black—and the whites have nothing but old rights and prejudices to maintain their illiberal position against their own original brethren."⁵ If they follow that insight, West Indians will learn to stand on their own feet secure in the proud assertion of their own unique history and culture. They will acquire a West Indian consciousness which, while retaining the best of the British tradition, will seek to restate it in West Indian, not copied English, terms.

Liberalism has now to be restated in terms that, first, are political, so that the doctrine of rights may finally transcend the barrier of colour, and, secondly, are economic, for it is a historical fact, as the history of Emancipation gives proof, that the moral elevation of the negro can only take place when it goes hand in hand with economic forces that give material backing to his claims. That will require a realisation on the part of the British people, of all classes, that their welfare state cannot survive in a privileged position now that nationalist revolutions in colonial territories have begun to undermine the economic structure upon which, for some two centuries, their standards of life have depended. It will require, more than that, a recognition of the fact that with the entry of societies like India and, possibly later, the Caribbean Federation, into the Commonwealth, the ethnic composition of that historic institution will begin to reflect the rising importance of the non-European peoples in the modern world. The new Federation provides the tool for fresh advances along those lines. It only awaits West Indian statesmanship to finish the job.

III

Parliamentary government, said Disraeli, is party government. Since 1945 the colonial territories have been grappling with the

⁵ Quoted by Eric Williams, *Documents on British West Indian History, 1807-1833*, Historical Society of Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad Publishing Co. Port of Spain, Trinidad, 1952, p. 222.

implications of that truth. Their sudden gift of representative institutions has compelled them to re-examine the problems of party principle and party organisation. The constitutional crisis of 1953 in British Guiana showed how the absence of mature political parties to take over the job of government when reforms are granted may have unfortunate results. The state of West Indian parties therefore becomes of paramount importance in the discussion of the federal development.

The notorious immaturity of party life in the area is not difficult to explain. The Crown Colony system of government has done little to encourage responsible habits in local political leadership. The elected member to the legislative council had no share in the responsibility of governing. His vote, even if made unanimous, could always be overridden by the Governor's paramount powers. An alliance of nominated members and *ex-officio* officials, in turn, could override the majority will in the assembly. The presence of officials in the assembly had the further bad effect of inhibiting the parliamentary rise of elected members. The system of the nominated member, in turn, worked to weaken the idea of party still further, since men assured of a safe dignity in appointed office were unlikely to risk the hazards of party support. All this led to a fatal division of power and responsibility, with the natural consequence that, where the prestige of decision-making rested with others, the political leader cultivated the art of irresponsible opposition. It is only since 1953 that Jamaica, one of the most advanced, constitutionally, of the islands, has enjoyed a fully fledged ministerial system which sets the ground for the development of the parliamentary character of the legislature and the collective character of the executive, while most of the other islands still have some way to go before they attain full internal self-government. The successful West Indian politician, as a result, has been the colourful demagogue who exploits the appeal to emotional nationalism in public and only collaborates with Government House in private lest he lose face as a colonial "stooge." Recent history is evidence of the ease with which the West Indian lion may be tamed by the judicious use of "honours."

Other factors of the regional life increase the anarchy of party arrangements. That is not, as in Great Britain, a healthy union of political and economic effort, but, rather, the private control of a labour "czar" over immature unions, so that trade-union politics often look like the early Victorian portrait of Dickens's *Hard Times*. The class-colour complex, in addition, serves to inhibit the growth

of responsible parties on the conservative side, since the white middle-class that should logically be their support are caught insecurely between the coloured majority on the one hand and the English colonial elite on the other. As a result, it is practically impossible for a white candidate to secure election anywhere, while parties that can be identified with the white man and the employer, like the erstwhile Electors' Association in Barbados, collapse with fatal rapidity. The racial animosities in the multi-racial areas, finally, give rise to the habit of communalism and all its attendant vices, so that leaders like Mr. Maraj in Trinidad thrive on the power of inter-communal fear. Only the success of the People's Progressive Party in British Guiana in uniting the East Indian estate labourers and the Georgetown Africans into one group brightens the horizon in this respect, and even then it might be the exception that proves the rule.

The fact that Mr. Williams's own new party was launched in Trinidad in early 1956 at the same time as another Independent Labour Party venture was floated is unhappy evidence that factionalism is still powerful enough to sabotage the argument for working-class political unity. It will be a long time before the notorious anarchy and immorality of Trinidadian politics, which is a byword in the Caribbean, will yield to better things; and it is not encouraging that because of its excellent communications Port of Spain may well become the new federal capital.

The challenge of federation is clear. For its proper working it demands parties and party leadership capable of getting above the limits of insular parochialism and communalism. A federal government needs federal politics. That is the truth that Adam Smith underlined in a pungent passage in the famous section of his great work attacking the economic worth of colonies. He saw that his proposed scheme for incorporating colonial representatives into the imperial Parliament would give them new horizons of thought and action. "Instead," he wrote, "of piddling for the little prizes which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony faction, they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of British politics." The subsequent constitutional development of the Empire, with unique exceptions like Malta and Northern Ireland, has been away from Smith's plan of incorporation and towards dominion status. His remark applies, nonetheless, with especial force to the new West Indian experiment.

The Federation envisages the gradual federalisation of existing public services and the setting up of a federal civil service, along with the new federal political institutions, and Sir Hilary Blood has emphasised the importance of a functional as distinct from a unit Public Service Commission which will escape the spirit of localist representation.⁶ It envisages, likewise, a nominated Senate, largely because such a second chamber could the better become a federal platform for experienced public men who might not otherwise be available.⁷ The office of federal Prime Minister, in its turn, assumes the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility and the existence of a parliamentary majority, led by him, in the executive Council of State.⁸ Yet it is difficult to appreciate how any of these offices and functions are to work properly without a driving force of organised political parties. Federalism, almost by nature, encourages centrifugal forces and, historically, every federal scheme has had to succour national party forces as the surest guarantee against disruption. A reading of West Indian newspaper comment is enough to indicate how long a road might have to be travelled before that truth is generally accepted and acted upon. Much of it appears to assume that the federal government will be nothing much more than a type of United Nations Organisation, complete with veto, where nothing vital gets done except through the influence of public opinion and where the groups in the legislature would vote along strictly insular lines.

The London Conference itself provided evidence of this centrifugalism, for nothing could have better dramatised the absence of common purpose than the failure of the territorial governments to arrange a pre-conference meeting among themselves in the Caribbean before sending their delegates to London. The conference failure, even more, to arrive at amicable agreement upon the delicate issue of a federal Customs Union, the sure test of any federal venture, indicated forcibly how Caribbean divisions are still overwhelmingly island and not party divisions; for if, on the one hand, that failure was related to Trinidad's fear of its economy being damaged by import duty adjustments made by a central government, it was related, on the other, to Jamaica's fear that immediate free trade might damage its nascent industries. If the Caribbean Federation fails to learn that regional economic forces must be met by political forces equally regional and equally strong,

⁶ Report of the Civil Service Commissioner, *op. cit.*, paras. 141-145.

⁷ *British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee Report*, para. 60.

⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 84, 85, 86.

that in democratic societies, at least, strong central government rarely goes hand in hand with weak and divided political parties, then the success of its venture will not be guaranteed, not even by those appeals to cricket metaphor which so frequently pass for conclusive argument in West Indian assemblies.

Nor is that all. The method of freedom is the method of political party. Nothing short of full internal self-government, operated by parties of their own choosing, can now satisfy the sense of West Indianism. The West Indies, after all, have a proud record of constitutionalism; the liberal constitution of Barbados goes back, in one way and another, to 1639. The restrictions of the federal constitution have been justified, by Professor MacInnes, for example, on the old argument of local immaturity⁹; to which the answer, quite simply, is that maturity only comes with experience. The method of gubernatorial liberalism is no longer adequate, despite the perennial appearance of first-class governors like Olivier and Foote, for the reason that the trend in the office of the Governor in the dominions is toward a constitutional neutrality, a trend that the office of the new federal Governor-General must surely follow sooner or later. The rise of Labour parties in the Caribbean region in the last two decades indicates the proper direction to take, that of parties based upon broad social forces rising above racial and geographical boundaries. The whole drift of West Indian life, as Mr. Adams has observed, is towards unitary government, and his further observation that care must be taken lest, with a federal capital city in Port of Spain, the federation become something run by the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the West Indies,¹⁰ is recognition of the truth that the proper battle, in the long run, will be the battle of social interests grouped around all-Caribbean political parties. Nor can it be seriously suggested that the human material requisite to that end is lacking. Leaders like Manley and Bird and Adams would make good House of Commons men.

The growth of party discipline, finally, on the model of the People's Progressive Party in Jamaica, must work to eliminate the bane of Caribbean politics, an exotic but unreliable individualism which has made it almost impossible to predict the attitude of politicians to crucial issues with the exception of higher wages and extended self-government. A corollary of such a reform would be,

⁹ C. M. MacInnes in *Developments towards Self-government in the Caribbean*, W. Van Hoeve Ltd., The Hague, Bandung. 1955. pp. 168-169.

¹⁰ *Barbados House of Assembly Debates. Official Report*. Bridgetown, Barbados. Session 1950-1951. Nov. 5, 1951. Col. 1234.

it is to be hoped, the decline of a public discussion of personalities, often amounting to violent abuse, that is one of the most distressing features of the regional politics. Politics in the West Indies, even more than in the United States, has been looked upon as an organised game for its own sake rather than as a means to more noble ends. It is not for nothing that no one sees anything strange in a famous cricketer retiring into politics as a fit arena for the further exercise of his gifts.

The metaphysics of politics is the organisation of the good life in the great society. That means, in the British West Indies, the planned rehabilitation of the economy treated as a regional whole, and in the real interests of its urban workers and peasantry. What the politicians too frequently have offered has been merely a bogus radicalism that patches up the existing structure of society by extracting higher wages from employers or bargaining with London for better prices for local products, and does nothing to tackle, like Muñoz Marin and his party in Puerto Rico since 1940, the problem of planned production for community consumption. Little so far has been done either to re-establish both peasant and plantation farming along scientific lines, with the incongruous result that a region that could produce much of its own foodstuffs continues to import British canned foods, or to initiate a programme of imaginative industrialisation. Widespread poverty means that even the most advanced of the island-economies like Jamaica (where the Monymusk Estate of the West Indies Sugar Company is a model of employment practices) are dangerously dependent upon their export markets,¹¹ a plight that should ultimately be remedied by the regional planning of the productive processes and consumption potential of the region by the federal government, in order thereby to avoid a short-sighted mercantilism on the part of individual economies attempting to compete in the world markets alone. The kind of plan such an outlook would involve has been set out, on an island basis, by the People's National Movement in Trinidad.¹² What remains to be done is for the plan to be set out on a regional basis for regional purposes.

IV

The new Federation must be appreciated, last of all, as the political expression of the cultural nationalism beginning to emerge in the

¹¹ Alfred P. Thorne, *Size, Structure and Growth of the Economy of Jamaica*. Supplement. Social and Economic Studies, University College of the West Indies. 1955. pp. 55-56.

¹² *The People's Charter*. The People's National Movement. Port of Spain, Trinidad, BWI. 1956.

Caribbean, as elsewhere in Asia and Africa and the Middle East. The promise of the federal constitution is just one part of the promise of West Indian life itself. For some three centuries the acceptable norms of Caribbean life have been those superimposed by the European occupying powers, French, English, Spanish, Dutch. "Progress" has been identified with white, "backwardness" with black manners and ideas, even physical appearances. The thinking West Indian has been made to feel ashamed of his semi-African, semi-West Indian tradition.

But the decline of white European prestige in the twentieth century is setting the stage for the return of the native, for a cultural renaissance in all of the "underdeveloped" areas. In art, literature, music, a new sense of pride in the local tradition, in the hitherto repressed African heritage, is already springing up in the Caribbean. It is evident in the novels of Lamming and Mittelholzer; in the dance-forms of artists like Geoffrey Holder; in the Haitian art movement of painters like Hector Hypolite and Rignaud Benoit; in the development of the steel band in Antigua and Trinidad; in the investigations of the Social and Economic Studies Centre in Jamaica; in the rise of a new class of native sociologists and anthropologists undertaking a re-evaluation and re-appreciation of local culture and art-forms; in the recognition, all in all, that Caribbean folkways must be accepted as the ground of Caribbean culture, rather than the slavishly copied ideas of the metropolitan societies, with its consequent cultural vassalage.

It would be a difficult task, of course, to visualise in any detail the new society that will emerge in the future in the West Indies. Yet certain general features will have to be present if it is to be a worthwhile civilisation. It will have to be, to start with, a mixed culture, seeking to combine the best of both the English tradition and the local pattern of things. That means it will have to negotiate a middle direction between an exaggerated Anglophilism on the one hand and an insularist folk-nationalism on the other. The establishment of the welfare state no longer makes it inevitable that development should be bought at the terrible social and cultural price it extracted, a century ago, from the English working class. The impact of industrial change upon the life of the peasant—ignored, on the whole, by orthodox Marxism—may give rise to social and cultural forms as yet but dimly appreciated by a sociology fashioned upon the inarticulate presuppositions of Western European-American industrial society. A civilised universe is a pluralistic universe. In the making of it there is a new and

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important role for the awakening nations. Not least of all, a role for the West Indian who has attributes of his own to add.

Not the least crucial thing in all this, finally, is the opportunity to terminate the long and evil history of colour warfare, both in the Caribbean and, through Caribbean example, in the world outside. Race and class have been so mixed up in West Indian life that the one has almost become the symbol of the other. The British Colonial Administrative Service has failed in the past, much more than its French and perhaps, also, its Dutch counterparts, to meet the challenge of racial understanding and racial co-operation. It has suffered, as Sir Ralph Furse's *Memorandum* of 1946 pointed out with a refreshing frankness, from characteristic inhibitions. It would be a tragic pity if this were to lead to a radical rift between England and the new West Indian Federation. For the promise of West Indian unity lies, not in the pursuit of an extremist nationalism founded on feelings of revenge for a past that is best forgotten, but in following, as a new nation, the path of international co-operation, not only with England, but also with the northern American and Latin-American hemispheres between which the Federation will constitute a connecting bridge. All would learn much from the intermixture. It would not be the first time in history that new worlds have been called in to redress the balance of the old.

SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVE POLICY NEVER CHANGES

JULIUS LEWIN

THE need for a native policy common to all parts of South Africa was felt long before Union. Within two years of the end of Anglo-Boer war a commission was sitting to discuss the question. Appointed by Milner, nine of the eleven men who sat on this commission were English-speaking and of British origin. The native policy they sketched in their Report, published in 1905, is, in its essential features, recognisably the same policy as the one that prevails now. The limitation to the ownership of land by the Bantu; the pass laws; the fear of a common non-racial franchise and the alternative of communal political representation; the design of employing the tribal chiefs for administrative control—all these salient purposes were approved at that distant date.

When Hertzog was in search of a native policy twenty years later, some of his advisers must surely have known this Report of the Inter-Colonial Commission and drawn their main ideas from its pages. Looking back, a writer in the conservative imperial journal, *The Round Table*, in 1932 perceived that the Report was "mainly the natural product of well-to-do land and mine owners, representatives of an acquisitive society hardened by pioneering experience and eager for economic development."

This insight accounts for what is otherwise mysterious about the passing of the first Native Land Act as early as 1913. Why were such severe restrictions put at that time on the freedom of the Bantu to acquire land, even by proper purchase? No convincing excuse was made in Parliament. A minor reason may have been the recent legal transfer to Africans of land that they already occupied but were not allowed to own in the Transvaal until the decision by the Supreme Court in *Tsewu's* case in 1905. This adjustment did not increase the actual amount of land in African hands but it may have led Europeans to believe that the amount was rapidly increasing.

A more substantial reason was no doubt the serious difficulties that the mine-owners of the Rand had long faced in their unending quest for a veritable army of unskilled labourers. This chronic

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shortage was indeed one of the factors that had impaired the relations between the Transvaal Republic and the *uitlanders* and led to the Boer war. The mine-owners knew from their experience the relation between land and labour. If the Bantu were free to acquire more land, they would be reluctant to leave the reserves to work for low wages in the mines, and the constant shortage of labour would get worse. It may well be surmised that, behind the scenes if not openly, there was pressure on the Government to close the door against this possibility. The first Prime Minister of the Union, Botha, was amenable to the demands of the mine-owners. In 1903 he had said that "he would, if necessary, break up the areas of land reserved for the natives (including the Protectorates) in order to provide labour for the mines and farms."

Whatever the pressure for its passage, the Land Act was a heavy blow to the Bantu, coming as it did three years after the new Constitution itself had excluded Africans from ever sitting in the Union Parliament.

Like all South African affairs, native policy is affected by events abroad. The first world war occupied public attention from 1914 until 1919 and its economic aftermath explains the next phase of native policy. The generally unsettled situation, coupled with the high cost of living and the lack of economic planning, threatened the standards of the white working class. Moreover, the effects of the Land Act were now felt in the reserves where the native population was increasing but not the area of land available to it. The interests of the mining industry had already been further safeguarded in 1911 by the legislation dealing with the recruitment of native labour. Under this law a colour bar against the use of Africans in skilled or even semi-skilled jobs had operated, presumably at the request of the white miners whose trade union was first recognised by the mine-owners in 1915. A crisis began when the Transvaal Supreme Court held the regulation embodying the colour bar to be *ultra vires*. The price of gold was falling and so the mine-owners were tempted to seize the opportunity provided by the disappearance of the regulation to employ fewer white men and more black men at a lower wage and also to let the black men do semi-skilled work. It was this policy that precipitated the great disturbances which ended in civil war on the Rand in 1922.

The white miners lost the decisive battles but in the end they won the political campaign that followed. Smuts's Government fell from office in 1924 and Hertzog lost no time in entrenching the colour bar by the Act of 1926.

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Later it became apparent that this struggle, and its outcome, had been the turning point in native policy; it remains the most significant event since Union. What was really decided by the explosion of 1922 was that white public opinion would never tolerate the replacement of white labour by black labour at a lower wage. The crisis made a deep impact not only on the public mind but on the mine-owners. They learnt the lesson that a permanent part of the cost of mining in South Africa was the acceptance of the colour bar. Never again did they attempt to abolish, or even to lower, racial barriers on the mines. From that time the mine-owners and the white miners entered a kind of partnership based on a common attitude denying advancement to Africans in the industry.

The pattern of partnership thus established in the country's biggest industry was followed, in one way or another, in the secondary industries that began in the nineteen-twenties, flourished in the nineteen-forties, and are still growing. Industrial relations were firmly shaped by the Act of 1924, which remained unaltered until it was tightened to the detriment of white trade unions in 1956. The vital feature of this legislation was the exclusion of Africans from trade unions. Another Act of 1953 attempted to provide separate machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes involving Africans. But what kept the status of Africans in industry low was not only these laws but the inherent weakness of the illiterate and the unskilled class of labourers, a weakness aggravated by the pass laws and the laws governing urban areas.

The expansion of the Union's economy between the two world wars drew from the countryside and into the towns two streams of men in search of work and wages. This great trek of the Afrikaners continued for more than twenty years before its peak was passed and the white population stabilised in the proportion of only about half-a-million, or one-sixth of the total, in the countryside. The parallel trek of the Africans began after (if not during) the first world war and continues to this day, in spite of numerous and increasingly harsh laws designed to stem the tide. Had the census due in 1956 been taken, the figures would assuredly have shown that well over one-third of the Africans are now resident in urban and peri-urban areas.

Europeans, including the Afrikaners, have accepted the inevitable fact of urbanisation as it affects themselves, but pre-conceived ideas about Native policy, coupled with sheer blind prejudice, have prevented them from accepting the same fact as it affects Africans.

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It is this failure that lies behind all the urban-areas legislation passed since the Smuts Government introduced the first Act in 1923. Few things are more astonishing than the persistence, through thirty-three years, of the same rigid framework to "control the influx" of Africans, a migration compelled in fact by economic pressures in the reserves much more than by the economic and social attractions of the towns. The historian of the future will surely comment on the blind refusal of white opinion to recognise that legal restrictions and even political penalties have not proved stronger than the economic forces responsible for industrialisation and its sequel, urbanisation.

The historian will not have to look far to confirm the theory that ideas can possess men. During the nineteenth century, if not before, ideas about Africans became fixed to such a degree that hard facts to the contrary could not shake them. One of these stereotyped ideas was the notion that, in times of social change, it was possible to employ the unchanging institution of tribal chieftainship as an efficient element in native administration.

The British had developed first the practice and then the theory of this form of "indirect rule" in India, in West Africa, and later in all their African dependencies. By 1927 when this technique of local and regional government attracted Hertzog's attention, it had grown to be an orthodox and unchallenged feature of British colonial policy. The Native Affairs Department in Pretoria had for at least ten years been toying with the idea of granting the chiefs ampler recognition and of allowing traditional native law and custom to play a bigger part in the administration of justice. The acceptance of this idea by politicians was retarded only by the recollection that the chiefs had in earlier generations been the natural leaders of the resistance to conquest and white supremacy. It was this idea that eventually inspired the important Native Administration Act of 1927, a framework for tribal government that anticipated the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. (Incidentally, what no one in South Africa seemed to notice was that by 1939 British colonial policy had begun seriously to modify indirect rule, recognising its obvious shortcomings when faced with the challenge of democratic pressures.)

There are unconscious factors that explain why the Union made the attempt after 1927, and vigorously renewed it after 1948, to revive tribal institutions in obvious decay. To the mind of Europeans, nothing marks the Bantu as a different race with a different culture so clearly as the survival of native customs that

have no place in western culture. Indeed, to stamp this primitive culture as "different" is itself a relatively recent courtesy; for generations it has been frankly looked down on as inferior and not merely different, in the sense that French culture is different from English. Why are Europeans determined to preserve Bantu culture, even against the wishes or the true interests of the Bantu themselves? The real reason is that Bantu culture marks all Africans as a people apart, unfit to assimilate the standards and values of the richly civilised and wholly superior Europeans. It follows that the standards and means by which white men shape their relations with other white men need not be applied to black people. In plain words, in order to exploit Africans fully, it is necessary to disguise the process by professing to have a deep respect for their peculiar culture. By this means Europeans hide even from themselves the consequences of dispossessing Africans of their lands and forcing them to work for low wages in enterprises highly profitable to white people. Behind all the specious concern showed by Europeans for "the soul of the Bantu" under the protection of tribal institutions and native customs lies the white man's own desire to rationalise the economic subjection that he has imposed on the Bantu.

Land, labour, and the theory of tribal institutions—it is the interplay of these three factors that explains, more than does anything else, the evolution of native policy since the close of the South African war. The mine-owners and the farmers have long shared a permanent need common to all big employers, the chronic need, somehow or other, to find enough labourers at a wage low enough to enable their mines and farms to show a substantial profit. It was this need for labour that also explained the first appearance of pass laws a century before Union. It was this need that explained the steady maintenance of the pass laws as rules of the game in which farmers and mine-owners competed for the available supply of labour.

Once this fundamental fact is grasped, the contents of the statute book since Union take on a monotonous appearance. Whatever the annual variations, the theme continues essentially unchanged. The more that native policy seems to change, the more it has remained the same. Fifty years ago men were solemnly discussing "the native problem": they are still debating it today with the aid of a richer variety of masked words that yet fail to obscure the grim economic realities behind all the political verbiage.

This does not mean that nothing in the Union has changed in

the field of race relations during the last fifty years. Significant change has indeed come, but not in native policy or in the white man's outlook on it. What has changed is the black man and his attitude to white men. When the British proposed, in 1905, to limit the franchise in the Transvaal (then a British colony) to white men, no black man's voice was raised in protest. By 1909, however, the colour bar in the Union's constitution did not pass without protest from African leaders who dreamed that one day their sons might sit in Parliament. The African National Congress was formed in 1912, and in the following year the first Land Act presented it with a second major grievance on which to grow. The Congress movement lingered in a long adolescence but its growth was eventually quickened by the new climate of opinion in race relations produced by the second world war. By 1946 the liberal Cabinet Minister Jan Hofmeyr was surprised by the demand put forward by African leaders for the repeal of all laws involving racial discrimination. By 1952 hundreds of thousands of Africans had learnt from their Indian fellow-countrymen and political allies the force of passive resistance. By 1956 no African aspiring to leadership would dare to accept a programme for his people based on anything less than essential equality. That is why no African organisation murmured a protest when the Minister of Native Affairs recently threatened to end the meagre and useless form of communal representation of Africans in the Union Parliament. For by this time the white man's unchanging ideas about native policy were no longer of close concern to those who endured the policy. Africans were thinking about their own destiny in very different terms, confident that they would one day march by a different route towards a clearer goal.

A SURVEY OF RECENT BOOKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ELIE KEDOURIE

THE Middle East and North Africa are now increasingly in the news. People are perplexed and puzzled, for it is very difficult to make out what exactly is happening in these areas and what line of policy should be adopted towards them. Walter Z. Laqueur's *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 349 pp., 32s.) is therefore published at a timely moment, when what seems a new and most disturbing factor has come in to bedevil an already complicated and dangerous situation. Recent Soviet intervention in the Middle East has been indeed spectacular and far-reaching; but the peculiar circumstances which led to the absence of Russia from the Middle Eastern scene for some four decades could not last for ever, and sooner or later a day was bound to come when a secular aspect of Russian foreign policy would manifest itself again. Now of course the methods are somewhat different, and the aims, it is feared, more radical and ambitious than ever. It is thought that communist subversion from the inside would powerfully reinforce a skilful diplomacy exploiting the considerable advantages which its very absence hitherto from the scene and a widespread reputation for anti-imperialism have given it. Mr. Laqueur's book may perhaps help to assess the seriousness of communist subversion in the Middle East. The author has set himself the task of examining communist factions and activities in Egypt, the Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. His work consists mainly of a detailed chronicle of the genesis, composition, fissions, and activities of the communist movements in each of these countries. Among these, the Jewish communist movement in mandatory Palestine must figure as a curiosity. Constrained by their doctrines to take up zealously the cause of the Arabs against the Zionists, they found themselves the allies of the extremist leaders of the Palestinian Arabs in whom hatred of the Zionists was indistinguishable from contempt of the Jews, communist or otherwise. Some of the details marshalled by Mr. Laqueur are not correct, and in a book where such pains have been taken to transliterate Arabic words phonetically, more care should have been taken to see that they were transliterated correctly. The

RECENT BOOKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND N. AFRICA

picture which by and large emerges from Mr. Laqueur's survey is one which shows the unimportance, the marginal influence, of the communist movement in the countries with which he has dealt. Only where the Soviet army was present could the local communists manifest themselves and become a power, albeit for a very short while, as in Azerbaijan and Persian Kurdistan. Elsewhere, communism is largely an affair of students, lawyers, and miscellaneous individuals to whom so far opportunity has not been vouchsafed to manifest any revolutionary talent they may possess, and who themselves cannot rely on a mass proletarian following.

The word *Nationalism* figures in the title of Mr. Laqueur's book; it is not that he is concerned to describe nationalist movements as he does communist ones; the word rather finds its place in the title in order to indicate an argument which supplements the author's survey. This may be put in his own words: "Nationalism in the Middle East," he writes, "is not a force opposed to communism. On the contrary, at the present time it has paved the way for and has collaborated with it." There is something odd about this argument. Communism in the Middle East, so far, is a negligible force, while nationalism has been and continues to be the motive force moving the rulers, the urban literate classes, and the masses alike. What may be nearer the truth is that communism in the Middle East is not a force opposed to nationalism. Just as the Soviets espouse nationalist causes in the Middle East and elsewhere to serve their ends, so, to make any headway, local communist movements espouse nationalist causes and cannot afford to oppose them. The nationalists themselves accept or reject Soviet help, but their passions and interests lie elsewhere. If the affinity goes deeper than this, why do the Turkish nationalists or the Zionists dislike communism, and why should the Iraqi Government, which is a nationalist as the Syrian or the Egyptian, break off relations with the Soviet Government?

The matter can be seen in its true perspective with the help of Robert Rézette's masterly study, *Les Partis Politiques Marocain* (Armand Colin, Paris, 400 pp.). M. Rézette shows how in Morocco which has as great an industrial proletariat as anywhere in the Middle East, where the local Communist Party adopted and made its own nationalist slogans and demands, and where it could draw on the experience and support of the French party, the Istiqlal party—the foremost nationalist party—nonetheless decisively attracted the loyalty of the masses when it chose to compete with the Communist Party, and even worsted it in the field of trade unionism. M

Rézette's work is of great interest, not only to students of Middle Eastern affairs, but also to students of politics in general. He explains clearly and precisely the local Moroccan conditions and the protectorate policies which necessarily conditioned the action of Moroccan political parties; he also records minutely the histories of the different political groupings which, from incoherent and accidental beginnings, succeeded in organising the country in such a way that the position of the protecting power was in the end made untenable. But he does more than this. He tries to provide a coherent explanation of the nature of Moroccan political parties at different stages of their existence, the reasons for the appeal they had for different classes in the country, and the influence of their structure and organisation on the kind of political action open to them. In this last part of his study, M. R  zette seems much influenced by Professor Duverger's analysis of political parties, and he provides a striking practical illustration of the use of this method in the study of a number of parties functioning at a particular period of history.

M. R  zette makes the point that the efficacy of the Istiqlal Party, and the potency of its nationalist campaign, lie in its ability to mobilise in the masses the feelings of Muslim solidarity against the Christian foreigner, thus making it very difficult for the French to rely on that widespread acquiescence in the exercise of authority without which government is impossible. Gilbert Grandval's memoirs, *Ma Mission au Maroc* (Plon, Paris, 273 pp.), illustrate powerfully the intractable situation in which the French Government found itself in Morocco. In the early summer of 1955, M. Grandval, who for the ten previous years had been Governor, High Commissioner, and Ambassador in the Saar, was appointed Resident General in Morocco and instructed to devise urgent measures to retrieve the French position made precarious by nationalist agitation and terrorism. M. Grandval remained only two months in office, and the memoirs are written to describe the situation which confronted him, the measures he advocated, and the obstacles, in the end insurmountable, which he encountered. He emerges as an attractive figure, quick at sizing up a critical situation, and resolute in coping with it. M. Grandval came to the conclusion, after a few weeks in Morocco, that the friends of France, who had hitherto been the natural leaders of Moroccan society, had lost their grip on their followers and that, in the circumstances, the French administrators could no longer find it possible to run the country. He believed that to preserve what could still be preserved

of French influence and interests in Morocco the Moroccan nationalists, or at least the moderate among them, should be conciliated and allowed some access to power. This policy went counter to the views of the French settlers in Morocco and their powerful sympathisers in Paris; M. Grandval felt he no longer enjoyed the confidence and support of the Government and resigned. In the event, the French Government opposed, and perhaps could oppose, no kind of resistance to the nationalist demands, and there was no question of merely allowing the nationalists some access to power, but rather how little influence the French could succeed in preserving while giving up the substance of power to the nationalists. M. Grandval's argument must in the end remain inconclusive. For it turns on the possibility not only of distinguishing between moderate and extreme nationalists but also on that of the moderates being able for any length of time to withstand the extremists without having to imitate them.

M. Grandval's memoirs make stirring reading, and also constitute a valuable document for the historian. But, of necessity, it will be only one among thousands of fragments which he will have to piece together in order to fashion a picture of Franco-Moroccan relations at this particular period. By itself, any fragment, however striking and interesting, still remains a fragment until the imagination and the knowledge of the historian work over it and endow it with a place in a coherent pattern. It is therefore somewhat difficult to know what to make of Professor J. C. Hurewitz's two volumes of fragments, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Macmillan for D. Van Nostrand Co., vol. I, 286 pp., vol. II, 421 pp., £4 4s. the set). These two volumes form a collection of documents to illustrate the diplomatic history of the Middle East. Volume I which consists of 286 pages covers the centuries from 1535 to 1914, and volume II which runs to 421 pages deals with just over four decades, from 1914 to 1956! This lack of proportion gives the impression of an unhistorical preoccupation with the contemporary, as though the year 1956 were a kind of apotheosis towards which all previous centuries led. It is in any case difficult to see how mere documents can by themselves support or illustrate this or any other theory about Middle Eastern history, unless it is that they inadvertently weave some kind of chronological pattern, the earlier document coming on a preceding page and the later on a succeeding one. But this could hardly have been the compiler's intention.

ELIE KEDOURIE

Mr. Edwin Samuel's *Problems of Government in the State of Israel* (Rubin Mass, Jerusalem, 107 pp.) is a little book which has many virtues. Mr. Samuel authoritatively describes the workings of the more important departments of state, and of party politics and the relations between religion and the state. In the process he explains clearly and concisely the factors which have given Israeli administration its particular characteristics: the status of Palestine as an Ottoman province before 1914, the structure of the mandatory administration from 1920 until 1948, the quasi-government for the Jewish community built up during that period by the Jewish Agency and related institutions, and the atmosphere of emergency and crisis attending the birth of the state and its subsequent existence. The chapters on the absorption of immigrants and on the civil service call for special mention.

Major Edgar O'Ballance's *The Arab-Israeli War 1948* (Faber, 211 pp., 25s.) provides an orderly narrative of the guerilla warfare between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine from December 1947 to May 1948, and of the military operations by the Arab League and the Israeli armies from May 1948 until the signature of the armistices. The writer gives no indication of the sources on which he has relied for his work, and while there does not seem to be much which is new in what he has to say, it is quite useful to have complicated and scattered operations neatly and compactly described and assessed. One important but hitherto quite obscure feature of the fighting in Palestine, namely the process whereby large numbers of settled Palestinians became refugees, is made little clearer in this book. We know roughly that some fled in panic, that others abandoned their homes on orders from their leaders, that still others were removed by the Israeli army, but we are quite in the dark as to the numbers involved at different stages in the fighting, and as to what share chance and design had in the catastrophe. The inherently chaotic nature of the process, the passions it has engendered, and the special pleading to which it has given rise ensure that we know little, and with an uncertain knowledge. And maybe we shall never know more.

RUSSIA from the inside

In times like these, people who want to know what is really happening in Russia go direct to the source. Technicians and industrialists are subscribing to Russian technical journals, scientists are scanning the many specialised publications published in the U.S.S.R., and in the fields of economics, literature and the arts more and more people are getting the complete picture from the periodicals in which they are particularly concerned. Here are a few which may be of interest to you, together with details of their annual subscription rates and the number of issues per year.

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BOOK REVIEWS

HOME AND ABROAD. By LORD STRANG. [*Deutsch.* 316 pp. 21s.]

It is interesting to read this autobiographical commentary on certain international negotiations and diplomatic situations with which the author was associated against the background of recent events which have involved the breach of many of the diplomatic rules and principles which governed Lord Strang's conduct of affairs at the Foreign Office. With thirty-seven years in the foreign service, during the last three and a half of which he was Permanent Under-Secretary, William Strang, as he then was, kept his emotions to himself, and to all except those who worked closest with him he was generally regarded as the typical civil servant, unimaginative, colourless, and not too brilliant. How wrong was this view is now disclosed. Beneath the cold exterior deep emotion and anger were held in check. But he writes that it was not the incapacity or inefficiency of public men that angered him, but the evils of cruelty, injustice, oppression, bad faith, the subversion of order, and the cult of destruction. Had he been at the Foreign Office during the Suez crisis, his anger must have broken through.

In his brilliant assessment of the great qualities of Ernest Bevin, which made him one of the best loved and greatest Foreign Secretaries in recent times, Lord Strang ranks highest his fine sense of international relations and of timing. Both were apparently sadly lacking in those who were responsible for handling the Middle East situation in recent months. All who worked with Ernest Bevin would agree with Lord Strang that he regarded each problem as a whole; for him no matter stood alone, and he would not come to a conclusion until he had assured himself what effect each of the alternatives would have on other questions and other countries. When problems were taken to him, more often than not he would perceive connections and repercussions which others had failed to comprehend. Having reached his conclusion, Ernest Bevin would then invariably ask whether the right moment for action had arrived; whether it were not better to wait for this or that to happen. Lord Strang adds that Bevin taught the Foreign Office that timing could be the essence of diplomatic operation. With his power to foresee the full repercussions on others of his action and his ability to take time for reflection before going into action, Ernest Bevin would almost certainly have avoided many a mistake of his successors. He would never have allowed any action of his to threaten those three pillars of his policy so painstakingly erected: co-operation within a free community of nations, the Anglo-American alliance, and adherence to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The strength of Bevin's personality ensured, and his success as Foreign Secretary confirms, Lord Strang's conclusion that "foreign policy is most smoothly formulated and executed when the Foreign Secretary has the predominant voice in its formation and can rely on especial relations of confidence with the Prime Minister." In this he agrees with the famous dictum, which he quotes, of Lord Granville, who, when Foreign Secretary in one of Gladstone's administrations, stated that, although the Prime Minister had the undoubted right to communicate directly with British representatives abroad and with the Foreign Secretary, "it is in his interest as

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IN HIS FOREWORD to this new book, Sir Edward Fellowes, the Clerk of the House of Commons, remarks on the greatly increased interest which is being shown in this country and in other parts of the world, not only in what happens in the Parliament at Westminster, but also in how it happens. That is why the authors have produced this all-embracing work, based on their knowledge of current practice and its historic origins, and in these 224 pages will be found a remarkable amount of interesting information, some of which has never appeared in print before.

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Here the reader who requires precise information on particular aspects of procedure or explanations of parliamentary idioms will find exactly what he needs to know, while for the general reader the book is packed with interest. The style of the work is concise yet comprehensive, and the reliability of its contents may be judged from the fact that the authors hold responsible positions in the House of Commons and write with intimate knowledge and long experience of parliamentary affairs.

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BOOK REVIEWS

much as in that of the Foreign Secretary that he should only appear as the *deus ex machina*."

The author's reflection is made in the context of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938 with which he was closely associated as the responsible Under-Secretary. He accompanied Neville Chamberlain to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich during his personal, unorthodox and tragic conduct of foreign relations. Seeping through this chronological account is the anger, helplessness, despair, and even disgust that Lord Strang apparently suffered at this contact with Hitler and his entourage. As the career diplomat Lord Strang considered Chamberlain's choice of a Treasury man, Sir Horace Wilson, as his adviser regrettable. While considering that he was unjustly criticised for his part in the negotiations, since a civil servant must do as he is bid, he suggests that he could not possibly have been in a position to tender advice on policy and procedure based on long years of experience in the practice of diplomacy, as were those in the foreign service. And the lesson of Munich? "The price of safety lies in resolute preparation for collective defence" is Lord Strang's practical conclusion, and his more philosophic conclusion is that no one man was to blame for this "tragic necessity . . . this great reverse in our affairs." After the first world war the British electorate, Lord Strang explains, had given themselves governments which were incapable of coping successfully with the international problems of the period, so that the people themselves were to blame. This leads him to conclude that in the handling of international affairs "the qualities most to be desired are knowledge enough to understand the past, perception enough to judge the present, imagination enough to scan the future, and, when action is needed, resolution enough to take courageous decisions and act on them."

In largely confining himself to recounting those events with which he was closely associated, and in refraining from writing his memoirs or autobiography in the conventional form, Lord Strang makes a valuable contribution to the better understanding of some of the most important international situations of the thirties and the immediate post-war period. He wisely leaves to others the task of putting them into their historic perspective. Nonetheless, the chapters on the Soviet trial of the Metrovick engineers, the Czechoslovak crisis, and the Moscow negotiations of 1939, as well as his personal assessment of them, will aid the historian in his task. These sections, together with the chapter on Ernest Bevin, written with such understanding, appreciation, and affection, show Lord Strang to be possessed of greater ability as an author, deeper understanding as a man, and more wisdom as a philosopher, than the "mere retired craftsman in the art of diplomacy" with which typical modesty he describes himself.

ERNEST DAVIES.

BOOK REVIEWS

GOVERNMENTS OF GREATER EUROPEAN POWERS. By HERMAN FINER. [Methuen. 931 and xciv pp. 60s.]

THE subtitle of this stout volume (it weighs about four times more than an average novel) is "a comparative study of the governments and political culture of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union." It is a very remarkable book and I know of no other which is at all like it. Professor Finer analyses at great length the governmental system of each of the four countries. He describes minutely the machinery of government, the framework of institutions and constitutions, but it is never at any moment an academic or anatomic dissection of organisation, for what interests him is not the anatomy, but the biology, of government. The words "political culture" in his subtitle correctly indicate the angle of his vision. He is concerned with how these variform systems have evolved and how they actually work rather than with their formal and static skeletons. He is therefore continually considering the governments in relation to the national societies, the ways in which they work and also the way in which they are determined by and determine the lives and thoughts of Britons, Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians. Like Sir Thomas Browne, he loves to pursue his reason, not perhaps to an *O altitudo*!, but to a generalisation.

In a sense, each of his four surveys is built round and upon a great generalisation regarding something deep down in the history and character of each of the four peoples. Thus in the history of Britain he sees the growth of a consensus of opinion and compromise, the evolution of "two superb qualities for government: common sense and a kind of golden mean." He sees in the French the same two superb qualities, but French history has to a considerable extent negated them by creating deep divisions instead of a consensus of opinion, a ferocity of political passion, and a kind of chronic instability in political beliefs and emotions. German history forged the Reich of "blood and iron," the violent oscillations of the political pendulum being both cause and effect of the German people becoming a people of extremes, so organisable and obedient and at the same time so tyrannically brutal; indeed, so strange and many are these psychological dichotomies that Professor Finer adds that there is an element in them not explained by history. Finally he finds the major political genes in Russian history and psychology to be orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism. For nearly 500 years—from 1450 to 1917—Russia, he maintains, was Asiatic in its unlimited autocracy, a despotism of a "villainous nature." At the end of the section dealing with the government of the USSR he gives in tabular form a list of the professions of the Soviet Government and then in three columns sets out (1) what in fact has been achieved, (2) reason offered for result, (3) real reason. The whole is a terrific indictment and shows that orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism remain exactly the same, even if they have now changed their Russian names.

Professor Finer writes with such knowledge, such imagination, and such a passionate interest in man and his history that his book has a life and liveliness very rare in a survey of this kind. The result is that one can go on reading with passionate interest right up to the end of page 931. And perhaps that remarkable, almost unique, experience is itself the result of Professor Finer's belief (which he puts into practice) that "all politics, in the end, is poetry." The defects of the book are few and slight, springing from

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the same roots as its merits. There is a tendency to poetic exaggeration of what the author likes, e.g., the British monarchy, and of what he does not like, e.g., French "instability." The imagination every now and then produces an obscurity of style; for instance, he writes of prohibitions in the Soviet Constitution: "Free association and free speech are thus outlawed; but these are not 'political,' they are primordial." Lastly—and this is a grumble against the publisher rather than the author—it is a great pity that the work was not published in two or even three volumes of reasonable and readable size instead of in this immense, unwieldy, double-columned tome. The book is not a mere work of reference, it is the kind of book which one wants to read comfortably in an armchair and ruminate over—a thing which it is impossible to do as it is.

LEONARD WOOLF.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. By DAVID WIGHTMAN. Prizes in International Organisation: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, European Center. [*Stevens and William Heinemann.* 267 pp. 21s.]

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. By A. H. ROBERTSON, with a Foreword by GUY MOLLET. Published under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs. [*Stevens.* 221 pp. 42s.]

THE post-war movement intending *faire l'Europe* exhibits as disturbing a gap between aspiration and reality as most other efforts to qualify the operation of the principle of national sovereignty, whether in the economic or the political field. These two works dealing with contrasted efforts to promote co-operation in Europe illustrate some of the reasons for this state of affairs.

Mr. Wightman's book, which is the first winner of the Carnegie Endowment's annual prize competition for studies on problems of international organisation, is the more considerable of the two, though the less expensive. It deals chiefly with the history and operations of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, but it provides also a detailed account of the political pressures which have played round that body, restricting it to its present limited functions. It thus includes a good deal of material, not new but ably presented, on one of the central episodes in the diplomatic history of the post-war period, the Marshall Aid offer and its repercussions in Eastern and Western Europe. There is also an account of the present state and prospects of East-West trade which should dispel some of the illusions that cling round that subject.

Mr. Robertson's account of the structure and functions of the Council of Europe is a more limited piece of work, which confines itself chiefly to describing in detail the constitutional intricacies and historical development of the Council of Europe. The distinctive aspect of this organisation's history, as he rightly points out, is that the attempt to turn it into a political authority of even the most limited sort has come to nothing; but he does not adequately explore the national political conditions which produced this failure, or clearly relate the fortunes of the Council to the general history of the period in which

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it has functioned, though these are perhaps the most interesting aspects of its existence. Both books are scholarly in tone, carefully documented, and sober in their estimates of the future of the two organisations with which they deal.

Taken together, they illustrate the conflict which arises from two definitions of Europe. In practice, if not in theory, Europe for the Council of Europe lies west of the Elbe. When it failed to turn into any sort of political authority the Council's principal remaining prospect was of becoming a framework that might integrate the "Little Europe" of the six federatively inclined powers with Europe as a whole. But even this line of development now looks unpromising. The collapse of the E.D.C. and the European Political Community that was to have been associated with it, the failure of the Western European Union to generate any particular enthusiasm anywhere, and the rejection of the "European solution" for the Saar have dealt heavy blows to the federative movement. It only now survives in some economic fields. So that the Council of Europe has remained basically an organisation in search of a purpose, an essentially political body, as Mr. Robertson notes, with no clearly defined political role.

The Economic Commission for Europe, on the other hand, both in theory and in practice defines Europe in its traditional sense. That is to say, it has managed, despite the tensions of the Cold War, to retain its membership on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, as Mr. Wightman points out, these tensions, though they paralysed many of its activities, were at the same time an important factor in keeping it in being: the organisation gained support from the reactions against an indefinite continuation of the Cold War.

The history and prospects of the two bodies have nevertheless tended to counterbalance each other. The years when it seemed as if the Council of Europe might come to something were 1948–1951, when Russian pressures were most formidable and there seemed some urgency in a consolidation of the West against the dangers of the East. With the *détente* from 1953 to mid-1956, the prospects of the Commission rose as those of the Council declined. No doubt the general climate of world politics will continue to dictate their respective futures.

CORAL BELL.

FROM SCHOOL BOARD TO LOCAL AUTHORITY. By ERIC EAGLESHAM. [*Routledge and Kegan Paul.* 220 pp. 24s.]

IN her life of her famous uncle, A. J. Balfour, Mrs. Dugdale recalls the partnership of Balfour and Morant in the preparation of the Education Act of 1902. She describes Morant, "his courage, vision, enthusiasm; qualities which, in conjunction, produce the great civil servant." And she tells how Balfour and Morant used to pace the grounds at Whittinghame, "deep in conversation" about the bill. The political history of the Act, as she computes it, extended over some four years, and stressing how much Morant's collaboration meant to Balfour during that controversial phase she comments: "The effect on the course of politics of the relationship between Ministers and permanent officials would make an interesting study."

In this book Professor Eaglesham sheds new light on some of the problems that Balfour and Morant had to consider, especially the implications of the

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Cockerton case. It will be remembered that this case arose because Cockerton, a district auditor, disallowed certain expenditure of the London School Board on some higher grade schools and evening classes on the ground that it was not "elementary education" and, therefore, under the law not proper expenditure for a school board. It was, Mrs. Dugdale tells us, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case that led Balfour to give "his whole mind" to the preparation of the bill that became the 1902 Act. Professor Eaglesham had read so many vague references to the consequences of this case that he resolved to try to find out what influence it really had on the course of our educational history: "What was the significance of that queer event, the notorious *Cockerton* case? What really happened to the higher grade schools then, and 'why?' To what extent were evening schools involved in the educational crisis of that time? What bearing had these questions on events leading up to the 1902 Act? And what part did Morant play behind the scenes?"

With these questions as the agenda of his research the author examined closely files of the Education Department, the Board of Education, and the Local Government Board. Drawing upon unpublished material that he discovered, he has succeeded in writing a book not only interesting, readable, and well documented, but also important because of the new light that it throws on a crucial policy-making period. Among his "finds" were lengthy memoranda written by Morant which he includes as appendices. Of these one deals with the origin and growth of Higher Grade Schools: written in 1897, it was revised by Morant in 1901, no doubt for A. J. B.'s enlightenment. Professor Eaglesham's researches lead him to conclude that the *Cockerton* case "so far from being a bolt from the blue was merely the culmination of a long series of disputes"; it was, in his view, "a mere smoke screen" and "the harm done to education during these critical years was almost entirely of political, not legal origin."

When the author began his investigations he was "an opponent of the school boards" but when he had completed them he was convinced that, "with all their faults, they had a much stronger case than is generally realised." This leads him on to contend that if the *ad hoc* principle had been systematically developed in the local government of education it might have produced "a sounder system of local educational administration" than that provided by local authorities today. He spices his narrative with other debatable comments. Critical of "the formidable powers" vested in the Minister under the 1944 Act, he expresses the fear that these "vast central powers" may "prove even more disastrous than the 1870 device of leaving the law vague and undefined." "The system," he contends, "is becoming . . . more a balance of local politicians against central politicians"; and he deplors the "ever-increasing scope" for "political decisions in such matters as school organisation and selection for secondary education." But the book owes its undoubted quality not to such *obiter dicta* but to the skill, ability, and industry with which the author carried out his research, and to the new knowledge that he thereby contributes to the study of educational history.

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CASSELL

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THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM. By C. A. R. CROSLAND. [Jonathan Cape. 1956. 540 pp. 42s.]

THE 1950s are marked by a demand for "new thinking" among socialists. Achievement after the war of so much of the objectives dearest to pre-war socialists, partly through legislative and administrative measures, partly in a remarkable change of the political and social climate in the direction they aimed at, has knocked some of the substance and much of the drama out of the appeal made by their case to the conscience and aspirations of that public which seeks a just and progressive society. The virtual disappearance of unemployment, malnutrition, and "poverty in the midst of plenty," as well as an apparent toning down of the grosser forms of inequality of opportunity, seems greatly to have weakened their case for radical reforms. What then, it is asked, is the meaning and significance of socialism today? And it is suggested that the basic need is "to go back to socialist first principles." Mr. Crosland has written the best book on this subject since the resignation of the Attlee Government, in that it does help to disentangle socialist first principles having the permanence of social values from the practical programme, temporary and immediate, in which in the inter-war period they were embodied, and with which they have become identified as though this were not a transient expression but their eternal essence.

Mr. Crosland is surely right in arguing that socialism is not simply to be equated with "nationalisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange" and that there is room for a large private enterprise sector in a socialist society. But he gives too little weight to the "first principle" on which such a policy is founded—that essential services should be subject to public accountability. It is not enough to say that shareholders normally exercise no authority, that large undertakings are now run by a managerial and specialist caste whose aim is efficient service of the public rather than maximum profit for capital, and that in times of full employment the trade union exercises an effective authority over conditions of work, which interest it, while production policy does not. For the socialist it is not enough that responsibility to society should rest on the uncertain foundations of good behaviour on the one side associated with a narrow technological interest, or on poor behaviour on the other side associated with a narrow concern with immediate advantage. Nor is the claim that public corporations are often remote from their staffs and show monopolistic or bureaucratic tendencies a sufficient reason for rejecting further nationalisation. That would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Rather should it be recognised that much more needs to be done than merely to transfer ownership and convert a board of directors into a public "commission," "authority," or "council." If an earlier generation was too exclusively concerned with the first step and exaggerated its effectiveness, the requirement is now to consider and take the next steps, keeping always the original objectives in mind; not to doubt the rightness of the first step, but to recognise that it was both necessary and inadequate.

What are these objectives? They are still developments of the theme, liberty and equality, and Mr. Crosland shows that he holds to them. He speaks of increasing personal freedom and the range of choice, of the fragmentation of power by diversifying the forms of public ownership, of

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aiming at a continually rising consumption. "I have never been able to see," he remarks, "why high consumption and brotherly love should be thought incompatible." He wishes "not wholly to destroy" private property "but to alter its distribution," and with that no socialist will quarrel who recognises private property as necessary to liberty, to the development of personality, and to the growth and spread of culture. To education he gives a higher priority than to nationalisation as a necessary means to reducing class consciousness and inequalities that lead to social resentment. But he does not show why they should be regarded as alternatives. On industrial aims he speaks of the need for co-operation with trade unions, for an enlightened labour policy, and a willingness to settle grievances, which he prefers to schemes for formal joint consultation, remarking that nationalised industry sometimes shows a worse record in these matters than private enterprise. But again, this seems to be an argument for ensuring that these objectives are pursued more effectively by and within nationalised industry, that personal freedom, a greater range of choice, a fuller development of personality, the spread of culture should there be consciously sought where public authority and responsibility can be most directly exercised, in regard both to producers and to consumers, than that doubts should be cast on the merits of collective enterprise as such. Again, however, there need be no quarrel with the thesis if what it implies is that more attention should be directed to improving in these respects the socialised sector, and that merely to spread it without doing so is to invite discouragement, if not worse.

Socialist policy should not be identified with austerity. That it should ever have been so was, after all, an accident due to the coincidence of a Labour Government with immediate post-war scarcities. It should now lay chief stress on the planning of expansion, encouraging vital investment, and increasing consumption. Pre-war squalor is of the past. "We can increasingly divert our energies into more fruitful and idealistic channels, and to fulfilling earlier and more fundamental socialist aspirations."

A signal service is rendered here, in regard to these aspirations, by Mr. Crosland. It is his reminder on two basic socialist values which have only too often been lost sight of under the strain of poverty and insecurity. One is the respect for individual personality, a respect which, surely, Marx and Engels shared with its great defender, John Stuart Mill, and which places the socialist on the side of freedom "when we turn to the more serious questions of socially imposed restrictions on the individual's private life and liberty. There come to mind at once the divorce laws, licensing laws, pre-historic (and flagrantly unfair) abortion laws, obsolete penalties for sexual abnormality, the illiterate censorship of books and plays, the remaining restrictions on the equal rights of women." The second, linked with that socialist tradition for which William Morris stood, is the respect for the social heritage of art and beauty, and a determination to preserve and extend it—in short a passionate interest in the grace of living. Where the Fabian was concerned with good drains we can now afford to insist on good architecture. "Posthumously," writes Mr. Crosland, "the Webbs have won their battle, and converted a generation to their standards. Now the time has come for a reaction: for a greater emphasis on private life, on freedom and dissent, on culture, beauty, leisure, and even frivolity. Total abstinence and a good filing-system are not now the right sign-posts to the socialist Utopia."

H. R. G. GREAVES.

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THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT. Report of the Preparatory Commission.
[H.M. Stationery Office. 135 pp. 35s.]

THE publication of this important Report has doubtless been timed to coincide with the announcement that the Gold Coast is shortly to become a sovereign and independent state. The Report specifically states that the project and its implications should be fully understood, accepted, and supported by the people of that country before a final decision is taken. The Gold Coast Government has expressed the view that there would be great and lasting advantages if they agreed to the scheme as the government of a sovereign independent nation.

The object of the Volta River Project is to construct a large dam and power station in order to produce aluminium from the bauxite deposits in the vicinity. The project involves a partnership between the governments of the Gold Coast and of the United Kingdom and two great aluminium companies (the Aluminium, Ltd. of Canada and the British Aluminium Company). The total cost of the project (calculated at £144,000,000 in 1952) is now estimated at over £230,000,000. The cost will be shared between the Gold Coast Government, the United Kingdom Government, and the aluminium companies.

The present Report¹ deals with the technical aspects and the human factors; with communications and logistics; with problems of manpower and personnel management; with the effects of the dam and the lake on the life of the area and the thousands of families which they will displace; with the consequences to health and sanitation resulting from the formation of the new lake; with the financial and economic aspects of the project; with the administrative and legal framework which should be set up, and with the political considerations arising from so vast a scheme that will transform the life of the whole territory.

The Report gives the impression that the Preparatory Commission has done its work with great care and thoroughness. Almost every aspect is examined except the profitability of the project from the standpoint of the aluminium companies. On this very important point the Commission was content to infer that as the companies were prepared to invest a large sum of money in the smelter, it would be unnecessary for them to inquire into the profitability of the undertaking. This shows a degree of trust in the wisdom of private enterprise, which is not invariably justified. Moreover, since the failure of the undertaking from a commercial point of view would be disastrous if this very large amount of capital had been sunk in the project, it would have been only prudent to examine the prospects of continued operation by the companies or by alternative methods of operation.

The general conclusions of the Commission are that the project can be regarded as technically sound, and that the scheme is not capable of significant improvement from an economic point of view. It thinks that the project can be carried out successfully, and that the many human and mechanical problems can be solved.

¹ A White Paper (Cmd. 8702/1952) was discussed in an article published in *The Political Quarterly*, Jan.—March 1954 (Vol. XXV, p. 55).

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The Preparatory Commission has had a substantial amount of advice on the sociological factors involved in the project, including race relations, housing and town planning, nutrition, and labour relations. Again and again they insist on the importance of developing satisfactory race relations among the various groups concerned with the project. "Relations between management and labour, between workers on the project and people already living in the areas concerned, and between people of different races and different backgrounds, would need to be maintained and developed on a satisfactory basis if the project was to go forward free from the difficulties and interruptions which would follow from failure in any aspect of these relations."

"The Commission has regarded it as axiomatic that the project would be undertaken in the spirit of racial harmony which today characterises the Gold Coast, and that there would be no question of segregation in the organisation of working or living conditions."

The Report deals at some length with the housing needs which will arise from the scheme, and expresses the view that the workers engaged on construction should be able to bring their families with them. This, of course, raises the question of education, and consideration has been given to the need for primary, middle, and secondary schools to be provided for the new communities, and also for technical education. Recreation and welfare, town planning and shopping facilities, are also discussed in a liberal and progressive spirit.

The success of the scheme would create great new capital assets in the Gold Coast, and bring the people there opportunities on a considerable scale for employment and training in new skills and occupations. It would widen the economic basis of the territory which is at present mainly dependent on cocoa for its exports. To Britain it would bring a large increase in the supply of aluminium from the sterling area, and thus be an important dollar-saving enterprise. To the companies it would bring an additional source of ingot production at a competitive price.

The Report proposes that a Volta River Authority shall be established as a public corporation, the members of which should be appointed by the governments and the aluminium companies. The Volta River Authority would construct the dam and power installations, and might also be asked by the Gold Coast Government to carry out a great deal of the other development work there.

The Report in general is an excellent one. The scheme is a highly important example of mixed enterprise in a new field. Perhaps the strongest aspect of the Commission's work is its understanding of the importance of the sociological impact of the scheme on the inhabitants of the Gold Coast.

W. A. ROBSON.

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YOU ARE WRONG FATHER HUDDLESTON. By ALEXANDER STEWARD. [*The Bodley Head*. 111 pp. 12s. 6d.]

PAN-AFRICANISM OR COMMUNISM? By GEORGE PADMORE. [*Dobson*. 463 pp. 25s.]

BLACK POWER. By RICHARD WRIGHT. [*Dobson*. 358 pp. 25s.]

EPITAPH TO INDIRECT RULE. By NTIEYONG U. AKPAN. [*Cassell*. 204 pp. 12s. 6d.]

COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE. By J. S. FURNIVALL. [*New York University Press*. xiii + 568 pp. \$7.50.]

THAT the flood of books on African affairs published in Britain and the United States should continue to swell is not surprising. Africa is news: readers have become alive to the fact that nowhere else in the world is the movement of social and political forces more dynamic or less predictable. Nor is it surprising that the authors of the books should approach the larger issues with emotions that are strong, even passionate. No honest man passing judgment on a political situation can claim to be objective; he can at best endeavour to give a fair account of the views that he rejects. It is right for the partisan to admit his partisanship; it is his treatment of the case for the Whig dogs that makes the difference between a propagandist tract and a guide to informed understanding. Yet the very fact that a writer on African politics may give no space to another point of view, except for the purpose of impatiently brushing it aside, will in itself be significant. At the heart of Africa's problems lie the emotional attitudes of Africa's citizens towards those problems. The propagandist tract may sometimes be more revealing than the guide book.

In *Naught for your Comfort* Father Huddleston made no bones about his emotional involvement in the racial problems of the Union of South Africa. His central theme was that the destruction of Sophiatown (which might have been supported on town planning grounds) and the removal of its community outside the urban area of Johannesburg to Meadowlands was to be absolutely condemned because it was ordered in pursuance of the Group Areas Act, which is an instrument of the policy of *apartheid*, which is an immoral policy adopted by an immoral European society in its own interests. Mr. Alexander Steward sets out to demolish these arguments. He shows that the Africans are better off materially in Meadowlands than they were in Sophiatown, that the European is often benevolent to the African, that some Africans approve of racial separation and that a policy of *laissez faire* might result in the urbanised African suffering still more discrimination than he suffers at present. The principle of *apartheid*, he argues, is wholly moral, since it envisages nothing more than a territorial separation of the races, each maintaining its own identity and dignity and each having the fullest opportunity to develop its own culture. Mr. Steward presents his arguments ably, and with the single-mindedness that is to be expected of one who is Director of Information at South Africa House in London; but he leaves many questions unanswered or half-answered. Is there the slightest practical possibility of ever achieving complete territorial *apartheid*? The Tomlinson Commission did not think so; nor does the present Union Government. In so far as it

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cannot be achieved, should Africans within European areas continue to be subject to the degrading prohibitions against social contact with Europeans? Do these prohibitions really exist for the benefit of the Africans? What is the relationship between *apartheid* and *baasskap*? (Neither the word *baasskap* nor its English equivalent appears anywhere in the book.) Is there nothing worthy of explicit criticism in the present practice of *apartheid*? On what moral ground was Father Huddleston's pupil, Stephen, refused a passport to enable him to take up his scholarship in the United States? Mr. Steward complains that his Government's intentions have been grossly misrepresented and misunderstood overseas. One reason for this may be that its spokesmen have been unable to give acceptable answers to questions such as these.

An unbridgable chasm divides the South African nationalism of Alexander Steward from the negro nationalism of George Padmore and Richard Wright. Padmore was born in Trinidad, Wright in Mississippi. Both have been ardent disciples of communism; both turned their backs on it when they discovered that their function as publicity agents for the Soviet Union was all that mattered to the party. Both are acutely sensitive to any suspicion of colour discrimination and bitterly resentful of any claim of white men to be equipped to lead black men. Both are at pains to stress that communism (which, to them, is essentially a white man's creed, although it professes to be colour blind) has hardly any direct influence on African nationalism and that African nationalist governments will be the only reliable bulwark against the spread of communism in Africa. In this they are almost certainly correct. African governments will want to go their own way, which will not be the way of the "people's democracies." But it would be idle to become incensed if they are equally reluctant to link arms with the western world. "Few whites can envisage a world in which they are not pushing coloured folk around," writes Mr. Padmore. That an influential writer on black nationalism should hold such a point of view is regrettable; but it is a point of view that is prevalent among African nationalists at the present time.

Pan-Africanism or Communism? has many defects. It covers too much ground—it ranges from back-to-Africa movements to tribalism in Nigeria, from pan-African congresses in London to European colonial policies, from Mau Mau to the Liberian constitution—and it is often superficial. It is badly arranged and contains several errors of fact. It has far too little to say about the economic and administrative problems of a newly emergent African state. For all that, it is readable, informative, and, to the English reader, disturbing.

Mr. Padmore, while rejecting every vestige of white tutelage for the African, is under the sway of western political ideas. He looks forward beyond independence towards a future in which an array of democratic socialist states will join together in a United States of Africa. Mr. Richard Wright may share these visions of a distant future, but he is not so sure of the relevance of western political values in the immediate political context of Africa. His book is a record of a visit to the Gold Coast, made in 1953 at the suggestion of the wife of his friend George Padmore. This was his first experience of Africa, and no traveller's tale could be more colourfully told. He was at once captivated by Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party, with its *mystique* of freedom, its hilarity and mass emotionalism, its surge of black power. He was for and with the Africans but not of them, exasperated

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but uplifted, disgusted but fascinated, bewildered but percipient. The reader is with him in the Gold Coast and is reluctant to depart. One is left with a clear picture of the nature of the appeal made by the C.P.P., and of the handicaps under which its opponents labour. One is also likely to be moved to indignation by some of the author's political judgments. It is not too much to say that Mr. Wright detests the British political tradition and shows a hearty dislike of Englishmen. His statement that if an African student in England is known to be a nationalist "he will surely not pass his bar examinations" suggests a limitless gullibility. Dr. Nkrumah may well feel disinclined to treat seriously the author's advice to "militarise" the social life of Ghana for the next generation. Mr. Wright's political acumen is suspect, but he should be judged primarily as an artist; and he has a striking aptitude for painting vividly impressionistic pictures in words.

Mr. Akpan's book on African local government is of a wholly different character. In the Eastern Region of Nigeria, where the author serves as a locally recruited administrative officer, indigenous tribal institutions were not strong, and it was there that the British Government decided to make its first experiment in the introduction of democratically elected local government authorities into Africa. Mr. Akpan shows how mistakes were made in keeping too closely to the English model and in failing to provide sufficiently for the association of traditional authorities with the new bodies. He also makes out a strong case for closer central control of local government in Africa and for the continuance of the role of the administrative officer when full self-government has been achieved. His analysis of the functions and practical working of local government in Eastern Nigeria is illuminating and thorough. The 1955 Local Government Ordinance, which was passed after most of the book had been written, incorporates the substance of several of his recommendations for reform. Books on local government tend to be dull; this book is of unusual interest and high quality. That it should have been written by an African administrator is encouraging.

Broad surveys of colonial policy and practice are not, as a rule, dull; nevertheless, Mr. J. S. Furnivall's book is heavy going. It is solid, substantial, and informative; it has many thoughtful passages on social welfare and economic development; but it is dated. It was first published in England in 1948, and it had been written at the request of the Government of Burma which had wished to have the author's views on the relevance of colonial administration in the Netherlands Indies to the problems of post-war reconstruction in Burma. By the time the book was published, colonial rule was at an end in both of these areas. Much of what the author has to say belongs to history, but students of contemporary problems in South-East Asia will find some interesting material in his analysis of the shortcomings of British rule in Burma. In the second part of the book he dwells upon the larger issues of colonial development and welfare. Here he makes the mistake of generalising too freely about the *Richtlinien* for progress towards autonomy. ("Three essential elements of a representative government in a tropical dependency would seem to be a native President, a National Assembly and an Economic Council.") An imperial power preparing for its own abdication must be empirical. By equipping itself with a grammar of politics it is unlikely to make the path of transition any the smoother.

S. A. DE SMITH.

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BRITISH SOCIAL WORK IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By A. F. YOUNG and E. T. ASHTON. [*Routledge and Kegan Paul*. 1956. 264 pp. 25s. net.]

FOR students of the social history of nineteenth-century Britain, confronted with a growing and already massive body of literature, the first part of this book is an example of discrimination in subject-matter and brevity in presentation. Within the compass of a mere fifty-six pages, Mr. Ashton provides, in pleasant and unhurried tones, a broad sketch of the social conditions and intellectual climate which influenced the development of a haphazard philanthropy into relatively coherent, organised systems of social welfare and social work. He concentrates on two major themes; the role of religious thought and the influence on social theory of the poor law principles of 1834. Evangelicalism, as a way of life and as a deeply felt religious experience, shaped the attitude of the upper and middle classes to the poor. While, on the one hand, it stimulated and moved a great many men and women to protest against the social evils of the times it contributed, on the other, to the acceptance of the doctrine of "less eligibility." Hence, the birth of an immense number and variety of voluntary movements, most of them dedicated to limited, practical objectives of a personal, reformative nature. Out of these forces there slowly developed the main branches of social work as well as many of the social services as we know them today.

How slow these developments were, particularly in relation to child care and the welfare of all handicapped groups except the blind, is well depicted by Miss Young in the second and third parts of the book. In a series of brief sketches of movements, individual reformers and categories of need, she is concerned to describe and discuss the social work aims and methods which accompanied and informed the growth of organised systems of social welfare. Although the study stops short inconveniently at the end of the century, when the practice of social work was just beginning to acquire some theoretical basis, Miss Young has a great deal of ground to cover. Her definition of social work is a broad one. In interpreting the term to refer to "the personal efforts of individuals to assist those in distress" the study often becomes in effect, and perhaps inevitably, an account of social reform seen through the activities of many of the great figures of the nineteenth century—Octavia Hill, Elizabeth Fry, Barnardo, Mary Carpenter, Josephine Butler, Barnett, Edward Denison, and a host of others.

The work and lives of most of these influential figures, who were both reformers and active workers, has been told before and in more detail. Though it is an advantage to have the essence of these individual histories brought together in one book, nevertheless, something is occasionally lost of the personality and philosophy which guided these movements. For obvious reasons, Miss Young could not follow the example set by her collaborator; she had to be concerned with the detail of aims and methods. She tackles her heavy task methodically; perhaps, in some sections, a little too methodically to allow herself time to distil out of her material some of the more interesting ideas about the relationships of these early social workers and their clients.

The middle part of the book is devoted to a history of the development of what is now known as "family case work." This is largely the story of Thomas Chalmers' efforts to help the "innocent indigents" of Glasgow, and

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of the birth and development of the Charity Organisation Society in London after 1869. The last part of the book is a series of brief accounts of specialised activities—the care of deprived children, the penal services, the handicapped, moral welfare, settlements, and youth work. Each of these chapters is, in turn, split into small sections, ranging from "Ragged Schools" to aid for discharged prisoners; from education for the deaf to "White Slavery."

We learn from these individual stories a great deal of what was done in the nineteenth century for the poor and to the poor. We see how largely these activities were dominated by ideas of character building, obedience, gratitude, and order. Somehow, it all now seems so curiously passive. What we are thus led on to speculate about is why these ideas were so strongly held; what were the psychological motives which drove these people into social work, and why so little thought was given to the ethical questions involved in the exercise of authority and judgment in social work relationships. But this is not to criticise Miss Young. She and her collaborator have filled a serious gap in the literature by drawing together the many separate and confused strands in the story of the nineteenth-century pioneers of social work.

RICHARD M. TITMUS.

THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH LEGION. By GRAHAM WOOTTON. [*Macdonald & Evans, Ltd.* 348 pp. 25s.]

To write the official history of a voluntary body like the British Legion is easy: the author works through "documents never before made available in their entirety" (Mr. Wootton's words), taking care that the number and distribution of his words of praise for the workers in the cause reflect the official view, and without giving anything away. It is not surprising that it is done often, but it is surprising when the result is a useful book of fairly general interest. Although Mr. Wootton was allowed to put things his own way, his script was read by two "scrutineers," and "at some points . . . the shadow of reticence has fallen over the harsh glare of 'absolute truth.'" Yet he has succeeded in giving a basically honest and informative account that is well organised and lucidly written.

Students of history will probably find the material on the "German" policy of the Legion in the inter-war years most interesting. For students of politics what Mr. Wootton has to say about the political methods and the political successes and failures of the Legion constitutes a case-study in "pressure politics."

Although ex-service men's pressure politics is fairly simple—the Legion is virtually the only general ex-service men's pressure group; and there is no directly opposing organised group—Mr. Wootton finds it hard to measure the effects of particular methods and to assess the degree to which pressure from the Legion accounts for its successes. Thus, on the National Public Petition of 1925: "its main effect was to be discerned only in the long run as part of a cumulative pressure." On recent successes that "reflected a change in the attitude of society itself to soldiers returning from the wars": "that change of attitude no doubt was the resultant of many forces, but there is also no doubt that it was, at least in part, induced by the untiring efforts of the British Legion over the previous twenty years." And if securing the retention

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of a separate Ministry of Pensions in 1922 gave the Legion a taste of "the power in public affairs of an organised interest group," what does the failure to prevent the disappearance of the separate Ministry in 1953 show? These remarks are not intended as an adverse criticism of the book: quite the opposite. Official historians are apt to take too narrow a view and claim too much for their organisations. Mr. Wootton avoids the trap. His account shows the limits of "pressure politics" as an explanation of policy-making.

His account also illustrates how much the relation between the Government and pressure groups is a two-way relation. One of the inducements that led several ex-service men's bodies to form the British Legion in 1920 as the comprehensive ex-service men's organisation was the money in the United Services Fund. Between 1919 and 1947 the British Legion Relief Fund received nearly £2,000,000 from that source. As Mr. Wootton puts it, the Legion was soon "established," with a Royal Charter, its representatives on consultative committees, and its leaders' names in the Honours Lists. When competitors appeared briefly during the second world war the Minister of Pensions attacked them publicly: "he made it plain that he regarded the British Legion as the truly representative body of ex-service men and women." No wonder there are those who suggest that British pressure groups are more powerful than American pressure groups, whose relative blatancy is a measure of their relative ineffectiveness.

But there is the other side. The leaders of the Legion defended the Ministry of Pensions against attacks from the rank and file. In 1933 there was a major row, in which the Prince of Wales was induced to speak on behalf of the "platform" in defence of the Ministry (his similar support of the "German" policy two years later received much more attention). Earlier, in 1926, the Legion Conference had passed a resolution against the advice of the "platform" making it possible for the Legion "to oppose every Parliamentary candidate who has voted against the Pensions policy of the Legion." The leaders had this decision reversed the next year.

Mr. Wootton believes that the Legion would have been less effective if it had carried out the policy approved in 1926: he speaks of the "exigencies of the party system in Parliament." I think he is right, though this may, in Professor Homan's words, bring us back to the drain pipes ("drain pipes remain on the outside of British houses so that they can easily be got at if they freeze"). Mr. Wootton, quite properly, leaves the task of arguing the point to students of politics. They would be well served with materials for analysis if all authors of official histories were as conscientious, fair, and perceptive as he.

ALLEN POTTER.

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THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT. By STEPHEN WHEATCROFT.
[Manchester University Press. 358 pp. 35s.]

For the non-specialist reader this book is fairly heavy going. It is not very attractively produced, and Mr. Wheatcroft has few stylistic graces. Its importance lies in the unique combination of practical experience, academic qualifications, and enthusiasm for the subject possessed by its author, and in the fact that—according to its bibliography—it is the first full-scale, non-official work on European air transport to be written since 1940. As Mr. Peter Masefield says in his introduction, "it provides the best compendium of clear thinking on the subject which has yet been compiled—and in many places it provides the only reference available."

Although a summary, in a few sentences, of Mr. Wheatcroft's long and well-sustained argument inevitably involves some distortion, it must nevertheless be attempted to show the book's importance. He holds that the solution of European air transport's "short-haul" problems demands more intensified operations with higher load-factors. This means, among other things, that limitations must be placed upon the further extension of an already over-extended system, and that existing services must be replanned on more rational principles, with the use of bigger aircraft and fewer main airports. Obstacles to progress along these lines are the devotion to prestige and exclusive economic advantage of the governments operating airlines and the empire-building proclivities of the national airlines themselves. Ideally, Europe (that is, the "western" Europe with which Mr. Wheatcroft is exclusively concerned) needs something broadly equivalent to the United States Civil Aeronautics Board. In existing political circumstances, however, this is not merely ideal but Utopian. An alternative would be the conclusion of "pooling" agreements between operators—but these would be reconcilable with the public interest only in a very few circumstances, as they would eliminate those desirable forms of competition upon which efficient service to the public largely depends. As, therefore, it is important that "ultimate arbitration should be by public and not private authority," governments must be persuaded to take a longer-sighted view and to establish and support machinery for a more developed type of regional planning than exists at present. This can be built on the existing basis of the European Civil Aviation Conference and the Air Research Bureau, and must be closely linked with the International Air Transport Association. Its key organisation would be an Air Transport Commission, with the primary function of studying European traffic flows and preparing plans for a more rational pattern of routes.

I can claim no expertise in Mr. Wheatcroft's subject. Hitherto my interest in European air transport has been exclusively that of a consumer. But I cannot imagine that anyone will be able to detect serious flaws in his diagnosis or suggest a remedy which, given the present reluctance of European states to make serious sacrifices of their economic sovereignty, could be considered more practicable.

The question, of course, is whether they can be persuaded to surrender the immediate advantages which they imagine to accrue to them from the present system, even to the extent necessary to make Mr. Wheatcroft's scheme workable. To all he offers the bait of a very considerable reduction in costs. To

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the economically weaker states he offers an investment trust which, by assisting them to re-equip their airlines, would enable them to enjoy genuinely "fair and equal" opportunities within the framework of a "less restrictive régime." The latter seems to me an essential part of his plan, for without it the full co-operation of the smaller airline-owning countries could not possibly be secured.

These are fair offers, and one can only hope that those responsible for the vast, disorderly European network will study Wheatcroft on *Air Transport* seriously. That he should have to be so cautious in his approach to a solution is a sad commentary on economic relations in western Europe. It is still sadder that eastern Europe has had to be left out of the picture altogether.

A. H. HANSON.

MEN AND POWER, 1917-18. By LORD BEAVERBROOK. [Hutchinson. 448 pp. 25s.]

A SERIOUS historian, a sociologist, and a psychologist might each find in this book material of profound interest, though almost always the interest would be the opposite of what the author intended or expected. Let us first try to see it through the eyes of the psychologist and put the author on the inspection or operating table. This is appropriate for after all, even in history or historical biography or autobiographical history—all three of which this book purports to be—everything which is given to us, including the facts, comes to us through the mind, such as it is, of the author.

The mind of Lord Beaverbrook is certainly such as it is. As one of the two or three most powerful tycoons of the newspaper world, he must judge the ability and control the fate of vast numbers of writers; yet he himself is a very poor writer of the English or Canadian language. The paragraph is always a good test of the slovenly writer and thinker. Lord Beaverbrook spatters his sentences over the page, in ones or twos or threes, without reference to their meaning or connection. The sentences themselves are dull and undistinguished; their quality can be seen in the following taken at random:

"Following upon his dramatic mobilisation of the Fleet on that dark night at the outbreak of war, he did not remain long in the position of responsibility where he believed his talents were used to best advantage."

When a man writes and publishes a book, he reveals a good deal of his mind and its quality to the psychologist by the way in which he writes. But there are people—though in fact there are surprisingly few—whose thought is original or profound and have important things to say, but who are very poor writers. Let us see whether Lord Beaverbrook is one of these profound dumb thinkers, and here, of course, we move gradually into the field of the sociologist and historian.

Lord Beaverbrook, in this book, is telling the story of the crucial year in the first world war, the year in which the fate of Britain, the Commonwealth, and Britain's allies hung agonisingly in the balance. He tells the story apparently from the inmost inside where Prime Ministers and Cabinets, kings, generals, admirals, and newspaper proprietors make history. He was always running round to these great men, being consulted and consulting, calling

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them by their Christian names, with his finger perpetually in the evil-tasting pie which historians call history. It is remarkable, therefore, that, seeing so closely the making of what were great and often disastrous events, he never in over 400 pages has an important or original thing to say about them out of his own mind. There are plenty of very interesting things in his book, but they are always either "revelations" in the sense in which that word is habitually used in Lord Beaverbrook's papers or they are personalities. Here we have pre-eminently the backstairs gossip of history; here indeed we

"hear poor rogues

Talk of court news; and we'll talk with them too,—

Who loses and who wins, who's in, who's out,

And take upon's the mystery of things,

As if we were God's spies."

What is depressing is that the mystery of things as revealed by the proprietor of the *Daily Express* is so trivial and so sordid. It is almost entirely a story of who loses and who wins, who's in, who's out. The history of the years 1917 and 1918 as we see it through Lord Beaverbrook's eyes is a personal struggle—and more often than not a nasty personal struggle—for place and power between politicians, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and even King George V. The centre of the struggle was the determination of the military to wrest from the civilian Cabinet and ministers the direction of the war and the control of policy. And in the centre of the centre stands Lloyd George who, by a formidable combination of complete unscrupulousness, subtlety, cunning, and patience, defeated all the generals and admirals and their allies on the throne, in the Lords, and in the Commons. Everything, as recorded by Lord Beaverbrook, about Carson, for instance, Haig, Allenby, Robertson, Trenchard, George V, and the rest of them, is no doubt true and documented in the vast collection of letters, etc., possessed by him. Yet it is difficult to believe that this is the whole story. The observer of events, unless he is intelligent enough to mistrust himself, sees only what interests him or what he wants to see. Lord Beaverbrook saw only the struggle of little men for place and power. Herodotus, Thucydides, Gibbon also saw and described that struggle making history in other times and climes, but they did not see it as the sole determining factor. Is it simplicity and sentimentality to believe that, if Lord Beaverbrook had only been able to look beyond the end of his own nose, he too might have seen some other and more interesting things making history in the year 1917?

LEONARD WOOLF.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE MINISTRY OF WORKS. By SIR HAROLD EMMERSON. [Allen and Unwin. 171 pp. 15s.]

THIS is the fourth volume in the New Whitehall Series, the purpose of which is to describe the work of government departments. The author is a former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works. He shows that the activities of the Ministry cover a wide scope. They include the provision of accommodation for government departments in this country and official missions

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abroad; the supply of furniture and equipment, and common services such as removals, cleaning, and so forth. The Ministry is also responsible for safeguarding what the author calls "the heritage of the past." This comprises the royal parks and palaces, public buildings such as the Houses of Parliament and the law courts, and many historic buildings, ancient monuments, statues, and works of art belonging to the nation. The efficiency and well-being of the building industry is one of its constant preoccupations. The book describes all these activities in an interesting and lucid manner; and it concludes with a description of the way in which the department is organised and managed.

AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION. By HAROLD F. ALDERFER. [*The Macmillan Company*. 662 pp. 41s. 6d.]

This is a competent and comprehensive general account of local government and administration in the U.S.A. The task is a difficult one, since there are about 117,000 units of local government of various kinds, and there is a great diversity among the several state systems. Professor Alderfer's treatise is a good deal better than many textbooks on the subject for several reasons. One is that he devotes a considerable amount of space to tracing the historical foundations of American local government—an aspect which is often neglected. Another is that he deals at length not only with relations between the local authorities and the states, but also with the relations between the federal government and the localities. Thus, for example, constitutional requirements and Supreme Court decisions about de-segregation in schools is a matter where federal law and policy profoundly affect local education authorities. Federal grants in aid are also a matter of importance to local authorities. A third reason is that the author gives attention to the local electoral processes, and to political parties and local politics. And, finally, he addresses himself to a number of important problems, such as metropolitan areas, the reform of areas and authorities. The book contains a detailed description of the main services carried out by local authorities.

CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, 1956. Edited on behalf of the Faculty of Laws, University College, London, by G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER. [*Stevens*. 275 pp. 32s. 6d.]

This is the ninth volume of public lectures on contemporary questions of law and government delivered in University College, London. Many of the lectures deal with matters of great interest. We would mention particularly Professor Lloyd's essay on Obscenity and the Law; Professor FitzGerald's talk on the constitutional future of Malta; Mrs. Korah on the control of monopolies and restrictive practices; and Mr. Justice Devlin's address on the common law, public policy, and the executive. The conclusions at which Mr. Justice Devlin has arrived concerning the inability of the courts to control the executive are of great importance and should be widely known. Professor Lloyd's views about the law of obscenity are eminently sensible and robust. The Law Faculty of University College continues to show considerable imagination in arranging these annual courses of lectures, and they are well worth publishing.

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The Storm Centre

For the last 3,500 years—from the day when the imperialist Agamemnon sent his ships and chariots against Troy to the day when Sir Anthony Eden sent his ships and aeroplanes against Egypt—the Middle East has been a geographical and political storm centre. Today, quite apart from the sudden acute crisis caused by the ill-advised action of the British and French Governments, the area, as so often before, is one of the principal key positions in international affairs, for how and by whom the key is turned there may well decide whether the world is to have peace or war. This special issue of *The Political Quarterly* is devoted to an analysis by experts of the fundamental issues in the Middle East problem. The immediate dangerous and difficult crisis has, of course, in part influenced us in the choice of a subject for this special issue and it looms over every article, for it complicates every problem. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate its importance or its meaning. The ultimate problem of the Middle East, demanding the highest statesmanship for its solution, would have been there, threatening the world's peace in the next ten years, if the abortive seizure of the Suez Canal had never taken place. To begin with Agamemnon in the first sentence of these editorial notes is not a pedantic or academic anachronism. It is important, at the very beginning of any serious consideration of the Middle East problem, to realise how extraordinarily ancient and deep-seated are the factors creating it.

Of course, even in the Aegean and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf things change a little in three or four thousand years, yet it is no exaggeration to say that, *mutatis mutandis*, the same geographical, ethnographical, and economic factors which made this area a storm centre in the time of Agamemnon, Xerxes, or Alexander the Great are operating to make it a storm centre today in the time of the Arab League, Colonel Nasser, the Suez Canal Company, and the American oil tycoons. Geographically the Middle East remains what it has been since the beginning of European history, the meeting place of Asia and Europe. Hence geography has made it an area of strains and stresses where two different civilisations, two different ways of life must clash or adjust themselves. You have only got to go into a government office or a bazaar in Cairo, Ankara, and Bagdad to see that the process is as difficult today as at the time of the Battle of Marathon, the Roman

Empire, or the Crusades. Secondly, within the area there are very ancient and violent centrifugal racial forces, resulting from the jigsaw pattern of Greeks, Turks, Arabs, Jews, Egyptians, Persians, and so on. The violence is increased and bitterness of struggle exacerbated by the modern form of extreme emotional nationalism and its apotheosis in the national state. Lastly, the area remains, what it has always been, a vital route between the west and east economically and an area rich in raw materials. Hence today the enormous part which the Canal, the pipelines, and the oil have played in complicating geography and inflaming nationalism.

