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Indian Economic Planning

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I

The first point I wish to make, is obvious, though not always remembered. To draw up an overall state economic plan for economic development, to be prepared to take radical economic policy measures for this purpose, to co-ordinate by that plan all these state economic policies, and to do it in a political setting of full parliamentary democracy—which is what you are trying to do in India, and what peoples and governments are trying to do in other countries of the region as well though as yet with less zeal and success—is an entirely new and unique thing in history. State interventions were never given that role in the now highly developed countries, when they were in their pre-industrial and early industrial stage, and state interventions were never co-ordinated in a unified effort of central state economic planning. And these countries were at that time not democracies, founded on universal suffrage.

The reason why the underdeveloped countries today have to give to the state so much greater responsibilities than the state ever had in our countries—and why there is a rather general agreement among economists here and in the developed countries as well that in underdeveloped countries state economic planning is necessary—is, of course, that the conditions for economic development are very different and much less favourable in the as yet underdeveloped countries than they once were in the now highly developed countries. On this point I will not dwell long this time, but let me just quickly refer to the main differences.

The average levels of income are very much lower in the underdeveloped countries; in India the national income per head is perhaps only a third or a fifth of what it was in the now developed countries when once they start-

ed out, hundred or two hundred years ago. These other countries had available an international capital market where lenders were competing to provide them with capital disposal at a rate of interest often around 3 per cent and sometimes lower. The population growth had not in advance cumulated to such a tremendous pressure on the land, and the population prospects were less dynamic and sinister than they now are here under the influence of the explosive advance of medical science. The mere magnitude of the problem of the underdeveloped countries is also totally different. The now developed countries had small populations; I believe England had only around ten million people in pre-industrial time. The now highly developed countries could rise as small islands in a large ocean of undeveloped peoples, could exploit them as sources of raw materials and markets for cheap industrial goods and could for this purpose even keep them under colonial domination. Now it is, instead, this whole "outside world" which is rising and craving for economic development and a more equal share.

Central state planning we saw first in Russia, and I believe that the Soviet Union should be given its due recognition as originator on a large scale of this idea, in the light of which you are now operating. But here in this region you want to accomplish economic development in a setting of a parliamentary political system built on free elections and universal suffrage.

II

India's First and Second Five-Year Plans are thus a truly pioneering effort, an attempt to do a totally new thing in history. As an economist I have respect for the technical work done by my colleagues and friends in the Indian Planning Commission. The techniques for planning in a democracy?

just readily available for application but have to be experimented out in the usual way of trial and error. The pragmatic approach is the only sensible one. I know that this is their approach and that they are continually trying to improve the planning techniques as they go along. It will be a measure of true success if in ten years' time your first two plans will look rather crude and unaccomplished from the point of view of the very much improved planning techniques which will then be available as a result of experiences gained by the first two and later plans.

I have a great admiration also for the earnest devotion India has given to spelling out the basic human values and principles upon which its planning is founded, the broader social aims the nation wants to reach. I admire also the great educational efforts in India to bring economic planning to the people, to reach the masses and get them to feel that they have a stake and to get them to understand what this stake is. If I might venture to say so in passing, I would wish that again you carried the present discussion about those changes of the Second Five-Year Plan, to which you may feel yourself compelled, outside the committee rooms and the Parliament—to the people in the workshops and factories and in the villages.

When India has come so much further in its economic planning than other underdeveloped countries, I believe this is very much due to the fact that here it has been understood that economic planning must be done directly by the Government, controlled in the regular way by the Parliament. Essentially an economic plan is a political programme. It consists, as a matter of fact, in a co-ordinated system of political decisions. The technical work has no other purpose than to prepare for such political decisions. And no work even on details in the plan can proceed successfully except on the basis of continually taken political decisions. If the Government and the Parliament should attempt to escape this direct responsibility, planning would sink down to an intellectual exercise, useful and, as I believe, essential, but not much different from the high level discourse of nationally

important issues which you should have the right to expect from your free universities and from individual scholars and research institutes.

That in the middle of the Second Five-Year Plan the responsible political authorities in India—in the final instance the Government with its basis of political power in a functioning majority in the Parliament—feel constrained to make certain changes in the Plan, does not, by itself, worry me very much. Rigidity should not be the signum of economic planning. A main general weakness of an underdeveloped country is, in fact, rigidity in its entire structure, and economic planning should not add a new element to the rigidity its economy is suffering from.

Rather one great purpose of central economic planning should be to make it more possible for the Government and Parliament to adjust in a rational way to the changed circumstances, the new experiences won, and, indeed, to new nuances in your own views on how things are and how they ought to be. The purpose of economic planning should not be to put a nation into a self-imposed shackle, but instead to liberate its efforts for progress, and to give the Government a maximum of freedom and flexibility to take advantage of the terrain as it walks on and to avoid stepping into pitfalls.

Indeed, speaking as an economist who has given some thoughts to economic planning since a long time back, let me explain that my ideal of planning is what I would venture to call a "rolling planning". For India I would recommend to make for every year three new plans; *firstly*, one for the next following year, this yearly plan should include the fiscal budget and, equally important, the budget for the utilization during the next following year of the scarce foreign exchange resources; this yearly plan would generally determine state and private economic activity during the next following year; *secondly*, one for the next following shorter period of some few years, let me be conservative and keep to the five-year pattern, adjusted annual through the deviation of the year, which has passed, and the inclusion of an additional year; you

would thus now be working under the 1957 Five-Year Plan and be preparing 1958's Five-Year Plan to be followed during 1959; and *thirdly*, one perspective plan for fifteen, twenty and in some sectors even more years ahead.

The yearly one year plan must be fitted into the same year's new five-year plan, and both must be determined in the light of the vision given by the perspective plan. The system of rolling planning would, of course, not increase very much the real work on planning, as the earlier years' plans would form the basis for every new year's plans. Planning is anyhow a continuous work. As a matter of fact you have already, and by necessity, a rolling planning. My point is only that it would imply a rationalisation in our thinking and acting if this fact was recognised and the planning techniques changed accordingly.

I realize, of course, that you might have the intention to commit yourselves to a measure of rigidity in order to keep you to the chosen track and prevent you from falling back on your determined goals. But the measure of wholesome rigidity should, *firstly*, be present in the yearly five-year and perspective plans, where the Government every year again would have to take responsibility for raising or lowering the sights. Particularly the perspective plan should be focused on the rate of a country's general advance and not to the same extent on specific undertakings. *Secondly*, in order to safeguard that measure of rigidity which a Government deems useful in order better to resist the temptations of relaxing, new constitutional and political arrangements will have to be developed in regard to specific undertakings, by which the Government and Parliament will be making decisions binding—within limits—even on future Governments and Parliaments. This is a big topic, which includes, *inter alia*, the still largely fluid relations between, on the one hand, Government and Parliament and, on the other hand, public corporations and authorities. Generally, I believe that India will have to introduce much more of decentralization in the running of the state's business—including more of automatic fulfilments of political decisions, when they are once taken.

I am eager that this view of mine that economic planning should give a large scope for flexibility from year to year, which I hold on grounds of principles, should not be interpreted as an invitation to complacency and defeatism in regard to the fulfilment of India's Second Five-Year Plan. I am today not undertaking to discuss that plan and the partly unforeseen difficulties it has run into. But let me just say, in order to prevent any misinterpretation, that my firm conviction is that India can ill afford any substantial scaling-down of the general rate of development which was set as the main aim of the plan. The detailed priority system can be discussed; there might be reasons to make interchanges and to delay or omit certain individual items, but I will hope that instead other undertakings will be added or speeded up.

For as a whole the plan is certainly not too big. In the steep uphill fight India has begun, even the fulfilment of the core and considerably more than the core means only a very small step towards the goal. I believe that the rate of development will still be much lower than normally it is in the richer countries of the West or the Soviet countries, so that the gap will continue to be widening; and, we know for certain that in India the employment situation will not be improved, even if the plan is largely fulfilled, but will be a little worse. The small step represented by the Second Five-Year Plan is important in the total dynamic setting of India's economy—including its population increase—mainly as a preparation for much bigger steps in future plans. To make plain and clear these fundamental facts in the Indian situation and thus strengthen the morale of the Government and Parliament and of the people of India is indeed the chief purpose of a perspective plan, and the reason why it is so important that this perspective plan is soon laid on the table.

III

My next point is the observation that India's economic planning—and the planning efforts in all countries of the region—is narrowly nationalistic. This has to be viewed against the background of the fact that initially trade

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and economic relations generally between the countries in this region are on unnaturally and abnormally low levels and—except for the new airlines, which can take people around who can afford it, and some merchandise, which can pay very high transport costs—that even regular transport facilities are grossly underdeveloped between most of the countries in the region.

You will excuse me, if when coming from ten years' work on Europe's economic problems, I cannot abstain from pointing out how in Europe, differently from South and South-east Asia, trade between all European countries, rich and poor, is and always has been very important and transport facilities well developed, and how even the Cold War, which has split the Continent so severely and tragically, was not able more than temporarily to stop what in Europe we call East-West trade. Different from Europe the underdeveloped countries out here have traditionally most of their economic relations and, incidentally, also most of their cultural relations, with one or more of the highly developed countries on the other side of the ocean, but very little of mutually beneficial inter-relations amongst themselves.

Without developing this theme any further I will just mention that the main explanation of this extraordinary situation in this region is generations and centuries of colonial domination, economic underdevelopment and general cultural stagnation.

The national communities which came into being when colonialism disintegrated, inherited this situation and they had naturally as their first task to consolidate the new nation-states. In many of the countries of the region there is still much to accomplish in order to reach this first goal: a well integrated and effectively operating modern nation-state. The economic planning which stood out as an urgent necessity and which has been carried on with varying degrees of success, in the several countries, had to be a narrowly national planning.

In regard to the interrelations between the several countries in the region the exchange difficulties have naturally also tended to

decrease their volume. The exchange difficulties should not be looked upon as a temporary exigency, nor as only the result of mismanagement of trade and financial and monetary policies, even if that has contributed mightily to the exchange difficulties in some countries and in all countries at some time. Essentially they are a normal and natural condition in any underdeveloped country which takes the planning problem seriously and wants to press on with economic development to the limits of all the circumstances in the situation, including its foreign exchange resources. But independently from their causation, the exchange difficulties have naturally contributed to turn the economic policies of these countries in the direction of autarkical self-sufficiency.

The colonial empires had also permitted, and often by their policies, provoked, situations and developments which, when the foreign domination disappeared, left awkward problems, resentments and tensions between the countries in the region. I am thinking of the Indian moneylenders and landlords in Burma, the imported Tamil labourers on the plantations of Ceylon; and I am thinking also of the unconcealed hostility between India and Pakistan in the wake of partition.

Also the political forces operating in the region from outside after the war have continued to follow a course which has had similar effects. The old colonial powers in Western Europe in alliance with the United States of America, on the one side, and the Soviet Union, on the other side, are locked in the deadly struggle of the Cold War, which has become intensified after the emergence of the New China and its rise to national unity and strength as a Communist state, allied to the Soviet Union. In this situation, the influences from world politics has acted upon the countries in this region as if they had been forcibly placed in a powerful magnetic field with the two poles far away in Washington and Moscow.

This has contributed to split the region more seriously than ever. It is true that the Bandung Conference was a mighty demonstration of a will to unity and cooperation. But the

Conference bypassed altogether — and probably had to bypass — the problems of economic cooperation. We have now reached a stage in this development where it is difficult to conceive the possibility even of a new non-economic and purely political conference of the Bandung type.

