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
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
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CONTENTS

Language Logic and Fact: by Kalidas Bhattacharyya	.. 145
The Dilemma of Religious Art: by Rev. J. F. Butler	.. 159
Inward and Outward Advaita Vedanta: by D. M. Datta	.. 165
On the Metaphysical Status of "Past-Present-Future": by C. T. K. Chari	.. 173
A Positivist Analysis of Descartes' Ontological Arguments for God: by G. N. Mathrani	.. 183
Does Indian Philosophy Need Re-orientation?: by R. Panikker	.. 189
Discussion: Inward and Outward Advaita Vedānta by G. R. Malkani	.. 201
Book Review: <i>A Story of Indian Culture</i> , by Sri Bahadur Mal	.. 207
Books Received	.. 209

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Vol. XXX, No. 3]


[October, 1957

Language Logic and Fact

by

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Logical Positivists and the philosophers of the School of Analysis reduce complicated propositions to some simple types and believe that the latter alone represent facts directly. This method, they claim, is justified by at least the principle of parsimony. Our task in this essay is to expose the defects of this method and follow this up by an outline of constructive metaphysics.

The first question we ask is whether the propositions embodying the views of these philosophers are themselves simple or reducible. As not immediately representing facts of sense they are not simple, and we do not see how possibly they can be reduced. As a matter of fact, the reduction has never been attempted. There are three other possible answers of which one has to be accepted. The propositions in question are either meaningless or tautologies or simple in another sense. Wittgenstein believes that they are meaningless; some other Analysts hold that they are tautologies; and according to older metaphysicians they are simple but representing facts of a different order.

Wittgenstein's answer is self-contradictory and reminds us of Bergson who having employed reason all through comes to the conclusion that the real is irrational. For Bergson there might still be a way of escape. He might hold that reason has only a provisional status and that, having provisionally proved the irrationality of the world, it tends to merge in the abyss of

irrationality. But Wittgenstein cannot save himself that way. There is still some romance round the irrational. But the meaningless is worse than nothing.

The ultimate principles of Logical Positivism are not also tautologies. No one feels them that way, not even the Positivists themselves. The question is whether analysis is always equivalent to that which is analysed. When a complex proposition is analysed into simple ones, these together might in some way be treated as equivalent to the former. But the *analytic theory* of the Positivist is not analysis of that sort. In the analysis of the former type there is replacement of a bad language by a good one, but the analytical theory is no such replacement. (There is at most the replacement of a bad metaphysic by a good one).

The analytical theory is a statement (or a body of statements) either about facts or about statements or about ways of stating. If about facts, it is either an immediate representation of facts, or a tautology or meaningless. We have seen it is neither meaningless nor a tautology. It follows that so far it is an immediate representation of facts.

The analytical theory is not also a statement about statement. If a statement is inevitably of a fact—directly or indirectly, rightly or falsely—a statement about this statement would only be a secondary statement of the same fact. But of what fact or facts might the analytical theory be a statement? If there is a statement like 'This flower is red', the statement about this statement would be like 'That this flower is red is true'. But the analytical theory is not a secondary statement that way.

May it not be—one might still ask—a tertiary statement about 'truth' itself? The idea is this:

If the secondary statement 'That this flower is red is true' is about 'This flower is red', the analytical theory is a statement about 'That this flower is red is true'. As so about the secondary statement, it deals proximately with the 'truth' itself and is only ultimately about 'This flower is red', through the intermediate stage of being about 'That this flower is red is true'.

But this interpretation is faulty. In 'That this flower is red is true' one is still occupied vitally with the fact represented by the proposition 'This flower is red', not with *truth*. When, on the other hand, one concentrates on the predicate 'truth' of the

secondary proposition there is an immediately felt detachment from the particular content. The secondary proposition is but the primary itself made reflective and, therefore, in a sense tautologous. But the so-called tertiary one, unless it be the secondary one repeated in a useless manner¹ like "That this flower is red is true" is true", is no tertiary statement, in the sense of being a more delayed one, about the old primary content 'This flower is red'. The concentration on *truth* is not useless that way. Not merely earlier metaphysicians, even Logical Positivists and Analysts are serious with *truth*,² though in their own way. It would be of no avail, therefore, to contend that the analytical theory is a tertiary statement. It is not tertiary in the sense of being an extension of the secondary. If, then, a statement about *truth* is not useless, this *truth* itself would be a datum—a fact—though unlike any that the Logical Positivist is prepared to admit.