The Legacy of Imperialism

In the nineteenth century these three eternal factors, geography, ethnography, and economics, produced the phenomenon of modern imperialism, which it is now fashionable to call colonialism. Like one of those stars called Novae, which suddenly flame up in a distant galaxy, western civilisation suddenly erupted in the industrial revolution, and the enormous power and energy which it gave to European nations made the backward, racially divided peoples of the Middle East powerless before this new impact of the West upon the East. Industry and commerce, the need for markets and raw materials, inevitably drew the great Powers and power politics into the area; the cutting of the Suez Canal and railway concessions, of which the German visionary Bagdad Railway was a characteristic example, showed the everlasting importance of the route from Europe into Asia. The Ottoman Empire was driven out of Europe, lost effective power at all points of the compass, and was treated as moribund. In Egypt, in the Persian Gulf, in northern Arabia, in Persia the great Powers established protectorates or spheres of influence. The twentieth century today is reaping where the nineteenth sowed; we are enjoying the legacy of imperialism. All over the world, and not least in the Middle East, imperialism has produced a violent reaction in the "colonial" peoples against the imperialist Powers. The reaction has taken the usual road trodden by "subject peoples"; they have used the weapons, the science, and not least the ideas of the West against the West. At the end of the 1914-1918 war there were only two "sovereign independent" states in the area, and both their sovereignty and their independence looked to be precarious. There are today ten sovereign independent states in the Middle East whose status has been recognised by their admission to membership of the United Nations.

These ten states differ profoundly from one another in almost

every kind of way. Saudi Arabia has an area of 1,600,000 sq. kilometres and a population of 6,000,000, Egypt an area of 1,000,000 sq. kilometres and a population of 20,000,000, Israel an area of 20,678 sq. kilometres and a population of 1,764,000, and Lebanon an area of 10,400 sq. kilometres and a population of 1,383,000. Nearly all these countries are governed by dictatorships, some completely barbarous as in Saudi Arabia, others military and "westernised" on the South American model, as in Egypt. In Turkey there is a kind of twilight régime between dictatorship and democracy, while in Tel-Aviv there is a government as democratic and western as that in London, Paris, or Washington. The economic differences are fantastic. In Iran and Iraq, in Jordan and Egypt, the standard of living of the average man is extremely low, but, as Mr. Patrick points out in his article on oil, the tiny sheikhdom of Kuwait on the Persian Gulf has the highest *per capita* income in the world. But however wide the differences may be between these states, in government, economics, and civilisation, they all agree in having taken over from the West the ideas and emotions of nationalism in their most violent and belligerent forms. The "problem" of the Middle East is, therefore, only part of the whole problem of Asia—how to provide for the transition from imperialism or colonialism to a régime of numbers of sovereign, independent Asiatic states in which exacerbated nationalism is often used by their rulers as a convenient instrument of government. In the articles which follow it becomes clear that there are three or four highly important, stubborn facts, peculiar to the area, which will have to be dealt with if the transition is to be made without disaster to both West and East. First, there is the calamitous immediate situation resulting from the failure of the French and British inept coup. Secondly, there is the long-term question of the position of the Canal as an international waterway and of the oil resources of the area which are in the hands of governments incapable of exploiting them without western aid and in nearly all cases with economic commitments to western governments or capitalists. Thirdly, there is the position of Israel, a state for whose existence Britain and the U.S.A. are mainly responsible, now surrounded by savagely nationalist, hostile "Arab" states determined to destroy it. Lastly, there is the factor which is dealt with particularly in the articles of Colonel Wheeler and Mr. Esmond Wright, the impact of the Soviet Union and communism upon the peoples and governments of the Middle East and the strategic position of the area in the cold war between the Russian East and the American West.

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Alternative Policies

There are two ways of dealing with troubled waters, one is to pour oil on them and the other is to fish in them, but you cannot do both at the same time without ludicrous and usually disastrous consequences. In the Middle East the great Powers are attempting to do these two contradictory things at the same time. The communist East provides Egypt and the Yemen with arms to use against Israel and the West; the Eisenhower Doctrine gives arms to Saudi Arabia to use against Israel in return for a military base which can be used against the communist East. The whole policy of the Soviet Union is directed to the infiltration of communism and to support of the Arab League as a means of stirring up trouble against Britain, France, and the U.S.A. The western answer is a Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. In the nineteenth century the great Powers were pursuing precisely this policy in the same area in what they called the Eastern Question, stirring up and muddying the Levantine waters and then fishing in them—with disastrous results for all concerned. But in the nineteenth century there was no League of Nations and no United Nations. Today the United Nations at least feebly exists and through it these great Powers are attempting to counteract by international action the suicidal folly of their national policies. An international "army" patrols the Canal to replace the "imperialist" armies of France and Britain and to prevent mutual slaughter of Israelis and Egyptians; the Secretary-General of U.N. feverishly flies from west to east and from east to west trying to pour international oil upon the storms of nationalism.

If the western Powers really want peace and prosperity they must stop destroying with the left hand what they are attempting to build with the right. The transition from colonialism to Balkanisation of the Middle East in which Egypt and Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Turkey lie down peacefully together as sovereign independent states, with Israel in their midst, is going to be a very difficult business. The "backwardness" of governments and people, their economic immaturity, the irresponsibility of many of the ruling dictators and ruling castes, the crudity of their nationalism make it impossible for them, if left entirely to themselves, to cope successfully with the economic and political difficulties of the transition. It is a silly and dangerous fashion among many people today to encourage and extol the hysterical, virulent nationalism of brown men or black men merely because in the nineteenth century their fathers were the victims of the nationalism of white men. No sane

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man who had to choose between subjection to the imperialism of America or Britain and the imperialism of King Saud of Saudi Arabia or Colonel Nasser of Egypt would choose the latter. If the crude nationalism of these new states is not to make things worse than they were in the bad old days of colonialism, somehow or other the economics and politics of this region must for a time be subjected to international guidance, control, or restraint.

The International Solution

The international instrument which is alone available is the United Nations. Whether it can be used effectively must depend ultimately upon the United States and Soviet Russia. The Middle East is only one front in the cold war and the operations there will be determined by the general course and strategy of the main war. But even if the Soviet Union persists in cold war and therefore in fishing in troubled waters, the United States (and Britain and France in a lesser degree) can do much to ease the transition, to restrain passions and promote prosperity. American Middle East policy has been shortsighted and immature in recent years. It brought pressure upon Britain to "clear out" without any provision for dealing with the danger of Arab and Egyptian nationalism, the threat to Israel, or the economic problems involved in the oil industry and the Canal. Nothing can excuse the folly of Sir Anthony Eden's adventure; but the way in which President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have dealt with the situation is inept and disastrous. To treat Britain and France as if they are naughty boys to be stood in the corner and Colonel Nasser as a blue-eyed boy to get whatever he wants is the foreign policy, not of statesmen, but of newspaper strips. To allow Colonel Nasser to blockade Israel and pursue guerilla war against her on the frontiers, treating Israel as if Egypt was at war with her, and then to treat any act of resistance by Israel as "aggression," refusing at the same time to guarantee Israel against Egyptian blockade or raids, is to destroy the United Nations as an instrument of peace and international law and justice. To base American policy on placating the Arabs by arming the medieval monarch of Saudi Arabia in the hope of obtaining a secure strategic base against the Soviet Union is a stupid and dangerous proceeding which the whole history of relations between western governments and reactionary Asiatic kings or dictators during the last twenty-five years shows must fail in its objects.

Events have shown that the British strategical game in the

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Middle East was played with the utmost incompetence and Mr. Dulles's strategy is even worse. To wobble strategically for a base against Russia from the Canal to Jordan and from Jordan to Cyprus and a Bagdad Pact is to build your base on quicksands, and Mr. Dulles will find that he has picked another quicksand in the desert owned by King Saud. If the western Powers wanted to play power politics against the Soviet Union, they should have looked for allies and strategic bases in Turkey and Israel. But the Middle East is the last place in which Britain and the U.S.A. should play at power politics and strategical games against Russia. The policy of the Soviet Union is to stir up the greatest possible trouble everywhere short of a major war, and for completely unscrupulous fishing in troubled waters, as every article which follows shows, the area is ideal. In these kinds of manoeuvre neither the U.S.A. nor Britain nor France can compete with Russia and to attempt to play power politics whether by seizing the Suez Canal or arming Saudi Arabia is simply to play into communist hands. Even an American policy of indiscriminate economic bribery, without manoeuvres for strategic bases, would almost certainly fail. The right policy for the West is courageously to reverse their policy, to forget about the cold war and strategic bases in the Middle East, and to concentrate upon attaining certain limited objectives through international action and the United Nations. These should include, first and foremost, the imposition of peace upon all the states in this area. No one can pretend that this will be easy, but the existence of the U.N. forces in Egypt makes an extension of international control at danger points at least possible. This must lead to international surveillance of freedom of navigation through the Canal and the insistence that Egypt cease the blockade and other belligerent acts against Israel. Finally, some international agreement with regard to oil should be aimed at, an agreement which would protect the interests of states, oil producers, and oil consumers.

These objects will not be easy to attain. They will be met by opposition and sabotage from the Soviet Union. But if the U.S.A. and Britain pursued them with determination and honesty within and without the United Nations, they would soon gain a great deal of international support both within and without the Middle East. For most states and enormous numbers of people in three, if not four or five, continents would benefit if peace and prosperity could be assured in the Middle East, a prospect which even the most extreme nationalists must consider.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

ROBERT STEPHENS

"THE truth is that the great majority of publicists, politicians, diplomats, and businessmen, and scholars not least of all, approach the civilisations and problems of the East with a complex of misconceptions which a whole lifetime is not long enough to eradicate."

This severe and justified warning of Professor Gibb's should be kept in mind in any attempt to sketch the outlines of political and social development in the Middle East, particularly when as here the sketch must be brief and inevitably superficial. One of the errors most common and most difficult to avoid is to look for too close parallels with European history and thought, and to judge "progress" too rigidly by the yardstick of European political and social forms. At the same time one has to avoid the other extreme of unrestrained expertise—what might be called the anthropological approach—which has contributed a good deal to current misunderstandings between Europe and the Middle East. The anthropological approach tends to make us think that in the Middle East the human mind necessarily works differently from anywhere else, whereas in fact its basic reactions to any given situation are the same and if they take a different form, it is because the mind's picture of that situation is different. The task of the experts is, by translation and interpretation, to show us the picture the Middle East sees. It is then the task of political imagination to see how far we can both be brought to see the same picture of a situation and to act accordingly.

Thus one must try to understand the historical and cultural factors which influence the way the Middle East frames its political ideas. But one must also resist the temptation to think that these special local conditions are the only real explanation of political actions. Otherwise, in our international relations, we may be led to neglect the straightforward political action which is within our scope, in favour of generalities about different cultures which are difficult to influence or control.

The first pitfall is the term "Middle East" itself. It is primarily a European concept, a label for a set of diplomatic and military

* The author is on the staff of *The Observer*.

problems located in a vaguely defined geographic area straddling part of Asia and Africa. It is commonly taken to include the states of the Arab League (but not North Africa), Israel, Turkey, Persia, the Persian Gulf and southern Arabia, and sometimes Cyprus. But if inhabitants of these countries think of themselves in a wider collectivity it is not primarily as part of the "Middle East." Most Arabs, for example, would consider themselves as part of a larger Arab grouping extending for some purposes to North Africa. The Moslem majority among them would also have a sense of belonging to the still larger collectivity of Islam. This sense would also be shared in some respects by the Persians and even some Turks, though qualified in the case of the former by their adherence to the Shia, the minority division of Islam, and in the case of the latter by the official laicism and orientation towards Europe, of Kemalist doctrine. Israelis would see their extension first into the Jewish Diaspora and into the Western world generally.

Nevertheless, these countries have certain common features and problems. I do not propose to try to describe in detail the social and political developments in each one of them. But I would like to consider some of these common factors and also indicate some of the local variations in dealing with them.

Nationalism in the Middle East

From the point of view of a European political historian the Middle East problem of today might be described as the second instalment of the Eastern Question which so agitated Europe in the nineteenth century. The Eastern Question has been defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire in Europe. From a similar narrow power-political point of view, the Middle East question might be defined as the problem created by the collapse of the Turkish Empire in Asia and Africa. In both cases nationalism has provided the main political driving-force in the break-up of an empire and the creation of new nations. In both cases this same nationalist dynamic which has sustained the new nations has also aggravated their problems. It has hindered as well as helped their economic development. It has brought them into conflict with outside Great Powers and with one another. British and French power hastened the break-up of the Turkish imperial mould, but could not be more than a temporary substitute for it in the face of increasing nationalist pressure.

Turkey itself and Persia are variants in this general pattern.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Though subject to strong foreign influences and pressures their structure as states was never completely submerged under foreign rule. Both were concerned with the preservation rather than the creation of their nationhood, although in the case of Turkey this also involved a new theory of a homogenous nation state to replace the former concept of the Ottoman empire. This continuity has given them a certain psychological advantage in dealing with the outside world.

Islam and Western Civilisation

But the political evolution of the Middle Eastern states also forms part of a bigger historical development: the adjustment of Islamic society and other old-established non-European civilisations to the impact of the scientific techniques and political and moral concepts of the Western world. This process has been going on for several decades at a varying pace and is now going forward faster than ever before. Consequently the whole Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia is in the throes of one of the deepest crises in its history.

Even in the easiest political circumstances the social changes produced by increased intercourse between Islamic society and the West would have created serious difficulties inside the predominantly Moslem countries of the Middle East. But the circumstances have been far from easy because the primary impact of Europe was in terms of superior military and political power. In those parts of the Middle East where Britain and France were imperial and mandatory Powers, their presence undoubtedly hastened social and technical development in the Western sense. But the political strains caused by their presence increased local instability and above all the moral confusion which accompanies social change.

For Western civilisation has brought to the Islamic world and the Middle East not merely its technical successes but also its own social and philosophical weaknesses, its still unresolved conflicts. Moreover, the two most important conflicts spring from the very elements which gave the West its superior power against the rest of the world—the development of science and the creation, through scientific application, of highly organised techniques of economic production. The West has not yet resolved the clash between science, with its philosophical cousins of rationalism and materialism, and religion: it has at best accepted a truce and co-existence between them. Nor has it yet found a really satisfactory

answer in human terms to the conflict between modern economic organisation plus centralised political power and the thirst of the individual human soul not merely for political freedom but also for a sense of personal significance and a creative role in the universe.

These conflicts are also now entering the Islamic world. They are all the more intense there because the questions which Western civilisation poses have not sprung spontaneously from the internal evolution of Islamic thought and society, but have appeared from outside formulated in an unfamiliar way. Moreover, they are entangled with the more visible conflicts between different civilisations—in customs, clothes, manners, and style of living.

The capacity of the Middle East to adopt Western scientific techniques in a creative rather than superficial and imitative manner depends in the last resort on its ability to face the questions raised by the scientific process of thought. But it has to deal with their philosophical and social implications in its own terms. Western culture, by its very nature, does not provide complete ready-made answers. Part of the attraction of communism is that it seems to offer a way out of this dilemma. It appears to offer a complete philosophical and political framework for the application of scientific techniques of power.

The multiple impact of the West has meanwhile produced a complex effect in the Middle East, in which acceptance and imitation are mingled with revulsion and rejection, in differing proportions according to circumstances of time and place.

One of the first effects was the creation of the nucleus of a Western-educated upper and middle class which sought to apply the principles of constitutional liberalism and national self-determination which it had learned from Europe. Such was the inspiration of the earlier attempts at constitutional reform in the Ottoman Empire, in Persia, and in Egypt, and one of the stimulants of the Egyptian and Arab nationalist movements. Together with these movements went a general desire for "progress" and "modernisation" and usually a secular approach to politics.

But the Western impact also brought a sharp reaction from Moslem thinkers. Some religious thinkers advocated a liberalising of Islam to adjust it to the new ideas. Others sought refuge in a simple conservatism, while yet others reacted by preaching reformism of a different kind, a return to a more fundamentalistic and puritanical form of Islam. The latter rejected Western culture as a whole while the secular nationalists opposed only the political manifestation of Western rule or power. A few original thinkers

grasped the real problem of modernising Islamic society from a technical and social point of view without destroying its moral basis.

In more recent times this picture has been complicated by new factors. There has been a split inside the Western-educated class caused by the spread of that class outside the confines of the wealthy and by the influence of European radicalism. This has led to the emergence of new movements in which nationalism is linked not with political liberalism but with radical ideas of social reform. In the Arab countries, especially Egypt, radicalism has also been infused into the more puritan forms of Islamic reaction, such as the Moslem Brotherhood. The fact that the ruling classes were to a large extent westernised in habits and manners and that luxury is sometimes represented by the more sordid aspects of Western life, intensified the revulsion of these religious radicals from Western culture.

A third factor has been the rise of communist Russia, joined now by China, not merely as a Great Power bordering on the Moslem world and engulfing part of it, but also as an alternative source of inspiration for the modernisers.

What has been the result so far of this ferment, this confused but very real social and political revolution which is the most important fact in most of the Middle East today? Judged by the standards of West European society, the results may seem meagre. But set against past conditions in the Middle East itself, they are in many ways remarkable.

Political Development

The first big change is in the achievement of nationhood. Persia and Turkey have preserved and consolidated their organisations as national states. In the areas formerly under Ottoman and then British or French rule, twelve new nation states have been established during the past forty years, eleven of them predominantly Arabic-speaking countries and the twelfth Israel. While all of them still face many serious internal and external problems, they have managed with remarkable success to create the first essentials of statehood, internal security, and an administration with effective authority. Most of them have, of course, carried their national development much further.

It has to be remembered that for the Middle East the nation state is in itself a comparatively new and unfamiliar political form. For most of its history the Middle East has been organised in the form primarily of empires and religious communities. The idea of

patriotism, of duty and allegiance to the state, has had to overcome the obstacles of other older and deeper loyalties to family, tribe, and religion. The growth of the idea of personal political responsibility, of co-operation with and acceptance of national governmental authority, has also been handicapped by past centuries of insecurity and of governments whose chief role in the eyes of the public was that of oppression and extortion.

In the case of the Arab states there are also historical factors which suggest that the present system of nation states may not be a final definitive political form. Many Arab nationalists regard at least some of the present national frontiers as artificial divisions imposed by the Great Powers. They foresee broader regroupings of the existing Arab states, either in the merger of certain neighbouring states such as Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, or in a federation eventually embracing all the Arabic-speaking countries, or a combination of both these systems. Various moves towards the smaller mergers, in the form of the "Fertile Crescent" or "Greater Syria" or Iraqi-Syrian union, have hitherto failed in the face of local vested interests, international jealousies, and the objections in Syria, part genuine part excuse, against union with Iraq and Jordan while these countries were still regarded as under British influence. The first attempt at a wider organisation, the Arab League, has also largely failed, partly for the same reasons. It was never more than a loose alliance of sovereign states and suffered from the persistent suspicion and rift between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the Hashimite-ruled countries of Iraq and Jordan on the other. It finally lost most of what efficacy it had with the open split caused by Iraq's membership of the Bagdad Pact. Side by side with it has developed the new alliance between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to which Jordan has now been added. Official sentiment in Cairo, Damascus, and Amman is now in favour of an eventual federation of all the Arab states, and on the initiative of the Syrian Pan-Arab socialist Baath party the first moves have been taken towards a federal union of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In North Africa, there is strong support for a regional confederation of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, which might also be extended to take in Libya. There are many obstacles in the way of either such partial regroupings or of a complete Arabic-speaking federation. Complete "Arab unity," if it ever comes at all, may not be achieved as a practical reality for many years or even decades. But the idea remains an active political force in the Arabic-speaking countries both inside the Middle East and beyond. So much for the external state forms.

But, except for Israel, which has been able to establish a political democracy of Western European type, the internal political constitutions of the Middle East states have not yet been fully stabilised. At present they vary considerably in character from country to country. Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon, and the Sudan are republics. The rest are monarchies. In all except Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, which are absolute monarchies, and in Egypt, which is a military oligarchy, there are constitutions of the parliamentary democratic type functioning with varying degrees of reality and effectiveness. Even in Egypt, the professed aim of the régime is to return eventually to a form of parliamentary life.

The Prospects for Democracy

Much has been written about the unsuitability of parliamentary democracy for states with different traditions of government and without the social structure necessary to support a democratic system. Difficulties of this kind abound in the Middle East and have contributed to the vicissitudes of constitutional life there. But perhaps even more striking than the weaknesses and failures of the parliamentary system in many Middle East countries is the tenacity and vitality it has continued to show despite upheavals and the hold which it still maintains as an ideal to be aimed at. Although there is a tradition of authoritarian government in the Middle East, it has also been paralleled, among the Arabs at least, by another strong tradition of a democratic kind, a rebellious individualism and a feeling of personal equality.

Nor should the defects of parliamentary government where it exists in the Middle East lead us necessarily to the conclusion that it is completely useless or incapable of reform and evolution. The interference of monarchs, the corruption of ministers, the rigging of elections, rotten boroughs, control by landed interests, the buying of votes, ignorant electors, and the lack of a system of clearly defined parties—these are all weaknesses and scandals which have also marked the path of parliamentary evolution in Britain and other democratic countries. In the Middle East it is as if the great revolutions of Europe, spread over several centuries, the emergence of national states, the creation of representative government, the Enlightenment, the industrial and agricultural revolutions, and the struggle for social democracy were all taking place at once within the space of two or three generations.

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If one adds to this the abrupt outward changes in dress, customs, social habits, and the embroilment of the area in international tension through its sensitive geopolitical position, one should not be surprised if constitutional life does not go as smoothly as at Westminster. One should harp less constantly on the "instability" and "chaos" of the Middle East and rather appreciate the surprising degree to which it nevertheless continues to make an erratic but undeniable progress.

But the rest of the world sets a fast pace and those impatient to catch up have sometimes despaired of the efficacy of the parliamentary instrument for technical and social reforms and have been unwilling to wait until the instrument improved itself. Turkey, Persia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt have all tried the short-cuts of dictatorship for varying lengths of time. But all except Egypt have now returned to a parliamentary form of government, however imperfect, and it is more than likely that Egypt will eventually do the same.

The prominent role of army officers among the impatient reformers and revolutionaries of the Middle East is not due solely to the army's position as the final arbiter of power in the state. The army was the first institution in Middle Eastern states to feel the effects and the need of Western techniques. It offered the most accessible path to influence and power to active and ambitious men from outside the traditional ruling class. In some ways and at certain times it was not only a more disciplined but also perhaps a more representative institution than the civil governments, for its officers were in closer contact with the feelings and aspirations of the common people as embodied in its ranks.

But military revolutionaries have usually been unable to consolidate their power through the army alone. Ataturk created the civilian instrument of his single party system. Reza Khan made himself Shah and assumed the prestige of an established institution. In Syria, a minor character, Brigadier Shishakly, tried to establish himself through a new constitution with himself as President and quickly failed because he had little but some soldiers behind him. In Egypt, Colonel Nasser, a far more powerful figure of wider political appeal, has tried the same path of civilianisation and legitimacy. He has had more success but the greatest weakness of his régime is still its failure to create a genuine civilian political instrument in place of the army.

The increasing changes in social structure, due to many causes, the spread of education and other social services, improvement in

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transport and communications, a gradual liberation of the status of women and liberalisation of social habits and intercourse generally, the development of industry and the beginnings of trade unions, land reform in some countries, improve the future prospects for a more stable democratic life. They also sometimes make its immediate existence more difficult and may in the speed of their operation in some countries sweep it away altogether at least temporarily.

Town and Country

There is one important social feature affecting political life in the Middle East which is yielding more slowly to change than others, but which is changing nevertheless. This is the gulf between town and country and especially the domination of the capital city and the parallel weakness of local government, which should be one of the strongest foundations of a political democracy. The great expansion of cities is a familiar phenomenon of the industrial age in Europe and elsewhere. It is also occurring in the Middle East, accelerated in some countries, such as Egypt, by pressure of population on the land. But the gulf between the town and country dweller has in most Middle East countries lacked the bridge provided in Europe by the vestiges of the feudal system, the tradition of country residence by landowners, nobles, and squires which formed the nuclei and pace-makers of rural society. In the Middle East (except for Israel and parts of the Lebanon and Jordan) there is outside the towns and especially the big cities almost no social life except of the simplest village kind. More and better roads and transport and improvements in agriculture and rural social services are now bringing town and country into closer contact. The resulting increase in the political importance of the peasantry as against the traditional dominant role of the urban middle class can be seen most clearly in Turkey in recent years. But in Egypt and Persia, for example, it will be long before the social and political gap between town and country is closed.

The Role of Religion

Nationalism and modernisation are the watchwords—and also, of course, frequently the catchwords—of Middle East politics. There are tremendous problems to be overcome. One of them is the role of religion. Though most of the "modernisers" tend to be secular in outlook, religion is a live force among the majority of people in

the Middle East in a way which has become almost forgotten in Britain. Islam provided a political and social framework as well as moral and theological doctrine. Partly as a result, the non-Islamic minorities were also organised in communities of a semi-political nature. Thus the demands both of the national state, which in the Middle East usually includes minority communities, and of modernisation have to come to terms with religion in its social and political aspects. This is even partly true of Israel where the secular majority of political Zionism has had to compromise in certain respects with demands of religious groups that the laws of the state should conform more closely to the social precepts of orthodox Judaism.

I referred earlier in this article to the different effects of the impact of the West on Islamic society. These effects have shown themselves in varying proportions in different countries. In Turkey the result was a clear-cut decision in favour of the secular reformers, the official "disestablishment" of Islam. Though this remains official Turkish policy, the continuing vitality of Islam among the Turkish masses has led in recent years to a relaxation of restrictions upon religious activities, though they are by general agreement still excluded from politics.

The Arab nationalist movements have also been chiefly secular in character, though coloured by the central position of Islam in Arab culture and in the Arab myth. But Islamic institutions and laws have continued to play a big part in Arab political and social life. In Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Koranic law still prevails while in the other Arab states and Persia Islam has maintained a modified official status parallel with the creation of modern secular laws and political organisations. In recent years Islam has exerted a more open influence on Arab nationalism through the spread of a kind of religious radicalism and the pressure of movements such as the Moslem Brotherhood. In Egypt, "Nasserism," which is essentially an empirical kind of political eclecticism, has tried to deal with the conflict between Islam and modernisation by "Islamising modernism instead of modernising Islam," as an acute French observer¹ has put it. Resistance to demands for a more strictly religious state and the carrying through of such revolutionary reforms as the abolition of the Moslem Sharia courts have been accompanied by an increasing tendency to identify the nation with its Moslem majority and, in practice though not in law, e.g., in

¹ *L'Egypte en Mouvement*, Jean & Simone Lacouture.

employment regulations, to treat Egyptian Moslems as more truly Egyptian than their Christian or Jewish co-citizens.

But the fact that this tendency also exists in Turkey, where official policy is completely secular in conception and Islam has no official status, suggests that it is due primarily to the persistence of an old traditional outlook which cannot simply be legislated out of existence but requires time, education, and more stable political conditions, both internally and externally, to die away.

* * * *

The old order in the Middle East is dying. We do not yet know what will take its place. It may be that this region, which has proved so fruitful in ideas in the past, will produce some original form of society of its own. But it is likely that the political framework of the new order will be affected by the relative influence of the West and of Soviet and Chinese communism as sources of technique and ideas. For the revolution through which the Middle East is passing is not a mere change of local political forms but part of an irreversible world-wide technological and cultural process which affects almost every aspect of life and thought.

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Egypt and the Arab World

EGYPT in recent years has tended to become one of the most noteworthy blind spots in the British diplomatic eye. Never a colony in the full sense, it was the scene of an experiment in concealed colonialism—a country where overt tutelage was replaced by a treaty relationship which did not permit full independence though the Egypt of 1936 and later was nominally a sovereign state. British policy after 1945 aimed, doubtless with complete sincerity, at the eventual liquidation of all colonial rights, but at a tempo and in a manner to be dictated from London; when it became clear, under the immediate predecessors of Colonel Nasser, that no Egyptian Government could accept the British tempo and conditions and retain the support of the active political elements, the British response was one of irritation and a growing belief in the unreasonableness and ingratitude of the Egyptians: and when finally a strong man appeared who secured by the threat of force the concessions which his forerunners had failed to obtain by negotiation, irritation blazed into open resentment. Reviewing the events of 1956, one is left with the strong impression that emotional dislike of Colonel Nasser and of his political and military associates was a more potent determinant of British (and French) policy than a reasoned assessment of Egypt's position and probable behaviour.

There is, of course, a basic contradiction between the British and the Egyptian conceptions of Middle Eastern affairs. To Britain, it is essential that the Suez Canal should remain open, and that it should continue to be produced in the oil countries, and that Egypt nor her neighbours should either demand too much of the West or lay themselves open to political advances from the Soviet Union. To Egypt, the problem of the entire Middle East is North Africa is the problem of Egypt herself writ large; to eliminate all forms of outside influence deemed to be inconsistent with independence, and to accept western help and western capital only in so far as they do not infringe national rights—and to the demand that the Middle Eastern countries should not get too friendly with the Soviet Union practically any Egyptian would now

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reply that the friends his country seeks are none of the West's business.

It is the sense of responsibility for the other Arab countries, current in Egypt, which is most commonly misunderstood in the West. What is conceived as responsibility in Cairo is only too easily interpreted elsewhere as a claim to hegemony in the Arab world—an interpretation encouraged by the fact that some Arab leaders bitterly resent any such claim. It is indeed one of the tragedies of the Arabic-speaking Moslem countries, from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, that while there is between them a certain cultural and sentimental unity, there is no obvious centre of gravity round which a political unity can evolve. If such a centre is to exist, it must be created, and one of the dominant factors in present Egyptian policy is the belief that it ought to be Cairo.

This is not a new claim. Cairo is the largest and most important Arabic-speaking city and is conveniently situated in relation to the rest of the Arab world. It still possesses, in the El Azhar University, an important focus of Moslem orthodoxy, while the new universities of Cairo and Alexandria are among the principal seats of modern learning in the Middle East. There is a long—and in Arab eyes creditable—record of opposition to the domination of Constantinople under the Ottomans. Under the monarchy, several attempts were made (the last under King Farouk after the war) to get approval from the other Arab countries for a revival of the Caliphate in the person of the Egyptian King. While the Arab League existed in its original form, successive Egyptian governments claimed a sort of senior status for themselves on the ground that Egypt possessed the strongest army and the greatest economic potential; the disasters of 1948–1949 shattered the myth of Egyptian superiority, and the shock to public and military opinion was one of the main reasons for the revolution of 1952.

Under Nasser, the doctrine that Egypt is a sort of *primus inter pares* among the Arab countries has been modified and extended. Alone of them all, she can claim that the great foreign interests have been eliminated; there are no special treaty relationships, no foreign bases, no big external investments in a single dominant industry as there are in the oil countries, and since last July even the Suez Canal is held to be a purely Egyptian institution. Having secured, the argument would run, all these successes by her own unaided efforts and by the strength and determination of her Government and people, she is now in a position to extend her sympathy and her practical assistance to her less fortunate neighbours,

and to help them to attain the same degree of independence as she now enjoys herself. By themselves, the small, unfree countries of the Levant and North Africa cannot hope to win their freedom. Only if the Arab world unites its forces against external domination can the common objective be gained. Because Egypt has already won her own battle, and because of her favourable geographical position and her growing military and economic strength, she is the natural leader in the battle for liberation.

It does not follow, of course, that all other Arabs accept this claim. In the south, Saudi Arabia is anxious to maintain friendly relations with Egypt, but at the same time to assert her own individuality and to keep free of too close an entanglement; the successes of Egypt are recognised, but her assertions of leadership are not. In Iraq (where the concept of Arab unity has a different meaning) Nuri es-Said is certainly unprepared to allow the supremacy of Cairo, though he is too good an Arab to state his own counterclaim in favour of Bagdad except in a circumspect manner. Syrian governments have within the last two years veered between violent hostility to Egypt and the acceptance of a plan for federation, and it can never be assumed that the Egyptian claim will go unchallenged in Damascus. Further west, it is not even certain that Tunisia would long acknowledge Egyptian superiority; intellectually Bourguiba is at least the equal of Nasser, and of the two he has much the closer experience, and much the more realistic understanding, of what is practical in international politics.

Nuri's concept of Arab unity is far narrower than Nasser's and is confined in effect to the Levant states (the former British and French mandates) with Bagdad as the centre. This coincides closely with a frequently stated British policy. The 1955 Bagdad Pact was an effort to shift the centre of gravity of Panarabism northwards, with a view to counterbalancing the increasing influence of Egypt; unfortunately for its sponsors, the calculations turned out wrong, Iraq became the only Arab member of the pact, and the anti-western trend of the Arab movement under Egyptian leadership was intensified and not halted. French opposition to Egypt's claims was if anything even stronger than the British, because of Cairo's open support for the Algerian rebels. Yet because the French Government, with too long a memory, still hankered after the old idea that Syria and Lebanon were areas of French influence, it did not support the Bagdad Pact, and the Egyptian position was strengthened by the disunity of the two western powers principally concerned.

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If the first, and long-term, foundation for the Egyptian claim to hegemony is the aid that Egypt can give in expelling foreign influences, the second and more immediate is the active part she plays in relation to Israel. Israel appears to the Arabs as a western creation, an alien intrusion which only western support made possible. That Israel defeated Egypt in the field in 1948 no longer matters; the failure of those days has been purged by the popular revolution. That she did so again in 1956 matters no more; that defeat was caused by the British and French intervention and by the demand of the United Nations for a cease-fire at the moment when (it is suggested in Cairo) the tide was just about to turn in Egypt's favour. It is certain that the attack on Egypt strengthened her position in the eyes of the Arab countries as nothing else could have done; even Iraq under Nuri was not prepared to concede a single point to her ally in the Bagdad Pact, and the demand that Israel should withdraw from all the positions her arms had won was put forward by every Arab country in the most impressive demonstration of unity yet achieved. To the extent that British, French, or even American diplomacy had tried to create centres of gravity other than Cairo, the events of November 1956 were an unrelieved disaster for western policy.

Egypt and the Soviet Union

The claim for hegemony among the Arabs is thus one of the constant and dominant elements in the foreign policy of Egypt under Nasser. The second charge made against him is that his real aim is to lead Egypt and as many Arab countries as will follow him out of all association with the West into the orbit of Russia.

It is a dangerous fallacy, prevalent in the outlook of western politicians and officials, that anyone in the uncommitted world who does not accept the western viewpoint is necessarily pro-communist; the idea of genuine neutrality is difficult to comprehend. In support of the charge against Egypt there are adduced, *inter alia*, the buying of arms from Czechoslovakia in October 1955, the visits of Mr. Shepilov to Cairo and the offer of financial aid for the Aswan Dam, and more recently the build-up of Egyptian armed strength with Soviet weapons, which was presented by the British Government as an *ex post facto* justification for the attack of October 30. The Egyptian leaders stoutly deny the charge; the Czech arms deal was "an ordinary commercial operation," Mr. Shepilov was only doing what more than one British Foreign Secretary has done in visiting

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Cairo, the commercial agreements with Russia and China were fully within the rights of a sovereign state (and by implication might not have been made if the West had shown more concern for Egypt's cotton surplus), and the reports of Soviet arms were held to be grossly exaggerated.

In July 1955 Colonel Nasser was interrogated on this very point, and one of his answers is worth quoting in full.

"Our first task is to break away from all foreign domination. When I signed the Anglo-Egyptian agreement last year I said it would be the last treaty we would make with a foreign country. Our nation will never accept new military commitments. We have no reason (especially in view of the present improvement in relations) to align ourselves with either camp. When people ask me 'Which do you prefer, America or Russia?' I reply 'Egypt.' Only the interest of our own country should determine our policy."²

Although that statement was made before the Czech arms deal, the argument is one that has been repeated on numerous occasions since. Fairly obviously, Egypt is well placed to play off the one group of powers against the other, forcing each to put its price up in the hope of gaining exclusive support. The most striking example of this is, of course, the history of the Aswan Dam. The British and American offer of financial assistance was made within a few weeks of the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia, was maintained as long as the suggestion of Soviet counter-offers remained, and was withdrawn only after it had become clear that Shepilov's visit had produced little in the way of concrete proposals—or proposals on terms which Egypt was unprepared to accept. It is too facile to say that the withdrawal of the Aswan offer was the reason for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, though it did provide the immediate excuse. None the less, the end of the Suez affair has been a much bigger American offer under the Eisenhower doctrine, which Egypt must now consider whether to accept or refuse.

Economic help is not the only form of advantage to be bargained for. Political support, especially in the United Nations, is extremely important to a country which is trying to change its international status, and it is additionally helpful if it can be hinted that military support might be forthcoming too. If the price for such support is in danger of rising too high, to the point where it becomes a case of stepping out of the frying pan into the fire, skilful diplomacy should be able to put the process into reverse.

Bargaining of this sort is a dangerous game, but the strength of the cards in Egypt's hands should not be underestimated. Because

² Interview with M. Edouard Sablier, *Le Monde*, July 30, 1955.

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it has become so clear that an attack on Egypt unites the Arab world (at least temporarily), both groups of big powers will be well advised to handle the situation carefully. In the business of competing for support, Egypt is not the wooer but the wooed. The western powers, in particular, need to recognise this fact if they are to avoid creating a worse disaster than has already befallen them, and unfortunately there is still little sign that either Britain or France has done so.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

It is probable, in fact, that nothing in the policy of Britain and France can now have much effect on Egyptian behaviour—unless they are so foolish as to drive her into the arms of the Soviet Union. If the West is to retain any influence at all the initiative must come from the United States.

The full impact of the Eisenhower Doctrine can hardly be assessed for some time yet. The doctrine is more in line with past American policies than is commonly supposed; America, with greater wisdom than Britain, preferred to associate herself loosely with the Bagdad Pact rather than to become a full member of it, and because her past was less heavily tainted with colonialism (at least of the overt kind) there was and is a greater prospect that her aid will be accepted at its face value. If the doctrine evolves too narrowly, if it implies, however indirectly, that acceptance of American aid and political support involves even the most shadowy of commitments, it will be rejected by the Egyptians. The first reactions in Egypt were cautious, and while they showed no disposition to refuse the proposals out of hand, equally they made it clear that Egypt would try to lay down her own terms for acceptance.

What these terms are likely to be requires careful study by the Americans. It must be taken for granted that Egypt will not willingly surrender her claims to hegemony among the Arab countries. Nor will she cease her propaganda backing for anti-western movements; her diplomats and agents will be active in Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, her press and radio will continue to urge on the Algerian rebels, and within all practical limits she will probably finance those countries which are losing by the severance of their ties with the West. She will not yield any territory to Israel, will demand continued control over the Gulf of Aqaba, and will probably demur at allowing cargoes for Israel through the Suez Canal when it is opened again—whatever her attitude to the wider aspects of the Canal question. Almost certainly her pressure on the

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Sudan will increase, especially if the Aswan Dam project goes through in anything like its present form.

None of these terms will be easily accepted by the West; in fact, the Americans would be perfectly justified in demanding that they should all be dropped before any aid or protection is given. Yet the only conceivable way in which the Eisenhower Doctrine can become effective is by a compromise, for the simple reason that Egypt can at any time decide against accepting it if the Government feels that the political price for American economic aid is too high. Nor is it wholly true (as some people in the West are apt to think) that it is only a matter of increasing the amount of economic aid offered to induce the Egyptians to modify their terms; there have been several cases, of which Persia in 1951 was the most notable, where the governments of underdeveloped countries have been perfectly willing to sacrifice economic interests to their own peculiar conception of national prestige.

In point of fact it will not be a matter of direct bargaining alone. Egypt's attitude will to some extent be determined by the behaviour of the other Arab states, and if one of her competitors for leadership—Saudi Arabia, for instance—decides to accept the American proposals Egypt will have to decide on one of two courses—to reject them out of hand and try to retain her influence by propagating anti-Americanism, or to accept them and try to turn them to better advantage. To do the first might easily lead both Egypt and her closer friends considerably nearer to the Soviet Union than Nasser in fact wants. To do the second would make nonsense of the argument that the Eisenhower Doctrine is a subtle new form of indirect colonialism. It would obviously suit American policy far better if the second course were adopted, and presumably the State Department will endeavour to work on some of the other Arab countries in the hope of softening up the Egyptians. For without Egypt's support (or at least abstinence from full-scale opposition) the Eisenhower Doctrine is bound to fail in its main purpose.

A second factor which will help to determine what Egypt does is the attitude of the other countries on whom she depends for backing in her diplomacy and in the United Nations; here Nasser will have to walk warily. For the support he has already gained in the last few months has been of two kinds. There is, first, the support of the communist countries, which he can rely on whenever he does anything to split the West, but which will not secure him a majority in the United Nations. Secondly, there are the countries of the Afro-Asian group whose general sympathies lie

with Egypt's struggle for independence, who may even look up to her as a successful destroyer of colonialism, yet who, at the same time, will not follow her if she offends too grossly against certain standards of international behaviour. In November 1956 the United Nations almost unanimously came to her aid and, in spite of Egyptian propaganda to the contrary, saved her from an ignominious military defeat. But this does not dispose of the fact that her past record in dealing with the United Nations is bad, and her present attitude does not suggest that it will be better in future.

Egypt, not Israel, was the technical "aggressor" in 1948, and thereafter spurned every opportunity of bringing the war to an end because it suited her book to keep the situation in suspense. Resolutions on the freedom of passage of the Suez Canal went unheeded. The closing of the Gulf of Aqaba was indefensible. The weakness of the United Nations in dealing with these successive acts of defiance was due to the unreadiness of the leading Powers to support condemnation with action at any level; if the leading Powers are similarly unready to insist on guarantees of good behaviour in future, Egypt will doubtless continue to be defiant. But to the extent that she does defy the United Nations, she must expect to lose some of the good will of several of the countries now disposed to support her, and her power to impose her own terms for the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine or any other form of political and economic aid will be diminished.

Possible Solutions

The ultimate solution of the principal economic, social, and political problems of the Middle East will be found by the Arab countries themselves. But because the West is so heavily committed, it is impossible for some responsibility to be escaped.

Desirably, a solution should incorporate a degree of political unification, economic advance, and an acceptance by the Arabs of the State of Israel. The political fragmentation of the Arab world is largely due to western action in the past, with Britain and France as the chief culprits, and it is hardly surprising if modern Pan-arabism does not accord with western views on the matter; the last chance to bring the Levant States together, as British policy once wanted, was irretrievably lost in 1945, and there is now little prospect of uniting the countries of French North Africa on lines acceptable to the West as long as the French population of Algeria remains as a European enclave as alien and as hateful to its

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neighbours as Israel is to the Levant. Unfortunately, it is still fatally easy for the West to play on the internal jealousies of the Arab countries to keep them apart, and there is evidence that this is still being done in the hope of countering Egyptian influence. This is a profoundly mistaken way to behave. The worst enemy of the Arab world is political instability, and though there may be brief advantages to be gained from playing politics in Iraq, Jordan, the sheikhdoms, or North Africa, the final result can only be to perpetuate disunity and uncertainty. The West would be better advised to leave the whole business of changing the political structure of the area to the Arabs themselves. That does not mean recognising the Egyptian claim to hegemony, but simply that the Arabs are quite capable of dealing with Egypt in their own way.

Economic advance depends both on an increase and a different distribution of the funds now available for investment. The argument is now familiar that a Middle Eastern development plan could be partly financed from the oil revenues, but the oil countries might legitimately object if their resources were used for the development of, say, Algeria. It could be that there ought to be initiated not one plan but two, one covering the Asian Arab countries and Egypt, the other North Africa; another possibility would be a broad plan for the entire area with a subsidiary plan for the countries where the oil revenues can reasonably be employed. But the important thing is that, whatever its coverage, there should be a plan for co-ordinated development to which the West will be prepared to contribute over and above the oil revenues. It must not involve military commitments—that is to invite rejection and to strengthen the Soviet hand among the dissidents—and it must not be conceived simply in terms of counterweighing the other Arab countries against Egypt. Egypt herself needs assistance, and it is better that her development should be co-ordinated with that of her neighbours than that she should be left in isolation. The Eisenhower Doctrine incorporates some sound points in this respect, in that it treats the Middle East as a unity and links political stability with economic advance, but it must be repeated that military commitments attached to economic aid will defeat the whole purpose of the proposal.

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

GEOFFREY WHEELER

THE Middle East is at present experiencing the latest and by far the most serious of Russia's attempts to establish her influence there and thus gain access to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. It is the most serious partly because Russia has never before been so powerful or so well organised, and partly because the character of the Middle East has fundamentally changed during the last quarter of a century.

The history of what used to be called the Eastern Question has been exhaustively treated by historians and no attempt will be made to recapitulate it here. The main object of the present article is to consider Russia's policy since the Revolution and the methods she has used and is now using to gain her ends; but a few preliminary observations on her general position in relation to the area are essential.

Russian Policy before the Revolution

For the purposes of this study the Middle East may be taken as including Egypt, the Sudan, the Arabian peninsula, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Persia. Up to the 1914–1918 war this vast region contained only two sovereign states—Turkey and Persia, with both of which Russia had common frontiers. Transcaucasia and Central Asia, the parts of Russia abutting on the Middle East, contained nearly four-fifths of Russia's twenty million Muslim subjects the great majority of whom were Turkic or Iranian by race and culture. These circumstances might have been expected to give Russia great strategic, political, and cultural advantages over her West European rivals. In fact, however, largely owing to her own economic and political backwardness Russia's penetration of the Middle East made no progress except in Persia where trade and military pressure gained for her a considerable position. Elsewhere she was blocked or outwitted by the West European and Central Powers: she had failed in her repeated efforts to secure control of or preferential treatment in the Straits of the Black Sea and Dardanelles; her plans to build railways to

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Alexandretta and the Persian Gulf were thwarted by Germany; even in Persia her commercial and political designs were considerably circumscribed by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The Arab world was scarcely aware of Russia's existence.

The Policies of Lenin and Stalin

When Turkey entered the 1914-1918 war on the side of Germany Russian hopes of getting possession of Istanbul and the Straits were revived. These were in fact promised to her by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of March 1915, which lapsed when Russia concluded a separate peace with Germany after the Revolution. One of Lenin's first acts was to publish the terms of this unconfirmed and unratified agreement as a striking example of imperialist methods and of their contrast with those of the new Soviet régime. At what point Soviet leaders reverted to the traditional aims of Russian policy in the Middle East is a matter of some dispute, but there is no doubt that they soon decided that the impact of the Revolution not only on Middle Eastern peoples, but also on the twenty million Muslims of Russia was favourable for the long-delayed extension of Russian influence. Stalin's concept of "Revolution in the East" envisaged a loose federation of the Russian Muslim peoples, which would gradually embrace the adjoining Muslim countries. Circumstances seemed propitious for the realisation of this plan: the Turkish empire was disintegrating and with it Turkey's temporal and spiritual leadership of the Muslim world; and something like chaos prevailed throughout the Middle East. Two other circumstances, however, rendered Stalin's plan abortive: in the first place the Russian people in general, and the millions of Russian settlers in Central Asia and the Caucasus in particular, began to feel that these regions were an integral part of Russia and should not be allowed to get out of Russian control; secondly, formidable opposition to the Soviet régime quickly developed among the Muslims of Central Asia after the end of the Civil War. A kind of compromise was found in the "policy of nationalities." This meant that the southern Muslim fringe of the Soviet Union was divided up into six Socialist Soviet Republics each one of which abutted on an independent Muslim country. It was clearly laid down by Stalin that it was incumbent on these republics to project the light of socialism to the benighted world of colonialism which lay across their frontiers—Tadzhikistan in particular he described as the "lighthouse." In effect, Soviet efforts have so far been mainly

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

directed towards preventing any contact between these republics and their neighbours. It does not, however, follow that this isolationist policy will continue.

The "Revolution in the East" having failed to materialise in the way and with the speed that Soviet leaders had hoped, the objectives of Soviet policy had to be approached by different methods. There are grounds for supposing that in the early days of the Soviet regime there was a good deal of doubt about the nature of these objectives. The idealist in Lenin may well have cherished a sincere desire to "liberate the Middle East from colonialism," and this desire is still reiterated today; but it soon became clear that Soviet policy was in reality informed by more practical and less altruistic considerations, some at least of which had also informed Tsarist policy. Broadly speaking it can be said that, whatever may have been the personal convictions of Lenin, the Soviet Government quickly reverted to the Tsarist conviction that Russian access to the "warm waters" of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf and security against attack from the West could only be assured by doing away with the independence of Turkey and Persia.

Unsuccessful Soviet Efforts before 1940

Russia's attempts since the Revolution to re-establish and extend her influence in the Middle East have been punctuated by several serious setbacks, each of which was followed by a withdrawal and a period of relative inactivity. These setbacks have been the result partly of western opposition, partly of Middle Eastern nationalism, and perhaps most of all of Soviet miscalculation, crudeness of method, and precipitancy.

Early Soviet endeavours to obtain a foothold in the Middle East were haphazard and unco-ordinated. Support in money and arms was given to Kemal and the Turkish nationalist movement; treaties were signed with Persia and Afghanistan in 1921; almost simultaneously an attempt was made to establish a Soviet republic in Gilan. A little later an elaborate network of espionage, propaganda, trade representation, and subversion was laid down in Persia and on a smaller scale in Afghanistan. At the same time, inducement was offered to the Azeri, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, and other minorities of Persia and Afghanistan to migrate to the USSR. Most of these plans were ill-conceived as well as badly executed: the Soviet Government greatly overestimated the attractions of the Revolution and of Russian mentorship. The Turks were ready to

accept material support in order to re-establish themselves, but once they had done this, they wished to have no more to do with the Russians, whom they had always feared and distrusted and whose agents and representatives now seemed mostly to be Jews or Armenians, objects of their traditional dislike. The Persians were at first mildly impressed by Soviet protestations of good-will and intention to cancel all concessions granted to the Tsarist government. But they were alarmed by the landing of Soviet forces in Gilan and by the army of Caucasian spies and trade agents who swarmed into the cities of north Persia. Nor was news of the internal state of Transcaucasia and Central Asia encouraging enough to induce more than a very few Turkmens, Tajiks, and Baluchis to emigrate. It was particularly unfortunate for the Soviet Government that their designs in the Middle East happened to coincide with the appearance of two of the strongest and most determined rulers Turkey and Persia had ever known. The still weak and groping successor states of the disintegrated Ottoman empire were all under British or French mandatory control and military occupation and thus denied to Soviet penetration.

An excellent account of Soviet methods up to 1929, of the ambitions and fears which actuated them, and of the small dividends which they paid can be found in the memoirs of G. S. Agabekov published in Berlin in 1930 and still the most instructive book on early Soviet technique in the Middle East. Agabekov describes among other things the various Soviet attempts to exploit the discontent of the tribal and other minorities in Persia and the disastrous military intervention in Afghanistan in 1929.

In the early thirties a change in method could be observed: all the many Soviet consulates in Persia were closed down; the propaganda and trade agents and the flashy ladies who often accompanied them departed; and representation was thenceforward confined to persons of comparatively respectable appearance and behaviour. Trade agreements had been signed with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan and treaties of friendship were concluded with Saudi Arabia (1926) and the Yemen (1928); but only in Persia did these more normal measures produce any concrete results. Trade with north Persia continued to be considerable and some profitable barter operations were carried out in the Persian Gulf.

By 1941 Soviet policy in the Middle East had made next to no progress. Attempts to revise the Montreux Straits Convention had failed; relations with Turkey were distant to the point of being strained; Russian political, commercial, and cultural influence in

Persia was far less than it had been before the Revolution; the Arab world was still barely conscious of Russia's existence and any communist infiltration was confined to the disgruntled intelligentsia. Russia's entry into the war on the side of Britain and the joint occupation of Persia gave her, as it were, the respectable introduction to the Middle East which she had so far lacked. Her diplomatic and even military representatives were now able to move about with a new freedom, and British propaganda obligingly began to tell the people of the Middle East of the vast resources, skill, and gallantry of the new ally. By 1945 Soviet legations had been opened in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and Bagdad, and a definite foothold in the Arab world thus established. Only in Persia were Anglo-Russian collaboration and friendship viewed with growing alarm.

Soviet Policy after the War

It might have been expected that the dismal failure of the early Soviet technique of subversion, direct action, and espousal of minority causes would have impressed upon the Soviet Government the advisability of trying new methods in these new and propitious circumstances. Indeed, the exemplary behaviour of the Red Army in the early days of the occupation of Persia suggested that more conciliatory tactics had been decided upon. Soon, however, what must have appeared as a unique opportunity of developing large scale subversion, sabotage of British interests and enlistment of minorities on the Soviet side proved too tempting. Plans were formulated which included a revolution against the existing regime, the detachment of the rich province of Azarbaijan and its union with Soviet Azarbaijan, and the establishment of Kurdish autonomy—in fact the liquidation of Persia's independence and of her association with the West. The Soviet Government apparently assumed that the West was in no mood to risk a new war and that a show of force in Persia and on the Turkish frontier would enable Soviet aims to be quickly realised. They also gravely underestimated Persian resilience and astuteness. In the event, Russia was quickly compelled by Western pressure to remove her troops from Persia, including the large armoured force which she had brought into Azarbaijan after March 1946, the date by which she was committed by the Tripartite Agreement of 1942 to complete evacuation of Persian territory. The collapse of the Azarbaijan and Kurdish autonomy movements and the virtual removal of Soviet influence followed. The magnitude of this setback to Soviet policy can best

be apprehended from the various Soviet apologias which have appeared since, the most illuminating being contained in M. S. Ivanov's *Short History of Persia*, published in 1952. For reasons of what may have at the time seemed to be expediency the moral of this first post-war Soviet venture in imperialism was never brought home by the West to the peoples of the Middle East, who, if they ever knew the facts, have now apparently forgotten them.

Elsewhere the same opportunities for direct action were lacking and Russia had to proceed towards her objectives more cautiously. After denouncing in 1945 the existing Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression with Turkey, the Soviet Government made the revision of Straits regime and the restoration to the USSR of the territories of Kars and Ardahan conditions for its renewal. Turkey's refusal was followed by a period of strained relations which lasted until 1953.

By the end of 1947 it must have become clear to Russia that no progress could be made with her immediate neighbours which still constituted the lines of approach to her main objectives—the East Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. It was, for instance, highly significant that she made no overt attempt to profit from the near anarchy prevailing in Persia during Dr. Mosaddeq's administration. It is probable that it was at this point that Russia decided to by-pass Turkey and Persia for the time being and to concentrate on the Arab countries. There the rising tide of nationalism, hostility to the West and particularly to Western defence plans, and the Arab-Jewish conflict seemed to offer much better prospects for exploitation. But in spite of regular diplomatic representation the Soviet Government's relations with Middle East governments remained bad. It persisted in regarding them as "bourgeois" and reactionary and as the "lackeys of imperialism." But the only means which it now cared to use were diplomatic pressure on governments, radio propaganda directed towards the masses, and local communist parties working among the intelligentsia and masses with the ultimate aim of revolution. Soviet leaders had not yet grasped that from their point of view the Middle Eastern intelligentsia, proletariat, and peasants were useless and that effective power was in the hands of the "national bourgeoisie" who controlled and very often consisted of the armed forces. The Soviet press and radio continued to fulminate against past and present "bourgeois nationalist" leaders such as Kemal, Gandhi, and Nehru, and Soviet policy accordingly remained sterile. In 1951, for instance, threatening Soviet notes addressed to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel in

connection with their possible adherence to the proposed "Middle East Command" were ignored by the governments concerned and were condemned by them in the press as interference in their countries' internal affairs.

Up to 1951 Russia had still achieved next to nothing in the Middle East. Even the increased diplomatic activity of the next few years achieved little beyond an opportunity to study Middle East problems more realistically; but events now began to work in the Soviet favour. British influence suffered a severe setback in Persia; Anglo-American differences became more pronounced; Western insistence on defence began to alienate the Arab states more and more; finally, in the middle of 1954, British forces began their withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone. From Russia's point of view these events, although propitious, were negative in the sense that they were not her doing. A new and positive policy was necessary in order to exploit the new situation.

Change of Policy after Stalin

No attempt seems to have been made to formulate a new policy during Stalin's lifetime, and even after his death the first changes were only tactical: the claim against Turkey for Kars and Ardahan was dropped in July 1953; broadcasts in Kurdish were discontinued in August of the same year; the frontier dispute with Persia was settled in December 1954; overtures were made to India and Afghanistan; diplomatic contact with the Arab states was further strengthened; and an attitude of uncompromising hostility was developed towards Israel.

Other indications of a less obvious kind could be noticed during 1954: for the first time, the Soviet Union sent a large delegation to the International Congress of Orientalists at Cambridge; in November a decree on the subject of religious propaganda was promulgated, and the cruder forms of anti-Islamic propaganda were thereupon discontinued. It was not until 1955 that it became clear that a new policy was on the way, but it is probable that even before Stalin's death realisation had come that between the two poles of imperialism and anti-imperialism there was a pacifist neutral zone which was neither capitalist nor socialist and which was ideally suited for Soviet manoeuvre and eventual appropriation. The Stalinist attitude had been a simple dualism—the opposing forces of imperialism and anti-imperialism divided the world into two camps looking towards Washington and Moscow. There was

a corollary to this proposition—"only the proletariat is anti-imperialist." In the Middle East, the proletariat was dominated by the "national bourgeoisie" whose class interests impelled it to become the "faithful allies of the imperialists." There was thus no intermediate solution between the retention of power by the pro-Western bourgeoisie and the revolutionary seizure of power by the proletariat under the aegis of local communist parties. The tour of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Afghanistan and Shepilov's tour to the Middle East were the first signs that a vital and epoch-making decision had been taken in the Kremlin, namely, that henceforward the Soviet Government, so far from continuing its denigration of reactionary, "bourgeois nationalist" governments, would support these governments wherever and whenever it thought necessary. For the present, however, the signatories of the Bagdad Pact would be excluded from this support.

The new policy came formally into being with the XXth Party Congress held in February 1956 and particulars of it were set forth in detail in the review *Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye* (Soviet Orientalism), No. 1 of 1956, an attempt being made to show it merely as a "correct" interpretation of Lenin's doctrine. This important statement of policy received scant attention in the West and it is doubtful whether it is yet fully realised that it will mean, and has in fact already meant, the adoption of methods far more difficult to counter than any used so far. In effect, the Soviet leaders have decided that the countries of the Middle East can best be brought under Soviet influence not by internal subversion organised among the so-called effendi class and the proletariat where it exists, or by resort to armed force, but by courting the favour of the "national bourgeoisie," whom they have at last recognised as the real rulers of these countries. At the same time local communist parties, which have been the outposts of Soviet influence for so long, are now to play a different role: they are no longer to plague the national bourgeoisie with threats to its vested interests, but are to join with all other parties in the cause of nationalism against Western imperialism. A *mariage de convenance* has, in fact, been arranged between communism and "bourgeois nationalism."

A significant passage in the editorial of the latest issue of *Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye* to reach England (No. 5 of 1956) shows clearly the lines on which the Soviet Government is now thinking and on which it hopes, not without justification, that the Middle East is thinking too: "A characteristic of the national liberation

movement of today is the participation in it of all patriotically and anti-imperialistically inclined representatives of widely varying social strata and religious and political convictions. These range from workers and peasants, who constitute the chief driving force of the movement, to the national bourgeoisie and to some extent even to the landowners; and all of them are united in their aim of freeing their countries from the colonial yoke."

The year 1956 was a profitable one for Soviet policy. Since 1951 Soviet propaganda had been proclaiming the hypocrisy of Western insistence on the need for defence of the Middle East against possible Russian attack, and now in November 1956 it was the West which attacked the Middle East. This attack must at first have alarmed the Soviet Government, but they quickly exploited the hesitation shown in pressing it home and made the Soviet Union appear as the undoubted defender of Middle East rights. It was clearly to the Soviet advantage that the West should exaggerate as much as possible reports of the Soviet arms build-up in Egypt and Syria and thus reinforce Arab convictions about Soviet readiness to fight their battles for them if the need should arise, not only against the West, but against Israel.

In conclusion, it may be of some interest to attempt an appreciation of Russia's present and future position in the Middle East in the light of a long experience of Soviet activities there and of an examination of recent Soviet publications. The ultimate Russian objectives are still the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf and they can only be reached by subjugating or by-passing Turkey and Persia. The Soviet Government has chosen the latter course and is directing its attention primarily towards the Arab countries and Afghanistan. The principal factors in the Russian favour are the disappearance of paramount power from the Middle East and from the Indian sub-continent, and the vacillating and apparently uninformed policy of the United States. Other factors are the hostility towards the West accentuated by the West's over-emphasis of the need for military defence against Russia, Muslim-Israeli hostility, and the telling examples of the material advantages to be gained from Soviet tutelage of underdeveloped countries provided by the Muslim republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Formidable as these favourable factors are they are balanced by no less formidable difficulties and obstacles. Apart from its somewhat unfortunate military origins the predominantly non-Arab Bagdad Pact constitutes a natural and historical counter to Arab nationalism, and Soviet attempts to disrupt it have so far been unsuccessful.

The fact that Russia now has to deal not with two sovereign states as formerly, but with ten will gravely complicate the direction of any uniform anti-Western policy. The governments of all these states are traditionally bourgeois and individualist and unlikely to respond uniformly or tamely to stereotyped Soviet methods of approach. Finally, although Russia may be instrumental in causing, and has indeed already caused, serious damage to Western and particularly to British interests, establishment of equivalent Russian interests presents great difficulties especially in such matters as banking and insurance.

In spite of the confident—almost triumphant note sounded in Soviet propaganda there is no reason to suppose that the Russians are blind to the difficulties just enumerated. They can, therefore, be expected to use every means at their disposal in order to overcome them. The keystone of their policy is at present their revised attitude towards “bourgeois nationalism.” This legitimist, almost counter-revolutionary, line recalls the Tsarist government’s intervention on the side of the Shah during the Persian Revolution of 1906. On this occasion it was the British who supported the revolution thus laying themselves open to the charge of subversion, a charge which the Soviet Government would be quick to prefer against the West again. Economic and technical aid will no doubt continue to feature prominently in Soviet tactics, and a campaign of cultural penetration is under way. Soviet oriental studies have already assumed formidable proportions and the volume of publications on Middle Eastern art, literature, languages, history, economics, and politics is steadily increasing.

It is not the purpose of this article to suggest ways by which Soviet tactics can best be countered. This, however, can be said: far closer study is required of these tactics and of the process of thought behind them. This is particularly true of Soviet publications on Eastern affairs. These are not at present subjected to any systematic analysis in the West partly because of a lack of co-ordination in the work of universities and learned societies engaged in Soviet and oriental studies, and partly because of the mistaken notion that Soviet publications contain little real scholarship and are “mere propaganda.” In fact, however, they not only include much work of a very high standard of learning, but they all reflect either directly or indirectly Soviet policy, of which they are regarded as one of the most important instruments. Their study is indispensable for a proper apprehension not only of the dangers, but of the weaknesses of Soviet policy.

PANARABISM AND BRITISH POLICY

ELIE KEDOURIE

Panarabism and Egypt

IN the years following the first world war Panarabism was the only political doctrine to make headway and to exert a powerful appeal in the Arab-speaking lands. The nature of the war settlement itself and the political power which some of its leading votaries acquired in consequence of this settlement contributed alike to such a result. The situation developed suddenly, with revolutionary abruptness. Men who, before the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, were quite obscure, emerged all at once after 1919, not only to preach a doctrine which got the Arab east into its grip, but actually to exercise political power in one of the former provinces of the Empire. In 1914 such a state of affairs was impossible to imagine. It is true that there were then murmurings in Beirut, and that Syrian *émigrés* in Cairo were demanding a decrease in meddling from Constantinople and the enlargement of local initiative. But these grievances were local and specific; they related to the quality of government services, or to the financial relations between the centre and the provinces, or to the proper scope of local administration; and those who sought redress for such grievances were mostly men well known in their communities, able perhaps to conduct a sober constitutional opposition, but not to entertain grandiose, limitless ambitions. How they would have fared under imperial rule, where their opposition would have taken them, how the Arab provinces would have developed under their leadership, it is now impossible to say. The war made England and the Ottoman Empire enemies; England fomented a revolt in the Hijaz against the Turks, and to this revolt gravitated a number of disaffected Ottoman officers who, when the war ended with the triumph of their patron, claimed the leadership of the Arab movement and were eventually enabled, by devious and complicated means, to obtain political control of Mesopotamia, where they set up government as the Kingdom of Iraq.

The new leaders thrown up by the war were Panarab by nature. They came to politics not through consideration of concrete difficulties or the grind of pressing affairs or daily responsibility, but

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by way of a doctrine. Their doctrine was compounded of certain European principles which made language and nationality synonymous, of a faith in sedition and violence, and of contempt for moderation. They believed that the Arabs, because they spoke Arabic, a language different from Turkish, were *ipso facto* entitled to secede from the Ottoman Empire and to form a state where everybody who spoke Arabic would be included. They were not ambitious for the community they knew, or the locality where they were born and reared. The European doctrine of linguistic nationalism with which they were imbued, the oecumenical claims of the Arabian Caliphate the glories of which they aspired to revive, the impetuosity of their youth, and the insignificance of their origin and their prospects alike combined to help them nurse ambitions to which only their dreams could set a bound. As one sympathiser with Arab nationalism, Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb, put it:

"The Arab nation . . . like all other nations, is not an entity delimited by ethnographical data, nor the fortuitous result of geographical or historical association, but the function of an act of will."¹

The will of these young officers willed an Arab nation, and ethnography, geography or history were of consequence only as they offered sustenance to their imagination. When, therefore, the miraculous circumstances gave them suddenly a country to govern, it was not gratitude to fate and their patrons that they felt, but rather that they were cheated of their dream. They had desired an Arab nation and an Arab state, and they got Iraq, a specific country with specific frontiers. They denounced the imperialist dismemberment of the Arab nation, and called the boundaries drawn up at the peace settlement arbitrary and artificial. This was indeed true, for what otherwise can boundaries be when they spring up where none had existed before? These officers, of course, did not think to blame themselves for having, by their disaffection, helped the Powers they were now denouncing to defeat the Ottoman Empire, and thus to erect these hated boundaries. With the establishment of these men in the Government of Iraq, therefore, Panarabism itself was endowed with a political base from which to prepare future incursions. The settlement of 1921 which created the Kingdom of Iraq, contained the seeds of its own destruction; for it gave power to men who were intent precisely on overthrowing such a settlement.

The ambitions of these men were, to start with, confined to the

¹ *The Near East: Problems and Prospects*, P. W. Ireland, editor, Chicago 1942, p. 70.

Fertile Crescent, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, the stage on which, during their youth under the Ottoman Empire, their dreams were accustomed to play. Between the wars, and after the outbreak of the second world war, their efforts were bent on securing a dislodgement of the French from Syria and the Lebanon, and a curtailment or, if possible, a suppression of Zionist activities in Palestine; thereafter, on putting together a unitary or a federal Arab state embracing the Fertile Crescent. This was the burden of Nuri al-Sa'id's proposal to Mr. Casey, Minister of State in the Middle East, in December 1942. This was the original Panarab programme, on the realisation of which the original Panarabs had always set their hearts. But this was not yet to be. Instead, after negotiations lasting from 1943 to 1945, a quite different scheme of Arab unity was set afoot. In this scheme, there was no amalgamation or federation of states; it provided rather for an alliance of sovereign states in which, unexpectedly, Egypt figured as the leader.

Egypt had never before manifested any interest in Panarabism, and though we do not yet know all the negotiations which led to the formation of the Arab League, we do have a few details which throw light on Egyptian policy, and which explain in some measure this new and sudden development. A Panarab policy for Egypt seems to have been throughout the handiwork of King Farouk and some of his entourage. The evidence for this is cumulative and convincing.

Farouk's father, King Fouad, is said to have nursed the ambition of becoming the Muslim caliph in succession to the dethroned Ottomans, and Farouk to have desired to follow his father's policy. In 1939, on the occasion of a meeting in Cairo of Arab magnates to discuss Palestine, while the king, his entourage, and his foreign guests were present at a mosque for the Friday prayers, the palace officials prevented the Imam of the mosque from officiating as usual, and the king himself led the congregation in prayer—a traditional prerogative and attribute of the Caliph—and on emerging from the mosque was proclaimed a true Caliph and a pious ruler. In 1946, again, when Ismail Sidqi was Prime Minister, the king, on his own initiative, assembled a meeting of Arab kings and presidents on his estate at Inshass to which neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister were invited, and at which decisions on Panarab policy and on Palestine were taken. "People then understood," writes Muhammad Husain Haikal, the eminent Egyptian statesman who recounts the incident in his Memoirs,

"that King Farouk's personal policy had for its aim the establishment of his personal leadership over the Arab states. However, the Ministry raised no protest, and did not wish to make an issue of what happened."² In May 1948 also when the Egyptian troops went into Palestine to oppose the establishment of the State of Israel, they did so at the king's instance and on his orders. Hostilities began on May 15, and until May 11, writes Haikal who was at the time President of the Senate, al-Nuqrashi, the Prime Minister, was quite unwilling to intervene in Palestine; "he used to say"—

"that he would not commit the Egyptian army to a position such that the British troops stationed on the Canal would be able to take them in the rear, . . . but from one day to the next this opinion changed. On May 12 al-Nuqrashi asked me to summon Parliament to a secret session to ask authority for Egyptian troops to enter Palestine. People learnt a little while later that the Minister of Defence, General Muhammad Haidar Pasha, the King's man and his private aide-de-camp received an order direct from the King, and he then ordered battalions of the Egyptian army to cross the frontiers into Palestine, without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, and without waiting for the decision of Parliament and the decision of the Cabinet."³

Farouk, of course, did not carry out his Panarab policies single-handed. He had coadjutors and instruments, and of these the most prominent were Ali Maher and Abd al-Rahman Azzam. Ali Maher became Chief of the Royal Cabinet soon after Farouk came to the throne, and acquired great influence as the king's political adviser. It was during his tenure of office that an active Panarab policy was initiated. In 1939 the British Government convened a Round-Table Conference on Palestine to which the Arab states and Egypt were invited. The Egyptian Prime Minister, then Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, decided to lead himself the Egyptian delegation to the Conference. It was then suddenly announced that Ali Maher would go instead, and would take with him Abd al-Rahman Azzam—later to become Secretary-General of the Arab League. "I do not know," writes Haikal, who was a member of Muhammad Mahmud's Ministry, "that the Cabinet ever delegated this matter to Ali Maher Pasha for the question never came before the Cabinet."⁴ Haikal then goes on to say how, when Ali Maher was away in London, certain notions relating to the restoration of Islamic principles of government, to the efficacy of quick dictatorial reforms, and suchlike, began to get increasing publicity, and he adds: "It is true that these notions were current before the

² Muhammad Husain Haikal, *Memoirs* (Arabic text), vol. II, Cairo 1953, p. 319.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

Chief of the Royal Cabinet's visit to England; but those who advanced them had done so somewhat shamefacedly. After his departure, however, this propaganda became more active, and the Palace was not averse to such notions being attributed to it."⁵

In August 1939 the king dismissed Muhammad Mahmud's Cabinet, and appointed Ali Maher Prime Minister, who included in his Cabinet Azzam, first as Minister of Religious Foundations, and then of Social Affairs. As soon as this Government was formed, it set up a so-called Territorial Army, which seems to have been Azzam's invention and of which he was put in charge. This Territorial Army seems to have been devised to indoctrinate youth and to prepare armed bands which could be used by the Government for political purposes. In this, Ali Maher and Azzam were merely following a fashion made popular by the Nazis and the Fascists, a fashion already adopted in Iraq, and in Egypt itself, where Blueshirts and Greenshirts organised by the Wafd and by the Young Egypt Party made the streets of Cairo hideous with riots and molestations.

The Territorial Army attempted, as the eminent orientalist Ettore Rossi observed at the time, to take up again "with new regulations and new aims"⁶ the traditions of these organisations which had been dissolved by Muhammad Mahmud Pasha when he took office in 1938. A writer knowledgeable in Muslim Brotherhood affairs, Dr. Heyworth-Dunne, thinks that Azzam took the idea of a Territorial Army from Hasan al-Banna, the Leader of the Brotherhood,⁷ and it is worthy of note that the Brotherhood had its own private army organised in battalions and regiments, members of which had to swear to defend the faith and to obey orders unquestioningly.⁸ Among other members of Ali Maher's Cabinet were Salih Harb and Mustafa al-Shurbatchi, known for anti-British agitations and for their connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and similar bodies; as was the Chief of Staff appointed by Ali Maher, Aziz Ali al-Misri, who "never," says Haikal, "at any time hid his admiration for Germany."

Ali Maher's Ministry lasted from August 1939 until June 1940. Britain was at war with Germany which took the offensive in the spring of 1940 and soon scored a brilliant and resounding victory. Egypt was bound to Britain by an alliance, but under Ali Maher's

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁶ *Oriente Moderno*, Rome 1939, p. 512.

⁷ J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*, Washington 1950, p. 36.

⁸ Ishaq Musa al-Husaini, *The Muslim Brotherhood* (Arabic text), Beirut 1955, pp. 108-109.

administration and especially in its last days, Egypt was lukewarm towards her ally, and perhaps worse. The British, comments Haikal, "were seeing with their own eyes what was taking place in Egypt, and hearing that Abd al-Rahman Azzam Bey, the Minister of Social Affairs, and Saleh Harb Pasha, the Minister of War, were talking at every social gathering of German victories and British defeats. . . ." The British Ambassador demanded the resignation of Ali Maher; the king dismissed him, and Ali Maher delivered a bitter speech in parliament denouncing the British for meddling in the internal affairs of Egypt.

It was these men and their party who, inspiring the king or inspired by him, invented and propagated Panarabism as a policy for Egypt. It is true that Egypt negotiated the formation of the Arab League when they were under a cloud, the Wafd in power, and Mustafa al-Nahhas Prime Minister. We do not yet know what convinced al-Nahhas that Panarabism was a paying policy, but no doubt the desire to please the king, to dish his opponents by adopting their policy, the approval of the British, and visions of future grandeur had their part to play. But it is clear that the policy originated neither with the Wafd nor with al-Nahhas. It originated with the king or with men who, either out of personal ambition or doctrinaire conviction, conceived the dream of an authoritarian Muslim state in Egypt embracing gradually all the Arabs, and perhaps in the fullness of time all the Muslims. Their inspiration was not strictly the same as that of the original Panarabs; but this is not to say that they contradicted each other. The ideal of the Panarabs was authoritarian also. They desired to transform the heterogeneous, fissiparous, sceptical populations of the Fertile Crescent to the likeness of their dream, with all differences suddenly annihilated, and external unity the emblem of a deeper, still more fundamental internal unity: one state, one nation, one creed.

It is said that Panislamism and Panarabism are contradictory. Owing to an historical accident the Panarabs had acquired the reputation of being opposed to Panislamism. Panislamism was used by the Ottomans to provide a support for their empire; when the Panarabs rose, they necessarily had to emphasise the opposition between Panarabism and Panislamism. In Egypt, of course, there was no place and no need for such opposition: the enemy was Britain, not the Ottoman Empire. Islamic sentiment and Islamic solidarity gave body and passion to the struggle against the

⁹ Haikal, II, pp. 180-181.

foreigner. A remarkable illustration of this appeared in a prayer written by Hassan al-Banna, the Leader of the Muslim Brothers, for the use of his followers:

"O God, Lord of the Creation who giveth assurance to the insecure, who humbleth the vainglorious and who layeth low the tyrants, accept our prayer and answer our call. Enable us to obtain our right, and give back to us our freedom and independence. O God, those British usurpers have occupied our land and made free with our rights; they have oppressed the country and spread evil in it. O God, turn their intrigues away from us, weaken their strength and disperse their hosts; annihilate them and those who have helped them to victory, or have aided them, or have made peace with them, or have befriended them, in a manner worthy of an all-powerful and majestic One. O God, let their actions rebound on them, let calamities descend on them, humiliate their kingdom, release Your land from their power, and let them have no sway over any of the Believers. Amen." ¹⁰

Here we see well exemplified the general character of Islam as at once a political and a religious creed. The Panarabs desired the unification of the Arab lands; they desired to expel the foreigner. These aims are acceptable to, and indeed mandatory on, Muslims, for the Arab world is the cradle of Islam and to expel the foreigner from it is a meritorious action. Such is the agreement in principles between Panislamism and Panarabism. It explains how the original Panarabs in the Fertile Crescent, though different in outlook and assumptions from Farouk and his advisers, could effect some kind of junction with them, and sign after long and no doubt difficult negotiations the pact of the Arab League.

At this further stage in the progress of Panarabism, the revisionism implicit in the settlement of 1921 became explicit. To the Pact of the League two annexes were attached, one dealing with Palestine, and the other with "Arab countries which are not members of the Council of the League." In both cases the League served notice of its right to meddle in the affairs of countries outside the jurisdiction of its members, and of its claim to advise and direct Powers ruling over or having interests in countries inhabited by Arabs, until such Powers should agree to liquidate their authority and their interests in favour of Panarabism. The Zionists did object to the annex on Palestine and pointed out to the Mandatory Power that it was a derogation of its authority.¹¹ The Mandatory Power remained serene and unmoved, not thinking that a day

¹⁰ Al-Husaini, p. 119.

¹¹ At a meeting between Jewish Agency officials and Foreign Office officials on March 21, 1945, and in a letter from Dr. Weizmann to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of March 27. I am indebted for this information to the Weizmann Archives, Rehovoth, Israel.

would come when claims such as these would affect more than mere Zionists.

Britain and the Arab League

Such were the men and such the policies which the British Government encouraged with its support and blessing. On two public occasions during the second world war, once in a speech at the Mansion House in 1941—to which great importance seems to have been attached, for it was published as a White Paper—and once in answer to a question in the House of Commons in February 1943, the Foreign Secretary declared that it was “natural and right” that cultural, economic, and political ties among the Arab countries should be strengthened: “many Arab thinkers” desired, it seemed, a greater degree of unity than was then enjoyed by the Arab peoples; “no such appeal from our friends should go unanswered”; and the British Government would give “full support to any scheme that commands general approval.”

It is well known that in the 1930s, Germany and Italy by a skilful propaganda, by judicious disbursements, by the powerful appeal of their efficiency and success, established themselves as the champions of, and could set the pace for, Arab nationalism. And yet when one comes to examine what, with their freedom from local and imperial responsibilities, and their lack of scruple, they were in the end prepared to concede, one is struck with their discretion and circumspection, compared with the generous and insouciant abandon of British policy. In the summer of 1940, when Rashid Ali al-Kailani was engaged in the preliminaries of his conspiracy to take power in Iraq and range it alongside the Axis, he sent an emissary to Turkey who presented to von Papen, the German Ambassador, a list of demands which included the confirmation by the Axis of the independence of all Arab countries, the abolition of the Jewish National Home, and the recognition of Arab unity.¹² But neither Germany nor Italy would be drawn so far, and after months of consideration, they made a declaration in October stating that they desired to see the Arab countries prosper and occupy among the peoples of the world a position commensurate with their natural and historical importance, that they had always followed with interest the Arab struggle for independence, that in this struggle the Arabs could count on the full sympathy of the Axis.

Again, in April 1941, when Rashid Ali was in power, and

¹² The list is reproduced in *al-Irfan*, Sidon, August 1951.

before he declared war on Britain, he concluded, as the official history of the Indian Army records, a secret treaty whereby in return for recognising a union—whenever effected—between Iraq and Syria, the Axis would receive oil and pipeline concessions, the lease of three ports on the Syrian coast, and the right to construct naval and military bases thereon.¹³ And even when Rashid Ali's movement against the British was under way in May 1941 and Hitler was persuaded to give some help, he was not ready to go beyond careful and qualified generalities. In his directive of May 23, 1941, he laid down the policy on which propaganda was to be based:

“Victory by the Axis Powers will liberate the lands of the Middle East from the British yoke and give them the right of self-determination (hand-written note: except Syria). Let those who love liberty join the anti-British front.”¹⁴

Exactly the same demands as were made to the Germans were made—albeit by different persons—to the British Government. And the sympathy of the British Government was full indeed and active. They elbowed the French out of the Levant, to the Zionists they turned a deaf ear, and the scheme of Arab unity, realised by a fortuitous agreement between Farouk and the original Panarabs, they supported and blessed. What then was anticipated from such a policy?

The policy rested on a theory and a hope of which there are many expressions, official and unofficial. The Arab League, as Lord Altrincham (who was Minister of State in the Middle East from the assassination of Lord Moyne until 1945) said in an address at the Sorbonne in May 1947, was encouraged by Britain; but he claimed that it was an autonomous power created by the Arabs themselves and represented their unanimous resolve to act independently in world affairs. Theirs was an ancient civilisation now being reborn, and it was possible to capture their friendship and goodwill by helping them in this enterprise. Lord Altrincham buttressed his hopes by a curious argument. If the Palestine White Paper of 1939, he explained, had not been issued, the whole Arab world would have been against the Allies in the most dangerous years of the war, from 1940 to 1942; hence the way to safeguard Western interests in general and British interests in particular was to act with the Arabs, assembled in their new League.¹⁵ This was

¹³ Compton Mackenzie, *Eastern Epic*, vol. I, 1951, p. 93.

¹⁴ *History of the Second World War, the Mediterranean and Middle East*, vol. II, 1956, p. 334.

¹⁵ The address is printed in *Politique Etrangère*, Paris, July 1947.

to confuse the wishes and anticipations of those who invented the White Paper of 1939 with what in fact happened. For it was precisely in these years between 1940 and 1942, that the Arab world manifested great hostility to Britain.

What saved the British position in the Middle East was not the White Paper, but military power, Mr. Churchill's daring, and Hitler's obsession with the conquest of Russia. Such arguments deserve mention to show the foundations on which such grandiose hopes were built. Lord Altrincham's views are worthy of notice because they provide evidence of the terms in which someone who had held high office connected with the Middle East was prepared to think of policy.

But to appreciate the full scope and ramifications of this theory, we must go to unofficial sources, to the writings of some British academics on Middle Eastern affairs, among which those of Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb are noteworthy. The theory, we find, is concerned, in the first place, with a presumed Muslim ethic, and in the second with a presumed difference within the ranks of Arab nationalists. As to the first, Gibb explains that though Muslim society has suffered from violence and lawlessness, and from corruptions introduced by non-Arabs,¹⁶ its true principles, which had been in particular the safeguard of Arab Muslim orthodoxy, could still be applied in the Arab Muslim East. "Islam," for instance, "still maintained the balance between the exaggerated opposites of bourgeois capitalism and communism," and "while hostile to banking capital and unrestricted exchange it sanctioned private property and commercial capital"; Islam "had not succumbed to the obsession with the economic side of life which was characteristic of almost all our Western societies." Gibb asserted that "it is by these and similar ideas that the thought of the Arab nationalists is being more and more strongly influenced."¹⁷ After the Arab League was formed Gibb explained that the "duty laid upon the Arab leaders is, in its essence, closely parallel to that laid upon the leaders of the United Nations."¹⁸

As to the Arab nationalists Gibb said that there were "two kinds of Arab nationalists: those whom I call by that name, and those whom I call Panarabs." The Panarabs were intolerent bigots, while the nationalists, though certainly respectful of Islam, desired

¹⁶ The question is discussed at greater length in my article, "Islam and the Orientalists," *British Journal of Sociology*, September 1956.

¹⁷ *The Near East: Problems and Prospects*, P. W. Ireland, editor, Chicago 1942, p. 62.

¹⁸ "Toward Arab Unity," *Foreign Affairs*, New York, October 1945, p. 129.

also to adopt Western ideas in order to combat feudalism, internecine rivalries, and to collaborate with the non-Muslim minorities. "Such there are in all the regions of the Arab East—Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, even" he asserted, "Arabia—and it is upon them that the hopes of a revived, progressive, respected and self-respecting Arab nationhood depend." Let, therefore—and this was said in 1942—a federation of the Arab lands in Asia be constructed, and the sound Arab nationalists would be able to get on with the work which centuries of Sassanid corruption and Ottoman malpractice had left undone: "it is a rational, reasonable, eminently practical objective."¹⁹

Such were the doctrinal foundations on which a policy was based to encourage Farouk, Azzam, and the triumphant doctrinaires of the Fertile Crescent to come together and emulate the ideals of the United Nations. Many people must have felt misgivings as to how such an adventure would end, but it is safe to say that nobody of position or standing, whether British or Arab, was ready to question in public the assumptions and execution of this policy as Haikal coolly and soberly questioned it. He is reported to have declared at the time of the first formal conference on Arab unity in 1944:

"It is doubtful whether the union will be a political union; it is doubtful whether, in case one of the Arab states is attacked, the others will hurry to its aid. It is also doubtful if an effective cultural union, or a union of some other kind could take place, because the history, the legal codes, agriculture and industry are necessarily different in the different Arab states."²⁰

The rational, reasonable, eminently practical objective has failed of its attainment, and the policy which sought to promote it is now dust and ashes. It disintegrated on the battlefields of Palestine in 1948, three years after the foundation of the League. It was a swift reckoning. Policies are meant to succeed; if they fail, then they are bad policies; unless, that is, new and powerful circumstances which could not have been foreseen impinge to falsify calculations and upset expectations. But between 1945, or indeed 1943, or 1939, and 1948 no new elements, no alien factors were introduced into the Middle Eastern situation. The Zionists were there, the Panarabs were there, Farouk and his men were there, and their antecedents, capacities, and ambitions were for all to see. To argue that the policy failed because the Zionists were not docile enough, the Arabs united enough, or wise enough, is to argue either from ignorance or from fancifulness or from sentimentality.

¹⁹ Ireland, pp. 95, 98.

²⁰ *Oriente Moderno*, 1944, p. 2.

It may be said that whether they knew it or not, the makers of the Bagdad Pact have thereby finally abandoned the policy which led to the encouragement of the Arab League. If so, it is a return to common sense and prudent calculation. Friends made friendly by the persuasion of tangible interests, by a reckoning of risk and advantage, by a provident quest for military and economic security: such is a conceivable objective of foreign policy. But will it be easy to extricate oneself from the quicksands of a doctrinaire adventure?