Keeping all these things in mind, it is not surprising that the efforts to economic planning in the several countries of the region have remained autarkic, and that they do not contain any serious efforts in any of these countries to plan for the over-coming of the abnormal and unnatural commercial isolation, inherited from the colonial era. I am not making this observation as a criticism against the economic planning done or the economic policies followed in this country or the other countries of the region. In the situation, that existed, and with the urgent problems, that had to be met, nothing else than national autarkic planning was practical politics.

Politics is the art of making the best of what is possible, but the secret of great statesmanship is to do something more. While turning what is actually possible to the best results, it will at the same time be bent upon changing the conditions for what in future can be practical politics. With this reminder I will now ask for your attention during a few minutes for a vision of the future.

Though I am quite clear that for the time being nothing else than national autarkic planning is rational, practical and even possible in India and the other countries of this tropical region under the arch of the Himalayas, I am firmly convinced that in twenty and perhaps fifteen or even ten years' time the problem of closer economic cooperation between the countries in the region will stand out as an eminently practical and important problem.

I am then making the assumption that India and the other countries in the region will have a reasonable success in engendering substantial economic development along the lines they have chosen. This is a very important assumption for my reasoning, which might not come true. And I would want in passing to make

the further observation, that in spite of the abnormally low level of commercial relations between these countries, the political interdependence between them as a matter of fact, is so close, that it is difficult to believe that anyone of these countries, say even India, would succeed to develop economically while the neighbouring states would go to the dogs.

I will now rapidly enumerate the reasons why in this future situation, I expect, under the assumption made, the problem of regional economic cooperation to rise to ever greater importance.

To begin with, for reasons I have already hinted at, the levels of transport facilities and inter-regional trade are abnormally low. This implies that to raise these levels would be to the mutual advantage of these countries. The common idea, which is a spiritual heritage from the colonial era, that these countries are not complementary in their economic structures, is exaggerated. Naturally, all these countries need to buy capital equipment and many other things from the richer countries and to preserve, as far as they can, the markets in those countries for their traditional exports, mainly primary products. I am not arguing for less of economic relations with the developed countries, quite on the contrary, but for more interrelations between the underdeveloped countries in the region, in addition to these established relations with the richer countries.

Even at present, I believe that more intra-regional trade in many products would be advantageous. I believe, for instance, that already today it would be advantageous for the countries in the region to consider their food and agriculture problems together, and indeed, work out a food plan for the region as a whole. Most countries here are deficit countries, but some are surplus countries, and they might be willing and able to increase their agricultural production and exports very considerably, if they had assured a more regular and stable market.

But, and this is my second point, the advantage of closer economic cooperation will stand out as so much greater, when these countries advance — as I have assumed they

will — in their economic development. They are all bent on industrialization. To build up a complete structure of industry in each country is, however, not very possible and is anyhow not very economical. And it becomes less possible and profitable with every day, as the modern technology is giving, on the whole, more and more advantage to large size of an industrial establishment.

These countries can all proceed much faster in their industrial development if they establish, through trade, a division of labour and a certain specialization amongst themselves. This holds particularly true, of course, of the smaller countries in the region, like Ceylon. But it is also true, though to a lesser extent, for a country as big as India. I have found here in India a certain optimistic exaggeration of India's possibility to have a rapid industrial development in all fields and a belief that the vast size of the population in this country can be relied upon as offering industry a huge almost inexhaustible self-contained market. But the size of the market is depending upon, not only the number of people, but also their average income and purchasing power. And from a cold economic point of view India, in spite of its huge population, is still—and will for many five-year plans ahead remain — a rather small country economically, with a market size comparable to that of one of the smaller countries in the Northwestern European region, of whom none would think of the possibility to expand further on a basis of self-sufficiency in industry.

My point is simply, that the industrialization of the countries in this region, including India, can reach higher much more rapidly, if a certain specialization can be agreed upon, by means of a common, protected market. Underdeveloped countries have a number of rational reasons for protecting their infant industries, which developed countries don't have. I have expounded these reasons and pleaded for the rationality of a "double standard morality" in the world as far as commercial policy is concerned. What I am here suggesting is that it would be in the mutual interest of the countries of this region, if they could arrange their industrial protection

as a regional protection and not simply as a national one. These countries have much more valid economic reasons for a "common market" than the richer countries in Western Europe, who, according to my opinion, could have afforded, to carry out such internal and external economic policies that they now would be in the position to open their boundaries towards the whole world for capital and commodity flows, instead of closing up among themselves in a union that fundamentally is nothing more than a "rich man's club".

I believe in ten, fifteen or twenty years' time the idea of a common market in the underdeveloped countries of this region will impose itself into practical politics for still another reason, namely, the increasing difficulties I foresee for these countries to keep up the flow of their exports to the richer countries. The traditional exports from this region of many primary products, like tea, rubber, jute, cotton, etc., have not expanded in pace with world trade, and they face a bleak future. On this point I would recommend for serious study two chapters on inter-regional trade in the *Economic Survey of Europe 1957*, which is just out and where forecasts for 1975 of the international demand for various products have been carried out. These forecasts show great possibilities for the exports of oil and some other mineral products, of which the resources in this region are not rich, while for the traditional export products the trend is not rising in pace with world economic development.

Very rightly, all the underdeveloped countries in the region are now bent upon rapid industrialization as their main long-term chance of economic development. The first problem in India is very definitely to raise agricultural yields, because a very much larger supply of food is a condition for any economic expansion; lack of food is continuously India's main bottleneck. But this does not countersay the proposition that a substantially higher level of income per head in India can only be reached on the basis of a very much expanded volume of industrial production, which it will take many five-year plans to accomplish. On these higher levels of income and industrial production India will continuously need much

greater imports, however much India succeeds to produce at home. India's traditional exports will, as I noted, probably not rise very much. Consequently, India must then be a large exporter of manufactured industrial goods. *Mutatis mutandum*, the same holds true for all or most of the countries in the region.

This large-scale industrial export offensive on a broad front, when it comes—and it must come, if we keep to the assumption that these countries will have a reasonable success in their economic development—will then meet, I am afraid, a most determined resistance in the richer countries, in comparison with which the discrimination in trade which has met, and is meeting, Japan is a mere child play. The wages in these countries will continually be relatively low, and their exports will be looked upon as dumping.

I am not pleading for this development — I consider it irrational and damaging to world progress. In practically every year's Economic Survey of Europe the Secretariat of ECE has given the rational reasons why the richer countries in Europe should not protect their labour intensive industries, both because they have better use for their labour — in these countries labour is the long-term bottleneck for their efforts to further expansion—but also in order to give the underdeveloped countries, which are now attempting to rise, some reasonable export outlets. But this has been a sermon in the wilderness. I have yet to meet a responsible politician or official in any one of the richer countries, who would take this argument to heart.

Neither in Australia, where I have recently been, or in New Zealand, in Canada, the United States or in Western Europe will large-scale industrial exports from the underdeveloped countries be welcomed. The present trend towards regional compartmentalization, of which the strivings for a common market and a free trade area in Western Europe are an example, will strengthen the resistance against these countries as intruders in the established markets for industrial goods.

There is a possibility which I will not exclude, that the countries in the Soviet sphere, which

have centrally directed economic systems and can direct their trade more or less at will, would be willing in this situation to enter upon large-scale trade agreement with the underdeveloped countries in this region, by which they would preserve for them certain fields of industrial exports. This is a possibility. Whether it is very likely, I do not know and probably neither do you today. If, however, the countries in this region should not become entirely depending on the centrally administered trade monopolies of the Soviet countries, this outlet for industrial exports could hardly be exploited to a larger extent than to mitigate somewhat their general export difficulties.

In this situation, which I consider highly probable, the very fact of these countries' success in economic development and industrialization will greatly increase the value they can have to each other by offering each other export markets. This implies and assumes, as all trade does, division of labour and industrial specialization. The drive for a common market behind a common wall of protection will then not be only a vision, as when I am now talking to you, but practical politics, indeed a practical necessity.

For the moment, for all the reasons I hinted at, regional economic cooperation is not practical politics. It belongs simply to the facts of life that a very considerable part of Pakistan's economic planning, and a not inconsiderable part of India's, have to be directed to the problem of how to get along in spite of the partition of the sub-Continent. Little Ceylon has to plan under the severely restricting condition of its smallness; compared with its bigger neighbours to the north it has at least the advantage of not seeing such a large part of its resources for development squandered in military machines and munitions.

But as all these countries in the region are now rising to independent nationhood and orienting themselves to reaching for a fuller and richer life, there should be individuals and groups in these countries who took upon themselves the responsibility to think further ahead than the present daily worries, people who have the agility of mind and the courage of heart to

cultivate visions. And even if these things, of which I have spoken, are not very practical for the moment, still your practical plans and actions from day to day can without great sacrifice be oriented so, as to make the vision somewhat easier to realize, when its time comes.

IV

If I am given a little more time, I would still skip altogether the important problem of the overriding priority that in my view should be given to agriculture in India's planning, the problem also of the relative priorities to different industries, the problem of the financial frame and of savings and taxation, capital inflow from abroad and foreign aid, etc., and would concentrate my thoughts on the first paramount imperative in India's situation, if it wants to advance substantially and rapidly. That paramount imperative, is to my mind, the urgent importance to raise labour productivity.

There is a danger that in our endeavours to procure the machines and the tools, and to build the factories and the dams and to find the money to finance it all, we become too materialistic and forget the human factor, the people, whose bodies and minds must be the chief depository of a developing nation's savings and investments.

It is far from my intention to make propaganda for Communism, but on this point simple honesty compels me to stress that the Soviet Union never made this mistake. In the time of the harsh, cruel and criminal dictatorship of Stalin, and in spite of the exigencies of the long civil war and the Second World War, and in spite also of an outmoded materialistic theory of capital formation, which Marxism has inherited from the classical economists and which defines capital as only material goods, and while they were pressing up capital formation in that narrow materialistic sense to extraordinarily high levels, the Russians, at the same time, also continually, made huge investments in the human beings, what Marshall called "personal" capital. The result is that the Soviet Union now stands with levels of education and health equal to and in some respects superior to, what is standard in the richer Western countries.

I recommend for study a little article on the Soviet Central Asian Republics in ECE Economic Bulletin for Europe, the last issue of 1957—which is the result of a sort of additional preparation by myself and my two collaborators before we began our study of this region. These four republics are a purely Asian region with a Moslem population; what has been done there in regard to the human material should have particular interest for those who are concerned with development problems here. The serious question raised is whether a parliamentary democracy, which has imbibed the glorious traditions of Western and Asian humanism, should be less willing and capable to lift the masses out of illiteracy and ill-health to a richer and fuller life and to higher productivity, than a totalitarian regime.

But let me start with a comparison with another corner of the world which is geographically further away from India than Soviet Central Asia, but in some respects spiritually nearer. When my home country, Sweden, which in numbers has only 2 per cent of the population in India, has a national income about half as large as India's, and on that basis is able to save considerably more than is saved and invested in India, i.e. if the individual Swede earns some twenty to twenty-five times and can save fifty times more than his Indian fellow human being, this is primarily due to the fact that, on the average, he works more hours a year, works harder, when he works, and works more efficiently. He produces more because he is more fully employed and because labour productivity is much higher.