The Analyst has treated universals also in the same slipshod manner. Consider the propositions—(1) This (flower), (2) This is flower, and (3) Flower is a class such that The first represents a fact directly. Whether the second is a mere repetition or not of the first depends on whether or not the predicate 'flower' means anything over and above the given particular; and so long as these two propositions (1) and (2) alone are concerned there is no decision. The predicate appears indeed to mean something additional, but as the proposition (2) is reducible to (1)—the apparent novelty being ascribable to mere linguistic manipulation—one might, on the logic of parsimony, conclude that the novelty is nothing that is *meant*. But the third proposition is not so reducible. One is here definitely speaking about a universal. The universal is so far meant as a fact. Whether it is actually a fact or not is another question with which the Logical Positivist is not concerned. Fact, with him, is what is meant: he is not concerned with the ordinary problem of error. When he denies the facthood of the universal his idea is that it is never even meant. This is a sort of *apriori* condemnation of the universal, following from an analysis of language. We conclude that such *apriori* condemnation is hasty. The universal, as is evident in the third proposition

1. The repetition is useless in the sense that it can be multiplied *ad infinitum* without adding an iota of novelty, whether subjective or objective. The secondary statement was at least subjectively novel, but the tertiary and all later ones have not even that much of novelty.

2. The concepts of *fact*, *reality*, *object*, etc., are only variants or correlates of the concept of *truth*.

above, is at least meant and, so far, a fact.³ So is the case with *truth* or the universal called *fact*, *reality*, *object*, etc.

Once the universal flower is taken as a fact, the proposition (2) above needs a new interpretation. It may now be said that the predicate *flower* in that proposition means a universal, though not one apprehended as dissociate. The universal that is meant is meant as yet fused, in whatever way, with the particular given. The exact character of the universal and its fusion with particulars is a genuine problem with metaphysicians. It may be said that in 'This (flower)' the universal remains wholly fused with the given; in 'This is flower' it stands only half dissociated and, therefore, still in a form of fusion; and in 'The universal flower is such that ' it is meant in its dissociation. The propositions 'S is P' and 'That S is P is true' ought similarly to be reinterpreted in the light of a proposition like 'Truth is such that ' In the proposition 'Truth is such that ' truth is meant as a distinct fact; in 'That S is P is true' it is half distinguished and yet fused with 'S is P'; and in 'S is P' it stands wholly fused and, therefore, as yet undistinguished.

The *analytical theory* as a statement about truth, fact or reality is thus meaningful, and we have seen that it means a new fact. How would the Logical Positivist react to this? He might still contend, as suggested above, that it is only a statement about a *way of stating*. But if the older metaphysicians had a way of stating and the Logical Positivist another, what evidence is there—we ask—that the latter is tenable and the former not? Two kinds of evidence might be offered—formal and material. The Logical Positivist claims he has offered both: his way of stating is not merely more parsimonious, the simple propositions to which he reduces complicated ones directly represent facts. But the material evidence adduced is obviously dogmatic. We have just shown how there may be other types of fact, viz. the universal, truth, etc. If that is not convincing enough, there are other considerations. Does the conclusion of an *inference* mean a fact or not? And if so, how? That it means one goes without saying. The Analyst would attempt reducing this conclusion-proposition to simple ones by means of his new logic. He would say that the proposition in question is of the form 'If X and Y then Z', where X and Y are either them-

3. Wisdom, Ramsey and even Russell were fully aware of this difficulty and tried in various ways to reconcile this with their atomism. We have no space here to examine their views in detail.

selves simple propositions or reducible to simple ones. But, we reply, the conclusion of an inference is not of the form 'if—then'. At least one of the propositions in the antecedent clause is, in actual inference, a categorical proposition. The portion 'If X and Y' is, in actual inference, to be understood as 'If X, and Y', not 'If X and if Y', nor 'If X-and-Y'.

A word about Russell's *logical construction* would not be out of place here. Russell's 'knowledge about' is often a categorical statement, though indirect. He only means that such statements are to be reduced to, and therefore demonstrated as logically constructed out of, simple propositions. Are conclusion-propositions to be understood that way? Russell says that the proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is in the last analysis knowledge about some particulars in the past, called Caesar, Rubicon and crossing, of which particular things in the past there was some knowledge by acquaintance. Is the conclusion-proposition to be understood this way as knowledge about a past, future or distant particular or particulars?

Such interpretation would be faulty for many reasons. Logical construction is involved, according to Russell, as much in these cases of 'knowledge about' as in our knowledge of anything other than sense-data. Things and facts like 'This flower is red' are, in his opinion, logically constructed, which means that logical construction here is not of the same sort as one involved in the knowledge of the past, future and distant. There are indeed men who regard anything that is not known by acquaintance as *inferred*. We have no quarrel over terminology. We only like to point out that then all inferences are not of the same type. The conclusion-proposition does not mean the facts represented by the premise-propositions, and yet it means something. It cannot be said that what is meant here is just the following of the conclusion-proposition (or the corresponding fact) from the premise-propositions (or the corresponding facts), nor even the former-as-following. A proposition which could mean this last would only be a secondary proposition about the conclusion-proposition. When, therefore, the conclusion of an inference means a fact it is neither known by acquaintance nor a logical construct in the accepted sense of the term.