Years of official Panarabism mean that inevitably the Middle Eastern political debate is securely confined within the Panarab groove. When the Bagdad Pact was made, its Arab enemies denounced it as a betrayal of the Panarab cause. To reply to them when they became most vociferous at the time of the Suez operation, Nuri al-Sa'id made a long broadcast in December 1956. The burden of his argument was that communism, Zionism, and France were allies against whom Iraq always has fought and will always fight. Iraq, he said, was the only true servant of Panarabism. How can those, he asked, who maintain the frontiers created by imperialism (here alluding to Syria, and the well-known Panarab argument that all frontiers in the Fertile Crescent were artificial and arbitrary) be called patriots and nationalists? It may be that that Iraqi Minister was trying to pay back his enemies in their own coin, but it is as probable that he is sincere in what he says: "The call to Arab nationalism," he declared at the end of his broadcast, "is not something new and accidental with me. It is my very being, of which I am proud, which I seek to protect and to tend, whether I am in power or not. If such has been my way in my youth and in my middle age, it is not strange that I should remain the same in my old age." This is quite true, and to the extent that it is true disengagement from the quicksand is difficult. Britain may perhaps find herself facing obligations and being involved in quarrels and complications not envisaged within the text of the Bagdad Pact.

In the circumstances, one further remark remains to be made. Panarabs are quite fond of citing German unity in the nineteenth century by way of precedent and analogy to prove that Arab unity in the twentieth century is inevitable. They forget, however, that German unity was made not only at the expense of the French, but also at that of a fellow German, the Habsburg Emperor. The Panarabs have fought their Sedan—and lost it—in Palestine in 1948. Sadowa still remains to be fought. Who shall be its Bismarck, and who its victim, only the future will tell.

TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

ANDREW J. A. MANGO

THE inclusion of an article on Turkey in an issue devoted to the Middle East needs to be justified. If a European country is one that tries to live up to European standards, just as a man who acknowledges and seeks to live by Christian standards is commonly presumed to be a Christian, then Turkey is a European country. The proclamation of the Turkish Republic, prepared by a long process of assimilation of European influences and symbolic of the success of that process, has torn Turkey from the Middle East and has propelled her finally into the North Atlantic region. Strategic convenience may produce fanciful geography, but the fancy is based on fact. The fact is that Turkey has gone much further along the road to the west than her Middle Eastern neighbours, and the inequality of their attainments separates them. They are also separated by an undesirable first product of westernisation, the adoption of the ideology of nationalism.

Westernisation of Turkey

The westernisation of Turkey started long before Atatürk. A century ago a reformed and constitutional Turkey was admitted to the concert of Europe: the Turkish delegates at Strasbourg follow a long line of Europeans. By the first world war the entire Ottoman ruling class was westernised: it had been educated abroad or in foreign schools in Turkey, or again on translations of foreign textbooks. The success of the revolution of Atatürk was, therefore, no accident. What it did was to proclaim the private practices of the rulers as the faith of the state. The Middle East is behind the back of republican Turkey. It is also, to use the unlovely language of Soviet experts, an internal émigré. But let us take the rejection first. It was made easier by the fact that politically there was nothing left to reject: the Arabs had come under the care of a western headmaster, and both teachers and pupils looked hopeful. Nevertheless ram's horns were produced and anathemas pronounced:

"We came near to extinction as we tried to free ourselves from this race [the Arabs] which has lost all nobility and vitality. I personally would much

* The author was born in Istanbul. Employed in the British Embassy in Turkey 1944–1947. Ph.D. thesis on Persian poetic versions of Alexander legend. Broadcasts Third Programme on Persian Literature.

rather see as neighbours on our southern frontiers Paris smarties than Syrian *hajjis* [Moslems who have been on a pilgrimage to Mecca]. At least the Parisians are generous enemies and intelligent and honest friends. For five centuries we gave our blood and our possessions for the Arabs and still could not please them. Let us see how the noble race fares under the French."

The extract comes from a novel by the mediocre but popular Turkish writer Burhan Cahit. The failure of the Holy War proclaimed against the Allies by the Ottoman Sultan was particularly instructive. Burhan Cahit's hero concluded from it: "The Arabs are always the same: sweet as lambs when faced with armed might. They care little whether they are governed by Moslem Turks, Roman Catholic Frenchmen, Protestant Englishmen, or Buddhist Japanese. They are always ready to flatter the mighty." And, of course, intrigue with the mighty. T. E. Lawrence and all that were a symbol of Arab treachery, of treachery compounded in spite of five centuries of common life, of common religion, of the Hejaz Railway built with Turkish money, the aqueducts paid for by pious Turkish Moslems, and all the rest.

Arab nationalists in the meantime were forging a defensive myth, that they had kept faith with the Ottomans until the godless Young Turks arrived and Turanians became more important than good Moslems. But these rival myths were elaborated in different compartments and did not impede each other's growth. When England and France fell out with the Arabs, the usual Turkish reaction was: "What else could you expect from this ungrateful race? We are well rid of them, but what made you take them on?" This is not all sour grapes. There was and there still is a genuine disinclination among educated Turks to get drawn into the bog of Middle Eastern politics.

The repudiated Middle East had, however, its counterpart in Turkey. Just as the entire population of the Roman Empire did not become Christian with the conversion of Constantine, every Turk did not become a westerner when the republic was founded. *Hajjis* were not confined to Syria: the species existed also in Turkey. A former Turkish diplomat, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, author of *Panorama*, an ambitious novel which has the present state of Turkey as its main theme, has drawn the picture of a typical internal émigré, Hajji Emin Efendi. Hajji Emin Efendi believes that the Kaiser Wilhelm was a secret Moslem, that the Ottoman Empire was defeated because Turkish officers in Enver Pasha's suite had entered the sacred enclosure in Mecca while in a state of ritual impurity. "When the Arabs saw that, they

understood that the Turks were done for. The only way out for them was to drive us out of the Sacred Places. Had they not done so, their position would have been as bad as ours now: the last traces of religion would have disappeared from their lands too!" Hajji Emin Efendi believes also that "it is a sin to speak against the Arabs. It is equivalent to disbelief in the Prophet, who said 'I am an Arab.'" Having delivered himself of these sentiments Hajji Emin Efendi goes off to hoard some gold. He is clearly a bad citizen.

Hajji Emin Efendi is also a typical oriental. *Sarkılılık* (the quality of being oriental) is a term rich in associations; it stands for superstition, inefficiency, lethargy, and dubious morals. These associations derive from experience of oriental society in decay and have some truth in them. That society is essentially incoherent: the medieval Islamic ideals which once inspired it become and are seen as irrelevant: the new western ideals are unevenly adopted and applied. Old forms of group and guild solidarity and loyalty disappear and are not immediately replaced by new ideals of citizenship. Religion becomes ignorant superstition. Such incoherent societies lie to the east and south of the Turkish Republic; they make uneasy and rather unattractive neighbours.

In Turkey the battle against "backwardness and superstition" has been won in principle, although the end of the mopping-up operations is not yet in sight. These local campaigns are absorbing much of the energy of the new generation of Turkish intellectuals. Their main weapon is "education in the spirit of positive science," which they see as the essential condition of economic and social progress. Their advice to their Middle Eastern neighbours is to adopt the "Atatürk solution": westernisation, secularisation, collaboration with the West. Educated Turks believe that they can save the Middle East by their example. There was a time between the two wars when it was a matter of academic and rather superior interest to the Turkish ruling class whether the Arabs and Persians followed their example or not. But this is no longer so. A distasteful necessity has again forced Turkey to attend to her oriental neighbours. The need arose some time before the last war when the influence of western democracies began to recede. The remedy fashionable at the time was to conclude a feeble *entente*: by concluding the Pact of Saadabad with Iraq, Persia, and Afghanistan, Turkey applied the fashionable remedy. The Pact of Saadabad proved to be a document of no great worth. The present Turkish Government hopes that the Bagdad Pact will be different.

Turkey and the Bagdad Pact

It is said that the interest shown by the Turkish Government in the Bagdad Pact means that Turkey is again facing east. This is a misleading and not very meaningful metaphor. The rulers of Turkey who are trying to turn their own orientals into Europeans are not becoming orientals themselves to please less developed neighbours. The Bagdad Pact was born out of strategic necessity, but its success depends largely on the social evolution of its Middle Eastern members, on the growth in numbers and importance of westernised social groups to supply a cohesive principle. (Seen from the other side of the Curtain, the growth of these groups in the Middle East is as distasteful to the Soviet Union as was the movement for constitutional reform in Persia to Czarist Russia. There is a Europe of the spirit and a backwoods of the spirit. The rulers of the Soviet Union belong to the latter and seek their allies in similar thickets: "Mental proletarians of the world unite!") The accession of the United States to the Bagdad Pact, which is the prime aim of Turkish foreign policy at the present moment, would promote both causes, the strategic security of the Middle East and, through American economic and cultural aid, the social evolution of its inhabitants. American aid has been from its inception a civilising force in the Middle East: American university missions, Fulbright scholarships, the known preference of the Americans for decent social and political practices have helped to raise the tone of civil life in the countries of that region. But in the meantime the attempt of the Turkish Government to collaborate with less developed Middle Eastern countries has raised some difficulties. There is the noisy quarrel which Arab nationalists are waging with the West; there are the Arab objections to the existence of Israel. So far the views of the Turkish Government on both matters have generally coincided with those of the United States Government. But by withdrawing her minister in Tel Aviv in order to appease Arab nationalists in Iraq, Turkey has, however slightly, fallen out of step with the other members of the western club to which she is proud to belong. The group of young Ankara intellectuals who produce the fortnightly review *Forum*, a review which resembles the *New Statesman* not only in format, disagreed with this gesture of appeasement. "In regard to our relations with Israel," *Forum* said, "we should know that the existence of that state in the Middle East is in Turkey's interests. If a war were to break out in the Middle East tomorrow, the Israeli army would be the only serious

force capable of fighting on our side; its value is greater than the combined value of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and other Arab armies."¹ *Forum* believes, on the other hand, that Turkey should support the Arabs where their claims are justified, over the North African problem, for example, or over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. "Turkey," *Forum* concluded, "has grown out of the stage of romantic nationalism through which the Arabs are now passing; ours has long been a rational nationalism. In our actions we should not try to play up to the Arabs, but to serve as an example to them. Otherwise the Bagdad Pact will never succeed in remedying the problems of the Middle East."

The trouble is that epithets applied to nationalism tend to be subjective. Would Syrian nationalists agree that their claim to the Turkish province of Hatay was romantic? The essentially ungenerous nature of nationalism is in itself an obstacle to better relations between Turkey and her Middle Eastern neighbours. Geographically contiguous nationalisms are usually antagonistic; national friendships, as extolled in nationalist literature, operate, like the knight in chess, at one remove: the smaller the contact the greater the friendship. The Turkish Government is, therefore, probably right in asking for United States participation in the Bagdad Pact and in seeking the extension of the pact: American restraining and civilising influence would help to keep apart rival nationalisms. The peaceful development of the Middle East and Turkish-Arab co-operation within it, require, not the absence, but, on the contrary, a multiplicity of conditions to American aid.

Turkey and Islam

It may be objected that I have neglected the factors which Turkey and the states of the Middle East are believed to have in common: the Islamic religion, Islamic culture, past co-existence in a multinational state. But, as I have already contended, the concept of Islamic solidarity was proved to be politically inoperative in the first world war. Mediaeval Islamic culture (and there is no other Islamic culture) is dead: fewer traces remain in Turkey than in the Arab lands and they are growing fainter everywhere. In Turkey, as a result of thirty years of secular nationalist education, the legacy of that culture is fully available only to university-trained orientalists. Just as western positivism, or "positive science" to give it the honorific title by which it is known in Turkey, had dissolved the

¹ "Clarity in our Middle Eastern Policy" (editorial), *Forum*, December 1, 1956, p. 4.

structure of Islamic society, western nationalism has torn the links that united the former subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Arab proper names appearing in Turkish newspapers in strange western transliterations instead of their traditional Turkish forms are a symbol of Turkish-Arab estrangement; places in the Middle East where Turks fought or which they governed and which were part of their personal experience are now names in dispatches by western correspondents. Today Turks and Arabs can establish fruitful contacts only as they become citizens of the West. A young Turkish lecturer who recently visited the Arab lands to study cultural co-operation found English and French to be the most useful common languages. The future rulers of Turkey and of the Arab countries will, I hope for the sake of civilised progress in those lands, first meet as Fulbright scholars or as students at the London School of Economics. They will certainly not meet at the al-Azhar university in Cairo. The most nationalistic Arab parents would choose a proper university in the West for their children if they were given the choice. Their preference is logical: the West, meaning the north Atlantic region, is the home of the only civilisation that is alive today. Clichés about a meeting or a synthesis between East and West, between eastern spiritual values and western technology are meaningless and are seen as meaningless by the people who matter in the Middle East today. Islamic civilisation can be studied; it can no longer be lived—and even the study is carried on in the West or is directed from it. There is nothing paradoxical or supercilious about such a judgment: it was natural for scholars to go to Alexandria in Hellenistic times, to Bagdad or Cordoba in the Middle Ages. Today the most favourable ecologic conditions for the growth of culture happen to be in the West.

Integration with Europe

Seen in this light, the efforts of the Turkish intellectuals to achieve full integration with the West are not funny (*pace* Miss Rose Macaulay), even although they will reduce the incidence of the picturesque. The level of economic and political development is not an index of westernisation: some western communities are poor, others are or have been governed by dictatorships. They do not become Asiatic for all that. Incidents such as the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in September 1955 are adduced as proof that Turkey is not a western country. It would, indeed, be convenient if nationalist riots did not form part of the western heritage: like

proletarian revolutions, they are unfortunately an excess from which the West has not been immune. We are, of course, all in favour of remedying defects and avoiding excesses, but so are our opposite numbers in Turkey. Political thought, literature, or popular taste in Turkey cannot be studied in isolation from trends in the West. Socialists and Keynesians argue in the columns of *Forum*; Turkish *literati* favour Silone's type of humanism, Faulkner's folksy realism, and the real people of Steinbeck or of Italian film directors; *Waiting for Godot* was produced in Istanbul before it came to London; the Turkish students' association is earnestly debating the dangers of rock'n'roll. There is, it is true, one basic difference. As long as they remain at home, Turkish intellectuals are disseminators rather than creators of western culture. But this is true of all intellectuals east of Rome. Today Turkey is badly served by western writers. Ignorance of the Turkish language is understandable but not inevitable: it should be recognised as a handicap by writers who seek to interpret Turkish public opinion and Turkish literature. No civilised man can object to writers who take an interest in Byzantine or classical Greek remains in Turkey, provided that books on archaeology are not served up as books on modern Turkey. Seekers after the picturesque should go further afield.

The political scene in Turkey should not be judged too harshly. Radicals have always looked with disfavour on Turkey. They are apt to divide nations into reactionary and progressive, and the Turks are usually consigned to the former category, irrespective of any changes that may have been introduced into the civil government of Turkey. Turkey falls short of west European standards of social and political democracy, although administration in Turkey is much more democratic than in the socialist sixth of the world. Practical obstacles must be recognised before radical remedies are recommended. The standards of the Turkish Civil Service (which remains, nevertheless, the best in the Middle East) limit the useful range of state administration and intervention; general cultural standards make for high differentials in rewards (for if the habits and standards of life of different sections of the population are profoundly unequal rewards have, at least to some extent, to be unequal too); powerful incentives are needed if economic development is to proceed quickly. There are arguments for restricting in practice democratic rights to the westernised part of the population: the extension of these rights since the war beyond the confines of the élite has created difficulties. Members of the religious opposition in Turkey, for example, do not behave like western defenders

of spiritual values. They go in for breaking statues and hounding women out of public life. The obstacles to the creation of a social-democratic welfare state in Turkey are formidable, assuming, as many Turkish intellectuals do assume, that this is a worthy object of endeavour. Western aid and sympathy are needed if they are to be overcome: there is no lack of Turkish progressives with whom western progressives could sympathise.

Similar considerations apply probably to many Middle Eastern countries. What distinguishes Turkey is the extent of westernisation and, consequently, of the growth of westernised classes, the self-identification of most articulate Turks with the west and the sense of purpose which they and their rulers seem to have. These phenomena have their social counterparts: the Turkish middle class, for example, is more numerous and more powerful than is the case in any Middle Eastern country. The growth of the middle class was one of the factors in the victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 and was in turn further stimulated by that victory. Indeed, one of the dangers to which the Turkish body politic has been exposed during the last few years was due to the circumstance that rapid economic progress had added to the socially and politically important classes elements which had not been fully westernised. It is they, for example, who produced the appearance of a religious revival, although that phenomenon can perhaps be more accurately described as the open manifestation of existing religious attachments which had been less obvious because they had been harboured by less important people. The middle class is, moreover, not confined to a few cities, as is usually the case in the Middle East. A Turkish actor told me recently that he had witnessed the best theatrical manners in the town of Adana where a large and wealthy audience assembled to watch a performance of *The Rainmaker*. When a branch of the Turkish State Theatre was opened a few months ago in the central Anatolian town of Konya, all available tickets for a season's performances were sold out in a few days. The numbers of the intelligentsia can also be gauged from the fact that an uncompromisingly serious review like *Forum* has a circulation of approximately 10,000 copies. Turkish newspaper circulations generally have doubled or trebled since the war, although here technical improvements are more conspicuous than any new excellence of content. The total circulation of literary periodicals has, however, also increased very considerably. Serious works of foreign literature, particularly American, French, and English, are translated in large numbers and within a remarkably short time of

their first publication abroad. Here again it is the extent and the diffusion of cultural and educational activity which differentiates Turkey from the countries of the Middle East.

Turkey is today a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the Council of Europe. Many people in the west consider this as a formal strategic or political arrangement; some may even think of it as slightly incongruous. But to the Turks, their country's membership of these organisations is a recognition of their status as Europeans and as westerners, the formal abandonment of what they call "the crusaders' mentality," the hostility of Christian Europeans for Muslim Turks. The recognition has not come suddenly, it has not been unearned. It is in the interest of the democratic countries of the west to give effect to this recognition by helping in the integration of Turkey in the western community. This in turn would encourage the countries of the Middle East, or rather the people who matter in those countries, to take the road to the West.

DEFENCE AND THE BAGDAD PACT

ESMOND WRIGHT

BRITISH thinking about the Middle East is rooted in two myths. The first is that the area is strategically a single whole, and the second is that our own relationship to it is special and—until recently at least—privileged. Neither of these myths has justification today.

Myths About the Middle East

There is, of course, a sense in which the area of which Cairo is the spiritual and political centre can be thought of as united: by Islam and *Sharia* law, by the near-universalism of Arabic, by the age-long contrasts of *bedu* and *fellah*—and of native worker and foreign exploiter—and by what seems to us an infinite deep disdain for progress. Though these things have their truth, they are less striking today than the facts that divide: Sunni against Shia, Arab against Jew, Egyptian against all Egypt's neighbours, Arab against Kurd in Iraq, "Arab" against Copt in Egypt, Hashemite in Iraq or Jordan against Saudi, Maronite against Moslem in Lebanon. Only one fact today appears to maintain Arab unity—hatred of the Jew, woven into the whole fabric of Arab religion and history. Remove that force and what emerge are local loyalties, to tribe or clan or nation, synthetically inculcated and xenophobic in expression. It is in the handling of these local and intricate—and often personal—problems that Britain has encountered difficulty in recent years. Having fought and won two world wars in the area in this century, and having in large part "created" some of the Middle East "nations," Britain has long thought of the area in strategic terms; socially she has been conservative in her handling of local administrations, happier with the *sheikhs* than with the new emerging middle class; she has never been happy in the Arab world (as with Ireland, India, and Palestine) with nationalism, even though she has fostered it with educational as well as with political grants. Russia's strongest ally in the Middle East is now this xenophobic nationalism. To the familiar picture of the Islamic world there has now to be added the centrifugal factors of fifteen

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DEFENCE AND THE BAGDAD PACT

sovereign states, all nationally conscious, and of four distinct civilisations (Turkish, Persian, Arab, and Jewish).

The second myth—valid at least until last November—is that the Middle East is an area in which Britain has a special responsibility, that it is, or rather was, part of our indirect empire. Though never part of the political empire as such, some areas in the Middle East have been indistinguishable from imperial bases: Egypt under the protectorate (1914-1922) and subsequently, Iraq and Jordan as mandates, the Sudan in the years of its condominium. These varied forms of control have deceived both parties: Arabs have seen in them evasions of or apologies for straight imperial mastery, and their transience has concealed from ourselves how vulnerable our position has been. Lacking an imperial sanction, Britain's position in each Middle Eastern country has depended, if not on local goodwill, at least on local agreements, however short-lived, on her capacity to win friends and influence *sheikhs*, and therefore in the end on her prestige. This has never been fully realised, for the myth of our special relationship to the Middle East has fostered the notion that we are specially informed about it, that there was even a basic affinity in the "national character" of Arab and Englishman, that they could share ideas like honour and pride and even their humour across all barriers of language. Jews might smile cynically at these illusions, as might servicemen in war-time who knew only the Egyptians—wilder than the "Arabs" and largely creatures of the bazaars. Nothing has done more to foster these deceptions than the subsidiary myth of T. E. Lawrence, and the *nostalgie du désert* of much recent English literature. Perhaps the major error committed by Britain in her administration of these diverse and exotic lands was to replace the Levant Consular and the Indian Political Services by a single Colonial Service fed from Oxford which grew steadily out of touch with the new and zesty forces of contemporary Arab—and Israeli—life.

Britain's Position and the Arab League

There were other, and more durable, reasons than these for the dominance of Britain in the Middle East. When Britain replaced the Ottoman Empire as a non-imperial suzerain in 1918, there was no other Power to challenge her position. Her ally of 1914, Russia—to whom in 1915 she had made one of the greatest concessions in her diplomatic history, in promising her Constantinople at the end of the war—was by 1917 in a state of revolution and happily for

Britain no longer entitled to her share of the spoils; she played no effective part in the Middle East until 1946. France was recognised as having a *mission civilisatrice* in Syria and the Lebanon, but nowhere else; and her misfortunes in Damascus in 1925, like those twenty years later, made it imperative for Britain to dissociate herself from her. Britain made no common cause with France in the Middle East at any point after 1918—until 1956. When taxed on this point, Lloyd George once commented that he had not won the Middle East for the sake of a handful of French nigger policemen. The United States, offered a mandate for Armenia in 1918, thought better of it—and of all such foreign adventures; but she managed, League or no League, to get a share of Iraq petroleum. But for twenty years, no Power—except perhaps that of Zionism concentrated in New York and London—rivalled Britain in the Middle East. And the concessions made reluctantly to nationalism—in Egypt in 1922 and 1936, in Iraq in 1931 and in Jordan—did not seem to imperil Britain's ultimate control of the key resources of the area: cotton, oil, desert transport, airfields, and the Canal waterway. Though there were many alarms, there were no major threats: a single company could keep the peace in the Sudan or in Cyprus, and when the Egyptians were ordered out of Khartoum in 1924 they went.

After the Second World War

The second world war brought decisive changes: it helped to train a Jewish Brigade; it gave a great stimulus to Arab nationalism in each country even as it emphasised the unity of the Middle East as a whole; the economy of the area was centrally planned and directed through the Middle East Supply Council; and the whole region from Alexandria to the Persian Gulf became a base for the maintenance of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Armies—a base, it is worth noting, that was much bigger than the Canal Zone and involved the use of all the ports of Egypt, of Palestine, and of the Persian Gulf.¹ Politically the major result of the war for Middle East politics was the formation of the Arab League, encouraged by Britain and especially by Anthony Eden, in the hope that it would bring stability to the area and help to solve the Palestine problem, but also because it fitted in with the Ottoman-inherited concept of the strategic unity of the Middle East. The first draft of this

¹ Cf. the discussions on the value of the Cyprus base in the *Sunday Times*, December 23 and 30, 1956, especially the letters of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck and Lieut.-Gen. Sir William Lindsell.

scheme had been produced by Nuri Pasha es Said, the elder statesman of Iraq, and had suggested the creation of a unitary Arab state in the Fertile Crescent, with a special protected status for Lebanese Christians and for Palestinian Jews. This would have excluded Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen. Similar proposals had emanated from Abdullah of Jordan. These schemes were replaced by one in favour of a looser organisation—a confederation of sovereign states consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, pledged to common defence. Egypt was and is opposed to the unity of the Fertile Crescent, as a threat to her own ambitions. She became paramount in the councils of the Arab League; an Egyptian has been from its inception at the head of its secretariat; its budget has been largely met from the Egyptian Exchequer.

The Israeli war of 1948–1949 and the military weakness of the Arabs that it revealed led in April 1950 to the conclusion, under the auspices of the Arab League, of an Inter-Arab Joint Defence Alliance (the Arab League Security Pact), the original signatories of which were Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, later joined with a certain reluctance by Iraq and Jordan. There is no evidence that this Pact is anything but a form of words. The Israeli war had more serious effects on Jordan, which was transformed from a feudal land ruled by a subtle and pro-British Emir into the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, with territory on both banks of the river and with its population almost doubled by the ingress of Palestinian refugees, all of them intractable, all of them feeling superior to those they regarded as *beduin*, most of them as bitterly anti-British as they were anti-Israeli. As aftermath of the war came the murder of Nokrashi Pasha of Egypt by the Moslem Brotherhood in 1949, and of Abdullah of Jordan by the Mufti's henchmen in 1951.

At this point an area that had been regarded by the United States as one almost exclusively of concern to Britain began to be seen in a global context. The weakness of the Arab states and their vulnerability in the event of a war with Russia became a source of anxiety to the West. In their declaration of May 25, 1950, the Western Powers (Britain, France, and the United States) offered to arm the Middle Eastern states for internal security and for area defence on condition that no aggression was intended against any other state. Britain began to see in multi-lateralism a possible solution to her Egyptian difficulties: she had withdrawn her troops from Cairo and the Delta in 1947, but all further negotiations had

broken down because she was unwilling to agree that the Sudan should be assigned to Egypt without reference to the wishes of the Sudanese. In the spring and summer of 1951 a completely new approach to Middle East defence was attempted by the Western Powers and Turkey. They proposed to Egypt that she should become with them a founder member—"on a basis of equality and partnership"—of an Allied Middle East Command, to which the British military bases and facilities in the Canal Zone would be transferred; this arrangement would replace the 1936 Treaty, and such British forces as did not become part of the Command would be withdrawn. These proposals were rejected by the Wafdist Government, and although the Western Powers announced their intention to create a Middle East Command—"an integrated allied command, not a national command"—the effort came to nothing. In the climate of opinion that then prevailed, no Middle East defence organisation under Western auspices was possible: there was no pressing sense of danger from Russia, except in Turkey and fleetingly in Persia; a Western-sponsored pact might prevent a "second round" with Israel, then the theme of all Egyptian propaganda; Turkey was in any event a suspect state in Egyptian eyes, as a relict of the Ottoman Empire, as now avowedly lay and not Moslem, and as a Power that had recognised Israel. In the period of the Korean war, neutralism was in the ascendant. What might have been the turning point was passed. Turkey joined NATO and looked to more stable allies.

America's Northern Tier Policy

Until 1952 American interest in the Middle East was slight. There was from 1936 onwards a concern with Aramco (one recalls Ibn Saud's remark that he had given the contracts in 1936 to the Americans "Because they were the farthest away") and there were every four years vehement verbal sympathies with the Zionist cause. These, however, were themselves cooling at every quadrennial stage: Ireland and Israel are no longer forces to toy with in American domestic politics. But as late as 1948 his speedy recognition of Israel did help to put Truman in. The Republican Administration of 1952, without direct interests inside the Middle East, was determined to put a ring-fence round Russia and China. The weakest link in the chain was the Arab "roof of the world," and to strengthen it the State Department evolved the "Northern Tier" policy. This was not merely an idea of the errant Mr.

Dulles, who was prompt to support Nasser and Neguib in 1952—with money and with the gift of symbolic gold-plated revolvers; it emerged from the Kennan policy of containment of the Soviet Union, and it was served by the State Department without any serious questioning (and without much attempt after 1951 to align itself with Britain). In the Middle East its instruments were less Mr. Dulles than Henry Byroade, sent to Egypt to become a friend of the military junta, George Allen, Loy Henderson, and Herbert Hoover Junior. If the Middle East was threatened by Russia, these men argued, its most vulnerable area was its northern oil-bearing perimeter, from Lake Van through Kurdistan to Afghanistan and Kashmir. From 1952 the Soviet Union was charging the West with seeking to use Kashmir as a site for air bases directed against China; and this fear of Mr. Nehru's is something that has rarely been heeded in the West. By 1954 both Turkey and Pakistan were receiving American military aid. In February 1954 Pakistan and Turkey announced a Treaty of Friendship, which included arrangements for the exchange of information on military matters.

Of this Northern Tier policy Britain was at first suspicious. She was alarmed at its effects on Russia, on India, and on Egypt. It subordinated the economic and political problems of the individual countries to the needs of a strategy conceived in the West. Traditionally, too, Britain's interests were in Egypt and the Persian Gulf, in cotton and oil, and she was preoccupied with the settlement of the Canal dispute; Mosul apart, the northern areas had not been of direct concern to her. There were, however, by 1954 compelling reasons for coming to terms with Egypt: it was proving expensive, and perhaps futile, to tie down 80,000 men to garrison duty among a hostile population; the Canal Zone, however valuable—and perhaps irreplaceable—as a base, and then estimated very much more highly than it has been recently, was nevertheless vulnerable in an air-atomic war; as Mr. Head put it in the House of Commons in July 1954, thermo-nuclear weapons put "a premium on dispersion"; large-scale land campaigns in the Middle East now seemed less likely. Given the strategy of the Great Deterrent, air bases close to Russia would now be more valuable than Fayid or Abu Suweir. Even this view is now debatable: with the development of the B52 and of air-refuelling there is now a case for the use of more distant bases, in, *e.g.*, Aden and Central Africa. At any rate, in July 1954, under many pressures, American, Egyptian, Indian, and domestic, Britain put its faith in Nasser and signed a seven-year agreement (now unilaterally abrogated by Egypt). The Canal Zone was to be

evacuated within the next twenty months, but it could be reoccupied by Britain if any Arab state or Turkey were attacked by an "outside Power" (*i.e.*, not Israel); 2,000 British civilians were to be stationed in the Zone to maintain the installations: in fact by this step the key to Middle East defence passed from Egypt to Turkey—a member of NATO and of the Balkan Pact, an ally of the United States and of Pakistan, with an impressive army and, after the Korean war, considerable military prestige. But for Britain the decision of the summer of 1954 was a diplomatic revolution, and it was the price she was paying in the Middle East for her American alliance elsewhere. Without imperial sanctions in Egypt after 1955 she was powerless to check the march of events there. Within a few weeks of the departure of the last British soldier, the Canal Company was nationalised and the Canal seized.

The Bagdad Pact

With Turkey and Pakistan in alliance, all that was needed for the security of the Northern Tier was the allegiance of Iraq. Nuri es Said, perhaps the most mature of Middle East statesmen and himself originally a Turk, visited Istanbul in October 1954 and announced that "Iraq will enter the Turkish-Pakistan Pact if needed." Iraq, however, is an Arab state and as such anti-Israeli: recent meetings of the Bagdad Powers have excluded Britain because of her support for Israel last November. But Iraq is an unusual Arab state: Shia in religion and containing non-Arab groups (Kurds and Christians), anathema to Saudi Arabia as Hashemite and progressive, anathema to Egypt because of its independent stand and its Fertile Crescent ambitions; alone among its neighbours it is using its oil resources for the benefit of its people, and it realises that its oil-fields are only some 400 miles from the Iron Curtain. Egypt countered this Iraqi move by pleading that all attempts to strengthen the defence of the Middle East should be channelled through the Arab League Security Pact, and then by radio propaganda against Iraq. Despite the fulminations of the "Voice of the Arabs" Turkey and Iraq signed the Pact of Mutual Co-operation at Bagdad in February 1955 with the aim of united resistance against Russian threats, open or subversive. In April Britain joined the Pact, agreeing to supply economic aid and to withdraw the R.A.F. units stationed at Habbaniyah and Shaibah, leaving only instructors and two training squadrons. The "Voice of the Arabs" now hurled its charges against Britain as well as Iraq and sought

with marked success to prevent the adhesion of Jordan to the Pact. In September 1955 Pakistan joined the Pact, and in terms of the agreement a Permanent Council was set up in Bagdad. In October—coinciding with the receipt of Czechoslovak aid by Egypt—came the adherence of Persia, after centuries of neutrality between East and West. Though Persia is at present of slight military value, its adherence emphasises the psychological value of an alliance that now extends from the Bosphorus to the Hindu Kush.

What then is the value of the Bagdad Pact? Is it in the words of *The Times* (November 19, 1955) a "modest microcosm" of NATO? Or is it a permanent shield for the vulnerable area between Mount Ararat and East Bengal? On the positive side, it strengthens the physical defences of the Northern Tier and establishes a kind of ideological frontier that must not, on pain of war, be crossed. Turkey and Persia lack the xenophobia that distort the politics of the Arab countries; they, and Pakistan, have been only indirectly concerned with the problems of Israel. The first meeting of the Permanent Council held in Bagdad in November 1955 emphasised economic co-operation, and among the plans drawn up was one for an atomic energy training centre—countered by Russia with an offer to Egypt of a nuclear energy laboratory in Cairo! Hope is being placed in the economic development of Iraq: if the social inequalities of one Middle East country can visibly be destroyed, Iraq might replace Egypt as a symbol of "liberation" among the Arab peoples. The economic committee of the Council might in the long run prove more significant than the military.

Nevertheless, there are many weaknesses in the Bagdad Pact as a serious military arrangement. The only local forces that it can muster are those of Turkey—some twenty divisions, but not all available to meet a threat through the Caucasus, since the major line of Turkish defence must be at the Straits. The other local forces would hardly be enough to delay an invading Russian Army. The communications of Persia and Iraq are primitive; there is only a single line metre-gauge railway from Basrah; it took a week for twelve Centurion tanks, recently sent to Iraq, to make the journey by barge up river. Politically the price paid for the Bagdad Pact is already high. Jordan appears to be lost to Britain, and perhaps to the West, after thirty-six years of British subsidy and the services of two generations of British officers—buying hate, it has been said, at £12 million a year. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have replaced Britain as its sponsors, and its existence would seem now to depend on American influence exercised *via* King Saud. Egypt has been

alienated from the West and given a ruler who might be described as the first native ruler in its modern history—certainly the first *fellah* to seize power there. Communist penetration of the Fertile Crescent, especially of Syria, has been facilitated; a dangerous Southern Tier—Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Yemen—has come into being under Cairo's direction. Not only has the old historical rivalry of Nile and Euphrates been revived, but the defence of the Arab lands has been entrusted not only to foreigners but to countries that are non-Arab and that follow heterodox forms of Islam. To the fear of Israel that unites the Southern Tier there has been added dislike of Hashemite and, as it seems to them, sycophantic Iraq. Among the Bagdad Powers there is no solidarity of race or religion or culture, as there is among the Arab League states. France has been scornful of the Pact. The United States refused to join it, despite Nuri's recent urging—partly because she is unwilling to appear anti-Zionist, partly because of her involvement with Saudi Arabia, partly because with an observer in its councils she does not need a multilateral tie of this sort. In a sense it is easier for her, here as elsewhere, "to go it alone," especially if her primary purpose is military containment.

The British interest in the Northern Tier and in the defence of the Middle East is as real as the American—more real apparently than that of the Arabs themselves. Apart from strategy and oil she has ties inherited from an imperial past—in Cyprus and Aden and the ex-Indian "protection" of the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and the Hadramaut; she has a special relationship with Libya and—perilously—with Jordan, and a happy role still in Iraq. As a Government—here to be distinguished from the personal or company interests of Frenchmen or Americans—she has claims on the Suez Canal Company, and a Government share in Iran and Iraq and Shell Oil. For generations her nationals have lived in and traded with the Arab countries, especially in Egypt. In 1950 British trade with Egypt alone amounted to £60 million sterling and in favourable years a figure as high as £150 million might be reached for the Middle East as a whole. To protect these interests, and the traffic through the Canal itself—most of it British—a number of strategic sites were gradually acquired. Some of them have gone and the maintenance of all of them has been handicapped by recent developments. The great imperial strategic reserve of 1939 has disappeared, Cyprus faces local unrest, the airfields of Mafraq and Amman are in question. But the reserve would be a source of trouble not of gain if ever the area were involved in global war.

At Acrotiri and Jiwani, Bahrein, Sharjah and Asmira Island, at Habbaniyah and Shaibah, Kormahksah and Khartoum—to cite military fields alone—Britain still has access to valuable air bases, most of them reasonably secure. They give impressive reinforcement to the American bases at Tripoli and at Dhahran, and to the yet embryo strength of the Northern Tier.

Not that the defence of the Middle East can be thought of in such purely military terms. As an area of tension between two great imperialisms its first line of defence is its social condition and its political stability. As lavish a programme of military aid as the "Eisenhower Doctrine" was received with favour only in the Northern Tier; elsewhere its references to the "power vacuum" of the Middle East were treated as disparaging; like all nationalist movements the Arabs seek to be dependent on no one. There are, of course, acute and apparently insoluble political problems—Israel and its role, refugees, and the dislike of the Hashemites. These, however, have been perennial in the Middle East, and they will not of themselves bring in Russia. Nor will the Northern Tier, S.A.C. bases, or Canberra bombers keep Russia out. Khalid Bikdash is more significant than Sirraj in Syria, the Moslem Brotherhood more dangerous than Nasser in Egypt. For this is an area that has lost faith in Islam and has never had faith in democracy; that has no tradition of a responsible native governing class, and that is so poor that Nasser could treat threats of boycott with scorn: his people, he said, were so poor already that it would hardly affect them. Perhaps a Britain that is now conspicuously unsuccessful as an imperial Power might be better equipped than the United States to seek to understand the new classes of the Arab world, the students, the middle class army leaders, the *fellahin* at last breaking through the restraints imposed by Islam and feudalism. The war to be won in the Arab world is the war against trachoma and billharzia, against ignorance and want, against over-population. These things are communism's strongest weapons, especially as handled by unscrupulous demagogues. As Mr. Jo Grimond put it on January 26,

"What we want is not an Eisenhower Doctrine of defence but a liberal doctrine of offence against the poverty, chaos, and suspicion in which communism grows so readily."

OIL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

MARTIN PATRICK

No consideration of relations between the Middle East and the rest of the world can be realistic or complete unless it takes oil into account. Europe's further industrial development and its standard of living must depend for the next few decades on the supply of oil from the Middle East. Equally the economic development of the Middle East—and political and social progress prospers on a solid economic basis—must depend on the successful harvesting and marketing of its one big cash crop, crude oil. Can this common interest be the basis of a fruitful partnership? Can it be a bond of friendship which extends from oil into the cultural and political fields? Or must it become in Middle East eyes an outworn relic of "colonialism," a bond of servitude harnessing the natural oil resources of the Middle East to the service of the West?

Interest in Middle East oil dates from the beginning of this century but it was not till the Ottoman Empire lay in ruins after the first world war that oil considerations first began to assume significance. In the re-shaping of the Middle East after the first war oil was still of secondary importance in comparison with the strategic, political, and even sentimental (*e.g.*, Palestine) considerations involved. By the thirties, however, Middle East oil production had grown substantially and by the late thirties western Europe was already drawing about one-fifth of its oil supplies from the Middle East. After the second world war west European oil requirements grew very fast and, moreover, the Middle East's percentage contribution to these requirements increased sharply.

Not only had total fuel consumption gone up in western Europe, but the proportion of total energy requirements provided by oil rose from 8 per cent. in 1938 to 18 per cent. in 1955.¹ The OEEC Commission for Energy² has estimated that this proportion may rise to 24 per cent. in 1960 and to 36 per cent. in 1975. In terms of total oil imports to the OEEC countries this means an increase from 117 million tons (coal equivalent) in 1955 to an estimated maximum of 175 million tons in 1960 and 415 million tons in 1975.

By 1955 the Middle East contribution to western Europe's oil

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¹ OEEC member countries.

² "Europe's Growing Needs of Energy. How can they be met?" May 1956.

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imports had risen to 80 per cent. from 19 per cent. in 1938 and 69 per cent. in 1951. Middle East oil does not only flow to western Europe; of the Middle East's total exports in 1955 only 63 per cent. went to Europe. The importance of Middle East oil supplies to other parts of the world can be seen from the following table:

Table I
Destination of Middle East oil exports (1955)

	Million tons
Western Europe	92
Asia (Far East)	36
North America	14
Latin America	4
Total exports	146

More important, however, than actual production is the fact that about two-thirds of the world's proved reserves of oil are estimated to lie in the Middle East. Thus, although the Middle East's current rate of production (1955) is about 160 million tons (21 per cent. of world production), its future potential dominates the global energy outlook for the rest of this century.

So far this article has talked in terms of "the Middle East." This implies that the Middle East is a homogeneous area and that, at least in the context of oil, it can be considered as a whole. This implication of homogeneity in the Middle East is generally invalid and misleading and not less so as regards oil, as will be seen from the following table, which summarises the distribution of oil resources (actual and potential) amongst the Middle East countries:

Table II
Middle East oil resources

	Production (millions of tons per annum)	Proved reserves (millions of metric tons at end of 1956)
Bahrain	1.5	30
Egypt	1.8	25
Iran	16	4,000
Iraq	33.2	3,000
Kuwait	54	7,000
Kuwait Neutral Zone	1.4	100
Qatar	5.3	200
Saudi Arabia	46.8	5,400
	160.0	19,755

It will be seen from this table that both currently and in terms of potential the distribution of oil reserves is uneven; the scene is dominated by the four giants, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. It must be remembered, however, that exploration of the Middle East for oil has not yet been either intensive or complete and there may well be important reserves which are still undiscovered and therefore not included in the statistics. Looking at the above table, perhaps it is most significant to note the countries whose names are not shown; these include Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; Egypt too, though included in the table, can for all practical purposes qualify as a "have-not" as far as oil is concerned. Although this article is not primarily concerned with purely political problems, it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that this uneven distribution of natural oil resources amongst the Middle East countries creates a fundamental cleavage between "haves" and "have-nots." It is also not without significance that (except for the aberration in Iran in the early years of this decade) the relations between the "haves" and the West have been and are more friendly and stable than is the case with the "have-nots." The dramatic interruption of oil supplies stems not from difficulties with the countries where the oil is produced, but with some of those "have-nots" that geography has placed athwart the tanker routes and trunk pipelines, notably Egypt and Syria. The effects in the consumer countries of the interruption of oil supplies do not need to be emphasised or elaborated; but it must not be forgotten that the interruption in production and consequently in oil revenues has equally detrimental effects in the producer countries. Both through the delaying of long-term economic and social development plans and in terms of current financial difficulties the producer countries are as much victims of the interruption and dislocation in the flow of Middle East oil as are the consumers.

Again, however, it is not possible to generalise, and the effect of the crisis on the different oil producing countries will vary, depending on the use to which they have been putting their oil revenues. The magnitude of the sums involved can be appreciated by looking at the figures shown in Table III on p. 171.

The dangers of generalising about the Middle East are nowhere more apparent than when one considers the use to which oil revenues are being put. Iraq and Kuwait are notable examples of what can and should be done. Recognising the need for capital investment on a scale much larger than would normally be available

Table III
Approximate annual oil revenues

	1954 £ millions	1955 £ millions
Bahrain	4	3
Iran	—	32
Iraq	68	73.8
Kuwait	70	100
Qatar	8	12
Saudi Arabia	56	100

to develop the country quickly, the Iraq Government decided in 1950 to set up a Development Board and to place at the disposal of this Board 70 per cent. of the oil revenues. The Board includes one British and one American national, but is predominantly Iraqi. Inevitably, in its early stages there was little to show for its activities beyond plans and blueprints, but already now finished projects are coming off the production line by way of major irrigation schemes, flood control measures, road and bridge development, together with hospitals, schools, housing, and industrial undertakings. Thus the oil wealth which has lain undeveloped in the earth for centuries is now being used to build up healthy agriculture and industry, together with the necessary sub-structure of communications, utilities, and social services. If progress can continue in accordance with the promise of the first six or seven years of the Board's activities, Iraq, with its large and undeveloped resources of land and water, will become an important agricultural state equipped with supporting industries; on the basis of a prosperous economy, social and political progress can be made with less likelihood of major upheavals and travail.

Kuwait's position is different. A small Sheikhdum consisting mainly of arid desert and without water supply, this territory at the top of the Persian Gulf now possesses, it is estimated, the highest *per capita* income in the world. Oil revenues are allocated roughly in the proportion of one-third to the running of the state and to the ruler's family, one-third to current development, and one-third is put into reserve in an investment fund against a rainy day (if this metaphor may be permitted in referring to a desert!). Current development expenditure could not usefully absorb as high a proportion of Kuwait's oil revenue as in Iraq. The emphasis in expenditure in Kuwait has been on public utilities and social services, with quite remarkable achievements in each direction. Free nursery and primary schools, and technical and secondary

schools have been set up. New and elaborately equipped hospitals and modern housing estates have been built. Within the limited requirements of this small Sheikdom, modern roads have been provided. The picturesque but also squalid and insanitary Kuwait belongs to the past. Now it is a modern welfare state under the benevolent dictatorship of a ruler who deserves great credit for having been able to use so constructively the unexpected wealth which the discovery of oil brought.

Although her large-scale oil industry is older than that of Iraq and Kuwait, Persia is somewhat behind the other two as regards the utilisation of oil revenues for development purposes. In earlier years there were various proposals and plans for a co-ordinated economic development scheme, but disappointingly little came of them. Since 1954, however, after the reactivation of the oil industry, a fresh start has been made, and a seven-year plan for spending some \$700 million of oil revenue has been announced. It is somewhat early to expect major results from this plan, but progress to date is encouraging. It is envisaged that the bulk of the expenditure will be on agricultural development and upon much-needed improvements in communications.

It is in Saudi Arabia that the situation is least encouraging. Inevitably in a feudal country where the ideas normally associated with the existence of a social conscience have no currency, money is spent in ways which would be unacceptable in a modern parliamentary democracy. Some useful things have been done, but there is no systematic plan of development, simply an odd hospital or school here and there, some assistance to agriculture and irrigation in favourable areas, and a certain amount of expenditure on roads and railways. Much, however, of the money has been spent in ostentatious ways on palaces, the much-publicised Cadillacs, and the like, and it is notorious that a great deal has also been spent in providing financial support for Saudi Arabian foreign policy. Although this picture is not a very happy one as regards the past, it is to be hoped that the permeation of modern ideas, together with the example of neighbouring countries, will gradually lead towards a better organised and constructive utilisation of the oil revenues in Saudi Arabia too.

In addition to the oil revenues resulting from the direct payments to the governments concerned, the activities of the oil industry in the Middle East, both by way of fresh capital investment and by way of current operations, make a very large contribution to the national economies of the countries concerned. Indeed, the scale of

their activities means that the oil companies, by reason of the importance of their economic and social impact on the countries in which they operate, cannot fit unobtrusively into the normal pattern as would other commercial undertakings. Because of this special position in which they find themselves, the relationships of the oil companies with the governments and people of the countries in which they operate have had to be of a special type, and the development of these relationships is well worth some consideration. Indeed, it may not be too much to say that it is on the existence of sound and stable relationships of this kind that the future development of the oil industry in the Middle East will depend.

Historically, relations between the oil companies and the governments developed on the basis of concessions which provided that the oil company would pay to the government a royalty of a fixed amount per ton in respect of every ton of oil produced. During this period also oil company operations tended to be self-contained and divorced from other local activities. Working as they did in undeveloped countries and very often of necessity in remote and sparsely inhabited areas, the oil companies were compelled to develop their own methods of communication, their own services (including medical services and public utilities), amenities, housing, and so on. It was during this period that by force of circumstances "oil towns" came into being, and something in the nature of a cantonment mentality developed in the local relations between oil company employees and the rest of the population. Today, however, this idea of the oil company as "a state within a state" is obsolete. Where the oil revenues have been used to develop the producing countries, the oil company operations have tended to merge into the economy. The oil companies were only self-contained because they needed to be, and where local governmental or commercial enterprises can provide services or supplies, the oil companies are generally quick to make use of them.

The most important change in relationships between governments and companies dates from the beginning of this decade. After the war it was clear that the old system of concessions with fixed royalties was out-dated. Most of the Middle Eastern countries were aware of a change in their political status; their sovereignty was now real, where in many cases it had been somewhat theoretical. There was an understandable tendency—encouraged by nationalist and chauvinistic sentiment—to view with suspicion any arrangements entered into under the "old régime." Inevitably the oil concessions came under critical scrutiny, and this happened

just at a time when there was an increasing recognition of the vital importance to the West of a continued supply of Middle East oil.

It was against this background that a new concept was introduced to replace the old concession idea. This new concept was equal profit-sharing. First introduced in Saudi Arabia by the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) it has been adopted in principle in all the other main oil-producing countries. In essentials, the profit-sharing idea is a simple one: the profit is calculated by deducting from the value of the oil (at the point of export from the producing country) the cost of producing it and getting it to the point of export; half of the profit thus calculated is paid by the oil company to the Government. In practice, as was to be expected, experience has shown that the detailed application of this profit-sharing principle is not so simple. It is not surprising that there have been many arguments of detail and some of principle in defining and calculating the precise profit to be shared equally. What is the value of the oil at the point of export? What is the cost of production and transportation, and what items can be included in this cost? These are two examples of the difficult questions which can and do arise in the application of the profit-sharing principle.

Although the essentials of equal profit-sharing can be easily and simply summarised, it is necessary to look beyond its mechanics to the underlying principles; these are rooted in the idea of a partnership between the country owning the natural resources and the industrial undertaking which is fructifying them. It is in this kind of partnership that one can look for a hopeful answer to the questions with which this article began. To arrive at some appraisal of the viability of this partnership it is necessary to examine the common interests on which any lasting partnership must rest, and the main contributions which each party can expect from the other for their mutual benefit.

The obvious contribution that each producing country makes to the partnership is the oil itself; but this oil is deep underground where it has been for centuries, a potential source of wealth that does not become actual until it is developed. A less obvious but essential contribution which the oil company can reasonably expect is a state of affairs which permits the oil company to operate. This "state of affairs" is difficult to define or describe. It includes maintenance of public order and freedom of movement of persons, equipment, and stores; communications, legislation, and many other things besides which can be summed up in a word—co-operation.

As has already been suggested, the oil companies neither can nor should operate in an independent, self-contained manner; on the other hand, they can only fit into the general economy of the country if their presence is accepted by the people and government.

Next let us consider the contributions which the oil companies can make to the partnership. The one that comes to mind first is that of technical knowledge and general "know-how." The scale and complexity of modern oil operations is well known to be such as to make it evident that operations of this type can only be conducted effectively if guided by persons of scientific and administrative skill and experience. It may be argued that this is only a temporary contribution and that with the development of scientific education and the increasing technical training of Middle Easterners (a great part of the more advanced studies in this respect are, incidentally, financed directly by oil companies or out of oil revenues), they will themselves be able to provide all the skill and experience required. Although this argument is valid to the extent that an increasing number of Middle Eastern nationals are now participating in the actual conduct of the oil industry in the Middle East, it is by no means true to carry the argument to the point of saying that the Middle East will soon be in a position where it has nothing to learn from the rest of the world in the matter of oil technique. The technology of the oil industry is no more static than that of other modern industries; what seemed impossible yesterday is taken for granted today. These techniques cover a very wide field from the first phase of exploration to drilling of wells and production of oil, the construction and operation of vast pipeline systems, the various refining processes and the distribution of the many products. Discovery, production, transportation, processing—each of them involves a great many technical and administrative problems, and there is constant and rapid improvement in the way in which these are being tackled. The international oil companies operating in the Middle East, through their world-wide ramifications and the technical knowledge and experience they command, can continue the flow of information and knowledge, which the Middle East oil industry must have if it is not to lag behind the rest of the world in technical development.

The second major contribution that the oil companies make to the partnership is capital investment. It is not always fully appreciated that the scale of capital investment required to undertake large-scale oil operations fully justifies the Hollywood epithet of colossal. It is estimated that in 1956 total new investment

exceeded £3,000 million of which about two-thirds was in the United States. A high proportion of this gigantic total is in production facilities although refining and marketing facilities also call for increasing capital investment. Millions have to be spent to find oil in the first place, and if it is found in quantities justifying further development, this will require many more millions. A modern Middle Eastern oilfield, with all its plant, mechanical equipment, power requirements, and so on, not to speak of pipelines if the oilfield is remote from the sea, costs tens of millions of pounds in capital investment before a drop of oil can be produced. Reference has already been made to the fact that Middle Eastern countries are themselves short of capital for other development purposes, and it has been shown that they look to the oil revenues to finance their urgent needs. It follows, therefore, that without the foreign capital provided by the oil companies these great reserves of oil now being rapidly developed would, in the main, have to remain—for lack of indigenous capital—with their beneficial potentialities undeveloped.

A third major contribution—and one the importance of which was demonstrated during the Iranian crisis—is that of marketing arrangements. It has been argued that oil being such a desirable, indeed essential, commodity, there can be no great difficulty about marketing it. This superficially plausible argument overlooks the fact that crude oil in the Middle East is the wrong stuff in the wrong place. The crude oil has to be processed so that it can be converted into the marketable fuel and industrial products required. These processes inevitably involve more skill, “know-how” (both technical and commercial) and capital investment. But, even when the crude oil is refined it still needs to be in the right place, the place where the products are needed, if it is to be marketed. At a time when there is so much awareness of Russian interest in the Middle East it is worth emphasising that the one thing Russia cannot offer the Middle East is a market for its oil since the growing oil production of Russia and some of its satellites is expected to continue to meet their own requirements. Therefore, the Middle East must willy-nilly look to Western Europe and the rest of the non-Russian world for its markets.

This examination of the recent developments in the relationship between governments and companies in the preceding paragraphs shows the direction in which progress was being made at this commercial level. Precisely because it was not startling or dramatic, this growing partnership offered hope for the future.

The events at the end of 1956 inevitably focused attention on the Middle East generally and on the problem of oil supplies. The limelight tends to call forth heroic measures and stimulates a great deal of well-meaning but often ill-informed speculation and conjecture. Because the crisis was a crisis at the government level and was caused by a breakdown in government-to-government relations, there is a superficial logic in arguing that its resolution should be at a government level and that the continued supply of oil from the Middle East should be based on government-to-government agreements and arrangements. A variation on this theme is to advocate “an international approach” to the problem, but still at a government or United Nations level.

These contentions, if examined critically, are shown to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding. In simplified form, the argument runs: a breakdown in government relations stops the flow of oil; therefore the flow of oil can only be restored by inter-governmental arrangements. The fallacy in this argument is that it fails to distinguish between a cause and a consequence. The flow of oil stopped as a consequence of the breakdown in government relations. It does not necessarily follow that direct governmental intervention is required to restore the flow. It is true that the development of the partnership between the oil companies and the governments of the producing countries described above is dependent on the political climate. In a period of active hostility between the West and the Middle East it is clearly not to be expected that a partnership between oil companies, which are identified with the West, and Middle Eastern governments should flourish.

But, leaving aside these objections, the many suggestions now current that the future of the Middle Eastern oil industry should be dealt with inter-governmentally—preferably channelled through the United Nations—are attractive, at first glance. Experience, however, has shown too often in the past that direct inter-governmental dealings in the execution of economic programmes or the conduct of industrial undertakings have not worked well. The experience of UNRRA after the war and the difficulties encountered by U.N. Agencies in the Middle East now, provide sufficient examples of the problems and frictions which are unavoidable in such relationships. Some governments will have to insist on controls which seem reasonable enough in their eyes as the minimum safeguards for their taxpayers, but which will be strongly resented as unwarrantable infringements of sovereignty by others; oil affairs would become involved in every little dispute or disagreement

between the governments concerned; indeed, it is usually suggested that the taking over of responsibility for the oil industry by the governments should be part of a general strategic and economic arrangement, thus making sure that the oil industry's fortunes will be at the mercy of every diplomatic squall. At a time when the governments involved would have to be those of the West—so suspect in Middle Eastern eyes—on the one hand, and those of the Middle East—so prickly in their consciousness of their sovereignty—on the other, it would be unreasonable to expect a workable, much less happy, relationship in these circumstances.

The best hope would seem to lie in doing everything possible at the inter-governmental level to restore the political climate and thus to provide an atmosphere of stability and security in which the companies and the governments can develop their partnership at the practical and undramatic, but less sensitive and less vulnerable, commercial level.

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

THE HON. EDWIN SAMUEL, C.M.G.

LET us first of all decide about whom we are speaking before we analyse the present political crisis in the Middle East. We should, perhaps, speak of the Arabic-speaking peoples rather than of the Arab states. For Egypt—which plays a great part in the Arab League—claims not to be Arab by race, although it is certainly Arabic-speaking.

There are several other Arabic-speaking countries that are too far removed from Israel to play much part in the conflict. Sudan is one; Libya is another (neither of these have strictly "Arab" populations); Yemen is the third. The countries we shall consider are thus Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon (whose territories are physically contiguous to Israel); and Iraq and Saudi Arabia whose territories are not contiguous but are sufficiently near for their troops to move on to Israel's frontiers through Jordan.

Most of these countries contain large areas of desert; and a measurement of their size gives no indication of their strength. Jordan, for example, covers 35,000 square miles—which is more than twice the area of Austria; but only 5 per cent. of the land in Jordan is cultivable. There is the same proportion of cultivable land in Iraq; in Egypt the proportion is only 2 per cent. Syria has 15 per cent.; Israel 19 per cent., and even the most fertile—Lebanon—has only 20 per cent.¹

The populations of these countries is a better guide to their real strength than their areas. The figures for 1951 (and there has been little change since, save in Israel) are as follows:

	(Thousands)
Egypt	20,700
Saudi Arabia	about 6,000
Iraq	about 5,000
Syria	3,300
Israel	1,500 (1957: 1,900,000)
Jordan	1,400
Lebanon	1,300

But, in the Middle East, nationality is a relatively new concept; race and religion provide much closer bonds of union. Although

* The author was a member of the Palestine Civil Service 1920–1948.

¹ These figures—and all others except where stated—are taken from *The Middle East*, by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2nd ed., 1954.

both Arabs and Jews are Semites, the rising tide of Arab nationalism excludes Jews (except perhaps in Tunisia, which is outside the Middle East). Even though most of the Arabic-speaking peoples are Moslem, there are many Christian Arabs of different sects (for example, in Lebanon); while even the Moslem Arabs are divided between Sunni and Shiah, which forms a basis for separation in politics (for example, in Iraq). The figures by religious communities are as follows:

Egypt: Of a total of 20,700,000, 1,400,000 are Coptic Christians and 300,000 belong to other Christian communities. Few Jews remain.

Saudi Arabia: Practically all are Sunni Moslems, largely of the puritanical Wahhabi sect. There are a few Christian Arabs from other countries, but no Jews at all.

Iraq: Of 5,000,000 inhabitants, only 150,000 are Christian. Nearly all the Jews have gone to Israel. Of the 4,850,000 Moslems, nearly half are Shiah.

Syria: Of 3,300,000 inhabitants, 500,000 are Christian. Of the 2,800,000 Moslems, 2,300,000 are Sunni and 500,000 are Shiah. Most Jews have gone to Israel.

Israel: Of 1,900,000 inhabitants, 1,700,000 are Jewish. Of the 200,000 non-Jews, 140,000 are Sunni Moslem Arabs, 40,000 are Christian Arabs, and 20,000 are Druze.

Jordan: Of 1,400,000 inhabitants, 100,000 are Christians and the rest are nearly all Sunni Moslems. There are no Jews.

Lebanon: This is the most complex of all the Middle East states, although the smallest. Of its 1,300,000 inhabitants, 700,000—or just over half—are Christian, and just under half are Moslem or Druze. (Nearly all the Jews have gone to Israel.) But the 600,000 Christians are divided between Maronites (370,000), “Greek” Orthodox (130,000), and the remaining 100,000 between seven other Christian sects. Of the 600,000 non-Christians, 270,000 are Sunni Moslems, 240,000 are Shiah Moslems, and 80,000 are Druze.

Hence, the Middle Eastern countries which have the most influential Christian communities are the Lebanon, Egypt, and (through the added influence of the Holy Places) Israel.

As regards the Shiah Moslems, Iraq is nearly half Shiah and Lebanon one-fifth. As regards Jews in the Middle East, those in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and the Lebanon—about a quarter of a million in all—have largely gone to Israel. There never were any Jews in Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

But even the racial and religious composition of the Middle East countries is inadequate to portray the relative strength of each without taking into account their economic, cultural, and constitutional levels. The basic economic division of inhabitants in the Middle East is not only between urban and rural; the rural population in several Arab countries is further sub-divided into settled Arabs and nomad Arabs. There are large cities—with all that this denotes in the development of a middle class—in Egypt (Cairo 2,100,000; Alexandria 900,000), Israel (Tel Aviv 300,000), and Lebanon (Beirut 300,000). Even in some countries with large nomadic populations there are large cities—for example, in Syria (Aleppo 340,000 and Damascus 300,000) and Iraq (Bagdad 360,000 and Mosul 320,000). But there are no cities even approaching a quarter of a million inhabitants in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which have the largest proportion of nomads.

A better picture of the relative economic levels of the countries we are considering can be obtained from the following figures (published by the U.N. in 1950) of the national income per head in 1949 in U.S. dollars:

Israel	389
Lebanon	125
Egypt	100
Syria	100
Iraq	85
Saudi Arabia	40

(No figures are given for Jordan.)

It is a sobering thought, however, that even the figure of national income per head in Israel is only half that in Britain and a quarter of that in the United States.

It is far harder to get comparative figures of cultural levels. One measure is literacy; but it is difficult to define; and those communities that are least literate are also least able and least interested to disclose the fact. Literacy is known to be high in Israel and Lebanon; it is known to be lower in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, and lower still in Saudi Arabia. Big strides in reducing illiteracy are being made in several of these countries; but even in Egypt the U.N. figure for 1952 showed that only 30 per cent. were literate. This cultural level must be taken into account when considering the military value of each Middle East army. No matter how many modern planes, guns, tanks, and warships are acquired, their influence is largely nullified if there are not enough officers,

N.C.O.s, and men with an education adequate to operate them and maintain them.

The cultural level also determines in large part the constitutional level of each of these seven Middle Eastern countries and even their internal stability. The fact that three are monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan) and four are technically republics (Egypt, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon) is not in itself the primary distinction. The real distinction is between those states that are democratic in actual fact and those that are not. The most democratic are undoubtedly Israel and Lebanon, with the minimum of *coups d'état*. Iraq has a Parliament but it is governed largely by the will of one strong man Nuri Said Pasha. Jordan and Syria both have Parliaments; but army commanders—especially in Syria—really dominate the scene. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have no representative government at all and are governed in one case by a military dictator (Col. Abdul Nasser) and in the other by an autocratic king (King Saud). Saudi Arabia is so undemocratic that slavery is still legal there.

We thus find a very complex situation in the Middle East—a series of superimposed linguistic, national, and religious allegiances, among a group of peoples at various economic, cultural, and constitutional levels. The position is further complicated by the varying political alignments of the several countries. First, there is the dynastic tie between Iraq and Jordan whose young kings are both great-grandsons of the Sherif Hussein of Mecca and hence second cousins. Both kings are united in an undying hatred and fear of the increasingly wealthy Saudi Arabia whose present ruler is the son of the late King Ibn Saud who took Mecca by force of arms, in 1925, from their great-grandfather.

Secondly, in so far as foreign influence is concerned, Iraq is a member of the Bagdad Pact (and linked thereby to Turkey, Persia, and Pakistan on one side, and to Great Britain on the other). Jordan, at the time of writing, is still linked by a mutual defence treaty with Great Britain but is coming more and more under Egyptian influence. Egypt has denounced the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 and claims to be neutralist but is becoming more and more dependent on Russia. Egypt is bitterly hostile to Iraq, in part as an ally of Britain but also as part of the millennial struggle between the Empires of the Nile and the Euphrates for domination of the Middle East. Syria is bitterly anti-French and anti-British. Many of the army leaders who dominate the country are pro-Russian. Syria has recently allied itself with Egypt, as also has Saudi Arabia, although Saudi Arabia is in part under United States

influence through the oil royalties it receives. Half-Christian Lebanon, still linked culturally with France, is afraid of Syria, its larger and fanatically Moslem neighbour. Israel has tried to maintain its neutrality between the American, British, and French *bloc* on one side and the Russian *bloc* on the other; but its sentiments and interests are both much more closely linked with the West. Lastly, there is the almost pathological hatred and fear of Israel by the Arabic-speaking countries. This hatred and fear is due largely to the following causes:

- (a) Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism that regard Jews, both by race and by religion, as alien colonisers, in spite of Jewish historical connections with Palestine.
- (b) Embitterment caused by the 750,000 Arab refugees.
- (c) Recognition of Israel's higher standards of education, its greater power of organisation, its internal cohesion, patriotism, and energy. (Hence the effort to keep Israelis out of the Middle East markets.)
- (d) Jealousy of Israel's comparatively greater wealth and its financial backing by Jews abroad and by foreign loans and Government grants (in spite of the comparable oil royalties received by the Arab world).
- (e) Conviction that Israel's policy of mass immigration must inevitably lead to an expansionist urge.

This hatred and fear are expressed in three main directions:

- (a) The blockade of Israel, involving the closure of all frontiers; no trade with Israel and the attempt to black-list all ships and even companies in other countries trading with Israel; the closure of the Suez Canal and (until its clearance in November 1956) of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel shipping;
- (b) Frontier clashes and penetration of Israel by infiltrators; and
- (c) Refusal to recognise the existence of Israel; to participate in international gatherings (other than the U.N.) attended by Israel delegates; and to sign peace treaties with Israel following the 1949 armistices unless the "peace terms" of the Arab states are unconditionally accepted. The "peace terms" of the Arab states virtually involve the liquidation of Israel as a viable state (which is, of course, their intention). They include: (i) the cession of Western Galilee, the Western Negev, and the Jerusalem Corridor, *i.e.*, the return to the partition plan of 1947, rejected at the time by the Arab states; (ii) the repatriation of all the 750,000 Arab

refugees to their original villages (in most cases no longer existent); and (iii) payment of compensation by Israel to the refugees.

These "terms" are wholly unrealistic from Israel's point of view, especially as Israel did not lose the war of 1948. If the Arab armies had entered Tel Aviv in 1948 in triumph, their peace terms would have had to be accepted by Israel, if indeed Israel had continued to exist. Alternatively, if Israel forces had entered Cairo, Damascus, Amman, or Beirut in triumph in 1948, peace might have been dictated on Israel's terms, e.g., the recognition of the present frontiers and the abandonment of the blockade and armed attacks. But the Arab-Israel war of 1948 was a war that nobody won and there has been a deadlock in the Middle East ever since.

The Arab blockade ever since then has undoubtedly hampered Israel; but it has failed to cripple her and, by forcing her to make every effort to find new markets, develop her armed forces and form a united front, may have done Israel more good than harm. In 1955, however, Abdul Nasser went a step further and planned the physical conquest and total destruction of Israel. For this purpose he purchased large quantities of arms from the Russian *bloc*. He also organised Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip into commando groups (*fedayeen*) to carry out deep penetration raids into Israel from bases not only in the Gaza Strip but also in Sinai, Jordan, and even Syria.

Apart from the general Arab hatred of Israel, Abdul Nasser has an additional reason of his own. As long as Israel exists, Egyptian land forces cannot be moved to other Arabic-speaking countries for mutual aid or—which is more sinister—to extend Abdul Nasser's Middle East empire and to bring him to grips with his arch-rival, Iraq. Hence, in 1956, advanced Egyptian bases for an attack on Israel were established in Sinai, equipped with large quantities of the new weapons and stores purchased from the Russian *bloc* (including such fantastic items as 2,000,000 blankets).

Following the first Suez Canal crisis in the spring of 1956, part of the Egyptian forces in Sinai were withdrawn and the *fedayeen* raids against Israel were called off. Later, the Egyptian forces returned to their old positions in Sinai and the *fedayeen* raids were restarted. When the Jordan elections showed a distinct swing towards Egypt, a military alliance was signed between Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, bringing the Jordan and Syrian armies under Egyptian command, thus encircling Israel.

Israel felt that her very existence as a free nation was imperilled

and, after establishing a world record for speedy mobilisation, invaded Sinai at the end of October last year. Instead of leaving the initiative to Egypt, the initiative passed to Israel. The Egyptian forces were caught off balance and obliged to withdraw to the Canal, losing 5,000 prisoners, much equipment, and all their stores. What were Israel's objectives in invading Sinai? They were:

- (a) To push Egypt out of her forward bases in the Gaza Strip and Sinai and thereby reduce the *fedayeen* raids and remove the risk of an early Egyptian invasion of Israel;
- (b) To cripple the Egyptian forces and explode Abdul Nasser's military reputation. (No military dictator, however, can afford to admit defeat; and the myth of Abdul Nasser's masterly strategic redeployment of forces has now been accepted throughout Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world.)
- (c) To smash the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba;
- (d) By occupying the whole Sinai peninsula, to force Egypt to allow Israel ships to pass through the Suez Canal and, if possible, to sign a peace treaty with Israel in return for Israel's subsequent withdrawal from Sinai.

Not only did Israel attack entrenched forces superior in numbers and equipment, but she also took a calculated risk that Jordan and/or Syria might come to Egypt's aid and invade Israel under the new alliance. Neither country, in fact, moved, presumably because they were afraid to. Syrian and Iraqi forces entered Jordan: the Iraqi forces have meanwhile left. To save the face of Jordan and Syria, Abdul Nasser now says that he did *not* call on them to attack Israel. Even if true (which seems most unlikely), this shows a remarkable failure by Abdul Nasser to strangle Israel by tightening the noose he had placed around her neck.

The United States Government is said to be extremely annoyed with Israel for attacking Egyptian forces during the American Presidential election week, when American sanctions against Israel might have lost Jewish votes for the Republican Party. I doubt, however, whether the date of attack was deliberately fixed with this end in view, or similarly, to take advantage of Russian pre-occupation with the Hungarian revolt. These undoubtedly were factors that were favourable to Israel: but the sudden decision to attack on October 29 was due to the encirclement of Israel following the Jordan elections and the Egyptian military alliance with Jordan and Syria.

Nor do I believe there was any "collusion" between Israel and

Great Britain. I believe that there was a prior agreement between Israel and *France*, involving

- (a) the supply of French arms to Israel;
- (b) French sympathy towards the possibility of an eventual Israeli attack on Egypt, with whom France also had accounts to settle; and
- (c) a French undertaking to veto any attempt by the U.N. Security Council to brand Israel as an aggressor and to apply sanctions.

I do not believe, however, that, prior to October 29 there was any decision by France to launch an attack on Egypt simultaneously with Israel's invasion of Sinai. I believe even less that Britain had come to any such decision or was even aware that an Israel invasion was imminent. It must not be forgotten that, in the early part of 1956, Britain had been most unpopular in Israel, ever since Sir Anthony Eden's Guildhall speech that appeared to countenance territorial cessions by Israel as the price for peace. The British "unofficial" Arabic broadcasts from Cyprus through a "privately owned" station—the Near East Arab Broadcasting Company—were considered in Israel to be pandering to Arab chauvinism. Hence, the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv was one of the persons least likely to be taken into Mr. Ben Gurion's confidence in October 1956. When partial mobilisation was declared in Israel (and it was no secret), Britain warned Israel that, if she moved against Jordan, Britain would be bound to intervene if called on by Jordan to do so.

In fact, the sudden British and French decisions to intervene with force in Egypt came as a distinct surprise to Israel. The intervention bore all the marks of hasty improvisation based on largely incorrect military and political appreciations. Britain failed to square the United States: it failed to carry with it the Commonwealth or even an appreciable section of the British public and press. Its forces moved with studied leisureliness—in contrast with Israel's lightning blow by a united people.

The result of British and French intervention, from Israel's point of view, reduced Israel's losses (by neutralising the Egyptian air force); but, by invoking heavy American, Russian, and U.N. pressure on Israel—as well as on Britain and France—to withdraw unconditionally, it lost to Israel the use of the occupation of Sinai as a means of forcing Egypt to make peace with Israel or, at least, to allow free passage of Israel ships through the Canal. Hence the situation will revert largely to what it was before the Sinai invasion.

It is too early yet to know what will be the future of the Gaza Strip and of the captured Egyptian positions on the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel can hardly afford to incorporate the 200,000 embittered Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Israel is desperately anxious to prevent Egypt from re-establishing itself in the Gaza Strip and at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Meanwhile, it is clear that Abdul Nasser is in an angry and revengeful mood. The Arabic-speaking world hates and fears Israel now more than ever. In spite of the good intentions of many would-be mediators, peace in the Middle East cannot be *forced* on the Arab world or on Israel. The necessary sanctions are either not available or unlikely to be used. The new Eisenhower Middle East policy makes it clear that the Arab states are to be wooed away from the Russian embraces by subsidies (tactfully called economic aid) and armaments.

This is an ideal situation for several of the Arab governments, which will try to play off Russia against America. In Israel, this situation is viewed with the gravest misgivings. It is becoming increasingly realised in Israel that Israel may have to go it alone, and that a further armed clash with the Arab world, and even with Russia, is a distinct possibility. Russia could bomb Israel's cities to ashes in a few hours. That is a risk that Israel and the Jewish people must face—not for the first time in their long and chequered history.

BOOK REVIEWS

DEVELOPMENT FOR FREE ASIA. By MAURICE ZINKIN. [*Chatto and Windus*. 263 pp. 21s.]

OUT OF THE GUN. By DENIS WARNER. [*Hutchinson*. 239 pp. 18s.]

THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE. By CHESTER BOWLES. [*John Lane*. 408 pp. 25s.]

WHAT ideas are to direct the destinies of Asia and Africa and two-thirds of the human race? The battle for its mind is the most momentous that confronts our generation. Predominantly it is the mind of the peasant; of man in direct contact with the soil; organised in small communities, gaining from it a meagre and precarious subsistence. And the lessons which the West propounds to him are marked by glaring inconsistencies. Progress achieved by reason and good will, on the basis of freedom and equality, and the respect for human life and personality; the immense possibilities of increasing wealth and welfare by the application of science, organisation, and capital in the form of accumulated plant, public works, communications, and machinery; these stand beside the barriers of power and the experience that force alone breaks them down, that since violence, whether in insurrection or war, is the sole road to emancipation and the welfare enjoyed by the free, the only restraint on its use should be the practical question: will it succeed?—that, as Mao Tse-tung has said, "Power grows out of the barrel of the gun."

That the battle for Asia and Africa is one primarily of ideas is the clear verdict of each of these very different books here under review. It is essential from the start to realise that the people of these continents are far less aware than those of the West of what communism has meant in terms of the suppression of liberty and life. For what they see in it above all is the obliteration of ruling classes, the successful planning of industrial development on a vast scale which they regard this as having made possible, and the conversion of a weak and poverty-stricken agricultural society into a wealthy and powerful industrial one. Far less conscious than the West of the cost in loss of liberties, many of which they have never significantly enjoyed, they see achievements of the very kind they most require in order to be able to hold up their heads among the advanced nations with high standards of living and an economic potential giving political prominence in world councils. Moreover, they naturally welcome this challenge and this glimpse of the possibility of liberation. Small wonder if they are much more conscious of the West's suppression on grounds of colour than of communist suppression for opinions, or if they value racial emancipation more than the rule of law. The Russian leaders have ably managed to identify themselves with anti-colonialism. They have followed a fairly consistent line of opposition to imperialism.

The moral of these books is clear and unanswerable. It is to remain true to the principles which have made our modern civilised societies, of freedom and equality and co-operative effort for the sake of human welfare. The export of these very principles to Asia and Africa is what has created the revolutionary situation confronting us. Mr. Zinkin speaks of the "recent discoveries which now make a rapid advance for Asia possible for the first

time." At such a moment it would be fatal to our belief in those principles to betray them on grounds of race or colour or in a selfish desire to cling to self-advantaging inequalities. Mr. Bowles draws the contrast between India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, where the reward for policies based on faith in them has been comparative peace, progress, and the absence of a serious communist threat, and the different story of Indo-China and Indonesia. His book is a plea for much more assistance to those countries that are willing to help themselves and a greater humility in giving it. His view resembles that of Mr. Zinkin, that to aid the development of Asia is a moral duty and an interest; for there is no safety for freedom where two-thirds of the world live in poverty, and, where development is the urgent and now conscious and articulate need, the only alternative to voluntary investment is the communist method of enforced investment. To support community projects and the dedicated spirit in which often these are being undertaken, to realise the peculiar need in backward societies for the state to innovate, to promote the western values of individual merit as opposed to social status—in such policy lies the great, perhaps the only, opportunity of winning the war for Asia which Lenin saw as the key to the world's future. Important, too, that it constitutes the positive policy with which Mr. Bowles wants to replace the negative one of "containing" communism and would enable America at last "to break loose from the hypnotic grip that communism has upon us." In short it is a constructive policy, built on the conscious pursuit of creative social ideas, as opposed to a defensive attitude simply resisting a communist offensive. Conviction retains for it the initiative. While the strategy in the United States in the purely military field has on the whole been good, Mr. Bowles condemns her strategy in the field of ideas; while military communism has been contained by the drawing of clear lines at which to resist, politically militant communism has been less effectively dealt with. Being directed mainly at an American audience Mr. Bowles's book does less than justice to the immense constructive effort that has gone into British colonial policy since the war.

Mr. Zinkin provides an enlightened guide to those who would emancipate and develop underdeveloped societies. It is wise, balanced, original, and marked by great sincerity. Every politician and administrator of such communities should read it. So should those responsible for all forms of assistance from more advanced countries. He, too, lays great stress on the example of India's notable experience and noble efforts.

In Mr. Warner's book we have the vivid appreciation by an able journalist of the strategy and the tactics of communist China, a country which may contain as many human beings by the end of this century as the whole world did at the beginning of it. We emerge from a reading of it with varied impressions—of the genius of Mao Tse-tung as a political and as a military leader "with his insistence that battles should be fought only when victory is certain" and that to achieve peace "we must wage a life and death war, must be prepared to sacrifice everything, and must fight to the last until our aim is achieved." The prerequisites are industrialisation and indoctrination or "brain-washing." But here is no slavish imitation of Lenin: Mao's revolution is based on the peasant not the factory worker, and race and anti-imperialism, more than anti-capitalism, are its inspiration. "For ten years, and probably longer," writes Mr. Warner, "while the communists are

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preparing, Janus-like, to look both east and west with equal power and strength, the West has its chance to define the ultimate frontiers of containment. After that, the gun will be pointed not at a Chiang Kai-shek across the Formosa Strait, or at a Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, but at the world. During this preliminary period, through their programme of qualified risks, the Chinese communists clearly plan to sweep the approaches. They intend to take the rubber and rice and tin bowls of South-East Asia and, in 'semi-colonial' areas, to couple subversion with 'peaceful co-existence,' confident that the defences of the mind will not for ever resist when the gun manifestly has the power to obliterate all physical barriers." And of Singapore: "a distillation of the whole complex struggle between East and West is fermenting and preparing to explode. . . . Never was a situation more favourable for import of revolution."

How much depends on our capacity in the next "ten years or probably longer" to build "the defences of the mind" by re-emphasising our own values and ensuring that they are applied with as fertile an invention and as warm a concern for human welfare as we would apply at home. "There shall not be in the eye of the law any distinction or disqualification whatever founded on mere distinction of colour, origin, language or creed," said the Proclamation annexing Natal in 1843. Those are the ideas alone on which co-operative commonwealth can be built between East and West capable of containing communism. We cannot contend victoriously with one betrayal of the dignity of man, that based on his creed, by accepting another, based on his colour.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. Vol. I ON THE DIVERSITY OF MORALS; Vol. II REASON AND UNREASON IN SOCIETY. By MORRIS GINSBERG. [*Heinemann*. 329 and 328 pp. 25s. and 21s.]

GERMAN SOCIOLOGY. By RAYMOND ARON. [*Heinemann*. 141 pp. 16s.]

PROFESSOR GINSBERG is one of the most distinguished and respected of British sociologists. In these two volumes—two monuments of conscientious thought and academic learning—his contribution to the youngest of what professors call "disciplines" can be studied with admiration and perhaps awe. M. Aron is a distinguished French Professor of Sociology, well known in this country, and in his book on German sociology, admirably translated by Mary and Thomas Bottomore, he has produced one of the most lucid and illuminating works on a subject which in less competent hands would merely explain the obscure by the unintelligible or the unintelligible by the obscure. Anyone who desires really to know what this "social science" is about and what its contribution is to human knowledge must read these two books.

Let us look first at Professor Ginsberg's two volumes. They contain essays published in various journals or lectures delivered by him over a number of years. The title of the first volume is derived from the title of the seventh essay in it. The volume is divided into two parts. The eight essays contained in Part I are concerned with ethics and morals and presumably come under the heading of social philosophy rather than sociology. They deal with such subjects as the moral malaise in contemporary society, the relation of

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psycho-analysis to ethics, and the ethical theory of Durkheim. Professor Ginsberg combines learning with common sense; his method is mainly analytic and didactic. At the end of each essay the reader is left with a good deal of knowledge and usually an eminently sensible conclusion of Professor Ginsberg's. Thus of psycho-analysis he concludes that it is not necessarily committed to any ethical theory and "is compatible with very different theories of the logical character of moral judgments." Or after reviewing various examples of contemporary moral malaise, he comes to the conclusion that "the problems of the morally bewildered will not be resolved by their acceptance of an unquestioning faith, religious or other, for which there is now so much clamour. What is needed is greater moral courage and above all greater knowledge of social facts and a development of ethical theory equal to the task of evaluating and interpreting them." The second part is not really concerned with the diversity of morals, but with society and sociology. It contains ten essays which deal with such subjects as The Individual and Society, The History of Sociology, The Concept of Evolution in Sociology, and The Place of Sociology. Turning to the second volume, one finds the title a little misleading. The relation of reason and unreason to morals and politics crops up in the essays from time to time, e.g., on page 54 he explains the place which "the power of the mind" is given in Hobhouse's theories and on page 75 "the part played by reason in morals" according to Westermarck. Later on in the volume there is, too, an essay on The Function of Reason in Morals. But the first six essays are really concerned with the methods of sociology and of particular sociologists, e.g., Hobhouse and Pareto. The next four essays deal with such heterogeneous subjects as national character, German views of German mentality, the causes of war, and anti-semitism, while the last essays deal mainly with law and morals.

Professor Aron's book, first published twenty years ago, is a model of conciseness, a masterly exposition and criticism of the theories of the German sociologists, in some ways the founders of this modern science of sociology. In three chapters and about 100 pages he deals with systematic sociology, historical sociology, and Max Weber. In the first chapter on systematic sociology he expounds the theories of Simmel, von Wiese, Tönnies, Vierkandt, and Spann. In the second chapter he deals with the "historical" sociologists: Oppenheimer, Alfred Weber, Mannheim, Lukacs, and Scheler. The third chapter is devoted wholly to Max Weber, the fourth chapter deals with the specific features of German and French sociology respectively.

Any one interested in the study of history and of human society, who wishes well to sociologists and admires the work of these two eminent professors, can hardly avoid, when he has at last read the 800 pages of their books, a feeling of uneasiness or even bewilderment. One asks oneself: where is sociology going, what is it all about? And one sees no clear or certain answer to these questions; indeed it often seems as if the only thing which one can say is that sociology is about sociology. The first 130 pages of Professor Ginsberg's first volume are devoted almost entirely to discussions of what sociology is or ought to be or of the "methods" of sociologists. About a half of his second volume deals with the same kind of questions, e.g., the "place" of sociology or the relation between sociology and history. And the general impression one is left with by Professor Aron's book is that German sociologists have been very largely concerned with such questions as

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what should be the subject and object of sociology, how it is to be distinguished from other "disciplines," the most complicated and abstract theorising about "method," and finally with what appears to be the sociology of sociology. The layman who reads with care Professor Ginsberg's meticulous essay on recent tendencies in sociology or, say, Professor Aron's account of phenomenology or of "the internal dialectic of Mannheim's thought," may be excused if he feels that the sociologist is rather like a snake which has got hold of its own tail and, with conscientious but mistaken sedulity, is trying (vainly) to swallow itself.

There are three things which contribute to this unsatisfactory position. First, sociologists have not decided and are not agreed on the subject-matter of their discipline. Professor Ginsberg says that "it is concerned with all that happens to human beings in virtue of their relations to each other." Surely this is far too wide a definition; it is certainly contradicted on page 112 of his second volume in which he is dealing with Max Weber's theories and notes that "only such contacts between individuals are social which rest upon an intentional reference to others." According to Vierkandt, on the other hand, the subject of sociology is much narrower and entirely different; it is concerned with "the analysis of such relationships as those of leadership, obedience, punishment, community, struggle, power, and the like."

The second difficulty is closely connected with the first. Professor Ginsberg notes that a good deal of the criticism of sociology as a branch of learning is based on the fact that for philosophers it is not philosophical enough and for scientists not scientific enough. The trouble is that sociologists are not agreed as to whether sociology is a science or a philosophy or a hybrid of both, and how it differs from history, the philosophy of history, social philosophy, or political science. It reminds one, in more ways than one, of the academy of projectors in Laputa which, Swift tells us, "is not an entire single building, but a continuation of several houses on both sides of a street, which, growing waste, was purchased, and applied to that use. . . . Every room hath in it one or more projectors; and, I believe, I could not be in fewer than five hundred rooms."

Finally, sociology is already suffering from the disease of modern scholasticism. The danger of all academic disciplines is that they tend to become scholastic, the professors being concerned with logical niceties of method and with theoretical subtleties and unintelligibilities which have lost all connection with reality. The controversies between homoiousians and homoousians are not confined to dead theologians. If you read the *Economic Journal*, you will see that economics has become a branch of theology and if you read Professor Ginsberg's account of von Wiese's "formal sociology" and his analysis of social process in the "formula" $P = I \times E \times U \times (I \times E)$, you will see that sociology is on the same road. There may be good reason for scholastic subtleties if you have to expound the Athanasian Creed or the biology of angels, but the economist is supposed to be dealing with the wages, not of sin, but of sailors or signalmen, and the sociologist is supposed to be dealing with the day-to-day relations of ordinary men in their families, their parishes, their trade unions, or their states. It is difficult to see the relevance of the abracadabra of modern economics to anything in the modern world except the minds of economists or the relevance of nine-tenths of sociology to anything except the minds of sociologists.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW: 1857-1957. Editors R. H. GRAVESON and F. R. CRANE. [*Sweet & Maxwell*. xviii and 459 pp. 35s.]