Differences in natural resources mean of course a great deal. But don't let us exaggerate that factor. Denmark, which before the war had Europe's highest level of living and stands comparatively very high even now, is primarily an industrial country, though it has no industrial resources whatsoever, no coal, no hydraulic power, no minerals, no forests, indeed nothing, except sites to place the industrial plants on—and its people. Switzerland is another highly industrialized country, though it is almost void of industrial resources, except water power. Denmark has also a highly

developed agriculture. As a matter of fact, it is an industrialized agriculture, as to a large extent it uses imported fodder to produce its bacon and butter, and it has had to buy it on the open world market without having the special advantages of a colonial empire. This production provides two-thirds of that country's exports, which have a very much higher share of the country's national income, around one-third, and does it with a labour force corresponding to only one-fifth of the population.

The Swede, the Dane and the Swiss have at their disposal on the average very much more of capital equipment. But don't let us exaggerate that factor either. After Wicksell, economists have come to look upon capital and capital equipment more as something which becomes created in the process of successful economic development, rather than being its pre-condition.

Let me remind you of the situation in Germany after its total defeat in the war. Germany's material capital apparatus for production, and its houses and everything else, were very thoroughly destroyed. Levels of living were pressed down to rock-bottom; people were huddled in ruins and actually starving and freezing. I saw it with my own eyes, and I was in ECE directing research on these conditions. If the Germans, after some time of demoralisation and total frustration, within a span of a few years succeeded again to come on the top of the world, this was not primarily due to what of scraps of an old industrial capital apparatus they had left in the wake of the war—many economists have made the observation that Germany succeeded to gain a particular advantage by having to build up its capital equipment anew, and then could make it more modern. The German "miracle" was mainly due to the will, the skills, the drive and the workmanship of the German people.

Or take the Soviet Union. The industrial apparatus after the war, as we learn now, was much more destroyed than even the experts knew ten years ago. It was a half-starving people with a thoroughly destroyed country who had to begin anew. And they did get

through and started out on a more definite and more rapidly accelerating economic development than ever. The main explanation is again that in the human beings there were invested will and skills, and that they were set to work long hours and work hard.


The main differences between an underdeveloped country and a developed one is in the human factor and I want to stress that I am saying this as an economist and not only as a humanitarian. In a developed country people work more, work harder, and work more efficiently. In an underdeveloped country there is permanent unemployment and underemployment, and I believe the people in India work perhaps not much more than half the number of hours a year compared with what people do in a developed country — and what the Indian people must come to do if this country shall become developed. And when they work their efficiency is low. This is true even of the professors, the students, the officials and engineers and, I would assume, the politicians also, except a few who fortunately and naturally tend to rise to the top. It is of course still more true of the large masses of labourers and peasants whose low levels of living, malnutrition and ill-health often prevents them from working at all, or working the whole time, and when they are working, prevents them from working so hard and so efficiently.

One adverse factor, is, naturally, the climate. All modern industrial civilizations are in the temperate zones, including the Soviet Union, Japan and also a large part of China as it now strides along. The larger part of the peoples of underdeveloped countries live in the tropical or the arid sub-tropical zones. But if we don't want to give up, we are not allowed to give too much weight to the weather. We have rather to direct intensive research on the practical problem: by what means we will be able to make sustained, hard and efficient work possible also in the tropics.

V

The two main development problems in India are therefore:

- (1) how to get the population into fuller employment and to liquidate not only



unemployment but the much more serious underemployment.

(2) how to raise labour efficiency.

The task is simply to increase the number of effective work hours per year for the entire population in the working age, the labour force, and at the same time to increase the efficiency of work, so that more is produced per work hour. In the final instance, India's economic planning will succeed or fail depending in this human factor: whether India can get its population to work more and better, and to produce more.

There is no lack of work to be done: industrial plants to be constructed and equipped, lands to be made to yield more than they do, houses to be built and repaired, latrines, drains and sanitary wells to be dug, trees to be planted, books to be printed and books to be read, floors and streets to be swept and cleaned, children to be washed and educated, sick and old people to be cared for, etc., etc. All this work, of whatever type, flows into, and raises, the national income, increases savings and investments, lifts levels of living, on the basis of which still more intensive work can then be done. The result is economic development.

Some of this work requires capital equipment, which, however, in the end itself consists of labour, pent-up labour. Some of it can be done by the use of nothing more than our brains and our bare hands. Prime Minister Nehru has recently very rightly reminded us that a speeding up of popular education in the villages doesn't even require school buildings, as the teacher can assemble the children in the shade of a tree and give vacation when the monsoon comes. The requirement is will and ambition, or, if you look one step behind and ask how to mobilize will and ambition, what we call enterprise and organisation. The requirement is also improved nutrition and health, which can give strength to work, and education that can lift the ambition of people living in apathy; apathy is, indeed, the cultural impact of long ages of backwardness. But these requirements, too, represent themselves, in the final instances, more work and better workmanship.

VI

We are here facing the crux in planning for economic development. I will in this connection only point to one very important element of cumulative causation. I am in my studies becoming increasingly impressed by the fact that the low labour efficiency in an underdeveloped country, when labour is working, is largely an effect of the fact that people are not working or working only fewer hours than would be desirable.

Unemployment and underemployment signify a lack of scarcity of labour which is deeply demoralising. It creates a mental climate in society where labour is wasted by the employers. Around every piece of work to be done, there are too many workers hanging around. If I want a lamp fixed in my house, there comes a man who does the work, one who holds the tools, one who carries the ladder and, perhaps, a few more who are just standing by. You are, of course, well aware of the fact that a regular situation in some of the most modern factories in India is that a machine which in Sweden or Germany, the Soviet Union or the United States is serviced by one man or woman, here will need two, three, four or even five men. In spite of low wages the actual labour costs to the industry then often comes up towards, or above, the levels in the richer countries with their higher wages but also higher labour efficiency. Your industry is then not competitive and will lack the strength for expansion.

In this social and psychological climate of lack of scarcity of labour the workers are in the same way often brought to show resistance to rationalization because it is labour-saving. In India as in other underdeveloped countries labour legislation and the administration through labour courts and officials of the labour laws are often raising hindrances for technological changes in the interest of higher labour efficiency, much more than they do in our highly developed countries. In the existing situation of surplus labour, they may even see good reasons for doing it, but this is only part of the vicious circle by the operation of which lack of scarcity of labour causes low levels of efficiency of labour.

There is, of course, only one solution to this: people must be set to work. Labour must become scarce and expensive. Only then can we permanently and over the whole field increase labour efficiency. Only then will the employer be made to avoid wasting labour—in the present situation to employ more labour than is needed seems sometimes a socially good behaviour. Only when labour has become scarce and expensive, will the worker wholeheartedly welcome rationalization as a means by which his labour can become still more scarce and expensive.

I think we should not conceal to ourselves that reaching such a situation will imply the sacrifice by the well-to-do classes in an underdeveloped country of certain amenities and conveniences which they are now enjoying. The society we have to strive for is a society where we are not surrounded by unemployment and cheap labour: where we have to carry our own bags; where regularly ministers and professors and their wives and children, according to an increasingly democratic cooperation within a family, will have to sweep their own floor, prepare their own food, take care of their own babies; where perhaps every family has one or two automobiles, but nobody can have a chauffeur; and where the few servants there are, are professionals with salaries not very different from the salaries of a professor or a minister.

Some of the richest countries—rich because labour is expensive and labour efficiency high—have got near this ideal. All the underdeveloped countries are, of course, far from this situation and will reach it only after a long development. My point here is only that this must be the direction of their development efforts. Labour must be made scarce and expensive. Only then will labour productivity rise. Only then will rapid economic development ensue as an almost automatic process.

Indeed, not before labour has become an expensive commodity can we reach far with our social reforms. I am not criticising the important constitutional, legal, financial and administrative steps that Indian Parliament has taken to blot out that shameful phase of the stale caste system in India which is present in

the inferior social and economic status of the casteless, but true equality for the Harijans. India will realize this when unemployment and underemployment have been liquidated, and when human labour has become expensive.

Prime Minister Nehru has a few days ago had occasion to stress again, what he has stressed often before, namely, that the status of women is one of the most important indicators of the advance of a country. I would like to add that the full equality of women in India—not only in the upper classes, where they largely enjoy it, but in villages and among the masses—will only be reached when what woman can produce with their brains and hands has a greater economic value in India's economy.

Scarcity of labour has in this way important relations with moral values, and cheap labour means unfortunately that human beings and their welfare become cheap also. There is one general ideal which I would have liked to see stressed more in the excellent preamble to India's Five-Year Plan, namely respect and esteem for manual labour. As we all know such a valuation of manual labour would have the support of the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, whom you are so exceedingly fortunate to be able to name the Father of the Nation. But it is certainly not enough to express a general moral principle. It is not even enough to legislate that principle. Respect in Indian society for manual labour will come when labour is not available in such almost scandalous surplus, when it is scarce and expensive. And then India will be far on the way to economic development.

VII

The practical problem for the planner is then: how can more employment be created? How can the demand for labour be raised so much and so rapidly as to make labour scarce and expensive?

I have no panaceas to offer but will simply have to refer to all that India is actually trying to accomplish in its economic planning, possibly with some slight differences in emphasis.

We are all agreed that the long-term solution is industrialisation. But we also know that industrialization does not create a great volume of new employment in the short run. More particularly, the effect of industrialization to raise employment is not large and may for a time even be negative, insofar as industry comes to substitute for crafts and insofar as industrial production is becoming rationalized, which India must try to accomplish if it wants its industry to be fully competitive and have the strength for expansion. Again I will refer to the little study of the economic development in Soviet Central Asia in last year's Economic Bulletin for Europe, where it is shown that even an exceedingly rapid industrial development, which has already been going on for decades, has as yet hardly begun to absorb the population increase in the rural sector of society.

While India is expanding its industry as rapidly as possible it will therefore, at the same time, have to try to increase work in all sectors outside industry. I pointed to the great amount of work which needs to be done everywhere in the country on roads and irrigation systems, building and repairing houses, in reforestation, improving facilities for health and education and, naturally, of raising yields in agriculture. Much of this work lies right before everybody's nose. Much of it will have a direct effect of improving the quality of the labour force and raising labour efficiency. All that is done in the field of community development, agricultural extension service, co-operation, basic education and health reform has, from this point of view, this important extra motivation that it puts people to work and thus raises the scarcity of labour. It creates in people's mind the realization, that one should work, that one should do something with the passing hours to improve life for oneself and those who are dear to one.

I for my part would not hesitate to consider also taking out the youth of the country—all the young men and women—for one or two years' public service. I would use the time I had then under the national colours for improving their education; it would in India be an education already to live together under

a common discipline. To administer such camps I would look for aid to your excellent army and the soldiers who are set free after their release from the army.

And I would not permit the continuation of a situation of half a million educated unemployed assembling in the city's slums—a serious demonstration of misdirected higher education in a country which has not too much but very much too little education—but put them to work as teachers in the camps for public service and send them to the villages to intensify the much needed literacy drive among the peasants. After retraining and rehabilitation some of them should go to industry, where there is a serious lack of literate workers.

This is certainly things which a Communist regime would do in India. To explain why a Swede, who is not a Communist, can look with favour on taking certain disciplinary measures for putting the educated youth to work and to organizing for the whole younger generation on the basis of national duty, regular mass camps to carry out reforestation, road-buildings, and other useful things, I might be permitted to point out that we on the continent of Europe have, not as India, the dominions and the U.S. inherited the British tradition of a standing and professional army, and we have not the British resentment against compulsory military service.