This is true as much of inference as of any other kind of indirect knowledge, viz. memory and knowledge through testimony. Propositions like 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' represent facts.

known either by memory or by inference or through testimony. Russell's attempt to reduce it to certain simple propositions would be like arguing in a circle. For, what evidence is there that there was a person called Caesar, a river called Rubicon, etc.? These were undoubtedly known by acquaintance; but how does Russell now know that they were once so known? He either remembers this or infers this or knows it through testimony. Even if we do not deny that genuine facts are necessarily to be known by acquaintance, we refuse to admit that all of them are so known by me and now. If they are so known by others or by me at other times, we cannot hold that their factuality is certified by acquaintance. That they were once known by acquaintance is irrelevant in the present context, as much as the Berkeleyan doctrine '*esse is percipi*'. Their factuality is certified by the fact that they are now remembered, inferred or known through testimony. The basic doctrine of the Analyst that acquaintance alone is the certificate of fact thus falls through.

There is thus no material evidence for the Analyst to prove that *their* simple propositions alone should represent facts. Can they bring in any formal evidence? They claim that their principle of parsimony is one such.

Without questioning for the present the exact scope of that principle we may yet point out that if by 'simple proposition' they mean one which cannot be reduced, then even memory-propositions, conclusion-propositions, etc. have to be taken as simple. Reduction must be wholesale or it is no reduction at all. Partial reduction always leaves a surd unreduced, and that surd at least has to be taken as simple; and, further, as the complex proposition here is not the surd *plus* the so-called simple constituents discovered, but as rather that surd has lent a unique colour to the entire complex proposition, partial reduction is of little value, except as a not ingenuous hope that one day the surd will be reduced. In the meantime, however, we have to put up with the surd.

Not that the analytical method of reduction is still good as an *ideal*. It is not binding on us that we should always attempt this type of reduction. The reduction that the science and philosophy of all ages have accepted as an ideal method is one of subsuming diverse particulars under a general rule and diverse rules under one that is still more general, and so on. The analytic reduction, on the other hand, proceeds the other way about. It always attempts reduction to the lowest particulars.

The Analyst might reply that fact-seeking is as much an ideal as conceptual colligation and that his method of reduction is only a way of seeking facts. We rejoin, however, that there is no way of seeking facts. Facts are given, and though we may like to have facts there is no *method* about that, no logic of fact-seeking. We may prepare ourselves in a way for correct appraisal of facts, as in experiment. But for all that facts are facts, and they are exactly so far as they are not due to our seeking. There is no *apriori* necessity that a complex appearance is to be reduced to simple constituents. The necessity of such reduction is felt only when we fail to manage a complex appearance, as in error. In other cases facts cannot be shaven off by Occam's razor. The principle of parsimony has nothing to do with facts. It is applicable only to hypotheses. Where only of two hypotheses one is more complex than another the latter is to be chosen. The Analyst does not know the exact scope of the principle of parsimony.

We have shown that over and above sensible facts there are also facts like universals, truth, etc. The most important distinction between the two types of fact is that while one is sensible the other is not. The latter may be called intelligible as distinct from sensible. The intelligible is not, however, the inferrible. Whatever is inferred is also sensible. That alone can be inferred which or the like of which was once sensed as associated with a mark sensed. The second type of facts or their like were not, on the other hand, sensed. The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* of Indian logicians will be of little help here. Whatever is inferred in that way is inferred as *temporally* connected with sensed facts, as either prior or posterior to these or as the *temporally* abiding substratum of which the sensed facts in question are accidents. But the intelligible is neither a cause nor an effect nor temporally abiding. It is not, as sometimes understood, a material cause. It is only the logical presupposition, an essence. If it is eternal it is so in the sense of being non-temporal, not 'in all times'.

The universal and truth are not inferred like the fire on a hill. We are somehow immediately aware of them. This does not mean that we perceive them through the sense. Through sense we perceive only sensible facts. If they already involve essences these also are, it is true, perceived in the same act; but they are not perceived as in themselves, as distinguished self-contained entities. In that act they are perceived as only undistinguishedly fused with sensible facts—maybe through complicated relations like *saṁ-yuktasamavāya*, *saṁyuktasamavetasamavāya*, etc. In themselves they are intuited in an altogether different act.

In themselves they are intuited through the use of language. When we perceive *this (flower)* we may speak out our knowledge, but we need not; and even when it is spoken out we feel that the knowledge as such had no need of the language. But essences cannot be known except as spoken. The universal flower cannot be known as even half distinct unless through the judgment 'This is flower', and the fully distinct universal is known only through the judgment 'The universal flower is such that...'. The very intuition of these essences is linguistic. Language, in these cases, is necessary not merely as a certificate for the facthood of the essence, as senses are in the case of sensible facts; it enters into their very nature. The language used may not be obvert, but it is language still. What is called *thought* is only a subtle form of speech.