THE members of the Law Department of King's College, London, have had the excellent idea of commemorating, one might also say celebrating, the centenary of the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, by a volume of essays in which the developments in family law since that date are described, and, to some extent, discussed. This century has, of course, witnessed a revolution, not quite but very nearly complete, in the position of married women, changes of great substance in the law relating to children, and, perhaps, the beginnings of a genuine system of family law. This process has been most complicated, involving several different important branches of the law. Some of the changes were already under weigh before 1857; most of them did not really get going till sometime later, but divorce, made a practical, if still a difficult, proposition by the Matrimonial Causes Act, was undoubtedly, from the point of view of the family, the most radical and far reaching of them all, so that it is very reasonable to date the "revolution" from its passing.

The term "family law" itself marks a milestone in the history of English law. Before the war it was hardly if ever heard, and it has only now come into use because a few of the law schools in our universities have recently decided that it is a subject worthy of recognition in their degree courses. Indeed, it may be said with truth that there is no such subject as family law, and that what is being taught under that title is merely a selection of those principles and rules from recognised branches of the law which are relevant to the affairs of a family and to the solution of the disputes which may arise between its members among themselves, and between its members and the outside world. Thus the topics dealt with in the present volume are: the legal conception of marriage, the illegitimate and deprived child, legitimation and adoption, parental control and guardianship, tort, contract, evidence, criminal law, gifts and transfers of property and the matrimonial home, family settlements and succession, women in public law, matrimonial tribunals and their procedure, matrimonial relief, the enforcement of financial provisions, the family and conflict of laws. This proliferation of subject-matter, which one suspects is partly due to the existence of a number of willing authors, has led to a good deal of overlapping and repetition, particularly on the historical side where some of the same material is reproduced several times. Rather more careful editing would have vastly improved the book.

Although several of the learned authors have valiantly attempted to make their chapters intelligible to the layman the length and technical quality of the book will make it quite unacceptable to the majority of such readers. To the practitioner, on the other hand, it is for the most part too slight in quality to be useful as a textbook, though to the more cultivated lawyer it should be welcome as an attempt to put the whole subject into perspective. The volume would appear to be primarily intended for students, and to them it may, with some reservations, be warmly recommended. I say with reservations because, as was to be expected in what appears to be the first substantial attempt to deal with the whole subject of family law in one book, there are a number of weaknesses and mistakes which will no doubt be put right in subsequent editions. There is too a very noticeable difference of quality

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between the various essays, and it is unfortunate that one of the least satisfactory is that which deals with the conception of marriage in English law, a key subject and one of real difficulty. Again in concentrating upon the effort to attain brevity and lucidity some of the contributors give scant attention to the social problem with which the law is concerned. And in the case of juvenile courts where legal and social aspects are particularly interrelated the subject is ignored altogether.

Two of the chapters, however, can be commended to the lay reader, that by Professor Graveson on the Background of the Century, and that by Mr. Stevas entitled Women in Public Law. Professor Graveson's essay is in effect a sympathetic historical appreciation of the century's progress, a progress in which the married woman has advanced from what can only be described as a servile status to one approximating to equality with her husband in respect of almost all the matters on which the law touches her closely. From being a mere appendage of her husband she has become an independent individual, that is, in the eyes of the law. But of course in an actual family, especially in a modern family, individualism constantly gives way to family unity. This is a conception which English law as reflected in the chapters of this book has great difficulty in recognising. Indeed, it is very seldom that our law pays any attention to the family as such. Here and there we have signs of a new outlook, as when one of our authors refers to the wife as "an equal partner in the firm of marriage," but of course partnership is a very definite legal conception which does not really fit the family, a unique institution which requires its own set of legal doctrines.

Much of this chapter is naturally concerned with the developments of the divorce laws towards an ideal of justice. But justice in respect of divorce has been secured at the cost of a growing toll of broken marriages; from a mere handful in the years following 1857 to the present "steady stream of 30,000 divorces a year" and, as *The Times* reviewer of this book said, at the price of destroying the homes of 20,000 children. It should, of course, be obvious even to a *Times* reviewer that the homes of these children must already have been broken in respect of all except the outward values of conventional morality before the divorce decrees were pronounced.

But *The Times* reviewer at any rate saw that elementary justice required what he chooses to regard as a sacrifice. This can hardly be said of the views of the majority of the recent Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, the report of which is summarised by Professor Graveson in the final chapter of the book. This report deals with many matters which are ancillary to divorce and is pertinent to several of the subjects dealt with in this volume. But this survey was evidently ready before it appeared, for its recommendations are not referred to elsewhere. This is a pity because Professor Graveson's uncritical handling of it hardly relates it adequately to what has gone before.

Women in Public Law is really a misdescription for the admirable essay in which Mr. Stevas describes the struggle for women's political rights. In style and sincerity of feeling it transcends all other chapters in the book, and being concerned with law only in an indirect and non-technical way it can be thoroughly commended to all those who want a short, clear, and exciting account of what must, after all, be regarded as one of the great achievements of history.

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ST. ANTONY'S PAPERS. Number One. SOVIET AFFAIRS. [*Chatto and Windus*. 147 pp. 12s. 6d.]

THIS volume is the first of what is intended as a series of three issues annually, each issue to be devoted to one aspect of the work to which St. Antony's College, Oxford, has given main emphasis since its foundation in 1950. One such subject of study in St. Antony's has been Soviet affairs, on which Mr. David Footman conducts a weekly seminar, at which papers are read both by members of the College and by visitors. These seven essays on various aspects of the U.S.S.R. have no unifying theme, and are intended to be a selection of papers, and no more.

While study of the Soviet Union as an academic discipline is subject to some limitations, there are broadly two fields to which scholars can and should legitimately devote their attention. One is history, in which a great deal remains to be done if the bulk of existing historical writing which has won premature acceptance as "standard" is to be brought into some degree of correspondence with the great mass of available source material. And secondly, there is the scholarly assessment of such evidence as exists about current political and social problems. The present collection of essays illustrates each of these fields. Two of the papers are historical, and each of them breaks new ground and throws new light on the evolution of the Soviet régime. One is by Mr. E. J. Scott, on the Cheka (the first security organ), the other by Mr. Footman on Siberian Partisans in the Civil war. Mr. Scott now shows clearly the extent to which the Cheka was bolstered by Lenin, often against the views of his supporters in the party. Mr. Footman explodes the current legend that the partisan war in Siberia was under the control of the Communist Party. He combines scholarship and style with such grace that one can only regret that he has let such a long time pass since his last publication on history. Mr. A. Nove and Colonel Wheeler, dealing with the current situation, provide excellent illustrations of the way in which the scholar can utilise knowledge of the historical and political background in order to make a balanced assessment of contemporary problems. Mr. Nove examines the functions which Soviet economists can perform within the narrow limits of the premises to which they are still forced to work: "what the state does is right, and what is right the state does." Colonel Wheeler examines the new trends in Soviet policy towards Islam. By far the longest of the papers is Mr. G. Sherman's careful analysis, based on a good deal of research into available documents, on the relations between the Russians and the Communist Party of Eastern Germany between 1945 and 1953, when the June rising occurred. Finally, there are two papers of personal reminiscences. Mr. Leonhard, himself once a high "ideological functionary" in Eastern Germany, contributes a paper on this new priesthood, which is a convenient summary for those who cannot tackle his full-scale memoirs in German. And Mr. Claudius, a German journalist who spent five years in Soviet prisons, contributes an article on his own experience and on the people he met. Neither of the last two papers could claim to be works of scholarship as are the others. But the reminiscences of those who have escaped from the communist world have so much enriched our knowledge of communism and the Soviet Union that it is only right that the sober pages of a collection such as this should be opened to material of this nature.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Academic study of the Soviet Union is still in its infancy in our universities. This first harvest from St. Antony's will be welcomed by all concerned with this field of study, both for its own sake and as earnest of things to come.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO.

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. By P. M. S. BLACKETT.
[C.U.P. 107 and vi pp. 8s. 6d.]

ATOMIC QUEST. By ARTHUR H. COMPTON. [O.U.P. 370 and xix pp. 30s.]

ROCKET. By AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR PHILIP JOUBERT DE LA FERTÉ.
[Hutchinson. 190 pp. 18s.]

QUESTIONS of conscience apart, the Great Debate of the era of atomic weapons is how to adapt defence policy to techniques and implements of war against which there is at present no direct defence at all. All three of these authors have tried to give some sort of answer, and to their credit none of them has left the question of conscience entirely apart. Professor Blackett's three lectures at Cambridge, now reprinted in close to their original form, are certainly the most important addition to the discussion. Dr. Compton, who was closely connected with the early atomic developments in the United States, makes a sincere effort to resolve the contradiction in the mind of a practising Christian who has helped to create instruments of human destruction. Sir Philip Joubert has without a doubt made the oddest contribution yet, with his startling conclusion that in the long run it doesn't really matter much, because the world will grow cold in time and space travel will make it possible for our descendants to seek another and happier world, free (one might gather) from socialists, trade unionists, and those who want to give away the British Empire.

The essence of Professor Blackett's position in the argument is summed up in one sentence near the end of the book. "I think we should act," he writes, "as if atomic and hydrogen bombs have abolished total war and concentrate our efforts on working out how few atomic bombs and their carriers are required to keep it abolished." The deterrent is not an overwhelming preponderance of bombs, but the possession of enough to ensure that all-out war will be too dangerous for the other side to want to start it. For the rest, certain minimum conventional forces are needed to deal with local wars and disputes, and though this part of the argument is familiar it may come as a shock to some people to discover that Professor Blackett puts his minimum requirements and their cost comparatively high. The "massive retaliation" of earlier American thinking, like the "instant and condign punishment" which once found its way into official British thought, is ruled out as self-destructive. Ruled out, too, are the efforts of the conservative military men who want to maintain a valueless Fighter Command and a submarine fleet, for Professor Blackett clearly has little faith in the possibility of "broken-backed" warfare once the atomic assault has been delivered. Every part of the defence machine must exist only because it has a definite role to fulfil, and broadly speaking those parts that contribute to global defence (or

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with a foreword by GUY MOLLET

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deterrence, to be more accurate) against major attack will not be the same as those whose job it is to deal with minor disturbances; the quantitative distinction between big and little wars has become a qualitative one too. If this argument is now well known, and even incorporated into official Labour Party policy in the current discussions on defence, it is partly because Professor Blackett helped to make it so.

The value of the other two books is mainly historical. Dr. Compton traces the course of atomic development from the earliest discussions to Hiroshima, and Sir Philip Joubert gives an account of the action taken to forestall the Germans from launching weapons of total destruction against Britain in the later stages of the last war. When they get away from the field in which they are experts, much of the value is lost; Dr. Compton dissolves into a well-meaning liberal humanitarianism which has little to do with practicalities, and Sir Philip Joubert allows himself to indulge in a frightening array of political prejudices which obscure the fact that his conclusions are not really very different from those of Professor Blackett.

We must, it seems, still await the answer to several longer-term questions, which even Professor Blackett does not touch on. Supposing the hope which he allows himself in his concluding sentence materialises, and agreement is reached first on controlling and then on abolishing the bombs; what then happens to our defence policy? It may be that the current distinction between atomic (or big) wars and non-atomic (or small) ones is based on a fallacy. While there is no control, and while neither side knows at all exactly the strength of the other in the new weapons, the fear that they will be used is a powerful deterrent, since each side assumes that the other will be prepared to use them first, and bases its defence policy on this assumption. But if the number and striking power of the weapons were limited by agreement, even at a high level, would the same necessarily be true? (It certainly would not be if the weapons were abolished.) Or to put it in another way: if the strength of each side were known, would the existence of the bombs be a deterrent against going to war, or only against using the bombs in a war which had already started? The importance of this distinction is obvious, for it implies that a big war with conventional weapons is possible even in an atomic age, and would not be of the "broken-backed" variety.

Secondly, it might be better not to presume too much on the capacity of ourselves or our allies to fight local wars; there is danger in that, the danger that the big Powers will feel themselves able and entitled to use their limited military strength in conventional weapons to preserve existing situations even when those situations ought to be changed. That indeed is the risk inherent in all forms of collective security; the *status quo* acquires a sanctity of its own, and desirable changes are held up or prevented when there is no likelihood of major war, and undesirable changes may be allowed when there is. (Indo-China and Cyprus might be taken as cases in point.) The doctrine of limited force to be used for police duties implies a careful thinking out of all the possible political implications. What are the interests that must be defended by these means? Does the acceptance of the qualitative difference between big wars and small ones mean that the great Powers will be more anxious or less anxious to seek allies among the uncommitted? These and many others are questions relevant to both military and political planning, and if none of the three authors answer them it is to be hoped that someone else will.

T. E. M. McKITTERICK.

BOOK REVIEWS

FABIAN INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS. Edited by T. E. M. McKITTERICK and KENNETH YOUNGER. [*Hogarth*. 219 pp. 18s.]

THE 129 prefatory words that justify Mr. Gaitskell's prominence on the dust-jacket are not as perfunctory as they might appear: for they state candidly and clearly both the weakness and the strength of these essays. "They are a collection of individual contributions and do not present . . . a consistent theme or policy throughout" and yet "their approach is objective and realistic," which is "especially to be desired in a field where . . . illusions . . . are apt to persist and ideas are too swiftly outdated by events." But there is something in each of us that must feel it hard not to be disappointed that the parts are so much stronger than the whole. Here are seven excellent essays by seven intelligent socialists, but there is not a glimmer of a specifically socialist foreign policy, although "illusions" are exposed in plenty. And, a fault part of nature and part of editors, the essays are uneasily scattered at different points between the hotly topical and the coldly eternal. Moreover, much that was topical when the book went to press in May 1956 has come to be, indeed, "swiftly outdated by events."

Mr. Lowenthal's "Co-existence with the Soviet Union" is a good account of the relation between Soviet totalitarianism and Russian foreign policy, although it could have appeared almost anywhere. He argues that Soviet "co-existence" is simply their deep belief in inevitable peaceful victory by economic superiority. Therefore, the West is engaged in a "competitive co-existence" in which it must keep its powder dry, but also fill the granaries and the workshops of the underdeveloped areas. And the true political reason for this often thankless task is for once clearly stated: "simply to ensure their independent development along non-totalitarian lines." Mr. McKitterick argues the same point in an essay on the Middle East: "the West should therefore try to ensure that aid from all sources [*i.e.*, even Soviet] is enough, rather than to embark on a process of competitive bidding for exclusive support." Our true interest should be in Middle Eastern stability, not in unpopular military alliances. The ultimate problem of the Middle East is, indeed, one of using the £360 million oil revenue left in the area to the betterment of all the inhabitants, rather than to provide more king-size Cadillacs for pint-sized rulers.

Mr. Balogh's "Political Economy of the Cold War" puts a convincing case that our startling "drift downwards" in political influence stems from our shortage of capital. If we could pursue a "forward policy of capital accumulation" by at least forgoing increases in our standard of living, we could afford independent policies and arrest the decline that comes from "doing too much on the basis of too little." The problem of British foreign policy is thus the problem of capital accumulation. And Mr. Balogh is also not embarrassed to dwell upon the overwhelming importance of our relations with the United States. He *talks about* our "simultaneous feeling of envy and superiority," and shows far more understanding of American diplomacy than is usual on the left. It is a nice question why there was not a separate essay on the United States as there was on Russia. After all, following the shame, folly, and stupidity of Suez, it is a little comic to write essays that speak of our influence here, there, and everywhere, unless it is realised at every turn that our greatest influence on world affairs must be made through

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the still substantial remains of our peculiar relationship with the United States. Britain is still listened to in the United States more than her power alone explains, but she must now learn to listen too. Although the Fabians are now able to exorcise sentimentality towards the U.S.S.R., they are not quite ready to swallow a national pharisaism towards the U.S.A.

Mr. Strachey's contribution on "British Defence Policy" is a weighty (but dubious) case that our political influence demands the possession of a successfully tested hydrogen bomb, and therefore drastic reductions in conventional weapons. Mr. Younger's essay on the Far East deserves, though may not get, an equally close attention in the State Department and Pentagon. Mr. P. C. Gordon Walker submits a sound and sober brief for the Commonwealth and, as a law-abiding subject of the Queen, is careful to say nothing that could possibly cause disaffection among any of her darker subjects.

Those who had hoped for a socialist policy from these essays will be profoundly (or irritably) disappointed. But such a disappointment should be overcome. Mr. Healey's closing essay, "Beyond Power Politics," pulls the book together; it is full of the ambiguities and ambivalences inherent in the debate about a socialist or a liberal foreign policy, but its self-awareness of these things is its strength. He begins by suggesting that the American writers of the "national interest," "realist" school, Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippman, run the risk of playing "Nietzsche to some Hoosier Hitler." But that is a cheap and ignorant smoke-screen. For he does not, in fact, refute the national interest school but rather, like the other disparate essays, shows a broader awareness of what national self-interest is—of how inextricably the ideals and the fears of one nation are bound up with those of another. The stress is all on practical problems. Mr. Healey cautions against trying to rationalise drastically the welter of inter-governmental organisations effecting Europe; he deplores a false juridical neatness and points to the surprising success of many of these institutions as being due to "the patient empiricism of the organic approach." Of the three ways of looking at international politics, that of the engineer, the lawyer, and the gardener, Mr. Healey chooses that of the gardener: "who deals with forms of organic life which are not fully subject to either rational or mechanical control. He must understand and accept in advance the limitations of his materials." So here is a Burkean methodology of politics with a socialist perspective, a synthesis that could gain great authority. The *Fabian International Essays* are not socialist in the sense that they are applying a theory, but are socialist in the sense that when examining any problem they take into account a far wider range of social interests than any conservative advocate of "realism" and "self-interest" seems able to comprehend.

BERNARD CRICK.

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THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. By FRANK H. UNDERHILL. [*Cambridge for Duke University Press.* xxiii and 127 pp. 15s.]

BRITAIN COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE 1901-1955. By PAUL KNAPLUND. [*Hamilton.* xii and 541 pp. 35s.]

BULK-BUYING FROM THE COLONIES. By CHARLOTTE LEUBUSCHER. [*Oxford for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.* x and 206 pp. 30s.]

THE Commonwealth Studies Centre at Duke University is an object of expectant curiosity to students of the Commonwealth of Nations. Its existence in Durham, North Carolina, is in itself somewhat bizarre; and its apparent policy of excluding scholars from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon while admitting those from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, suggests that its studies may become increasingly out of touch with the development of a Commonwealth in which the majority of people have coloured skins. However, it has made a good start with the publication of Mr. Underhill's book, the result of lectures given at Duke in 1955. In these he has shown the development of "The Liberal Victorian Empire" into "The First Commonwealth" and "The Second Commonwealth." Although he has understandably given the work a Canadian bias, it remains a useful potted study of the growth of the Commonwealth. He says he will not gush, and he sticks to his word. He is sober and factual, with an occasional dig in the British ribs which his audience must have enjoyed and his readers can enjoy too.

Yet one can still find things to complain about in Mr. Underhill's treatment; and they are serious things because they tend to perpetuate typical American misconceptions. For example, is it any help, after saying that "the Commonwealth has none of the precise commitments of a formal alliance," to add, "yet it functions as an unwritten treaty of mutual guaranty"? It may be true that some Commonwealth countries feel themselves bound in honour to come to the aid of some others; but he would be a wise man who could nominate in advance which these would be. Americans who took this statement at face value would have had some thinking to do about the line-up in the Suez crisis of 1956.

Again, Mr. Underhill gives the usual twisted North American explanation of the sterling system: British leaders, he says, "are under a strong temptation to retire from hard competition with Americans and Germans and Japanese in world markets and to seek their economic future inside a closely organised sterling bloc." There is some truth in this, but on its own it simply feeds vulgar American prejudice and neglects the main aspects of the real state of affairs, as those affect the Commonwealth countries and the United States.

A further matter on which it is unlikely that Americans will be enlightened by Mr. Underhill is the Monarchy. It is true that he refers to republics in the Commonwealth, and to variations in the Queen's style and title; but to the term "Head of the Commonwealth" he imparts an unnecessary air of mystery: "none of us in the Commonwealth has since inquired too curiously what are the powers and functions of this Head of the Commonwealth." If we have not inquired, it is because there is nothing to inquire about. The Queen as Head of the Commonwealth has no "powers and functions," if these mean, as the ordinary use of language suggests they mean, things which

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she can or ought to *do*. She is called upon solely to *be*. To imply that there are hidden powers and functions is to encourage American suspicions that the Commonwealth is a Punch and Judy show with George III manipulating the puppets.

Professor Knaplund's new book is intended to provide information which no other single book gathers together. It gives not only the development of the Commonwealth in this century, but also the *domestic* history of each Commonwealth member (including Britain) and of the Colonial Empire. Professor Knaplund combines with considerable skill the economic and political factors of change in each of the countries with which he is concerned. A breathless tone and some slight errors are probably inseparable from such a treatment. But the errors are often irritating. Who were W. H. Hughes, G. B. M. Hertzog, and John Richard Seddon? How did J. T. Lang come to be Prime Minister of New South Wales? What had become of Jervis Bay in 1914 that the Australian Naval College should be established at Geelong? Who is the personage called Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs? Did Britain introduce conscription after the second world war had begun, and did she actually divert an Australian division from Egypt to Malaya in 1941?

Again, some judgments are hasty or misleading. It was optimistic to suggest that "Ceylonese communal problems practically disappeared" in 1943-1944, and over-dramatic to say that "Britain sacrificed her foreign markets" at Ottawa in 1932, and emphasise this by the assertion that "in the 1930's the Dominions . . . compelled Britain to reorganise her tariff system." There is a harsh judgment about British colonial officers on p. 254 which much of the book suggests is untrue. The author can hardly contain himself when he writes about South Africa. But in the main his judgments would be endorsed by most students of the Commonwealth. Two minor matters which his British publishers might have warned him against are his annoying linguistic uses of "Labourite" for member of the Labour Party and "Black-fellow" for Australian aborigine. They might also have checked the maps more closely: Basutoland, Swaziland, the Northern Territory of Australia, Palestine, and Southern Rhodesia all suffer peculiar changes of status in one map or another.

Dr. Leubuscher's work is a most scholarly account of British bulk buying from the colonies during and after the second world war. It makes plain how different are the bargaining positions of the colonies with Britain, from those of the member-nations of the Commonwealth; and this underlines the need to keep separate the two kinds of "Commonwealth country," the dependent and the independent. To their credit, this is something about which the two North Americans, Messrs. Underhill and Knaplund, are scrupulously correct. It is a pity that their example is not followed by more writers and speakers in Britain.

J. D. B. MILLER.

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LAW AND ORDERS. By SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN. Second edition. [Stevens. xxv and 482 pp. 42s.]

THIS is more than a second edition. The author tells us that he has rewritten the greater part of the text, that he has omitted a good deal which was of immediate relevance in 1945 but which is now only of remote interest, and that he has brought the remainder up to date. This last phrase must, however, be interpreted widely; there is much that is new, for there is much that has happened in the last eleven years which is most relevant to his thesis. Thus the forty-seven new statutes referred to include the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act and the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act of 1945, the Emergency Laws (Transitional Provisions) Act, the Statutory Instruments Act and the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act of 1946, the Crown Proceedings Act and Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes) Act of 1947 and the Supplies and Services (Defence Purposes) Act of 1951. Thirty-two new statutory instruments are referred to; and a great number of new cases, including the notorious *Odlum v. Stratton*, set out at length in an Appendix.

Sir Carleton Allen writes in his new Preface that the first edition "happened to appear on the eve of a general election" and this "coincidence in time seemed to give the impression in some quarters that this was a piece of political polemic. It was never intended to be anything of the sort, nor is it now." The impression was not wholly made by the coincidence and the main feeling created by the first edition was not that Sir Carleton was lambasting the Left; there had not then been any wicked socialist government with a working majority, so they could hardly be blamed. Sir Carleton says that his political leanings are to the Right. But, at a guess, he is more of a nineteenth-century Tory than a twentieth-century Conservative and, if so, can have no Spencerian objection to the exercise of governmental power as such. In both editions of this book he condemns Sir Oswald Mosley and Sir Stafford Cripps for advancing totalitarian views. Nevertheless, the first edition read like a polemic; so does the second. My dictionary tells me merely that a polemic is "controversial" writing but there is an illustration, alongside, of a pole-axe, which has strayed down from higher up the page and which seems, for this book, to indicate a more precise derivation. This book is polemical—but not about parties. It is polemical about excessive concentrations of governmental power and about tyrants at all official levels. If it were not controversial, the book would contain long chapters about the practical difficulties of administrators—which are also real. If it were non-political, the book would deal in some detail with concentrations of power in private hands; but that is another story, which perhaps Sir Carleton will tell us another time. What we have today is a masterly, learned, and detailed analysis of one aspect of public administration, made and not marred by vigorous exposition in direct and purposed prose, founded on immense distaste for the cult of authority. The attitude of some of the Left to unimaginative officialdom and even to administrative immorality (as in Crichton Down) can be shortsightedly defensive. The machinery of regulation must be made as perfect as its human masters can contrive. Sir Carleton Allen's book shows some of the present imperfections in both the machinery and the masters.

J. A. G. GRIFFITH.

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SHORTER NOTICES

THE SUEZ CANAL. [Stevens. 76 pp. 10s. 6d.]

THE present crisis in the Middle East has led many people to want to refer to the various documents relating to the international status of the Suez Canal, and the rights of the Suez Canal Company. This publication provides a most useful selection of such documents in a readily accessible form. They include documents concerning the status of the Company and the concession granted in 1866, together with the Nationalisation Law of 1956. Under the heading of International Instruments we find the Declaration of December 1873, the Convention of 1888, the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, and the relevant articles of the peace treaties made after the first world war. There are a number of other documents together with a list of books and articles, British parliamentary papers, and judicial decisions relating to the canal or the company. The collection is published under the auspices of The Society of Comparative Legislation and International Law.

THE SCHOOL TEACHERS. By A. TROPP. [Heinemann. 286 pp. 21s.]

THIS is a very interesting book which deserves the attention of all who are interested not only in education but in social history generally. For it is an admirable study of the social history of teachers, of "the growth," to quote its subtitle, "of the teaching profession in England and Wales from 1800 to the present day." It begins with the teachers of charity schools who may be counted as the first "professional" teachers, and it traces the story through the National Union of Elementary Teachers to the N.U.T., the Act of 1944, and the profession's problems today. Dr. Tropp has done his work extremely well and has graced and enlivened his book with some very interesting illustrations.

EUROPEAN REFUGEES: 1939-1952. A STUDY IN FORCED POPULATION MOVEMENT. By MALCOLM J. PROUDFOOT. [Faber. 542 pp. 52s. 6d.]

THE author, who died in 1955, was an American professor and had served during the war in the Displaced Persons Branch of SHAEF. He had a thorough knowledge of his subject and his book is the result of an immense amount of labour stretching over six years. Sir John Hope Simpson's *The Refugee Problem* was a study of European refugee movements down to October 1938; Professor Proudfoot's book carries on the story from that date, but is concerned mainly with the refugee movements of the second world war. The first chapter deals with refugee movements before the war; there then follow chapters dealing with wartime movements. The organisation and working of UNRRA and mass repatriation are described in great detail. The horrible story of Hitler's massacre of Jewish populations is given a chapter by itself; it should be noted that Professor Proudfoot, after very careful calculations based upon investigation of all available data, estimates that 5,163,000 Jews were exterminated. The book contains an enormous mass of material nowhere else available, presented in a masterly manner.

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Israel and the Middle East

A VISIT to Israel is not an editorial excuse but a good reason for returning to the subject of the Middle East. Though the Suez crisis has been moving slowly towards what may be politely called a solution—a lamentable, ignominious solution—the region itself remains a storm centre, for nothing has really been done during the last three months to effect a permanent calming of the troubled waters. The key which might open the door either to peace or disaster, not only for the Middle East, but for the whole world, is in the sovereign independent state of Israel. There is no exaggeration in this statement. The existence of Israel as a state is due to the action of the governments of the Great Powers less than forty years ago. Though there were tremendous arguments in favour of that action, it was yet possible for a most sincere wellwisher of the Jews at the time to doubt its wisdom. But in history and politics it is no good to argue over spilt milk. Once something has been done to create a new situation, the statesman should consider objectively and practically only what the new situation requires for the present and the future. The past may be left to bury its own dead; our business should be to see that the present and future have no dead to bury.

* * * *

Unless the world's statesmen act with wisdom and courage, the future will have many dead to bury in Israel and the Middle East. Israel is today a state containing in a narrow strip of land about 1,700,000 population and the population is expected to increase by the immigration of Jews at the rate of 100,000 annually. It is surrounded by six sovereign independent "Arab" states which together contain nearly 40 million inhabitants. The Arab governments make no concealment of the fact that they are determined ultimately to destroy the state of Israel by force, to drive out its inhabitants, and to reconquer the land for the Arab "refugees." There are three things which have prevented or can in the future prevent the carrying out of this determination: first, military efficiency of Israel and inefficiency of the Arabs; second, the disunion among the Arab governments; third, a determination of the Great Powers to honour their international obligations towards Israel and to insist upon the rule of law and order in the Middle

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East. The first two factors are at the moment of great importance. No one who has seen what the people and government of Israel are doing and the spirit which animates them can doubt their ability and determination to defend themselves. If efficiency, toughness, enthusiasm can save a people, Israel will survive. What is more impressive than even this will to survive, the passionate determination to create a green and pleasant land out of a stony wilderness, is the spirit of the people. The visitor to Israel immediately feels that he has entered a country which is, like England and London from 1940 to 1943, beleaguered by a pitiless enemy. The people have no illusions about the intentions of their Arab neighbours. They have themselves seen only a few years ago the Syrians and others descend like wolves upon the fold, in the war which brought them independence, and destroy their farms and their homes. You have only to go into a kibbutz on the shores of the Sea of Galilee and look at its "war memorial" to realise the price in men's lives which Israel had to pay for independence. Yet the visitor will be surprised to find that there is no bitterness among the Israelis against the Arabs or even against Nasser and the Egyptians. Everyone, from high officials to taxidriver or the shepherd of the kibbutz who wanders with his flock along the Lebanon border, will be ready to discuss the situation with him. The Jews, like the Greeks (both ancient and modern), have a passion for discussion, particularly political discussion, and we must have discussed "the situation" with dozens of different people all over the country, but we never heard a single word of anger, bitterness, or even resentment against their enemies. The attitude of a man in Galilee was characteristic: he had himself seen the extraordinary exodus of the Arabs from the Galilean villages, he had fought with a primitive rifle and an antique cannon against Arabs armed with machine guns and a tank; yet his final conclusion was: "The mistake of the Arabs here was that they could be made to believe anything. They were misled by their leaders."

* * * *

To face one's enemies calmly and resolutely, without anger or bitterness, is a source of strength. It makes the efficient, united Israelis militarily a very formidable foe compared today with the inefficient, disunited Arabs. But this kind of relative strength and weakness cannot be relied upon as a permanent prevention of Arab attack or war in the Middle East. The folly of dictators, kings, and unstable governments, the crazy passions of crude nationalism,

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might at any moment lead some Colonel Nasser, in Egypt or elsewhere, to gamble on a military adventure. The danger will be enormously increased if the Soviet government continues to arm the Arab rulers with modern weapons and encourage their aggressions. It follows that if a horrible war of Arab against Israeli is to be permanently prevented and a stable peace established in the Middle East, it must be by international action. As we implied above in the first paragraph, this is a test case for international law and order, and therefore for the United Nations. The Great Powers are responsible for the creation of the state of Israel; Israel is a member of the United Nations; a work of immense significance for civilisation is being accomplished by the Israelis which, if encouraged and developed, might be of great value to all the peoples of the Middle East. For the Great Powers and the United Nations to abet or allow a lawless attack upon Israel, or even the continuance of illegal blockade, would be to endanger the future peace of the whole world. The dilemma is clearcut and simple. To think that you can have an international system which can preserve law, order, and peace in Europe and the Americas, but connive at and encourage war, massacre, blockades, lawlessness in Egypt and Jordan, is as stupid as to believe that the judges and police could preserve law and order in Pimlico if they encouraged battle, murder, and sudden death in Paddington.

* * * *

No one should underestimate the difficulties in the way of re-establishing order and peace in the Middle East through the United Nations, but the task is not impossible. The first step must be to reverse the dangerous, unwise policies of all the governments who have been playing the game of power politics there. To speculate about the intentions and future policy of the Soviet Union would be a waste of time. The Soviet government will probably continue to stir up as much trouble as possible in the Middle East, as in the rest of the world. The right policy for the United States and the British Empire is the exact opposite, *i.e.*, to create conditions in the Middle East which will be most unfavourable for the stirring up of troubles. It follows that the first part of this new policy should be negative: both America and ourselves should give up any attempt to play at power politics there. For instance, the subsidising of Arab kings and dictators by the United States must be abandoned. To give King Hussein of Jordan millions of dollars or even millions of halfpence to bolster up his army and himself may look like a

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good short-term coup, but it is completely shortsighted. It plays into the communist hands by trying to play them at their own disastrous game. There is not the slightest assurance of stability in either the king or his army, and to finance them as a weapon against the Soviet Union is crazy as a long-term policy. In the modern world £10 million will not buy a halfpennyworth of "loyalty" or gratitude from an Asiatic dictator and his subjects for an "imperialist" power.

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A negative policy is, however, not enough; a positive policy is also essential. It should consist in a continual insistence by the United States, Britain, and France on the duty of the United Nations to interfere in the Middle East and actively promote law and order. First there is the importance of continuing and developing the "police" functions of U.N. The presence of the U.N. force should be used to guarantee the international rights in the Canal as an international waterway and in the Gulf of Akaba. The U.N. should actively and continually try to induce the Arab states to "make peace" with Israel. There is little doubt that some of these states, *e.g.*, the Lebanon, if left to themselves, would be quite willing to come to a reasonable agreement with their neighbour. They might well be encouraged by international action. Finally, the possibility of reconciling the conflicting interests of nations and classes, of producers and consumers, in oil and oil field, in pipe lines and refineries, by international co-operation rather than by national competition should be explored.

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But this kind of international action is not the only way in which the western states could work for peace in the Middle East. American policy of using the vast resources and wealth of the United States to finance schemes of international rehabilitation or of the development of backward regions, though often misused in practice, is sound in principle. The misuse has been to attempt to combine international charity with power politics, to use Marshall Aid or an Eisenhower Plan, not for promoting economic prosperity and peace but as instruments of American national policy, as means of buying allies and armies in the cold war against communism. If President Eisenhower would use his millions of dollars for specific purposes of peace or economic development, instead of on

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King Hussein's army, he would be taking the first important step in defeating the Soviet policy of stirring up trouble. Take, for example, the extremely difficult and dangerous problem of the Arab refugees. It is true that an attempt has been made to deal with it internationally through the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and that the U.S.A. has contributed large sums to the Agency. But the approach to the problem has become completely unrealistic. The number of refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Jordan is over 900,000 and there is actually a natural increase in this refugee population of about 20,000 annually. About half the total number are children under fifteen years of age. Practically all the money contributed to the Agency has been spent upon relief and there has been no permanent rehabilitation or resettlement. These unfortunate people are being used as pawns in the deadly game now being played by the Arab states against Israel. They are being promised repatriation in Israel and are encouraged to refuse any permanent alternative to repatriation. Whatever were the wrongs or rights of the original Arab exodus, repatriation, even on a very small scale, is today absolutely impossible. No Israeli government could consider it, for it could not be accomplished without chaos and disruption. What is required is a new and realistic approach to the whole problem. The existing position is so bad that no new scheme will succeed immediately, but a plan on the following lines, if resolutely pursued by the U.S.A. through the United Nations, should in the long run be successful because it would have on its side the logic of facts:

- (1) The pretence and promise of repatriation should be abandoned on condition that Israel agrees to pay compensation as a contribution to the expenses of permanent rehabilitation and resettlement outside Israel;
- (2) The U.S.A. should contribute large sums, not for the relief, but for the permanent settlement of the refugees through such projects, already proposed, as the Jordan Valley and Sinai schemes.
- (3) The U.S.A. and the United Nations should offer every kind of inducement both to the refugees and to the Arab governments to co-operate in this work of resettlement.

CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS

JOHN HUTCHINSON

On January 30, 1957, the Senate of the United States authorised the appointment, by Vice-President Nixon, of a bipartisan Select Committee of the Senate to investigate the extent to which "criminal or other improper practices" exist or have existed in labour-management relations, in employer organisations and in trade unions, and to determine whether any changes in Federal law are required to improve the present state of affairs. The Select Committee was appointed, a "preliminary" appropriation of \$350,000 made to support the work of the Committee, and hearings began in February with the interrogation of officials of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, representing up to a million and a half transport and allied workers, one of the largest and most powerful unions in the world. The hearings were sensational, front page news in every major newspaper in the United States. The union fared poorly, with a parade of witnesses alleging the involvement of various Teamster officials in such questionable activities as gambling, prostitution, political bribery, and the use of union funds for private purposes. This is only the beginning. The Committee itself is not composed predominantly of "friends" of labour,¹ and may be relied upon to give at least as much attention to the sins of the trade unions as to those of management. Since the Committee hearings are scheduled to last at least a year, and may go on for two, the seamier aspects of American trade unionism are in for a prolonged and highly publicised airing. There is, unfortunately, a great deal to tell.

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¹ The Committee members are: John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas (Chairman); John F. Kennedy, Democrat, Massachusetts; Samuel J. Ervin, Democrat, North Carolina; Pat McNamara, Democrat, Michigan; Irving M. Ives, Republican, New York; Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Barry M. Goldwater, Republican, Arizona; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota. Only Kennedy and McNamara are regarded by the AFL-CIO as friendly. Ervin and Ives are regarded as unreliable at best. The rest are looked upon as unfriendly or downright anti-labour.

The history of corruption in one section or another of the American labour movement is a long one.² Corrupt practices were not unknown in the fledgling American Federation of Labour during the 1880's. The bitter opposition of employers to organised labour after the Haymarket riots led many AFL unions to adopt for the first time the institution of the "walking delegate," the full-time union official who could represent the union against the employer without fear of economic reprisals. In order to maximise the tactical advantage of a full-time representative, most of the walking delegates were clothed with a great deal of authority by the unions, empowered in particular to call strikes or protest meetings at a moment's notice. Most delegates were badly paid, and not all of them were equally honest; the sudden change from a position of subservience to one of real economic power was for some of them too great a temptation. Finding that employers were often prepared to pay a price for peaceful industrial relations, a number of delegates developed the practice of collecting "strike insurance" from employers, or levying fines on them for imaginary infractions of union rules.

However, it was not until around the turn of the century, with the development of large-scale unionism in the construction industry, that corruption became an important phenomenon of the labour movement. The highly speculative nature of the industry made the exaction of tributes from employers, in return for undisturbed work, a relatively easy matter. In turn, not all employers were averse to collusive arrangements with union officials which disciplined the industry, fixed prices, and assured good incomes for both parties. The result was the development in a number of areas—particularly major urban centres—of personal trade union empires which for years successfully defied the resentment of the public and the attentions of the law.

The first of these was probably in New York. From 1896 to 1903 the New York building trades unions, and the industry, were in the grip of Sam Parks, president of the housesmiths' union. Parks, who had been in turn a lumberworker, a coal-heaver, a sailor, a railroad brakeman, and a bridgeworker before he became a housesmith, was a "roughneck" imported from Chicago by his

² There appears to be no full-scale, scholarly treatment of trade union corruption in existence. Probably the best book on the subject is Harold Seidman, *Labor Czars—A History of Labor Racketeering*, New York: Liveright, 1938. Brief but good accounts are found in Joel Seidman, *Union Rights and Union Duties*, New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1943; Murray I. Gurfein, "Racketeering," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: MacMillan, 1934; and Jack Barbash, *The Practice of Unionism*, New York: Harper, 1956.

employer, the George A. Fuller Construction Company, to seize control of the building trades unions of New York. He was very successful. In seven weeks he assumed control of, and reorganised by physical force, the weak and divided Housesmiths. Soon afterwards he was elected to the presidency of the New York Board of Building Trades, a council representing most of the building trades unions in the city. Parks ran both the Housesmiths and the Board with an iron hand. There was no democracy in either. What dissent or curiosity in the union Parks could not satisfy by patronage or bribery he stilled by violence, while not even the presidents of many unions affiliated with the Board were allowed to attend the secret meetings of the small circle of thugs who actually made the decisions. Meanwhile, Parks lived well. He remained for some years on the payroll of Fuller, which in a period of general turmoil in the industry from 1896 to 1903 experienced not a single strike. Through the acceptance of bribes and strike insurance from other firms Parks lived in high style on an official salary of \$48 a week, travelled widely, decked Mrs. Parks in diamonds, became an important citizen, and amassed a large private fortune. Finally arrested in 1903 for extorting \$2,000 from the Hecla Iron Works, he was bailed out by an ex-chief of the New York police, re-elected to office and voted \$1,000 for defence expenses by his union. He beat the charge, but later the same year was sentenced to two and a half years in Sing Sing for a similar offence. Again the union voted to keep him in office and pay his salary while in jail. He was soon released on a certificate of reasonable doubt, in time to lead the annual Labour Day parade, on a white horse to symbolise the purity of labour, down Fifth Avenue. Arrested again in 1904 for a further extortion, he died in Sing Sing while serving a two-year sentence.

The system of collusion, extortion and violence that Parks developed was copied, with varying degrees of skill and success, in other urban centres throughout the United States. In Chicago, Martin B. "Skinny" Madden, head of the steamfitters' union in that city, controlled the building industry through the Board of Business Agents of the Building Trades Council from 1896 to 1908. After him came a number of pretenders, pre-eminent among them "Umbrella Mike" Boyle of the electrical workers.³ Boyle controlled the electrical construction industry in Chicago until well into

³ So called because of his practice of hanging an umbrella from the counter of his favourite bar to receive the tributes of employers. This enabled him to deny he ever accepted bribes.

the twenties, collecting a personal fortune of half a million dollars in the process. Other union officials succeeded in establishing empires in the road transport, plumbing, bricklaying, baking, and catering trades. In San Francisco, Patrick Henry McCarthy of the carpenters' union dominated the building industry as president of the Building Trades Council from 1898 to 1922, waxing rich on stolen union funds and contributions from grateful companies; he was finally voted out of office for acting concurrently as a paid lobbyist for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company. In New York, Robert P. Brindell, a near-illiterate Canadian docker who headed the Dock and Pier Carpenters Union, won control of the Building Trades Council at the outbreak of the first world war and made over two million dollars in ten years. For over a decade, beginning in the early thirties, Vice-President Joseph Fay of the Operating Engineers and Vice-President James Bove of the Labourers conducted at some profit the familiar pattern of strike insurance and extortion in the New York and New Jersey building trades. Nor is the practice extinct today. As recently as 1955 Evan Dale, a business agent of the Labourers who controlled all labourers' local unions in Southern Illinois, was arraigned for extortion. The principal offence for which he was convicted was his attempt to extort \$1,030,000—equal to 1 per cent. of the total contract price—from a private builder engaged in constructing an atomic energy plant for the United States Government. When the builder refused to pay, Dale embarked upon a campaign of harassment which cost the government an estimated \$51,000,000 above the original contract price.⁴

Meanwhile, with Prohibition came the systematic entry of gangsters into the labour movement. The use of hired gunmen, provoked largely by the violent anti-union activities of employers, was not new in American unions. Madden had used them in Chicago, as had some of his associates. Then, in New York before the first world war, a gangster by the name of "Dopey Benny" Fein organised a unique and highly effective service for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.⁵ He divided the womens' garment industry into territories, one to each subsidiary gang. The union hired the gangs for special tasks in their respective bailiwicks, paying for services rendered according to a fixed fee schedule—\$150 for raiding and wrecking small plants, \$200 for breaking a limb, \$600 for raiding and wrecking large stores, and

⁴ *Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the United States* (Washington: 1955), p. 125.

⁵ Seidman, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-49.

\$600 for shooting a man in the leg or arm, or removing his ear. There were daily rates of \$7.50 per gangster, \$12 per gang leader, with extra *per diem* bonuses for operations conducted in such faraway garment industry centres as Cleveland and Philadelphia. The system was effective, but it was not characteristic. For the most part, corrupt activities in the labour movement before Prohibition were conducted by men who could at least claim to be trade unionists.

The mechanics of bootlegging, the slump in law enforcement, and the ordinary ambition of gangsters all contributed to the infiltration of many unions by the underworld. Aiming principally at road transport and the service trades, gangsters played an important role in trade union affairs, particularly in the East and Midwest, during the second and third decades of the century. Probably the most successful invasion was conducted, principally in Chicago, by the late Al Capone. Through threats, violence, murder, and the protection of compliant unions against other gangs, Capone came to control an estimated two-thirds of all local unions in the Chicago area by 1932. In Detroit, the Purple Gang took over the cleaning, dyeing, and coal transport unions, and through their control of the plumbers' union in that city dominated the building trades as a whole. In Cleveland, racketeers dominated the funeral business and its unions, not hesitating to break up "rebel" funerals, throwing "non-union" coffins into the streets. In New York and New Jersey, the painting, flour trucking, baking, fur trade, and motion picture operators' unions, to name only the worst cases, were run from 1928 to 1937 by two celebrated "hoodlums," Louis "Lepke" Buckhalter and "Charley the Gurreh" Shapiro. There were many other gangsters involved, notably in the hotel and restaurant trades, but these were the principal figures. Virtually every major industrial crime in New York and New Jersey was attributed to them in their heyday; their joint gross income during the years 1932-1937 is estimated to have been about \$5 million a year.

In two cases the underworld actually succeeded in winning control of an entire union. In 1934 Capone began to take control of the Building Service Employees International Union, a major AFL affiliate, with headquarters in Chicago. In the same year he arranged for the elevation to a vice-presidency of the union, without the formality of an election, of George Scalise, a convicted extortioner and white slaver, and until then a professional strike-breaker. In 1937 the incumbent president of the international union died,

and Scalise was appointed by the executive board of the union—again under Capone's instructions and without an election—to succeed him. Scalise reigned in office until 1941, when he was sent to jail for stealing \$60,000 of the union's funds. Also in 1934, a gangster by the name of Willy Bioff joined forces with George Browne, a Chicago official of the International Association of Theatrical and Stage Employees, the largest union in the entertainment field, to extort money from the industry. With the help of the Capone organisation, Browne was elected without dissent to the presidency of the international union in the same year, appointing Bioff as his assistant. Under the watchful eyes of Capone, who appointed an overseer to the union to report back on the activities of Browne and Bioff, the two associates went on to a highly successful career of extortion from theatre owners in the Midwest and East. In 1936 they felt strong enough to move into Hollywood, where they extracted hundreds of thousands of dollars from motion picture studios in return for harmonious labour conditions and limited collective bargaining demands. Both Browne and Bioff were jailed in 1941 for extortion.

However, by the end of the second world war a great change had taken place. All the old building trades empires had crumbled before the advance of municipal reform. Federal and State criminal prosecutions had sent off to jail all or most of the great underworld figures in trade unions who had escaped the bullets of their competitors. Many union leaders of high personal courage and probity had done much to purge their own unions of gangster elements.⁶ The vast majority of American trade unions and trade union leaders had become—and remain today—free of alliances with the underworld.

But the problem of corruption remained, if the details were generally less bizarre. A series of postwar legislative investigations showed the existence of pockets of corruption in a number of unions, large and small, with some old underworld figures—now more respectable members of the community—still in positions of authority. In particular, the 1953 report of the New York State Crime Commission demonstrated beyond doubt the complete domination of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA),

⁶ The long list of union leaders who launched frontal attacks on strongly entrenched racketeers in their unions includes David Dubinsky of the International Ladies Garment Workers, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Max Zaritsky of the Hatters, James C. Pettillo of the Musicians, and Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers. Many unions, of course, were never troubled with the problem. Others, who had it, left it to the police and courts.

a 60,000-member dockers' union on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, by racketeers. Further, the phenomenal growth since the second world war of negotiated health and pension funds has opened up an entirely new field for corrupt activities. Many of these funds, now involving over \$7 billion a year in employer contributions, fall under the jurisdiction of the Taft-Hartley Act,⁷ section 302 of which requires that any fund set up after 1947 must be governed by a joint labour-management board of trustees. The great majority of these funds appear to be governed honestly and with reasonable efficiency. Management, however, where it has not actively connived in the plunder of welfare funds, has generally shown little interest in their operation, thus permitting the development of administrative practices not prohibited by the Act but never contemplated by the Congress. Worse still, the whole area of negotiated health and pension plans has been invaded by an army of insurance agents, brokers, and consultants of varied competence, some of whom have shown little interest in quality of service or integrity of operation. The result has been the bleeding of many welfare funds through the levying of excessive premium charges and brokerage fees, through hasty insurance estimates leading to expensive changes of policy or company, and through the rendition of unnecessary and expensive services. Union officials in charge of welfare funds, also, rarely receive the training necessary for proper welfare fund administration, and have often proved easy victims of the various mendicants in the field. But much of the abuse has been simple graft on the part of trade unionists, involving such practices as fee-splitting between brokers and union officials, the purchase by union officials of welfare fund policies from insurance companies in which they have acquired a financial interest, the retention of insurance company dividends for personal use, and the outright theft of welfare fund resources. Whatever the method, the misuse of welfare funds since the second world war has involved the loss of millions of dollars to the rightful beneficiaries of the funds.

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The problem of trade union corruption in the post-war years was serious enough for both the AFL and the CIO to take extraordinary action against it. In 1952 the AFL appointed a three-man

⁷ 29 U.S. Code, 186. The best recent sources on corruption in welfare fund administration are *Welfare and Pension Plans*, Interim Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: 1954); and *ibid.*, Final Report (Douglas Report), 84th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: 1956).

committee to investigate the issuance of local union charters "to persons who had no previous connections with the trade or calling covered by the International union concerned." Since racketeers profit greatly by the cloak of legality provided by a local union charter, the latter are much in demand, and have often been issued to "trade unionists" with only the flimsiest of claims to legitimacy. As a result of the committee's findings, two local union charters were revoked by parent unions, one by the Distillery Workers, the other by the Jewelry Workers.⁸ Then, in 1953, the sensational findings of the New York State Crime Commission on the ILA led to the expulsion of the union from the AFL—the first time such action had ever been taken in American labour history on grounds of corruption.⁹ In 1954 the AFL annual convention endorsed an Executive Council report strongly condemning corruption in welfare funds,¹⁰ as a result of which the Executive Council of the AFL issued, in 1955, a series of recommendations on welfare fund administration.¹¹ These recommendations were subsequently adopted by the founding convention of the AFL-CIO.

The CIO, also, had adopted in 1951 a convention resolution condemning "unethical practices" in trade unions after corrupt practices had been discovered in a few local unions; the resolution, which called for prompt action against offending union officials, was repeated in similar form in 1952 and 1953.¹² In 1954 the CIO set up a Standing Committee on Ethical Practices after the New York State Department of Insurance had charged five New York locals of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) with welfare fund abuses.¹³ The Committee was instructed to investigate all charges of maladministration in welfare funds and to formulate standards for their operation. After extensive inquiries into CIO union practices the Committee drafted

⁸ *Proceedings*, AFL Annual Convention, 1952, pp. 94-95. The members of the Committee were AFL Secretary-Treasurer George Meany, President David Dubinsky of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and President William McFetridge of the Building Service Employees International Union.

⁹ *Proceedings*, AFL Annual Convention, 1953, pp. 53-82, 364, 397-398, 486-493, 647.

¹⁰ *Proceedings*, AFL Annual Convention, 1954, pp. 563-568.

¹¹ AFL Executive Council, *Guides to the Administration of Health and Welfare Funds*, Washington D.C., 1955.

¹² *Proceedings*, Annual CIO Convention, 1951, pp. 320-325; 1952, pp. 356-357; 1953, pp. 30-33. The CIO, due to a combination of factors—its centralist traditions, its industrial union structure, its youth and its stronger idealistic orientation—was much less troubled with corrupt practices than the AFL.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1954, pp. 431-459, 469-471. The members of the Committee were President Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, President Joseph Curran of the National Maritime Union, and Secretary-Treasurer I. W. Abel of the United Steelworkers of America (succeeding James G. Thimmes on his death). Arthur Goldberg, General Counsel of the CIO, acted as Director of the Committee.

an "Employee Welfare Plan Disclosure Act" which was adopted by the CIO convention in 1955.¹⁴ Meanwhile, four of the five RWDSU locals were suspended, the fifth being expelled for refusing to accede to suspension.

By constitutional provision, convention resolution, and executive action the AFL-CIO, founded in December, 1955, has taken further steps against corrupt practices. "It is a basic principle of the Federation," the new constitution states, "that it must be and remain free from any and all corrupt influences. . . ." The Executive Council of the AFL-CIO is authorised, where "there is reason to believe" that any union is so affected, to conduct an investigation. Upon completion of the inquiry the Council may, if the evidence warrants it, "make recommendations or give directions" to the union concerned. If the condition remains unremedied, the Council may then, by a two-thirds vote of its twenty-seven members, suspend the union from the AFL-CIO. Suspension by the Council may be appealed to convention, but remains in force pending appeal. A simple majority vote of the convention decides the matter. The Executive Council of the AFL had power to suspend, and the Executive Board of the CIO had power to expel, for cause, but neither body had ever taken such action on grounds of corruption.

The first AFL-CIO convention also adopted a resolution on welfare fund administration which closely followed the recommendations of the AFL Executive Council.¹⁵ The resolution recommended *inter alia* that no salaried union official should receive extra compensation for welfare fund activities; that any official connected with a welfare fund should be free of "compromising personal ties" with agencies doing business with the fund; that any trustee of a fund accepting "an unethical payment" should be removed and legal action taken against both the giver and the receiver of the payment; that "the best accepted" accounting, auditing, and reporting procedures should be adopted by all funds; that full investigation and competitive bidding should precede the purchase by a welfare fund of any insurance policies; that all funds should provide adequate appeals procedures for union members; and that unions should "encourage and develop the widest possible degree of active and informed interest" in their plans on the part of union members. The resolution went on to propose, as the CIO Standing Committee on Ethical Practices had done, the adoption by

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1955, p. 232.

¹⁵ *Proceedings*, AFL-CIO Convention, 1955, pp. 86-89.

the Congress of legislation requiring "annual reports and public disclosure" of the financial operations of welfare funds, including their transactions with insurance carriers and service agencies. It was further recommended that such legislation be administered "at the Federal level rather than through a multiplicity of State agencies"; that the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act "be made a function of the Federal tax power" to avoid dispute whether welfare funds were of an interstate or intrastate character; and that "criminal penalties for non-filing and false filing" be provided. The final section of the resolution urged the adoption of State legislation to prohibit the payment of agency or brokerage commissions where no services are rendered; to develop standards to govern the size of commissions and the business practices of brokers and agents; to permit the development of non-profit, lay-sponsored health plans; and to submit welfare fund trustees to the same restrictions as all other trustees under State law.

The convention adopted a second resolution on ethical practices which called upon all affiliated unions to take steps, including constitutional changes if necessary, to effect the "policies and ethical standards" of the AFL-CIO. The full support of the federation's Committee on Ethical Practices was pledged to all unions undertaking such action. The Committee on Ethical Practices itself, according to the constitution, has been set up "to keep the Federation free of any taint of corruption or communism. . . ." ¹⁶ Concentrating virtually exclusively on the former, the Committee has played a prominent role in AFL-CIO affairs. The first report of the Committee to the Executive Council in February, 1956, dealt mainly with procedural matters, but the Committee said it would soon submit to President George Meany of the AFL-CIO "certain information and reports" which it had received since the convention. The Executive Council, in turn, vested "the authority of the Council" in the Committee to conduct either preliminary or formal investigations into charges or evidence of corrupt practices in any union, and to develop "principles and guides" for adoption by the AFL-CIO "to implement the constitutional determination of the AFL-CIO that it shall be and remain free from all corrupt influences." ¹⁷

Since then the Committee has formulated four codes of behaviour for trade unions and trade union officials, all of which

¹⁶ *AFL-CIO Constitution*, Art. XIII, s. 1 (d). Communism as an internal problem of the AFL-CIO is now almost non-existent, and the Committee on Ethical Practices does not appear to have paid it any real attention.

¹⁷ *AFL-CIO News*, February 18, 1956.

have been adopted by the Executive Council. The first of these, adopted in August, 1956, relates to the granting of local union charters by international unions.¹⁸ The Committee, while affirming the "complete authority" of each union "to prescribe the particular procedures governing the issuance of local union charters," stated in its report to the Council that "each autonomous union has the duty to see to it that the purpose of issuing local union charters is to promote the general welfare of workers. The constitution of the AFL-CIO makes it clear that no affiliate has the autonomous right to permit corrupt or unethical practices which endanger the good name of the trade union movement." The code itself, which states that a local union charter should be regarded as a "solemn instrument," condemns the creation of "paper locals" not functioning as genuine unions, the issuance of charters as "hunting licences" for the sole purpose of raiding other unions, and the issuance of charters to persons "known to traffic in local union charters for illicit or improper purposes." The code states that the AFL-CIO and all affiliated unions "shall take prompt action" to prevent the distribution of such charters and to revoke those which have already been issued.

The remaining three codes were approved and promulgated at the Executive Council's meeting in January, 1957.¹⁹ The first of these deals with the administration of welfare funds, hewing close to the recommendations of the welfare fund resolutions passed at the founding convention of the AFL-CIO; the principal innovation is the recommendation that where welfare funds are negotiated or administered by local unions or other subordinate organisations, the national or international union concerned should have the authority to audit such funds and to "apply remedies" where unethical practices occur. Since most welfare fund abuses occur at the local level the point is an important one.

The second code in this group, published under the embracing title of "Racketeers, Crooks, Communists, Fascists," states that no individual supporting "totalitarian agencies" should hold office in a trade union; nor should anyone hold such office who has been convicted "of any crime involving moral turpitude offensive to trade union morality" or who is "commonly known" to be a crook or racketeer "preying on the labour movement and its good name for corrupt purposes, whether or not previously convicted for such nefarious purposes." The code makes the point that it is "not

¹⁸ *New York Times*, August 30, 1956.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, February 1, 1957.

within the purview or authority of a trade union to convict its members of a violation of statutory law," but argues that no union should wait upon conviction in the courts before acting against unethical individuals.

The final code in the series deals with conflicts of interest. "It is too plain for extended discussion," the code says, "that a basic ethical principle in the conduct of trade union affairs is that no responsible trade union official should have a personal financial interest which conflicts with the full performance of his fiduciary duties as a workers' representative." The code notes that the problem could be solved by the simple principle that no trade union official should invest in anything, but states that such a rigid standard would be both "unnecessary and unwise"; union officials should not be prevented, it says, from investing their personal funds "in the American free enterprise system" so long as scrupulous care is taken to avoid actual or potential conflict of interest, and so long as their investments are not large enough to affect corporate decisions. Conflicts of interest would occur where the official has a personal financial interest which inhibits the full performance of his trade union duties; where the official has a "substantial business interest" in the enterprise with which he bargains collectively or in any enterprise in competition with it; and where the official accepts gifts of more than nominal value from an employer.

The adoption of these measures has been accompanied by firm AFL-CIO executive action. The week of the merger itself witnessed a major challenge to the prestige and authority of the new federation.²⁰ Led by Teamster Vice-President James R. Hoffa of Detroit, the Eastern, Midwestern and Southern divisions of the union signed what was described as a "mutual assistance" pact with the outlawed ILA. The agreement provided for joint organising activities between the two unions in the Atlantic, Gulf, and Great Lakes regions, and for a loan of \$400,000 from the Teamsters to the ILA to help the latter pay off debts it had incurred fighting the old AFL. This was a serious matter. The help of the Teamsters, with their control over road transport, is crucial to most unions engaged in strike or boycott activities; some unions literally depend upon the Teamsters for their existence. Further, the huge membership of the union provides a considerable proportion of the revenue of the AFL-CIO. There was, finally, the knowledge that seldom—if ever—in American labour history had

²⁰ *Ibid.*, December 5, 1955, *et seq.*

federation disciplinary measures been successfully applied to a major affiliate. But the challenge was accepted. The proposed agreement was clearly incompatible with the new AFL-CIO constitution, which expressly forbids the "recognition" by an AFL-CIO affiliate of any union expelled by either the AFL or the CIO and still under such penalty.²¹ Since, also, the ILA was the *cause célèbre* of the pre-merger fight against corruption in trade unions, the Teamster plan could not have gone unchallenged without serious loss of face for the AFL-CIO. President George Meany of the federation announced that he would investigate the proposed alliance and "take whatever action the circumstances warrant, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Constitution of the AFL-CIO." After conversations between Meany and President Dave Beck of the Teamsters, action on the agreement was postponed by the union pending a meeting of its Executive Board in March, 1956. Meany then stated that a special meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council would be called in early April to consider action on the agreement. At its March meeting the Teamster Executive Board shelved the proposed loan to the ILA, and after a further warning by Meany cancelled the organising agreement. No more has been heard of it since.

The rebuff to the Teamsters has been followed by disciplinary action against three small affiliates generally believed to be heavily influenced by dishonest elements. All three figured prominently in the Senate investigation into welfare funds. One of these, the 25,000-member Distillery Workers, was charged with corrupt practices by New York State insurance authorities in 1954.²² After investigating the charges, the Douglas Committee estimated that various illegitimate welfare fund practices had yielded one union official and two shady "associates" of his a return of some half a million dollars over a seven-year period.

The welfare fund of the Laundry Workers, a union of some 72,000 members, was examined at some length during Senate investigations into welfare funds.²³ The Douglas Committee concluded that the broker of the union's welfare fund had simply embezzled \$900,000 of the fund's resources. Further, the Secretary-Treasurer of the union sought the protection of the Fifth Amendment when asked by the Committee to explain the presence of \$573,000 of the union's group insurance fund in a private bank

²¹ *AFL-CIO Constitution*, Art. IV, s. 6.

²² *Douglas Report*, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-285.

²³ *Op. cit.*, *Hearings*, Part 2, pp. 279-746.

account under his name. He has since been relieved of his post by the Executive Board of the union.

The third union, the 73,000-member Allied Industrial Workers, shot to fame in 1955 largely through the activities of its powerful Chicago local.²⁴ The President of the local, Angelo Incisco, appears to have engaged in somewhat unusual administrative practices during his tenure of office. No meetings of the full local union membership were ever called. No reliable records of the local union's business were ever kept. In particular, no attempt was made to obtain the permission or even *post facto* consent of the membership for Incisco's expenditures. Some of these expenditures were remarkable. Mixing welfare funds indiscriminately with general union funds, Incisco gave himself liberal allowances to make trips, accompanied frequently by relations or bodyguards, to such varied and distant places as Puerto Rico, Haiti, Vera Cruz, Habana, Kingston, Caracas, the Dutch West Indies, Panama, Italy, Israel, France, Syria, and Turkey. Incisco justified his travels by stating to the Douglas Committee that "we should get into some of these foreign countries, see how they are operating, and see how they are living in comparison with the people of this country." An even more intriguing passage in the fragmentary records discovered by the Committee showed the following items charged to "Organisational Expenses":

	(Dollars)
2 diamond dial watches and 2 diamond watch bands on January 25, 1952	1,050.00
1 "gents" diamond ring on February 7, 1952	1,200.00
1 "gents" ring on April 22, 1952	1,100.00
3 cases of whisky on January 5, 1953	180.00
150 billfolds for committeemen and stewards as Christmas gifts on December 14, 1953	918.00
3 (money) clips on May 17, 1954	1,080.00
1 money clip on June 1, 1954	360.00
1 pen and pencil set and 2 pairs of cuff links to be used as gifts on June 14, 1955	385.90
4 pairs of cuff links to be used as gifts	460.00

Incisco stated that the recipients of these gifts were officials of other unions who had been of great help to him, and that it was his custom to offer gifts on such a scale as this. When asked if he had attempted to secure the consent of the members of his union before making the gift of say, the \$1,200 ring, Incisco said: "No, because it would take me so long to get all my dues-paying members

²⁴ *Douglas Report*, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-218.

together, that before I get it done, it would be out of style." That such a baronial style of living should be considered inappropriate for a trade union official seemed to cause surprise and pain to the simple Incisco. This part, at least, of his performance carried some conviction. "I don't believe," remarked Senator Allott of Colorado at the conclusion of Incisco's testimony before the Committee, "that anything we could say or do could . . . make this man realise the moral significance of what he has done. . . ."

Neither Incisco nor his local union are any longer affiliated with the Allied Industrial Workers, but the character of its leadership—particularly in New York—prompted a further investigation by the AFL-CIO Committee on Ethical Practices. An investigation of both the Allied Industrial Workers and the Laundry Workers was begun in August, 1956, while the Distillery Workers were required to show cause why they should not be suspended forthwith from the federation. All three unions were the subject of exhaustive reports by the Committee on Ethical Practices to the AFL-CIO Executive Council in January, 1957. As a result each of them was given ninety days to eliminate all corrupt influences "or stand suspended and face expulsion from the AFL-CIO."²⁵

* * * *

These are important events. The AFL-CIO, by its actions since the merger, has shown its opposition to corruption in the labour movement to be genuine and strongly based. There can be little doubt that the future will see increased efforts on the part of the federation and the vast majority of its affiliates to rid themselves of men and practices which, now more than ever, are inflicting such great harm on the reputation of trade unionism in the United States. The task will not be easy. It is, first of all, as much a matter of trade union standards as of criminal law. Many, if not most, of the activities now being exposed by the Senate investigation—the holding by union officials of conflicting business interests, the use of union money for marginal or dubious political activities, the manipulation of welfare funds for private gain, the admission of convicted gangsters into trade union office, the provision of token services to union members by high-salaried union officials—are simply not criminal; nor is it at all certain that the AFL-CIO would welcome legislation to make all such activities subject to governmental control, since not all governments use their powers

²⁵ *New York Times*, February 6, 1957.

benevolently. Thus a heavy strain will be placed on the self-disciplinary powers of the AFL-CIO itself. The federation has already prescribed the standards by which such powers should be used. The constitution of the AFL-CIO, the resolutions passed at its founding convention, the codes of the Committee on Ethical Practices and the pronouncements of the Executive Council constitute an explicit rejection of the philosophy of business unionism of which so much modern trade union corruption is a natural fruit, and are a commitment on the part of the AFL-CIO to the older trade union ideas of fraternity and service. The new standards are unequivocal, and they are deliberately conceived.

The problem will be enforcement. The AFL-CIO, like most organisations of its kind, is a confederal body. Its powers are delegated powers; it can do nothing of consequence without the support of a strong majority of its affiliates; it has no constitutional disciplinary authority over its member unions other than suspension and expulsion; it has no direct authority over individual members of affiliated unions at all. A further problem is that while the existence of corrupt practices—at least those of a criminal character—is certainly a statistically minor phenomenon in American labour, a considerable number of unions are tainted to some slight extent.²⁶ All AFL-CIO unions, however, are highly jealous of their independence, and will tend to resist any attempt by the federation to assume unusual authority in dealing with corruption. Except in the more flagrant cases, therefore, the AFL-CIO may be forced to confine its activities to the formulation of standards and the exhortation of unions to observe them. Since, in turn, some unions will be either reluctant or unable to impose strong discipline on wayward local affiliates, the process of purification is likely to be slow. Even where the most blatant violations of AFL-CIO standards take place, retaliatory action will not necessarily be automatic. The massive Teamsters are not the only large AFL-CIO union infected by the worst type of corrupt practices, and the

²⁶ Nobody knows with any accuracy the extent of criminal or unethical practices in the American labour movement. There seems to be no satisfactory way of finding out except by prolonged investigation. Most competent observers seem to agree that unethical practices in trade unions are no greater than in most other organisations, and that criminal practices are much less frequent than in many types of business organisations. Perhaps as good a statistic as any is the fact that with approximately the same number of bank employees as union officials (494,000: 480,000), in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, there were Federal indictments of forty-two bank employees and thirty-five union officials. Bank employees hold a slightly higher percentage of indictments, which is perhaps understandable. See *Annual Report of the Attorney-General, United States* (Washington: 1955), p. 124. I am indebted to Gordon H. Cole, President of the International Labor Press Association, for the above comparison.

application of strong disciplinary measures against a group of the AFL-CIO's most powerful affiliates will require a great deal of courage and intra-federation co-operation. There is a danger that the quality of justice meted out by the federation will turn out to be a function of size. Yet even if the sternest of reprisals are taken against the most powerful of unions—and given the character of the present leadership of the AFL-CIO they probably will be where necessary—it is by no means certain that they will achieve the end desired. Expulsion is the final penalty of the federation, carrying with it a political and economic ostracism most unions will do much to avoid; but the example of the ILA—which has survived almost intact, since its expulsion from the AFL, the unwelcome attentions of the Federal government, the National Labour Relations Board, two state governments, the public press, several grand jury investigations and three attempts by “legitimate” unions to replace it as the bargaining representative of the longshoremen—is hardly encouraging. With all the resolution in the world, the AFL-CIO is unlikely to solve the problem of internal corruption with the dispatch it deserves.

But with the exhaustion of trade union remedies against unethical and criminal practices the only recourse is the law, and here the situation is gloomy. Many undesirable practices, as already noted, are not subject to the law at present. Yet even those that are too frequently go unpunished; despite a recent increase in Federal indictments and convictions of “labour racketeers”²⁷ it appears to be extraordinarily difficult to institute successful court actions against criminals in the ranks of labour. Federal anti-racketeering statutes are largely limited to extortion, a crime not easy to prove in court. In addition, Federal criminal jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in interstate commerce—apparently a

²⁷ The United States Attorney-General reported in 1955 that since the advent of the Eisenhower Administration there had been, under the appropriate Federal statutes, seventy indictments involving 149 union officials, leading to twenty-two convictions involving forty-six persons. He also reported that from 1945 to 1952 the Department of Justice filed only five cases involving corrupt practices in unions. These figures suggest that the problem, at least at the Federal level, is one of lax enforcement rather than inadequate laws. See *Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the United States, op. cit.* See also Warren Olney III, “Current Developments in the Battle Against Organized Crime,” *Department of Justice Press Release*, February 24, 1955. Olney stated that “Two years ago there were many indications that the country was faced with what appeared to be a new phase in the problem of organized crime. After intruding themselves into the labor world with violence and corruption the molesters were using their power for extortion on an increasing scale against business and industry and the United States Government itself. . . . It is with great satisfaction that I can report that our prosecution of these extortioners and bribe takers has received encouragement and support from organized labour all over the country.”

substantial limitation. As the Kefauver Report stated: “While channels of interstate communication and interstate commerce may be used by organised criminal gangs and syndicates, their activities are in large measure violations of local criminal statutes . . . it is upon state and local prosecuting agencies, police, and courts that the major responsibility for the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of offenders rests.”²⁸

Federal authorities have thus been driven, in most cases, to the prosecution of racketeers for offences other than racketeering, such as evasion of income tax and illegal use of the mails. State and local enforcement of existing statutes, moreover, seems to be something less than exemplary. The uneven quality of local and State police departments, frequent ties between racketeers and politicians, the fear of underworld reprisals on the part of many prospective witnesses, and the general problem of developing legal definitions of racketeering acceptable to the courts—all these make effective opposition to racketeering a difficult task. Nor, under present circumstances, can the Federal government be of much assistance:

“The Federal government can do little to compel State and local governments to meet their law enforcement responsibilities. It cannot compel the removal of local law-enforcement officials who have connived in criminal operations. It can do nothing about the influence which gangsters and racketeering elements exert upon local political organisations. It cannot correct the inefficiency or ineffectiveness of local law-enforcement agencies. Nor can the Federal government eliminate the diffusion of responsibility and the ‘buck-passing’ which take place between independent law enforcement agencies operating in the same county or the same metropolitan area. Finally . . . the Federal government can do nothing about the misguided leniency of State and local judges who impose small fines or short jail sentences in racketeering situations.”²⁹

Since the publication of the Kefauver and American Bar Association reports, no important changes in Federal or State law relating to racketeering appear to have taken place. The continuing unsatisfactory condition has prompted one observer to offer the morbid, if somewhat exaggerated, judgment that there is “no direct legal attack on racketeering. . . . Local ordinances are powerless to get at the operation of racketeers. So are the ordinary state laws.

²⁸ *Organised Crime in Interstate Commerce*, Third Interim Report (Kefauver Report) of the Special U.S. Senate Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: 1951), p. 6.

²⁹ American Bar Association, *Organized Crime and Law Enforcement*, New York: The Grosby Press, 1952, p. 23.

So are the Federal laws. Under the American system of law enforcement and prosecution, racketeers are practically immune."³⁰

In welfare fund administration, also, the law appears to offer little protection at this time against abuse. The Taft-Hartley Act, apart from a prohibition against offering or taking bribes, prescribes no standards for administration and thus no penalties for violations of them. The only other Federal statute of some application to welfare funds appears to be the Internal Revenue Code which, since it is primarily concerned with taxation, provides little in the way of positive regulation of the funds. There is, it is true, considerable support in the Congress for legislation which would require proper administrative and actuarial practices in welfare funds and provide criminal penalties for violation of Federal requirements, but no such legislation has been enacted as yet. Equally important is the apparent absence of any Congressional intent to regulate the insurance industry. The Congress, indeed, has abdicated the entire field of insurance regulation, leaving it specifically to the States. The States, in turn, have largely neglected the problems of crime and unethical practices in insurance—a condition which, according to the Douglas report, the insurance companies themselves have shown little interest in correcting.³¹ The result is that abuses in welfare fund administration—most of which depend upon collusion between representatives of labour, management, and the insurance industry—are largely unregulated and unpunishable. "The logical conclusion," the Douglas report says, "is that . . . there is no legislation at either the Federal or State level that will adequately safeguard those welfare and pension funds or the equities of their intended beneficiaries."³²

* * * *

It is certain that the Senate investigations will result in a major effort to remedy the defects in the law. If public interest and indignation are sustained at their present high level for any length of time, there is good reason to suppose that the effort will meet with substantial success, probably to the great discomfort of organised labour. The least that can be expected is the passage of new laws to regulate the book-keeping and fiscal reporting practices

³⁰ Walter C. Reckless, *The Crime Problem*, New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1955, p. 189. For a proposal to increase Federal authority over criminal activities, see Rufus G. King, "The Control of Organized Crime in America," *Stanford Law Review*, December, 1951, pp. 51-67.

³¹ *Douglas Report*, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-67.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

of unions and welfare funds; such legislation is now being prepared and, at least in the matter of welfare fund regulation, will have the general support of the AFL-CIO. Other legislative proposals will not be so welcome. "Right-to-work" Acts, prohibiting union shop agreements in labour-management contracts, are now in effect in eighteen States; in the present climate of opinion the enactment of more such laws, striking at the heart of trade union power, is at least a clear and present danger. There will also be an attempt to enact a Federal right-to-work law which, if less likely to pass than individual State laws, would be a major disaster for the labour movement.³³ A number of other proposals—to regulate the internal government of unions, to prevent union officials from using union funds to defend themselves in courts of law, to make unions subject to the monopoly provisions of the anti-trust laws, to supervise the investment of union and welfare funds, and, perhaps most important, to impose severe restrictions on the political activities of the labour movement—have already been made. No doubt more will follow, and some will become the law. It is not at all certain that trade unionism in the United States will benefit from them.

"We are," a labour leader has said, "in Gethsemane." The AFL-CIO does indeed have a major choice to make at this low point in its fortunes. The weakness of the law, of law enforcement, and of the AFL-CIO's own disciplinary processes will not be remedied soon. For the present, at least, the federation will continue to suffer greatly in public prestige from a condition for which it has only a limited responsibility and for which it is poorly equipped to effect a cure. It will take years of internal struggle, and the vigorous enforcement of existing and perhaps new laws, to purge completely the elements which have done so much harm to the name and purpose of trade unionism in the United States. Meanwhile, however, the AFL-CIO can attempt to deal with the problem openly, continuously, and aggressively, treating it as a matter of great urgency; or it can proceed quietly and cautiously, minimising the importance of the issue. The latter course has its

³³ s. 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, a Federal statute, permits the states to pass laws prohibiting union shop contracts, *i.e.*, contracts requiring the employee to join the union after being hired. Union shop contracts are general practice in craft unions and widespread, in one form or another, in industrial unions. Federal law prohibits only closed shop contracts, *i.e.*, contracts requiring the employee to join the union before he is hired. Even union shop contracts, however, add greatly to the economic power of unions and to union control over members. The union shop has no direct connection with corruption, but its abolition can weaken drastically the bargaining and other powers of unions perhaps more than any other single legislative act. Anti-labour groups will no doubt take full advantage of the present low repute of labour to press anti-union shop legislation.

appeal; no organisation likes to expose its weaknesses, and most American newspapers are not particularly fond of trade unions. There is also the argument that the problem of corruption is better dealt with by the labour movement itself through infiltration and gradual attrition rather than by expulsion and legal action—a case which has some support in recent experience.³⁴

The AFL-CIO clearly holds the former view. It is, after all, a political organisation. Its primary purpose, as a federation not directly involved in the everyday processes of collective bargaining, is to protect the interests of labour in the Congress, in the State and local legislative bodies, and in the community at large. This is a vital role in a time when American unions are tending more and more to seek benefits for their members through political action; it is doubly important for a labour movement which is already considerably regulated by law and which has good cause to believe that the near future will bring powerful attempts to enact further regulatory—and perhaps punitive—legislation. The fate of such legislation will be influenced by public opinion, which in turn will be affected by the behaviour of the AFL-CIO. Silence—or even modesty—on the part of the federation regarding its own policies and actions against corruption, and any trade union obstruction of the legitimate inquiries of the Senate Committee, will help to foster a strong public image of a labour movement riddled with racketeers and parasites. Accordingly the AFL-CIO, while properly warning against the use of legislative investigations as a club to beat labour, has given official indorsement to any legislative committee “seeking

³⁴ The survival of the ILA has already been mentioned. Among Communist-led or pro-Communist unions expelled from the CIO, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union led by Harry Bridges has weathered the storm. The Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, reported at various times to be on the verge of surrender to the Teamsters, still survive. On the other hand, the United Electrical Workers (UE) have been practically decimated by the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), chartered by the CIO after the expulsion of the UE, under James B. Carey. It should be noted that this was the only case of a new union being chartered by the CIO to take over an expelled union; the expelled Marine Cooks and Stewards were beaten later by a new union chartered by the AFL and supported by the ex-AFL Seafarers' International Union under Harry Lundeberg. Several other ex-CIO unions, such as the Fur Workers, the Food and Tobacco Workers, the United Public Workers, the United Office and Professional Workers, and the American Communications Association, eke out a marginal existence or have disappeared altogether. The evidence may only suggest, of course, that it is easier to take on and defeat a union led by Communists than one led by racketeers. The International Brotherhood of Longshoremen, chartered by the AFL to fight the ILA, has lost three hard-fought elections against the enemy; its prospects of victory seem dimmer now than at the beginning. There have been, indeed, some recent signs that the AFL-CIO, while holding to a policy of vigorous and open attack on corrupt practices, is now inclined to help honest trade unionists overthrow corrupt leaders from within wherever possible, resorting to suspension and expulsion from the federation only when other measures fail.

fairly and objectively” to keep trade unions or any other organisations free from corruption.³⁵ The deliberations of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, the promulgation of the codes, the arraignment of suspect unions, the discharge of federation employees found guilty of corrupt behaviour, the suspension of President Dave Beck of the Teamsters from the Executive Council of the federation,³⁶ and the opinions of President Meany and other prominent leaders of the AFL-CIO on corrupt practices have all been given the widest publicity. But the real test lies ahead. As the tragic story unfolds before the Senate Committee, the AFL-CIO will be judged by the actions it takes against those who violate its standards. There can be no doubt that the path of honour will impose an enormous strain on the sinews of the federation, perhaps upon its ability to survive. The ordeal begins.

³⁵ *New York Times*, January 29, 1957.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, March 30, 1957.

INDIA AFTER TEN YEARS

SIR IVOR JENNINGS, K.B.E.

THE publication of an excellent study of *Parliament in India*¹ reminds us that the four countries of Asia which achieved independence in 1947—India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon—have now completed ten years of their history as independent countries. There can be no doubt, even on a superficial view, that India has been the most successful. Pakistan had by far the most difficult task and its initial organisation was a miracle of improvisation—for which Chaudhri Mohamed Ali was mainly responsible—but it suffered severely by the death of M. A. Jinnah and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. It has at last attained a constitution, and in H. S. Suhrawardy it has an able and experienced statesman: but the break-up of the original Muslim League has left both East and West Pakistan to tortuous group politics, and it is still far from its first general election. Burma is now running more smoothly as its young men have gained experience, but it still suffers from the too rapid leap to independence which the Rangoon graduates insisted on taking in 1947, and its Government has never had control of the whole of its territory. Ceylon, whose task was comparatively simple and which did very well for its first five years, suffered severely by the death of D. S. Senanayake, and turned up its sillier side in 1956. The real left wing, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, has able leaders but is unfortunately the prisoner of its ideological past. Because it was founded in the thirties it thinks it is Marxist and claims affiliation with the Fourth International, though in fact it talks plain social democracy. Hence, when the electors wanted to get rid of the United National Party they had to turn to S.W.R.D.—Bandaranaike's miscellaneous group.

India had advantages which Pakistan and Burma did not possess. Justice will probably not be done to the Indian civil service and the other joint services until the memories of Congress agitation have faded. In spite of the immense difficulties of the last ten years of British rule, India was well governed by increasingly Indianised services, and in 1947 the Congress took over an excellent administrative machine. Since it lost few of its able personnel to

Pakistan but did lose three provinces and two halves, there was ample material to replace the comparatively few expatriate officers. The organisation of the Congress in depth and its long period of highly organised non-co-operation had given its leaders, even of the second rank, political experience which could easily be turned to more constructive purposes. Moreover the principal leaders were not politicians on the make but persons whose patriotism had been tested in the fire. Independence gave them a flush of enthusiasm which ten years' experience has still not extinguished. Through the influence of Mahatma Gandhi they had genuine mass support, whereas the Muslim League consisted of a comparatively small group of educated Indians whose only appeal to the masses was the brotherhood of Islam, an appeal which became weak when once Pakistan was established as a Muslim country, Jinnah and Liaquat were dead, and the lesser men began quarrelling about places. Above all, India has had firm and able leadership from Jawaharlal Nehru. One hesitates to say so, but it probably gained from Gandhi's death at the height of his glory. His influence might have kept down some of the corruption and place-seeking that is now beginning to appear in some of the Congress outposts. On the other hand, he was lacking in the plain common sense which is needed for practical politics—indeed that was part of his mastery—and had he shared the leadership with Nehru there would probably have been confusion and perhaps some division of the ranks of the Congress.

It is difficult, even now, to pass judgment on Lord Mountbatten's transfer of power. His theatrical ways, oddly enough, convinced the Congress of his (and Britain's) sincerity and gave him unexpected popularity among the masses—how professional republicans do love a monarch!—but his name is mud in Pakistan, perhaps rather unfairly. The administrative machine was threatening to break down, and Jinnah was too obstinate to work in harness with the Congress, while his authority was too great to enable the more amenable Muslims like Liaquat, Ghulam Mohamed, Nishtar, and Chaudhri Mohamed Ali to function in a coalition. Moreover the major blunder, the Punjab boundary, was not Lord Mountbatten's but Lord Radcliffe's. It is difficult to believe, however, that a less impetuous Viceroy could not have held on for another six months, until the Punjab and Bengal were partitioned, Pakistan organised enough to maintain law and order, the problems of Hyderabad and Kashmir settled, and the Hindus and Muslims on both sides of the new border accustomed to partition. Those six months might have

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¹ *Parliament in India* by W. H. Morris-Jones, Professor of Political Theory and Institutions in the University of Durham (Longmans).

made all the difference to sixteen million refugees, not to mention the thousands who died or were abducted.

If the Mountbatten hustle was a mistake, however, it affected Pakistan more than India, though India's social and economic development will necessarily be hindered so long as the Kashmir problem remains unsolved. Nehru suffers more than most politicians from the tyranny of the cable, the process which compels us to read a sub-editor's selections from a reporter's selections from a political speech. I remember a speech of Nehru's which, read in *Dawn*, looked quite stupid, but which looked quite excellent when the fuller report of *The Statesman* arrived in Karachi later in the day; and Karachi prints more than London prints. Nehru does tend to lecture, but he lectures his own people as much as he lectures lesser breeds west of Suez; and sometimes they are very good lectures. Nor should everything said or done on behalf of the Government of India be attributed to him. He has a very heavy job, and the process of blaming the man at the top is American, due to the fact that the United States followed the cult of the individual before Stalin was born. Krishna Menon's bad manners are not Nehru's but his own. Nor should the case made for India over Kashmir, before the Security Council, be regarded as Nehru's, or even Krishna Menon's. It was quite obviously a brief prepared by a junior accustomed to litigation. A more skilled advocate would have selected from it the few and simple arguments which were likely to have weight, and would have left out the trivial and sometimes contradictory debating points. Nehru's own case on Kashmir is quite clear and quite good. The Maharaja of Kashmir, like the Nizam of Hyderabad, was trying to hold on to his prerogatives during a period when triumphant nationalism was sweeping the sub-continent and demanding democracy in the States as well as in British India. He therefore hesitated either to accept the Indian Government's broad hint that he should accede to Pakistan or to take the politically more dangerous step of acceding to India. His Muslim subjects becoming impatient and rebellious, there were rumours on the frontier that they were being oppressed; and the tribesmen poured in, no doubt with the connivance of the Frontier and Punjab Governments, to defend Islam against the infidel. The Maharaja, in a panic, asked for Indian aid, which was refused on Lord Mountbatten's advice unless it was made lawful by accession to India. The accession was then accepted subject to consultation with the people of Kashmir when the raiders were expelled. They never were expelled, because when it appeared

likely that Indian troops would clear what is now called Azad Kashmir Pakistani troops were sent in—possibly in November 1947, but certainly before May, 1948. India's case is that the India occupation of Kashmir was lawful because it followed accession while the Pakistani occupation of part of Kashmir was an unlawful occupation of what had become, temporarily at least, Indian territory. While Nehru has been willing to compromise he has at all times insisted that the status of the two countries in relation to Kashmir is quite different.