Since Napoleon's time we have not built up our military defence on a professional army but a citizen's army, and for us that has been a democratic cause. Every Swedish young man has about a year's military service when he reaches the age of 20—and this explains incidentally, why our army is equally large as your army, though we are so very much fewer. Now I am not suggesting that India should suddenly scrap its professional army for a citizen's army. I am only questioning if, as part of the efforts to set the people to work and to educate the youth to work and discipline and so, at the same time, to raise the levels of education and living, India could not utilize the capital asset of her professional army and of those who have been trained in it to direct the youth of the country for a year's or two years' national rehabilitation work. In India's

climate there is no need for elaborate buildings and establishments for such a purpose. There will be need for some more textiles, of which India has always a potential surplus, and above all, extra food. More food, however India needs for every expansion of employment, production and investment and it is in this sense that increase of agricultural production is basic to economic development of the country.

The chief bottleneck is, of course, bringing about a united national will to development. If the Communist countries can proceed more courageously and rapidly in expanding work and increasing the scarcity of labour, we are deceiving ourselves and at the same time saying something very sad about our own future, if we believe that their higher discipline is merely the results of police state. In the Stalin era there was certainly much of ugly forced labour and the talk of "slave camps" had a background of sinister reality. When forced labour is now disappearing rapidly in the Soviet Union, this can be relied upon to be a permanent change, as slave labour does not fit into, and is not economical in, an educated society where labour is becoming scarce and efficient. Even in that harsh era, however, economic development was not only spurred by compulsion. And the young komsomol boys and girls from the big cities, whom last year I found working on the irrigation projects on the Hungry Steps in Uzbekistan might have been under some social compulsion to go there; but the more important drive was their enthusiasm and their devotion to the national needs.

The real challenge to the independent new democracies in this region, raised by Communism, is not a military threat and not what is called subversion, but is this most serious question which has, as yet, not been satisfactorily answered: *whether in a country on very low levels of living the forces of democracy will succeed to invest in the people that minimum of concerted determination to advance and that minimum of national discipline, which are necessary for economic development under the hard conditions of mass poverty, while preserving political freedom and full civil liberties.*

VIII

It would be dishonest to minimize the tremendous difficulties in the way of India's development efforts to increase the demand for labour through industrialization, community development, co-operation and all other things, which India is doing and might come to do for the purpose. Under such circumstances we cannot afford to fail to look also on the problem what India can do to decrease the supply, or rather, *decrease the constant increase of supply* of labour which ensues as a consequence of the rapid and accelerating increase of the population. This is the other side of the basic human problem I am discussing.

There are certain fundamental facts in the population situation of India which cannot be repeated too often.

The population increase is now in India commonly underestimated. The rate of increase is rising. It will probably rise still further, if India has any success in its health reforms and its attempts to raise the level of living.

The rapid and accelerating population increase swallows up by far the larger part of all India's too small savings and capital formation in purely "demographic investments", which do not contribute to raising the living levels of the masses and advancing the economy.

As long as industrialization cannot absorb any substantial part of the population increase in rural areas—and this is a situation that will remain for a long time to come—the population increase is an eroding force in every village: increasing the pressure on land, causing further fragmentation of the farms, increasing the proportion of the landless, and fortifying the inegalitarian social and economic structure of the village.

The population mechanism, as those who have been working on statistical materials know, is a heavygoing and not easily adjustable machine. Even if India from today should have a much lower birth-rate, the population would continue to increase for decades ahead. The population in the working age—those who have to be provided jobs—fifteen, twenty years

ahead are already born. In all now foreseeable circumstances India will have more than 600 million people some time before the end of the century. And most of these people will continue to be living in the villages. This, however, only stresses the urgency of spreading birth control as rapidly as possible, because otherwise it is difficult to see any real hope for India in the longer future.

This is a most serious situation. And we cannot expect that birth control will come by itself, as it once did in the Western countries. When it came in these countries, it was at a much higher level of living than India has or will have in any near future—and it will never have it, if it has not first got birth control and stopped the population increase.

Nevertheless, I am not a defeatist. History regularly does not repeat itself. In India's situation there are two fundamental differences. They are to India's great advantage, if they are utilized.

First, birth control in the Western countries had to spread as a sort of "private enterprise" against the powerful forces of organized society: the law, the church, the medical profession, the press and the educational structure. This was true even in the Protestant countries; in Sweden we had a law intended to keep down the sale of contraceptives until in the middle of the 30's, when it was a great thing that we finally succeeded to take that law away from the statute book as a result of the great population debate which then began. It is a very different situation when, as here in India, birth control is condoned by organized society: has the backing of Government and Parliament and all enlightened citizens and thus can be promoted as a social reform.

The second thing to which I should like to point and which can potentially mean a tremendous difference to India's advantage, is that in our countries birth control was not, and is largely still not, carried out by technical contraceptives. If modern technology were now set to work in the underdeveloped countries this could imply a tremendous difference to their advantage. We who are interested in

this problem, are waiting for the inexpensive, innocuous pill or injection which will make a man or woman sterile for a month or, if possible, longer. If we had it, and if we used it, the things which are so urgently needed could happen fairly rapidly. And already now we have at our disposal inexpensive contraceptive techniques of high reliability.

I am well aware of the enlightened public opinion which has been created in India, and the measures which have been taken. I am nevertheless of the opinion that India is not moving with the speed and determination that the very dangerous population situation would motivate. Still too many people in India cling to the illusion that birth control will come by itself as in Europe as a result of industrialization and education, and the equally mistaken idea that India can afford to wait.

I have noted that Prime Minister Nehru when he wants to spur an audience to see the realities and the need for more radical action, has taken to the habit of pointing out that we now live in the Sputnik age and should adjust our policies to the much greater urgencies and also the much greater technical possibilities of this new age. India has rational reasons, not only to watch for the technological development abroad, but to start medical research of its own to find the ideal inexpensive contraceptive which will do the trick. And India has reason to spend much more efforts on raising a nation-wide campaign, reaching out in all villages, attempting to spread to the impoverished masses the idea of birth control and give them the rational motivation for birth control.

To this I will only add that though our anxiety in the West twenty-five years ago was in one sense the absolutely opposite—namely a pending population decrease—our fundamental approach to birth control can be identical. In Sweden the question was raised in the middle of the '30's; it was hotly discussed as an important issue should be in a democracy; a population commission was set to work; somewhat later population commissions were set up in Denmark and in Britain also. The conclu-

sions that came out of public discussion and political deliberations were certain principles which are equally valid here:

- (1) that children should be born when they are desired after rational considerations on the part of the married couple, and that birth control should be spread to make such "voluntary parenthood" possible;
- (2) that society should so arrange by reforms the economic and social conditions for the family that ordinarily people would come to want to have the number of children which would secure the survival of the nation, and
- (3) that more important than quantity is the *quality* of the children born as determined by the economy of the individual family and the social investments made by organized society in the education, health and general welfare of the children and of the families.

IX

India has decided that its goal is a "socialistic pattern of society".

I have met friends from the United States of America—another great country which through study I have come to know and love very much—and also Indian friends who are honestly afraid that India is taking a too radical course. This opinion might be represented even in India's Parliament. I may therefore, perhaps, be permitted to end my discourse by expressing my opinion as an outside student, who is deeply and warmly interested in India's destiny, that the danger is not, as I see it, that you are going too rapidly but is, on the contrary, that you will be tempted to try to advance too slowly.

India is still very far away from a socialistic pattern of society—much further away than the countries in the West who do not pretend to be socialistic.

Your public sector is relatively smaller than it is and—except for Britain, where the nationalisations are more recent—has ever been in the richer countries in Northwestern Europe

who are usually not looking upon themselves as very socialistic.

More important is perhaps the question of public controls. While the British left you with a plethora of bureaucratic regulations of all sorts of petty matters, which was their way of ruling a colonial people, and while you yourself in the short era of independence have, in the main, not only preserved but in many fields increased these bureaucratic regulations, the big overall controls of industry, trade and agriculture are very much less developed, less comprehensive and effective, than they are in those countries. The trade in agricultural produce is for instance regulated by co-operatives and by the state not only in Sweden but equally in conservative Switzerland and in the United States of America. Let me continue illustrating my thesis by pointing out that if we in those countries have not nationalised our banks and our insurance enterprises, the chief reason is that the private firms carrying on these businesses are so closely controlled by the state that it would not make much difference. Both insurance and important segments of banking have also in our countries come under co-operative management, at least to the extent that there is created an effective competition with the privately run businesses.

If as a third criterion for the socialistic society I take equality of opportunity, it is of course, plain that India, with its very wide income spans, its existing gulfs of social distance between people in different strata, and its rigidity of class and caste, is much more inegalitarian than all the richer countries including the United States of America, or than many of these countries have ever been. I am saying this not to criticise the policies of India, but, on the contrary, to explain both why I so wholeheartedly can feel myself in agreement with the goals you have set up for yourself, and why my fear is not that you are proceeding too rapidly on uncharted roads, but rather that you might not go fast enough in this era, the Sputnik era, when historic forces move very much quicker than in those times when the welfare state was gradually developing in the now rich, progressive and highly developed countries.

I have one more thought which wants to come out, before I end. The most explosive element, thrown into the Asian drama, is the principle of universal suffrage which all these countries in South and Southeast Asia have accepted, almost as if it was something natural that they should, and which, in addition, India has had the determination to give life and reality to in election after election and in a parliamentary process which has won her the admiration of the world.

This is, perhaps, the most important element of unprecedented newness in India's—and the region's—situation and in its approach to its future. I need not remind you that the now developed countries were not democracies in this sense at the time when they went through the industrial revolution and began to develop rapidly. Suffrage was restricted to only a tiny number of the people in the higher classes by means of narrow economic limitations. Adult suffrage and the work on building the modern welfare state came later, when production and average incomes had reached much higher levels; and these countries were never so poor to begin with, and were never cursed by such glaring inequalities. In fact, political democracy has hitherto never been a permanent success except in rich countries with fairly much of equality of opportunity already attained. Those who have a European background, in particular, are apt to remember how all the new democracies rapidly built up on raw ground in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe after the First World War, very soon succumbed to internal pressures.

But as I said, history does not always repeat itself. The most important lesson from history is that one should be careful in reading lessons into history. History is not blind

destiny but is our choice and is thus of our own making. Everything depends upon the human will and upon leadership—in India's case very much upon decisions to be taken by the parliament during years to come.

The majority of very poor people who have been given the power of the vote will naturally in time press for substantial economic development and for a more equal share—for a rapid progress towards the goals you have set for yourselves. They will do it more and more, as they become more rationally aware of their interests and their potential power. The very functioning of the Parliament and other elected assemblies in India and of public discussion in the press and other forums will spur this development, as will also all the social and economic reforms India is giving birth to. The rising level of education and the gradual liberation of the people from feudal and other tradition-bound blinkers of their minds will have the same effect.

It is for the political leaders to turn this tremendously explosive power of adult suffrage released for the first time in history in an underdeveloped country, into a concerted and constructive effort towards rapid economic development of an ever more integrated nation. To proceed slowly in this situation would for a democracy be suicidal. Of this I am deeply convinced.

I know of no task which, though immensely difficult, is greater and nobler than the task facing India, today and in the years to come. It is an inspiring task, and it should be inspiring particularly for the young in the nation, who must now soon take over the responsibilities from the cherished leaders who carry the glory from the successful fight for independence and full democracy.

Urbanism at Mid-Century

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This is the century of the city. For the first time in human history societies around the world have been penetrated, even saturated, with the values, the technologies, and the modes of life and work of urbanism. Clearly this development has been uneven over the world, but the trend is clear: probably all countries are now undergoing a transition from a rural social order to a society dominated by cities. Unless this trend is seriously interrupted or terminated by a major catastrophe—war, for example—at the end of the present century a large proportion of the world's peoples will live in urban communities, many of them gigantic megalopolitan centres.

THE GROWTH OF CITIES

Although cities have existed in almost every country of the world for a long time—centuries, in some instances—urbanism as a vast complex of social, economic, political, and cultural traits and values emerged only in the last century, and then in western Europe. By the turn of the twentieth century England had become so thoroughly industrialized and urbanized that most of the population was residing in urban centres, and London was the world's greatest metropolis in point of size. England as the pace setter in this respect was followed by other countries in Europe, Oceania, and North America; and, more recently, in Asia, Africa, and South America, the same trends are clearly apparent. The inexorable upsurge of industrialism and commercialism, aided and abetted by technology and appropriate economic and political forms, is creating in those countries urbanized societies comparable to those already in existence in the West.

The degree of urbanization, gauged by the proportion of population living in cities, varies greatly. At one extreme is England, with

more than four-fifths of the population classified as urban; at the other extreme are countries like Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, having less than one-tenth of the population located in cities. The highly-urbanized countries (with more than three-fifths of the population in cities at most recent census) include England, Israel, West Germany, Australia, Denmark, United States, Belgium, Argentina, Canada, and New Zealand. At the other end of the scale (countries with less than one-fourth of the population in cities) are the Dominican Republic, Rumania, Iran, Korea, Jamaica, India, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Haiti, Burma, Yemen, Ghana, the Sudan, and Libya. No doubt the Soviet Union has more than half its population in cities, but reliable census data are not presently available.

If this is the era of the city, it is pre-eminently the era of the metropolis. A century and a half ago there were probably not more than 50 cities in the 100,000 class, and none with as many as a million inhabitants. The 1958 *Demographic Yearbook* of the United Nations lists 1,034 cities having more than 100,000 inhabitants, and 78 cities in the million class.¹ Whatever inaccuracies and incon-

¹ The editors of the *Yearbook* rightly emphasize that these data are by no means precise and must be used cautiously. Censuses are taken at different dates, various methods of enumerations are employed, and there are undoubtedly marked degrees of accuracy. Furthermore, figures on many cities are estimates rather than enumerations. Wherever data on "agglomerations" or "metropolitan districts" are provided, these have been used instead of figures on the central cities. Thus "greater Calcutta" or "greater New York" have been counted as a metropolitan unit. This has the effect of reducing the number of enumerated cities since many of the metropolitan areas or districts (agglomerations) include two or more cities with populations over 100,000. But it is the larger metropolitan unit rather than the specific political cities included in a metropolitan area that is significant from our standpoint.

sistencies may exist in these data, it is the overall picture that is important. At least one fourth of a billion persons are dwellers of large metropolitan communities.

Allowing for errors and inconsistencies in the data, the population and rank of the eleven largest "agglomerations" or "metropolitan areas" are as follows:

Name.	Population.	Rank
New York	14,066,000	1
Tokyo	8,471,000	2
London	8,270,000	3
Shanghai	6,204,000	4
Chicago	4,920,000	5
Moscow	4,847,000	6
Paris	4,823,000	7
Calcutta	4,578,000	8
Buenos Aires	3,673,000	9
Berlin (East & West)	3,345,000	10
Bombay	3,211,000	11

The largest of these concentrations, Greater New York, contains more people than reside in 18 of the less populous states of the United States, and more people than live in the countries of Paraguay, Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua combined. There are more people in Greater Tokyo than in Sweden, more in Greater London than in Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel combined. Greater Moscow has as many residents as Norway, while the population of Greater Calcutta exceeds that of Switzerland.

Nor do these concentrations tell the whole story. There are, in certain countries, galaxies of urban communities that extend over wide areas. In the United States, for example, the entire northeast Atlantic seaboard, from New England to Virginia, is virtually a continuous urbanized region. This development has also occurred in Britain with the growth of such great "conurbations" as Tyneside and the region centering around London. A similar development has occurred in western Holland and northern Belgium, in the industrialized Ruhr region of Germany, and in the cluster of cities centering around Tokyo in Japan.

Countries that are now predominantly urban will inevitably experience a decline in the rate of urbanization. At the beginning of the present century England had almost as high a proportion of people living in cities as she has today: 77 per cent in 1901 as compared with 81 per cent in 1951. The most rapid urbanization is occurring in the technologically underdeveloped areas, principally Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. At least in these regions the growth rate of cities is probably higher than in any other major areas. Most of these cities grew slowly, if at all, in the early decades of the present century, but in the past twenty years or so the acceleration of growth has been little short of phenomenal.

And the end is not in sight. The ten largest cities of India, taken together, increased in population by 64 per cent between 1941 and 1951, and in the preceding decade they grew by 52 per cent. In the 1941-51 decade Madras increased by 84 per cent, Greater Bangalore by 91 per cent, and Delhi (Old and New) by 234 per cent. During the two census decades, 1930 to 1950 the African cities of Abidjan and Leopoldville increased five-fold in population, and Accra and Lagos almost doubled in size. Cities like Manila, Singapore, Jakarta, Rangoon, Hongkong, Karachi, and Teheran received a powerful stimulus to growth in the catastrophic events associated with World War II and the post-war period. In semi-industrialized Latin America the same trend has resulted in spectacular growth of such cities as Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Caracas, Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires.

Though the trend toward increasing urbanization is perhaps universal it is hardly likely that all countries will travel equal distances or at equal speed toward a state of overshadowing urbanism. There is little probability, at least under present conditions, that a country like Saudi Arabia, or even India, will in the foreseeable future be as highly urbanized as England or the United States. If four-fifths of India's population lived in cities, as in England today, the urban population of the great sub-continent would number some 300 million

persons and the rural population only 75 million. The present century will witness no such revolutionary shift of population. The combination of conditions that produced highly urbanized societies in some countries probably cannot be duplicated in other areas. Yet there is good reason to conclude that the number and size of cities, the proportion of city-dwellers in the total population, and the pervasive influence of cities on the social order will continue to grow in most countries.

Many countries are dominated by a single metropolis which towers in size over other cities. These primate cities, to use Mark Jefferson's term, are usually the economic, cultural, and political capitals of the countries in which they are located. A combination of circumstances, past and present, gave certain cities an initial advantage over others in the same country, and this advantage has usually continued through the years, often increasing relatively. Buenos Aires is eight times as large as Rosario, the second city in Argentina, and there is no likelihood that the differences will significantly diminish in the future. Similarly, Bangkok is eight times as large as the second city of Thailand. The figures after the following representative primate cities indicate the number of times the population is greater than that of the city ranking second in:

Montevideo, Uruguay	17
Saigon-cholon, Viet Nam	14
Budapest, Hungary	12
Copenhagen, Denmark	10
Manila, the Philippines	10
Lima, Peru	9
Bangkok, Thailand	8
Buenos Aires, Argentina	8
Vienna, Austria	7
Mexico City, Mexico	7
Havana, Cuba	7
Athens, Greece	6
Santiago, Chile	6
Teheran, Iran	5
Rangoon, Burma	4
Helsinki, Finland	4

The phenomenon of metropolitan primacy tends to be more characteristic of semi-industrial or agrarian countries than of the highly industrialized and urbanized nations. Among the major regions of the world it stands out conspicuously in Latin America. Among the twenty-one primate cities in this region only three are less than three times as large as the second city in the same country. But even here there is an important exception in Sao Paulo, which has now grown to greater magnitude than Rio de Janeiro, the primate city during most of Brazil's history. There are many other notable exceptions. Metropolitan Calcutta, for instance, is only about one and one-third times as large as Metropolitan Bombay. And Metropolitan Montreal is only slightly larger than Greater Toronto.

In many countries the primate city is at the same time the political capital, the chief cultural centre, and the hub of the country's economic organization. In Latin America such cities are Lima in Peru, Santiago in Chile, Buenos Aires in Argentina, Bogota in Colombia, Caracas in Venezuela, Havana in Cuba, and Mexico City in Mexico. In the Middle East there are Baghdad in Iraq, Teheran in Iran, Beirut in Lebanon, and Cairo in Egypt; in Asia, Rangoon in Burma, Bangkok in Thailand, Jakarta in Indonesia, Manila in the Philippines, and Colombo in Ceylon. Even in urbanized Europe many of the primate cities are national capitals as well as cultural and economic centres. Among them are Oslo in Norway, Stockholm in Sweden, Copenhagen in Denmark, Paris in France, Vienna in Austria, Bucharest in Rumania, Budapest in Hungary, and Prague in Czechoslovakia. London and Moscow are also in the same categories.

These primate cities have no serious national rivals nor is their metropolitan leadership likely to change short of some major disruption, such as the effect of war on Berlin's position. Other cities located in the same country become secondary or tertiary in a very real sense; they are primarily regional cities except as they may have some economic or social speciality of national importance which affords them a specialized national reputation. Each has become the pool centre of a regional

"empire" over which it holds sway. In countries having an advanced technology and a highly developed economic organization, such as the United States and the countries of western Europe, the hinterlands are dominated economically and culturally by regional cities. Examples are Minneapolis—St. Paul and Seattle, each of which exerts a powerful dominance over the economic and cultural patterns of a large tributary region. Bangalore in India, Milan in Italy, and Mandalay in Burma are such regional cities.

In industrialized countries like the United States the development of a complex network of transportation and communication, along with the growth of regional and national "chain" organizations, has tended to bind the hinterlands more and more tightly to the central cities and thus to accentuate the economic and cultural dominance of these centers. But the regional hinterlands in the so-called underdeveloped countries do not fall, as yet, so completely under the dominance of the cities. There is reason to believe, however, that technological, economic, and political change, even if slow, will stimulate metropolitan dominance over the economic and cultural life of the tributary hinterlands. This is another way of saying that the life of people on farms and in villages falling within the orbit of metropolitan centres will become increasingly dependent on these centres.

THE ECOLOGY OF CITIES²

People and institutions concentrated in an area which we call the "city" or "community" are, as everybody knows, not evenly or indiscriminately distributed. As a consequence of the interplay of various factors—economic, political, cultural, geographic, racial, demographic, psychological, technological—each city exhibits certain spatial configurations which reflect both local and societal conditions. Cities developing under somewhat similar conditions tend to manifest strikingly similar ecological

²In sociological literature the study of the spatial configurations, the changes occurring in them, and the factors associated with these changes, are generally called "human ecology". The concept of "social morphology" as used by geographers has a similar connotation.

features—although certainly every city is unique to a degree.

One of the most significant trends in urban ecology, especially in industrialized countries, is the decentralization of population and institutions. Although the growth of suburbs in world cities is by no means new, recent decades have witnessed a spectacular rise of suburbs in the industrialized regions, notably in the United States and Canada. Numerous factors have been involved in suburbanization but perhaps the most important is technology as applied to transportation and communication, plus the growth of large-scale corporate organization taking the form of merchandizing or manufacturing "chains". The decentralized retail emporium commonly referred to as a "shopping centre" has become an important feature of suburban America. These shopping centers, large and small, supply a wide variety of goods and services to the suburbanites, hence enabling them to supply most of their consumer needs without going to the central business districts. Indeed, these outlying shopping centers have attracted such a large proportion of the business of the metropolitan area as to represent a serious economic challenge to the central business districts in the inner zones of the central cities.