Pakistan also has a case, though it is probable that Nehru has understood it as little as the Pakistanis have understood his. Perhaps, therefore, he is wrong to insist upon his point so obstinately, though he thinks he is defending the rule of law against the rule of force. He is not helped by Krishna Menon's special pleading (which in fact weakened a good case), nor by the inaccurate and tendentious statements of some of his official propagandists. There are, too, other factors. I do not believe that much can be made of the fact that he is by origin a Kashmiri Brahmin. Nor do I believe (though the Pakistanis certainly do) that his object is to weaken Pakistan in order to absorb it into a reunited India. There are no doubt people in India who have that object, but there is no evidence that Nehru is one of them. On the other hand, he has no sympathy with a state which claims to be founded on religious premises, and he did not think that Jinnah was a particularly religious man; he exaggerates that foundation by calling Pakistan a "theocracy," which it is not. He has also been misled by his advisers into asserting that the Pakistan constitution incorporates Kashmir as Pakistani territory. It does not, though it does include Chitral and, by implication, Junagadh. His case is weakened by the Indian Government's refusal to recognise Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, and by the "police action" in Hyderabad. Moreover, he has consistently supported a minority Government in Kashmir which keeps itself in power (with Indian assistance) by undemocratic means. He cannot really believe that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly represented the people or that its acceptance of accession to India is the consultation with the people for which the Government of India so properly stipulated in 1947. Nevertheless he has a case, and it rests fundamentally on a point of law which could without great difficulty be settled by the International Court or any other judicial tribunal, that India is lawfully in occupation of Kashmir territory and Pakistan is in unlawful occupation of Azad Kashmir, so that if Pakistan wants a

plebiscite its first step should be to withdraw its troops. Pakistan also has a case founded on different premises which could equally be put before a court. This is the sort of problem which might have been settled by judicial decision because both countries accept the principle of the rule of law, while as the event proved it could not be settled by conciliation and arbitration. Nehru's objection to American military aid to Pakistan seems superficially to be irrelevant and was therefore generally regarded as a mere excuse for not having a plebiscite. The fact is, however, that India still fears that if Pakistan were strong enough it would decide the issue of Kashmir by force. The Pakistan scheme of defence perhaps encourages this view in a mind grown suspicious after ten years of neighbourly difficulties. It seems to have been assumed that air power renders impossible the defence of the frontier by forces in the Khyber Pass, which is still the invasion route; but troops stationed in the plains are also stationed behind the frontier of Azad Kashmir. Nor is it unlikely that there are troops stationed near the Indian frontier, for Indo-Pakistan relations are governed by the distrust arising out of ten years of conflict over Kashmir and Indus water.

There is, too, another point arising out of India's "neutralist" policy. This also has had a bad press, but it arises out of an assessment of probabilities in respect of which it is difficult to be dogmatic. The Americans have decided, and they may be right, that Soviet communism is fundamentally aggressive and that it can be contained only by a ring of bases and military pacts from Norway to Peshawar. Nehru's view appears to be that such a ring is in itself an encouragement to aggression by making the Russians fear western aggression. He regards the cold war as an American product as well as a Soviet product. He fears that if both sides have nuclear bombs somebody some day will drop one. Pakistan, by joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and taking American aid has extended the cold war to India's frontiers and encouraged an attack through and over the Khyber. To allow Kashmir to accede to Pakistan would be to extend the area of danger. It is possible to believe India to be wrong but not possible to prove it wrong, for the premises must be mere estimates of probability. The West prefers to gamble with bombs and India prefers to gamble without them, and gambling without them is cheaper. The odds may be against India, but at least it is a fair gamble.

The success of India since 1947 ought, however, to be judged not by its failure to solve the Kashmir problem but by the success

of its parliamentary institutions, which Professor Morris-Jones describes. It has now held two general elections under a highly complex federal constitution. It is possible that the less reputable methods of winning elections, which are well known in Pakistan and Ceylon and perhaps even better known in Kashmir, are being learned in India: corruption begins to tell in the third election. There can be no doubt, however, that so far as the central organisation of the Congress is concerned the elections have been entirely fair; and this, with an electorate which is largely illiterate, is no mean achievement. There have been other difficulties arising out of the heterogeneous character of the population, and no doubt we shall hear more about them when the communist Government of Kerala gets going. We may hear more of them after the general election of 1962, when even in the most favourable circumstances the Congress is likely to lose three or four other States. The foundation of success so far has been the predominance of the Congress both at the Centre and in the States. This has enabled the Congress to keep control of the States, to work by common party action the complex and intricate constitution which the Constituent Assembly foisted on the country and, where difficulties have arisen, to secure without difficulty the necessary constitutional amendments. Particularly impressive has been its success in suppressing the Princes and reorganising the States on linguistic lines, though there is a great deal to be said for Nehru's dislike of linguistic sectionalism.

How long this hegemony of the Congress continues depends partly upon Nehru himself. In any case the Congress will probably have lost four or five States by 1962. In large measure, however, the strength of the Congress lies in Nehru himself. He has great electoral appeal, and he gives such strength to the High Command that it is usually able to settle by ukase the personal squabbles that so often break out at lower party levels. When he disappears from active politics—and ten years in so difficult a post as his is a long time even for so hardy and active a man—the chances of the Congress breaking up into factions, as the Muslim League has already done, are considerable. On the other hand, the long period of Congress rule has been of great advantage to India. Not only has the country had a consistent and, generally, a sensible policy, but also the electorate has got used to thinking in national terms, while the most difficult part of constitution-making, the formation of an Opposition, is well on its way. In a democracy one-party rule must lead to two-party rule. There is now more than a reasonable chance that a very heterogeneous country will hold together

and that when the Congress falls there will be an Opposition ready to take over. One could not have said that ten years ago, when a Balkanisation of India seemed more than likely. Nor need there be any great fear of communism so long as the possibility of two-party government remains. The Malayalees were always difficult people and the loss of Kerala was not unexpected. It is encouraging that Andhra, which was expected to go communist after the incorporation of a large part of Hyderabad, has not done so.

The economic problem does, however, cause some disquiet. It is of course Congress doctrine that economic development was retarded by British rule and so all Indian politicians tend to be over-optimistic. Moreover, there is an enthusiasm for "planning" which in Europe has tended to wane, not because there is anything wrong with the theory but because we have sometimes taken a look at our would-be "planners." In India a national plan has to be built up out of regional plans, which have as much relation to reality as science-fiction has to science. Even a Planning Commission of super-men, however, dare not reject all the bright ideas because there is no money to finance them. The National Planning Commission does not consist of super-men although, as Professor Morris-Jones points out, it is beginning to look like a super-Cabinet. There is a real risk of inflation through excessive optimism, and therefore some risk of political disturbance through economic distress. It is still true not only that money makes money but also that to make money one must first get money. The great risk is that the banking institutions will be required to make money by faking credit. In spite of Keynes, there is still a lot to be said, at least by those who are not professional economists, for the good old nonconformist virtue of saving up, and India's population has not at present much to save.

This is an essay and not a review, but I ought not to end without expressing appreciation of Professor Morris-Jones' industry, accuracy, and fair-mindedness. In the early pages of the book I thought I detected a rather soapy tendency not uncommon among those who go to Asia with the intention of being nice to everybody; but as he warms up he gives what, I am sure, most Indians themselves would most appreciate, a fair and accurate appraisal without muffling criticisms where they seem justified. The result is, of course, generally favourable to the Congress effort. Some Indian ought to amuse himself by collecting the material produced in England during the thirties. He might begin with a collection of Sir Winston Churchill's speeches.

ADULT EDUCATION IN TRANSITION

PROFESSOR S. G. RAYBOULD

ADULT education in England is in a condition of change. No doubt it always was; but whereas there have been long periods in the last hundred and fifty years when trends were clear and particular institutions dominant, the post-war decade has not been one of them. In the early part of the nineteenth century the Adult Schools were active in the task of reducing adult illiteracy. A generation later the Mechanics Institutes were at the height of their influence and prestige. From the 1870s until 1900 the university extension movement held the field, and for forty years after the launching of R. H. Tawney's first tutorial classes there was no question what was the main force: it was the partnership of the Workers' Educational Association and the universities, inspired by the notion of "education for social and industrial emancipation." But in the second half of the twentieth century the picture is more confused and the prospect uncertain, not least in regard to the forms of work hitherto most purposeful and assured.

Something can be learned from statistics; and since the largest question mark appears to hang over the future of the W.E.A., the figures relating to various aspects of its condition may be considered first. At first sight the position is reassuring: in terms of branches, members, classes and students the Association is stronger than at any time before 1939, when its place as the dominant institution in British adult education was unchallenged and apparently unchallengeable. In all except one of these respects, however, it is weaker than it was a decade ago. The number of branches is a little higher than in the late forties, although a little less than in the early fifties; but the number of branch and district members, perhaps the acid test of the strength of the Association as a voluntary body, is 25 per cent. less than in the peak year of 1946-1947, when it exceeded forty-five thousand. The fall, moreover, has been uninterrupted year by year, except for a small improvement in 1954-1955 which was more than offset in the following year. In regard to classes and students the peak session

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came a little later, in 1948-1949, after a rapid recovery from the trough reached early in the war. In that year there were more than a hundred and ten thousand students in over six thousand classes provided or organised by the Association—many more than in any pre-war year. By the middle fifties, however, there were almost a thousand fewer classes and nearly twenty thousand fewer students, although there were signs of stabilisation after five years of uninterrupted decline—decline which was marked before the freezing of Ministry of Education grants by Miss Horsbrugh came into effect.

One aspect of the W.E.A.'s situation which is of special importance and interest is its relation to the universities. After the successful start of the first university tutorial classes almost half-a-century ago the number of such classes, and of joint committees of the Association and the universities to sponsor them, grew rapidly, until the joint activity dominated the extra-mural work of the universities as well as constituting the hard core, although not the major part, of the W.E.A.'s total class work. The tutorial classes shared in the recovery of the later war, and the immediate post-war, years, and the number of one-session classes organised by the Association and taught by the universities became very much greater than before 1939. On the one hand, however, since the war the tutorial class situation has been less satisfactory than that of other types of class; and on the other, in the same period the most notable feature of university adult education has been the growth of work organised by extra-mural departments independently of the W.E.A.

After the outbreak of war the tutorial class movement reached its lowest point, in terms of numbers of students, in 1941-1942, when the total was 6,541, just over half the figure for 1938-1939. Seven years later the total was 14,700, the highest ever recorded; but this level has not been maintained, and in the last three or four years the number of tutorial class students has been less than in the late thirties, although in W.E.A. classes of all kinds the figures for the fifties are about one-third greater than for the immediate pre-war years. The decline since 1948-1949 has been accompanied, on the other hand, by a rapid growth of classes organised directly by the university extra-mural departments, and usually sponsored by extension committees as distinct from joint committees of the universities and the W.E.A. As far as three-year classes are concerned, the number is still considerably less than half of the number organised by the Association; but whereas in 1948-1949 the

total number of such extension classes was only three, in 1955-1956 it was 282; and what is perhaps more significant than this rapid rate of growth, this total was distributed amongst a considerable number of universities. In regard to one-session classes the picture is different, but the trend the same. In 1945-1946 the number of university sessional classes organised by the W.E.A. was 652, and in 1955-1956 it was 635. The corresponding figures for one-session extension classes were nine and 734.

This growth of "independent" university provision is forcing to the front a question which other tendencies within and without the W.E.A. have raised, namely what is to be the Association's role in the second, as compared with the first, half of the twentieth century. Within the W.E.A. there are a marked change in the character of the student body, and a shift of subject interest. Outside it there are new trends in trade union and co-operative education, in regard to both content and organisation; and these bear on university provision as well as on the work of the W.E.A.

The shift in subject interest in W.E.A. classes is probably less significant than the changes in the student body. It is a partial change in emphasis from social studies such as economics, politics, international relations, and some branches of history to subjects like literature, music, and the arts, and in the light of the history of the Association is a return to an earlier situation, rather than a novel one. The W.E.A. has always had a concern for studies which promote the cultural development of the individual, as well as for social studies, and the proportions of classes in the two groups have varied according to changes in popular interests, and especially according to the degree to which public attention has been focused on social and political events at home and abroad. In the twenties, when although there was persistent and serious unemployment it did not get dramatically worse, and when world peace was not obviously threatened by the dictators and would-be dictators, more than a third of all W.E.A. classes were in literature, music, and the arts, and by the end of the decade the figure was over 40 per cent. A change began during the slump of 1929-1931, and was accentuated after Hitler's accession to power in 1933. The proportion of classes in social studies rose, and the proportion in literature and the arts fell, almost uninterruptedly until the latter part of the war, when the figure for the former group was almost 70 per cent, and for the latter little over 25 per cent. (The remaining classes were mainly in one or other of the sciences.) After 1943 the pendulum moved quite sharply back for two or three years, and

since then the ratio between the two groups has remained very steady at about two to one—less than between 1935 and 1945 but greater than in the late twenties and early thirties. These overall figures, however, do not tell the whole story, because the term “social studies” covers a considerable number of classes, in local history for example, in which interest is not directed to an understanding of contemporary society, but often turned away from it. This is not necessarily to be deplored, any more than is the interest in literature and the arts; but it raises the question whether the W.E.A. is serving as effectively as it did as a means of promoting study of the contemporary world.

The change in subject interest is probably connected in part with the change in the student body. Here two features stand out: the fact that many more women than men now attend W.E.A. classes; and a declining proportion of “educationally under-privileged” students. Of 73,000 students classified by occupations in 1955–1956 more than 43,000 were women, and less than 30,000 men; and of the women more than 25,000 were housewives. Women attend classes in literature, music, the arts, and psychology in larger numbers than do men, and the popularity of these subjects since the war is connected with the increase in the proportion of women students.

The question of who are the “workers” for whom the W.E.A. should specially provide is the subject of much dispute. What is clear is that there has been a considerable change in the proportions of different kinds of workers attending the Association’s classes; and it is not certain that the change is completed. In both occupational and educational terms the extremes may be taken as manual workers on the one hand and professional workers (excluding teachers) on the other; and since 1939 the proportion of manual workers has halved and is still falling, and the proportion of professional workers doubled. Manual workers now constitute about one in six of all students, as compared with one in three before the war, and their total number is some five thousand less than immediately after the war, and smaller than at any time in the thirties. The number of professional workers is still much smaller than that of manual workers, three thousand as compared with twelve thousand, and in some parts of the country, especially the north, the proportion of manual workers is considerably higher than the average; but that the Association is changing in its social and educational composition cannot be doubted. To have an accurate picture of the extent to which it is becoming a “middle-class”

rather than a “working-class” organisation, or, in educational terms, a body catering for ex-grammar school, rather than ex-secondary modern school, students, it would be necessary to know something of the educational background of the housewives who now constitute such a large part of the student body. Information of this kind is not available on a national scale; but the one inquiry on this point known to me showed that a larger proportion of the housewives than of the men students had had a grammar school, and often higher, education.

These developments raise the question of whether in the future the W.E.A. is likely to be as closely associated as in the past with education of special concern to working-class organisations such as the trade unions and the co-operative movement. In both fields interesting new departures have been made in recent years, and their full outcome remains to be seen.

The traditional method by which the unions have assisted the education of their members is affiliation to the W.E.A., or the National Council of Labour Colleges (N.C.L.C.), or both, and encouragement to trade unionists to make use of the facilities—day and weekend schools, classes, summer schools, and correspondence courses—offered by these bodies. Many unions still use this method, although a number apparently have no educational schemes; but in the last few years it has been supplemented in several important cases by other measures. Some unions, including the two largest, have appointed their own full-time education officers, and at least one, the Transport and General Workers’ Union, full-time teaching staff. Others, and notably several divisions of the National Union of Mineworkers, have made direct approaches to university extra-mural departments, thus by-passing the W.E.A., which for many years has had a virtual monopoly of university-working class relationships. Day-release arrangements have been initiated and expanded, again notably by the N.U.M., in some cases with the assistance of the management side of the industry concerned—the National Coal Board is sharing the costs of day-release schemes for Derbyshire and Yorkshire miners. The Workers’ Educational Trade Union Committee, through which the W.E.A. co-operates in special trade union education schemes with affiliated unions, prepared some years ago a special report which has led to the establishment of three pilot schemes in South Wales, on Tyneside, and in Cleveland, with specially appointed organisers and the purpose, not merely of reaching larger numbers of trade unionists than spontaneously come into W.E.A. classes but of

experimenting in new methods of teaching them. Most surprising perhaps, an increasing number of rank-and-file union members have manifested a desire to obtain, through attendance at courses and examinations, university qualifications in subjects such as industrial relations.

These experiments—for most of them are not yet beyond the experimental stage—have been prompted by an awareness on the part of a few people in the unions mainly concerned, and in the W.E.A., that the educational work hitherto supported by the British unions has been much less in volume, and in some respects inferior in quality, to that undertaken in some countries abroad, and not adequate for the needs of the unions in the new situation in which they find themselves in post-war Britain. In several cases they owe a good deal to American ideas and practice. During and after the war a number of the people in Britain mainly concerned with the subject visited the United States, and under the Fulbright scheme a succession of American trade unionists and university teachers interested in workers' education have visited this country to study the work of the W.E.A., Ruskin College, the N.C.L.C., the T.U.C., and some of the unions. This exchange has given rise to a good deal of questioning of the appropriateness of the traditional methods and content of trade union education here; or at least of their adequacy. In particular, British unionists became aware of the value of work of a kind common in the U.S.A., much less common here: the training of trade unionists, usually under the unions' own auspices, in techniques necessary for effective trade union action—work study, negotiation, arbitration, committee procedure, public speaking, and the like. In this direction perhaps most has been done by the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, through full-time courses of several weeks' duration arranged in association with technical colleges; but similar conceptions and methods have influenced the activity of the Transport and General Workers' Union, the day-release schemes of the National Union of Mineworkers, and the pilot schemes of the W.E.A. and the W.E.T.U.C.

How far these developments will go remains to be seen; but the principles involved in them are potentially far-reaching, both for the W.E.A., which has hitherto exercised such a strong influence on the minds of many leading trade unionists, and for the character of trade union education in general. From the point of view of the W.E.A., both the character and the method of organising much of the new work are important: the former because the W.E.A.'s

experience and tradition are in the realm of "liberal" education, not technical training; the latter because already some unions, including at least one long associated (and still associated) with the W.E.A., are discovering and demonstrating that for at least some of the work they wish to do they can dispense with the assistance of the Association, either by doing it by themselves or by making direct approaches to universities. And it is the "doing it by themselves" that gives rise to a question of another kind: whether, if not only technical training but the study of general questions of industrial and economic policy comes to be sponsored by the unions themselves, under the direction of their own education officers and conducted by their own tutors, it will ever be as free and radical as it should be and as it might be if done under the auspices of independent educational organisations. It is striking that this practice and question should arise in trade union education hitherto conducted on different lines just when there are signs in co-operative education of a change in the reverse direction.

In the nineteenth century the co-operative movement was a pioneer in workers' education, and towards its end had many links with university extension. At the beginning of this century, through Albert Mansbridge and others, it helped to found the W.E.A.; but in later years, until very recently, co-operative education has tended to be separate from the work of the Association and the extra-mural departments, although many individual co-operators have, of course, been members of W.E.A. and extra-mural classes. Much of the educational work required by the movement is technical in character, and thus not suited to W.E.A. or university sponsorship: in the last decade much of it has been done at the Co-operative College at Stanford Hall. Lectures, day schools, weekend schools, and discussions on topics of a more general character, however, are regularly arranged, especially by the Co-operative Women's Guilds; and as a result of discussions with the W.E.A. undertaken in the late forties, it was agreed that as a matter of policy the Association, either directly or through its connection with the universities should be the normal source of provision of courses of non-vocational adult education required by co-operative societies. This agreement, however, did not result in any noticeable increase in work of this kind; and in the last two or three years special arrangements have been made with certain university extra-mural departments for day-release courses to be provided for co-operative employees and, in principle at least, members of management committees and directors of societies. The

courses so far arranged have generally been shorter than the day-release courses provided for members of the N.U.M.—one or two academic sessions of one day a week, instead of three sessions of, sometimes, two days a week; but in purpose and to some extent in content they have been similar: a study of the structure and condition of the movement in the light of its aims and the general economic situation in which its activities are carried on. What is particularly interesting about these new ventures is that they are prompted by what seems to be a growing feeling within the movement that neither the movement itself nor its educational work is as effective as it might be, and that one road to improvement may be to engage the interest of outside persons, and in particular of university teachers, in the study of co-operative problems, and in educational work amongst both employees and directors of societies. Suggestions have been made that special lectureships might be instituted at some universities for this purpose. So far no action on these lines has been taken, but it is at least possible that new ground may be broken in co-operative education in the next few years.

It is not only in regard to trade union and co-operative education that the universities are tending to work independently of the W.E.A.; nor is it only in these fields that an increasing amount of extra-mural work is related to the vocational or near-vocational interests of the students, rather than to their interests as citizens. The growth of "independent" extra-mural provision is one of the outstanding features of the last decade, and so far as can be judged is only likely to be checked in the immediate future by lack of resources, if at all. The figures of three-year and sessional classes given above do not by any means tell the whole story: a great many shorter courses have also been provided, many of them certainly of too low a standard to justify university sponsorship, but many, and probably an increasing proportion, of a genuinely advanced or "refresher" character. The impetus behind this development appears to be twofold: an unwillingness on the part of the universities to restrict their provision as closely as (in most cases) before the war to the special clientele of the W.E.A., and a readiness on the part of the "new" public—ex-grammar school, training college, and university students—to avail themselves of the facilities thus offered. One result of this change has been a broadening of the curriculum of university adult education. A wider range of "arts" subjects, including ancient and modern languages and literatures, is being studied. Sciences other than the botany, biology, and geology which have long, but almost alone,

appeared in W.E.A. programmes, are pursued, often at a post-graduate level. Extra-mural courses in technologies such as engineering, agriculture, and mining are becoming common. In the field of social studies, an increasing variety of semi-specialised courses is being provided, attended largely by people employed in the same or closely related occupations—courses in, for example, industrial management, public administration, law, criminology, and psychology and psychiatry in relation to various branches of social work. Some of these new developments, and especially the last two—increasing provision of courses in technology and the vocational study of specialised branches of social science—are giving rise to fears lest extra-mural departments move away from their traditional concern with the promotion of interest in the great humane studies, although some observers as well as practitioners, and notably Sir Eric Ashby, frankly welcome this development and see in it the possibility of leading students from a primarily vocational starting point to a thoroughly liberal destination. In any case, it does seem that in these fields are to be found some of the spontaneous growing points. In regard to the approach to social studies, one sometimes has the strong impression that whereas before 1945 it was the desire to create the welfare state that impelled people to the study of economics, politics, and public administration, now it is the desire to administer it well that is giving rise to the new types of course.

Before leaving the subject of the relations between the W.E.A. and the universities a word should be said about the report of the Ashby Committee. The committee was asked to review and make recommendations concerning the system under which adult education in England and Wales is aided by grants from public funds. It did not recommend any fundamental changes. On the contrary, it explicitly advised the continuance of the present arrangements under which both W.E.A. districts and university extra-mural departments receive most of their teaching costs from the Ministry of Education. But it did discuss two proposals which have been canvassed in several quarters since the war and which if adopted would result in important changes. One is the proposal that local education authorities provide all non-university adult education which attracts grants. The other is the suggestion that extra-mural departments depend for the great bulk of their funds on the universities themselves and not on the Ministry—and this the committee thought should in time be adopted, although not at present. Space does not permit discussion of the significance of

either proposal; but it may be remarked that the freedom of discussion and controversy which have been so marked a feature of adult education in this country, particularly of the W.E.A. type, might be seriously threatened if local authorities became financially responsible for all the non-university work.

Next to the growth of new forms of extra-mural work, perhaps the most striking feature of adult education since the war has been the increase of residential facilities, particularly short term facilities. No new long term colleges, providing courses of one or two academic sessions like Ruskin, Hillcroft, and Fircroft, have been established, although some of these, and especially Ruskin and Fircroft, have been considerably enlarged; but some two dozen new colleges have been founded which provide or accommodate courses ranging in duration from a weekend to a few weeks or, occasionally, two or three months. They vary in their origins, their support, their aims and their methods; but their success indicates that there is a widespread appreciation of opportunities for short periods of residence and study-cum-discussion. The majority were founded, entirely or in part, by local authorities; but others were supported by trusts, or by universities, or in some cases by joint enterprise. Most provide some courses themselves, conducted by the warden and other full-time or part-time staff, but also accommodate courses organised and staffed by other bodies. The variety of subjects in which courses are provided, sometimes even in single colleges, is as great as, or greater than, that in extra-mural programmes, ranging from say, bird-watching to courses for engineering apprentices, and embracing hobbies and recreational pursuits as well as academic studies. To some extent, perhaps an increasing one, they are used by groups of students from part-time classes; but generally speaking they appear to have attracted many students not associated with other forms of adult education—and they have been little patronised by the trade unions.

Finally, reference should be made to adult education in the armed forces, particularly in view of the decision to end national service within the next few years. Since 1948 most of the extra-mural departments and some W.E.A. districts and local authorities have assisted in Services' education, at the request of the Ministry of Defence. Many of them had been active in the wartime and demobilisation schemes of 1940 to 1948; but these were temporary, and the present arrangements were made with the intention of establishing the participation of civilian organisations as a permanent part of the peacetime educational system. Upwards of

thirty full-time tutors have been appointed, mainly by universities, and a considerable amount of work has been done by them and a much greater number of part-time lecturers and teachers, mainly with national servicemen. The work has ranged from classes in commercial and technical subjects to tutorial work in languages, mathematics, and science with university graduates. Latterly an increasing amount has been done with regular soldiers, including men in the technical corps and officers preparing for promotion examinations, or hoping to qualify as interpreters or for admission to the Staff College.

From the point of view of the civilian agencies concerned, and especially the universities, the great defect in present arrangements is that their status is that of auxiliaries to the education branches of the Services—the R.A.E.C. in the case of the army—without any defined place or sphere of work, available to be called on or not as determined by the service departments. This makes for uncertainty and insecurity, which have been accentuated by doubts about the future of national service, and by liaison arrangements which hamper close relationships between teaching staffs and units served. The decision to terminate national service might well be made the occasion for reviewing the experience of the last eight or nine years and considering *de novo* how civilian experience, resources, and influence might be best employed in Services' education in the future.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND NATIONALISATION

JOHN DUGDALE, M.P.

OUGHT the Labour Party to drop all its nationalisation proposals and concentrate solely on building up the welfare state? This seems to be the view of a few people in the Party, and Tony Crosland spent nearly half of a very well-written book, called oddly enough *The Socialist Way*, in stating the case against nationalisation far better than it is stated by the Conservative Central Office. I must confess myself to being an unrepentant believer in the need for a Labour Government to take over a further large section of private industry.

I will at once admit that there are many things wrong with our nationalised industries—just, indeed, as there are with private industries—and that in some respects they have been a disappointment to us. This is partly—perhaps mainly—due to the fact that we expected so much of them. The old socialist idea was that you had only to nationalise an industry for it to be at once perfectly organised and full of workers who were willing to give of their last ounce to make it a success. The organisation of most of the industries that have been nationalised shows, in fact, a considerable improvement on what they were before nationalisation, and in many of them, notably coal mining, there is a far better spirit between workers and managers than existed before.

But they have a long way to go before they reach the standard that we want. There is much that needs to be done to give the workers in each nationalised industry a feeling that they are directly concerned with its development, and that their views on how it can be improved will be fully taken into account. More, too, can be done to make it easier for men to climb the ladder “from bench to board room.” Quite apart from the need to get all workers to express their views and feel that they are being listened to, is the need for them to understand fully decisions that have been arrived at by the management. We are considering nationalised industries, but if we want to find an example of an industry whose public relations are really bad, and where there seems to be less contact between management and workers than in any other, it is surely

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the motor industry, where recent strikes over automation revealed a lamentable state of affairs.

There is, of course, one question which concerns nationalised industries, and which does not in the same way concern private firms. I refer to the question of their relation to Parliament. Is a Minister to be answerable for detailed matters, or only for matters of general principle, and where is the line between “principle” and “detail” to be drawn? Is Parliament to debate every nationalised industry’s affairs in detail, as it does those of the Post Office? If it does so, will it get men with first-class brains to go onto the Boards of nationalised industries? If it does not do so, can it ensure that there is adequate control over them? In short, should Parliament exercise more, or less, control over the nationalised industries, or has it achieved the right balance already?

I experienced this problem myself when I was Minister of State for Colonial Affairs and responsible, under the Secretary of State, for such parliamentary control as there was over the Colonial Development Corporation. It would have been possible to question in great detail every new enterprise proposed by the Corporation, and refuse to sanction any that was not thought by the Colonial Office to be sound. But what point would there be then in asking men of first-rate business ability to serve on the Boards if one was not to rely mainly on their judgment? We decided to leave all purely business questions, in particular the assessment of the possible profitability of any new proposal, to the Board and, on reflection, I really think this is the right policy to pursue. Neither Ministers nor civil servants are particularly well suited to give opinions on the possible profit or loss of business ventures. Nevertheless, I fully recognise that there is a very real problem here, and one which needs to be solved if we are to combine parliamentary control successfully with business enterprise. These are all important questions, but there is no need to prevent other industries being nationalised until they are solved. It is indeed doubtful if there is one solution which would be suitable to every nationalised industry, and it would be absurd to halt all further nationalisation until one is found.

This article, however, is not intended to be an appraisal of the nationalised industries, a task which has been performed by many who are far better qualified to do it than the present writer. The point that it is intended to make here is that nationalised industries, though some of them still leave much to be desired, are sufficiently successful for us to be able to say that it is worth while

adding to their number. In any case, such reforms as are necessary in their organisation can be carried out simultaneously with the nationalisation of a further group of industries.

The recent decision of a large shipping company to transfer its head office to Bermuda in order to escape heavy taxation illustrates at least one of the difficulties of leaving industry in private hands. The advocates of the "control is enough" policy appear to believe that private industrialists will be willing to work indefinitely whatever government is in power and whatever policy is pursued. The policy that they, in fact, advocate is to raise taxation still further and to stop all loopholes. But taxation, even at the level we have today, has begun to make large firms transfer their headquarters abroad. If it is increased still further, there may be many others who are at present undecided, who will follow suit. If, in addition, all methods of earning money without paying taxes are finally prevented, the move to leave England may become a stampede. Many business men reckon that it is worth while working hard in order to earn business expenses and capital gains. Would they work so hard if both these sources of income were removed from them? They might well consider that if there were no chance of earning money through either of these methods, they would transfer their business headquarters abroad. After all one cannot blame them since the whole object of business men is to make a profit, and if they are prevented from doing so in England, it is only natural they should take the first opportunity of trying to set up a business elsewhere.

It would be open to a Labour Government so to alter the law that it would become illegal to transfer the headquarters of a British business to another country. This would, indeed, present some difficulty, since other nations might conceivably take action in reverse, and prevent their own business men from starting businesses in the United Kingdom. But assume that such a law is brought in, its effect may well be to make many industrialists decide to cash in on what they have earned so far, and live in retirement abroad, or even go and work for foreign firms. At this point we should be forced, at a time not of our own choosing, to take over the businesses which they had abandoned. Is it not better to take them over systematically at convenient intervals, so that they can be properly "digested"?

The basic mistake that seems to me to be made by those who believe solely in the "control" system is to suppose that it is possible to depend on private enterprise to develop production

without the rewards that private enterprise expects. Their idea is to milk it indefinitely in order that it may pay for the welfare state, at the same time abusing it continually. But there comes a time when the cow refuses to give any more milk, and if Labour comes into power, brings about a drastic increase in taxation, and stops all loopholes, this time may well arrive.

It has always seemed to be wrong to say that we believe that industry should be run for the benefit of the community and, at the same time, to leave the greater part of it in the hands of people who believe that it should be run with quite a different object, namely, their own profit. Surely if we believe that the private profit motive is wrong, we should not allow three-quarters of our industry to work in accordance with this motive. If, as I am assuming, private industry will not do the work that is necessary for us to keep up our standard of life, unless it is given far more freedom and far bigger profits, we shall have increasingly to depend upon public enterprise. It may well be that I am quite wrong in my assessment of the effect of high taxation upon private industrialists, but it would seem a wise precaution to prepare to take over those industries in which industrialists will react in the way I have suggested. The idea of a welfare state built on private enterprise may prove to be an illusion, and the sooner we face up to this the better.

The strongest argument in favour of leaving things as they are is that large numbers of businesses are today run, not by individual *entrepreneurs*, but by directors who themselves have little or no money invested in them and who work by and large for salary and expenses. It may, therefore, reasonably be argued that they would work just as well for a company as for a state enterprise, whatever the level of taxation might be. Yet curiously enough this argument applies most strongly in just those industries which a Labour Government is most likely to take over—those that are highly developed and that have a monopoly or quasi-monopoly. If I am correct in my thesis it is the more old-fashioned type of business man—the real *entrepreneur*—who is determined to build up *his* business and make a large profit for himself and his friends—who is most likely to sell out and go abroad if threatened with heavy taxation.

We should, therefore, be prepared to take over in our own time any businesses which they are likely to give up, and which it is desirable to continue in the national interest. This may present us with one of our most difficult problems, but it is one which we should face up to in advance.

But let us assume that I am wrong and, in fact, business men carry on quite cheerfully in spite of the high taxation while a Labour Government is in power. Are we really to assume that they will be willing to pay high taxes when the Conservatives are returned once again? Surely the natural assumption is that the business men who have put the Conservative Government into power will immediately take steps to reduce taxation to the level it was before they came in, and this they can only do if, at the same time, they make drastic cuts in the social services.

Among the first industries that should be taken over, other than steel and transport which we have already stated that we will "re-nationalise" and those, if any, which are "abandoned" by their owners, are monopolies or quasi-monopolies, the outstanding example being I.C.I. It has even been said that some of the more publicly minded directors of I.C.I. favour its nationalisation. There can be no conceivable reason why a socialist should object to I.C.I. being nationalised, and even Mr. Crosland does not seem very anxious to prevent this happening. Nor would there seem any reason against nationalising firms (or groups of firms) that have been the subject of a report by the Monopolies Commission—such as, for instance, British Oxygen and the British Match Corporation—and every possible reason for doing so.

But the most important "industry" of all to nationalise is the insurance business. So important is it that if it were nationalised the country would at one stroke gain control of something like 50 per cent. of all British industry still in private hands. We are constantly talking of the need for investment to be directed to this or that end, yet we allow the insurance companies to control both the rate and direction of investment over a wide field.

The main reason—let us be frank about it—that has prevented us coming forward with a policy for the nationalisation of insurance has been that a large section of industrial assurance is run by the co-operative society. This is a dilemma which we must face up to at some time or another. We do not face up to it by refusing to touch any insurance on the ground that a section of one part of it is successfully run by the co-operative movement.

There would seem to be two lines along which we should act. The first line of approach is an indirect one, whose consequence it is difficult to anticipate. It is, as the National Executive appears likely to propose at the next Party Conference, to initiate a scheme of state insurance to cover those people who want a larger pension than the bare minimum received under the present national insurance

system. Insofar as this meets—at a lesser premium—a need which is now being filled by private insurance companies it will, in fact, result in the state taking over a section of the private insurance business, though how big that section will be it is quite impossible to estimate.

The second line of approach is to say that the state will buy out individual insurance firms and run them in competition with those that are left in private hands. If it bought out even one large company, it would be able to do two things. First to affect insurance company policy generally by the very fact that it was one of the principal companies. Secondly, to gain control over the insurance companies and, in consequence, to replace its nominees on a number of boards of directors.

To sum up, there would appear to be a strong case for a big step further in our programme of nationalising the country's principal industries and services, so that they may, in fact, be run for the benefit of the nation. I would suggest that the Party should have a bold but flexible policy, and should be ready to start nationalising a number of industries soon after it comes into power, and that its aim should be to nationalise first those whose nationalisation is likely to be most strongly opposed by the Conservatives, and leave till later those that might cause less difficulty (the exact reverse of what was done by the last Labour Government).

While I would have in our own minds a general idea of what we mean to do, I would not be in favour of making a specific list of industries we intend to nationalise. It would be wrong to commit ourselves to such a detailed programme, since it may cause us to alter it. One such event, which I mentioned earlier, would be the decision of a particular company to go out of business, and the need for the state to take it over, so that its work could continue to be done. If anyone says that it is dishonest not to make a detailed list, the only answer is that the Conservative Party has seldom, if ever, during its history asked for a mandate to do a number of specific things. It normally asks to be returned to carry out some vague policy such as "peace, retrenchment, and reform," but there have been times when it has not been even as specific as this, and has asked for nothing more than a "doctor's mandate." There is much to be said for our taking a leaf out of their book and leaving ourselves free to act according to circumstances. But let us at least be clear in our own minds what we want to do, if circumstances allow us, and let us be clear that we cannot expect to make Britain a socialist country, unless we socialise the majority of its industries.

THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM

MARIO EINAUDI

THE seriousness of the crisis of communism is by now apparent in all its complexity. For the first half century of its existence Marxian communism moved largely in the realm of theoretical discussion. For most of the second half century it chiefly rested on the strength and the leadership of the Soviet Union. For the next fifty years it will have to seek a new equilibrium amidst an entirely different set of conditions. What will happen, and what kind of equilibrium, if any, it will find are matters of the greatest importance, and as yet hidden by the swift flow of events. But the issues are sufficiently far-reaching, both in theory and in practice, to warrant a preliminary effort at analysis.

I Universality and Simultaneity of the Crisis

The crisis is present within the Soviet Union, in the other communist states, and in non-communist states as well.

The crisis can be seen inside the Soviet Union in the awakening of public opinion, in the publication of heretical student magazines and of novels that express the quandaries of the new generation of educated Russians. It is visible in the new forces that the death of Stalin has released, in the inability of the Kremlin leadership to deal with problems of dissent and heterodoxy in the traditional Stalinist way. It can be seen in the assurances hastily given concerning the daily life and the rights of Soviet citizens, in the new balance struck in the realms of economic policy and power.

The fundamental difficulty seems to be this: how can a society, radically changed between 1917 and 1957, be best managed within the framework provided by communism? It is with the variety of possible answers that can be given to this question that the Soviet communist elite is struggling today. The problem is a new one, and the question of whether or not there can be a return to Stalinism is irrelevant.

The crisis is real in all other communist countries. One of its more obvious aspects is the asperity with which the so-called satellites deal with each other now that the application of the repressive hand of the Red Army is no longer possible everywhere.

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One can hardly doubt that over a period of time these conflicts are bound to alter the international structure of power of communist states from China to Poland.

Finally, there is the open crisis of communism in non-communist countries. The crisis is especially significant in those European countries where communism had developed into a mass phenomenon. Votes have been lost. The hold of communism on the working-class movement, on trade unions, and on factory councils, has been weakened. There have been many resignations of party members, while the two leading communist parties of the West accuse each other of theoretical deviations. There is the loss, hastened by events in Poland and Hungary, of that intangible element of prestige among the intellectuals that was one of the more important assets of European communism during the last fifteen years.

The attacks that are now being levelled against communism by some of its most noted earlier defenders are bound to have consequences of incalculable severity. When Picasso, Sartre, Claude Roy, and others speak, their voices are heard and the mythology of communism begins to fade away. It is true that Sartre's position is still a doubtful one, but his avowed intention to do battle against the French Communist Party, to foster its destalinisation, is likely to be widely echoed.¹

While the extent of the communist crisis cannot be doubted, to measure its importance we should try to identify its causes and implications. I would like to offer some tentative answers built around three main themes.

1. The economic and social transformation of the Soviet Union.
2. The restoration of the legitimacy of socialism.
3. The crisis of communist theory itself.

II The Economic and Social Transformation of the Soviet Union

As has been pointed out many times before, it is the very success of the Stalin revolution that has brought about the present tensions. Thirty years ago, within the present boundaries of the Soviet Union, there were roughly 22 million people (including dependents) in industry, transport, and all services (including government services),

¹ Cf. his "Le fantôme de Staline," *Les Temps Modernes*, Paris, November 1956-January 1957, pp. 577-696. On this article, see the sharp comments of Jean Conilh, "Staline, Le fantôme de Sartre," *Esprit*, Paris, March 1957, pp. 499-501.

and 138 millions occupied elsewhere, nearly 90 per cent. of them in agriculture. Today there are roughly 95 millions in industry, transport, and services, and 107 millions elsewhere. The increase from 22 to 95 millions in the number of people depending upon the activities and institutions of modern industrial society is the essence of the Russian problem.

The issue is: how are the nearly 100 million Russians belonging to this category going to adapt themselves to the conditions established by Soviet communism? What are the claims that they are going to put forward as an increasingly educated and articulate group, as the possessors of great and at times unique skills? To speak of the possibility of a return to Stalinism in this context does not make sense, for Stalinism might be defined as the sum total of the policies and the procedures chosen by the leader of the Russian revolution to bring this wholly novel state of affairs itself into being.

Rather, it is possible to envisage two more likely lines of development—either concurrent or alternative.²

One would come as a result of the very weight and immensity of the economic system that has been created. Of its size, even of its reasonable efficiency in certain areas, we can be certain. But a critical point has been reached where subtler means have to be used in order to realise any further advance: productivity and not production has acquired special importance in view of the shortage of man-power. Also the development of the remoter areas in Siberia and along Asian borderlands will probably require new administrative planning approaches. Over a period of time the traditional authority of the totalitarian rulers might be unable to assert itself as strongly as before. Therefore, large areas of geographic and functional autonomy and different sources of political and economic decision might become established. The ability of a centralised, ideologically obsessed communism to maintain itself as the driving moulder of opinion and formulator of policy would be gravely handicapped. One of the mainstays of totalitarianism would be seriously undermined.

Another possibility would be the gradual erosion of power at

² For a very perceptive analysis of the possible "images of the future," see Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, *passim*. George F. Kennan and Isaac Deutscher, among others, have from time to time expressed a belief in the probability of transformations in the Soviet system. For the view that "it seems most likely that the totalitarian dictatorship will continue and become more total," cf. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 300 *et seq.*

the top by the managers and technicians who would in the end replace the second generation of Bolshevik revolutionists into whose hands power has been shifting since Stalin's death. The taking over might still be accompanied by an effort to maintain strongly directed political and economic systems, but systems in which efficiency and not ideology would be the decisive factors, where the industrial elite and not the party elite would be supreme.

The course of events within the Soviet Union during the past three or four years tends to show that both trends may be developing at the same time: a slow but probably accelerating receding of central power, followed by the slow rise in the independence of certain geographic areas or of certain economic centres, while a third generation of Soviet leaders composed chiefly of technicians and managers, with rather dim views about ideology, is coming to the fore.

These trends may be seen at work in the increased autonomy of the Soviet Republics, in the reorganisation of economic life envisaged by the establishment of the new regional economic councils, in the weakening of the police, in the many reforms that are imposed by the contrast between economic progress and obsolete political and economic forms.³

As far as we are concerned, the main point is not whether democracy is going to be the end result of this process of transformation. Certainly democracy, in any possible meaning of the word on which the non-communist world might agree, does not appear possible.⁴ Some novel variety of feudalism or technocracy might become the temporary resting point of Soviet society, and it should be clear that despotism and certain forms of terror would still be possible within the hypothetical future framework. What should be recognised, however, without too much hesitation, is that the outlook is for changing policies and a new distribution of power, under conditions of continuing crisis that will make virtually impossible the maintenance of the ideological totalitarian straight-jacket of the past forty years.

³ I would like to call attention to the exceedingly authoritative and interesting summary of what appear to be the views of the former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Charles Bohlen, appearing in *The New York Times*, April 19, 1957.

⁴ I agree with Brzezinski when he writes that democracy requires "a basic recognition of some sort of higher law, a fundamental attitude of toleration, an absence of doctrinal fanaticism—all of which are, at most, only indirectly linked to a state of 'well being,' and none of which seem to be even remotely present in the existing Soviet scene," ("Totalitarianism and Rationality," *The American Political Science Review*, September 1956, p. 758), but I don't see how this reasoning could be used as an argument against the possibility of Soviet change.

III The Restoration of the Legitimacy of Socialism

The second element of the crisis of world communism has been the restoration of the legitimacy of socialism brought about by the first Khrushchev report to the XXth Congress. By accepting officially the view of the "polycentric" nature of communism, of the variety of ways which can be followed for the attainment of a socialist society, Khrushchev was undermining the foundations of modern communist power, of the superiority of communism over socialism which Lenin and Stalin had established.

One can go back for a moment to the founding of the Third International in March 1919. The Comintern must become, said Zinoviev, the leading organ of the international proletariat. The Socialist Second International was nothing more than a letter-box, and had failed because it "tolerated in its midst parties whose practice and tactics were in flagrant opposition to the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat."⁵

The purpose of the Bolshevik leadership was to prove, when the Second Congress of the Comintern met in Moscow in July 1920, that only Moscow-directed communist parties could be the authentic possessors of the techniques to be used by the proletariat in achieving its revolutionary goals, that the Bolsheviks were the sole depositories of truth, and that salvation could be achieved only through the unquestioning acceptance of the universal validity of the precedents drawn from the Russian experience.

Thus the twenty-one conditions were born. They were largely prepared by Lenin, and they were to be submitted to all working-class parties as the supreme test of their adequacy. Their acceptance meant admission into the fold of the Comintern, wholly controlled by Russia. Their rejection meant exclusion from the ranks of proletarian parties.

The twenty-one conditions were carried to the main European centres of proletarian power in the four months between October 1920 and January 1921. An extraordinary congress of the German Independent Socialist Party met in Halle in October. Zinoviev was present to defend the twenty-one conditions. By a majority of 237 to 156 the twenty-one conditions were accepted, and in December the united German Communist Party was formally organised, and the warfare of German communists against German socialists began. The French Socialist Party met at Tours on

⁵ For a full account of these developments and of Lenin's subsequent *mainmise* on Europe's socialist parties, cf. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, vol. III, esp. Chap. 25.

Christmas Day 1920. The twenty-one conditions were accepted by a two-to-one majority. The French Socialist Party became the French Communist Party, while the dissident minority reorganised itself into a new Socialist Party. The Italian Socialist Party met in Leghorn in January 1921. There the twenty-one conditions were rejected by a substantial majority. The dissidents left the Socialist Party and founded the Italian Communist Party.

Everywhere in Europe the Bolsheviks had forced upon the parties of the working-class an uncompromising choice. The groups which had declared themselves ready to accept the full discipline and control of Moscow became the communist parties of the West. Acceptance of the uniqueness of Bolshevik doctrine and of Bolshevik methods concerning the ways in which the revolution was to be carried out had been made the fundamental test.

This state of affairs prevailed without much change from the summer of 1920 to February 1956. Throughout those thirty-six years, both in theory and in practice, and in spite of short, but meaningless, popular front interludes, the communists refused to recognise the legitimacy of independent socialism as an instrument of proletarian revolution. The character and instruments of the proletarian revolution of our times had been determined by Russian communism.

Suddenly, this elaborate construction collapsed, when Khrushchev, at the Tenth Congress, in effect recognised that the unique features of Soviet communism, its right to dictate the course of events and the tactics of all working-class parties throughout the world, no longer corresponded to the political reality of the second half of the twentieth century.

Khrushchev spoke of the Soviet way, of the way of the Peoples' Democracies, of the Chinese way. He pointed out that in the future the transition from capitalism will most likely show an even greater variety of forms. Among the possibilities will be that of using parliamentary methods to establish socialism, due to the fact that socialism is much stronger and capitalism much weaker than a generation ago.

One may wonder whether Khrushchev realised the implications of what he was saying. Strong repercussions were unavoidable, regardless of the conceivable validity of Khrushchev's appraisal of the changed balance of world power. Everywhere his words were correctly understood as a repudiation of Lenin's position of 1920, establishing the uniqueness of the Soviet way to socialism, as an

admission that the more flexible and varied socialist ways that had been so sharply condemned in 1920 stood vindicated. And was not Khrushchev's subsequent denunciation of Stalinism further proof that the time at last had come to break away from the rigidities imposed since 1920?

The further question was asked in socialist quarters: had not the very *raison d'être* of communist parties in western Europe disappeared? If both Lenin's twenty-one conditions are ruled out and Stalin's practical management of communist affairs is condemned, isn't there a strong case in favour of the restoration of the legitimacy of socialist movements?

The renewed acceptance of socialist methods could very well mean a return of the working-class to the socialist fold, for it was on the methods of socialism—not on its goals—that the rupture took place a generation ago. This development has become a main source of embarrassment to western European Communist Parties. If the Soviet leaders can with seeming safety put on a certain bourgeois *embonpoint*, it is because they have forty years of successful revolutionary effort behind them, and no competition as yet. But for European communists to do the same—even supposing that they can do it now—without a similar record of revolutionary achievement and with some fairly lean competitors around, is clearly risky. For the temptation will be great among many voters to shift party allegiance, if socialist, radical-socialist, or other lay centre parties give signs of life and are persuasive in their attempts to prove that when it comes to parliamentary and democratic action, their credentials are more respectable and historically more credible than the communist ones.

IV The Crisis of Communist Theory

I come to the third element of the communist crisis, that of communist theory itself. The crisis is visible at two levels. More concretely in the way in which seemingly well-established elements of Marxist-Leninist doctrine are coming under pressure in communist states. More abstractly in the discussions raging in Marxist circles of non-communist countries.⁶

⁶ Two valuable collections of annotated documents have been published by Columbia University in 1956: *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, The Russian Institute, 342 pp.; *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, A selection of documents on events in Poland and Hungary, February–November 1956, Paul E. Zinner, ed., 563 pp.

In communist states

The Soviet Union is still trying to cling to the Leninist belief that a strong, centrally organised, and ideologically led state is essential to permit the communist party to achieve its objectives. But this position is challenged both from inside and from the outside, and the leaders are beginning to yield.

From the inside, as part of the transformation of Russian society which, as I suggested earlier, is now under way. Much of the uncertainty felt by communist leaders today in their domestic policy is due to the fact that the conception of an all-powerful central state acting through a lumbering ideological bureaucracy, is defied to an increasing extent by the rising classes of new intellectual and professional people. The recent novel by Doudintsev, *Man Doesn't Live by Bread Alone*, in which the sad history of the frustrated inventor, harassed all along by a stupid and grasping state machine, was told to the delight of thousands of readers and the applause of literary critics, is a good example of the new problem facing Soviet communism.

From the outside, by competitive communist systems. Tito is accepting government practices which clash with the firm Marxist view of the need of centralism, a view which, from the revolutionary writings of 1848 to the final vision of the "commanding will" of the manager of the economic society of the future, never wavered. It is true that, having gone thus far, Tito remains convinced of the position of the communist party itself as the inspirer of the life of the country. But this may be a difficult position to defend if the real instruments of political power are weakened and scattered. Tito's recent statement that the dictatorship of the proletariat "must above all be imbued with humanism"⁷ sounds an unusual note. Totalitarian dictatorships can maintain the full role of ideology only to the extent that they keep intact their machinery of power. For this reason, Tito's success or failure here will prove a matter of considerable importance in any attempt to anticipate future trends in Russia.

But, Tito's pace may be forced by Gomulka. For Gomulka has apparently decided to retreat as much as the safety of the country will permit from the exposed positions of Stalinism. Some of the public freedoms have been restored and many of the personal ones. The Church has once more re-established itself as a main element of Polish life. Gomulka has even suggested that non-materialist

⁷ *Le Monde*, Paris, May 3, 1957.

philosophies may contribute to the building of socialism.⁸ In his dealings with the one important surviving Stalinist party, the French Communist Party, Gomulka has restated the right of each country to realise socialism in its own way and the need of democratic practices within the Party.⁹ In a series of sometimes moving and always revealing testimonials, Polish writers have during the last three years shown the depth and strength of the efforts being made to achieve authentic national expression.¹⁰

It is difficult to overestimate the long-range consequences of this kind of fierce competitive coexistence among communist states. They are engaged in the kind of dialogue Stalinism never permitted. The chances are that this revisionism and multiplicity of approach, affecting such central points of Marxism as the role of the state, the relationship between central and local agencies of government, the scope and method of planning, the collectivisation of the land, the existence of non-communist parties, the acceptance of a materialistic philosophy as the exclusive ideology of communism, will subject the communist world to serious theoretical strains and conflicts which could not be foreseen a generation ago.

In non-communist states

These strains are also apparent in non-communist countries, where communist writers and leaders are still confronted by that bothersome "preliminary" question of the conditions surrounding the seizure of power and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In his June 25, 1956 report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti said that it was only after the experience of the Paris Commune and contrary to his earlier views that Marx saw the need of smashing up the structure of the bourgeois state before it could be replaced by the apparatus of the

⁸ In a speech at the Eighth Plenum of the Party in 1956, quoted by Brzezinski, "Ideology and Power," *Problems of Communism*, Washington, January-February 1957, p. 15.

⁹ These views are to be found, amidst many pious utterances of solidarity and of Marxian orthodoxy, in a joint statement issued by the Polish and French parties on February 2, 1957. Cf. text in *Cahiers du Communisme*, Paris, March 1957, pp. 458-461. This document is only one of many similar documents on the outcome of high level "diplomatic" negotiations among western and eastern European Communist Parties. These exchanges are a novel development and are apparently meant to maintain a semblance of unity in a climate of increasing contrasts and misunderstandings.

¹⁰ Cf. the collection of Polish writings from 1953 to the present in "Le Socialisme Polonais," a special issue of *Les Temps Modernes*, Paris, February-March 1957, pp. 1065-1448. The underlying common theme is well expressed by Andrzej Braun, who writing six months before the October Revolution tells us that "the entire new generation of young intellectuals is now beginning to move: it finds itself in the midst of a desert just past a closed epoch of lies and lugubrious falsehoods" (p. 1176).

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proletarian state. As Togliatti rightly pointed out, these were the essential themes elaborated by Lenin in his subsequent doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They have remained until today the truest and the most authentic expression of Marxist thought, fortified as they have been by the experience of the Soviet revolution.

But Togliatti now raised the question:

"Can this doctrine remain fully valid today? Here is a subject for discussion. For when we maintain that it is possible to move towards socialism not only by using democratic methods but also by using parliamentary forms, it is clear that we are correcting something in that theory, as we take into account the transformations which have taken place and are still taking place in the world."

It is very well to say that by going back to an earlier, pre-Commune Marx it is possible to discover a justification for a democratic and parliamentary approach to the problem of the seizure of power. But it is even truer to say that the whole development of Marxian theory leads to the Paris Commune doctrine, and that half a century of revolutionary communist experience had firmly fixed this doctrine as the only guide to proletarian action. To go back to a different position must mean to lead communism into the realms of opportunism and reformism. The fatigue of communist theoreticians as they try to maintain their sense of direction under such confusing conditions is already showing up.

Roger Garaudy is not at ease in his sustained polemical attack against certain tendencies that have developed within the Italian Communist Party.¹¹ To speak generically of the leadership of the working class leads to an over-estimate of spontaneity and to an under-estimate of the role of communist parties. To insist as Togliatti does on the parliamentary way, without stressing that parliament would then have to be used to smash the bourgeois state machinery, leads simply to reformism. To take a stand on the unconditional acceptance of democratic freedoms leads to a view of the proletarian revolution as a mere extension of 1789.

But there are other causes of anxiety, due to a growing uneasy feeling that the development of capitalistic societies is not following the Marxist pattern. Up to a generation ago the optimism was high and the great depression seemed to be about to confirm the Marxist prophecy of the downfall of the capitalistic system.

Much has happened since then to upset normal expectations. Politics has shown a baffling strength and superiority *vis-à-vis* of

¹¹ "Le 8^e Congrès du Parti Communiste Italien: A propos de la voie italienne vers le socialisme," *Cahiers du Communisme*, Paris, January 1957, pp. 33-55.

economics. The course of economic events has been controlled and modified by political action enjoying an autonomy of inspiration that even the communists have had to notice. Theories of exploitation within the modern factory have had to be modified, and current capitalistic doctrines of human relations and conditioning of the worker are beginning to be taken seriously as an important element of the contemporary picture. There is a feeling abroad among communist writers that the world is changing rapidly and that for the first time Marxism cannot account for these changes, and even less predict their course.

As some of the more restless French communist intellectuals are now saying, an immense critical, historical, and theoretical effort is required. Pierre Hervé, Aimé Césaire, Edgar Morin, Jacques-Francis Rolland have all in recent months moved against the ossified communist doctrine:

"We must be able, as Henri Lefebvre said recently, to undertake the colossal task of the reconstruction of Marxism. We cannot live any longer on the basis of frozen theories which have only the remotest relationship with the dramatically changing reality of today. Only a vigorous theoretical effort can enable us to start a debate on the new ways to socialism."¹²

The interested outside observer may wonder what will be the source of the fresh theoretical and political leadership that the communist movement so desperately requires.

¹² Rolland's interview in *L'Express*, Paris, November 9, 1956

THE CHALLENGE OF GHANA

R. B. DAVISON

New nations are not born every day, and the emergence of a new sovereign state within the Commonwealth in Africa is an event of considerable significance. The importance of Ghana—for the Gold Coast changed its name on independence day—is not confined to the African continent, nor is it of significance only to the British Commonwealth. Within the next few years one state after another will emerge from British colonial status and they will take their places, presumably, as full and equal members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Malaya, Nigeria, and the West Indies are clearly candidates for early elevation to full sovereignty, and if independence is postponed for other territories, the causes of the delay may be sought in the internal economic or political conditions of the countries concerned and not, as surely even the most rabid section of the U.N. will be forced to admit, in the U.K. herself.

The Achievement of Independence

Until the eleventh hour, however, there seemed to be a very considerable danger that the independence of Ghana would be achieved in a bloodbath. The opposition of the powerful Ashanti traditional authorities to the administration of Kwame Nkrumah was deepseated, and there were open threats of Ashanti secession and of violence. It is a tribute to all concerned—to the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, for his last-minute intervention, to the backstage courage and sagacity of the Governor, Sir Charles Arden Clarke, and, not least, to the leaders of the political parties in Ghana herself—that independence day was celebrated in such a cordial manner. Only in Togoland was the peace disturbed. The violent opposition of many Ewes to integration with Ghana before the part of their territory now under French control had achieved full independence, necessitated the intervention of extra police and troops to restore order. Camps were set up in order to train civilians for terrorist activities; over 200 people were arrested and many were sentenced to fines or imprisonment for rioting and unlawful assembly. The wheel of fate has turned, and Kwame Nkrumah, so

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long the bitter enemy of imperialism and colonialism, now has a "colonial" problem of his own!

Tragic though the Togoland rioting was, a much greater tragedy was averted by the last-minute political truce—it can hardly be called a settlement—between the rival parties in the Ghana political arena. Nothing that may be said in criticism of the means by which the truce was reached should be allowed to obscure this fundamental fact. The overriding need earlier this year was to arrive at some compromise—almost any compromise—which would enable the country to obtain full independence on the stated day. Whatever may happen now is not a British responsibility, but the lessons which may be learned from this experience in colonial administration have an application which extends beyond Ghana, and beyond Africa. Fundamentally the problem facing Ghana was how to reconcile rival powers in an agreed constitution which is itself extraneous to the society in which it is to operate. One group of powers—typified in Ghana by the Asantahene, the chief of the Ashantis—is the "old guard" of tribal or traditional authority, drawing power from age-long custom and usage and firmly based on the land. The rival power—in Ghana, the Convention People's Party led by Nkrumah—is the rising new group of professional politicians, often university trained and drawing their power from mass organisation in a newly enfranchised, largely illiterate population. The one calls for support on tribal unions, the other on trade unions; one is based on custom and tradition, the other on ideas and revolutionary ardour; the one on land, the other on labour. Such is the dilemma of an emergent nation. The pattern differs from country to country but the underlying tensions, perhaps complicated by racial overtones, must be resolved or brought into equilibrium before harmony can prevail.

The Rival Parties

The situation which had developed in the Gold Coast a week or two before independence day was briefly as follows. Nkrumah and the C.P.P.—the "popular" party—which had already won several elections, was the spearhead of the demand for full independence, and was bent on reform of all kinds. In opposition was the traditional element, backed by a strong "middle class" group of lawyers and absentee landlords, by this time thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of Nkrumah government unrestrained

by British colonial officials. Nkrumah wanted a unitary government with a single legislative assembly, simple majority vote even over constitutional matters, and central control of the finances of the country as well as the police, operating through local authorities (including regional assemblies) which were virtually controlled by the central government. The Opposition wanted a federal form of government with effective power over finance and internal security dispersed in several regional assemblies, and a central government which was closely circumscribed to avoid any "abuse" of power. A virtual deadlock had been reached when the Colonial Secretary from the U.K. visited the territory personally, and shortly afterwards a White Paper¹ promulgated a constitution which was accepted with reasonably good grace by all concerned, except the dissident elements in Togoland.

The New Constitution

The main points in the new constitution are that there will be a national legislative assembly, elected by popular ballot, with overall responsibility for Defence and External Affairs. There will also be five regional assemblies with defined powers in specified spheres, a House of Chiefs in each region (with the position of the Asantahene, the traditional head of the Ashantis, enshrined in the constitution) and non-political commissions governing the judiciary and the public services. Control of the police force is to be decentralised; amendments to the constitution are carefully circumscribed to prevent erosion of regional powers by central government enactment or decree.

The precise division of responsibility and power (particularly over finance) as between the national and regional assemblies was not laid down in the White Paper, but was postponed until after Independence Day. The White Paper provided that a regional constitutional commission would be appointed as soon as possible to "make recommendations as to the composition, authority, functions and powers of the regional assemblies, the funds required and the means of providing them." Meanwhile members of the national Legislative Assembly from each region are to form a temporary regional assembly. As a short term settlement of an immediate crisis this White Paper was a masterpiece of statesmanship. Probably no other solution would have been politically

¹ Cmnd. 71, February 1957. The proposed constitution of Ghana. H.M.S.O. 8d.

practical or effective. Nevertheless it is legitimate to ask whether this short term advantage has not created longer term problems which may yet bring Ghana to the edge of disruption. Will the new constitution best serve the long term interests of the country or will the ultimate price of the immediate settlement be regarded in the years to come as heavier than seemed likely at first? The White Paper certainly helped British colonial policy over an awkward hurdle, but there is no point in ignoring the fact that it leaves a legacy of problems which the politicians in Ghana must now resolve. The path before them will not be all a bed of roses.

Past History

Before we try to look at the future we must first of all glance briefly at the past in order to gain a little historical perspective. The story of British participation in West African affairs is well known, but briefly it might be recalled that the British government assumed control over the Gold Coast in four quite distinct steps and in four quite distinct ways.

The first region to come under British rule was the Colony area, in 1874, which was taken over by an extension of an agreement with the local chiefs, the so-called Bond of 1844. The warlike Ashantis, terrors of the Coast, thus found their way to the sea—and the lucrative trade with Europeans to be found there—barred by other tribes who were determined to interpose themselves as middlemen between the Ashantis and the European traders. The Ashantis periodically went to war in the nineteenth century in a vain attempt to break through this barrier and establish themselves firmly in a coastal port, but the British backed the coastal tribes, and their superior armaments frustrated the Ashantis. When the Germans and the French, taking advantage of the defeat of the mosquito by Sir Ronald Ross, began to move inland from their bases in the Ivory Coast and Togoland, the British decided to do likewise. They fought and subdued the Ashantis, taking over their territory by conquest in 1898. The British pressed northwards and concluded a series of treaties with the northern tribes thus establishing a "Protectorate" over them in 1901. Togoland was taken from the Germans in 1914 by joint Anglo-French action, and divided between them. Since then Togoland has been first a League of Nations Mandate, then a United Nations Trusteeship, administered, in so far as the section under British control was concerned, as part of the Gold Coast. It will be clear that the only effective military

resistance to British expansion came from the Ashantis, who retain to this day much greater cohesion than their neighbours, under their traditional head—the Asantahene—with his mystical Golden Stool which still remains a power in the land. One of the more interesting features of the White Paper constitution, which differs sharply from the proposals of the Gold Coast government, is the fact that the position of the Asantahene, and other less important traditional authorities, is safeguarded explicitly in the basic constitutional law. Indeed this clearly now states that, in the case of Ashanti, the Head of the region is the Asantahene. The implication of these entrenched clauses is that the full power of the National Assembly, based on adult suffrage, is severely delimited by the need to work through regional Assemblies on the one hand and in consultation with the traditional Chiefs on the other. To many people in Ghana itself these provisions are regarded as necessary as a protection against the allegedly dictatorial tendencies, with their consequential political and administrative practices, of the present central government. Since 1951, when the first constitution based on adult suffrage was instituted, the Gold Coast government has been dominated by a single political party, which in turn is controlled by a small caucus of men surrounding the person of the "Life Chairman" of the party, who also happens to be the Prime Minister.

Future Problems

One thing is now fairly clear. The room for manoeuvre by the Ghana government has been sharply curtailed by the new constitution. The political institutions now being framed in Ghana are very much better adapted to maintaining the *status quo ante* than they are to bring about any major changes in the economic structure of the country. But this is precisely where fundamental divergencies of opinion can arise. What sort of government does Ghana really need at this stage of her economic, political and social development? A traditionally minded, conservative, cautious administration careful to avoid infringement of any traditional rights? Or a dynamic leadership willing to remould the economy if necessary, in response to changing internal and external pressures, even if this entails drastic modification of existing social institutions? Looking at this dilemma another way: which is the greatest danger to Ghana today—a stagnationist government, anxious to preserve individual (or more accurately *tribal*) liberty of action, to avoid upsetting established patterns of behaviour, and also to avoid the

concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the men at the centre of affairs? Or a government anxious to promote economic growth and rising living standards (or more capital investment, as the situation requires) even if this means brushing aside some of the enchanting oddities of tribal behaviour so beloved by anthropologists, and so tenderly nurtured by the British administration in the past? It may be, of course, that in sweeping away some of the established institutions, such a government may be found to have swept away at the same time some of those safeguards of individual freedom so highly prized in the West.

Faced with these alternatives (and admittedly they have been posed in an extreme form) each person will react differently, were he called upon to make the choice, according to his political and social philosophy. Some will say that economic growth must be regarded as secondary to the preservation of individual liberty and the conservation of traditional authority (the fact that there may be a conflict between these two aims is not often stressed). Some will say that if Ghana makes noticeably less economic progress than other underdeveloped areas, particularly if those areas are subject to more authoritarian governments, this will lead to inevitable—and ultimately successful—communist subversion from within, particularly via the trade unions. Others, again, will stress the need to encourage international investment, and will argue that a stable government, based firmly on respect for tradition, will be more attractive as a potential field for overseas investors, private or governmental, than a “progressive” administration which may prove ultimately to have scant regard for its economic obligations towards foreigners. The point to remember, when discussing the new Ghana constitution, is that it differs markedly from the British model upon which the superficial observer (with his eyes on the mace, the Speaker’s wig, and the other ceremonial trappings) might suppose it to be based. An official “Opposition” exists, it is true, but it is an opposition based on geographical and historical differences, on cultural and linguistic dissimilarities, rather than on any kind of economic stratification. The fundamental clash over the last year or two has been between the traditional element, based firmly on the land and the tribal hierarchy, acting in concert with a number of “middle class” professional people—such as lawyers—and the new politicians based more in the towns, the industrial and urban workers, and the cocoa farmers outside the traditional framework.

The Economic Situation

It can be forcefully argued that the real test of the new Ghana constitution will be its long term effect on the future growth of the economy, although its short term effect in securing an apparent reconciliation between the conservative and the radical elements is likely to be in the forefront of the minds of most people today. If this analysis is correct, it is worth glancing briefly at the economic situation in which Ghana finds herself on the threshold of independence. At first sight it looks healthy enough—Ghana is one of the few countries in the western world which have a regular comfortable dollar surplus on their trading accounts, and a sizable fund of unspent sterling reserves. But on closer examination there are a number of factors in the situation which must give the government of Ghana cause for concern.

Since the end of the war the Gold Coast economy has been booming; the overwhelming dominance of a single crop—cocoa—is well known, and until 1954 the price of this commodity rose to unprecedented heights. Before the war cocoa was sold for something between five and seven cents a pound (spot) on the New York market. During the war the price was stabilised at 8.9 cents a pound. After the war the price rocketed upwards, until in July 1954 it reached 68.9 cents a pound. Since that date the price has fallen considerably, to less than half the peak figure, and there is little, if any, chance of its rising again to any marked extent. As a result of deliberate policy, the Cocoa Marketing Board, a government sponsored cocoa purchasing agency which has the sole right to export cocoa, paid the cocoa farmer much less than the world price and accumulated considerable reserves of over a hundred million pounds sterling, whilst the government itself had buoyant revenues beyond anything previously experienced. Once the post-war shortage of supplies had been overcome, the government used its enhanced spending power to expand both capital investment (in roads, bridges, and public buildings) and in welfare facilities (water supplies, housing, free primary education). During this whole period the cocoa industry was threatened by the spread of a virus disease of the cocoa trees, known as swollen shoot, which could only be controlled by cutting out the diseased trees. Millions of trees were destroyed in an effort to control this disease, a campaign which is still continuing. The present low price of cocoa in the world markets could—if the government were politically strong enough—provide a suitable occasion for rapid acceleration of this

cutting out process, as the loss of the cocoa thus destroyed might easily be recovered by an upturn in world prices, following decreased supplies. The resistance to the destruction of trees is, however, very strong, particularly in Ashanti, where an intensification of an unpopular policy, in present circumstances, is quite unthinkable.

More recently, the announcement of a new synthetic substitute for cocoa butter, called coberine, has brought sharply into focus for Ghana the fact that a high price for any commodity intensifies the search for chemically synthesised substitutes. The claims made for coberine have not yet been properly investigated by chocolate manufacturers, but its very existence is a salutary reminder to Ghana politicians that the extraordinary boom in cocoa prices, now ended, is not likely to return.

Oddly enough, the discovery of a substitute has also created some doubts (not alarming as yet, but disturbing) about the long-term prospects of another major Ghana export—diamonds. The recent announcement by the General Electric Corporation that a substance, called borazon, has been produced in the laboratory, which is even harder than the diamond, and at the same time withstands greater intensity of heat, is again a warning that the ingenuity of the research chemist is such that complacency amongst the primary producers of raw materials is, to say the least, unwise. Gold is another important export from Ghana, and whilst no one has yet announced the discovery of a chemical substitute (and there is no evidence that our modern alchemists are looking for one!) the long-term prospects for gold mining are overshadowed by the apparent determination of the U.S.A. government (which effectively controls the world price of gold under normal circumstances) to resist any attempt to raise the gold price in terms of the dollar. The fixity of the gold price is a problem for the Sterling Area generally, but it is of prime importance to Ghana particularly, as some of the older mines are now approaching the point where their further exploitation, in current market conditions, is a very doubtful proposition.

It would be idle to deny, therefore, that the political rejoicings in Ghana over the achievement of independence are unsullied with anxiety. Once its constitutional problems are, at least temporarily, settled, the government of Ghana will have to reach some far-reaching fundamental decisions on basic economic policy. The decisions may not be taken consciously, but they will be taken just the same. We may perhaps glance at a few of the more obvious

questions which will have to be tackled, resisting if possible the temptation to suggest what the answers should be. The very framing of the questions may, of course, betray an attitude of mind, but European commentators must now always remember that the decisions on these issues rest with the people and politicians of Ghana, and on them alone.

Agriculture

The primary economic issue which must be resolved is the general outline of agricultural policy. The alternatives may, perhaps, be summed up as the choice between conscious diversification, on the one hand, and deliberate specialisation on the other. There does not seem any reason to believe that the Ghana government will follow the advice given with such eloquence by Mr. Bauer² in favour of the restoration of a free market economy. "Capitalism," says Kwame Nkrumah in his autobiography,³ "is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation to operate." Indeed the whole trend of the argument in favour of re-establishing market forces as the arbiter of agricultural policy is regarded as more than doubtful not only by the politicians on the spot, but by others who take a rather more flexible view of the relationships between social institutions, such as the market, and economic development, than does Mr. Bauer. There are a number of tropical plants which can grow in Ghana, apart from cocoa, all of which have been grown at one time or another, but have been swept aside by the ubiquitous cocoa tree which has dominated the Gold Coast economy for forty years. Rubber, palm oil and other palm products, cotton, tobacco, sugar, and tropical fruits of many kinds (pineapples, oranges, lemons, limes, bananas) could all be revived as part of a coherent scheme of agricultural reconstruction in Ghana, provided—and here is the major stumbling block—the whole structure of the agricultural sector is remodelled. One factor in this situation is the present system of land tenure, to which we shall return in a moment. The other is the imperative need for the Ghana government to maintain control over agricultural marketing, and leaving aside the elegant mathematical formulae which have been devised to regulate the internal cocoa price,⁴ to pursue a deliberate policy of price discrimination including subsidy to some

² See P. T. Bauer, *West African Trade*, Cambridge University Press, 1954.

³ Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana*, Nelson, 1951, preface.

⁴ For instance by Mr. Bauer and Professor Paish. See *Economic Journal*, December 1952.

products, in order to diversify agriculture. There is no reason at all to believe that such a policy would have the slightest long-term effect on the supply of cocoa—anyone who has studied pre-war cocoa prices can only feel a little sardonic at the fears that have been expressed in some quarters on this account—but it would almost certainly stimulate the production of many agricultural products which have been allowed to fade away as the result of an agricultural policy based on *laissez faire*.

Industrialisation

How far is the Ghana government prepared to press ahead with industrialisation, and at what cost? A recent report by Professor W. A. Lewis⁵ is a classic in its field, wherein the proposition is fairly stated that any programme of industrialisation in Ghana must be based upon a substantial increase in productivity in the agricultural sector. It is easy enough to point out that too rapid an industrialisation programme is likely to cause heavy strain in the economy, but the fact still remains that if Ghanaians are prepared to tighten their belts they may yet make their country the workshop of West Africa. Until a final decision is reached on the Volta River project, any discussion of industrialisation in Ghana is somewhat unreal, for it is becoming increasingly clear that if Ghana goes ahead with the Volta project, she will have to sacrifice all thought of major development in other directions for several years to come, although the long term stimulus of electrification may be quite striking. The alternative to the Volta project is the development of a power programme based upon nuclear energy, for the possibility of atomic power ushering in an industrial revolution in the tropics cannot be overlooked.

The Sterling Balances

A third decision, which in part arises from the other two, is concerned with the disposal of the sterling balances now held in trust by the Cocoa Marketing Board. But in trust for whom? The original conception of the price policy of the Cocoa Marketing Board was quite clear: the Board was to accumulate a reserve to stabilise prices paid to the cocoa farmers, at least over the season, but it was not intended that the Board should make either a profit

⁵ Professor W. A. Lewis, *Industrialisation and the Gold Coast*, Government Printer, Accra, 1953.

or a loss, taking one year with the other. These facts have been used, not only by Mr. Bauer and Professor Paish, but by cocoa farmers in the Gold Coast itself, to argue that the reserves of the Cocoa Marketing Board "belong" to the cocoa farmers, and them alone, and should be distributed to them *in toto*. On closer examination, this seems too simple a view altogether. When the Cocoa Marketing Board was set up, no one could possibly have foreseen the fantastic rise in cocoa prices which lay just ahead: the fact of the matter is that one section of the Gold Coast community came in for a windfall. In Europe, the recipients of such an enhanced income would have found themselves subject to sharply progressive increases in their liability to income tax, and the government would have taken a substantial share of the proceeds for public revenues. Whether this is justifiable or not need not concern us here: the issue to be faced now in Ghana over these accumulated cocoa funds is not in essence dissimilar to that which faces any government anywhere when it finds that incomes within its territories are, or in the past have been, unevenly distributed. It is irrelevant to argue that some "promise" was given to cocoa farmers years ago that the Cocoa Marketing funds would automatically be distributed to them in the fulness of time. The real issue is, what general taxation and fiscal policy is the Ghana government proposing to pursue?

One line that the government may take is to draw down the existing sterling balances in order to preserve the present income level, particularly amongst the cocoa farmers. There will undoubtedly be a good deal of local pressure in this direction, and the new White Paper constitution will make it much more difficult to resist. In so far as the enhanced—or maintained—incomes are spent on imported consumer goods, exporters in Britain and Europe will benefit, although whether the long term loss of British capital exports will be offset by immediate exports of consumer goods is perhaps a debatable point.

Having decided what proportion of the sterling balances to retain subject to public control, and the general level of taxation which the country can sustain, the basic decision must be reached (perhaps by a process of aggregating a number of individual relatively small decisions) on the disposition of resources as between productive investment and welfare facilities. The immediate political pressure will undoubtedly be in favour of the latter, but if long-term economic growth is the aim to be pursued, prudence would suggest a concentration of resources on the "productivity"

objective. This would involve a careful scrutiny of all existing expenditure in order to determine if, and how far, it is likely to add to future productive capacity. It must be remembered that very often investment in what at first sight appear to be purely "welfare" facilities in an underdeveloped territory where living standards are very low may, on closer examination, turn out to be more accurately regarded as an investment in "social capital." Industrialisation cannot proceed without a reasonably healthy working force educated at least to the point of literacy. The dichotomy between "welfare" and "productivity" expenditure in underdeveloped countries sometimes appears to be rather artificial. Thus we come up against the White Paper constitution again. How far will the new political arrangements, with the galaxy of regional assemblies, Houses of Chiefs, and other possibilities for all kinds of political pressure, and possibly obstruction, inhibit the concentration of available revenues on capital investment—social as well as physical—as against the very natural desire to raise immediate consumption levels, and disproportionately to enhance welfare facilities for particularly favoured groups in the community such as cocoa farmers and, to a lesser extent, urban workers and civil servants?

Land and Labour Problems

Underlying these fundamental economic choices, which in one way or another present themselves to any government in the modern world, are two major problems which the British administration for the last half century has shelved rather than solved. The first is the problem of land. The second is the problem of labour.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of land, and the social arrangements governing the system of land tenure, in tropical Africa, not only as an economic factor of production, but as a fundamental element in the social structure of the African community. The Ashantis have a proverb—"All power lies in the land"—and there would unquestionably be bitter resistance to any government which attempted to alter the existing patterns of land tenure, either by legislative enactment or administrative practice. The British tried tentatively to provide some flexibility in the system of land usage, if not of land tenure, towards the end of the last century, but such an outcry was raised by the local inhabitants, including urgent petitions and delegations to the Colonial Office in London, that the subject has been left severely alone for very many years. As an alien ruling group, the British had no alternative

(in the absence of any settler element, which was forcibly prevented by deliberate policy) but to leave the land in the hands of the traditional authorities, who in turn allowed it to be fragmented into many scattered holdings. It was a cardinal element of British policy in West Africa to obstruct—or at least closely to regulate—the alienation of land by Africans to foreigners. Even mining companies could only take "concessions" on a lease; they were not permitted to buy land outright. An indigenous African government is in rather a different position from a colonising power, claiming as it can to draw its authority from a direct mandate of the people in the country, and it may well, as time goes on, take a very different view of the land question than its predecessor. It may well emerge that the most urgent requirement of the Ghana economy over the next few decades, if its position in world markets changes appreciably, is (a) the aggregation of the present scattered agricultural holdings into larger units in order that more modern methods of agriculture can be introduced, and (b) flexibility of agricultural products and decreasing dependence on monoculture. Suppose it is found that peasant farm holdings of small dimensions, scattered in all directions, often with absentee landlords, are simply not efficient—or flexible—enough to enable the formulation of a coherent agricultural policy, geared to changing world conditions. What then? Will the White Paper constitution be sufficiently viable to enable sweeping land changes, and if necessary an agricultural revolution to be carried through, or will the entrenched traditional authorities demonstrate their desire and ability to prevent any fundamental changes? In this event, will the constitution be strong enough to withstand the rising pressure of popular discontent, which will inevitably accompany a sluggish rate of economic growth?

The labour question has several facets. The economy of Ghana relies heavily on migrant and migratory labour, not only from the Northern Territories of the country, but also from the surrounding French colonial territories. The number of persons migrating to Ghana to seek employment, principally on the food and cocoa farms of the forest belt, has shown a substantial increase in recent years. The British administrators at intervals over the last few years have made some well-meant, but on the whole ineffective, attempts to provide some measure of welfare facilities for this rising flood of migrant labour. The migrants are political nonentities; even today few of the migrant workers qualify for a vote, those who do frequently fail to exercise their rights, and there is no

effective political organisation amongst them, apart from the tribal hierarchy. In consequence the British, and later the African, governments have tended to concentrate their efforts in the direction of labour welfare in other more politically attractive, but sociologically less desirable, directions. Indeed the general attitude of the Colonial government has been⁶ to assume that migrant labour not only is necessary and even desirable at certain stages in the growth of an emergent nation (which few will dispute), but that any attempt at large-scale settlement of migrants in Ghana, at least in mining enterprises, is itself undesirable (a proposition which is much less obvious). What will the new government of Ghana do about this particular problem? Will migrant labour be encouraged or discouraged? Will it be regulated or left free of governmental control and welfare? Will the ultimate aim be to stabilise the labour force, or to preserve the concept of "labour reserves" far in the hinterland? It may be that the ultimate policy that is adopted in relation to migrant labour will depend upon the drastic modification of the existing system of land tenure in the direction of plantation holdings, as distinct from highly individualistic peasant farming.

As Ghana celebrated her independence, with the good wishes of the world behind her, she entered upon an era which might well tax the ingenuity and the political acumen of countries with far older, and more stable, political systems than Ghana herself possesses. We cannot assume that the government of Ghana will necessarily continue to apply the economic policies inherited from her colonial predecessor. On the contrary it will behove any future critic of Ghana to remember, with due humility, that many of the problems which Britain either could not, or would not, solve and which have been left undisturbed by tacit consent for many decades are now coming openly into the light, and must be solved by the leaders of Ghana herself if she is to accelerate her rate of economic growth and thus take her place amongst the nations of the world as a worthy representative of the new nations now emerging in the continent of Africa. Furthermore the lessons that Ghana learns today have considerable relevance for other developing nations emerging from colonial tutelage.

⁶ See *The Human Factors of Productivity in Africa*, Inter-African Labour Institute (L.L.T.A.), p. 93.

BOOK REVIEWS

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. [Cambridge. xvi and 378 pp. 42s.]

EXPLANATION of revolutionary action in terms of continuity with the existing legal order is an art in which English constitutional lawyers are unpractised. The juridical basis of the Convention Parliaments of 1660 and 1689 was obscure; but the legislation they enacted was unchallenged in the courts, and the legality of the consequences of the Restoration and the Revolution came to rest upon acquiescence. The poverty of English legal theory is explained largely by the fact that embarrassing questions of a similar nature have not had to be answered in modern times. In 1954 and 1955 the legal advisers of the Government of Pakistan found themselves obliged to supply acceptable answers to a series of questions beside which the problems of 1660, 1688, and 1689 appear an elementary exercise. They were, in fact, able to supply answers that were accepted by the Federal Court of Pakistan. Sir Ivor Jennings, who was Constitutional Adviser to the Government of Pakistan during this period, has set out in full the judgments in the four relevant cases and has supplied a penetrating and intricately reasoned introduction and commentary of his own. The story is one of unparalleled complexity, but it is of interest, not merely to students of the affairs of Pakistan (who have hitherto had an inadequate body of material to work upon), but also to constitutional lawyers in Britain, for the cases involved a searching examination of the concept of sovereignty and the prerogative powers of the Crown in time of emergency, set in the context of the general principles of British public law.

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was set up in 1947 by the then Governor-General of India under powers conferred by the Indian Independence Act. The Assembly exercised both constituent powers and ordinary legislative powers; in its latter capacity it was styled the Federal Legislature. By October 1954 the Constituent Assembly had still not discharged its primary function of making a constitution for Pakistan; it was at loggerheads with the Executive, and it had become unrepresentative. On October 24 the Governor-General of Pakistan issued a proclamation to the effect that the constitutional machinery had broken down, that a state of emergency existed, and that the Constituent Assembly had lost the confidence of the people and could no longer function. Steps were taken to prevent the next meeting of the Assembly from being held. A group of Members of the Assembly thereupon challenged the validity of the dissolution of the Assembly, using machinery provided by an Act passed by the Assembly itself earlier in 1954. The Governor-General's position was difficult, for he had no express power to dissolve the Assembly or to convene a new Assembly, and his power to dissolve the Federal Legislature had already been removed. The Federal Court, however, was able to avoid having to pass upon the validity of the Governor-General's conduct by dismissing the action on the grounds that the "Act" under which the proceedings had been brought was a nullity in as much as it had not received the Governor-General's assent.

The immediate effects of this decision were staggering. The Constituent Assembly (unlike the Federal Legislature) had been thought to be a

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"sovereign" body whose measures did not require the Governor-General's assent. If the whole of its legislation was nugatory, then measures under which persons had been sent to prison and interned for reasons of security were invalid, provincial legislatures were improperly established, the operations of the State Bank were unconstitutional, and the decisions of the Federal Court itself were void. And it is worth mentioning that the Federal Government had never pressed upon the Assembly the view that its measures had required the Governor-General's assent.