Extensive decentralization of population culminating in the rise of politically independent satellites has tended to reduce revenues from taxes so badly needed in the central cities. Each year in American and Canadian cities an increasing proportion of the people who earn a living in the central city pay taxes only in the residential suburbs, although they make use of the central city's facilities. Thus extensive ecological decentralization of cities has created for the central zones of these cities serious financial crises. Annexation of the suburbs, or the creation of a metropolitan tax authority, might solve the problem, but suburbanites tend to resist political annexation and to oppose any other proposals that might, from their viewpoint, be disadvantageous. Some cities have experimented with an "earnings" tax for all persons gainfully occupied in the central city, including suburbanites, but this plan has been unpopular, especially among the suburban residents.

The heavy flow of population to cities from towns, villages, and open country has frequently resulted in a piling up of population in the central portions of the larger centers. This is especially characteristic of cities in the Orient and the Middle East, since suburbanization has not been of sufficient magnitude to relieve the increasing pressures in the central areas. Consequently the density of population in the inner zones has increased to a point that housing congestion is a serious threat to health and harmonious family life. In the United States this situation has been somewhat alleviated by the suburban movement. But the suburbs in America are mainly for whites; the Negro population has tended to pile up in the congested residential quarters of the central cities. In fact, central zones of most American metropolises are becoming increasingly populated by Negroes. Washington, D.C., is an extreme case but it does illustrate the trend. At the 1950 census some two-thirds of the school children in the District of Columbia were Negroes, but in the surrounding suburbs in Maryland and Virginia the population was predominantly white.

The ecological distribution of manufacturing varies considerably with the type of industrial activity, and the country in which a particular city is located. In Asia and the Middle East industrial processes are carried on, mainly, in small establishments. In these countries "cottage industry" has flourished. Such industries are commonly interwoven, ecologically, with residences; often the place of work is the place of residence, or if they are separated the distances between them are not great. Frequently commodities are produced and distributed in the same establishment, which also serves as a residence for the workers and their dependents. For handicraft industries especially there may be no industrial district separate from a residential district.

In the technologically advanced countries of the West industrial processes have been mainly separated from the home. This doubtless is partly due to the fact that handicraft industry has become mechanized; machinery for industrial operation, housed in special establishments, has displaced the independent handi-

craftsman. So-called light industries like the manufacturing of apparel tend to develop in specialized districts, ordinarily located in the inner zones of the city, near the central business districts and the wholesale houses. But even this type of industrial activity in the West has tended to decentralize, owing partly, no doubt, to changes in the character of transportation, which reduces the importance of a particular industrial location.

In the case of heavy industry the trend in most countries is toward decentralization of operations. As a general rule manufacturing plants which turn out such products as automobiles, airplanes, farm machinery, building materials, or locomotives require so much space that the cost of operations on high-priced land is prohibitive, even if there were no other limitations or disadvantages. Modern city planning reinforces the economic and social factors that determine industrial location; consequently heavy industries are almost invariably located near or beyond the boundaries of the city, in areas that are zoned for this purpose. Hindustan Aircraft and the Indian Telephone Industries, for example, are located some distance beyond the city boundaries of Bangalore; the United States Steel Company has a major mill in an industrial suburb beyond the southern city limits of Chicago; across the Rhine River from Cologne, Germany, is an area devoted almost entirely to manufacturing. Older industries established in the early stages of urbanization have frequently been surrounded by the expanding city; although their present location may not be the most desirable from several standpoints, the cost of moving the establishments would probably be prohibitive. The Ford Motor Company in Detroit is a case in point.

Ecological segregation, the tendency of "birds of a feather to flock together", either voluntarily or involuntarily, is apparently a universal characteristic of human beings; in cities this tendency to cluster together residentially results in the formation of "social islands" based on racial, religious, nationality, caste, or other differences. Each of these segregated areas tends, in the course of time, to take on certain institutional, cultural, and

behavioral characteristics that distinguish it from other areas. In Indian cities there are districts that are occupied exclusively or mainly by Muslims, Hindus, or Christians; Hindu areas are further divided as members of particular castes strive to be residentially separate from those of a different caste. In the cities of Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma the Chinese and Indians, representing a cultural or racial minority, live in districts that are populated in the main by their own kind. All over Africa Europeans and Africans are ecologically separated; and in South Africa the doctrine and practice of *apartheid* legalizes the principle of "apartness", to the distinct disadvantage of the Africans and Asians. In American cities segregation is both voluntary and involuntary; religious, cultural, and racial minorities tend to flock together voluntarily; but in most cities Negroes are expected or required to live in districts occupied mainly by that racial minority.

These social areas do not ordinarily remain unchanged in size and composition of the inhabitants. Occupational, cultural, political, and other changes foster movement in and out of the areas so that, over a considerable period of time, they may undergo a striking transformation. The edges are especially influenced as residents of different attributes take up residence in the areas and as the occupants themselves move away to settle elsewhere. In expanding cities these "invasions" are constantly occurring, with the result that the ecological areas undergo considerable change from one year or decade to another. In cities like New York and Chicago there are areas that have been invaded by a series of racial and cultural groups. Districts once populated mainly by, say, Swedes have been occupied successively by Italians, Jews, and Negroes. Some areas become increasingly heterogeneous as the different population elements jostle each other for favourable positions; others remain homogeneous, or become more so, as the occupants cling tenaciously to their homesites against any possible invaders of a different race or culture. Muslim districts in Indian cities have the appearance of relative permanence, and in some of the large American metropolises like Chicago the major Negro

districts are becoming more racially homogeneous. This is partly due to the fact that immigrants to cities ordinarily settle in the districts already occupied by those who are similar in certain respects.

SOME SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISM

The growth of cities has ordinarily been associated with an increase in national wealth, if not for everybody at least for a favoured minority. Since the rise of cities has been, in the main, the result of developments in production and distribution of goods, the increase in wealth has been generally gauged by the consumption of goods (and services) made available by the urban productive and distributive system. This has meant, in turn, increased exploitation of such natural resources that could be fabricated and distributed for consumption. City life and work has tended to whet the appetites of people for more goods and services, to intensify the demand for things that would provide comfort, prestige, and security for more and more people, not merely the elite.

Productive and distributive systems everywhere have responded to this demand, and in a real sense have helped to create it, with the result that the natural resources have been increasingly exploited to meet the demands for a rising level of living among the masses, both urban and rural. The voices of hundreds of millions of persons, rich, poor, and in-between, assert their desires for more and better food, more and better clothes, more and better houses, more books and newspapers, more automobiles, more bath tubs, more gadgets of an infinite variety and cost. Clearly this has meant intensified pressure on the world's natural resources.

There is no end in sight either in the growth of cities or in the demand for more goods and services. Urbanized countries like the United States and Canada are already surfeited with goods, but the appetites of the people even here appear to be insatiable. As the undeveloped countries become increasingly urbanized there will be a rising crescendo of demands for more

goods and services by people who throughout their long agrarian history had only a subsistence level of consumption.

But if the appetites of the people are insatiable, the resources necessary to satisfy these appetites are not without limit. This is not to say that appetites should not be satisfied. They should. Furthermore, the people in the "have not" nations will no longer remain content to live in a state of poverty. But this does not alter the realities of the situation. How can the rising level of consumption be maintained in a world of limited resources? The harsh fact is that it cannot. Even if the growth of world population could be miraculously stopped, which hardly seems possible, at least in this century, the demands for an increasingly higher level of consumption will mean increased pressures on the world's resources. Some of these resources have already reached the point of exhaustion.

This point may be illustrated in the case of paper. Urbanism has ordinarily been associated with literacy. As an increasing proportion of the population of a country become city dwellers there is a corresponding need for education to facilitate communication. This in turn creates needs for books, newspapers, magazines, and other media. To meet this need there must be an available supply of materials from which paper is made. The assumption of the "printed page" by coming generations will undoubtedly push the demand for paper beyond the limit of available supply. At the present time the United States alone, with less than three per cent of the world's population, consumes more than one-third of the present production of paper. Much of this consumption is profligate waste, to be sure, but there is no sign of an imminent decline. How the rising demand for more paper for the millions of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans can be met is a grave problem not only for those countries but also for those concerned with the economics and politics of international relations. There is reason to believe that the world's pulp forests cannot indefinitely meet the rising world demand, yet it is difficult to see how an urbanized society can exist without paper.

Urbanism has invariably been associated with economic specialization. As a society becomes more urbanized the division of labour becomes more pronounced. New or improved technological techniques, new forms of social and economic organization, and changed conditions of living and working produce an infinite variety of occupational roles. This specialization is especially pronounced in the great cities of the world. Furthermore, the metropolises tend to attract or produce occupational experts who are highly specialized in technical vocations. Many of the modern professions and skilled occupations, for example, tend to be heavily concentrated in the metropolis, for it is in the great cities that their services are especially needed.

Metropolitan London, in 1931, had about one-fifth of the employed population of Great Britain, but over half of the country's workers engaged in making scientific instruments and apparatus. Metropolitan Paris in 1946 had about one-eighth of the working population of France but 36 per cent of the engineers and 32 per cent of the laboratory chemists. Likewise, Metropolitan New York had about one-eighth of the national labour force in manufacturing, but 56 per cent of all workers engaged in the manufacture of surgical and medical instruments. Actors are more than three times as numerous in New York than they would be if there were an even distribution over the United States, while in London they are about two and one-half times as numerous. Paris is the Mecca of musicians; there are two and one-half times as many in that city as there would be if they were evenly distributed over France.

Thus great cities not only attract and produce specialists, but particular cities as functioning communities become more or less specialized. New York, for example, is the country's publishing capital; personnel engaged in publishing books, periodicals, and printing services (other than newspapers) are four times as numerous as they would be if there were an equal national distribution; by the same token, workers engaged in the apparel industry are three times more numerous in New York than would be the case of an even

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national distribution. This kind of metropolitan specialization may be observed in many countries. Ahmedabad, in India, is specialized in textiles; Amsterdam is the world's diamond cutting center; Sao Paulo is the coffee metropolis of Brazil and the world; Detroit is the world's leading automobile-manufacturing capital; Manchester, in England, is noted for its textiles.

The specialized economic functions of such cities are by no means unchanging. As the supplies of raw materials decrease or increase, as other cities become increasingly competitive, as political and economic conditions change, or as new skills or techniques supersede old ones, particular cities may become either more or less specialized, more or less distinctive in a type of economic or non-economic activity. Paris is no longer the undisputed fashion center of the Western world; London has ceased to be the world's banker; Chicago has declined, relatively, as the "hog butcher for the world"; even Detroit has become less important in the automobile industry as assembly plants spring up in various cities over the country. By and large there is a tendency for specialized cities to become increasingly diversified as they grow in size.

Occupational specialization so characteristic of urbanization has been associated with the growth of large-scale organization. Indeed, the bureaucratic type of social structure is virtually an omnipresent feature of urbanism the world over. Here are the gigantic governmental and military hierarchical structures, the great private and public corporate organizations functioning in the fields of industry, trade, and finance, the complex organizations that have emerged, or are emerging, in education, social welfare, communications, even agriculture. In highly urbanized countries an increasing proportion of city workers are occupationally identified with bureaucratic organizations, while the proportion of self-employed persons has consistently declined. These countries are becoming "employee societies", in the words of Peter Drucker. More and more the destinies of the masses of workers are inextricably linked with bureaucratic enter-

prises, which themselves are often becoming larger and more powerful.