The Governor-General next issued an emergency powers ordinance purporting to validate most of the Assembly's measures with retroactive effect and to make certain other constitutional provisions. But the Federal Court held that the powers under which he had purported to act did not authorise these measures. The Federal Government now found itself in a land without maps. It might have reconvened the old Constituent Assembly; but this was politically unthinkable. It might have applied for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or have requested the enactment of amending legislation by the United Kingdom Parliament; these courses were also politically unacceptable. It might have abandoned its responsibilities by leaving all the problems to be sorted out by the courts in ordinary litigation. Alternatively, the Governor-General might have made a clean break with the past, suspended the constitution, and assumed plenary power. But, as Sir Ivor observes, it was thought desirable to maintain the rule of law so long as it was possible to discover some law to rule. The course finally adopted was for the Governor-General again to validate the invalid Acts, but only for a temporary period, and to summon a new constituent body. The question of the validity of these provisions, and of the Governor-General's action in dissolving the Constituent Assembly, was then submitted to the Federal Court on a Special Reference. The court held that all the essential powers thus claimed by the Governor-General were vested in him by law. The power to dissolve, and to summon a new constituent body, was upheld by a very liberal interpretation of the royal prerogative powers that had been delegated to the Governor-General by the Indian Independence Act, viewed in the light of the fact that the Constituent Assembly had failed for seven years to achieve its purpose and had acted unconstitutionally. The assumption by the Governor-General of emergency legislative powers which, as the court had previously held, could not be supported by reference to any specific statutory grant of power, was more difficult to justify. The court was persuaded to take the bold step of falling back upon the common law doctrine of civil necessity in relation to the public welfare: the necessity for preserving the machinery of the state from destruction made lawful what would otherwise have been unlawful. Yet there was no modern precedent for invoking the doctrine of necessity to justify the exercise by the Crown or its representatives of common law legislative powers (as distinct from certain classes of executive powers) even in time of grave emergency. Nevertheless, the situation was saved; the new Constituent Assembly met, permanently validated its predecessor's enactments, and made a constitution for Pakistan.

To most readers the main interest of these cases will lie in the attribution to the Executive of inherent powers wider in scope than they will find mentioned in any of the modern books on constitutional law. Perhaps the books should now be rewritten; but one suspects that instead the Pakistan

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cases will appear in a very long footnote. The constitutional crisis in Pakistan was without precedent in the recent history of Commonwealth countries, and there is nothing very shocking in the fact that it should have been resolved by an unprecedented application of legal principle by a court purporting merely to declare pre-existing law. Since, however, the crisis was essentially a political contest in which the lawyers were appointed as champions and arbiters, Sir Ivor Jennings's account needs to be complemented by a political study. Unhappily, convulsive spasms continue to shake the body politic of Pakistan, and the events of 1954 may take their place as but one chapter in a history of critical emergencies.

S. A. DE SMITH.

NEW SOURCES OF LOCAL REVENUE. Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of Public Administration. [*Allen and Unwin*. 260 pp. 25s.]

THIS book is the result of two years' intensive research instigated by the R.I.P.A. and undertaken by a group of distinguished persons with a wide range of experience. It is written in an unpretentious and authoritative style admirably suited to the subject.

No really important form of local taxation has escaped the group's scrutiny, and the experience of eleven other countries has been carefully examined for possible lessons. The group has no illusions that a problem that has defied solution for many years will admit of a single, clear-cut remedy. It recognises that rating revaluation will not grant more than temporary relief; it advocates the abolition of derating and it dismisses (in my view too summarily) the idea of increasing revenue from fees, rents, recoupments, etc. It then proceeds to make the following specific recommendations. (a) That local authorities should be given power to impose a local income tax—limited to 3d. in the £, on personal incomes—and that an equivalent charge should be imposed on undistributed company profits which because of administrative difficulties would probably have to be excluded from the local income tax. (b) That local authorities should be given power to levy an entertainments tax, subject to the central government fixing by statute the maximum rates chargeable and the relationship between the scales of duty applicable to different classes of entertainment. This local tax would replace the duty at present levied by the central government. (c) That motor-vehicle duties and driving licences should be transferred to local authorities. All these additional sources of revenue are to be levied by and to accrue to the major authorities, the county councils and the county borough councils.

Far the most controversial of these recommendations is the proposal to raise a local income tax. For if means can be found of distributing the proceeds equitably between different authorities no large questions of policy would be raised by the transfer of entertainment duties, motor-vehicle duties, and driving licence fees from the state to local authorities. It must, however, be emphasised that the transfer of entertainments duties and motor taxation would greatly favour the large towns. Moreover, neither the transferred taxes nor the proposed new income tax would strengthen the financial independence and accountability of the county district councils.

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Already in my native county of Devon, rural district councils are spending on an average the rate equivalent of 3s. 8.2d. in the £ but are raising less than one-half of this amount (1s. 9.9d. in the £) in the form of the district rate. The remainder (*i.e.*, the equivalent of a rate of 1s. 10.3d. in the £) is being obtained from other sources, the most important single item being the capitation grant payable by the county council to the district councils under section 9 of the Local Government Act, 1948 (the equivalent of a rate of 1s. 6.5d. in the £). In one extreme case a rural district is spending a rate equivalent of 3s. 2.1d. in the £ and raising only 8.3d. in the £ as its net local rate.

If, therefore, we believe there is any virtue in local government being really local there is a great need to increase the financial independence and responsibility of the minor authorities, and this would certainly not be achieved by the group's proposals.

Even more debatable, however, is the proposal to levy a local income tax. The real handicap of local government finance is that it is confined to a particularly painful form of direct taxation, while the central government can enjoy the dubious reputation of being highly skilled in the arts of painless extraction through indirect taxation. Is it wise to urge that one form of direct tax should be supplemented by another equally subject to all the defects of local rates?

National income tax, even with its carefully graduated system of personal allowances, is already frightening enough—particularly for the middle class salary earner who can take no refuge behind an expenses account. What is he going to think of a local income tax which ignores his personal and family circumstances and takes the same proportion of his income as it does from the childless person with an unearned income? For, to a family man earning, say, £1,500 per annum, a local income tax of £18 15s. 0d. (3d. in the £) is not the inconsiderable burden that the group seem to consider it to be, even though it would be offset to some extent by a reduction in rates. It is true that the group is torn between a desire for a tax that can be administered locally and economically and a desire for a tax that will be equitable and acceptable. It is true, too, that the choice finally made must be a choice of evils. But it is difficult to see why alternative proposals "ought not to be criticised on grounds which, in fact, are equally applicable to the rates" (p. 16).

Nevertheless, the great merit of this book—which all interested in preserving the independence of local government should read—is that the writers have had the courage of their convictions. For courage and imagination will be needed if the present very unsatisfactory state of local authority finance is to be improved.

Although not everyone will accept its findings, whether on grounds of political wisdom or administrative feasibility, the group has done an extremely good piece of work within the limits imposed upon it by its terms of reference. What is needed now, I suggest, is an equally authoritative and exhaustive examination of the expenditure side of the accounts in an attempt to discover whether improvements can be effected in the present, apparently haphazard, methods of apportioning the costs of different local authority services between the national exchequer and local rates.

W. S. STEER.

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THE FATEFUL YEARS—MEMOIRS 1931–1945. By HUGH DALTON. [*Muller*. 493 pp. 30s.]

I WELL recall the first time I saw Hugh Dalton. He was addressing an audience of Cambridge undergraduates and astonished them by explaining, curling his lip as if in imitation of a camel, that it would be our future duty to tread hard on the faces of the capitalists. He seemed to regard his own class as vermin, but we were not convinced, as we were by the bitterness of Philip Snowden, the cripple from the poor home. Dalton's roguish—or was it ogish?—smile made us feel, as Mr. Baldwin is said to have remarked about Mr. Alfred Bossom, that he was "neither one thing nor the other."

As I got to know Dalton better, I discovered that he was excellent company, especially if you like gossip with a spice of malice in it—and who doesn't?—and that the main difference between him and other politicians was only that he preferred to forgo the advantages of pretending to be modest and disinterested. Instead he carried with him a banner announcing that in politics one must be Machiavellian, deep-scheming, and unscrupulous. If one didn't hiss like an adder, people might not believe that one could bite. In practice Dalton has been a middle of the road Fabian. As a political technique I recommend something half way between Dalton's display of candid venom and the usual hypocrisy of public school understatement. In fact, of course, Dalton has always been a serious professional politician, sensibly regarding political victory as important, holding that the Socialists' job is not revolution but peaceful change through nationalising industry. In the foreign field he has worked consistently for the League and the U.N., seeking co-operation with other social democratic parties. He never shared, except for peroration purposes, idealistic hopes about the brotherhood of man, or Marxist dogmas about class-war, fascism, and communism. In the first world war, in which as a young Etonian he fought in Italy, he formed a series of firm national likes and dislikes. He has always consistently hated the Germans and admired the Poles. Dalton's code has led him unreservedly to admire Arthur Henderson, to respect manual workers even when they talk wildly, and to reserve derision for doctrinaires.

In this volume, which deals with pre-war perplexities and war decisions, Dalton very naturally presents himself as the man who, with Churchill and Vansittart, was always right about Hitler and rearmament. He is caustic about most of his colleagues, illustrating his thesis, for instance, with choice selections from the larger absurdities of Stafford Cripps. But it is Dalton's weakness that in ridiculing Cripps's extravagant remarks about the dangers of "Buckingham Palace influences" and the potential threat of a Curragh mutiny against a socialist government he does not stop for a moment to examine the theory from which they sprang. Economic theories interest him; political and social theories pass him by. Politically he is purely pragmatic; politics is the art of gaining power and using it for social betterment; everything else is twaddle, fit only for undergraduate discussion societies.

Inevitably a book covering so controversial a period, written from a well-kept diary, with records of day-by-day conversations, becomes a personal manifesto. The advantage of this diary method lies in the undoubted authenticity of the recorded incidents and conversations. The defect is that he must select with hindsight and that the temptation is to publish the records which

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build him up, and anecdotes which, taken outside their wider context, may be misleading in their implications. If I take a personal example from this volume, it is not because I have any grievance, but because the example illustrates the inadequacy of his psychological picture of the thirties. He recalls a conversation with me when he returned to England after four months in Australia and New Zealand. The date was April, 1938; Hitler had just annexed Austria. My diagnosis was that Chamberlain had now a personal foreign policy which had left us so politically and militarily weak that we should lose a war against the dictators. Therefore, Dalton adds, my policy was to "seek the most peaceful way of letting them gradually get all they wanted."

I had my pacifist wobbles, and I am sure that Dalton accurately reports my pessimistic diagnosis. But he gives only half the story and it so happens that I can give the other half. On the week that Hitler invaded Austria, I splashed the front pages of the *New Statesman & Nation* with a candid examination of what I thought were two possible policies. Chamberlain, I said, was muddling straight into a war, which, as things were going, we should lose. If, in view of the appalling character of another war, he really intended to let Hitler have his own way in eastern Europe and the Empire, that was a policy which we should support. But I did not believe that this could be his policy and I vehemently urged the only sensible alternative, which was an alliance with Russia and the organisation of a collective security system under Churchill's leadership. I suggested that the leaders of the Labour Party ought candidly to back Churchill and to accept the rearmament and discipline involved in this policy. In short, I was on record in favour of the policy that the Labour Party, with Dalton's urgent approval, adopted in 1940. What I most feared was that we should muddle into the war without Russia's backing. Thus Dalton, truthfully reporting a conversation, unintentionally misrepresents the truth.

On the evidence of this volume Dalton does not seem to me ever to have understood his less tough-minded colleagues. He reports a conversation with Lloyd George, whose position was mine and that of many of Dalton's political friends. Given the prospect of a war on two fronts, Hitler might refrain from further aggression. But if the eastern front was represented by Poland without the Soviet Union, British threats and guarantees were, Lloyd George declared, merely suicidal nonsense. Dalton was right, and the Labour Party wrong, in voting against rearmament in the later period. But his colleagues were right that British rearmament was not the real issue. It would not have stopped the war, nor could it have atoned for the loss of our League allies, of whom the Soviet Union was one. That my prophecy about our losing the war without the Soviet alliance was not fulfilled was due to Hitler's fantastic folly in invading Russia and to Japan's equal folly in attacking America.

The chief value of Dalton's book lies in the account of the strange politics of the immediate pre-war period. As Labour's expert in these matters, Dalton knew a great deal that was going on behind the scenes. His account of the war itself gives a fine impression of Dalton as a Minister; and I do not doubt that he was the very man to be in charge of Economic Warfare and also of secret and "special" operations. One's regret here is that he could not give more details, including an explanation of his eventual change of office. One

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of his more amusing and endearing characteristics is his capacity for telling a story against himself, apparently without even knowing that it will cause a smile. He describes himself patting Churchill on the back and saying, "Well done, Prime Minister." He also tells us that he strongly opposed the appointment of Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to Moscow. When, in spite of his warning, Cripps was appointed, he said, "'All right, I hope it will be a success, but, if it goes wrong, don't blame me.' The Prime Minister said, with a friendly grin, 'You're on velvet.'" The capacity to tell that story without a qualm is no doubt a political asset.

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA. [*Witwatersrand University Press*, Johannesburg. 47 pp. South African published price 5s.]

THE ANATOMY OF SOUTH AFRICAN MISERY. By C. W. DE KIEWIET. [*Oxford*. 88 pp. 7s. 6d.]

THE LAST TREK. By SHEILA PATTERSON. [*Routledge*. 336 pp. 28s.]

IN DEFENCE OF COLONIES. By SIR ALAN BURNS. [*Allen and Unwin*. 338 pp. 25s.]

WHAT do people mean by the term, "a multi-racial Commonwealth"? If they mean that the Commonwealth is an association of sovereign states, some of which differ from others in racial composition, the term is unexceptionable. But if, as sometimes seems to be the case, they mean that within the Commonwealth all races are treated equally, this is plainly untrue. It is untrue even if they mean that the Commonwealth somehow *aspires* to this condition of equal treatment. British colonial policy may have elements of this aspiration about it, but there is nothing of the kind about Australian immigration policy, Ceylonese citizenship policy, or the obscure doctrine of "partnership" in the Rhodesias. It is simply not true that being in the Commonwealth is a guarantee of racial equality. Nor is it true, as is sometimes implied, that if South Africa were not in the Commonwealth, racial equality would prevail. But it is certainly true that the other examples of racial discrimination are mere shadows when compared with the harsh reality of the position in South Africa.

If South Africa had been colonised largely by people from the British Isles, like Australia and New Zealand, it is almost certain that racial inequality would still have prevailed there. The British settler community would have assumed a natural right of superiority over the Africans, and would have moulded their national institutions in ways which kept power effectively within their own hands. Faced with a situation in which they were the minority and the Africans the majority, they could hardly have acted otherwise. But it is hard to believe that they would have created a condition of inequality so ruthless as that which exists now. It is probable that a largely British community in South Africa would have developed institutions similar in character to the two "open" universities, of Cape Town and Witwatersrand, which present their case for survival in one of the books under review. Their principle is as follows: "While conforming to the South African practice of separation in social matters (residence, games, dances), these two

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universities, so far as possible, admit students on the basis of academic qualifications only, and in all academic matters treat non-white students on a footing of equality and without separation from white students." The white man can capitalise on his initial advantages, and has the control of affairs in his hands, but the black man can make his way to the top if he can surmount the obstacles of his own backwardness and of conformity to the standards of a white man's community. This is the tradition of Cape liberalism; but it is not the dominant tradition in South Africa, which is that of "the Boer people and the Afrikaner nation," as Miss Patterson puts it. This tradition is one of denial of even the possibility of equality between the races. It asserts the superiority of the white man over the man of colour, and of the Afrikaner who conforms to his national standards over other white South Africans. Thus it is no accident that the present South African government wishes to slam the doors of the "open" universities on non-whites, and make these universities conform to the existing practice of the Afrikaner universities of Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, and the Orange Free State. The essence of the nationalist Afrikaner position is that the tradition of the Boer Republics is the proper one for South Africa to follow, and that any other tradition of action, no matter how long domiciled in South Africa, is alien, unworthy, and subversive.

Dr. de Kiewiet knows the Afrikaner tradition well, but has rejected it for that of liberalism. He thinks that South Africa is heading for "chaos or social collapse" if the present policies continue; and he sees little hope of their being changed. His three lectures, delivered at McMaster University, Ontario, provide a selective history of South Africa, an analysis of Afrikaner nationalism, and an attempt to put the South African situation in perspective against the background of general change in Africa. His story is depressing, as it should be. Its only fault is that, being short, it cannot fill in the detail of Afrikaner life, and explain to puzzled and angry Americans, Canadians, and British people just what makes the nationalist Afrikaners act as they do. Fortunately, this task has been taken up by Miss Patterson.

The Last Trek is the first systematic study in English of the Afrikaners. Its faults are readily apparent and easy to dismiss: it is sometimes repetitive; occasionally its use of sociological terms is difficult for the layman to follow; its tendency to tell the same historical story in detached sections in different parts of the book is sometimes confusing. But the reader who makes his way through it will emerge with far more knowledge of the significant forces in South Africa than he can obtain elsewhere. If his previous information came from some of the books written before the war, he will find that, on the whole, he has been sadly misled in the past. A good many of these earlier books took as their theme the reconciliation of Briton and Boer after Campbell-Bannerman's great act of generosity to the former Republics. They saw Smuts as the symbol of an increasingly united white South Africa, and hoped that his views would prevail. It was assumed that, whatever manifestations of Afrikaner nationalism might occur, these should be regarded as survivals of the past and not heralds of the future: the future belonged to reconciliation. Miss Patterson shows in scrupulous detail how wrong a view this was. She shows how, throughout the nineteen thirties in particular, Afrikaner nationalism was growing and providing itself with the means of future strength. She describes the development of specifically Afrikaner

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institutions in economics, culture, religion, and education. She shows the determined, self-sacrificing efforts of the nationalists to make their language, religion, and social life separate and distinct from British influence, and how successful these efforts have been. She recognises that many people who are Afrikaners by origin have rejected this separatism and attempted to form a common South African culture with their fellow-whites; and she gives full weight to the influence of books and films and commercial forces from abroad (particular from the United States) which weaken the hold of traditional loyalties on young Afrikaners. But her book shows that, in spite of these diversions, militant Afrikaner nationalism not only dominates South African politics but is the most potent influence in South African social life. She is sure that there is no future for it in the world of tomorrow, where international influences will conspire to make the Afrikaner position untenable; but for the moment its very strength and sense of purpose create the danger to South African stability about which Dr. de Kiewiet writes.

The point about the Commonwealth which South African experience teaches is that, of itself, the Commonwealth creates no impulse towards multi-racialism amongst the nations which compose it. Rather it leaves each free to go the way which its social forces determine. It is all very well to talk about the prevalence of British institutions such as parliamentarism and the rule of law and the English language; in fact, none of these is inherent in Commonwealth organisation, and each can be dispensed with at will by a member-nation which chooses to do so. The present South African government knows this. Its reasons for staying in the Commonwealth are that it gets access to diplomatic gossip and is able to placate its English-speaking citizens by remaining a member of something which has taken over some of the forms and traditions of the British Empire; but it is well aware that there is nothing about the Commonwealth which compels or even influences it towards a relaxation of its racial policies.

Sir Alan Burns's *In Defence of Colonies* is a defence of British colonial policy and a spirited attack on those nations which are constantly criticising "colonialism" but "whose treatment of indigenous peoples is deplorable, and whose governments are the most notorious for tyranny, inefficiency or corruption." The book is particularly useful for its description of how colonial control has actually been carried on, and for its shrewd blows at some of the countries which assume that colonial expansion can take place over water but never over land. But there is an air of unreality about Sir Alan's treatment which is not really his fault. His method of detailed rebuttal of falsehoods about colonial administration means that, while he shows up small complaints as groundless, he does not and cannot show that nationalism as a destructive emotional force is groundless. The main chorus of complaint against British colonialism comes from countries in which nationalism is a religion so powerful that it renders a recital of relevant facts tiresome, and the possibility of a benevolent colonial policy inadmissible. It is not necessary to go outside the Commonwealth for an example: the Afrikaner nationalists see no contradiction between attacking British colonialism with undiminished vigour, and treating their own natives in ways which would be impossible in a British colony.

J. D. B. MILLER.

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INDUSTRY AND THE STATE. By P. SARGANT FLORENCE. [*Hutchinson University Library*. 189 pp. 10s. 6d.]

PROFESSOR SARGANT FLORENCE, finding it difficult to accept the passing of *laissez-faire*, traces the growth of state interference with industry during the last century and a half to conclude that its extension has been a natural development from *laissez-faire* itself to what he rather uglily terms *laissez-collectives faire*. Since he writes with such authority and always logically, the case he makes is plausible enough as far as the pre-war period is concerned, but despite a theoretical conservative dislike for planning, post-war Tory governments have only partially abandoned it and state influence on the country's economy including industry would be considered by many far greater than he admits in trying to justify his thesis.

Thus, Professor Florence presumes, perhaps a little too readily, that preference for non-interference by the state still prevails as it did in the time of John Stuart Mill. "Unless a case can be made out and *laissez-faire* proved guilty," he writes, "it remains true today that non-interference of the state with industry is presumed innocent and even praiseworthy." That may be so, but as the historic summary of the early chapters shows and the mere headings of the subsequent ones reveal, *laissez-faire* has been found guilty on so many counts that its ability to survive as an innocent party before a jury of economists would be doubtful. These chapters explain, for instance, the extension of state interference to defend labour against exploitation by the employer, and the consumer from the monopolist; how the state participates with labour and employer to avoid strikes and promote productivity and how it exercises control over much of industry and participates in it through nationalisation. And extremely useful chapters these are, constituting as complete a historic account as possible in so short a space.

The chapter on nationalisation is the least satisfactory because the least complete. But allowance must be made for this because the development of nationalisation is still fluid. Professor Florence does not disguise his serious doubts about the wisdom of public ownership and its present control and organisation. In fact, here he is least objective, but it is interesting that it is in this chapter that he formulates his theory of development towards *laissez-collectives faire*. He concludes that a nationalised industry operated on commercial lines in co-operation with the trade unions, trade associations, and the state itself constitutes one of the "collectives." "In spite of repeated assertions of the end of *laissez-faire*, Britain has emphatically not substituted state planning for a *laissez-faire* where the state keeps the ring and only interferes when a case can be made out." He adds that "the country has developed something much more original, indeed almost aboriginal: the doctrine or rather the practice of *laissez-collectives faire*." In discussing nationalisation, however, too little emphasis is given to the influence exercised over the public corporations by the ministers who have reserve directive powers. These public boards may be, as is suggested, along traditional lines in being a development of the joint stock company system, inasmuch as they are required to operate commercially and have a large measure of managerial autonomy; but the statutory powers possessed by the responsible minister, the obligation to maintain collective bargaining and joint consultation, and the provision for consumer representation, remove these boards a long way from the non-interference of

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the state. In fact, to some extent it could be argued that this direct or indirect ministerial influence has prevented the greater success of these publicly owned industries, although they have achieved a far greater measure of success than Professor Florence credits them with. It is true that he refers to the pressures in regard to prices and raises the pertinent question which has not yet been resolved when he writes: "Once nationalised, and having to consider price and output policies, state operated industries thus face the question whether they should satisfy national interests and human needs, or immediate individual consumer wants. The question may raise, and is today raising, dilemmas." In contributing so instructive and stimulating a volume to this political section of this useful university library series, which is edited by G. D. H. Cole, Professor Sargent Florence closes a gap and thereby serves well both the beginner and more serious student of economics.

ERNEST DAVIES.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL. By L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS. [*Faber*. 229 pp. 21s.]

SYRIA AND LEBANON. By N. A. ZIADEH. [*Benn*. 312 pp. 30s.]

THESE two studies of the area from Aleppo to Beersheba, and beyond, are valuable additions to a Middle Eastern library: informed, objective, and utterly contradictory. Both authors are able and honest men. Professor Ziadeh is a Lebanese who has studied at the University of London, taught at the American University of Beirut, and is now at Harvard; Professor Rushbrook Williams, his identity too long concealed behind the magisterial anonymity of *The Times*, is a former Fellow of All Souls and a former Professor of Modern Indian History at the University of Allahabad. Professor Williams writes with journalistic ease and with a skill in evoking atmosphere that comes out of a long experience of the East. Take his description of the impact of Israel on the traveller who arrives at Lod:

Beyond the range of the spit-and-polish of cosmopolitan hotels and international airports, the old Adam of the traditional East can often be discovered in the form of broken-down shacks: pools of scummy water: swarms of children, driving cows and goats which roam at large through narrow, unpaved, unswept alleyways: poverty: smells: flies. There is nothing of this to be seen near Lod. Everything is neat, clean and sanitary—a testimony to the efficiency of the local government authorities. The people do not go barefoot: they are well shod and well clad in European style: their clothing has nothing in common with the dingy white-grey amorphous cotton garments which the masses of Asia favour as their traditional garb. . . .

Each author follows a similar arrangement: a brief historical sketch, chapters on government and politics, on economics, on "human society" (Professor Ziadeh) or "Building a Welfare State" (Professor Williams), and, at the end, on the enemy. Professor Ziadeh's appendix on recent developments ends with a reference to a memorandum presented to the Government of Iraq by a number of professors at the A.U.B. in October last. It called on Iraq to recognise "Britain's unconcealed animosity to the Arab nation at

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large, and her clear conspiracy with its historical enemy. . . ." To read these two books together is to realise how wide and unbridgeable is the gulf between the two societies: one of intellectual conservatism and of social backwardness, of administrative incompetence and political corruption, and of great if exotic charm; the other of enthusiasm and zest, of skilful and effective state planning, of vigorous cultural life, of secularism and sanitation. As Israelis and Chinese realise, what the East needs is not so much democracy as drains, not only political wisdom but efficient water-closets.

There is little to fault in either of these books. Professor Ziadeh suggests, perhaps somewhat unwittingly, the chaos of Syrian politics. By linking the story of the Lebanon so closely with that of Syria, he underplays the wide difference between the two states; however much part of historical Syria they may be, Beirut, Aley, and the Beqaa, differ totally in character from the desert lands to the East. The story of successive dictators—Zaim, Hinnawi, Shishakli, and their would-be successors—makes the account of the political parties quite unreal. One tires of references in the popular Press, and even in this book, to Cabinets and Parliaments in the Middle Eastern countries as if they were instruments of government similar to, and as honest as, those in the West. It is clear from his later chapters that Professor Ziadeh is aware of the unreality of much Syrian "democracy," and of the political instability of the regimes. But what strikes the reader most sharply is the contrast of Arab with Israeli society. Israeli democracy is active, even overactive; landowners constitute between 42 per cent. and 47 per cent. of the Lebanese Chambers, and lawyers between 28 per cent. and 38 per cent. One of the most striking features of Israel since the end of the Mandate has been the development of local self-government and the extent of administrative decentralisation; Professor Ziadeh comments repeatedly on the lack of municipal self-government throughout Syrian history. The Arab states have failed—no doubt deliberately—to deal with the refugees; contrast the Hulch reclamation scheme or Operation Lachish in Israel. Illiteracy in Syria runs at 55–60 per cent.; Israeli publishing houses are putting out about one thousand new books per year in Hebrew, and much of the writing is original work. The contrasts can be continued until they pall, for they are the contrasts that occur in revolutionary times, not so much between races, but between the forces of dynamic change and of stasis and reaction. The Arab world is changing, but changing slowly and reluctantly; its conservatism is not that described by Burke as a condition of "old and settled order" but—like most conservatisms, *pace* Burke—one of rigidity; its politics are still essentially tribal allegiances, its culture specious and thin. The challenge of the Israelis is not solely a territorial threat, though it is easy so to picture it, but the unending challenge of education and enterprise and experiment. Professor Williams's book is a study of a national renaissance, of a nation of reformers. It is hard to find reference to a single reformer in Professor Ziadeh's volume. In the person of Musa Alami, of course, they can be found in the Arab world. But the treatment he received from his fellow Arabs is comment enough on the difficulties under which they work. It is clearly on the efforts of the Israelis, and on those of unappreciated Arabs like Alami, that any permanent hope of the reclamation of the Levant rests. And on this, in turn, can depend the peace of the world.

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PROGRESS IN THE AGE OF REASON. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY. By R. V. SAMPSON. [Heinemann. 269 pp. 21s.]

THEORIES of historical progress are now so much at a discount that it is good to be reminded of the intellectual respectability, the vitality and resilience of the notion that mankind is moving towards a brighter future. From the seventeenth century onwards, that belief has been one of the most powerful forces in western European thought; and, though it has certainly inspired a good number of cranks and charlatans, it has also deeply influenced some of the best minds in the history of our civilisation. That is why there is much to be said for trying to understand on what grounds men like Descartes and Pascal, Voltaire and Condorcet, Kant and Turgot sought to justify, each in his way, their belief in progress. Dr. Sampson's book makes a most valuable contribution to that understanding.

In the main, the "progressive" thinkers of the seventeenth century were content to view progress as the continuous increase in man's knowledge of the universe by the use of reason and scientific method. It is true that Descartes was confident that the "new method" would ultimately make possible a "most perfect moral science"; but he was also content to accept "provisionally" traditional ethical values, based on authority and dogma. And Pascal, whose theory of the progress of knowledge was, as Dr. Sampson shows, much superior to that of Descartes, specifically excluded such subjects as history and morals from the realm of scientific investigation.

This is the exclusion against which the eighteenth century rose in rebellion. The *philosophes* were haunted by the ghost of Newton. The progress which reason had made possible in the natural sciences, reason also guaranteed in human affairs. That was the underlying mystique of the Age of Reason. There have been many more ignoble ones in human history.

But the optimism of the Age of Reason was also grounded in its view of man, of nature, and of history. Man was infinitely perfectible, given a proper understanding of his nature and of the environment appropriate to the flowering of social virtues. Nature was wise, benevolent, rational; it "willed" progressive change towards a final goal of human happiness. Only ignorance of its laws and priestly vested interest in mystery and superstition were responsible for man's hitherto dismal career on the planet. Nor did history fail to inspire confidence that man must inevitably come into his rightful inheritance. The previous two centuries had already shown a steady advance towards knowledge and light. How could anyone doubt that the movement, though slow, was irreversible? The beauty of the appeal to nature and history, as Dr. Sampson notes, was that anything could, more or less plausibly, be demonstrated by reference to either.

The *philosophes*, as Hume, the pioneer existentialist, showed, were of course cheating, though some cheated much more outrageously than others and Dr. Sampson dissects with admirable skill and precision the nature of their mistakes. He is, on the whole, less happy in his brief survey of nineteenth century doctrines of progress, and particularly in his attempt to link Marxism to the philosophy of the eighteenth century. For the similarities between Marxism and the doctrines of the Age of Reason are far less important than the differences. Marx was not cheating. He did not have to, for, whatever

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other errors he committed, he had found something for which the *philosophes* had searched in vain: the concrete, historical agent of social change.

It would be easy, in surveying the history of the doctrine of progress, with its exaggerations and fallacies, to dismiss its advocates as poor deluded creatures, clutching at straws for some crumb of comfort. That temptation Dr. Sampson wisely resists. He does dismiss philosophies of history based on the belief in the inevitability of progress. But he also recognises that there is a world of difference between saying that men are *capable* of progress, have achieved much, and are likely, on the record, to achieve more, and saying that they are *bound* to do so. And it is refreshing to find a philosopher taking an extremely well-aimed swipe at the fashionable view that there are no ascertainable regularities in the historical process, from which it is possible to learn.

Why the Age of Reason held the particular views it did about progress is an historical and sociological question which Dr. Sampson does not seek to answer. He tends, at times, to exaggerate the influence of ideas in one epoch on the development of ideas in a subsequent epoch. This is a common failing of historians of ideas though Dr. Sampson is less subject to it than most. As an essay in intellectual history, this is undoubtedly one of the best books to appear in a long while.

RALPH MILIBAND.

FAMILY AND KINSHIP IN EAST LONDON. By MICHAEL YOUNG and PETER WILLMOTT. [Routledge. 231 pp. 25s.]

STUDIES of working class life, in the past, have been principally concerned with its failures—broken homes, juvenile delinquency, and so forth—and much of social work consists in repairing them. Hence, professional experience gives a morbid picture. For this reason, the book under review is greatly to be welcomed, since it deals with the ordinary lives of ordinary people. Although limited in scope to a study of family relationships undertaken mainly in Bethnal Green, it is reasonable to assume that something resembling the pattern outlined here is to be found in many other industrial districts.

The relationships with which the authors mainly deal are those which obtain between members of the wider family which extends beyond husband and wife to their kindred on either side. As they show, it is the tie between the mother and her married daughters which does most to hold social life together. "I'm very devoted to Mum, of course; that's understood with mothers and daughters," says one of the women quoted. The mother of grown daughters forms a rallying point to which they, their husbands, and children resort, in times of leisure and of crisis; and through her is linked a group which forms a true "friendly society" for the women who belong to it.

The authors then go on to consider what happens when this situation is upset, by the physical removal of the younger generation. The study is shifted to families removed to a housing estate, when limitations of time, money, and energy restrict contact with the folks at home. This in itself is felt as a severe deprivation, made worse by the difficulties now encountered in forming fresh human contacts. In Bethnal Green, family, neighbours, the sheer thickness of humanity upon the ground, gave scope for all who wished to be sociable. On

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the estate, shorn of their accustomed group support, people are inclined to be wary. Further, the scattered population, and the scarcity of such meeting places as shops, pubs, cafés, reduces the actual opportunities for meeting.

One might expect that, in time, the situation would right itself, as bonds of common residence and shared school experiences began to form and consciousness of differing origins receded; but the authors are not very sanguine. The majority of householders are young couples with children, and there are few older people. Many estates have left no room for expansion, and therefore the grown children will be forced to move away in order to make new homes. And, whereas in Bethnal Green, at least where private ownership of property exists, relatives or neighbours generally receive preference in letting houses as they become vacant, here the local authority must pursue its course uninfluenced by the ties of kinship.

The authors argue that such a policy is dangerously short-sighted, first because it ignores a vital area of human experience—the satisfaction which relatives together can enjoy; secondly because, by reducing the possibility of mutual aid, family provision for crisis is more likely to prove inadequate, and consequently a heavier burden is thrown upon the social services. They urge some official recognition of the value of the wider family in rehousing, and at the same time they would press for more intensive rebuilding even within the town itself. From my own experience, I believe these recommendations to be sound. Human beings need the warmth and friendship of the small group, and they need the unquestioned right to belong, simply by being themselves. We cannot afford today to disregard the forces which make for personal internal security and social cohesion.

It is perhaps a little surprising that the authors made no mention of the fact that much rebuilding has already taken place in the area with which they deal. Apart from the considerable efforts made by the Borough Council, several large L.C.C. estates have been and are being erected; and, while families are today being moved away from Bethnal Green, others are being moved in, both parties regretting the change, yet accepting it as inevitable. To improve on this situation would obviously be both complicated and invidious, but the arguments put forward here suggest it would be worth attempting.

The book is the first report of the Institute of Community Studies, a group of social scientists working together since 1954. Their next report will be on the family life of old people, covering much of the same ground, but from a different viewpoint; and we are promised a further series of family studies to follow. Although the text is embellished with a number of tables, and there are no less than ten Appendices, the language is non-technical, and the presentation readable and clear. It will be welcomed by professional workers, whose contacts are limited largely to the working day, and to the specific requirements of the job in hand, but who yet retain interest and energy enough to want to read around their subject. It should be of value also to the shapers of official policy on subjects connected with social welfare; as professional civil servants, many of them may have lacked the opportunity for a close and living contact with the people for whom they plan. Even those who are themselves of working class origin could find it useful; however familiar the picture, we cannot all bring to bear the capacities for insight and analysis on which an understanding of social relationships depends.

JUDITH HENDERSON.

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THE SWORD AND THE OLIVE. By SIR GEORGE RENDEL. [Murray. 348 pp. 28s.]

"ESSAYEZ." By LAWRENCE, SECOND MARQUESS OF ZETLAND. [Murray. xii and 307 pp. 28s.]

POLITICAL memoirs can be and often are very dull, or they may be highly entertaining. They may reveal facts and throw new light on familiar situations, or may merely repeat old information in the old way. Writing from experience, their authors could produce better history than ivory tower historians. This advantage may become a liability if the experience is too limited, or if it takes the form of a succession of appointments, so varied that their only link is the author's career.

Sir George Rendel has written about his life in the foreign service, and throughout the pages he emerges as a man with all the qualities of a good diplomat—disciplined restraint, balanced sanity, and a likable personality. But a good diplomat is not necessarily a good writer. The memoirs are too long and tend to be dull, despite enlivening episodes like his account of the quarrels of the exiled Yugoslav government during the second world war. He introduces certain facts that are not generally known, and one is appalled though not surprised by his revelations about the blackmailing of Luxembourg by Russia. Much of the detail is pernickety, and yet vital facts are sometimes missing or stories left unfinished, with a maddening excuse that it falls outside his scope. Such loose ends are inevitable, since the author has an itinerant career and relies almost solely on personal recollections, which makes the book episodic and lacking real continuity. Although he served in so many countries, he cannot communicate a feeling for place. He lived in a restricted society, which owes little to the country where it is situated, and he came into contact with fellow diplomats and Ministers of State more than with ordinary people. Whatever their defects, the memoirs contain incidentally a wealth of information about the calibre of our diplomats, the degrees of their responsibility, and their relationship as civil servants with the Government.

The Marquess of Zetland's political memoirs make absorbing reading, for he has a vivid style and writes from a rich experience, largely connected with the East. He gives a masterly account of the Muslim-Hindu conflict. As Rector of Calcutta University, he used his deep understanding and admiration for India to advocate the general study of her philosophy and literature instead of the compulsory western culture. He belonged to the happy school of thought which appreciated her peculiar genius, and which preferred to help her to grow to individual maturity rather than perpetually to spoon-feed a baby. Whilst Governor of Bengal, he promoted education and public health, especially combating malaria, and increased the prosperity and civic responsibility of the people. This breadth of vision deserts him in his final chapters about the difficult years 1935-1940, when he was Secretary of State for India. He becomes enmeshed in detail, and while the intricacies leading to the failure of the All India Federation may be of historic importance, a brief analysis would have been more in point here. He held his office under Neville Chamberlain and defends the unsavoury appeasement policy of the government. His arguments at least show the practical difficulties involved, whilst quotations from contemporary sources will confound some who would be wise after the event.

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BOOK REVIEWS

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. A Biography. By FRANK MORAES. [New York and London: the Macmillan Company. 511 pp. Cloth 35s. Paper 17s. 6d.]

AS I SEE INDIA. By ROBERT TRUMBULL. [Cassell. 256 pp. 18s.]

NEHRU, a rich Kashmiri Brahmin, was thirty-one when, in 1920, he first met the Indian peasants and saw their conditions of life. Mr. Moraes, the editor of *The Times of India*, who has written a life of Nehru, dates his development as a statesman from then. His anger and the peasants' trust in him enabled him to overcome his diffidence and speak freely before a crowd. His political thinking, previously engrossed by nationalism, became constructive. By 1927, when he finished a visit of a year and nine months to Europe, he had the essentials of both his socialism and his foreign policy. Thereafter Congress found itself approving of land reform and denouncing such far-away matters as Nazism and Japanese aggression in Manchuria; work on the first five-year plan began in 1938. India was educated for her present role in the world.

Mr. Moraes is best on Nehru's relations with his father, Motilal Nehru, and Gandhi. His father, himself a nationalist leader, was an exuberant patriarch who thrashed servants in front of guests. Nehru's own impatient arrogance and his rebelliousness may be equally attributed to his relation with him. Gandhi's influence on Nehru's behaviour was immense, on his beliefs negligible. Nehru thought Gandhi's fasts preposterous; he found the mystic connotations of his "inner voice" tiresome; he never accepted his absolute values, least of all his pacifism. On occasion he did reject Gandhi's leadership. He accepted it so often because he loved him and felt an inhibition over challenging him, because he wanted to preserve Congress unity, and because he recognised that Gandhi's methods were effective in arousing the Indian masses. Nehru's moral judgments have always been pragmatic. Since Mr. Moraes understands this, it is the more remarkable that he should deny that he is godless. Logic that claims Nehru for religion is of the kind that claims Shakespeare for Marxism. The arguments and quotations Mr. Moraes advances make any moderately decent and amiable rationalist more religious than any mystic. Nehru will remain godless though Mr. Moraes define apples as oranges.

Loneliness, in Mr. Moraes's opinion, accounts for much of Nehru's character. A childhood among adults (he did not go to Harrow till he was sixteen), prison, and the death in 1936 of his wife, Kamala, all contributed to his experience of it. Today he tends to isolate himself by his inability "to decentralise work by entrusting some of it to others." He is reserved with strangers. But he is relaxed with the masses and playful with his family. For the rest, he is orderly, brave, impetuous, petulant, and sensitive to ridicule; he keeps pet pandas; at sixty-seven he rides, swims, and stands on his head. Mr. Moraes's analysis of Nehru is surprising only in its dismissal of feminine influences. He regards his father and Gandhi as the only significant influences. Yet when Nehru was a lonely child his mother "was his confidante"; and the most emotional passages in his autobiographical writings are those on his wife. Nehru's marriage was arranged. For a long time he treated his wife fondly but not untraditionally. Her ambition—to lead Indian women into politics and prison—was fulfilled only a few years

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before she died. It is surely significant that the issue for which Nehru has risked most in domestic politics is the emancipation of women.

Despite mixed metaphors and elegant variations, Mr. Moraes's book is clear. Despite patronising and contemptuous phrases, used respectively of the British and the Muslim League, it is mostly accurate: the serious exception is the chapter on Kashmir; nowhere in it does Mr. Moraes bring himself to admit that Sheikh Abdullah (let alone the rest of them) is in prison. That he should draw on Nehru's autobiographical writings is inevitable. What is disappointing is that his book should almost cease to be biography, and become political analysis, when Nehru's autobiographical writings finish—on his release from Ahmadnagar Fort in 1945. Is it not worth mentioning that Nehru let a Gandhian disciple "fast unto death" before he agreed to the creation of Andhra State? Certainly Mr. Moraes's book does not compensate for the lack of Nehru's own account of the events since 1945: Nehru on Indian nationalism is the equivalent of Churchill on the second world war. To find time to write such an account he would have to put himself in prison or retire; the two seem equally improbable.

Although it was published in the United States, Mr. Moraes's book might best be read by uninformed Englishmen, those who believe that the Muslim League represented the Muslims and Congress the Hindus. A book for uninformed Americans is *As I See India*, by Mr. Trumbull, one-time correspondent in New Delhi of *The New York Times*. Mr. Trumbull resolves for them the paradox of Nehru's transformation since 1947 from nationalist white to non-aligned dirty grey. His book is similar to Chester Bowles's *Ambassador's Report*, but less earnest, less knowledgeable, more speculative, and more amusing. Mr. Trumbull writes of his own experiences—which included sending a telegram to Lhasa offering to fly the Dalai Lama out of Tibet—and of the Indian people, customs, legends, clothes, climate, lack of air conditioning, and tourist attractions. He discusses prices and tells readers where to report merchants who "cheat" them. American influence, he explains, is already causing the disappearance of the black tie; whether it can impose a retail-price system on the bazaar is to be seen. The black tie apart, Mr. Trumbull is sympathetic to the British, and he is almost sycophantic to the princes. Whether or not he used to believe that democracy and tyranny were the only two political orders, the evidence of paternalism in India seems to have surprised him. Needless to say, he still supports democracy. He accepts, and illustrates with objectivity, Nehru's dictum that India must run before she has learned to walk. One expects a book by a journalist to be topical; this one appears to have been written two years ago.

STANLEY ALDERSON.

BOOK REVIEWS

SHORTER NOTICES

- YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1955. [H.M.S.O. 556 pp. 70s.]
 EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 1945-1955. Revised ed. [H.M.S.O. 444 pp. 11s.]
 THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By C. E. TOUSSAINT. [Stevens. 288 pp. 37s. 6d.]
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By M. BALL and H. KILLOUGH. [Stevens. 667 pp. 50s.]

THE student of international government and relations will find much of value in these four books. The reference books of the United Nations are nearly always very well produced. The *Yearbook* dealing with the year 1955 is in the same form as its predecessors, with the omission of the section on structure which appeared in some of them. All the chief activities of organisation are recorded in two parts; the first deals with (a) political and security questions and (b) economic and social questions, the second with the specialised agencies. The paper-covered *Everyman's United Nations*, which gives a concise account of the organisation's first ten years, is the fifth edition of a book first published in 1945. It is a very useful summary written for the ordinary man who wishes seriously to study the structure and achievements of the organisation. The two other books are published in the "Library of World Affairs." Dr. Toussaint's book is an admirable study of the trusteeship system and gives a careful account of what has actually been achieved under Chapters XI and XIII of the Charter. *International Relations* is the work of two American professors and is a praiseworthy attempt to describe and analyse the centrifugal and centripetal forces in the modern community of nations. They deal first with the evolution of that community and its history under the influence of the pursuit of national policies. Then they consider the evolution of the League and the United Nations in the search for collective security. Finally, they consider the phase in which we stand today, the schism between West and East, between the U.S.A. and Russia.

TRADE UNIONS. By ERIC L. WIGHAM. [Oxford University Press. 277 pp. 7s. 6d.]

THIS is a new volume in the Home University Library and it is written by the Labour correspondent of *The Times*. It is an extremely interesting study of trade unions and trade unionism in which there is just enough history and analysis to put before the reader the problems of labour and the organised workers at the present time. Mr. Wigham is extremely critical of contemporary unionism and its leaders. He considers that at no time have trade unions been more powerful and less effective. For instance, he maintains that "the fundamental problem facing the trade union movement" is the problem of wages policy in full employment and that the TUC have not only failed to solve the problem, they have repeatedly refused to discuss it seriously.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Labour Party and the Ownership of Industry

THE Labour Party is in the throes of a discussion about public ownership which is likely to be of profound importance to the economic and social life of the British people. The recent pamphlet entitled *Industry and Society* has already aroused considerable opposition from a group of thirty-two Labour M.P.s. There will doubtless be strong criticism when this policy statement is considered at the Annual Conference of the party at Brighton in October. It should be considered jointly with the policy pamphlet on *Public Enterprise*, in which the Labour Party reviews the nationalised industries.

Industry and Society contains a remarkable analysis of the changes which have taken place in the private sector of the economy. It argues that it is unrealistic to lump together all the privately owned firms regardless of their size and irrespective of whether they are public or private companies. The vital element on which attention should be concentrated is the relatively small number of large public companies (about 500) which earn nearly half of the total profits gained by private industry. They are directly responsible for about half of the total investment in the private sector and indirectly for a good deal more. These great undertakings constitute a new sector which dominates the economy. Moreover, they are of growing importance, for they alone can command (either singly or in co-operation) the vast capital resources and the elaborate research facilities which modern developments in industry require.

Owners versus Managers

These large concerns differ vastly from the classic model of capitalist enterprise which socialism has traditionally rejected and fought. Ownership has become separated from control and management. The shareholders are virtually impotent because their holdings are so widely dispersed; and they are functionless because they bear an almost negligible risk and provide only a small proportion of the capital required for investment, by far the greater part coming from retained profits ploughed back into the business, from insurance companies and other corporate institutions. The control of the great industrial concerns is now in the hands of a managerial elite possessing special abilities and qualifications. "The world of the managers is not the world of the shareholders. Their concern is with production as much as with profits and with expansion far more than with dividends. Salaries, pensions, status, power, and

promotion—these rather than wealth are their operating incentives.” The interests of the managers diverge from those of the owners in regard to the allocation of profits. Yet despite this divergence of interest and the disappearing role of the proprietor, the rewards going to the individual shareholder have tended to increase. In consequence, the ownership of stocks and shares as a continuing cause of economic inequality has in no way diminished. The heavy taxation of incomes has been largely offset by the capital gains enjoyed by those who own stocks or shares in the large firms. Private ownership of the equity is thus a potent influence in supporting and increasing inequality.

This analysis of modern large-scale commercial enterprise is indubitably correct; and the Labour Party has done a useful service in bringing its members up to date on the nature of big business. The real grounds for debate should be confined to the question of future policy.

The State as Shareholder

The pamphlet recommends that the path to greater equality lies through acquisition by the state of stocks and shares in the large companies. This would enable the community to participate in the heavy capital gains which accrue almost automatically to the owners. It could acquire these holdings by various means, such as acceptance of investments in payment of death duties or through the proposed national superannuation fund or by purchase.

Socialism has hitherto signified both public ownership and public administration in one form or another of industries or services. Municipal trading, central government operation on the Post Office model, nationalisation through the newer device of the public corporation, and even the co-operative movement (in which the emphasis is on social ownership and social administration)—all these different forms can easily be fitted into the traditional concept of socialism. *Industry and Society* departs from the concept by advocating state participation in the ownership of public companies which will remain in the hands of their present managers and directors. The state will not acquire either the entire capital stock or even a majority holding. It will be one shareholder among many others.

The major aim of the state in wanting to jump on the bandwagon of happy equity holders is to secure a fairer distribution of income and of wealth, and the pamphlet contends that only by this means can the community secure to itself some of the princely

earnings which will otherwise enrich the functionless individual shareholder.

The reasons for the abandonment of public administration as a concomitant of public ownership are complex. By far the most important is a belief that the large concerns are well managed, and that any attempt at nationalisation would be detrimental to their well-being. The pamphlet explicitly states that “The Labour Party recognises that, under increasingly professional managements, large firms are as a whole serving the nation well. Moreover, we recognise that no organisation, public or private, can operate effectively if it is subjected to persistent and detailed interventions from above. We have, therefore, no intention of intervening in the management of any firm which is doing a good job.” Nevertheless, there are several matters of national importance which must be decided by public authority, such as the level and distribution of investment, the regulation of large-scale industrial building, and the balance between exports and home consumption; but the view is expressed that in general these can be effectively determined by government planning and control.

Where regulation is insufficient, “public ownership” may be desirable—meaning, presumably, complete acquisition by the state. But even in this event socialists are warned against equating public ownership with nationalisation in the sense it has so far been understood as involving the ownership and operation of an entire industry by a public corporation. The advantages of a single gigantic monopoly may be outweighed by the advantages of “autonomy and competition.”

Public Ownership and Nationalisation Distinguished

Industry and Society follows a line which was clearly marked out by Mr. Gaitskell's Fabian Tract, *Socialism and Nationalisation*, published in July, 1956. In it he drew a distinction between the ownership by the community of assets and property of any kind, and the nationalisation of particular industries. The former he regarded as necessary if we are to have a much more equal distribution of wealth. The state could and should become the owner of industrial, commercial, or agricultural property without necessarily exercising detailed control even over an individual firm, much less over an entire industry. He foresaw the possibility of establishing wholly-owned state enterprises to carry out a project where private enterprise was lacking, and also of mixed enterprise in the sense of a partnership between the state and private firms. About the

through either of these methods, they would transfer their business headquarters abroad." To make this illegal would present serious difficulties, but even if that were done it would be impossible to prevent the businessmen themselves from leaving the country.

Mr. Dugdale considers that it is illusory to believe that private enterprise can be relied upon to develop production without the rewards normally expected by business executives, and he warns that an attempt to combine a high degree of government control, oppressive taxation, and public abuse will lead to disaster. In consequence, nationalisation must be adopted as the only practicable method by which industry can be run for the benefit of the community.

Incentives in Public and Private Enterprise

The weakness of this approach is that it seizes on nationalisation as a way of avoiding certain difficulties which are likely to arise in the private sector of the economy without inquiring whether similar or comparable difficulties may not occur in the public sector also. Can we assume that the directors, managers, and technical experts of high ability which are needed in public enterprise no less than in private enterprise are indifferent to financial incentives and oppressive taxation? This is certainly not the view expressed in *Public Enterprise*. This pamphlet cites with approval the criticism voiced by the Herbert Committee on the relatively low salaries paid in the electricity supply industry to Board members and management generally, and declares that the salaries of such men should not fall below those paid for corresponding positions in private business. It would be rash to assume that men possessing the administrative abilities and technical knowledge which is in world-wide demand at the present time, will be willing to work in British nationalised industries if the fiscal conditions are such as to drive businessmen abroad. In its policy statement on *Equality* the Labour Party has already expressed concern at the emigration of scientific and technical personnel.

The Labour Party will have to face up to these disagreeable questions sooner or later; and the sooner the better. In our view, nationalisation should not be regarded by any means as a policy which has served its purpose and is no longer useful; but on the other hand, we do not believe that there is any large amount of potential electoral support for a policy of further nationalisation as an end in itself.

The Criteria for Nationalisation

The fundamental question on which clearer thinking is needed are the criteria which should be applied in deciding whether an industry or a firm should be nationalised. The following propositions are put forward for consideration in this connection. First, where an industry or a firm is working with obvious success and efficiency, there is no point in urging nationalisation merely because of its large size. Second, industries or firms which are largely engaged in operations abroad or in export, might well meet with considerable sales resistance on political grounds in several countries (notably the U.S.) if they were nationalised. Third, where the state takes over an industry which is suffering from bad management, technological backwardness, and a shortage of able executives and technical experts (e.g., coal and railways) it is extremely difficult to arrest the momentum of decline and replace it with a momentum of progress. In short, the conditions are highly unfavourable even though nationalisation is the only feasible policy. Fourth, the best results have so far been achieved in industries or services which came under public ownership and administration from an early stage, as in the case of broadcasting, the air lines, and atomic energy. Public enterprise can do much better in new and expanding industries than in old and contracting ones. Fifth, it is a mistake to identify nationalisation with giant undertakings running an entire industry on monopolistic lines. An effort should be made to discover the optimum size of the operating unit in each instance and to encourage as much emulation or competition as possible within a nationalised industry, or between public and private enterprise within the same industry or service. Sixth, although the decisions to nationalise in their entirety coal, gas, electricity, railways, the air services, and steel were correct in view of the technical, organisational, and financial conditions and needs of those industries, in future the Labour Party would in most instances do better to take over either individual firms or establish a new undertaking rather than acquire a whole industry.

Finally, the Labour Party will have to make up its mind at some stage whether it accepts the idea of a mixed and regulated economy, or whether this state of affairs is to be regarded as a step towards a socialised economy. The former will involve a very different attitude towards both public undertakings and private firms from the latter outlook.

THE CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS

F. H. SOWARD

AN American scholar who has made a special study of regionalism commented recently that "clearly, an uneasy and unstable equilibrium among contending and overlapping blocs has arisen at the United Nations which is defining the limits of international action and also imposing distinct reins on the freedom of multilateral and regional action."¹ This verdict by Professor Haas can be illustrated by a study of the pattern of voting at the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly. However, for reasons that will be indicated later, the writer would prefer to use the word "group" rather than "bloc" for all but one of the electoral combinations which were manifest in Assembly proceedings.

The Effect of New Admissions

What seems to be emerging in the United Nations is a kind of group veto in the General Assembly which, although not as obvious as the individual veto possessed by the Great Powers in the Security Council, may seriously detract from its effective working. Basically, such a development arises from the decision when the Charter was drafted that it should recognise, in the words of Article 2, "the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Much indignation and sarcasm has been expended upon the resulting parity in voting strength of the United States and Luxemburg, the U.S.S.R. and Panama or India and Libya, but such unreal equations of power must be accepted as among the facts of international life. The sole concession made in the Charter to those who dislike this principle was the stipulation that decisions in the General Assembly upon important matters should require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting but not unanimity as in the League of Nations Assembly. The second factor which has produced the

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¹ Ernst B. Haas, "Regional Integration and National Policy," *International Conciliation*, May, 1957.

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present difficulties has been the one-third increase in U.N. membership, which has taken place since December, 1955. At the close of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly some complicated negotiations in which Canada took an active part succeeded in breaking the deadlock between the U.S.S.R. and the West on the admission of new states that had existed for several years. No less than sixteen states were admitted in a package deal: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Roumania, and Spain. Three more, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan, were elected to membership at the beginning of the Eleventh Session while Japan and Ghana were added to the roster before the Assembly adjourned. As a consequence, the United Nations now has eighty-one members. With the exception of Outer Mongolia, *persona non grata* to the United States, Switzerland, the new State of Malaya, and the divided states of Germany, Korea, and Viet-Nam, it contains all political states (this phrase is used because of Vatican City) of any substance. As compared to the early Fifties, the result has been to increase European representation in the United Nations by ten, including four "Iron Curtain" countries, Asian by six, and African by five. If all member states are present and vote upon some important question, twenty-eight adverse votes can prevent adoption of the recommendation. Gone are what may seem to some American diplomats the "good old days" when the Latin Americans and the United States with a total of twenty-one votes could block action, if they so desired.

During the Eleventh Assembly, however, the number necessary to defeat an important resolution, assuming that there were no abstentions, was twenty-six. The reason for this variance from the present veto figure was the decision of the Union of South Africa in November and of Hungary in December to withdraw from participation in Assembly activities as a protest against the criticism voiced of themselves.² But during the Session the search for the necessary fifty-two votes led to some involved bargaining and dubious compromises. Fortunately, it was not quite as bad as it seemed at first glance, since there has not yet appeared in the Assembly a bloc of twenty-six states which can be depended upon to vote with mathematical monotony as their leader dictates. Only one voting combination is monolithic in character: the Soviet bloc. As for the rest, there are three clearly recognisable groups, the

² South Africa returned unobtrusively to cast a vote on the issue arising from the attack of the anti-colonial powers on Portugal.

Afro-Asian, the Latin American, and the Commonwealth, while a fourth composed of the European states outside the Iron Curtain is beginning to take shape. Not included in these groups are four states: China, Israel, the United States, and Yugoslavia which do not attend any caucus.

The Monolithic Soviet Bloc

The Soviet bloc of nine, if Hungary is included, consists of the U.S.S.R., two of its components the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R., and the six satellites. Whether they caucus or not is unknown, but there is no question that all major decisions on policy are made in Moscow. On one occasion only during the Eleventh Session Poland abstained on a resolution concerning the Hungarian question and its action caused a flurry of excitement in the corridors. The offence was not repeated, but thereafter delegates listened carefully to see if they could detect, as occasionally happened, slight Polish variations on the themes enunciated by the Soviet spokesmen. Otherwise it was axiomatic that all Soviet bloc speeches were the same speech. Jaded delegates left it to their advisers to adjust their earphones and listen while an Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, or Roumanian dutifully read his script. On many occasions a Yugoslav would vote with the other communist delegates, but it was obvious that both he and they realised that his support was not automatic. On some issues, such as Hungary, the Soviet bloc would be almost isolated. On others, particularly of an anti-colonial nature, it could have support from many who were not fellow travellers in an ideological sense, but who distrusted Western "imperialism" more than Soviet communism. The Indian ex-communist who once remarked that in Asia communism is simply nationalism painted red would have perfectly understood their position. The appeal of the Russians to this powerful sentiment of anti-colonialism was all the more effective in the Eleventh Assembly because of the intensified distrust of Britain and France which had been created by their attitude in the Suez crisis.

The Afro-Asian Group

The most significant group emerging in the United Nations is the Afro-Asian, which now numbers twenty-eight with the admission of Ghana. It may justifiably count upon further recruits in the near future as Malaya, Nigeria, and Somaliland, to list those at or closest to statehood, secure admission to the U.N. In a sense, this group

has grown out of the early Arab one, largely as a result of the Bandoeng conference of 1955, which helped to define its membership and gave it a sense of common purpose in striving to secure freedom for all Asian and African peoples. Afro-Asian caucuses at the U.N. were regularly announced over the loud-speakers in the delegates' lounges. They were chaired in monthly rotation by the leader of the various delegations, Jordan providing the chairman in March, for example. Their discussions were held in English, the language which the great majority preferred to use in the Assembly debates.

Although these states will vote in bloc fashion upon anti-colonial issues, they are by no means a disciplined bloc with an unchallenged leader. In fact, they do not refer to themselves as a bloc. The main reason for this absence of constant unwavering solidarity, which is the real proof of a bloc's identity, is to be found in the fact that a careful scrutiny of the Afro-Asian group will reveal the existence of no less than four groups within the larger one. Their composition is not hard and fast as attitudes change and new issues appear, but they are capable of identification. The first group consists of eight states which are linked with Western powers in regional associations or bilateral defence arrangements, established to combat Soviet or Chinese imperialism. The eight states in this category are Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Laos, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. They are associated with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand in such groupings as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact or, as is true of Japan and Laos, are closely associated with the United States or France. From their ranks come such well-known figures in the U.N. as Prince Wan of Thailand, president of the Eleventh General Assembly, General Romulo of the Philippines, and Mr. Entezam of Iran, a former president of the Assembly, who speaks little, but is said to exert a strong influence among his colleagues. Although this group will side with the West on many anti-communist issues or at least abstain, they will vote against the West on most anti-colonial issues and they will normally support their Arab colleagues over any issue involving Israel.

There are three African states: Ethiopia, Liberia, and Ghana, which share the anti-colonial views of the whole group, but on many issues are well disposed towards some of the Western powers, particularly the United States or the United Kingdom. Although anti-communist, they do not belong to any regional defence arrangement. On the other hand, they are less vocal than many of their

confreres about their "non-alignment" with either the Soviet Union or the West.

The Uncommitted States

The largest "inner group" among the Afro-Asians consists of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, and Tunisia. They may be best described as the uncommitted states, to use Adlai Stevenson's phrase, who like to insist upon their independence between East and West and distrust armed alliances as widening the danger of war. They vary in their attitude towards the West from a genuine sympathy with it, such as Mr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, displays and which is shared on many matters by Mr. Habib Bourguiba, the President of Tunisia⁴ to the annoying combination of a wide knowledge of Western manners and institutions and waspish censure which characterises Mr. Krishna Menon of India, the most influential member of the group and the ablest debater among the Afro-Asians. The states in this group are much less disposed to combine with Western states on anti-communist issues than such countries as Iraq or the Philippines.

The fourth and bitterest group among the Afro-Asians is largely drawn from the Middle East, including as it does Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. But it also contains Afghanistan and Sudan. All of these states were vociferous in their denunciations of the West over the Suez crisis during the Eleventh Assembly and were frequently to be found voting on other issues with the Soviet bloc, Afghanistan probably holding the record in that respect. Their ablest spokesman was Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This group has already begun to disintegrate as the breach between Jordan and Egypt widens and the Kings of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan draw much more closely together than seemed possible at the end of 1956.

The Latin American Nations

The senior group in the United Nations in point of continuity is composed of the twenty Latin American countries who have maintained their habit of association which was nurtured in the League of Nations, the Pan America Union and its successor, the Organisation of American States. During each Assembly, these states caucus

⁴ According to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 25, 1957, their correspondent lately in Tunisia described it as "perhaps the only Arab country in which common sense pervades the whole body politic."

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regularly under the chairmanship of whichever Latin American delegate has been elected as one of the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly. In 1956, he was Dr. Miguel Rafael Urquiza, who was chairman of the delegation of El Salvador. They are pro-Western and anti-communist, normally responsive to American leadership if tactfully exercised, but also anti-colonial. The last-mentioned attitude arises from their romantic tradition of rebellion against European supremacy which all share, except Brazil, whose peaceful separation from Portugal was affectionately recalled when that country ran into severe criticism in the United Nations. The Latinos, as their more irreverend colleagues describe them, cannot be accurately described as a bloc, since they are jealous of authority and acknowledge no unchallenged leader. Like the Afro-Asians they would reject such a description. But they do act like a bloc whenever the time comes to secure representation from their region on committees, councils, or commissions. Thus, in the Fourth Committee on Trusteeship just prior to the election of two states to the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories each delegation was handed a formal note which read:

The Delegation of El Salvador to the United Nations has the honour to remind that Guatemala has been indorsed by the Latin American Group for re-election to the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Not surprisingly it was from Latin America that four resolutions originated during the Eleventh Assembly, calling for an increase in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council, in the Economic and Social Council, in the International Court of Justice and in the International Law Commission.

The Commonwealth Countries

That the Commonwealth countries would never speak of themselves as a bloc is probably far more obvious to themselves than to others, but even the latter could not but have noticed how the Commonwealth was split on the Suez issue. With the addition of Ghana there are now nine Commonwealth countries in the U.N. During the Eleventh Assembly they normally met each Thursday morning for an informal discussion, attended by only the senior representatives from each country and a minimum of advisers. Such meetings were largely expositions of points of view on the issues before the Assembly and from the very nature of the Commonwealth could not result in a decision to have one state speak for the whole Commonwealth on any particular question. There might be

occasionally a Commonwealth chorus in the U.N., but there was no possibility of a Commonwealth solo! But it can be safely claimed that in no group could differences of opinion be more frankly stated or more sincerely accepted. Membership in the Commonwealth did not of course preclude the participation of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, and now Ghana in the Afro-Asian group and would not prevent the United Kingdom from participating in a European group. The Commonwealth countries are all anti-communist, but differ widely on how best to combat communism. The "Old Commonwealth," as the term is occasionally used, is instinctively pro-Western while the Asian members are equally firmly anti-colonial. For the reasons already given there could not be Commonwealth leadership in the United Nations, but from within the Commonwealth there came during the Eleventh Assembly far less leadership from the United Kingdom than in the past and a greater influence upon U.N. policy, for quite different reasons, by Canada and India. Sir Leslie Munro, the New Zealand ambassador to the United States, was held in high esteem as a U.N. personality by his fellow-delegates and is in the running to become the next president of the General Assembly.

A European Group?

Outside the Iron Curtain there are now seventeen European states represented in the United Nations. Two of them, Turkey and the United Kingdom, are already in other groups. As yet there is no formal organisation of a European group, but towards the end of the Eleventh Assembly there were signs of an embryo caucus, chiefly of NATO states. But it was noticeable that the European countries were becoming more conscious of themselves as a potential group, a feeling which was intensified by their common indignation at the tragedy of Hungary and the failure of the U.N. to achieve any effective action. Among the European states there are twelve already closely linked together by NATO and correspondingly inclined to vote as a group on many U.N. issues, including colonial ones but not Suez. To this generalisation there was unfortunately one marked exception, in that Greece, angered by its differences over Cyprus with the United Kingdom and Turkey, went out of its way to be as "ornery" as possible on issues which might be embarrassing to the British. The other five European states present individual problems: Spain because of the legacy of feeling left by the Spanish civil war and Franco's attitude during the second world war, Finland acutely aware of its geographical and political

position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, Austria, whose neutrality is the price of its freedom, Sweden with a tradition of neutrality that is over a century old, and Ireland with its own peculiar grievance over partition which left her out of NATO. All of these states are anti-communist in feeling and none can be classed as anti-colonial.

Of the four states which belong to no caucus the United States is, of course, by far the most significant and the one state which does not *need* a caucus. China is allied to the United States, but because of its government's confinement to Formosa is not regarded as a suitable member of the Afro-Asian group. The same was true at the Bandoeng Conference. Israel is barred by the Arab veto from the same group and was probably the most isolated state in the last Assembly. Yugoslavia stands alone as a "national" communist state and while disclaiming the description seems defiantly proud of its position.

The Pattern of Voting

With this description of the groups in the United Nations in mind it is interesting to analyse the character of some of the votes on important questions. Where the issues arising from the challenge and machinations of communism are clear-cut, it is not difficult to get a satisfactory majority based upon the European states, the Western Hemisphere and some of the Commonwealth and Afro-Asian countries. Thus, a resolution urging the establishment of a "unified, independent and democratic" Korea was carried by a vote of fifty-seven to eight (the Soviet bloc, of course, with Hungary absent) and with nine abstentions, mainly Afro-Asian.

All of the Afro-Asians voted for a resolution proposing the prompt dispatch of aid to the Hungarian people in the form of medical supplies, foodstuffs, and clothing. On December 8, 1956, by a vote of fifty-six to eight with thirteen abstentions, including India, the Assembly condemned the Soviet Union for its intervention in Hungary. On that occasion such states as Burma, Ceylon, Iraq, Libya, and Nepal were to be found among the majority. A third resolution to set up the special committee to take evidence on what happened in Hungary, a committee which has since produced so impressive a report, was sponsored by the United States, six Latin American countries, nine European countries, including the United Kingdom, two other Commonwealth countries, and six Afro-Asian states. Only ten states, including India, abstained on the resolution which was carried fifty-nine to eight. But there were other resolutions involving communism in

which the issues were less clear-cut. One of the best examples was the vote on a resolution proposed by the United States "not to consider . . . any proposals (as had come from India) to exclude the representative of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Republic of China." The issue was not a new one and the United States, well aware of the feeling among many of its own people, was eager to poll as large a vote as possible on the resolution. Despite assiduous canvassing, the best it could do was to secure a vote of 47-24-8. The Soviet bloc was joined in opposition by the Scandinavian countries, Finland, Yugoslavia, and ten Afro-Asians. Ten Afro-Asian countries voted with the United States while seven abstained or were absent. Clearly, the United States cannot afford many more victories of that kind.

The same pattern of voting can be detected on the issues arising from the Middle East crisis. A simple resolution calling upon Israel "to complete its withdrawal behind the demarcation line without further delay" was carried by the overwhelming vote of 74-2-2 with only France supporting Israel in opposition. A second one, urging prompt action to clear the Suez Canal, a measure of great importance to almost every state, was carried by 65-0 with the Soviet bloc abstaining. But when the same six powers who had sponsored the resolution calling for the speedy evacuation of Egyptian territory, the United States, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Norway, and Yugoslavia, a most interesting cross section of the Assembly, tried to draft a resolution on what should be done in the Gaza strip and the Sharm-el-Sheikh areas after the Israeli evacuation they ran into trouble. They had to resort to platitudes or vague suggestions that "the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement" required "the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Israeli Egyptian Armistice Demarcation Line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area." Even then, in contrast to their previous success, the vote was fifty-six to nothing with no less than twenty-two abstentions. The U.S. permanent representative at the U.N., Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, was the chief advocate of this resolution, which everyone knew was worded so as to meet the stipulations of Mr. Krishna Menon, who in turn was working in close co-operation with Dr. Fawzi. When the American delegate made a stronger speech than had been anticipated upon what might be the role of UNEF under such

conditions Dr. Fawzi promptly challenged his view and Mr. Menon said approvingly of the Egyptian statement that he had attempted "to say the same thing in his own way." The aftermath was regrettable. As the editor of *Foreign Affairs* wrote later, "The Secretary-General was left to interpret what had been the General Assembly's intent and to do his best to give it coherent execution."⁵ It is quite probable that Mr. Lodge had correctly assessed the nature of the vote in the Assembly. It was noticeable that neither Canada, which had refused to join the sponsors of the resolution and had a definite programme for improving the position in the Gaza strip and the Sharm-el-Sheikh area, nor the Afro-Asians, who were urging sanctions against Israel, attempted to put their proposals to the vote. But if the price of victory in the Assembly is to be imprecision upon a crucial question, it may sometime be too dearly bought.

Anti-Colonialism in the Assembly

On colonial matters the massive strength of anti-colonial feeling and the anxiety of both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers to win friends and to influence former subject peoples is reflected in the votes cast. Here, too, a clear-cut issue easily won indorsement. Thus, no state opposed the admission of Ghana to the U.N. and sixty-three voted in favour of the incorporation of the Trust Territory of British Togoland in the new country with none opposing and nine abstaining. On the resolution concerning efforts at settlement of the vexatious border dispute between Ethiopia and the Trust Territory of Somaliland, which no one wanted to see fail, seventy-one voted for further direct negotiations with U.N. mediation as an alternative if the former failed. None opposed and only three abstained, the two disputants and Italy, the state at present responsible for Somaliland. But in the colonial field as elsewhere there are few simple issues. The future of French Togoland, which has become by plebiscite "The Autonomous Republic of French Togoland" and has chosen to remain in the French Union, provoked a sharp three weeks' debate in the Fourth Committee before a resolution was finally hammered out for presentation to the General Assembly. The French wanted the trust territory freed from U.N. supervision. In the plebiscite which they had conducted without U.N. co-operation they had linked the establishment of the autonomous republic with freedom from Trusteeship,

⁵ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "The U.N. Experience in Gaza," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1957, pp. 609-610.

but had not permitted a vote on its independence outside the French Union. Some of the Afro-Asian group regarded the plebiscite as a fraudulent one and were contemptuous of the degree of self-government which French Togoland had acquired. After intricate negotiations a group of powers, including the United States, Canada, Thailand, Denmark, and the Dominican Republic secured the adoption of a resolution in the Committee calling for a Commission of six to visit French Togoland and study on the spot the degree of progress achieved and report to the next Assembly. In the Assembly this resolution was carried by 53-16-7. The Afro-Asians were badly split, ten supporting, eleven opposing and six abstaining.

The Russians scored their first success in the Fourth Committee at securing adoption of a resolution sponsored by themselves on a colonial issue. But their triumph was achieved only by watering down their original resolution calling for complete independence of five African trust territories and New Guinea within five years so as to omit New Guinea and the five-year time limit and substituting the requirement in the African trust territories that self-government or independence should be granted "at an early date." This resolution carried in the Assembly by 45-14-16 with the only Afro-Asian states not voting for it being Turkey and Laos. The one occasion upon which the Western Powers succeeded in blocking adoption of an anti-colonial resolution arose when one was presented to the Assembly calling upon the recently elected members to review their statements in reply to a letter from the Secretary-General, inquiring as to their possession of non-self-governing territories, and establishing a committee to "... study the application of the provisions of chapter XI of the Charter in the case of members newly admitted." The resolution was obviously aimed at Portugal, which stated that it had listed no non-self-governing territories, since under its constitution all parts of the national domain ranked as "provinces." When what began as an attempt to force Portugal to alter its position developed into what appeared to many as an unwarranted trespass upon national sovereignty there were many who regarded the issue as far more than a colonial one. As a result the vote in the Assembly was 35-35-5 to the chagrin of states like Iraq, India, and Sudan, which threatened to raise the issue at the next Session.

The Countervailing Power of Groups

In the light of these developments it appears that the Afro-Asians, when united, can block the adoption of any resolution. Similarly,

the United States, Latin America, Western Europe, and the Old Commonwealth can defeat resolutions sponsored by the Afro-Asian group and supported by the Soviet bloc. Contrariwise, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can hope to secure the adoption of an important resolution without winning support from the uncommitted states. Mr. Walter Lippman has gone so far as to declare in his column of February 7, 1957, that "... the United States working loyally through the U.N. can on the crucial issues take no positive or affirmative position to which Mr. Menon is seriously opposed." Most observers would regard this assertion as somewhat exaggerated, but it does point to a dilemma which is likely to be with us for some time. It certainly means that the Great Powers must develop even more effectively than in the past a technique of "getting out the vote" by using what might be described as national whips which can be exasperating and almost humiliating. It also means that corridor conversations in New York or diplomatic overtures in Washington will be required to create "assumptions" or "assurances" to make palatable a U.N. resolution. Such was certainly the case when Israel finally withdrew her troops from the Gaza strip in March of this year.

In their annoyance at the current trend in the U.N. there have been suggestions in both British and American circles that it is time to get away from the one-state one-vote absurdity and establish a system of weighted voting such as exists at the meetings of the International Bank or Fund. But no such change can take place without the Charter being amended. Amendments require the concurrence of all the Great Powers. Can anyone imagine the Russians losing an opportunity of demonstrating their concern for the rights of the smaller nations? Even if the Soviet Union did consent, the proposed amendment would require the concurrence of two-thirds of the members. How many small states can be expected to surrender their right of sovereign equality? It is significant that when the Committee established by the General Assembly in 1955 to recommend a time and place for a Charter Review Conference met for the first and only time on June 3 this year, it decided without a single dissenting vote to postpone making any recommendation for such a conference until 1959. The conclusion seems inevitable, therefore, that we may expect in the United Nations a period of uncertainty and uneasy balance which will test to the utmost the adroitness and patience of world's leaders.

THREE WHITE PAPERS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT

B. KEITH-LUCAS

THE structure of local government as we know it today was created in the years between 1834 and 1894, not on any calculated plan, but as the changes in society and political feeling dictated. Since that period of experiment and growth there has been remarkably little change; during the last sixty-three years there has been only one major alteration to the system—the abolition of the Guardians in 1929. Meanwhile the functions and duties of local councils have expanded in many ways; important services have been taken away from them, and the part they play in national life has altered much, but yet the structure remains essentially the same as it was when the century began.

It was not until the middle of the last war that there arose any general demand for a radical reorganisation of the system. Then a number of forces combined to suggest the need for such a change, most potent of all perhaps being the general feeling that victory should bring with it a new and brighter social organisation: a brave new world expressing in some way the essentials of the British way of life. This vague desire for improvement was supported by the new functions which it was expected local councils would perform in the administration of the Welfare State—in the health services, the relief of poverty, and the provision of more equal educational opportunities. Many people looked forward to the day when these councils would be building and managing the new health centres, community centres, county colleges, old people's homes, and children's homes, and much more besides.

So it was in this rather vague and optimistic spirit that political parties, associations, societies, and individuals issued their books and pamphlets of advice; some, like G. D. H. Cole¹ and the National Association of Local Government Officers,² proposed radical changes in the whole structure; others, like the County Councils Association,³ suggested rather an adaptation of the existing system. There

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¹ *Local and Regional Government* (1947).

² Report of the N.A.L.G.O. Reconstruction Committee (1943).

³ *Local Government Reform* (1943).

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was but little common ground among the various proposals; indeed there seems to have been but little agreement on why reform was needed at all, though most of the schemes proposed the suppression of some of the smaller authorities in each category, and many proposed the creation of some form of regional organisation to take over those services which, for technical reasons, demanded an area larger than a single county or county borough.

The Government recognised this need for change, but did not deal with the problem as a whole; it set up three bodies to tackle it piecemeal. In 1946 the Boundary Commission was established to take executive action in adjusting the boundaries and status of local authorities outside London; the Reading Committee was appointed to advise on the boundaries of Metropolitan Boroughs, and the Davies Committee to advise on how to obtain concerted action in carrying out the town planning schemes of the whole of Greater London. All of them ended in something like fiasco. The Boundary Commission existed for three years, produced an admirable report on how local government might be reorganised, made no single order altering any boundary, and was dissolved. The Reading Committee was rudely dismissed before it finished its inquiries, on the grounds that its terms of reference were inappropriate, and the Davies Committee produced a report calling for immediate action to establish an authority for planning and controlling the development of Greater London, but nothing more was heard of the matter. Mr. Bevan, as Minister of Health, declared that "the review of the structure and functions of local government is a constant preoccupation of the Government," and the responsibility was passed back to the associations of local authorities, who were obviously unlikely ever to agree to any general scheme of reorganisation. Their subsequent bickerings did nothing to help in any way.

Now the Government, after years of delay, has produced its own scheme of reorganisation, based on proposals which the associations have accepted with some hesitation and certain reservations. In the circumstances it was not to be expected that the policy would be one of radical reform; it is indeed a minimum of change within the existing framework. It is published in the three White Papers, *Areas and Status of Local Authorities in England and Wales*⁴; *Functions of County Councils and County District Councils in England and Wales*,⁵ and *Local Government Finance*.⁶

⁴ H.M.S.O. 1956, Cmd. 9831.

⁵ H.M.S.O. 1957, Cmd. 209.

⁶ H.M.S.O. 1957, Cmd. 161.

The first of these papers starts by proposing that new boundary commissions should be appointed for England and for Wales to make recommendations to the Minister in regard to the creation and extension of county boroughs, any necessary alterations in county boundaries, and the reorganisation of local government in the conurbations, which, it is suggested, should normally be on a two-tier basis. When this review is complete, the county councils should carry out a review of the minor authorities within their boundaries, much as they did between 1930 and 1938. The commissions would not be able to deal with the County of London, nor create county boroughs in Middlesex.

This White Paper and its policy were critically reviewed in the *Political Quarterly* by Mr. Peter Self earlier this year.⁷ It is therefore not intended to deal here with many of its proposals, Mr. Self having already done this so admirably.

The Second White Paper contains primarily a proposal that the larger district councils should be entitled to claim responsibility for a considerable range of functions in the fields of education, health, highways, planning, etc., instead of having, as at present, to rely on the good will of the county council in delegating responsibility: the smaller authorities would be given a lesser degree of responsibility under schemes of delegation to be approved by the Minister.

Finally the White Paper on Local Government Finance rejects any suggestion for new sources of revenue for local authorities other than an increase from 25 per cent. to 50 per cent. of the amount of rates paid by industry. Its principal proposal is the abolition of most of the percentage grants now paid for specific services (primarily education) and of the existing Exchequer Equalisation Grant. These would be replaced by a General Grant, fixed in amount for two or three years at a time, and distributed in accordance with a complicated formula, based on population weighted for children, high density, low density, and other factors. In addition there would be a Rate Deficiency Grant, to help the poorer areas, distributed to county boroughs and county districts on the basis of rate production per head of population, weighted for the sparsity of population.

The main effect of this would be that (apart from a few grants for police, highways, etc.), the existing specific grants, amounting to nearly £300 million a year, would be replaced by "block grants,"

⁷ Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 20-31.

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paid into the general accounts of the local authorities, and not earmarked for any particular service. Each council would then have to apportion its resources between its various functions; it would no longer be true that additional expenditure would bring in additional revenue in the form of percentage grants.

Such, in bare outline, are the Government's proposals. They can only be assessed by measuring them against the need for reform. How far are they likely to achieve an improvement in the system of local government? Will they enable the councils to do their work more competently and more efficiently? Will they lead to the decisions of local authorities reflecting more exactly what the people want? Will they help to give us better schools and houses?

The duties of local authorities have increased enormously in the last half century; despite the loss on nationalisation of gas and electricity and hospitals, their responsibility is constantly growing in many directions. And on the whole they have performed their functions with remarkable ability; the housing programme since the war, the adaptation of the schools, the building of technical colleges, all show that the local authorities as they now exist can and do serve their function well. But yet there are undoubtedly some points at which the system is unsatisfactory, and which demand adjustment.

First of these is the problem of the conurbations—the great areas of town which are governed at present by a dozen or more separate and independent councils, none of them able to make a plan for any service for more than its own small part of the whole; some of them unwilling to work closely with their neighbours. For example, Greater Birmingham is composed of the county boroughs of Birmingham, Walsall, Wolverhampton, Dudley, West Bromwich, and Smethwick, with parts of Worcestershire, Staffordshire, and Warwickshire, together with eight non-county boroughs, and twelve urban districts. Such a system is manifestly unsatisfactory, and precludes any general and effective planning over the whole area. The Government's solution to the problem is to instruct the boundary commissions to report on what should be done in each case, rather than itself to find the answer. This may be a sign of weakness, or a sign of wisdom. But at least the problem is faced, and it is accepted that reorganisation of a fairly drastic nature is needed, probably based on a two-tier system. The County Councils Association had recommended the establishment of such a structure of government in these areas; the Association of Municipal Corporations had replied somewhat haughtily that they saw "no reason

why areas within conurbations should either have taken away from them or be denied the advantage of 'all purpose' government." The Government, however, has at least provided a machinery for the needed reorganisation in these areas.⁸

Similar in nature, but much larger in scale, is the question of London. The City of London retains the boundaries it had in the reign of Richard II; the County, the boundaries assigned to the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855. Outside that boundary are parts of eight counties and three county boroughs, together with over a hundred urban districts and non-county boroughs. Less than a third of the whole population lives within the county, and no machinery other than the civil servants of the ministries exists to co-ordinate the administration and planning of this region. In 1935 Mr. Herbert Morrison wrote that "the muddle of local government in Greater London either means that Governments or Parliament wish it to be a muddle, on the divide and conquer principle, or that they have possessed neither the initiative nor the courage to grasp the problem boldly and settle it." Since then governments, whether Conservative, Coalition, or Labour, have continued the same lack of initiative and courage; the Local Government Boundary Commission was not allowed to deal with the matter; the Reading Committee was precluded from dealing with anything outside the county boundary, and dismissed on the grounds that, for that reason, its investigation was unrealistic. In the White Papers the question of Greater London is avoided on the grounds that it "would have to be specially considered" or that "the time is not ripe."

It seemed as if the reform of London government, and the introduction of some order and system, would once more be postponed. But unexpectedly in the debate on the White Papers on July 29, 1957, the Minister of Housing and Local Government announced the decision to appoint a Royal Commission on the government of Greater London.¹⁰ It may be that at last this problem will be tackled as a whole, after a century of delays and muddle. If this be so, something of real value will have been achieved.

Another of the ills from which local government suffers today is the lack of co-operation—or positive ill will—that exists between some local authorities, both among the councillors and the officers.

⁸ For a fuller discussion on the question of the conurbations, see Peter Self, *op. cit.*

⁹ *How Greater London is governed*, 1st ed., p. 122.

¹⁰ *Hansard*, No. 400, July 29, 1957, col. 919.

This generally springs from one of two causes. The most serious is the conflict between expanding county boroughs and the adjoining counties, who resist what they regard as aggressive encroachment on their territory. As the population of a city grows, the area of houses and buildings expands, but its municipal boundary remains unaltered. In default of agreement, which is rare, the only course is for the city to promote a bill to extend its boundaries, so that the borough area may coincide with the physical town. But the county council sees in this a threat to its power, and a danger of losing an area of high rateable value, on which it depends for revenue to support its lower rated rural areas. The county council opposes the bill. Both sides brief counsel, and fight it out in the committee rooms of the Lords and Commons. Counsel call witnesses, cross-examine and re-examine, as if they were appearing for the prosecution and the defence; they stress the other side's deficiencies, and try to ridicule their arguments. The bill may or may not succeed, but in either case the local authorities are left with an account of ten thousand pounds or more to pay, and a lasting ill will towards their opponents.

Wisely the Government has decided to change this procedure, and once more to entrust the adjustment of boundaries and the creation of new county boroughs to independent commissions; but this time the two commissions are, unlike the old Local Government Boundary Commission, to be advisory only. The final decision is to lie with the Minister. This would seem to leave the door open to attempts at political lobbying which might undermine the authority of the commissions. But at least the experience of the Boundary Commission will probably have taught the members of these bodies that their duty is to adjust boundaries, not to write essays, however brilliant.