Such names as Tata in India, Ford, Standard Oil, and General Motors in the United States, Krupp in Germany, and Cunard in Britain are symbols of the monolithic economic bureaucracies that have developed *pari passu* with the growth of great cities during the twentieth century.

Any objective analysis of bureaucratic structures demonstrates that, in general, there are effective mechanisms for getting things done, of achieving certain goals. A few gigantic industrial bureaucracies can manufacture, say, automobiles or airplanes more efficiently, and deliver them to the consumer at lower prices, and perhaps better quality, than a thousand small-scale enterprises in the same field. Through such mechanism have the masses of urban people been afforded a higher material level of living than would have been possible with only small-scale organization.

But the modern bureaucratic organization has become more than a means of getting certain things done. So pervasive is its influence, so great is its power, that in its multifarious forms it has overshadowed and dominated the lives of countless people. For these persons the bureaucratic organization specifies in detail their work behaviour, exacts their loyalties, indoctrinates them with certain values and ideologies, determines their station in the social and economic system, and equips them with a style of life appropriate to their bureaucratic role. It is this system that is producing what W. F. Whyte calls *the Organization Man*, and what David Riesman has called *the Other Directed Personality*, both conformist to core.

URBANISM AND PLANNING

The conditions created by the growth of cities and the pervasive urbanization of if not all societies have brought into focus the need for planning on the local, national, and even international level. This need has almost universally been recognized with the growing awareness of the complexity of cities, of urbanism in particular and of urbanism in general. Planning

on any one level clearly has ramifications for all other forms of planning; nevertheless, the planning of local communities, whether small cities or giant metropolises, is distinctive from national or international planning.

Perhaps the basic problem to which city or metropolitan planners must address themselves is housing. With a large proportion of the world's city people living in festering slums, often in homes that are unfit for human occupancy by any standard, the only workable solution is to construct houses that will afford the amenities and comforts available in modern civilization, at prices the occupants can afford to pay. That this must be done, at least in part, at public expense, by both national and local governments, has become increasingly apparent. The difficulty arises, especially in countries with limited resources or an underdeveloped technology, in providing the necessary finances, skilled manpower, or materials for wholesale slum clearance and re-housing programmes. Certainly private enterprise cannot do the job alone, even in countries having ample capital, an advanced technology, and a large reservoir of skilled workers.

Since one of the usual characteristics of slums is high population density, an attack on the housing problem involves area planning for a density level commensurate with a reasonable standard of the "good life". How best can the reduction of density be achieved? Can decentralization of population, along with the decentralization of industry, be effectively planned by the city itself or by the larger society? Or will it occur without central planning, thus reducing the population density in the inner zones of the city? Or can high densities be maintained in an area while the quality of housing and general neighbourhood surroundings be raised to acceptable levels? There is no categorical answer to any of these questions.

In the United States decentralization of population and industry has occurred more or less spontaneously, with a minimum of central planning, although all sizeable communities have zoning ordinances and many have drawn up plans for an orderly development of outlying districts. Most of the planning for such

decentralization of population and institutions has been carried out under private auspices. The Levittowns (gigantic suburban housing projects) in the New York area, or Park Forest (a similar development near Chicago) are examples of large-scale planned communities. In the 1940s Great Britain undertook the development of some fourteen "new towns" near the major metropolitan centers, the objective being to attract people and industry to outlying zones and therefore relieve the population pressure within the cities. In a number of Indian cities the Improvement Trust Boards or other planning organizations have initiated plans for the decentralization of industry, and have designated peripheral areas for housing developments. But the population density within the central zones of most of the Indian cities remains high, and will probably not be effectively reduced for some time. One of the difficulties in reducing densities and alleviating housing congestion is that in-migrants move to cities in even greater numbers than other occupants move out, either to outlying parts of the city or to other localities. Another difficulty is involved in discrimination—racial, religious, caste, ethnic, and so on. Wherever overt residential discrimination exists, legal or otherwise, its victims usually occupy the city's slums unless they are afforded relief by public housing and slum clearance programmes. Generally they are the last to be relieved by housing reforms or planning programmes.

When Ebenezer Howard, in England, introduced the "garden city" idea over a half century ago his conception of planning was heralded by many as the beginning of a new era in city life. The idea was certainly attractive, especially to humanitarians and liberals, but it was never adopted in any country on a very large scale, except for the recent "new towns" programme in Britain. Perhaps the reason was that the "garden city" scheme never came to grips with the central problem, namely, the metropolis itself. The emerging megalopolitan galaxies composed of multi-nucleated concentrations of population covering a whole region do not lend themselves to "garden city" planning. Neither the garden city nor any other model community has had any appreciable

effect on the character, extent, and rate of growth of these great galaxies and their metropolitan cores. Even new cities like Chandigarh in India challenge the imagination with their bold departures from tradition, but they will have little direct effect on the main currents in urbanism.

Although conventional city planning, including zoning, has introduced considerable order into what had at one time been costly chaotic growth, changes in the patterns of urbanization—the rise of Megalopolis and the emergence of megalopolitan galaxies—has virtually outmoded the concept of a city plan as applied to the city within political boundaries. The metropolitan constellation—the metropolis plus its suburbs and satellites—and the Megalopolitan galaxy—the regional concentration of cities large and small—are the units which must constitute the basis of effective planning. Only through metropolitan and regional planning, that is, planning for an entire metropolitan constellation or galaxy, can we come to grips

with the realities of a changing world. Such planning inevitably must depend on the co-operation and co-ordination of the various political units that make up the region, and very likely the national governments as well. To achieve such co-operation is manifestly difficult.

Mid-century urbanism, as we have observed, has had and will continue to have far-reaching consequences to every aspect of the social order, including the personalities of most of the world's peoples. It should be a major function of planning to direct these trends in as orderly a fashion as possible, to reduce the maladjustments and conflicts and even hardships that may be associated with urban living, to avoid economic waste and friction, and, in general, make the city a desirable place in which to live and work. But to achieve such goals planning must be broadly conceived; there must be varied kinds of plans, and varied goals for them. But an urbanized world without planning would be inconceivable.

Administrative Implementation of Family Planning Policy

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PART I—FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN PERIOD

A. POLICY SETTLEMENT

1. Does the rate of growth of population in India constitute a problem of which the Government should take cognizance? If so, does the spread of the practice of family planning among the people constitute a necessary part of the solution of the problem? Taking note of the fact that the subject is related to the intimate personal lives of people, that it is likely to entail public controversy of unpredictable magnitude, and there is no known precedent of any Government taking the initiative in propagating the practice of Family Planning among the people, is the problem so serious that Government should take such initiative?

2. These questions had been raised in Madras nearly thirty years ago. There was a Neo-Malthusian League of which an ex-member of the old Provincial Government and a High Court Judge were prominent members. The present Minister of Health who is today the Chairman of the Madras State Family Planning Board had successfully sponsored a resolution in the old Diarchic Legislature urging the Government to open Birth Control Clinics. But the Government of those days, understandably, took a cautious line. They kept an open mind about the first two questions, while decisively answering the third in the negative.

3. When the Second World War was nearing its end, the subject cropped up again. A famine had occurred in Bengal attended by over a million deaths from starvation in course of a few months. The interruption of the supplies

of rice from Burma created a food shortage which continued for years, in spite of efforts to whip up the internal production of food. A Statutory Commission appointed by the Government of India studied these phenomena and submitted its report. At the same time, a highpower Committee which had been appointed to survey the problems of Health Development after the war also rendered its report. The Commission and the Committee conferred with one another, and decided to include a cautiously worded discussion of the subject in their reports. In these reports the first question was answered in the affirmative. The second was left open. In respect of the third, it was suggested, in effect, that Government might move just a little into forbidden ground and see what happened. The Public Health Sub-Committee of the Post-War Reconstruction Committee reinforced the suggestion. That was how it came about that in 1945 the Government of Madras "permitted advice and suitable means of birth control being made available at health centres for married women when in the opinion of the medical officers they were required". It was also ordered that "information that such facilities were available should be given by Public Health visitors when necessary, but no other publicity should be given".

4. This policy continued to be in force till November 1954 when the new policy of the Government of India was formally accepted by the Government of Madras. The formulation of this new policy was commenced in 1951, when the Planning Commission set up a number of "panels" for advising it on

various categories of programmes to be included in the First Five-Year Plan. The Panel on Health Programmes was one of them and it was assisted by a Sub-Committee on the "Growth of Population and Family Planning". This Sub-Committee consisted of seven members including two women members, both of whom had a long and distinguished record of activity as social workers, though in different fields. They were, Shrimathi Dhanwanti Rama Rau and Dr. Sushila Nayyar. The Health Panel Sub-Committee submitted the following recommendation "for consideration by the Government of India and all the State Governments" :—

"Recognition of the need for Family Limitation.—That they recognise in principle—

(a) that family limitation is necessary and desirable in the interests of the family—what is to say, it is necessary and desirable that the members of every family comprising the nation should take all suitable and practicable steps for securing that the occurrences of birth in the family are properly spaced in time and limited in number, so as to safeguard the health of mothers and children and enable an adequate share of the resources of the family being applied effectively to the care and upbringing of children; and

(b) that in order to assure the success of plans and programmes designed to promote the health and welfare of the people and develop the national economy, it is essential that the National Birth Rate should be reduced concurrently with the National Death Rate, until the population is stabilised at a level consistent with the requirements of national economy. Family Limitation [defined as in (a) above] is necessary to secure this result also".

When this recommendation was forwarded to the Government of Madras, the latter decided that they would continue the policy laid down in 1945 until the Government of India decided on a new policy.

5. Two years later (in 1953) the draft report of the Planning Commission on the First Five-Year Plan was published. It contained the first formulation of new policy on this subject, as subsequently accepted by the

Government of India and the State Governments. The relevant passage ran as follows :—

"The recent increase in the population of India and the pressure exercised on the limited resources of the country have brought to the forefront the urgency of the problem of family planning and population control. The application of medical knowledge and social care has lowered the death rate while the birth rate remains fairly constant. This has led to a rapid increase in the growth of population.

While a lowering of the birth rate may occur as a result of improvements in the standard of living, such improvements are not likely to materialise if there is a concurrent increase of population.

It is, therefore, apparent that population control can be achieved only by the reduction of the birth rate to the actual extent necessary to stabilise the population at a level consistent with the requirements of national economy.

This can be secured only by the realisation of the need for family limitation on a wide scale by the people. The main appeal for family planning is based on the consideration of health and welfare of the family. Family limitation is necessary and desirable in order to secure better health for the mother and better care and upbringing of children. Measures directed to this end should, therefore, form part of the Public Health Programme."

6. At last, the Rubicon was crossed. All the three questions posed at the beginning of this section were answered clearly and unambiguously in the affirmative, together with a concise statement of reasons.

The policy as thus proclaimed, received strong support from the press and the platform throughout the country. It was acclaimed by eminent men in many countries of the world, as much for its pioneering courage as for its intrinsic wisdom. Voices continued to be heard for some time repeating the old dogmatic denials either of the existence of a population problem, or of the admissibility of State propagation of family limitation as its solution.

By the time the First Five-Year Plan came to its end, those voices ceased to be significant. All English language newspapers in this State and all Tamil newspapers (with one minor exception) have expressed themselves repeatedly in support of Government policy. There are no differences of opinion among the various political parties functioning in the State Legislature. Recently, in Madras State, an important law was passed by which the entire structure of local administration in rural areas is to be reconstituted on a new basis. The preamble of this law begins with the words "whereas it is necessary in the national interests that the production of food should be increased so as to keep pace with the growth of population, and the growth of population should be brought under control". And one of the operative provisions of the law makes it incumbent on Panchayat Unions (the new local authorities to be constituted at the rate of one for every Community Development Block) to make provision for advice on family planning to be given as part of its statutory responsibility for maternity assistance and child welfare. The entire law, including these provisions, was passed with the active support of all the political parties. The political climate necessary for administrative implementation of Government Policy leaves little to be desired.

B. CONTROVERSY OVER APPLIANCE METHODS

7. The Health Panel Sub-Committee of April 1951 which unanimously agreed on its recommendation regarding the new policy failed to achieve agreement on how a viable programme of measures necessary for implementing that policy should be framed. Shrimathi Dhanwanti Rama Rau proposed that "Birth control appliances and literature should be part of the equipment of every health centre in the country and should be made available free of cost wherever free medical services are rendered to the poorer classes".

8. Dr. Sushila Nayyar, the only other woman member of the Sub-Committee, opposed it. Pressed by other members to make it clear whether this was a matter of conscience the

on her part or whether there was any secular justification, she explained "There is a large section of the population which is opposed to contraceptives on moral, religious and other grounds. In my opinion, the real objection to a contraceptive drive is the likelihood of its proving a futility".

9. The majority of the Sub-Committee conceded that there was such a likelihood. The "poorer classes" constitute a decisive majority of the national population. Providing them with a free supply of contraceptives for the entire duration of their child-bearing period might cost an enormous amount every year, possibly exceeding the entire educational budget of all the Governments in India. Besides, there was no certainty that even if that cost were faced, the contraceptives would be used properly or even used at all. The lack of privacy, running water and other necessary home facilities rendered it probable that a contraceptive drive might prove a "futility".

10. Shrimathi Rama Rau's reply to this was two-fold. If it was really expensive it cannot be helped; the expense must be met on grounds of public policy. But there was a chance that quite inexpensive methods might be evolved. An experiment on home-made substitutes for the diaphragm and jelly method was in progress and proved promising. There might be other ideas forthcoming once the drive was launched.

11. The majority of the Committee took a middle view. Whether or not the appliance methods should be propagated aggressively through free supply of contraceptive appliances should be left an open question at that stage. To begin with, it was necessary to get the basic policy (on which all members were agreed) accepted by the Government and put across to the public. The success of this task should not be prejudiced by raising a controversy over the nature of the action to be taken by Government. So the conclusion was that the policy already followed in some States should be extended to all States, viz., advice on appliance methods and assistance in securing appliances should be made available in all health and medical institutions maintained by the Government and this should be done to

all who sought assistance not only on medical grounds but also on economic or social grounds.

At the same time, Government should give financial assistance to a suitable non-Governmental agency in order to set up a Research and Information Centre which could also function as a Centre from which all social workers who believe in planned parenthood could create a public demand for advice and assistance made available in Government institutions.

12. When the report of the Planning Commission appeared, it was found that the first of these two recommendations had been accepted, but the Research and Information Centre under an aided non-Governmental agency, which had been visualised by the Sub-Committee did not come into being. Instead, a Research and Programme Committee was set up as an advisory organ of the Ministry of Health of the Government of India.

C. CONTROVERSY OVER SURGICAL METHODS

13. While clarifying her attitude in relation to appliance methods, Dr. Sushila Nayyar surprised her colleagues on the Committee by her willingness to support surgical methods. In her minute of dissent she recorded her view in these terms—"The hospitals should offer sterilization facilities (and even contraceptive advice) for medical indications on a voluntary basis. In this connection it should be noted that sterilization of the male is a much simpler operation than of the female".

14. Shrimathi Rama Rau, in her turn, surprised her colleagues on the Committee, by her attitude towards sterilization. In her opinion "the State should accept the policy of the sterilization of the unfit, e.g., advanced cases of tuberculosis, heart disease, leprosy, epilepsy and mental cases, with the consent of the party concerned except in the last category". She did not accept sterilization as a method to be popularised for purposes of securing family limitation among the people generally.

15. The majority of the Sub-Committee took a view which, on this question, also, differed from that of both the women members.

If the unfit might be sterilized (and if even the fit might be sterilized on medical grounds), then it followed that surgical methods did exist which were at once harmless and efficacious for the purpose of stopping child birth. Why then limit the use of the method only to the unfit on only medical grounds. If a married couple thought they had had enough children and wished to be sterilized, why should they not be sterilized?

Whether there would be any very considerable public demand for sterilization was a different question. That question arose in respect of contraceptive appliances as well.

So, the majority of the Sub-Committee bracketed surgical methods along with appliance methods and recommended that "The State should provide facilities for sterilization as well as giving advice on contraceptives on medical grounds. Such help and advice should not be withheld from others who seek and need it on social and economic grounds".

16. When the report of the Planning Commission appeared it was found that there was no reference whatever to surgical methods, even as a suggestion considered in this context. In the light of subsequent experience it must be observed that the progress of implementation of Family Planning Policy has been significantly retarded by the failure to achieve unanimity within the Health Panel Sub-Committee about surgical methods.

D. CONTROVERSY OVER NATURAL METHODS

17. The Health Panel Sub-Committee did not recommend any natural methods. The Sub-Committee's views were thus recorded :—

"It is urged that family limitation can and should be brought about by self-control. This may mean either complete abstinence except for procreation; or limited abstinence except during safe-periods. We have no quarrel with this view, but do not expect significant results from its propagation." Dr. Sushila Nayyar observed in her minute of dissent that "self-control was not quite so futile or impossible as some people seem to think".

18. The Sub-Committee also observed that "the raising of the minimum age for marriage has been suggested. We agree that this will diminish the Birth Rate; and that the results will not be inappreciable; but we do not agree that it is a solution of the problem".

19. When the Report of the Planning Commission appeared, it was found to lay emphasis on the "rhythm" method (another name for the safe-period method). The relevant passage ran as follows :—

"Field experiments on different methods of Family Planning should be undertaken for the purpose of determining their suitability, acceptability and effectiveness in different sections of the population. If it can be demonstrated that our people, particularly those living in rural areas, can be educated to accept the rhythm method and use it as a practical method of limiting family growth; Government support should be extended to the propagation of this method. From the point of view of avoiding enormous expenditure as well as that of securing the ethical values which community life would gain by the self-imposed restraint which the rhythm method involves, it would seem desirable to try out this method fully and thus ascertain its practicability. Whether the rhythm method is capable of wide application in the community with adequate results or not, actual experimentation alone can tell. Research or experiment need not, however, be confined to a single method. There are numerous voluntary agencies which are currently propagating the spread of information on Family Planning and the use of chemical and mechanical contraceptives. Their activities would need support".

20. It should be mentioned at this stage that the Sub-Committee did not take into consideration the most widespread natural method—*coitus interruptus*. The question of defining the attitude of the Sub-Committee did not, therefore, arise.

E. SETTLEMENT OF THE MADRAS STATE PROGRAMME

21. If the present situation in the country regarding implementation of Family Planning Policy is to be clearly appreciated it is necessary to take careful note of the differences of opinion which had emerged already in 1921 over what should be regarded as a viable programme of measures needed for implementation of policy. These differences of opinion remained unresolved; when, early in 1954, the Ministry of Health of the Government of India took over the implementation of Family Planning Policy. It will appear later in this memorandum that these differences of opinion still remain unresolved at the All-India level.

22. A Research and Programme Committee was set up at the Centre. The advice of the Committee was forwarded to State Governments. The Government of Madras received the advice and considered it in consultation with their technical advisers (the Director of Medical Services and the Director of Public Health). On 30th November 1954, the Government of Madras revised the policy which had been in force since 1945 and issued orders in implementation of the revised policy. The specific measures prescribed by this order were as follows :—

(i) A simple Pamphlet on Family Planning should be prepared and distributed to all medical officers and others interested.

(ii) Medical Officers, Nurses, Health Visitors and Social Workers should be given training in Family Planning Propagation work for a period of one week.

(iii) Advice on Family Planning should be made available at all Health and Medical institutions in the State.

(iv) Family Planning Clinics should be opened (a) on a full-time basis in seven selected Government institutions in the State; and (b) in Government hospitals in all district headquarters, on a part-time basis.

(v) The curriculum of studies of medical students, nurses and pupil health visitors should be revised to include lectures and practical instruction on family planning.

(vi) A Family Planning Research Centre should be opened in the principal Government Hospital for Women and Children in Madras City.

23. These decisions were approved by the Government of India who agreed to share the cost of putting them into effect.

Thus the administrative implementation of Family Planning Policy in Madras State commenced at the end of the fourth year of the First Five-Year Plan period.

All decisions, except the last, were put into effect in the last year. Eight full-time clinics and thirteen part-time clinics were opened as Government institutions, thus providing at least one in every district. The Research Centre which the Madras Government had up-astended for investigation of methods of family limitation did come into being shortly thereafter; but, at the instance of the Government of India, it was devoted to investigation of sub-fertility.

24. The Government Order was silent on the nature of the methods of Family Planning which should be propagated in Government institutions. This was left to the Head of the Department to decide with reference to advice received from the Research and Programme Committee at the Centre. The "Simple Pamphlet" issued in pursuance of the Government Order specified three appliance methods and one natural method.

The three appliance methods were all mechanical; one was the diaphragm and jelly; and the other two were home-made substitutes therefor, viz., the "pad and oil" and "the pad and salt solution".

The natural method was the "rhythm" or "safe-period" method. According to the pamphlet, the method was reduced to a "12-day avoidance rule". The fertile period (to be avoided) was deemed to commence on the ninth day and end on the twentieth day of the menstrual cycle.

F. POSITION REACHED AT THE END OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD

25. The main achievement at the end of the First Five-Year Plan period was the creation of the necessary political climate which is the condition precedent to successful execution of a policy of this kind. This was achieved without any aggressive publicity on the part of the Government. The Report of the Planning Commission and its endorsement by the Prime Minister proved to be the decisive factors. The All-India report on the 1951 census published towards the end of 1953, dealt with the subject at length. The newspapers got convinced, though a few took time to do so. When they got going, they exerted great influence on the public mind. It is rather significant that relatively little was done by voluntary social service organisations. In fact, a social worker well known to the public of this State, by reason of her efficiency in directing the activities of social service organisations (while unreservedly offering her personal co-operation) decided that she should not risk the success of other useful services rendered by these organisations by engaging them on overt propagation of Family Planning.

Every new order of Government was publicised. Suitable occasions were availed of for speeches by Ministers and other influential leaders of public opinion. The fact that Family Planning was part of the National Five-Year Plan was stressed; and general publicity for the latter included the former. The cinema was left unused in order to avoid embarrassing reactions from mixed audiences. Oppositional speeches, mainly by certain leaders of the Roman Catholic church, were ignored; care being taken to avoid magnifying the opposition by engaging it in debate. The fact that there was no coercion or compulsion of any sort was stressed. It was publicly declared that the voluntary principle was applicable not only to the general public, but even to those employees of Government and local authorities who were serving in Health and Medical institutions. If any of them had a conscientious objection to do Family Planning