The other main cause of friction is the system by which at present county districts have few powers of their own, and rely greatly on the willingness of the county council to delegate to them responsibility for administering county functions. Some counties do this generously; others prefer to keep power centralised at County Hall, and pass only an occasional crumb of responsibility to the lesser councils. Out of this arises resentment and distrust. Were all county districts of equal size and capacity it might be possible to assign more power to them absolutely. But they are not, and some of them are very small; over 200 have less than 5,000 inhabitants, a few have less than 2,000. So such a course, though not impossible, would be difficult.

Instead of attempting to transfer power completely from the counties to the districts, the Government has decided to divide the county districts into an upper and a lower group, and to secure to each a greater degree of responsibility for administering county functions within the general policy of the county council. Though the Association of Municipal Corporations condemns such a solution and demands that responsibility should, wherever practicable, be given outright, there appears to be much to be said for it. Incidentally it entails the abandonment of the experiment of divisional executives under the Education Act, which might have been the beginning of a new form of devolution, but has in fact been, with some exceptions, a sad failure.

It is doubtless impossible to achieve anything like uniformity in the size of the minor authorities, but some move in this direction will apparently be made by the county councils when they carry out their reviews, after the commissions have done their work. One difficulty, however, is that many of the smallest authorities are ancient boroughs, with traditions of representative government continuing unbroken from days before the House of Commons was born. The White Paper recognises that the pride and continuity of these communities have a value in themselves, and it proposes that, if they are to be merged with their neighbours, their traditions and dignities should be carried over to the new and larger bodies.

The main controversy, however, arises around two other maladies of local government—central control and lack of independent revenue. The complaint of excessive supervision dates back to the days of Chadwick and the Three Kings of Somerset House. Indeed, that local councils should always demand more liberty is a sign of their vitality. But today control is in many ways excessive. It is not, as it was in Chadwick's day, direct control; not the power of the Minister to say "do this" or "don't do that." Such mandatory power is practically limited to one much resented section in the Education Act,¹¹ which is so powerful a weapon that it has only once been used. The control from which local councils suffer is a gentler, politer form, exercised greatly through circulars and letters expressing the Minister's advice or opinion. Much of it works through discussions between the civil servants of the Ministries and the chief officers of the local councils. Officers are advised in a friendly and helpful way how to proceed. They are told what proposals will, and what will not, receive ministerial

¹¹ Education Act, 1944, s. 68.

backing, and so they frame the advice they give their committees. Behind this advice lies the implication that if the approved policy is followed the Minister will produce permission to borrow and grants in aid; otherwise not. So the committees find themselves persuaded into following the ministerial policy, because they cannot afford to follow any other. Gently, but effectively, they are led to do what the Minister wants.

Occasionally the central authority is more definite and precise, and threatens to enforce its views, as in the case of the Ministry of Education circular 318 of 1956 which orders local education authorities to limit the numbers of their full-time teachers, in the hope that the surplus will then move to unattractive areas like Birmingham. Here there is a positive threat of coercive action against councils which refuse to restrict their staffs; the Minister will use his statutory powers to command.

The White Paper does contain a promise to inaugurate "a fresh review of the controls which the central government exercise over local government, a review including but not limited to the controls associated with the grants structure." It is not explained, however, why this was not done before, rather than after, the formulation of Government policy.

That some general control of policy by the Ministries is necessary no one denies; the question is only whether the present degree of detailed supervision is needed. And even here there is wide agreement that it is excessive. In 1950 the Manpower Committee¹² found itself diverted from questions of personnel to central control, and declared that this should be concentrated only at key points. Other critics, such as D. N. Chester,¹³ have shown how detailed control has grown up out of the power of the Ministries to grant and withhold loan sanctions and grants in aid.

Behind this, it is argued, lies the inadequacy of the rate as a source of revenue, leading to the increasing reliance of local councils on government grants, which now exceed the income from the rates. A group of experts, gathered together by the Royal Institute of Public Administration,¹⁴ has investigated this matter, and, after a careful survey of methods used abroad, advised the assignment to local authorities of other revenues, such as the motor licence tax and a part of the income tax.

¹² First Report of the Local Government Manpower Committee 1950, Cmd. 7870.

¹³ *Central and Local Government* (1951); and also *Local Government and Central Control* by the West Midlands Group (1956).

¹⁴ *New Sources of Local Revenue*. Royal Institute of Public Administration (1956).

The Government might have made use of this report, or have instituted its own inquiry into such possible lines of policy. It might have investigated the possibility of relaxing to some degree the extent of control exercised through the regulation of borrowing, which has grown to mean control of the details of the scheme for which money is borrowed. But it appears to have done none of these things. The White Paper mentions the R.I.P.A. report, but rejects without explanation any sort of alternative revenue. It concentrates only on one solution—the abolition of most of the specific or earmarked grants, and their replacement by a general or block grant. The effect of this, it is argued, will be to reduce the reliance of the councils on the central government and at the same time to place on their shoulders the full financial responsibility for every decision they make. The object of this is, in part at least, to make local authorities feel the need for economy more urgently than they do at present.

Percentage grants were mostly instituted as a bribe to persuade local councils to give better services than they would otherwise provide; to overcome their natural meanness or love of economy. Their abolition may lead to a reluctance to spend money, and a reduction in the standard of public services. Or it may lead to a greater concern for efficiency and proper economy. Or perhaps it will make but little difference. Whether it will lead to more freedom for local authorities is not certain; the Ministries have other means of control—particularly through the regulation of borrowing—and, unless there is a real change of heart in Whitehall, there is no reason to expect any great change of policy.

The greater part of these grants has gone to education, and it is here that the proposals are really crucial. This is a service in which there is an exceptionally close link between the officers of local authorities and civil servants in Whitehall, and in which the Minister exercises a particularly powerful control, given to him deliberately and explicitly by the Education Act, 1944.

If the specific grants are abolished, the Education Committees will have to compete for their money against the claims of other committees, and some critics fear that the councils will prefer to cut the rates, or vote money for parks and pageants instead of schools and colleges. They fear that, with the guiding hand of the Minister relaxed, the standard of education will fall. He, however, has proclaimed that he "will never surrender the duties of promoting education and of controlling and directing educational policy." In

other words, if this weapon is removed, he will continue with others.

The world of education as a whole is up in arms against the proposals. The Association of Education Committees has declared its unqualified opposition; the National Union of Teachers has issued a trenchant pamphlet,¹⁵ in which it declares that "the advocates of block grants . . . have always been the enemies of education," and makes other equally dogmatic statements.

It is possible that some councils will behave as the teachers fear, but the Minister still has power to make them keep up their standards. Moreover, the majority of members of education committees are responsible people, anxious to improve the schools of their town or county; indeed, in recent years they have more often been held back than goaded on by the action of the Ministry. There seems to be little reason to prefer the long range control of the Ministry to the local discretion of the council, unless the locally elected councillors cannot be trusted.

This violent reaction of the teachers and educationalists is unfortunate; it exposes a lack of confidence in local democracy which may be justified, or may be exaggerated. But that it should exist is a grave misfortune. It also shows that education is tending to become divorced from the rest of local government, and to become a separate world, half-way between the council and the Ministry. Some education officers and committees seem to feel more sympathy for the Ministry than for their employing councils, and to feel safer under the Minister's tutelage than under the power of their local council.

From the purely financial point of view the proposals are of very limited value. There will no doubt be some simplification of accounting, but this is a minor matter. The absurdity of derating continues, but the contribution of industry is to be doubled—a change which will bring in about £30 million a year, but of this the Exchequer proposes to take £20 million. This is to balance the resultant loss to the Exchequer from taxes, and to save the taxpayer approximately £5 million on the transaction. But it may be that industry will be made to bear more as the years go by. The total of grants is to be stabilised, which will help the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but the burden of rising costs will fall entirely on the rates, which will make municipal budgeting more difficult. The formula for distribution of the new grants is apparently complicated

¹⁵ *Education and the Rates.*

and illogical, and no explanation is given of the basis on which it is calculated. Why, for example, should there be three different weightings for children, and why should densely populated areas be specially favoured? On what information and statistics are the amounts for these factors calculated? The White Paper leaves such matters unexplained.

In many ways the White Papers are of value; the re-establishment of the boundary commissions, the abolition of a number of small grants, the desire to relax control, and the subsequent decision to investigate the problem of Greater London may all prove to be beneficial. But, particularly on the financial side, great opportunities have been missed, and the years which might have been spent in detailed investigation of the facts seem to have been spent in other ways. The blame for this lies partly with the local authorities themselves, and particularly with their Associations. It is a disaster that there is not one association of local authorities, able to discuss such matters with the Government. Instead we have five, dominated by the County Councils Association and the Association of Municipal Corporations, which is greatly controlled by the county boroughs. These bodies have spent the vital years since 1950 in issuing manifestoes against each other and proposing schemes which would annihilate or cripple their opponents. They might have spent them in working out a policy of what was needed for the improvement of local government as a whole.

THE INDIAN GENERAL ELECTION

N. C. B. RAY CHAUDHURY

A GENERAL election every five years has now become a part of the accepted way of life in India. The recent election—the second since her independence—has been a remarkable event in many ways. Not the least important among these is the fact that the faith of her people in the methods of the ballot box—as opposed to those of the bullet—and their capacity to carry through a democratic operation on such a colossal scale have been demonstrated once more in a striking manner. An eloquent testimony to this faith and capacity has been provided by the formation in little Kerala of a communist ministry which has come to power within the framework of parliamentary democracy by the use of constitutional methods.

It would be idle to deny that the machinery of election has had to contend with formidable difficulties, many of which arise from the illiteracy of the vast majority of the population, the large number of constituencies, the enormous distances to be covered, and the terrific job of dealing with an electorate of 193 million. A general election in India is spread over a period of about three weeks.¹

The political system in India is at the moment obliged to express itself, as well as it can, through a multiplicity of parties of which only four have so far been recognised by the Election Commission as having a national status. These four national parties are the Indian National Congress, the Communist Party of India, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Bharatiya Jana Sangha. But they do not, by any means, exhaust the bewildering variety of local groups and "Independents" who confused the Indian voters in the 1952 election and to a lesser extent in the recent election. Nevertheless, a summary of the salient points of their election manifestoes might provide a working clue to the understanding of the Indian electoral scene.

The Congress which has been ruling the country since the transfer of power in 1947 has based its appeal to the electorate on its claim that it had fulfilled its old pledge for independence under the leadership of Gandhi and is now aiming by the use of peaceful and democratic methods at the establishment of a full "socialist pattern of society" giving freedom, welfare, and equality of opportunity to all. Congress speakers have emphasised the value of a stable

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¹ Polling started on February 24 and ended on March 14.

government and of continuity of policy in the fulfilment of national plans and in the conduct of international relations, and have asserted that these can be provided only by the Congress and not by a heterogeneous, fissured opposition. The manifesto² of the party contains a sober statement of the problems at home posed by partition, poverty, and the feeling of separateness "whether communal or provincial or due to caste distinctions." This is followed by a brief review of what Congress governments have done so far to build a new India especially through the formulation and implementation of five-year plans. The paragraphs on international affairs contain references to Goa, Kashmir, and South Africa and a reaffirmation of India's determination to pursue the path of peace and friendship with all nations and of her opposition to the "cold war." The party has demanded that the changes taking place in Asia and Africa should be understood fully all over the world and that communist China should be admitted to the UNO. There is no mention of Hungary except for a brief echo in the statement that "any imposition of foreign authority or ideology cannot succeed." Another conspicuous omission is the Commonwealth which has always been a theme dear to Nehru. Recent tension in Indo-British relations might well have accounted for this unwonted silence.

There is little that is dramatic or spectacular in the manifesto. There are a good many things that "should" be, but few promises. The Second Five Year Plan, for instance, is said to represent "the combined wisdom of the country." But it is "flexible" and "will have to be adjusted from time to time as circumstances demand and as the resources of the country permit." Growth of the economy should not only be rapid but balanced as well. "A large measure of centralisation," we are told, "has become inevitable in modern life. But we have also at the same time to decentralise in so far as this is possible." The growth of heavy industry although essential "has to be balanced by small scale and cottage industries." The manifesto, in fact, is in the nature of an essay in patient counselling and argument rather than an exciting political document. A certain note of caution and circumspection is unmistakable.

The communists claim today not without justification that "we embody in our movement and its programme the principal challenge to Congress and its government."³ To the communists the Congress record of the past ten years is one of "betrayal of

² Indian National Congress, Election Manifesto, 1957.

³ Hiren Mukherjee, "The Communist Programme" in *The Statesman*, February 19, 1957.

pledges, defiance of popular will, stifling of political life."⁴ Some little progress has been made here and there but the overall picture "is far from what the ruling party would have us believe." Unemployment, low wages, poor housing conditions, fall in real income through price rises, appalling health conditions—these are among the problems which face the middle class as well as the working class. Intensification of internal strife and discord, appeasement of foreign capital and big Indian capitalists, waste of public money in grandiose projects, evasion of income tax, and the growth of authoritarianism are among the features which, according to the party, have tainted Congress administration in India. The communist programme demands among other things the breaking of the grip of British capital over important sectors of the economy, the curbing of monopolists and the rapid development of the public sector. It is curious, however, that the communists recognise the need of a certain degree of accommodation for "patriotic-minded Indian capitalists" and are led to admit that "all legitimate rights of the capitalists should be ensured and that their active co-operation should be secured for implementation of the plan of national reconstruction." The communist ministry of Kerala have, in fact, welcomed the investment of all foreign capital—even American—in Kerala. Apart from this, however, the communist programme says that the party would sweep away landlordism, transfer land to the peasants, remove unemployment and reduce disparities of income, impose a ceiling on profits of all big industries and commercial concerns and form a National Development Pool with the reserves of large companies, set up a state monopoly of foreign trade in the principal commodities, guarantee a national minimum wage and secure rapid advance in the sphere of health, housing, and culture.

In the sphere of foreign policy the communists condemn "the government policy of supine inaction in regard to Goa," advocate a break with the Commonwealth, and take the entire credit for the Congress government's opposition to military alliances and the formulation of the five principles of the Pancha Shila. This "orientation," as they put it, is the result of their persistent fight in Parliament and in the country and also of the "growing strength of the socialist world."

The Praja Socialist Party was formed after the first general election by the merger of the Socialist Party and the Krishak Majdoor Praja Party. The PSP has accused the Congress of piecemeal tinkering with issues and of avoiding a thorough, sweeping

⁴ Election Manifesto of the Communist Party of India, 1957.

social change. In particular it takes exception to the Congress objective of a "socialistic pattern" which, it feels, may mean all sorts of things, and reminds the electorate that the socialists have been fighting for socialism and democracy⁵ long before Avadi⁶ was even heard of. More specifically the PSP attack is directed against the Congress policy of land reforms and nationalisation. In the view of the party State legislatures dominated by feudal elements can hardly promote land reform which should be a central responsibility. The PSP also wants a larger degree of nationalisation than has yet been attempted and wants the state to nationalise banks, mines, and mineral oils and take over big plantations and trade—wholesale and foreign—in selected commodities. Economic inequalities are to be reduced through a tax on wealth as well as personal expenditure, not to mention capital levy.

Indian socialists, however, seem to suffer from divided counsel. Asoka Mehta, the PSP leader, has argued that the chief democratic parties should agree on certain nation-building activities which in his view could be carried out—whether they are in power or not—apart from partisan activities. This in his view is required by the "compulsion of a backward economy." Dr. Rammonohar Lohia, on the other hand, is equally convinced that the identity of the socialists as a separate entity should be maintained and has rejected the idea of a common programme among all political parties.⁷ This difference of opinion has apparently proved to be so acute as to lead to the formation under Lohia's leadership of a separate Socialist Party which has fought the election on its own, thereby dividing further the socialist vote.

The Bharatiya Jana Sangha which completes the list of the four national parties was born in 1951. It believes that "in all matters having a bearing on India's national interests and dignity, a virile and resolute policy must be followed," and is passionately opposed to what it calls the "Nehru policy of appeasement and surrender" in regard to Kashmir, Goa, Indians in South Africa, and so on. The President of the Sangha in a recent article⁸ says: "we must have a real welfare state for the masses," but has at the same time, curiously enough, opposed the extension of the public sector to industries

⁵ The Congress Socialist Party, which was formed within the Indian National Congress in 1934, seceded from that body and reorganised itself as the Socialist Party of India in 1948 and merged with the KMPP in 1952.

⁶ The Congress resolution on the socialistic pattern was adopted at Avadi in 1955.

⁷ Report of the Special Convention of PSP, Betul, 1953.

⁸ Devaprasad Ghosh, "Bharatiya Jana Sangha" in *The Statesman*, February 20, 1957.

other than those essential to the security of the state. Both socialism and social reform are anathema to the Sangha, the one because it is supposed to be a threat to liberty and the other for its alleged intrusion into "the sanctified atmosphere of Hindu family life." There is, in fact, little in the programme of the party to suggest that it favours the idea of a collectivist egalitarian democracy.

The arguments used in the election campaigns—apart from the refinements of the party programmes—can probably be stated in relatively simple terms. The Congress has appealed for votes mainly on the ground that only a strong, disciplined party can form a stable government and lay the foundations of national prosperity. The argument of the Opposition parties has rested primarily on alleged "ten years of Congress misrule" and on the deeply felt need of an effective Opposition to keep the government on the rails and, if possible, to form an alternative government.

The central issues dominating the national debate probably boil down to a few broad questions. First, there is the basic question of poverty which in India has to be seen to be believed. The other social evils of slums, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, and the general sense of insecurity all revolve round this central problem. The programmes of the various parties, in a sense, reflect—specific local issues excepted—the differences of approach in regard to this tragically urgent issue. Secondly, it seems that dissatisfaction with States' reorganisation provided election issues in Bombay, Orissa, and a little part of Kerala. In Bombay opposition to the Congress was directed against the continuance of the bilingual state and for thirty-five Lok Sabha⁹ seats (out of sixty-six) the Congress was opposed directly by Maharashtra¹⁰ and Gujarati supporters of unilingual states. In Orissa while all the opposition parties expressed dissatisfaction with the reorganisation which brought no fresh territory to the State from its neighbours, the Ganatantra Parishad refused to treat last November's decisions on territorial changes as final and wanted the incorporation in Orissa of border areas with Oriya-speaking populations. The Jharkland Party wants that a separate State should be carved out of areas in Orissa, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal with predominantly aboriginal population. Kesarkode in Kerala returned without contest from Maujeshwar an independent candidate seeking the integration of the area with Karnatak.

⁹ The Lower House of the Indian Parliament.

¹⁰ Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, which represented the Maharashtra point of view, was an electoral front in which the PSP, the Communists, the Jana Sangha, and the Peasants' and Workers' Party joined on the sole issue of a unilingual Maharashtra State.

Thirdly, problems of foreign policy have figured prominently in the speeches of party leaders. Broadly speaking, Kashmir has tended to be regarded as a national rather than a party issue and Opposition speakers have often accused the Congress of trying to make capital out of it. On the other hand, Nehru's policy in regard to non-alignment with power blocs seems to have been endorsed by the main elements of the Opposition. It is remarkable that while Nehru treated Krishna Menon's contest for a Lok Sabha seat from Bombay, "the political nerve-centre of India" as a test of the voters' confidence in the Government's foreign policy, the Opposition consisting of Gujarati and Maharastrian linguistic fronts chose to oppose Mr. Menon on the entirely different issues of States' reorganisation. This difference of emphasis seems to indicate the particular areas of policy in which the electoral combatants felt sure of their hold on the electorate.¹¹

Finally, no one following the course of the election campaign could fail to be impressed by the insistent demand for a strong, effective, responsible Opposition as something essential for the health and success of parliamentary democracy. This demand has come from all the non-Congress parties and the numerous "independents" without exception. Even Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, a former Governor-General and senior Congress statesman, lent his authority to it by saying that "it was also in the interest of the Congress itself."¹² Few people have made out the case for an Opposition more convincingly than the PSP leader J. P. Narain. He said, "The position today is that for the last ten years the Congress Party has enjoyed complete monopoly of power and huge majorities in the legislatures. I regard the continuation of this position, quite apart from the merits of the Congress Party, to be fraught with serious dangers to India's democracy and well-being." In the same statement Narain argued, "It is not the question whether the ruling party or its leader is good or bad. No matter how good they be, it is in the nature of this system that it cannot work well without an Opposition."¹³ Elsewhere the PSP leader had made the intriguing suggestion that it was the duty of Nehru during his lifetime to lay the foundation of a responsible Opposition party that would keep the ruling party on the right track.¹⁴ Nehru retorted that the Opposition had the fullest opportunity to express opinions and fight elections and it was absurd for him to choose

¹¹ Mr. Menon defeated his rival Mr. Peter Alvares by a margin of 47,741 votes. V. K. Krishna Menon (Congress)—171,708 votes, Peter Alvares (PSP)—123,967 votes.

¹² *The Statesman*, February 26, 1957.

¹⁴ *The Statesman*, January 29, 1957.

¹³ *The Statesman*, February 5, 1957.

candidates for the PSP and the Communist Party.¹⁵ This led Narain to state that while the Opposition must rise on its own legs Nehru could still give a helping hand, for did he not occupy a unique position, being much more than a leader of the Congress Party—a national leader?¹⁶ Narain, however, has not indicated the precise way in which Nehru might help apart from suggesting that he should treat the Opposition with courtesy.

It may be suggested that there is a certain dualism in Nehru's position that may be hindering the growth of an Opposition. He seems to oscillate between his historic function of interpreting and guiding India towards its destiny and his somewhat narrower task of heading a party government and of leading his own party to victory at the polls. His parries and thrusts at his political opponents are accompanied by sentiments that transcend the limits of party doctrines. In any case his national and international status—the fact that he bestrides the Indian political scene like a Colossus—and is equated with India by the world abroad—seems to overshadow his party position and put the Opposition somewhat into the shade. When the two aspects of his personality merge—as they inevitably must—the work of the Opposition necessarily becomes an uphill journey.

Apart from the traditional prestige enjoyed by the Congress from its association with the names of Gandhi and Nehru the other factor that hampers the Opposition is the schism in its own ranks. The Opposition in India seems to be a baffling complex of miscellaneous parties and groups without a coherent common programme and leadership to hold them together on a national basis. In fact, the main pattern of India's second general election as of the first has been a profusion of parties—a large number of them having only local importance—and of independent candidates. Not unnaturally opposition to the ruling party remained diffuse, and varied greatly from one part of the country to another. In Punjab, Rajasthan, Delhi, and Madhya Bharat the main opposition seems to have been offered by the rightist elements represented by the Jana Sangha and the Hindu Mahasabha. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the challenge came mainly from the PSP and in Orissa from the Ganatantra Parishad and the Jharkhand Party. The Parishad under the leadership of former Princely rulers aimed at having a powerful voice in the State Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) so as to be able to ventilate the grievances of the former Princely State areas. Most of the communist candidates were put up in Kerala and West Bengal.

¹⁵ *The Statesman*, February 2, 1957.

¹⁶ *The Statesman*, February 5, 1957.

In Kerala alone throughout India there was—in spite of a much divided “left”—a more or less definite contest between the Congress and the Communist Party. In West Bengal communist hopes of leftist unity were only partially fulfilled despite strenuous efforts to achieve this. Though the Party was able to enter into an alliance with four other leftist parties, the Opposition as a whole found itself divided into three irreconcilable alliances—the United Leftist Election Committee, the United Left Front, and the United Democratic People’s Front. Of the three the ULEC was undoubtedly the strongest and sought to form an alternative government on the basis of an agreed eleven-point programme.¹⁷

There has probably been less splitting of votes in the election of 1957 than in the 1952 election as a result of the larger number of local electoral adjustments. Some of the most intriguing electoral arrangements are to be found among those which the PSP made in different areas with groups not always sharing its own principles. PSP attitude to the communists in the past has not been dissimilar to that of the social democrats in the west. The PSP leader, J. P. Narain, was severely critical of Nehru for his initial failure categorically to condemn Soviet policy in Hungary. Whilst PSP alliance with the communists in West Bengal has been defended by a local PSP leader on the ground that the communists wanted to follow the democratic path,¹⁸ the PSP leader of Kerala has said that the Communist Party did not believe in a democratic set-up and that the PSP would endeavour to overthrow the local communist ministry in collaboration with the Congress whenever possible.¹⁹ In fact the PSP communist alliance in West Bengal in the ULEC is ideologically as hard to explain as its “adjustments” in Kerala with the Muslim League, a communal party well known for its advocacy of the interests of Muslims as such, and in Punjab with the Jana Sangha which could not even remotely be associated with anything smacking of socialism. That these anomalies have not affected the fortunes of the PSP adversely and that it has even succeeded in gaining some new ground are probably to be explained by the pre-occupation of the voters with local issues and the relative infancy of Indian democracy.

Ideological incongruities apart, the potentialities of a united Opposition—even though lacking in total unity—have nowhere

¹⁷ The ULEC was formed by the CPI, the PSP, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Forward Bloc, and the Marxist Forward Bloc.

¹⁸ See *The Statesman*, February 28, 1957, for Dr. P. C. Ghosh’s statement.

¹⁹ *The Statesman*, April 11, 1957.

been demonstrated so clearly as by the ULEC in Calcutta which has perhaps the heaviest concentration of voters in the whole of the country. The present writer found election campaigns in Calcutta a far more lively and exciting affair than what he saw in London during the general election in May, 1955. For some weeks the city reverberated with cries of “vote for . . .” and the election completely overshadowed all other points of interest in Calcutta’s public life. The campaigns of rival parties were conducted through colourful posters which outnumbered even cinema posters, house to house canvassing, processions, neon signs at street crossings depicting party symbols, election meetings in parks, etc., at the rate of a few dozens a day, distribution of leaflets, and so forth. And the end of it all was that Congress captured only eight out of twenty-six Calcutta seats for the State Assembly as against the sixteen it had won out of a total of twenty-seven seats in 1952. Outstanding among Opposition gains were the increase of communist seats from only five to ten and of PSP strength from one to four seats. As regards the four Lok Sabha (parliamentary) seats in Calcutta the pre-election position remained unaltered with the two communist sitting members retaining their seats and the Congress and a “leftist”-supported Independent candidate winning one seat each. Leftist success, striking as it undoubtedly has been in Calcutta, has not, however, set the pattern for West Bengal as a whole. While the leftists have scored over the ruling party in Calcutta in centres of labour concentration and in several towns, the Congress seems to have done well in rural areas except in a few constituencies. If leftism seems to thrive in Calcutta the cause probably is to be sought in the life of the city itself—in the large number of its educated unemployed, the influx of refugees from East Pakistan, the pressure of high prices on the living standards of the middle classes, the shocking contrast between poverty and wealth, and the highly developed political consciousness of the people. Congress success in rural areas is probably to be accounted for by the abolition of *Zamindari*, the Land Reforms Act, the Community Development Projects, relief provided for flood-stricken areas—measures which with all their defects have an undoubted significance to the life of the village. In the State as a whole the Congress has 153 seats in an Assembly of 252 as against the 171 seats it commanded in the pre-election Assembly of 238.²⁰ If the Congress has still a comfortable though reduced majority despite keen leftist opposition it is

²⁰ The CPI has now forty-six members against twenty-eight in 1952 in West Bengal Legislative Assembly.

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probably because the voters have preferred a tested leadership to rule by a necessarily composite and untried government.

Probably the most outstanding result of the general election has been not the return of the Congress to power at the Centre and in almost all the States—a thing not unexpected by any means—but the emergence of a communist ministry in Kerala contrary to the forecasts of political pundits and the strengthening of the communist Opposition over a wide area. The final party position in the Indian Lok Sabha seems to reflect the general trend.

	<i>After 1952 election</i>	<i>After 1957 election</i>
Congress	362	365
CPI	16	27
Praja Socialists	12	19
KMPP	9	
Jana Sangha	3	4
People's Democratic Front (Andhra)	7	2
Scheduled Castes Federation (Bombay and Mysore)	2	6
Independents	41	42
Other parties	37	23
Total	489	488

N.B.—Elections to the Lok Sabha for four seats from Himachal Pradesh and two from Punjab are not yet complete.

That a communist ministry now enjoys the support of fifty party members and five Independents in the Kerala Legislative Assembly of 126 and that the CPI now has representatives in every State Legislature²¹ are facts which may seem somewhat puzzling to the western observer in the light of Khrushchev's now famous "dethronement of Stalin" and events in Hungary. It may well be that the average Indian does not feel the same horror of communism as the average man or woman in the west does. It may also be that Hungary is somewhat remote from the life of the people of India. In fact Hungary seemed to have taken a back seat among the issues in the election. Whether communist gains at the polls indicate a positive liking for communism or a discontent with Congress rule is again a debatable point. The truth about this may not be known unless extensive researches in electoral opinion are undertaken. India still lacks the services of men like H. G. Nicholas, D. E.

²¹ The CPI was unrepresented in 1952 in three of the then Part "A" States, namely, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh.

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Butler, and R. T. McKenzie. Nevertheless, there may be a considerable amount of truth in the view expressed by Nehru that "local difficulties, local issues, and local irritations" have exercised a greater influence on voting behaviour than broad national or international issues. How important these have been in the Kerala election may be seen from the nature of the Congress reverses notwithstanding a deeply divided opposition. Kerala comprises most of the old Travancore-Cochin State, the Malabar district of Madras, and the Kasargode district of South Kanara. The Congress which commanded forty-five seats in the Travancore-Cochin Assembly has now only forty-three seats even with the inclusion of Malabar, which returned no fewer than forty-nine members to the Assembly. Congress weakness is highlighted again by the defeat of the last Congress Chief Minister, Mr. Panampilly Govinda Menon, in his own home constituency.

Communist success and Congress debacle in Kerala are probably as much due to the shortcomings of local Congress leadership as to local social conditions. Though it has the highest percentage of literacy in India and its people take a keen interest in politics, Kerala has in the past been afflicted with political instability resulting in two periods of President's rule. Politics seems to have revolved round personalities and caste and communal groups. The Congress, weakened by its own unimaginative leadership, internal discord, and its tolerance of group rivalries, failed to provide the kind of stable government which was needed to manage the affairs of a "problem State" characterised by high density of population, a large volume of unemployment and industrial and agricultural backwardness. Neither eight years of Congress rule nor about ten months of PSP government apparently convinced an extremely self-conscious electorate that either of these parties could meet their needs and requirements and so in the end they seem to have turned to the communists—the only other major party in the field.

Apart from the special case of Kerala communist gains elsewhere appear to have led the Congress High Command to do some heart-searching. It seems now clear that in many cases Congressmen, dissatisfied with party nominations, contested the election as Independents backed by leftist support. Nehru's advice to the dissidents—as in Madras, for instance—to curb their own feelings and accept the decisions of the party as loyal soldiers does not seem to have produced the desired effect. Secondly, a good deal has been said about inefficiency and corruption in the "lowest rungs" of administration—the village and town officials who directly deal with

the people. Mr. Feroze Gandhi is reported to have shocked the Congress Parliamentary Party with his account of gerrymandering of land records in U.P. and the enormity of local taxes imposed by district boards and village panchayats. Nehru himself has not only acknowledged the need for a speedy reform of the machinery and methods of administration but decried with equal emphasis the "ostentatious behaviour" of ministers and persons of authority. In his view the policies of some State governments also left much to be desired.²² No serious attempt seems to have been made to ascertain the number of people who abstained from voting from pure discontent with the attitude of public servants. A correspondent writing in a Calcutta newspaper said that eight members of his family including an ex-judge of the Calcutta High Court did not exercise their franchise "out of a sheer non-co-operative spirit towards the Congress Government."²³ The motives of educated abstainers would seem to offer a fruitful field of investigation. The existing system of public relations also might need some overhauling. The losses of the Congress may not have been in vain if they impress authority with the necessity of maintaining administrative efficiency and integrity at the highest possible level. It is also not improbable—as Mr. A. D. Gorwala has suggested—that the publicly expressed admiration of Indian leaders for Chinese and Russian leaders has led people into thinking that there is nothing bad about the Indian communists. In his view "You cannot attack the communists of the country and embrace communists of foreign lands."²⁴

Whoever in the Opposition may have gained in the election it is clearly not the rightist Jana Sangha. The party is represented today only in the Indian Lok Sabha and about half a dozen State Legislative Assemblies. The Sangha has always claimed to be an important champion of the refugees and their cause. It is therefore all the more remarkable that in refugee-ridden West Bengal the party has been completely extinguished in the Assembly where it had nine seats in the 1952 election. It is nowhere in the political picture either in left-minded Calcutta or even in the rest of the State. This may no doubt be partly due to the inadequacy of its organisation under conditions of adult franchise. But it is also probable that a party which equates socialism with totalitarianism in a sweeping manner and opposes divorce laws as anti-Hindu legislation

²² *The Statesman*, March 31, 1957.

²³ *The Statesman*, April 10, 1957.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

has failed to make much impression on the electorate in a period of increasing social ferment.

It may not be unreasonable to doubt whether Indian socialism as a separate political force will be able to make much headway in the face of the communists, on the one hand, and the Congress objective of "a socialistic pattern" on the other. Apart from the somewhat bewildering co-existence of the PSP and Dr. Lohia's Socialist Party, each competing with the other for the loyalty of the socialist voter, the Indian socialists face the dilemma of combining with the communists at the risk of compromising their own principles or of maintaining their own separate entity as an Opposition force at the expense of their effectiveness. The Jana Sangha, with its general hostility to State intervention in economic and social life, does not seem to fit into the picture of an expanding collectivism. In any case the party does not appear to have recovered from the blow to its fortunes inflicted by the death of its founder, Dr. S. P. Mookherjee, in 1953. In the circumstances, therefore, it seems that for all practical purposes it is the communists who will form the spearhead of the Opposition to Congress governments in India. Their discipline, internal cohesion and imaginative election campaign gave them a political advantage which is far from being negligible. Kerala shows that even the tremendous prestige of Nehru has not saved the Congress from its debacle and that Indian voters might, in a problem-ridden State, be inclined in the last resort to experiment even with government by a party not normally associated with parliamentary democracy.

A federal state with governments of different political complexions at the centre and the constituent units is not an unusual thing. That the first non-Congress ministry enjoying the support of a majority in the legislature is a communist one and has been voted to power by an assertive electorate with a high degree of literacy and political consciousness is probably a challenge to social democrats. If the communists can give a good account of themselves in Kerala they might not only get entrenched in that State but exercise a far-reaching influence on what happens elsewhere. They have indeed said that they will not establish a communist society in Kerala but will try to put the ideals of the Congress itself into practice. Nevertheless, the principle of competitive co-existence will now have been projected from the plane of international relations on to the sphere of India's domestic politics. Whether the new communist government can co-exist peacefully and in harmony with the Congress Union Government now remains to be seen.

THE DIPLOMAT

PETER CALVOCORESSI

THE list of the qualities required of the diplomat was established long ago and the stock simile has been familiar at least since Thomas Middleton wrote his play *A Game at Chess*, based on the activities of a celebrated Spanish Ambassador at the court of James I. Intelligence (in its two senses of wit and information), seeing several moves ahead, patience, application, industry, tact—and perhaps a certain kind of wife. Good looks and bad manners have also figured in some portraits of the ideal diplomat (and in real off-prints) but these should be regarded as adventitious options. The diplomat is a paragon definable in terms of personal qualities.

Do the requisite qualities change? Should the modern diplomat be a different kind of man from his Renaissance prototype¹ or the Great Masters of the nineteenth century? Criticism of diplomats is not infrequent, and implicit in much of the criticism is the assumption that new times call for new types. Put this way, the charge seems to me to beg a fundamental question. It assumes that failures in diplomacy in our times have been due to the fact that our diplomats are too much like their predecessors, but it can also be argued that they are not like enough. If we take Bismarck as an example of the supremely successful nineteenth-century diplomat,² do we want those who conduct our foreign affairs today to be more like him in their professional make-up or less? Is Bismarck a dated or a dateless paragon?

We begin to get to the answer, I think, when we realise that the delineation of the diplomat in terms of personal qualities is not the

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¹ The diplomatic arts and career originated in Renaissance Italy as Mr. Garrett Mattingly showed a few years ago in an original and enlivening book: *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Jonathan Cape, 320 pp. 25s.). It is a pity that the age and country which produced Castiglione's profile of the perfect Courtier and Macchiavelli's manual on how to be a Prince did not give us a companion study on the Diplomat.

² I use the word diplomat to include all who contribute to the formation and execution of foreign policies. The distinction between the diplomat, the career man who goes abroad to report and execute, and the Minister, the politician who sets the course and issues instructions, is valid in terms of careers but not in terms of the qualities required. Ambassadors have and make policies; they would need to be very dim not to. Equally politicians need the diplomatic arts. Practice has recognised the reversibility of the roles. The first Lord Malmesbury and Stratford Canning, two of the most outstanding of British Ambassadors, were both offered the Foreign Office and Clarendon actually got it. Abroad Talleyrand, Izvolski, and Bülow are eminent examples of a not unusual adaptability.

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whole of the matter. The prosperity of a country's foreign affairs is not assured merely by devising ways for discovering the paragons. If it were, we could go to school to the Tibetans and learn the signs for picking the Lamas of our diplomatic hierarchy. But the diplomat needs something besides a clutch of attributes. He needs also a sense of the times, for to be successful a country must move with the times and not against them. I do not mean that it is the business of diplomacy merely to spot winning causes and back them—politics, even international politics, are not as cynical as all that—but a constant addiction to dying causes betokens a dangerous unawareness of the ways of the world which the diplomat is supposed to understand, and too much swimming against the current must in time exhaust the swimmer until he is either left behind or drowned. In the nineteenth century British policies compared favourably in this respect with the policies of rivals, but more recently Britain has shown alarming symptoms of the delusion that everybody is out of step except Johnnie Bull.

In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nationalism has provided a stiff test, for in both nationalism has been one of the most potent and dilemma-posing forces in world affairs. In the nineteenth century Britain presented broadly speaking a sympathetic face to foreign nationalists (other than Irish ones) and neither underrated nationalism like Metternich, who failed to observe, let alone respect, forces which proved real enough in 1848 to send him packing from Vienna to Brighton; nor overrated it like Charles Albert, who lost a sound throne for an unsound motto. In these days, however, Britain looks more enigmatically on nationalists and gives encouragement, if at all, through the tight lips of a governess rather than the open smile of a benevolent uncle. The explanation is easy. Nineteenth-century nationalism was European and it did us no harm; on the contrary, to support it was politically useful as well as emotionally satisfying. But twentieth-century nationalism is Asian and African and it hurts our purses and our pride. 1848 and all that, and the struggles of Byronic Italians and Greeks against the horrid autocracies of Bourbons, Hapsburgs, and Turks, were movements pre-ordained for success and British commendation. The Asian and African counterparts of 1848 are 1905, when a European Power was first beaten by an Asian, and 1956, when two European Powers were thumbed out of Africa, and we have hardly begun to face the consequences of these momentous events. The link between the two periods stares us ironically in the face at this moment in Cyprus, an island peopled by Greeks, who were fit for

independence when they lived under Turks in Europe but are not when they live with Turks under the British off Asian shores. The paradox is too illogical to be carried off and those who try to do so are attempting the impossible and abandoning control of everything except the precise moment at which they will go under.

We shall get out of Cyprus one day with more or less dignity and more or less bloodshed. It is difficult for a serious observer to imagine that Britain will still be the owner of the island in ten years' time, impossible to imagine it still British in fifty years. The only things in doubt are the time-table and the method of departure. The current of the times makes the event itself certain. Yet British opinion, led from behind, has not adjusted itself, and likewise each episode in the spread of Asian and African nationalism presents itself as a separate traumatic shock, a disconcerting source of surprise and indignation; it is impossible to see the context if one is facing the wrong way. Ten years ago, when the British left India, Britain seemed to be making the necessary effort in readjustment, but subsequent events have fostered the suspicion that the abdication in India was forced, grudging, and no precedent. The attack on Egypt last autumn, when Sir Anthony Eden staked his claim to be accounted the Metternich of the twentieth century, may prove to have been the warning shock which opens the eyes and staves off greater disaster, but we still have the huge problems of Africa before us, more fateful and perplexing than the emancipation of European or Asian nations and by that very token demanding the fullest application of all the diplomatic qualities.

Swimming against the tide is only one example of the cardinal sin of diplomacy, trying to achieve the impossible. Another example is the attempt to fix a situation which cannot be fixed. The diplomat is a fixer most of his time. He needs to be a fixer in much the same way as the imaginative writer needs to be able to write English, but he needs also to be alert to the limitations and we have had recent occasion to note the consequences of erroneously supposing that every problem can be fixed if only somebody skilful enough is on hand to do the fixing. When last winter a notable diplomatic career came to a sorry end, the epitaph could have been: Skill without vision, or the fixer fixed. At the same time we had an object lesson in another form of attempting the impossible. There are objectives which can be compassed in time but not at once, and the impatient diplomat who mistimes his stroke will come undone as surely as the one who is facing the wrong way or the one who misjudges the nature of his problem. This question of timing was

the essence of the difference between Britain and the United States over what to do about President Nasser. Both, reversing earlier attitudes, had come round to the view that Nasser was doing more harm than good and should be removed. Mr. Dulles reached this conclusion rather later than Sir Anthony Eden but once he reached it there was basic agreement between Washington and London on ultimate objectives. This agreement seems to have lain at the back of the illusion in London that there was also agreement over methods, but this was not so, since Mr. Dulles was prepared to let his Middle Eastern policies proceed at oriental pace whereas Sir Anthony Eden snatched at a chance to do at once and by direct intervention what could better have been achieved in time and by the play of Middle Eastern forces themselves. It is perhaps difficult in an age of daily newspapers and flashing telegrams, and in a country specially devoted to sports where victory or defeat is registered at the end of an hour or so, to preserve in public affairs a time scale of a completely different order and to go on working to schedules which Lord Salisbury (the Prime Minister) would have found congenial and appropriate; but it is often necessary to do so.

The spacious age, we are apt to think, produced masters in diplomacy who have not had their equals in the present century. This judgment is not merely a characteristic moan from *laudator temporis acti*. It is a commonplace that the two great wars of the twentieth century originated very differently and it is a fact that the contrasted human failings which produced the first disaster (fumbling inadequacy) and the second (madly limitless ambition) are not to be found in Bismarck. Albertini's work on the origins of the first war (the third volume of Dr. Isabella Massey's fine translation was issued recently by the Oxford University Press³) underlines time and again the shortcomings of the actors and the inadvertence of the culminating events; things got out of control. Would the surer hands of the nineteenth-century giants have lost their grip and the peace? The second war was the very opposite of an inadvertent slide. It was an act of will. There was even a date before which, according to Hitler, it must begin. Bismarck too willed wars but he did not set out to be a world-beater. He made wars when he wanted them, but having got what he wanted he willed peace and kept it. He limited his aims and secured them. Besides possessing the requisite diplomatic attributes, he was a man of measure. He himself, commenting on the need to see several

³ *The Origins of the War of 1914*, Vol. III. By Luigi Albertini, translated and edited by Isabella Massey. (Oxford. 70s.)

moves ahead, added that it was just as fatal to see too far ahead as not far enough, and being neither too long sighted nor too near sighted he avoided the pitfalls of Wilsonism, on the one hand, as well as those of happy-go-lucky opportunism (a more characteristically British vice), on the other.

The Bismarck student is never short of new material. We have been promised and will shortly see *in extenso* all the documents from the German archives relating to the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne in 1869-1870, and a first volume of the Holstein papers has just been followed by a second containing the diaries for 1881-1888.⁴ We do not read Holstein's papers to find out about Holstein, whose fame, *pace* his professional skill, has rested on the secrecy rather than the content of his papers and on his reputation for collecting scandal. We may indeed ask in passing whether he deserved to have his *Nachlass* fall into such excellent hands, for the editing of these volumes is a model of concise and scholarly usefulness and the publisher's contribution is no less distinguished. But for all that we cannot read the written broodings of this mean-tempered man with pleasure. The mass of triviality is depressing and the malice more revolting than amusing. Yet these papers will be read, not for what they tell us about the unattractive Holstein, but for what they tell us about Bismarck, whose unattractiveness is irrelevant to his greatness. The lasting impression is of a statesman whose schemes and ambitions were within his capacities. He was limited by the character of his own sovereign, who had, for instance, the gravest doubts about the Hohenzollern candidature, and he was limited by the fact that the Germany he created was surrounded north, south, east, and west by Powers of comparable capacity and adverse interests. He worked within the framework of these limitations, which he accepted.

We can say that Bismarck was a better diplomat than any twentieth-century practitioner and at the same time agree that he had certain advantages over his successors in and beyond Europe. It is one thing for a growing Power, such as Prussia and then Germany in the German century, to limit its commitments to its capacities, and quite another thing for a declining Power to strike a similar balance. The growing Power has to exercise restraint (admittedly a rare and difficult discipline) but the declining Power has not even got full control over the commitments side of the balance sheet, since many of its commitments will have been

⁴ *The Holstein Papers*, Vol. II, *Diaries*, edited by Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher. (Cambridge University Press. 404 pp. 45s.)

inherited from a previous generation. Britain is at this moment a declining Power in the Middle East and it is obvious that British commitments to some three dozen minor Arab princelings in Arabia are an embarrassment, but it is not easy to see how they can be shed (especially if no attention is given to the shedding until some crisis necessitates action in the least favourable circumstances). Then again Bismarck was fortunate in that the people he had to deal with (though not always the problems) belonged to the comparatively small and familiar world of European power politics. Things have changed and it is only fair to the epigoni to acknowledge as much.

Before considering the principal changes, one alleged change must be mentioned with less sympathy than it usually attracts. We hear a lot nowadays about how overworked our Ministers and Ambassadors are. A certain kind of dedicated biographer and journalist is always ready to point out how so-and-so has worn himself out in the service of his country. I do not doubt that Ministers, like some other people, work extremely hard and bear a heavy load of responsibility. What, however, is untrue and unfair is the suggestion that they are in this respect more put upon than were their predecessors. Lord Melbourne, a familiar figure thanks to his biographer and his joke about the Garter, is too often regarded as typical of the nineteenth-century politician, but the notion of Britain being guided through the nineteenth century by somnolent and cynical peers is rubbish. Britain was not so great as to be able to afford that. Take, by contrast, Palmerston. Has any Foreign Secretary ever worked harder than Palmerston? When he died in office he was over eighty. He had been Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister for the better part of the preceding thirty-five years. Between the ages of seventy and eighty he was not merely Prime Minister but also actively in control of foreign affairs. His dispatches had to be written by hand and his study of Austrian, Italian, Belgian, Danish, and other European problems was interrupted by goings on in Mexico, Morocco, and Syria and by his own keen interest in the development of Africa.⁵ If, therefore, a Foreign

⁵ The amount of paper has of course increased. And so has the staff. On the political side Palmerston had a Parliamentary Under Secretary where his latest successor has two Ministers of State and two Under Secretaries. On the official side the Foreign Office contained at the end of the Palmerston period the Permanent Under Secretary, the Chief Clerk, eight Senior Clerks with an assistant apiece, and twenty-five Junior Clerks. See "The Foreign Office," by Algernon Cecil, in Vol. III of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*.

Secretary needs to be industrious and tough, there is nothing new in that. Holstein, searching anxiously in the eighties for somebody worthy to bear Bismarck's mantle, noted as the great objection to Hatzfeld (an obvious choice) the fact that he was lazy.

The most conspicuous changes in the conduct of international relations since Bismarck's dismissal have been the increase in the *dramatis personae*, the prospect of annihilation, and the greater weight of economic factors.

It is true that at the very top there are for the time being only two Powers who outstrip all others in material strength and that this bipolarity of power has had a very considerable effect on techniques and attitudes, making the game at chess look like a contest between two queens and many pawns with hardly a rook or knight or bishop on the board. The hostility of the two has been taken as part of the natural order of things in a way undreamt of in relation to any pair of states fifty years ago; fears and suspicions have become exceptionally sharp; and the manoeuvrings of the diplomat have, at this level, been replaced by the combative thrust and counter-thrust of the lawyer, whose business it is to present a case or rebut another rather than to persuade, to contrive, or to construct. All this is true and has been said before. Yet it may not continue so, and in any case this dualism is more relevant to war or the prospect of war than to the framing and execution of policies in time of peace. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., giants though they are, can neither rule the whole world in partnership nor ignore other states in the course of their dangerous competition. And the states which cannot be ignored are many—Britain, Germany, China, Japan, India, Canada at least must be included, oecumenical Powers by virtue of the fact that their interests may be affected by events in any corner of the world.

They lie moreover far apart and not, like their equivalents in the last century, within the circle of Europe. Then the Great Powers, crammed into the smallest continent, had a common culture and related sovereigns. They formed a club and anybody who wanted to manipulate the club had the advantages of knowing the club rules and knowing that the other members lived by these rules. There were only five or six full members and the would-be manipulator felt he understood them all. That is a far cry from today when the full members are curtained off from one another by wilful contrivance and by the inscrutability of a complete un-kinship. There are too dozens of second-class members, far more than ever

before and demanding more attention. They claim speaking parts; the temper of the times gives them a right to be heard and a platform and an audience. A recent writer has said that "during the whole of the nineteenth century democracy was strictly confined to domestic issues,"⁶ but now democracy has invaded the international field. This emphatically does not make things easier. Could even Bismarck himself repeat his achievements of making successful wars and keeping the peace? Making successful wars has in any case become a contradiction in terms and keeping the peace more like a game of Russian roulette than a game of chess.

Are diplomats then playing a hopelessly wrong game? The conduct of foreign affairs has consisted largely of finding out what other people are doing and getting them not to, and so it will always be so long as foreign policy is conducted in terms of national antagonisms backed by force. Mr. Denis Healey, one of the select few who manage to be stimulating and sensible at the same time on these subjects, has pointed out that if we do not get beyond this kind of power politics, we shall almost certainly ride to disaster. He has given us the parable of the engineer, the lawyer, and the gardener.⁷ The engineer's approach, treating human beings as passive objects of governmental manipulation, is the communist way; the lawyer in his parable stands for those who underrate the part played by physical force and overrate the rational and the moral in international behaviour; the gardener is the man who fosters organic growth in the awareness that neither mechanical control nor rational control will get him what he wants. What Mr. Healey wants is the substitution of consent for force in international affairs and the emergence of something which could truly be called an international society. Neither Mr. Healey nor anybody else can feel at all confident of the chances—the gardener works more slowly than the engineer or the lawyer—but there is, I think, another major change in international affairs in the present century which is at least a help. This is the added weight of economic factors.

Economics enter increasingly into the calculations of rising and of declining Powers. The giant Powers, who might be thought to have a certain freedom to disdain economics, are very far from doing so. Money has become a more important instrument of policy than ever before, and the place of the gunboat has been taken

⁶ Titus Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic, A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe 1914-1920* (Heinemann, 776 pp., 63s.), p. 16.
⁷ "Beyond Power Politics," by Denis Healey, M.P., in *Fabian International Essays*. (Hogarth Press, 18s.)

by the dollar as well as by the aircraft carrier. No doubt the armaments of the giants are the most conspicuous things about them and the first feeling each inspires in half the world is fear, but they also impress by their economic achievements—the U.S.A. by its fabulous standard of living and the U.S.S.R. for having pulled itself up by its own boot-straps in a generation. Moreover, since each is more than half afraid of the recourse to war, the competition between them has shied away from places like Berlin or Korea, where balloons can go up too easily, and has taken the form of wooing the neutrals with economic promises and (more particularly in the American case) performance. They are finding economic power as useful as military power. Like the Bellman and his crew they try among other things the technique of charming with smiles and soap.

Other Powers have become more mindful of economics through force of circumstances rather than deliberate choice. Declining Powers—those, that is, whose margins have become narrower than they used to be—have to keep a closer watch on the cost of their activities partly because they are that much weaker and partly because the progress of democracy and socialism is forcing them to spend more at home. The European Powers who formed the aristocratic élite of the world in the last century are rather like English Dukes. A rich Duke today is still pretty rich by most people's standards, but he no longer lives in a world where the cost of a thing simply does not matter and so, emulating insurance companies, chain stores, and others who have discovered how the pennies of the proles can add up, he throws open his home and keeps careful accounts. Britain and some other European Powers are also great by the standards of most countries but they have to mind their p's and q's, their imports and their exports. I do not want to exaggerate. Economics are not new. France, for instance, wanted to recover iron ore as well as honour in Lorraine. But the emphasis has changed and France will soon be forced to sacrifice territory, and what some Frenchmen consider honour, in North Africa in order to avoid collapse. Even Britain, whose exclusiveness has become proverbial on the Continent and a neurosis at home, is sacrificing a considerable slice of national autonomy in joining European organisations and is doing so for carefully calculated economic reasons. National survival is to some extent becoming less a matter of national power and more a matter of international economics. Where states used to make shifting alliances with an eye on the balance of power, they are now constructing different

and more permanent associations out of respect for the balance of trade.

If things are moving, albeit half consciously and half apologetically, in this direction, then the diplomat will need not a different set of attributes but a more complex emotional mainspring. To some extent he has already begun to change into something more like the typical civil servant and to lose the glamour, the mystery, and the panache which have stimulated many of the great figures of diplomacy from Aeneas Sylvius and Gondomar to our own day. In Whitehall interdepartmental and international committee work has contributed to the change and abroad there is far more co-operation and candour between members of allied missions than ever before. The Foreign Service, for all the facile criticism directed at it, continues to attract intelligent and alert men and in recent years it has been staffed near the top with a remarkable selection of all-round intelligence. Here, and to a lesser degree too in political circles, is the type of person who may draw from changing circumstances profit rather than befuddlement. Change confuses and alarms many people. Those who are neither confused nor alarmed may benefit themselves and save everybody else.

CONSIDER YOUR JURY

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DOING reform by stealth is an English national characteristic. A typical example was the recent enlargement of the jury lists throughout England and Wales. The public had no inkling of this reform. Not until they found an ominous blue document in their letter-boxes did householders learn that our juries had been placed firmly, if unintentionally, upon a more democratic basis.

Their ignorance was excusable, for the Act which effected this reform did not mention jurors but dealt solely with the rating of houses and other premises. Rising prices had made the assessments upon which rates were levied quite unrealistic, and there was general agreement in Parliament that their revision was overdue. Whether any revision of the sheriffs' jury lists was also needed was a controversial matter, which neither House seems to have had a chance of debating on this occasion and which certainly had nothing to do with local government finance. Yet, by revaluing dwelling houses, the authorities rendered hundreds of thousands of working class men and women eligible to serve upon juries.

It is difficult to believe that all the Members of Parliament by whose "advice and consent" this change was effected had been aware at the time that they were pumping this fresh blood into our aged jury system. Jury service in England and Wales has always been reserved for persons of property. They have had to be freeholders or the tenants of houses of some size. The law defines the minimum qualification for judging one's fellows as the possession of "a house containing not less than fifteen windows"—which probably made sense in the days of the window-tax—but in 1825 Parliament made the error of translating it into monetary terms. Under an Act of that year, a jurymen must either hold a lease of not less than twenty-one years and worth £20 a year or own freehold property of an annual value of £10. Householders otherwise qualify as jurors only if their residences have annual values of not less than £30 in London and Middlesex or £20 elsewhere.

Widening the Jury Lists

The result has been disappointing to any who believe that jury service is a democratic privilege to be granted with discretion, for inflation has meant that few houses are now assessed at under the prescribed minima. Quite a small three bedroomed terrace house

* The author is a student of criminal procedure, both of its history and current practice, which he has had the opportunity of studying in several countries.

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in a provincial city now has an annual value of over the £20 limit provided by the Act. Especially in towns where a large proportion of the residents own their houses (or, at least, owe them to a building society), the result has been an unprecedented influx of new names to the local jury lists. In a typical "middle" town like Luton, with an electorate of less than sixty thousand, the number eligible for jury-service leapt from a mere two thousand to a potential thirteen thousand. Many more Londoners living in the inner boroughs—some of which have never furnished many genuinely local jurors—became eligible to serve. The number of householders eligible to be jurors in Hackney, for example, rose from 3,027 to 8,379. Even in an almost entirely working class London suburb like Dagenham, where the majority of residents live in council owned properties, it was estimated that another twenty-five thousand would join the jury lists.

This unexpected increase in the number of potential jurors among us makes this a good time to consider the qualifications of those who form the juries in our criminal courts. One of the younger, yet among the best-known, of our High Court judges recently did so in the 1956 series of Hamlyn Lectures. Sir Patrick Devlin's six lectures on the English jury system have now been published in book form under the title *Trial by Jury* (Stevens, 15s.). Its topicality is not the only virtue which commends this book to lawyer and layman alike, for Mr. Justice Devlin is too modest when he describes his contribution to the study of our jury system as being "very elementary" and neither very novel nor very profound. In places, it is both of the latter.

A shrewd judge of men and law, regarded by many as a future Lord Chief Justice, Sir Patrick does not readily fall into verbal traps, whether of his own or someone else's making. His lectures showed the same skill in the use of words and theories that attracted popular attention recently when he presided over the long and difficult trial of Dr. John Bodkin Adams at the Old Bailey.

A Judge on Juries

Although he firmly rejects the idea of "any mystical quality distilled from twelve men selected at random which enables them in all cases to find the facts better than a judge alone could do" (p. 150), Mr. Justice Devlin approves, generally, of juries in criminal cases. No doubt his career at the Bar provided him with experiences upon which to base his obvious faith in the good sense and responsibility to be found in the average jurymen. Within only a few

months of being called, the young Patrick Devlin had the happy fortune of appearing for the Crown in the preliminary hearing of a case in Cornwall in which a woman was charged with double murder by arsenical poisoning. One wonders whether the way in which a jury of Cornish men was able to overcome the near-obsessional prejudice of their county against the accused, and give her the acquittal to which the balance of evidence entitled her, helped to convince the future judge that it was safe to place a man's life in the custody of twelve laymen. Certainly he felt still confident enough some twenty-seven years later to assure the jury in the Adams trial that if it was unable "to distinguish between what is solid fact and what is gossip and rumour, then you will not be the sort of jury I believe you are" (*The Times*, April 9, 1957).

As a judge, Sir Patrick has found in juries "a genuine satisfaction in seeing that justice is done." It is his belief "that the British have a taste for umpiring and feel flattered by having disputes referred to them. But above all they take pleasure in the service of the law" (p. 24). Not all English men and women, however, play cricket. Some appear to feel that if the law needs umpires it should seek them among its paid servants rather than trouble hard-working members of the public to whom a jurymen's pay—up to 30s. a day for loss of earnings and allowances for meals or travelling—seems poor recompense for the unusual intellectual effort involved. After the new rating lists were published last year, a registration official in Luton was quoted as complaining that the local burgesses were coming into his office at the rate of one every ten minutes to protest at the "J" symbol having been placed against their names. In the neighbouring county of Buckingham, where rating revaluation added 25,000 names to the jury-lists, five thousand sought to gain exemption from jury-service.

Most of these reluctant jurors, of course, would be unlucky. Exemption from being called as a juror is limited to a comparatively small number of people, though of a wide variety of occupations. The list includes members of both Houses of Parliament, soldiers, postmen, and medical practitioners. The latter category embraces chemists and veterinary surgeons, but it is the omissions that are perhaps more interesting. Councillors are exempt if they have been elected to certain types of councils, but not if they sit upon others. A member of the London County Council is exempt; his colleagues on Metropolitan borough councils may not be. There seems to have been no attempt to exclude any whose present or past vocation may make it difficult for them to take an impartial view of accused

persons with a history of delinquency. While a serving member of a police force may not sit as a juror, he can do so if he is retired. A clergyman, whose knowledge of criminal souls tends nowadays to be limited to a small circle, may be exempt; but not a Press reporter who is liable to be a walking encyclopaedia upon crime and criminals in his locality. Journalists are uneasily conscious of this anomaly, and their organisation in Oxford recently raised the question whether it was "fair that any journalist, who, by virtue of spending a great deal of his time in court, knew the background of most defendants, should be on a jury" (*The Journalist*, September 1956).

The Unrepresentative Jury

Of more significance than these exemptions are the great numbers of citizens who do not qualify to serve. Despite their recent enlargement, the jury lists are not drawn from a cross-section of the community but from special groups. "The jury," said Sir Patrick Devlin in the second of his Hamlyn Lectures, "is not really representative of the nation as a whole. It is predominantly male, middle-aged, middle minded and middle class" (p. 20).

It is not often that an English judge is so frank about the composition of juries. But anyone who cares to visit a court of assize or of quarter sessions can verify that Mr. Justice Devlin's blunt analysis is correct. There is certainly no question that our juries are still masculine affairs. Although it is nearly forty years since the disqualification upon women serving as jurors was removed, it is still rare to see more than one woman in the jury-box at a time. Sir Patrick has "never seen more than four women on a jury" (p. 21). Often there is none. This sex discrimination is not to be blamed upon the responsible officials, who usually take care to ensure that the proportion of women actually called to juries in their courts reflects accurately the number of women on the jury list. It is solely the product of the property basis of our jury law, for far fewer women than men are householders.

That juries should be middle-aged is not solely the result of the age limits imposed by law. The older people are excluded by the upper age limit of sixty, but it is the property qualification that keeps out the younger men, as it does women generally. Although they become eligible for jury service at the age of twenty-one, few young men acquire the kind of home that gives them the necessary jury qualification whilst they are still on the right side of thirty-five. In spite of the over sixty rule excluding many men and women of

retirement age who would still be able to add a vigorous intelligence to a jury's deliberations—Sir Patrick remarks that the rule's wartime relaxation was “without any ill effects”—it is perhaps the absence of younger jurors that is the worst feature. A high proportion of the offenders tried by jury are themselves in their twenties and early thirties, and it is difficult to justify a system that denies them trial by their peers.

If, as Mr. Justice Devlin so rightly asserts, English juries tend to be “middle minded” in their outlook, it is because their interests belong to the middle ways of life. As in age, so in social background. The property qualification has ensured, at least until recently, that jurymen should come largely from among shopkeepers, owners of small businesses, and professional men, together with that stratum of the working class—the better paid white-collar workers and technicians—most closely identified with the middle class. Only with the latest and drastic changes in rating valuations has the essentially middle class character been modified.

One need not be a cynic to recognise that as the selection of jurors becomes increasingly democratic we shall hear more voices querying the value of the jury system. Almost every political persuasion, it is true, professes veneration for the jury as an English institution which transcends the most extreme differences in outlook and interests. Even the Communist Party, the least reverent of our political groups, seems to accept the jury tradition. In “a fresh appraisal of our own traditions and forms of democracy in Britain”—a statement of policy upon the protection of human rights—a communist spokesman insisted recently that if his party attained power “trial by jury . . . will continue, but with improvements” (*Daily Worker*, February 27, 1957). The kind of “improvements” planned was indicated by a complaint that “trial by jury is at present hampered by a property qualification,” which, it was promised, would be “removed.”

Public Opinion on Juries

Although I have been unable to trace any authoritative statement by the Labour Party, Liberal Party, or Co-operative Party upon the future of jurors' property qualifications, this communist attitude towards the jury system seems to differ remarkably little from that held by the majority of left wing voters. The jury is one of the relatively few English institutions to be accepted without serious reservation by the whole of the public opinion of the Centre and Left. Yet one cannot feel confident that the jury system will not be

attacked from the Right and from many who, in spite of not sharing the political views of its right wing critics, feel that it is a feeble—and even a dangerous—instrument of justice.

Its venerable age does not necessarily make the jury system as sacrosanct to the Right as it appears to be on the Left. There have always been conservatives in this country with sufficient strength of character and perception to abandon hallowed institutions which they have felt to have ceased to serve the public interest as they saw it. While a communist is sensitive to a popular suspicion that he looks too much abroad and shows too little loyalty to English traditions, no such inhibition restrains the conservative. If he were to become convinced that juries were of a less “sound type” than had formerly been summoned, it is probable that many a right wing reformer could sacrifice the jury system without a qualm.

This could occur if the recent enlargement of the jury lists by the chance of rating revaluation led to a demand for the property qualification to be abolished. Even without inflation making the present £30 or £20 qualification still more meaningless, it will be difficult for any Government challenged upon this issue to justify refusing an extension of jury service to all local government electors within the prescribed age limits. Besides being undemocratic, the existing law upon eligibility for jury service is too illogical and too arbitrary to survive indefinitely. Yet any attempt to tamper with that law could arouse strong opposition in political and legal circles which showed no overt reaction to the juridical consequences of the recent rating reassessments.

Such opposition would not come solely from the lawyer temperamentally unable to reconcile himself to new ways. Even a judge with an apparently liberal outlook might baulk at having juries swamped by new recruits from a more numerous class, with whose ideas he might not be familiar and whom he might suspect of being (in the ever fresh words of the Common Law Commissioners of a century ago) “unaccustomed to severe intellectual exercise or to protracted thought.” Admitting that “it may seem surprising that in a country which has had universal suffrage for longer than a generation the jury should still rest upon a comparatively narrow base,” Mr. Justice Devlin argued in his lectures against any change of this kind unless it were accompanied by safeguards. “It might be dangerous,” he said, “so long as the unanimity rule is retained, to equate the jury franchise with the right to vote. No one expects the country to be unanimous in favour of the Conservative Party, but the jury must be unanimously for a plaintiff or a defendant.”

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He felt it was in "the central *bloc* of the population" that "safe judgment is most likely to repose," and he feared that it would be "difficult to estimate what the effect might be of the inclusion of more diversified elements" (pp. 22-23).

The Unanimous Verdict

To find a safeguard in the abandonment of the unanimity rule—the principle of English justice that the verdict of a jury must be the verdict of all of its members and not that of a mere majority—would not seem practical politics, even if the need for some such safeguard were conceded. Mr. Justice Devlin himself asserted in his third lecture that "unanimity is now so ingrained in our procedure that its eradication would seem to take from the verdict a virtue that in the criminal law it needs. The criminal verdict is based on the absence of reasonable doubt. If there were a dissenting minority of a third or a quarter, that would of itself suggest to the popular mind the existence of a reasonable doubt and might impair public confidence in the criminal verdict" (p. 56).

Apart from any psychological disadvantages of majority verdicts, their introduction would not necessarily be a remedy that would commend itself to all classes should an influx of jurors with different standards, as Mr. Justice Devlin apparently fears, render the unanimity rule unworkable. Far from preserving the middle class dominance of juries, the abolition of the unanimity rule would give the advantage to the working class majority which the relaxation of the property qualification would inevitably bring upon almost every jury. The political consequences are obvious. As a result of having eliminated the property qualification for jurors, the Government of the day might be unable to secure convictions in political or quasi-political cases in which trial by jury was unavoidable. And it would then be of no avail for it to discard the unanimity rule also, because the working class element on a jury would, unless it was "packed" in the best eighteenth century tradition, outnumber the "middle minded" jurors.

Will Juries Survive?

What might be more likely than the creation of safeguards against the consequences of abolishing the property qualification is that there will be fewer trials by jury. However much one might regret such a development, it would be unrealistic to ignore the possibility that a Government would prefer not to rely upon jurors in whose wise discharge of their duties it had no confidence. While

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popular juries could not easily be abolished formally in England—to treat so drastically one of our oldest traditions would be inviting trouble for any administration—they could be by-passed if particular types of cases were transferred by statute to courts sitting without juries or having juries composed only of persons with special qualifications.

This course would not outrage established judicial practice as much as many people would think. Already the protection of trial by jury accorded by our judicial system is much smaller than popularly believed. Far from being the usual practice, as it tends to be represented in more general studies of English institutions, jury trial is a rare luxury. Very few persons accused of a criminal offence in England ever see a juror. The overwhelming majority of offences are dealt with summarily—by justices and stipendiary magistrates—and even of the most serious cases not one in five ever goes to a court in which a jury can sit. As about two-thirds of these offenders plead guilty, in an average postwar year juries have tried only about 5 per cent. of the persons charged with indictable offences. Clearly then only an insignificant fraction of all accused persons have their cases put to their theoretical peers.

A strong case can be argued for sparing even these few suspects from being tried by their fellow citizens. Our juries are a tradition easier to attack than to defend. There have been so many tales of jurors' stupidity and inconsistency that one wonders whether some judicial doodlers are tempted to alter the somewhat mysterious title "Traverse Jury," which adorns some documents relating to jury service, to the more apt "Perverse Jury"! It is fortunate for the reputation of juries generally that a convenient legal fiction—for it seems to rest upon no surer foundation—makes the secrecy of the jury room as inviolate as the confessional. Were the deliberations of juries retailed in public houses no more freely than those of courts-martial have been discussed in some Service messes, the jury system might by now have been in grave dispute.

The miscarriages of justice that occur occasionally in jury trials are due in part to the jury system itself. The jury as a judicial instrument and the manner in which jurors' services are utilised in the English courts both have weaknesses too numerous and complicated to discuss at the same time as one considers the selection of jurymen. But it is not always the system itself that is to blame when a jury fails to function efficiently; the fault frequently lies in the poor calibre of individual jurors.

Some Weaknesses of the System

The statutory qualifications needed for a person to be summoned to serve as a juror have nothing to do with his physical or intellectual qualifications. So far as the law is concerned, it seems that a juror may be too deaf to hear the evidence, may be too illiterate to understand any written exhibit, may be too simple minded to follow counsel's arguments, or may even be ignorant of the English language. Many jokes may be heard in the Marches of Welsh speaking jurors who managed to reach the correct verdict without understanding a word of the evidence. There does not even seem to be any statutory requirement that a juror should be sane.

That jurors should lack the basic qualities the public expects them to possess is not, as one might suppose, due to neglect of his duty by some official. A registration officer, for example, has no means of knowing that the householder against whom he marks the letter "J" in the electoral roll is physically or mentally unsuited for a jury-box. Officials acting on behalf of the sheriff or the clerk of the peace will delete a name from the jury list if some reliable person satisfies them that it ought to be removed, but there does not appear to be any machinery for verifying that the persons named are physically and intellectually fitted to serve. Even when a juror appears in court, ready to take his seat, it may be nobody's business to ensure that he is competent. Mr. Justice Devlin finds that "there can be a degree of laxity that is almost indefensible" (p. 35), and it might be suggested that he errs on the side of kindness. Part of any blame may be thought to rest with the Bar for having allowed the old "challenge for cause"—an objection to a particular juror as being unfitted to serve—to fall into virtual disuse. It is today difficult for counsel to ensure that a jury consists only of fit and proper persons, for the rules do not permit any interrogation of a prospective juror upon the state of his health or his prejudices.

Eliminating the Unfit

The answer to this problem might be found in the period after the sheriff has selected the panel of jurors but before the clerk of the court divides them into juries of twelve. Most of our bigger courts already take this opportunity of sorting out the prospective jurors before the proceedings begin. They are divided into groups of a dozen, each of which elects its foreman and is given the date when its members must attend for duty. This gives the ushers a chance of detecting any whom it would be manifestly unfair to expect actually to serve. Besides giving those who claim that they

are suffering undue hardship by being called—the young mothers without baby-sitters, the dairyman who has no other driver to collect the milk churns, and the out-patient whose slipped disc needs daily attention—an opportunity to put their case for being excused, it also enables the clerk to weed out the mentally sick and senile.

However good their clinical powers, neither the ushers nor the clerk of the court can be expected to diagnose hidden defects which might adversely affect a person's performance in the jury-box or jury room. Many people called for jury service appear normal in health, yet suffer from some physical or mental condition which makes it difficult for them to concentrate upon a case. A man who suffers, for example, from mild claustrophobia is not likely to be in a fit state to weigh evidence when he is enclosed with eleven other people in a small box in a crowded courtroom. On the second day of one Old Bailey trial that was expected to last five weeks, a juror had to be released because he "could not stand crowds." The principal medical officer of Brixton Prison told the court that the man suffered from an ailment which meant that if he had continued on the jury his mind might well have been preoccupied with his own condition rather than with the evidence.

In addition to the need for some kind of examination of each individual juror before he is allotted to a jury, a case could be made out for allowing jurors to be excused more easily than it appears to be at present in most courts. Would it be unreasonable to allow a juror to stand down if he doubted his ability to remain alert during a trial? Too often a juror is only half awake, even if his slumber is rarely as deep as that of one juror whom counsel at the Monmouthshire quarter sessions accused of falling "fast asleep and only being roused by repeated shakings."

Being a juror is, of course, a duty as well as a privilege. But in choosing our jurors do we place too much emphasis upon their obligation to serve? While it may be important that jury service should not be evaded, it would seem more important that a miscarriage of justice should not occur through a juror having been forced to perform this duty when not fitted to do so. The community has a duty to the person being tried by jury. Unless our national faith in the value of jury trials is misplaced, the accused is entitled, not just to a trial by his peers, but to be tried by the best jury that can be assembled at the time and place. To submit his fate to the charge of men and women unable to apply their minds in a proper fashion to the facts of his case is a negation of his right to a jury.

THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN POLITICAL STUDIES

LESLIE LIPSON

COMPARISONS, so far from being either odious or odorous, have become the accepted fashion for the modern student of politics. Not that the comparative method in itself possesses any element of novelty. It enjoys both the antiquity and the respectability of an Aristotelian precedent. Employed by Machiavelli, it was further developed by Montesquieu. Freeman claimed it as a major source of inspiration in the scholarship of the nineteenth century. De Tocqueville, Bagehot, Dicey, Wilson, Bryce, and Lowell—all these belong to the comparative school, even though their specialised knowledge was limited in some cases to only a pair of countries.

Looking as objectively as possible, and without being unduly *laudator temporis praesentis*, one may fairly speak of the last decade and a half as a period in which political scholarship has markedly renewed its interest in the usefulness of comparing. Volume upon volume has been added to our store of information, while basic concepts and methodological techniques have been explicitly debated. The reasons for this contemporary vogue of comparative studies are neither obscure nor far to seek. In the sphere of practical affairs, one may cite the circumstances of the second world war, in which western democracy and soviet communism were linked in a war of survival against the fascist systems; the post-1945 "cold war" or "hot peace" that has witnessed the global rivalry between communism and democracy; the tidal wave of anti-colonial, nationalist movements and the urgent need of newly independent states to construct a framework for their own governments; the proliferation of international agencies helping the underdeveloped areas and supplying them with technical assistance. To such events and situations scholars have responded with increasing awareness of the demand for wider sources of knowledge and the need for systematic integration of disparate data. Nowadays, there is a supreme concern, academic and pragmatic alike, to explore and, if possible, solve the problem thus expressed by Professor William A. Robson of "how far conclusions drawn from the experience of one

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THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN POLITICAL STUDIES

country can be validly applied to the political systems of other countries."¹

The latest contribution to this inquiry is the book which Professor Gunnar Heckscher has just written, reporting and reviewing the discussions of the conference on comparative government conducted at Florence in 1954 by the International Political Science Association. All social scientists who employ a comparative method will welcome this important addition to our literature, which henceforth will join the category of "must-reading." What distinguishes the Heckscher report is its far-ranging, yet compact, survey of the subject, the reasonableness of the judgments, and the commendable freedom from the horrors of "scientific" jargon. Except for one major omission, to be mentioned later, this work provides an excellent analysis of the choices that must be made by anybody undertaking comparisons in the field of politics.

Perhaps it is the number and complexity of choices that first impresses the reader of this report. How bewildering in their variety are the "approaches" that offer themselves! Comparative government, it appears from the Florence symposium, may concentrate either on institutions or on functions. It can be configurative or analytical. It might proceed deductively from a general theory, or arrive inductively by research into particular problems. The key to its interpretation of politics could be provided by pluralism or by power. Either the single country or the larger area can yield a framework for study. You may be "policy-oriented" or "teaching-oriented"; or you may even amass knowledge from a simple desire to know (which, fortunately, is not labelled "dis-oriented"). Indeed, with so many approaches luring the researcher into charted and uncharted terrain, there seems little likelihood of this field ever being exhausted!

The fact that specialists of expert competence can argue plausibly for so many contrasted ways of organising their research is itself significant enough to merit comment. Evidently, there must be extraordinary richness and scope for experimentation in materials that can be viewed from such a number of angles. Or, less complacently, one might suggest that this diversity of treatments accurately reflects the confusion over objectives, concepts, and methods which currently characterises the discipline of political science. As the terms clearly indicate, comparative government, or

¹ In his preface to *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics*, by Gunnar Heckscher, p. 5. This book will be published by George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., and will be available almost immediately after the appearance of this article.

comparative politics, involves the fusion of two elements. A certain kind of method—that of making comparisons—is applied to a certain kind of content—the political. Hence, comparative government is blessed, or beset, with all the problems and perplexities that arise in seeking to clarify the meaning of politics and to classify and compare any X, Y, and Z.

The same point can be stated in another way. In the first place, the problems contained in the comparative study of government are part and parcel of the issues affecting the study of politics in general. There is no aspect of political science which cannot be treated on a comparative basis. You may, as Part Two of the Heckscher report illustrates, apply a comparative method to parliamentary procedure, nationalised industries, electoral systems, foreign policy, parties, or revolutions. In fact, any one of the conventional subdivisions of political science—to wit, public administration, public opinion, constitutional law, local government, political philosophy, etc.—can be handled comparatively. A study of the civil services of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States would come under the heading of comparative government, as would a book on American, British, and French political thought. Nothing political is alien to comparison. Hence, a scholar who uses the comparative method is inevitably compounding the problems that ordinarily inhere in political analysis as such with those that are peculiar to the comparative technique. Furthermore, the use of comparisons in discussing a political subject does not markedly differ from what takes place in economics, law, anthropology, or any other social science. In a still larger sense, which Professor Heckscher has skilfully explored in a chapter on “General Methodological Problems,” the issues of comparability merge with such broad philosophical questions as the formulation of hypotheses, the nature of evidence, assumptions about causality, and the like.

There is a direct and simple way of throwing light on what comparative government means and how it should be studied. This is by asking: for what purpose do we make comparisons? Presumably we make them in order to learn something about the significance of our data which would not be as readily apparent without comparing. There are three kinds of questions for which the comparative method is eminently suited. First is the basic one which must underlie every inquiry: what are the facts? We need to acquire information about governmental systems and the functioning of the political process. A comparative method enlarges our store of factual knowledge; helps us to classify our data; and, by

setting side by side the information we possess about different systems, reveals our weak spots and gaps. But, though we begin with amassing items of fact, we cannot stop there—not, at any rate, if we intend to do some thinking about our subject. For we must move to a new level of analysis, at which we embark on interpretations, properly so-called. As we classify our facts, a pair of problems must be tackled. We have to devise a conceptual framework in order to arrange the particulars in a logical pattern and subsume them under appropriate generalisations. Then, we confront the theoretical difficulty of adopting or inventing categories that are clear-cut and mutually exclusive. Next, as we start to sort our data in the places where they belong, we observe in what respects they are alike and unlike. At this point, provided our range of information extends broadly enough, we can say what is the rule and what is the exception.

Now emerges the second of our big questions, that of causality. Having determined by research what similarities and differences exist among the various systems, we must proceed to ask: why are they similar in these matters and dissimilar in those? What makes the generalisation what it is? What can explain the exception? Hence, we are obliged to draw inferences about causes. We attempt to construct sequences of cause and effect. Further, we seek to know whether the factors which we infer as the causes of a proven consequence in country A are also productive of the same results in country B, and whether like results may sometimes derive from unlike causes. Nobody who has tried this type of reasoning will pretend that it is easy to undertake or that his inferences can be absolutely certain. But this at least is sure. A comparative method is indispensable for attempts at delving into causation, since assumptions about causes that are drawn from the experience of a single country are far less reliable than those that are taken from several. An instance where comparisons are successfully employed in this respect can be found in a well-known work, Professor K. C. Wheare's *Federal Government*, the opening chapters of which review the general characteristics and conditions of federalism. His conclusions about the origins of federal union are more surely grounded because he compared four major systems—the American, Australian, Canadian, and Swiss. To have inferred the causes of a federal union from only one or two of these cases would have had far less validity.

On the other hand, even when comparative research appears to establish a uniform connection between factor X and factor Y, it is

still possible to be in error when identifying the one as the cause and the other as the effect. An example of this danger occurs in Professor Maurice Duverger's work, *Les Partis Politiques*. There, he claims to find a firm relationship between the type of electoral system and the nature of the party system. He then ascribes the former as the cause of the latter. However, in my judgment, granted that such a relation does exist, it can be more cogently argued that it is the party system which develops first and is rather the cause of the electoral system than the reverse.

Still a third big question remains. After discovering what are the facts and explaining why they are what they are, there is the final task of ethical evaluation. How does this enter into the comparative process? It is on this point that the report of the Florence round-table is disappointing. There is virtually complete silence on the issue which at present, and especially in the United States, is fundamental to political science. Is it the duty of the student of politics to confine himself to collecting and classifying factual data and to offering propositions that take the form "if A . . . then B"? Or, is it also part of his *métier* to evaluate his findings, to pass judgment in terms of such criteria as "good" and "bad," and to express a preference for one system as being "better" than another? What light can be thrown by comparative research on the validity of the ideal goals of political philosophy? In turn, how can the latter facilitate comparisons by suggesting criteria, categories, and standards?

The Florence discussions, as Professor Heckscher surveys them, did enter boldly into the vexed question of whether a general political theory could or should be developed. Indeed the report lucidly points out that many theories about the political process are implicit in the various approaches that comparisons pursue. Professor Heckscher demonstrates that people attach vastly different meanings to the ambiguous term "political theory" and gives the examples of the institutional, pluralistic, and power approaches.² But it is clear from the drift of the argument that political theory is to be understood in the sense of systematic abstraction and generalisation about the facts and functioning of the political process. The concept of a general theory is restricted to what is and was. It avoids debate over what ought to be. Surely, however, those who are interested in comparative methodology cannot evade these questions: Are they to pass moral judgments on what they

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

discover, or not? Does political philosophy enter into their work, or is it to be separated entirely from empirical research? Should our outlook remain "scientific" only, or are we not also concerned with the contribution of the state to the civilisation of Man? It is a great pity that this otherwise admirable report, far from adopting a position on these queries, does not even raise them.

Let us see what they involve. Suppose a political scientist wishes to write a comparative study of the legislative system. He will pick his cases from a number of countries, each of which exhibits something noteworthy in the processes and organisation of the legislature — e.g., Sweden, India, the United States, Switzerland, Great Britain, New Zealand, France. He would gather all the relevant data on the membership, structure, and functions. Scanning the biographical records, he can compile and tabulate the figures concerning the education, age, sex, occupation, party complexion, and governmental experience of the legislators. He will investigate the formal institutions, inquiring into the relations between the two branches (where the second survives), examining the committees and the role they play, ascertaining the influence of the legislature on the executive and vice versa. He will scrutinise the potent, though informal, effects of the party system. He will survey the "external" relations of the legislature with the courts, with a monarch or figurehead president, with the press and the pressure groups. Also he will observe the successive stages and procedures by which bills are converted into statutes, and will classify the law-making and all other functions of the legislature in terms of output, time spent, fulfilment of electoral promises, and so on.

Next, he will explore in each country the reasons why the legislature has evolved into its current form; he will explain why some systems contain features that are peculiar or unique; and he will account for the resemblances and differences between groups of countries. To do this, especially to make causal inferences, he will have to be historically minded and pay attention to the evolution of legislatures through their many phases. For, to be properly analysed, political causation requires, in addition to comparisons, that chronological perspective and grasp of growth and change which it is the special province of history to impart.

But is he to stop with this? Yes, say some political scientists. Up to this point, they contend, he has kept within the realm of what is and was. He has stayed strictly objective, excluding all personal judgment. His method, therefore, has been scientific. Such is the outlook of those who follow the fad or fashion that calls

itself behavioural science. They decline to offer value judgments, which they push aside as being wholly subjective and relative to the individual who judges. They create a gulf between "is" and "ought." They seek a science of politics clear from the contaminating influence of ethics.

The answer that I would give to the question at the beginning of the previous paragraph is a definite No. How can, and why should, the researcher who has carefully investigated a large and complex problem avoid passing judgments which are ethical in content? In such a comparative study of legislatures as that outlined above, must he not state an opinion whether the legislature functions well? Should he not appraise the calibre of legislators and judge the content of their legislation? Can he evade the responsibility of saying that one legislature operates better than another or that this mode of conducting legislative-executive relationships is preferable to that? Is he not also bound to estimate how well or ill the legislature serves the purposes of a democracy, adding to or lessening the personal liberty, civil rights, and social welfare of its citizens? The aim of comparison, in short, is evaluation. Naturally this both presupposes and produces a philosophy—which is precisely what the devotees of a strictly behavioural approach are unwilling to encompass. Indeed it is not surprising that the guiding concepts in so many behavioural analyses revolve around power and elites. The power approach is not a philosophy of government, but an escape from one. Nor does a concentration upon the roles and status of elites, though statistically manageable, abolish the existence of the masses of mankind who in a democracy are supposed to count for something. On the walls of the Social Science Building at the University of Chicago these words of Lord Kelvin are inscribed: "When you cannot measure, your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory." To this I would reply: "When you fail to evaluate, your comparisons are meagre and unsatisfactory."

With all its manifold possibilities, however, the comparative method also contains pitfalls and traps for the unwary. Whichever of the various approaches mentioned earlier be adopted, there will be some consequent advantages and some inevitable disadvantages. Consider, for example, the choice between organising one's material analytically or configuratively.³ The merit of the analytical scheme is that it picks one particular institution or problem or process, places it in sharp focus, and subjects it to detailed treatment. Thus,

³ See the Heckscher report, pp. 46-51.

one could write about executive-legislative relations in the United States, Great Britain, Switzerland, and France, and illustrate by these cases four different ways of handling the same problem. But the difficulties of such a topic are also apparent. How extensively is the discussion to range over other institutions of government or other aspects of the political process? Clearly, legislative-executive relations cannot be understood without reference to the party system, which is responsible for many of the differences between the House of Commons and the Assemblée. Also, the internal structure and discipline of the parties affects the potentialities of an integrated leadership, as the contrast between Washington and London will reveal. The relation to the courts and the state governments presents special issues for the American Congress; while the practice of referendum and the collegial executive produce their own consequences in Berne. As the Florence discussions of the "criteria of relevance" pointed out, one quickly finds out the elasticity of the relevant.

The use of a configurative approach avoids these difficulties. Its purpose is to achieve a total picture, in which the complete machinery of government and all facets of the political process will be surveyed together. The configuration, or *ensemble*, consists in the inter-relations of the parts and the unity of the whole. Quite evidently, this way of interpreting a nation's politics has much to commend it. Everybody is familiar with case-studies and monographs which rip something out of its context and treat it as a *Ding an sich*. Many of these works constitute original research and contain valuable information. But the reader is offered a partial view and is left with a distorted impression. The environmental connections are all-important for understanding an institution or process, since the "same" system is often transmuted into something different when shifted to other surroundings. Thus, the Swiss ratify amendments to their federal constitution by the requirement of a double majority at a referendum—the majority both of the persons voting and of the cantons. The same method was copied in Australia when the constitution of the Commonwealth was adopted. But the results in the two countries have been quite the opposite. The Swiss have not found it very difficult to secure the passage of amendments (although, admittedly, they have had a goodly number of rejections). In Australia, however, amendments have been very hard to obtain. A large part of the explanation is that it has proven easier to win a majority in eleven and a half cantons out of twenty-two than in four states out of six.

The same truth, that the operation of a political principle will vary with its surrounding context, can be further illustrated by a comparison of the parliamentary systems in the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa. In the formal constitutional sense, British parliamentarism accepts the rule that anything becomes law which has been voted by a simple majority of the M.P.s, following regular procedure, and is signed by the Crown. What prevents majority tyranny in practice is not any legal restraint or institutional separation of powers, but the political checks that derive from an effective opposition, periodic elections, free press and assembly, and an alert public. Transport the legal omnipotence of the legislative majority to another continent—translate it, too, into Afrikaans—and you have the situation which in the last five years has come menacingly closer to actuality in the Union of South Africa. Dr. Malan and Mr. Strydom have there invoked the British principle to overcome the legal obstacles of entrenched clauses and judicial review. If it is safe for the majority in Parliament to be constitutionally untrammelled in Great Britain, is this principle equally safe in the bitter racial and cultural divisions of South Africa?

Inevitably, as the last example shows, the configurative outlook embraces wider categories than the political. It may extend to any aspect of society—whether economic, religious, ethnic, cultural, or what you will—that bears directly upon the state. One cannot interpret politics intelligently in the South African case without placing the racial factor in the foreground and centre of the picture. In Canada, the relations between the linguistic and religious groups closely condition the functioning of the federal system. There, in order to promote a national unity that is compounded of two cultural traditions, the majority applies self-restraint to the exercise of its formal powers and the minority, by the sheer massing of solid negativism, can often exercise a veto. In Brazil, as I found when serving under the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations, in order to understand the administrative process it was necessary to read widely in history, economics, anthropology, and sociology. The total culture of a community is interwoven with the patterns of its politics. Of this truth one becomes the more forcibly aware, to the extent that the culture that one studies is the more alien to one's own.

Yet, here too a word of caution is needed. It is possible to draw false deductions from configurations that look similar, just as one may be misled by a similarity of names in describing objects that are essentially different. Shakespeare has parodied such abuse of

comparisons in a superb example of bad logic. This occurs in *Henry V* where, after the victory over the French, a group of soldiers are praising the qualities of their king. The enthusiastic Welshman proceeds to demonstrate that Henry is to be ranked with Alexander the Great. The premisses for his conclusion are these:—Henry was born in Monmouth, while Alexander was born in Macedon. There is a river in Monmouth, called the Wye; and there is also a river in Macedon, though what they call it is "out of my prains." Then—the final link in the chain of reasoning: "And there is salmons in poth." Therefore, Henry = Alexander. Q.E.D.

With all the risks involved, to encompass in one's comparisons the entire framework and functioning of a government is as difficult as it is intellectually fascinating and challenging. How does one comprehend and correlate the entire politics of one people with those of another? If it can be done at all, the two pre-requisites would seem to be an adequate scheme of classification and an interpretive philosophy. New ways of classifying our data are needed because the materials on which we now draw cover a much larger segment of human experience. The horizons of our thought have expanded in space as well as time. Just as the passing of each decade brings to the researcher a fresh flood of archives and documents and lengthens our perspectives, so does the political reawakening of Asia and Africa call for a wider field of vision and greater depth among all scholars—no matter what may be the particular cultural antecedents of the individual researcher. It is in this respect that the International Political Science Association responded to a genuine need at the Florence round-table, to which the geographical distribution of its participants supplies cogent testimony.

But it cannot be too frequently repeated that, in addition to neat conceptual frameworks for fitting facts into pigeonholes, what are no less urgently required are philosophies. Without some moral ordering of priorities, some hierarchy of values, comparisons are as insipid as food that is served without seasoning or sauce. In the study of politics it is the taste that counts, since ours is a discipline which belongs with the humanities and has only superficial connections with the physical sciences. What distinguishes the works of the classic authors in this field is that they combined their empirical data with a political philosophy, using the one to enlighten and rectify the other. This is true of Aristotle and Montesquieu, of de Tocqueville, Bagehot, and Wilson. It is also true of James Bryce, whose writings deserve better than some of the hostile

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strictures that are quoted from Florence.⁴ *Modern Democracies* was, and remains, a great book, because it successfully integrates a mass of significant data within a coherent philosophy explicitly formulated. Admittedly, Bryce has his preferences. But he is quite honest about them, and such was his concern for objectivity that he resolutely refused to include his own country in his analysis. Nor is he as "parochial" as his critics impute. A range of knowledge and insight that covered the history of Graeco-Roman antiquity and the Holy Roman Empire, and which in his own day extended over western Europe, North and South America, South Africa, and Australasia was no narrow intellectual feat. What Bryce did was to state the outline of a philosophy, to review a large number of countries in a truly configurative manner, and then in the light of the evidence to discuss broadly a number of weighty issues that test and re-check the philosophy. His method could still serve us as a model.

One may conclude with the hope that the continuing interchange of views among scholars of differing backgrounds and viewpoints will provide the stimulus, not only to refine our "typologies," but also to develop what we most need at this juncture of political affairs—a philosophy for the role of government in the further civilisation of Man.

⁴ See Heckscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

BRITISH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1914-1956

H. R. G. GREAVES

I

ONE way of clearly depicting our present structure of central administration would be by the use of pointed contrasts with some earlier date, such as the beginning of the century. This could bring into vivid relief its most significant aspects. The chronological account of changing organisation over the period of nearly half a century, which emerges from the work of the Institute of Public Administration study group,¹ loses something of this vividness, although it gains in the comprehensiveness of the detailed historical survey it provides. Its wealth of authoritative material will make it an essential book of reference for the years that have followed the Haldane Report on the Machinery of Government. And there is much new information revealed in it on recent developments in administrative organisation, especially in the concluding sections on the central co-ordination of government and the handling of administrative change, which has hitherto been quite unnecessarily hidden from public knowledge. But the complexity of detail may be thought a little to obscure the analysis and, perhaps inevitably, to place this contribution in a different category from the document produced by the Haldane Committee, one of historical narrative rather than directive reasoning. Seeing the story as a complex series of successive alterations of detail, of adaptations of machinery, of increases in numbers, and of new functions, devices and methods may cause us to overlook the fundamental character of the change that has occurred. The historical continuity of an evolutionary process may hide the real revolution in the perspective of the relationship between state and citizen which divides the middle of the century from its beginning, and constitutes a vitally important and revealing contrast.

That perspective at the outbreak of the first world war belonged essentially to the nineteenth century. The functions of the state were still thought to be confined to maintaining internal order and external defence, conducting foreign relations, and controlling vast

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¹ *The Organisation of British Central Government, 1914-1956*. Edited by D. N. Chester, written by F. M. G. Willson (Allen & Unwin. 457 pp. 32s.).

overseas territories and populations. Such rudimentary social services as existed were mainly the concern of local authorities, whether for the assistance of the poor or the education of the working class, though some beginnings had been made by the Liberal Government in old age pensions and health and unemployment insurance under central administration. There was no idea that the state should direct economic affairs, still less actively participate in industry or commerce, undertake research activities on its own account, or organise development and investment. The organisation of central administration itself was considered as a permanent structure, with at most the need for occasional and intermittent inquiries, which could be safely left to *ad hoc* committees of amateurs or royal commissions to undertake.

Despite the much greater recognition of social responsibility which occurred during and as a result of the first war, and the political controversies to which it led in the following years, and however much central government was driven unwillingly into more active participation, the attempt to revert to the pre-war attitude was largely successful after 1922. The flood was dammed, except for a few trickles, and could not break until the necessities of the second world war released it. But the release when it came was all the more overwhelming.

In the thirties, it is true, especially after the onset of the depression, the view was spreading that government might have a part to play in strengthening the economy. But this part consisted mainly in responding to signals of distress, supporting with export guarantees or tariffs or coming to the rescue with subsidies, though it might charge a price for its aid by imposing a scheme of marketing, as in agriculture, or of rationalisation, as in cotton and shipping. This involved some slight central government function of economic policy formulation, but scarcely anything that could be called a central economic administration. It was the patent need too for rationalisation in order to avoid increasing chaos which brought acceptance of the one measure of socialisation of the period, that of London Transport. With this exception, in the main part of what can now be seen as a transitional period of administrative attitudes, the only measure to take over for social benefit any source of wealth was the Petroleum Production Act, 1934. This vested in the community all oil and natural gas which might exist in the subsoil of Britain; but in no significant quantity was there known to be any! With this might be contrasted the Atomic Energy Authority Act, 1954, providing for the public ownership, exploitation and control

of a vast potential, involving huge investment, enormously expensive research, and immense possible profit. It would surely be neither cynical nor fanciful to take this as expressing a wholly different attitude of social responsibility for the production of wealth. It also typifies the enhanced requirements of a central administration upon which is imposed the obligation to deal with matters of such magnitude, and which, since the White Paper of 1944, has also the recognised obligation to secure full employment, a rising standard of living, and the avoidance of inflation and balance of payments difficulties.

II The Number of Officials

This is already much to attempt to achieve. It adds considerably to the functions of central administration. Still further functions have been added by the series of nationalisation Acts, and the great increase in insurance and other social welfare measures of the Labour Government in the immediate post-war years. All this has entailed an expansion of central government organisation to deal with these added responsibilities, which has gone on alongside the contraction naturally accompanying the transition from war to peace. Now, a decade after the end of the war, it may be possible to assume that a certain stability has been reached, and so to begin to compare present and past.

Comparison of the total number of officials in the departments of central government, however, is not as instructive as it appears. So many qualifying factors need to be remembered, and there are always difficulties of definition. When, for instance, a new public corporation takes with it a body of officials from a department, they will cease to be counted and a wholly unreal reduction will seem to have occurred. It is not unknown for political claims to have been made on the basis of such unrealities. Nevertheless some figures may be given as broadly illustrative.

Excluding the Post Office, there were about six times as many non-industrial civil servants in departments of central government in 1956 as in 1914, and nearly three times as many as in 1935. While the number of officers dealing with the collection of taxes had increased at half, and those concerned with the social services at double, this rate, those in economic departments had conformed to the general pattern of growth. And in 1956 there were roughly the same number in each of these three categories—about 60,000. Civil servants in the defence departments have increased at about

the same rate as those in social service departments, that is at double the average.

Another fact is more significant than this over-all growth. It is the movement out of Whitehall, and into more direct contact with the population. While in 1935 only about half the total were in departments having extensive local or regional organisations, and in 1914 scarcely one-sixth, in 1956 this was true of nearly all, and no less than two out of every three were actually based on offices outside London. The state, from being a far-off authority, vested with supreme power, whose chief visible expression was the armed forces and the courts of justice, has become the principal organiser of that system of co-operation by which society seeks the promotion of the health and welfare of its members and the development of the national patrimony; and as a social service organisation it enters into direct contact with the lives and homes of its ordinary citizens.

III Central Co-ordination

At the same time the general structure of central government at its apex shows a remarkable degree of continuity. At the level of the Cabinet and of departmental Ministers there are important developments to record, but they are not revolutionary. The Governmental apparatus has shown elasticity enough to absorb the extended responsibilities, with adjustments and new devices rather than radical change. Yet it would be true to say that it has become more efficient as well as more elaborate and articulated.

There has been an increase of no more than three departmental Ministers since 1935 and of seven since 1914, the non-departmental Ministers being four at each date, or five in 1956 if a possibly temporary Minister without Portfolio is included. The respective totals are twenty-nine, twenty-five, and twenty-one. But even this could be held to exaggerate the increase, for in 1935 there were two Parliamentary Secretaries at the head of practically independent departments—Mines and Overseas Trade—which have since disappeared. Allowing for this, it would not be unreasonable to claim that there is only one more departmental Minister today than in 1935. Thus an expansion of business requiring a sixfold increase in officials since 1914 has been met by the addition of no more than seven departmental Ministers since that date; and a threefold growth since 1935 by only one more departmental Minister.

But this has been accompanied by developments of the machinery for the central co-ordination of government of the utmost importance. The Cabinet committee system and the Cabinet secretariat

are, of course, the outstanding examples. The first seems to be of great flexibility, ranging from the standing committee with as wide and general a responsibility as the Future Legislation Committee of the Labour Government, to the *ad hoc* temporary committee attending to a special problem or limited field of policy, such as the Middle East. We also know of Cabinet committees with wide though fairly distinct fields of responsibility, such as civil defence or the social services, and others, more limited, concerned with such matters as atomic energy or the machinery of government. The committee may be used, too, to co-ordinate the work of departments whose heads are no longer members of the Cabinet, under the chairmanship of a Cabinet Minister, as has been the case with defence. There can be no doubt of the supreme value of this informal and anonymous machinery to the efficiency of the Cabinet system.

It is sometimes assisted at the official level by corresponding interdepartmental committees. It is always assisted by the Cabinet secretariat which has expanded considerably, is now directly under the Joint Secretary to the Treasury, and which contains its own economic intelligence section.

This much increased scale of activity, without the accompaniment of an equivalent addition to the number of departmental Ministers, must have made more heavy the burden falling on each. It has certainly meant that the business of central direction and co-ordination is more time-consuming, as well as more compelling. The greater absorption of Ministers in affairs of administration has undoubtedly contributed to the enhanced position of the Prime Minister, upon whom falls more exclusively the task of superintending government as a whole. The larger the machine and the more those running it become engrossed in its complexities, the greater grows the relative importance of the eye that has to range over the whole, and the hand that has to be ready to deal with any weakness which may reveal itself.

Of no small significance in this connection is the evidence of a speedier adjustment and adaptation of the central machinery which the last decade has shown. This is largely attributable to the greater attention paid since 1946 to the scientific treatment of machinery of government questions. The creation and continuance, both at the ministerial and at the official level, of committees with that responsibility attests this change, so long demanded and hitherto so inadequately met. They are now served, we learn, by a full-time principal. Whether or not this is yet enough may be open

to doubt, but at least it is a great improvement. And this whole development has been immensely helped by the provisions of the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946. Since that measure was passed, which authorises the transfer of any statutory functions of one department to another by simple Order in Council, no less than forty such transfers have taken place. No one can doubt that this has meant not only a considerable tidying up of central administration but its much more rapid adaptation to need, and that this has facilitated a more efficient performance by the Prime Minister of his function as chief architect of the governmental structure.

IV Economic Activities

The growth of state activity in industry, commerce, and the provision of economic services is so extensive and varied that it cannot be briefly summarised. Direct participation has replaced, on a large scale, regulation and support from a distance. The operation of public corporations, owning and running such industries as transport, coal, electricity, is not normally regarded in this country as falling within the realm of central administration. The attempt has indeed been consciously made to insulate the one from the other by a process which is not always easy logically to sustain. But the effects on the administrative structure of such direct participation cannot yet be thought of as having attained to stability. There have been more changes among the group of departments dealing with economic matters than in any other group. The Board of Trade has probably covered a more fluctuating collection of responsibilities than any other single department. Few would claim that in this general field anything like an optimum structure has yet been attained, or would doubt that here there is most room for improvement. To suggest that in this connection will lie a considerable part of the task falling to those concerned with machinery of government in the next decade is not, however, to deny that useful reforms have taken place. "Though the Board of Trade has been relieved of a number of major functions since 1914, within its more compact jurisdiction its work is far more extensive than was the case forty years ago, and the Board is even now in a constant dilemma over the size of its staff and over its internal organisation."

V The Impact of Science

Another development which deserves special notice relates to the contribution of the scientist to the business of government. There

are two aspects of this. First is the growth throughout the administration as a whole, and appearing in nearly all departments, of a new scientific civil service alongside the old one which originated in the recommendations of Trevelyan and Northcote and their implementation by Gladstone. The second is the attention now paid to scientific research, and the emergence of the Lord President of the Council as something in the nature of the Minister of Research envisaged by the Haldane Committee.

Placed under his responsibility are the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Medical Research Council, the Agricultural Research Council, Nature Conservancy, and the Atomic Energy Office, though this last has recently been transferred to the Prime Minister. The use of his office for this purpose represents a real achievement in the art of administrative improvisation. Research activities are clearly unsuited to the normal departmental set-up. They call for independence and yet for high-level support. Organisation under more or less autonomous professional bodies secures the one; the generalised authority of a principal member of the Government ensures the other. And few can doubt that the solution found is an improvement on the idea in its original form.

But this, of course, by no means exhausts the central administration's activities in relation to scientific research. The Defence Ministries and the Ministry of Supply have responsibilities in one direction, the Board of Trade in another. The latter is not only concerned in this field with statistical activities such as the censuses of production and distribution, but also has under its authority the Research Development Corporation and the Council of Industrial Design. Through the University Grants Committee the Treasury also has a direct responsibility covering important research activities. And so indeed have most of the economic and social service ministries.

What emerges, therefore, is a general picture of active state participation in, as well as support of, a widely varied field of research work. Here, perhaps more than in any other aspect of central government responsibility, can a vivid contrast be drawn with the position in 1914. And it reflects once again the fundamentally changing character of the activities covered by the organisation of British central government.

LABOUR RELATIONS IN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

B. C. ROBERTS

I

ONE after another Britain's colonial territories are gaining their independence. This year it was the turn of Ghana and Malaya and they will soon be followed by Nigeria and the West Indies. Much has been written about Britain's record as a colonial Power and the legacy she has bequeathed to those new nations, in terms of their parliamentary systems of government, independent judiciaries, and efficient civil services. Less attention, however, has been given to the growth of social institutions, such as trade unions, which have played a not unimportant part in the industrial and political development of the territories in recent years and will play an even more significant part in the future.

There is widespread ignorance, both in Britain and in other countries, of the progress that has been made in the field of industrial relations. This, perhaps, is not surprising, since the spectacular development that has occurred has taken place mainly in the past twenty-five years.

The beginnings of trade unionism may be traced back in some territories to the period of the first world war, but when Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb) became Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the second Labour Government, he found that there had been little or no development of labour organisation. In 1930, Lord Passfield, in a now famous memorandum, informed all colonial governors that the growth of trade unionism was a desirable and legitimate feature of industrial and social development. Legislation laying the legal foundations upon which trade unionism could develop, already existed in a few colonies, and within the next decade similar laws were passed in most of the other territories.

The laws adopted in each case were based upon the British model, with one major exception. Whereas in Britain a union is free to register or not, in the colonies registration was made compulsory. The object behind this retreat from the classic British principle of minimum legal interference with trade union autonomy was the desire to provide paternalistic guidance to workers without

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LABOUR RELATIONS IN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

experience of collective organisation for social and economic purposes.

There was little immediate response to this change in policy initiated by Lord Passfield; in 1932 only three trade unions had registered. The coming of the war and the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940 transformed the situation. A new stimulus was given to industrial and social development, since the law provided that, where money supplied under the Act was used, proper conditions of labour had to be observed and facilities had to be given for the establishment of trade unions.¹ By 1955 there were 1,177 registered trade unions and 223 employers' organisations with a total membership of almost one million.

Since out of the total population of Britain's colonial territories of some seventy-five million less than five million are engaged in wage-earning occupations, it would seem that about 20 per cent. are organised. This conclusion would be regarded by some authorities as grossly exaggerated. A recent official publication has stated that, "it is doubtful whether even as many as 5 per cent. of wage earners in the dependencies as a whole are paying members of trade unions."² It may well be true that at any moment only a small number of union members are paid up, but it is doubtful whether this strict standard of computing membership should be applied as a measure of union strength in the different conditions that prevail in the colonies. Although paid-up members may be few, at any one time, those who are in arrears with their contributions do not consider that they have dropped out of the union. What is more, from the point of view of union activity they can usually be relied upon to do the leaders' bidding as effectively as the paid-up members. There are, of course, considerable differences in the density of organisation and degree of maturity reached by the unions in different territories. Perhaps the most advanced and well organised unions are to be found in the West Indies and some of the weakest in Africa.

II

Trade unionism is a world-wide phenomenon. It has developed in every industrial country under very different systems of government and types of social structure. Whatever the attitude of the British Government might have been, trade unionism would have developed in the colonies with the growth of commerce and

¹ Walter Bowen, *Colonial Trade Unions*, Fabian Research Series No. 167.

² *Labour in the United Kingdom Dependencies*, H.M.S.O. 1957.

industry, but it may well be questioned whether it would have reached its present state of advance had it not been for the positive steps taken by the British and Colonial Governments, the Trades Union Congress, and such international agencies as the International Labour Organisation and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

The British Government followed up the provision of a legal framework within which the unions could grow by encouraging the establishment of labour departments in the territories and by setting up a central organisation for the supply of labour services. In 1938 a Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies was appointed; the labour advisory staff was subsequently extended to include a Deputy Labour Adviser, and an Assistant Labour Adviser who is a woman, and specially concerned with problems as they affect her sex. A Social Services Department was also created to advise on social policy; one part of this section of the Colonial Office is almost entirely concerned with labour matters.³

An important step was taken in 1942 with the establishment of the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee. This body is charged with the duty of considering and advising on all questions concerning the employment of labour. The chairman of the Committee is the Minister of State for the Colonies, and its members, who are appointed by the Secretary of State, include representatives of the British Employers' Confederation and the Overseas Employers' Federation, the Trades Union Congress, and independent members with knowledge and experience of Colonial Labour problems.

The Colonial Labour Advisory Committee has, in an unspectacular fashion, done a great deal to foster a healthy policy and to promote a continuous interest in labour problems. At the same time as the Committee was set up, another important experiment was embarked upon by the Colonial Office. Six British trade unionists were appointed as labour officers and sent to Trinidad, the Gold Coast, Palestine, Sierra Leone, British Guiana, and Nigeria to assist in the development of trade unions. Each of the men selected was an experienced trade union official, but more than experience was required to make a success of the job they were called upon to undertake. Considerable diplomatic skill was required, since the confidence of the local trade unionists had to be won, a good working relationship with the senior officers of the territory's Colonial Service had to be built up, and care had to be

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

taken neither to provoke hostility from employers nor, on the other hand, to develop too intimate a contract with them. The results of the experiment were extremely encouraging and there are now nineteen trade unionist labour officers employed in thirteen territories.⁴

The Colonial Office has been concerned to promote general labour services as well as trade unions. The first department to be set up by a colony to deal with labour problems was established by Malaya in 1912, but it was in the 1930s and 1940s that labour departments were created in all but the tiniest of the territories. Today more than 400 officers, of whom about half are indigenous and recruited locally, are employed by labour departments.⁵ Through these departments a great deal is being done to build up the kind of services provided in this country by the Ministry of Labour. Labour exchanges have been developed, fair wages clauses adopted, arbitration and conciliation procedure have been established, workmen's compensation laws passed, and minimum wages boards set up in appropriate circumstances.

Great efforts have been made to recruit and train staff of a high calibre. Training courses for labour officers were first started in Britain in 1939, but they had to be limited during the war. Since 1948 the Ministry of Labour has arranged, twice a year, training courses lasting three months. Labour officers attending these courses are given an intensive training in administrative techniques; they spend a period of time at the headquarters of the Ministry of Labour followed by a further period of practical work in regional and local offices. In addition to the special facilities provided by the Ministry of Labour in the United Kingdom, local training schemes are being established. Another valuable development is the holding of regional conferences of labour officers at regular intervals. In this way information and experience can be pooled. This type of activity has now become international in its scope. Conferences on common problems affecting Belgian, French, and British colonies have been held in Africa. In 1952 an Inter-African Labour Institute was established under the auspices of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara. The Institute, now situated at Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa, is directed by a Labour Officer who was formerly in Nigeria.

⁴ Several of the trade unionist labour officers from the United Kingdom have risen to be Labour Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners, and one has become Deputy Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁵ *Labour in the United Kingdom Dependencies*, H.M.S.O. 1957.

III

The labour officers and labour departments have exercised a considerable influence on the development of the trade unions and the machinery of industrial relations. It now becomes an important question as to what is going to happen when territories become independent. Impressive as the growth of trade unionism appears, there are many weaknesses that will be exposed when the experienced British advisers are withdrawn, and the Colonial Office no longer stands behind the labour departments.

In most of the colonies there are to be found examples of well organised, well led, and well administered unions, but for every established, viable organisation there are dozens of small, weak, and badly run unions. For example, in Nigeria there are 162 unions with a total membership of 141,000; in Trinidad there are sixty unions with a total membership of 41,000; in Hongkong 230 unions share between them 178,000 members. This kind of situation ought perhaps to be expected, since the history of trade unionism in many countries is a history of, at first, small local organisations, coalescing at a later stage into larger and larger units.

It is worth noting that there are some distinct differences in the nature of the organisations which exist in the colonies and the early British trade unions. In Britain unions were formed by groups of skilled craftsmen living in the same district and meeting together outside their place of employment. The common interest which bound them together was their craft, not their place of employment. Thus it was a natural development from district to nation-wide organisation. In Africa and other colonies the basis of organisation is often the place of work. In cases where the employer is the government or a large company, with scattered units of employment, the union may have gradually spread until it includes workers in every branch over a very wide area.

The plant or company basis of trade union organisation has a logic and is convenient, but it also has many disadvantages. It may sometimes mean that the union leader is, in effect, a prisoner of the employer; that he becomes, in exchange for certain benefits, simply an agent of the company. On the other hand, this basis of organisation generally means that it is the larger and more progressive firms that are organised, and usually these are the European or American concerns. The smaller, frequently locally owned firms, which pay low wages and provide extremely bad working conditions, are generally unorganised. The larger firms with enlightened labour

policies have sometimes gone out of their way to help build up the prestige of the unions. Unfortunately the provision of good wages and extensive welfare schemes does not always bring about better trade unionism, or even better industrial relations. Since the unions are based on the firm the leaders have not a strong incentive to organise the backward areas of industry and commerce; it is easier to take advantage of the goodwill of the employer who has accepted trade union organisation.

Another type of union which has developed in the colonies, particularly in the West Indies, is the omnibus organisation which will recruit any kind of worker employed in any industry. Such organisations are usually loosely organised round the personality of the leader, who is often a flamboyant character. Trade unionism of this kind is far removed from the traditional trade unionism of the craft type which seeks to provide specific services, and responsible leadership, and which has well-defined objectives, but in the context of colonial conditions these organisations may play as valuable a role as the general unions have done in Britain, if they can build up a corps of loyal and efficient officers.

There are unions in the colonies, for example, the Rubber Workers' Union of Malaya, the Seamen's Union of Sierra Leone, and the Oilworkers' Union of Trinidad, which are well organised and administered and which compare not unfavourably with British unions. These are, however, exceptional organisations and they provide a model to be followed as yet by few of their contemporaries.

In the kind of situation which prevails in most of the colonies, where tribal or customary forms of social organisation are breaking down under the impact of industrialisation, where the majority of workers are illiterate, where the new types of social skills and disciplines have yet to be firmly established, leadership becomes all important. In the early days of British trade unionism tremendous emphasis was placed on the ability and duty of every member to participate in the task of leadership. Executive offices in the unions were deliberately rotated so that everybody had the opportunity of taking a turn at leadership. This system of trade union government reflected the character of the members, who, by colonial standards, were skilled in social as well as industrial arts and had spontaneously founded their organisations. Trade unionism in the colonies has been fostered from above, rather than developed from below. There have been exceptions to this generalisation, notably in the West Indies, but even here unions have been the creation of educated individuals who have often seen a labour

organisation as a stepping stone to political power. There are examples of trade union leaders who have climbed out of the ranks, but even in these cases politics have often claimed their interest. It must also be acknowledged that some of the finest and most able political leaders in the colonies, such as Lim Yew Hock, in Singapore, have been products of the trade union movement. It is an excellent thing that the trade unions are a nursery for future political leaders so long as political aspirations are not allowed to jeopardise what should be mainly trade union objectives and loyalties.

It is inevitable that colonial trade unionists should be interested in politics, since the desire to influence industrial conditions is intimately associated with the desire for national independence. However, the experience of trade union movements in every country of the world has shown that when politics dominate sooner or later the common industrial interest of the members is rent by dissension. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the trade union movements in many of the colonies has been seriously impaired by political activities in the post-war years. In some cases the advance in trade union organisation has been almost completely retarded because of political disputes, made worse in most cases by fierce personal rivalry. Racial divisions are also another potent cause of inter-necine conflicts within colonial trade union movements. It is difficult to see how problems of this kind can be avoided altogether; it would be nice to think that colonial trade union leaders were ready to learn what are the limits of political action and how to avoid the dangers of racial cleavage from examples elsewhere. In fact, they are no more easily convinced by argument and example than their British counterparts; bitter experience is the teacher from whom they are more likely to learn.

Politics are not the only danger besetting the unions. In spite of manifold efforts by the British administrators to maintain the standards of honesty to which we are used in the puritan temperate zone countries, corruption is a widespread feature of life in the colonies. The trade unions have not been immune from these influences and it is an unfortunate fact that many trade union leaders have waxed fat on their members. One of the major difficulties in this respect is that the income of the unions is irregular and uncertain. This arises to some extent from the lack of members who have the social skills to play the part that voluntary trade union officers play in British unions. The problem is not merely one of organisation. Incomes of members are often low and they are

reluctant to pay contributions unless they can see a tangible reason for doing so. In these circumstances union leaders have to make their salaries as opportunity offers. Dues can be obtained when a victory has been won. This encourages union leaders to stimulate demands and to ask for back pay, since the award of a lump sum enables them to collect a rake-off.

Part of the difficulty in establishing a convention that contributions should be paid regularly arises from the essentially transitory character of paid employment in many territories. Workers in African towns are often only temporary migrants who are intent on earning a sum of ready cash in order to get married or purchase capital goods. When they have achieved their objective they then return to their families and their village holdings. As workers gradually become divorced from their peasant background and settle down to become town dwellers dependent upon the factory, mine, and mill for their livelihood they will become more closely identified with their organisations and adopt appropriate patterns of behaviour, but this will take a long time.

It was because of dangers such as those which have been outlined that registration of trade unions was made compulsory in every territory. Thus, in theory, the Registrar of Trade Unions is able to maintain continuous supervision of union finances and their administration. In practice, however, the Registrar may be faced with a situation where strict enforcement of the law would mean the destruction of the union. In such circumstances he will usually be in close contact with the Labour Department, which, however, may well advise that he should proceed with caution. Every attempt will be made to improve the situation by warnings and persuasion, rather than by seeking to impose the full penalty for non-observance of registration provisions. It is sometimes suggested that the British are too fussy about moral standards, when, after all, early nineteenth-century government in Britain was organised on venal lines. And in America and many European countries corruption in industrial, trade union, and political circles is no less significant. Be this as it may, it is surely the right policy to attempt to secure clean, honest unionism.

The responsibility for the establishment of good trade union practices depends to a large degree upon the quality of the union leaders. Considerable efforts have been made to develop good union leaders and much has been achieved. The next step is to build up leaders and much has been achieved. The next step is to build up an informed rank and file, since only in this way can there be a proper check on the activities of the leaders. Labour Departments

have encouraged local trade union educational committees and discussion groups. An important development in this respect is the provision of trade union educational courses by the extra-mural departments of the universities and university colleges in the territories. Extra-mural lecturers have been appointed in West Africa and the West Indies, and numerous courses are now provided. Many British university experts in industrial relations have been out to the colonies, under the auspices of the Colonial Office, to lecture and participate in conferences and courses for trade unionists. The results of this work will gradually be seen in the shape of better trade union organisation and leadership.

IV

The British Trades Union Congress has played a tremendous part in encouraging and helping the nascent colonial trade unions to become firmly established. Following a special study of the situation the General Council of the T.U.C. decided in 1956 that it would budget to spend on assistance to colonial trade unions approximately £32,000 in the following fifteen months. It was decided at the 1956 Congress to raise the affiliation fee to the T.U.C. by 3d. per member in order, among other things, that more could be spent on overseas assistance. In July, 1957, the General Council decided to allocate £500,000 to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to be used for advancing trade unionism in underdeveloped territories.

The T.U.C. has been concerned to see that the money it made available was wisely used. This has been achieved by providing grants for specific purposes, such as office equipment, libraries, and the expenses incurred in special organising activities. Much has also been spent on providing educational facilities. Trade union leaders have been brought to Britain to study at Ruskin College and elsewhere, but the general policy is now to encourage the growth of educational activities on the spot. It is thought to be wiser to send an experienced British trade unionist out to the territories, where his knowledge can be made available to a large number, than to bring someone to Britain. In order to carry on the advisory and assistance work more effectively the T.U.C. has doubled the size of its Colonial Department. The extent of the activities of the T.U.C. in this field is to be seen in the lengthy report presented by the General Council each year to Congress.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has played, since 1949, an increasing role in underdeveloped territories.

In British dependencies I.C.F.T.U. work is carried out with the knowledge of the T.U.C., and in turn the T.U.C. has agreed to inform the I.C.F.T.U. of any action that it is taking. Relations between the T.U.C. and the I.C.F.T.U., though cordial, have not been entirely free from difficulties with respect to developments in British territories. The principal cause of the problem has been the attitude and activities of representatives of the American Federation of Labour. Anti-colonialism comes naturally to Americans and this should be well understood by Britons in view of their historic relations with America. Anti-colonialism is not, however, in itself an adequate basis for active intervention in trade union problems in British or other dependent territories. The desire of the Americans to prove that they are on the side of the indigenous workers and against their British "overlords" has led to activities which may not be in the best interests of the unions concerned. The passing of a law or the supplying of a large sum of money or the financing of trips to America are not in themselves bad things to do, but in the context in which they occur they may do more harm than good. The building up of good trade unionism may be helped by legislation, but it cannot be created by legislation alone. Legislation of the American type, which provides a legal sanction for almost every facet of industrial relations, is a confession of failure to build a system that rests on respect and confidence. If the suggestions of the Americans were followed the danger would arise in the colonial territories that trade unionism became entirely dependent on legal regulation. This could very easily happen under American influence, especially when territories have been granted independence. Nor is it necessarily sound policy from the point of view of the long-run health of the unions to encourage their belief that American money in large quantities is available so long as they make the right kind of responses to American overtures.

The I.C.F.T.U. established a West African Information Centre at Accra, Gold Coast, in 1953. This centre, which is directed by a British trade unionist, is designed to assist African trade unionists to develop their organisations by providing them with advice and secretarial help. A monthly paper is published and educational courses are run regularly. In November, 1955, a three-week international seminar was held at the centre, and an African Regional Conference was held in 1957 to discuss trade union rights, organisation, economic developments, and the co-ordination of future activities. Similar activities have been organised by the I.C.F.T.U. in other regions of the world.

V

The growth of trade unionism in the colonies has been followed, as it was in Britain, though somewhat tardily, by the establishment of employers' organisations. Twenty-two employers' federations with interests in the British Commonwealth are affiliated to the Overseas Employers' Federation which has its headquarters in London. The Overseas Employers' Federation has sought not only to secure the affiliation of existing organisations, but to build new associations where none existed.

British companies have become more and more conscious during the past twenty years that industrial relations in the colonies must be based on the same principles as those which govern industrial relations in Britain. The fundamental position was clearly put as follows by the Overseas Employers' Federation in its recently published 11th annual report. "The management of labour relations between parties of equal knowledge and foresight; between partners who share the same desires and aims but are divided only in their judgment of the means and the opportunities that may best assure their ends; between partners who desire only to serve the communities of which they are the mainstay and not some vague and inchoate ideals or anarchies." As the report continues to say, these are new ideas in the colonies; they would certainly not be accepted by every employer.

Some idea of the extent to which British companies are moving may be gained from the increasing numbers of personnel officers and industrial relations advisers that are being appointed by companies with overseas operations. The big companies are now, in many instances, far ahead of their employees in their thinking on industrial relations. The problem which often confronts personnel officers is how to foster the development of sound trade unionism without undermining the self-respect and independence of the organisation with whom they have to deal. It is an easy matter for a large company to provide a headquarters for the union, to subsidise the activities of its officers, and to make things easy for them in many other ways, but in so doing it may corrupt and handicap the growth of responsible, democratic trade unionism. British companies with interests in the colonies are often portrayed by left-wing writers as vicious exploiters of the indigenous working population. Whatever they were guilty of doing in the past it is now freely admitted by native members of labour departments that

it is the British employer who obeys the law, who is setting the pace in welfare and industrial relations policy.

British employers are often highly critical of the failure of colonial governments to tackle such problems as health, housing, and unemployment more vigorously. Frequently employers are having to carry responsibilities for the provision of services which in Britain would be carried by the state. The difficulty here is the limited revenues at the disposal of colonial governments; until the tax capacity of countries rises so as to enable better social services to be financed centrally, governments will inevitably often have to leave desirable welfare schemes to private initiative. Whilst, therefore, it is proper that companies established in colonies should contribute to the social welfare of their workpeople, it will be in the best interest of healthy industrial relations if local governments can provide better services as soon as possible so that the paternalism which was inevitable in the past can disappear and the emergence of independent, self-reliant employees be expedited.

As yet it is only a minority of employers who hold these far-sighted views. In many instances employers are fearful of the growth of trade unionism and they have resisted the development of collective bargaining, since this involves the recognition of the ability of unions to negotiate responsibly. Collective bargaining machinery is, however, gradually being established; in a number of territories Joint Industrial Councils have been set up. The negotiation of collective agreements that will fairly satisfy the interests of both employers and workpeople and be honoured by them, is a highly sophisticated process which demands considerable skill and moral qualities. It is obviously going to take many years to achieve the standards of collective bargaining that prevail in the advanced industrial countries.

VI

There are some experts on industrial relations who have questioned the wisdom of applying concepts developed out of industrial experience in Britain and other western countries to Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Referring to the British policy one writer has recently commented, "it is tacitly assumed that projection into the African context of British trade unionism, with its superstructure of collective bargaining, is the obvious and right way to bring about an improvement in labour relations. There is, however, no *a priori* justification for assuming that what is right in one country at a

given stage of its development is necessarily right, with or without modification, in another, or that what has worked well 'back home' must (unless the people are incorrigibly stupid) necessarily work well 'out here.' Colonial administrators tend to try to create, if not people, then societies in their own image."⁶

Such words of caution are salutary, but they pose a problem rather than suggest an answer. It is, of course, true that wages and working conditions in industrial societies could be settled without the elaborate machinery that has been evolved in the advanced white countries. They could be settled on the basis of an individual contract, but experience has shown that the bargaining strength of the parties is unequally balanced and as a result work-people have everywhere sought to redress the balance by organisation. They could be settled by the state, but if this was done without consultation it would be a totalitarian method. If it were done after consultation it would be necessary for the parties to be organised.

Since these are the alternative ways of determining wages and working conditions it is perhaps not merely the arbitrary whim of colonial administrators that is responsible for the development of trade unionism and collective bargaining in British dependent territories. Institutions will naturally be influenced by the environment in which they operate and certainly the extent to which the government is the employer will affect the system of industrial relations and the evolution of economic policy. It does not follow, however, that different fundamental principles ought to be applied to overseas territories simply because they are at an early stage in their economic and social development.

Davison has questioned the tacit assumption on which British policy has been based because he believes that the development of anything like a free market economy is both unlikely and undesirable. He considers, for example, that a programme of farm collectivisation on the Chinese model is the *sine qua non* of raising the efficiency of agriculture in Ghana. This, he recognises, will create a problem in labour relations, but, he writes, "let there be no indignation about this. It is as essential a development, if the economy is to avoid stagnation, as was the Enclosure Movement in Britain in the eighteenth century, and powerful arguments may be advanced in support of the view that a reorganisation of agricultural

holdings, with its inevitable modification of the system of land tenure, is unavoidable if agricultural productivity is to rise."⁷

It is to be regretted that an English intellectual should give the impression that productivity can only be raised by measures of a totalitarian character when there have been demonstrations, under British guidance, of alternatives that have given impressive results in terms of higher productivity without loss of freedom to the state. The Gezira scheme in the Sudan provides an example of the type of approach to economic development in which the state, foreign capital and expertise, and the native peasant population work together as partners. The underlying philosophy of the Gezira scheme is democratic, as Arthur Gaitskell, late managing director of the Gezira Board, shows in a brilliant background paper written for the Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference on Human Problems of Industrial Communities within the Commonwealth and Empire, held at Oxford last year.⁸

One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from the background papers contributed by employers, trade unionists, and academics from all over the Commonwealth to the proceedings of this remarkable conference, was the universal applicability of the problems posed by industrialisation. This was still further confirmed by the reports of the study groups and discussions. Industrialisation has thrown up fundamentally the same issues everywhere and they can be approached in a totalitarian spirit or in a democratic spirit. This is not, of course, to suggest that the magnitude and complexity of the problems does not vary and differ from country to country.

There is no reason to believe that colonial territories will pass through exactly the same stages of economic and social development as did Britain. Respect for the individual and the idea of voluntary autonomous associations took deep root in this country during the period of *laissez-faire* which followed the industrial revolution. Since the colonies are jumping the formative stages they are not likely to develop liberal traditions spontaneously. If, therefore, the democratic ideas that have been evolved and distilled from the experience of the more advanced countries are not imported and implanted it is highly probable that tribalism will be exchanged for totalitarian central government. Davison seems to assume that this

⁶ R. B. Davison: "Labour Relations in Ghana," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March 1957.

⁷ Davison, *ibid.*
⁸ His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference on the Human Problems of Industrial Communities within the Commonwealth and Empire. Two vols. (Oxford. 338 and 339 pp. 42s.)

will be to the advantage of the colonial peoples, but it is difficult to see why it should be a gain to avoid the miseries that were the lot of the early English mine, mill, and factory workers, only to become proles in a modern totalitarian state. If this fate is to be avoided by colonial peoples there is no other way but for them to adopt the principles which have become generally accepted as making for democracy.

The universality of such concepts as the freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining, and the right to strike, and the way in which they have become embodied in the corpus of international law, has recently been expounded in an outstanding book by the Assistant Director-General of the International Labour Office.⁹ He has shown how gradually there has been built up a system of international standards, based on fundamental principles of human rights, which are enforced by accepted procedures. It is a primary task of the International Labour Organisation to see that these fundamental principles apply to the same degree in underdeveloped territories as they do in the more advanced metropolitan states. Of course there are difficulties; totalitarian methods are much simpler and easier, and the governments of the newly independent territories may be tempted to introduce repressive measures. If they make this mistake they must be subjected to the same kind of international pressures as were brought to bear against their previous imperial rulers. There is no reason why the peoples living in underdeveloped territories should not, in the long run, be equally as successful in the conduct of such social institutions as trade unions, co-operatives, employers' associations and the other voluntary associations which are part of the essential foundations of freedom in the modern industrial state. Whatever the shortcomings of British colonial policy might have been there can be no possible doubt that the governments of both parties have been absolutely right to foster free trade unionism and a pattern of industrial relations based in principle upon ideas pioneered and tested in Britain and the western world.

⁹ C. Wilfred Jenks, *The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom* (Stevens. 592 pp. £4 4s.).

BOOK REVIEWS

THE OPIUM OF THE INTELLECTUALS. By RAYMOND ARON. Translated by TERENCE KILMARTIN. [Secker. 324 pp. 35s.]

THE merits of M. Aron's book are many and great; the defects are few but also great. First let us enumerate its merits. It is a brilliant and original book. M. Aron has more ideas in 100 lines than most political, sociological, or historical writers produce in 100 pages. The ideas are as solid as the earth and as brilliant as the stars. They are concerned with an analysis or clinical examination of the inside of the heads of the intelligentsia, the political beliefs, philosophy, aims and objects of the Left intellectuals, principally in France, but also in Great Britain. In the first part of his book he deals with political myths which have profoundly influenced and still influence European intellectuals in the West. There are three great illusions which haunt their minds and direct their thoughts: the great myth of progress on the Left and reaction on the Right; the historical and political apotheosis of revolution; and finally the apotheosis of the proletariat as the collective saviour. In the second part M. Aron investigates the "idolatry of history," the enormous importance which history and its interpretation, thanks to Marxism, are given in contemporary political thought and the conflict of ideologies. The third part is devoted to a more microscopic survey of the composition, traditions, ideologies of the intelligentsia. Here M. Aron gives us an illuminating analysis of the differences in the psychology and political outlook of British and French intellectuals.

The author is a distinguished French sociologist and professor of sociology. Naturally he is mainly concerned with the position of French intellectuals in the political climate of the France of today. Much of his book is therefore occupied with the terrific influence of Marxism, communism, and the Sinaic voices from Moscow upon the politics and political thought of the Left intellectuals, both communist and anti-communist. Britain, owing to accidents of geography and history, has no experience of this large scale ideological deluge of Marxism and Leninism. But it is extremely interesting for an Englishman to read M. Aron's cautionary tale, his devastating exposition of the effect of Marxist and Russian opium upon the minds of Frenchmen. The kind of thing which Francis Jeanson and even Sartre can believe and write makes the matter-of-fact mind of a simple Englishman boggle.

M. Aron has both great intelligence and voluminous knowledge. His outlook is not merely academic, for he has a profound understanding of the conditions of contemporary politics in Britain and America as well as in his own country. It is, therefore, a little puzzling at first sight that the book leaves one with a slight feeling of disappointment. Why, despite M. Aron's knowledge, brilliance, profusion of ideas, Gallic clarity, does he leave me to some extent fuddled, not quite sure of what he meant the conclusion of the matter and of his book to be? The question, put in that way, suggests, perhaps, the answer and the one important fault in the galaxy of his talents. He has, as was said above, a profusion of ideas about politics and history, about political and communal psychology. The ideas are brilliant, but not just superficially brilliant; they are frequently profound both in explaining social phenomena and in their imaginative overtones. But he too often seems to pursue an idea, because it is true, important, and brilliant, until he has

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himself forgotten its relevance to the framework of his argument and of his book. In the end the reader feels that he has just finished reading a rather difficult book, that he remembers a number of illuminating essays on the proletariat, on Marxism, on the difference between French and British intellectuals, but that he would be hard put to it, if he had to say what is the final conclusion of the book.

LEONARD WOOLF.

WAGE POLICY AND THE HEALTH SERVICE. By H. A. CLEGG and T. E. CHESTER. [Blackwell, Oxford. viii and 142 pp. 18s. 6d.]

ARRANGEMENTS for fixing the wages and salaries of the various categories of employees in the National Health Service are unbelievably complicated. In the first part of this book the authors describe the relevant machinery in detail, showing how it has been fashioned out of the apparatus inherited from pre-Health Service days. Altogether eight distinct Functional Councils, as well as one General Council, have been constituted to look after the pay and conditions of medical ancillary staffs, nurses and midwives, clerical and administrative employees, professional and technical grades, as well as pharmaceutical, dental, optical, and medical staffs. In the Health Service (as also, incidentally, in the universities) direct negotiations between employer and employee are, moreover, further complicated by the fact that a third party—in this case the Minister of Health—has to find the money to pay whatever rates may be agreed, and has therefore to be associated with any decisions reached; while on the staff side the need to provide balanced representation for both professional and manual grades has also been a source of complication, if not indeed of friction. In the upshot, none of these councils is constituted or operated in exactly the same way as any other; and although the authors have done their best with their highly intractable material, the reader has to make a considerable effort if he is to get a clear and correct picture of this formidable structure.

What, however, is not so difficult to grasp is the way in which this machinery has in fact operated. In one respect the NHS can claim to have made history—at least so far as this country is concerned. Hospital authorities are forbidden by statutory instrument to pay more than negotiated rates; so that the practice, common in industry, of paying something over the union rate in the hope of attracting or holding an adequate staff in the face of a shortage of labour is definitely illegal. Apart, however, from this peculiarity, the business of settling wages and salaries in the Health Service has followed what has now become the established tradition both in the public services and in private industry.

That alas! is tantamount to saying that the whole procedure is thoroughly irrational. Any rational system of wage determination must consistently follow certain recognised criteria, such as movements in the cost of living, relativity with specified other occupations (not with different ones on the occasion of each claim) or indices of the adequacy of recruitment in the occupation concerned. Such criteria could equally well be either economic or social, and more than one of them could be operative simultaneously—provided, that is, that some system of priorities was established in cases where they conflicted with one another. What is not rational is to invoke any

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criterion that happens to be convenient on any occasion, abandoning this in favour of something else next time. That, however, alike inside and outside the Health Service, is what is usually done; and the result is that in the course of collective bargaining a vast amount of time and effort is wasted in presenting essentially phoney arguments, which are meaningless in default of acceptance of some common principles by both sides. For example: at one time the management side of one of the NHS functional councils proclaims that it does "not accept the view that the increase in the Index of Retail Prices should be the determining factor" in wage changes. At other times increases offered by management are defended on the ground that they are adequate to meet the rise in the cost of living. In 1953 a movement of 2.2 per cent. in the cost of living was said not to justify any increase; but in 1954 an increase of only 2.8 per cent. in the index was held to justify an advance of 4s. weekly. Equally irrational is the use made of arguments based on shortage of labour, which in various branches of the Health Service, as elsewhere, is often instanced as a reason for increasing rates of pay. Intelligently interpreted and applied, shortage of labour is undoubtedly the one absolutely incontrovertible economic argument for wage increases. Yet the evidence adduced to establish the fact, or the degree of shortage, is nearly always deplorably thin. At best a few figures of the trend of recruitment may be quoted; but no serious effort is made to estimate the scale of what is meant by "adequate" recruitment, or to discover empirically the effect of variations in pay in a given occupation upon the number of applicants offering themselves for employment. As our authors only too truly observe, in "negotiations in which the issue of shortage has been raised information sufficient to support a careful judgment has usually been lacking." "It would," they add, "be cynical to suggest that the rule was to reject considerations of labour supply unless the consequences of accepting them were insignificant, or unless they constituted a live political issue; and to reject them on whatever grounds seemed most convenient. It would be cynical, but it would not be inconsistent with the facts."

These observations apply equally to rates which are negotiated and to those (in the history of the NHS a very high proportion of all wage settlements) which are decided by arbitration in default of agreement. Arbitrators indeed make it easier for themselves to behave irrationally by the practice of not giving reasons for their decisions. It is not, therefore, surprising that our authors are forced to the conclusion that political pressures, though they do not explain all the awards and settlements that have been made in the Health Service, "cover more instances with greater plausibility than any other explanation."

What emerges from this book in fact is a well-documented illustration from a particular field of the contemporary collapse of the economic forces that relate wages to the demand for labour, and of our total failure to substitute any other criterion for wage regulation. Trade union activity in the Health Service, like trade union activity elsewhere, has become merely an exercise in power politics; though the Health Service unions, being of relatively recent growth, are less vulnerable than are many of their prototypes to the charge that they have betrayed the tradition of social justice in which they were nurtured.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

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NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH. By CLIVE PARRY. [Stevens. liv and 1021 pp. £6 6s.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH. Vol. I. THE MONARCHIES. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. [Oxford. xxiv and 496 pp. 50s.]

In the medieval common law the foundation of the relationship between king and subject was the concept of allegiance. But the common law did not succeed in providing an entirely clear definition of the degree of connection between a person and the king or his realm that would import the duty of allegiance. Later, a series of ill-drafted statutes added statutory naturalisation to the existing means of acquiring the status of a subject by virtue of *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*. By 1914 much of the obscurity had been dispersed, and a statutory code governing the modes of acquiring and losing British nationality was in force throughout the empire, with certain permitted local variations relating to naturalisation and the nationality of married women. This system, which was somewhat inaccurately called a common code, has now been destroyed. Between the wars it was subjected to increasing strains as a result of the development of the internal autonomy and international personality of the Dominions. A Dominion found that it needed to distinguish between those British subjects who were closely identified with itself and other British subjects. But it was not until 1946 that the decisive breach came with the passing of the Canadian Citizenship Act.

The Canadian Parliament prescribed rules for acquiring and losing Canadian citizenship. It provided that all Canadian citizens were British subjects, and that persons having the status of a British subject under the laws of other Commonwealth countries were to be British subjects (though not necessarily Canadian citizens) in Canadian law. The time had now come to grasp the nettle; a Commonwealth conference of experts was convened, and it was agreed that each self-governing country should pass citizenship legislation in terms similar to the Canadian pattern. For this purpose the United Kingdom and colonies became a citizenship unit. The British Nationality Act, 1948, passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, does not define the nature of British nationality for the Commonwealth as a whole; its operation is confined to the United Kingdom and colonies. What it does is to define the modes of acquiring what is called citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Every person who is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or is a citizen of another Commonwealth country under its own citizenship laws has, by virtue of that status, the derivative status of a British subject; and every British subject may be known as a Commonwealth citizen. In English law, therefore, the status of British subject derives from a number of individual citizenship laws.

Not all Commonwealth countries have chosen to adopt the same pattern. South Africa, India, and Ceylon do not designate their own citizens as British subjects or Commonwealth citizens; Pakistan and Ghana designate them as Commonwealth citizens, but not as British subjects. The status accorded to non-citizen British subjects varies considerably in individual countries, though in the United Kingdom no differentiation is made between British subjects who are local citizens and those who are not. Difficult problems of plural nationality and citizenship arise. Even in United Kingdom law a number of

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anomalous categories persist. There are not only citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and citizens of other individual Commonwealth countries, but also British subjects without citizenship. There are also British protected persons, who, though not British subjects, are British nationals in international law and are exempt from most of the disabilities attaching to aliens in English law. And there are the citizens of the Republic of Ireland, who, although neither British subjects nor British protected persons, are not aliens and are invested with nearly all the rights and duties of British subjects. Moreover, problems arising in British nationality law are often soluble only by reference to pre-1948 legislation.

In the result, the law relating to nationality and citizenship in the Commonwealth is immensely complicated. It is fortunate that its expositor should be one in whom are combined the qualities of the constitutional lawyer, the international lawyer, the private lawyer, and the legal historian. Mr. Clive Parry must surely know all there is to know about the citizenship laws of the Commonwealth, and he has the ability to render the material fully intelligible by setting it in its historical context and then illuminating the legislative text by ingenious hypothetical illustrations. In writing his treatise his labours have been prodigious; he has cited nearly 700 enactments of some seventy different legislatures (including the Republic of Ireland) and written a detailed commentary on more than forty of them. One who has sought in vain the texts of the nationality laws of Tonga, Qatar, or the Maldive Islands need look no further than Mr. Parry's book. One who is content with a comprehensive general account of nationality in the Commonwealth and in international law may browse in the four introductory chapters, which are distinguished by depth of scholarship and an acute perception. To the practising lawyer this will be an indispensable work of reference, though he will be well advised to make use of the publishers' supplementary service; since the book was published Ghana has enacted its own citizenship law, and the new constitution of the Federation of Malaya has made important changes in the citizenship laws of that country.

Sir Ivor Jennings's book is, in effect, a third edition of Jennings and Young's *Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth*. The main change is the elimination of the republics of India and Pakistan, which are to be dealt with in a separate volume, though the text of the Indian Independence Act is again reproduced. The present volume is styled *The Monarchies*. Eire was responsible for too many anomalies in the constitutional laws of the Commonwealth before 1949 for anyone to be surprised by the fact that this volume retains a chapter on the Republic of Ireland. But even in its new form the volume tries to cover rather too much ground in the space allotted. The introductory chapters on general principles are excellent; it is very useful, also, to have extracts from the leading judicial decisions on the interpretation of the Canadian and South African constitutions brought together with the various constitutional documents; but the chapter on Australia has ceased to be adequate in view of the proliferation of important High Court decisions, and one of the cases referred to by the author as if it were still good law (Vizzard's case) was overruled by the Privy Council in 1955. The next edition will presumably include material on the constitutions of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. The opportunity could then be taken to prune and reshape some of the chapters on the older constitutions.

S. A. DE SMITH.

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SOCIAL POLICIES FOR OLD AGE. By B. E. SHENFIELD. [Routledge & Kegan Paul. London 1957. 256 pp. 25s.]

THIS very welcome and timely addition to the series, the International Library of Sociology and Reconstruction, has for its sub-title—A Review of Social Provision for Old Age in Great Britain. In it Mrs. Shenfield marshals a great deal of the available knowledge about the problems of old age and what is being done about them.

She quite rightly starts by stating the problems in statistical and economic terms. She deals with the balance between producers (the working population) and the dependants (children and non-working old persons) and shows that the ratio of dependants to workers is likely to rise slightly in the next twenty years. This leads her to a consideration of the possibilities of old people remaining longer at work and the practical problems involved in this. Making good use of the available research studies she discusses such questions as to why people retire at such and such an age. All this is an extremely useful corrective to those who appear to think that the only problem of old age is the level of the old age pension. "No device of insurance or taxation can evade the claims of the old upon income currently derived from the labour of others" she says. The first approach, therefore, is to see that old persons continue to make some contribution to current production as long as they can. Mrs. Shenfield doubts, however, whether this contribution can be at all substantial, partly because of growing ill health with greater age and partly because of the practical difficulties of continuing to employ such people.

She then turns to pensions, their level and the method of their finance. In some ways this section, though carefully and sensibly written, is less stimulating than the others—possibly because so much has already been written on pensions and, therefore, it is difficult to say anything fresh and possibly also because Mrs. Shenfield avoids any dramatic proposals. Unfortunately her book was finished before the Labour Party proposals were published. Like many other commentators she feels that the Government's old age pension scheme has ceased to be insurance even though she points out that Beveridge's original proposal for a rising scale of pensions retained much of the insurance principle. At the same time she favours some form of contributory system, as against paying for everything out of general taxes. She does not put any scheme of her own forward but appears to fancy a scheme of contributions and benefits based on earnings rather than the present flat rate scheme. She also discusses the possibility of creating a national superannuation fund to foster the development of industrial pension schemes. Finally she surveys the provision for housing, residential care, welfare and medical care, and has much to say of interest and value on these matters.

In all these aspects she presents a clear and well balanced picture which will be of great value to all concerned with this social problem. She presents the facts, many of them rather grim, without being appalled at them. She does not get sentimental about the old yet she has sympathy for their needs. Altogether this is the best general introduction to the whole field of old age and its problems that I have yet seen.

As one who had the privilege of working closely with Lord Beveridge two things strike me about recent writings on old age pensions and to some extent even about Mrs. Shenfield's book. In the first place Beveridge assumed that

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the role of the state was to provide a subsistence level of benefit for all those in need. He assumed that with full employment and rising national income those of working age would save in various ways to supplement this minimum. Some would be more careful and thrifty than others and these would presumably have more to live on in their old age. He did not see this happening immediately, it was a long-term goal. In the second place he was very much aware of the old age pensioners as a potential, if not an already, highly organised pressure group. Moreover, unlike children, the other great dependent group, old age pensioners have votes. If the level of the state pension is not tied to any clear principle how is it to be fixed? By the higgles of the political platform—one party bidding against another—or how? Having regard to the large sums involved in the addition of a few shillings to each weekly pension and the demands of the Old Age Pensioners Association this is a real issue. A scientifically determined subsistence level of benefit and a close link between contribution and benefit seemed to Beveridge to offer both a fair and a firm basis for a scheme. There were, as he knew, difficulties in both principles but the finance of old age is not an easy matter and there are serious difficulties confronting any particular scheme. I mention this because it is notable how little interest there is in what may be called voluntary provision and how easily it appears to be assumed that Governments could readily, dispassionately, and fairly to all concerned fix the right rate of pension irrespective of the financial basis. It may be so, but it has not yet been proved.

D. N. CHESTER.

THE SAINT SIMONIANS MILL AND CARLYLE. A Preface to Modern Thought. By RICHARD K. P. PANKHURST. [Sidgwick & Jackson. x and 154 pp. 21s.]

MR. PANKHURST's book is about the Saint-Simonite missions to Britain. The first, that of Charles Duveyrier and Gustave d'Eichthal, landed in 1831. The Saint-Simonite apostles opposed militarism, inheritance, private property, and competition. They advocated internationalism, order, security, and equality of opportunity, all of which they believed could be achieved only in a hierarchical society organised by men of genius and love, themselves. Prosper Enfantin, the Supreme Father, a gentle, not very gifted megalomaniac some of whose writings are on the Catholic *Index*, insisted on the emancipation of women no less than of the workers; God, he said, was androgynous. The Saint Simonians "combined a highly rationalistic analysis of society with something approaching religious mania."

France had provided the first priests of the new faith. England, the most industrialised country, was confidently expected to provide the first people of the new order. Before the mission, d'Eichthal corresponded with John Stuart Mill and Thomas Carlyle. Mill, at first sceptical of Saint Simonism, conceded point after point in his letters till he wrote: "I regard you as decidedly *à la tête de la civilisation*." The English, he warned d'Eichthal, would accept no *doctrine générale*, yet he advised him which Englishmen to approach. When the missionaries arrived, he was reluctant to be seen with them in public. Thomas Carlyle was surer in his judgment. He could not stomach, "Dieu est revenu à la France en Saint Simon, et la France annoncera au

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monde le Dieu nouvea," yet could criticise Saint Simonism, as a self-professing religion, for its want of symbolism. Both Mill and Carlyle agreed with the Saint-Simonite critique of existing society, sympathised with its social ends, and were dismayed by its religiosity. The missionaries found in England that the religiosity repelled rationalists and Christians alike. Owenites criticised them for their anti-egalitarianism. In the Universities and the Press they provoked indignation. *The Times* was among those who alleged that they advocated communism, not only of property, but of women.

Despite the distraction of agitation for the Reform Bill, Duveyrier and d'Eichthal had made a little progress among the middle classes and the politically conscious workers, when "Père" Enfantin recalled them to Paris to face "the sword of Caesar." The Government of Louis Philippe had decided to bring the Saint Simonians to trial. Shortly afterwards "Père" Enfantin, with about fifty of his followers, retired to a monastery at Ménémontant. Mill wondered how they reconciled the sharing of menial tasks "with their maxim, à chacun selon sa capacité." At the trial of the Saint Simonians, the most preached-at judge in history finally sentenced Enfantin, Duveyrier, and one other to a year's imprisonment, imposed a few fines, and decreed the dissolution of the Saint Simonite Association. Although some Saint Simonians were soon off to the Bosphorus looking for a *femme libre*, a "female Messiah," in a harem, the movement was as good as finished. In England a second mission, that of Fontana and Prati, aroused sympathy, but no more, in feminists and in the working-class press. Mill virtually denounced them as impostors discrediting what was of value in the original Saint-Simonite doctrines.

The influence of those doctrines on subsequent political thinking has long been recognised. Marx acknowledged himself as one of the many who drew on them. Reading Mr. Pankhurst's scholarly and well-written study, one is more conscious of the correspondence between Saint Simonism and communism in practice: both promote the economic emancipation of the workers and women, and the Stakhanovite is rewarded *selon ses oeuvres*; both are hierarchical and foster the "cult of the personality." The inference is that Saint Simonism failed because it lacked an egalitarian façade, because its apostles preached what they practised, because it was built on ingenuous sand, not on the rock of doublethink. Saint Simonism can be seen as evidence of a reduction in religious belief. So to the stagecoach driver the main effect of industrialisation was a reduction in road traffic. What happened was that non-rational belief increased and diversified like transport; and Saint Simonism, with its religious vestiges and ideological portents, is a crucial chapter in its history.

STANLEY ALDERSON.

THE FRENCH NATION FROM NAPOLEON TO PÉTAİN, 1814-1940. By D. W. BROGAN. [Hamilton. 328 pp. 25s.]

AS FRANCE GOES. By DAVID SCHOENBRUN. [Gollancz. 341 pp. 21s.]

AFTER a very brief lull in the annual spate of books about modern France as "the sick man of Europe," two more have now come out. Each is excellent of its kind. Professor Brogan's is on the same period and pattern as Mr.

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J. P. T. Bury's *France 1814-1940*, and sets out to inter-relate the social, cultural, and economic history of France since Waterloo with its more familiar political and constitutional developments. Mr. Schoenbrun's is of the reflective, sympathetic yet critical "I was there" type of journalistic analysis, already done so well by Mr. Alexander Werth and Dr. Herbert Lüthy. That it stands favourable comparison with both these is high praise for the Paris representative of the Columbia Broadcasting System. There are, it seems, endless opportunities for men of learning and perception to go on writing very good books about modern France; and, if they do not succeed in avoiding repetition, they still contrive to offer yet deeper insight into the fortunes of that entrancing and exasperating nation. The number and quality of books about France, as compared with the number and quality of comparable books about any other European country, suggest that French civilisation has lost none of its old capacity to captivate even its most acute critics.

Any commentator on modern France finds himself being critical, and the better he understands her the more critical is he apt to become, until he is nearly as critical as the French are of themselves. It is inevitable, as both authors agree, that her present problems should be approached historically. France is haunted by her history. She is the land of the living past. She behaves, in Mr. Schoenbrun's phrase, "like the legendary floogie-bird, which flies backward because it is afraid to see where it is going but is fascinated by where it has been." In the half-century covered by the first part of Professor Brogan's brilliant survey, she returned nostalgically to a Restored Monarchy, then a Second Republic, then a Second Empire. The Fourth Republic, set up after a formal repudiation of the Third, perpetuates all its predecessor's instability and *immobilisme* with the added threat of communism. The scarecrow of clericalism still disrupts the left-centre parties, and the movement of General de Gaulle ran headlong into popular fears of Bonapartism and Boulangerism.

It is temptingly easy to amass evidence of all kinds for holding that nothing new ever happens in France, that she lives on and in the past, with an out-of-date economy and an antiquated fiscal system, and that she has a Bourbon-like ability to learn nothing whatever from experience. But as the point of such proof is being reached, it is noticed that France's birth-rate has come to be greater than that of Britain or Germany or Italy; that her average living standards rose 40 per cent. in the decade 1946-1956; that her total national resources doubled between 1949 and 1955; that she holds several industrial world records. The first parliament and governments of the Fourth Republic can be condemned for their *immobilisme* until it is noted, as Mr. Schoenbrun notes, that they made very momentous decisions each year: they ousted the communists from power in 1947, laid the foundations for European economic union in 1948, entered the North Atlantic alliance in 1949, and set up the Coal and Steel Community, on French initiative, in 1950. In her very resilience, economic and political, France is being true to her history. Bismarck, who, not even Mr. A. J. P. Taylor has denied, had a certain realism of judgment, thought in 1871 that the indemnity of £200 million would cripple France. The speed of her economic recovery proved him wrong. The next generation brought some of the finest cultural and scientific achievements in French history: and French creative effort, as Professor Brogan's account

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BOOK REVIEWS

shows, is liable to find vigorous expression in new forms when it is checked in old channels.

So great are the complexities, subtleties, and paradoxes of French history, as of the situation in France today, that events need the most careful explanation and interpretation. It is a pity that Professor Brogan's affection for allusions, combined with his own miraculous erudition, leads him so often to leave the explanation implicit rather than to spell it out in clear for the less learned reader. In so brisk a survey of congested events it is inevitable that a few slips should have crept in. Marshal Ney was not just "abandoned by his troops" (p. 13); Gambetta died a year later than December, 1881 (p. 177); and eighty, not eight, members of the National Assembly voted against its surrender of power to Pétain in July, 1940 (p. 301). Mr. Schoenbrun, who writes as an eye-witness of the events he describes, is at pains to make all his interpretations fully explicit. His historical generalisations are sometimes faulty: it is untrue that "The Paris workers were almost all Socialists in the nineteenth century" (p. 44), and Louis XVI fled to, and not from, Varennes (p. 92). But his descriptions of conditions and events are always vivid and often witty, and usually prompt him to put forward persuasive views about French affairs. His concluding chapters on the disasters of French colonial policy in Indochina and North Africa are especially illuminating, if also among the most critical. As a reporter he covered most of the war in Indochina, and was present at the critical moments in Morocco and Tunisia. His dispiriting experiences lead him to look upon North Africa as a possible graveyard of French policy.

But, he concludes, "the loss of the Empire may be the best thing that ever happened to France." It may divert her energies to a fuller expansion within her own frontiers. It may resolve the predicament of foreign policy that has beset her since 1940—whether to be the smallest of the big powers or the biggest of the small powers. If so, she may find a new resilience, a fresh era of greatness. There is nothing in the record, contained in these two witty books, to preclude such a possibility; and there is much to encourage one to expect it.

DAVID THOMSON.

TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP. By V. L. ALLEN. [Longmans. 336 pp. 30s.]

MR. ALLEN set out to write neither a biography of Arthur Deakin nor a study of trade union leadership as such, but to examine the wider implications of trade union leadership through the life of perhaps the most powerful trade union leader of the post-war decade. Mr. Allen has succeeded in making the examination which he planned, but he has not succeeded in writing a book. *Trade Union Leadership* is neither fish nor fowl; it is a collection of very uneven and often unconnected chapters. Some of the chapters are very good, and one stands out as of special interest. It deals with Deakin's groping attempts to cope with the problems of the wage-price spiral, as a conscientious trade union leader equally aware of the needs and aspirations of his members and of his national responsibilities.

Unfortunately the chapters of real merit are offset by others that are trivial and jejune. In his first book Mr. Allen prefaced his interesting study of

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—STEVENS—

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union constitutions with a discussion of the problems of democracy from the standpoint of the political theorist and was manifestly out of his depth. He has attempted in this book to provide a similar theoretical foundation for his later consideration of Deakin as a union leader. Again, he would have been wiser to have concentrated on a descriptive account of the Transport and General Workers' Union and its leader. The analysis of trade union morality and the ethics of union leadership provided in the opening chapter is, to say the least, rather superficial.

Allen's portrait of Deakin is sympathetic, but honest; the warts are not overlooked. The picture which emerges is that of a person of no great imaginative ability, rather ponderous and cautious in his attitude to problems large or small, but a man of great courage, with a strong sense of duty, immensely loyal to his comrades, his traditions, his union, and his country. Deakin, like his mentor, Ernest Bevin, tended to personalise every issue and herein lay both his strength and weakness. From the angle of administrative efficiency, large-scale unions, like big businesses, require the desiccated, calculating-machine type of leader, but from the human point of view this is not the kind of leader who inspires affection and loyalty. Since Deakin was a warm-hearted, vigorous, down-to-earth sort of person he ought to have been a far more popular leader than he was. His failure in this respect was due to a number of factors, of which perhaps the most important was his personal inability to establish intimate and easy relationships with his colleagues. He was not very good as an administrator and he did not appreciate the nature and significance of the administrative problem in an organisation the size of the Transport and General Workers' Union. As a result of these deficiencies he lost the active support of his junior officials, and, since he was reluctant to delegate responsibility, he became more and more overworked and more and more isolated.

Deakin believed that it was his duty to give a clear lead to the members of the union, but he often gave the impression, in private and on the platform, where he was not the most skilful of performers, that emphasis was more important than argument. His unpopularity was also due to a persistent and unscrupulous campaign of denigration by the communists, who rightly saw in Deakin their principal obstacle to the capture of the Transport and General Workers' Union. If Deakin had temporised they might well have obtained a dominant position in the British trade union movement. In standing up to communists, both in his union and in the wider trade union field, Deakin rendered an immense service to the Labour movement.

Mr. Allen has clearly been at pains to correct the picture of the union left by Goldstein's study published some years ago. He has received, as he acknowledges, considerable assistance from senior officials in the organisation. Inevitably, when writing from so close a position, it is difficult to obtain an ideal focus, and it is perhaps not surprising that the image is often blurred at critical points. The reader is too often left with the feeling that a problem raised has not been pursued as far as he might reasonably have expected.

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THE SOVIET FAR EAST: A SURVEY OF ITS PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY. By ERICH THIEL. Translated by ANNELIE and RALPH M. ROOKWOOD. [Methuen. 388 pp. 35s.]

THIS latest, and very welcome, addition to Methuen's list of geographical texts covers an area on which there are few works in English or in any language. And the work has in fact been drawn from the University of Munich, where Professor Thiel is Professor of Economic Geography: it was first published in 1953 as Volume I of the Publications of the Osteuropa-Institut of Munich. It is based on personal travel through the area, on an intensive study of the literature that does exist (there is a bibliography of two hundred and thirty-one items), and on a most careful examination of reports in Soviet newspapers and journals on current developments in Eastern Asia. The author pays a tribute to Soviet research, while regretting that so few of its results are available to foreign scholars.

In the title *Soviet Far East* Professor Thiel not only includes the Eastern territories whose rivers drain into the Pacific (Dalny Vostok) but Transbaikalia ("the base for the Soviet Russian position in Eastern Asia," p. 17), from which radiate all Russia's eastern lines of communication. These pass through Manchuria as well as north and east of it and the use of Manchurian railways and of South Manchurian ports since 1945 has brought these Chinese territories once again under Russian economic influence. In the Soviet East as in the American West, railways have been the instrument of change, and the pacemakers of progress. In 1955 it was reported that the railway line from Ulan-Bator to Kalgan was completed, further linking the Russians in Manchuria with Peking. Similarly, by the acquisition in 1945 of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles Russia became again a formidable Eastern sea power; and the construction of a dam in 1952 made Sakhalin virtually part of the mainland.

But the stability of the Soviet Russian position in Eastern Asia depends on the development of, as well as communications between, these territories. Though their population has more than doubled in the last thirty years, mainly from Russian immigration, it is still only some six and a half millions for an area of a million and a half square miles—one-eightieth of the Russian population living in one-eighth of its land area. To read Professor Thiel's chapter "The Physical Background" is to realise why: the extremely cold winters, seven to eight months in places, are reinforced by the great reservoir of cold water in the Sea of Okhotsk, "the ice-box of East Siberia"; along the coasts are semi-permanent and dense sea fogs; except near the sea, summer is a time of intense heat and humidity and storms, sometimes cyclonic; and, as if this were not enough, "the stings of the small mosquitoes which are generally called 'Gnus' (meaning vermin) by the Russians, are particularly painful" (p. 118). These things offset Professor Thiel's near-lyrical description of a Transbaikalian winter, with "its impressive quietness, its clean air, and a constantly cloudless blue sky" (p. 72). In the northern areas, summer travel is practically impossible; goods move in the winter, by dog- or reindeer-sledge.

Of the primitive peoples that remain in the Soviet Far East, only the Buryats seem significant, with their own autonomous Soviet Republic, and their own cultural organisations—a culture, the Soviets claim, national in its form but socialist in its content. To the Russians, who moved in as

Rural Local Government in Sweden, Italy and India

By Harold Zink, Arne Wahlstrand, Feliciano Benvenuti and
R. Bhaskaran

This comparative study was initiated by UNESCO under contract with the International Political Science Association. When selecting the reporting team emphasis was placed on finding competent scholars, familiar with the local government of their own countries, and the final comparative report was entrusted to Harold Zink, Professor of Political Science in Ohio State University.

The topics discussed are the scope and current status of rural local government, its historical development, legal status, machinery, activities, finance and intergovernmental relations. In each chapter there is a passage on each country, followed by a conclusion comparing the three.

The reporters have put in a year's hard work, and the unity of the book speaks very well for the co-ordinating influence of Professor Zink.

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colonisers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the wake of the Cossacks, this is a frontier society not unlike the American West of pioneer days—"Pompous buildings mostly of poor taste and dating from the time of the Tsars, stand next to narrow tenement houses in the centres of the larger towns, while in the outskirts rows of one-storey log cabins with four or more windows stretch for miles along unpaved streets flanked by wooden foot-paths" (p. 136). But the most striking impression is of chimneys and factories, and the contrast between the primitive suburb and the modern plant. The fact that this is the Far East is hardly discernible anywhere, even in Vladivostok.

Professor Thiel divides his book into two sections, the first a general description of the area as a whole, its people and resources and communications. The second section consists of eighteen chapters on the individual regions—it is less even in quality, as some of these areas remain inadequately surveyed. What emerges is a very clear picture, and some valuable assessments: of the coal deposits of the Amur and Vladivostok region, the iron-ore of the Bureya Mountains, and a very important analysis of the gold resources of the Soviet Union (pp. 195-199). Production of gold in 1952, Professor Thiel puts at 670,000 lbs. for the country as a whole, with the known reserves in the Kolyma district guaranteeing a regular output of 200,000 lbs. for fifteen to twenty years. Oil appears to exist in the Far East only on the periphery, in Sakhalin and Kamchatka. Gaps in the story remain, as the author realises. One would like to know more of conditions in the Jewish autonomous district, west of Khabarovsk, on both sides of the rivers Bira and Bidzhan—it is twice referred to, but only sketchily (pp. 138, 301). One wishes it had been possible for so cool an observer to learn more of the "shadow population" in the labour camps, whom he believes to be the main labour force on the Baikal-Amur Railway. But in a scholarly and lucid way Professor Thiel gives a valuable account of this marginal land between Russia and China, a contested area for three centuries, now being transformed in economy and society by the coming together of the two dominant pressures. He offers salutary reading in the West not only for geographers but for economists and strategists, whether in armchairs or aeroplanes, for this area is the basis of Russian power in the Far East, and a potential starting-point of political and military action.

ESMOND WRIGHT.

TURKISM AND THE SOVIETS. By CHARLES WARREN HOSTLER. [*Allen and Unwin*. 244 pp. 30s.]

If war teaches us strategic geography, the cold war does (or should) teach us political geography. In the United States, at any rate, Government agencies are determined to know their potential enemies: hence Colonel Hostler's interested pursuit of knowledge. A product of "the U.S. Air Force's far-sighted graduate training program," Colonel Hostler sets out to prove that "in the case of a Third World War—or intensification of the cold war—or in case of internal troubles involving the disintegration of Soviet power, Turkish nationalism will influence the policies of the Turkish Republic and the action of the politically developed Turkish peoples of the Soviet Union." At the end of his remarkably painstaking survey Colonel Hostler comes to the conclusion that "the Turkish regions of the U.S.S.R. will undoubtedly continue to

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develop as problem areas for the Soviets and the rulers of Russia who [will] follow them." Both premise and conclusion are reasonable, if not particularly novel: the value of the book lies not in Colonel Hostler's own views which are, in any case, given very little room, but in the material which he has assembled on the history of Turkish nationalism. The ability of American scholarship to dig out every bit of relevant material up to the date of publication of the finished work compels admiration: the care taken with the spelling of foreign words and proper names is equally admirable (to say that Colonel Hostler is 90 per cent. accurate in this respect is to give him high praise, for he uses sources in a dozen different languages and few scholars could have done a better job). In fact Colonel Hostler would perhaps have done better to use fewer sources and to subject the material he uses to a stricter evaluation. He would also have done better to restrict himself to modern nationalism: guided by the views of Professor Toynbee and of American sages, Colonel Hostler attributes conscious nationalist motives to early Ottoman and Saljuq rulers. It all depends, of course, on one's definition of nationalism, but the fact remains that if the Saljuqs were nationalists, then modern Turkish nationalists are not.

Modern eastern nationalism is of European origin, of 1848 vintage; and the disadvantage of historical treatment is that local vertical influences are given too much weight as against horizontal outside ones. The essentially imitative nature of the political phenomena discussed by Colonel Hostler is made clear by the material which he himself supplies. Ismail Gasprali, the great educator (in a nationalist sense) of the Turkish peoples of the Russian Empire, was influenced by the Slavophiles; Ziya Gökalp, another founding father of Turkish nationalism, received his inspiration from the French sociologist Durkheim; the Young Turks modelled their organisation on that of the Freemasons; the antics of extreme Turkish nationalists during the second world war remained fortunately a comic version of the Nazis' behaviour in Europe. Nor were the intellectuals of the various Turkish peoples left to discover western ideas and models by their own efforts: romantic western scholars, novelists, and politicians showed them the way. As Colonel Hostler says, "in the political awakening of the Ottoman Turks a role was played by Western Turkologists and Turkophiles."

The French historian Leon Cahun informed the Turks in so many words that they were a racial aristocracy. The same romantic notion occurred to the French novelists Pierre Loti and Claude Farrere. Turkish nationalists learnt the past history of their peoples from Russian scholars like Radloff and Barthold. A Hungarian Jew, Vambery, informed them of the state of their Central Asian brethren. Another Jew, Moise Cohen, writing under the pure Turkish pseudonym of Tekin Alp (which could be rendered as Heroic Prince) alarmed the Allies in the first world war by publishing in Germany the book *Türkismus und Pantürkismus*. A French political writer, Colonel Hostler tells us, called him the creator of Pan-Turkism, while the British Admiralty produced an English translation of the book and classified it "Secret." The ideal of Pan-Turkism which threatened the Russian Empire, and, later, the U.S.S.R. with disruption was exploited by Germany in the two world wars and by Poland between the wars, while Kaiser's Germany, Britain, and Mussolini's Italy flirted in turn with Pan-Islamism (there is here a parallel with the British fascination with the idea of the Arab League in more recent years).

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Nationalism, as a factor of national animosities and hence a factor of division among their enemies, helped the Bolsheviks to establish their dominion in Russia. Enver Pasha and other Turkish enemies of Britain and France seemed to them to be useful tools (as Colonel Nasser seems a useful tool to Mr. Khrushchev). It turned out otherwise: summoned to Russia by the Bolsheviks, Enver proceeded to organise an anti-Soviet rebellion in Central Asia. After the creation of the Soviet Union nationalism became dangerous and had to be outlawed. Emigré politicians were then taken over by the Poles, through a Polish-backed Promethean League, for which Colonel Hostler evinces a certain admiration. But Prometheus remained obstinately chained to his mountain and, after the collapse of Poland, most Prometheans offered their services to the Nazis who used them, but promised nothing in return. They are now growing old and are mellowing into liberalism, another example of the formative influence of prevailing western fashions.

Colonel Hostler informs us that with the development of the cold war between the West and the East, Turko-Tatar leaders have regained confidence and he adds that "together with the Anatolian Turks, these representatives of the Eastern Turks may be considered to form a *de facto* regional element united in spirit to the western nations." There is an element of truth in this statement, however amusing it may sound. If independent Turkish states come to be formed within the present borders of the Soviet Union, they will not be led by heroic nomads masquerading as grey wolves and celebrating their victory with draughts of fermented mare's milk. Their government will not be based on a romantically reconstructed Turkish tribal code. The difference will be that capital for their development will be supplied by the industrially developed West and not by Russia, that their youth will be brought up on western textbooks and western literature, that western technicians will teach them how to handle new equipment. This essence of the problem is realised by leading Turkish nationalists, such as Professor Zeki Velidi Togan who admonished the nationalists of Turkestan to take up the study of English and Urdu (as an intermediary language), instead of Russian. During the last hundred years Turkish and other east European and eastern intellectuals have been experimenting with various brands of western ideology, usually after a considerable time-lag: their future ideological development could be defined as a continuation of this process of experimentation and imitation. Colonel Hostler's book should, I think, be treated as a description of the reflections produced by western lights *in partibus infidelium*, or rather of a particular kind of western lights. As the emphasis is on nationalism, little is said of the influence of western liberal and left-wing ideas. This can produce dangerous misconceptions, particularly in the case of the Turkish Republic. Colonel Hostler emphasises the activity of extreme nationalist elements at the expense of the intellectually much more active left-wing liberals. The future may, of course, be with the nationalists and internecine strife in the west, such as the struggle resulting from the attempt to stretch Cyprus on the Procrustean bed of nationalism, weakens civilising influences on which liberalism depends. Only then the victorious partisans of national animosities will not form "a *de facto* regional element united in spirit to the western nations."

ANDREW J. A. MANGO.

SHORTER NOTICES

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1954. By CORAL BELL; edited by F. C. BENHAM. [Oxford University Press. 329 pp. 45s.]
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1954. Selected and edited by DENISE FOLLIOT. [Oxford University Press. 368 pp. 55s.]

THE 1954 volumes in this long, invaluable, and formidable series maintain its standards. There is a section on The West and Germany which is written by the editor using material by Miss Beate Ruhm von Oppen, and Dr. F. C. Jones in Part VII deals with China, Japan, and Korea. Otherwise the Survey has been written by Miss Bell. She has done her work well. Parts I and II are particularly interesting and important, dealing respectively with Indo-China and the Geneva Conference on armaments and disarmament discussions. The most important material in the Documents volume is that connected with the Geneva Conference and the Chinese-Russian agreements of October, 1954. Both volumes are, of course, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

69517
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM. By C. WILFRED JENKS. [Stevens. 592 pp. £4.5s.]

THIS book is published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. The most important developments of international action for protecting trade union freedom stem from the adoption by the ILO of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, which has been ratified by twenty-three states, and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, which has been ratified by twenty-six states. Dr. Jenks gives an extremely careful and clear account of the nature and effects of this international action. He first describes the existing international guarantees and standards, and then the international procedures designed to give effect to the guarantees. In Part III of the volume he examines the manner in which in practice the system has up to the present worked, and in Part IV he tries to assess the importance and significance of the facts reviewed by him in the previous Parts.

WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1956. [United Nations. 271 pp. \$2.]

THIS is the ninth in the series of economic surveys asked for by the General Assembly. The present volume attempts to comply with a resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council that surveys should in future deal with long-term problems of general interest. Accordingly the survey has been divided into two parts. The first is a review of the balance of payments in the post-war period. Part II deals with current economic trends in industrial countries, in primary exporting countries, and in countries with centrally planned economies.

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ப. எண் :

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