That language constitutes essences can be proved in two successive steps: (1) thought constitutes essences, and (2) thought is subtle speech. That an essence is constituted, to whatever extent, by thought follows from the fact that *as essence* it was not perceived before, even though it *was* there. As not my creation it was assuredly there before I intuited it, and yet it was not then intuited as essence. If so, there was either a defect on my part or some intermediate obstruction or some defect in the essence itself. *Prima facie* there was no intermediate obstruction. To postulate one, like *ajñāna*, would be unnecessary till we have tested other explanations. There was, again, no specifiable defect on my side, and to postulate one would be equally unnecessary till one other explanation is tested. It cannot be argued that the defect on my side was that at that time I had not the requisite type of intuition. For, when there is no obstructing medium, no defect on the object side and none about the organ of intuition I am bound to intuit, if only I like. It cannot also be said that I had then no *capacity* for that intuition. That would mean either that the capacity is produced for the first time through a sort of training, or that a dormant capacity is awakened through the training; but in either case there would be difficulty. The very concept of capacity precludes the possibility of its *birth* — the capacity for X is but X as dormant; and *awakening of dormant capacity* is a phrase without meaning. A capacity is always a dormant state, there is no conceivable second dormancy of capacity — a sleeping man has no second sleep. It follows that there was no defect on my side. In the absence of obstructing medium and defect on my side, only one other alternative is left, *viz.* that there was some defect in the essence itself; and this is no unintelligible hypothesis.

It means that the essence had formerly remained undistinguishedly fused with sensible facts and that now it stands distinguished. It follows that an essence as essence is but the essence-as-distinguished. To distinguish it is only another name for 'to intuit it', so that thought which intuit it has entered into its body.

True, thought does not constitute it wholly. I never feel that thought has *created* it: it demands an existence of its own. Kant understood this demand as never to be fulfilled and, therefore, a dialectical illusion. But illusion or not, there is no gainsaying the demand. The demand, also, can conceivably be realised in two alternative ways. We may try elimination of subjective thought and gain approach to the essence by practising self-surrender; or we may turn inward to discover the last being of the essence in the self itself. In either case essence and existence would be identified, and the existence so reached would be truly metaphysical; the lower existences, down to that of the sensible, would only be symbolisations of that highest existence. A third way has sometimes been suggested. It is the way of discovering a universal self within me or actually universalising the individual me. But this third is scarcely more than an extension of the second method.

We have shown how thought constitutes essences. We have now to show that thought is implicit speech. Normally in philosophy, as in common parlance, this is taken for granted. When sometimes philosophers deny it they do it on two grounds. They find that the actual words used in language are empirically derived and not, therefore, parts of thought, thought so far being a process that only *employs* language, not itself subtle speech. The other ground they rely on is that language often oversteps thought.

Let us examine the grounds. Empirical words, borrowed from outside, may have been *employed* by thought, though even there the process of borrowing and employment is already mysterious. Whatever that may be, there are also many words — and by themselves they form a self-enclosed system — which are neither wholly borrowed nor employed. They are grammatical or logical words representing *apriori* classes of sensible facts and *apriori* syntactical relations. The actual *names* of these classes and relations are indeed empirical, in the sense of being conventions that vary from one empirical language to another. But underneath those empirical names there are pure words which coincide with pure thought, as being its very forms. These pure words, though always clad

in empirical conventions, are the different *apriori* forms of semantic and syntactical aspects of language, studied in their purity in logic which is universal grammar. These words, therefore, are not employed after being borrowed from outside: they form the very life of language. As such they are as much subjective, in being forms of pure speech, as objective in being pure essences, and we have already seen how these subjective and objective characters of essences are related to each other.

Many modern philosophers and linguists deny that there is anything like universal language. But this denial is self-defeating. One who speaks out this denial, say, in English, wishes at the same time to be understood by others who do not know English, and this implies that he believes in a common language for all. This is not, again, a mere faith, never to be actualised. As a matter of fact, he can learn other peoples' languages, and this would not have been possible except through a common language. Some primitive languages may lack some pure forms, but the very assertion of this lack points to a universal language. Some advanced languages, again, may have put in some newer forms; but this is due, as will be shortly seen, to a peculiar freedom of language. That people speaking different languages understand one another is a proof positive for the universal language.

Logic is a study of some forms of this pure language. We deliberately say 'some forms', because it will be shown immediately that there are some other forms which logic cannot recognise. We have seen that the forms of language are as much forms of speaking as objective essences, and we have also seen that the essences are the essences of sensible facts. Logic studies those forms which as essences are in this way connected with sensible facts. Aristotle might have missed, or deliberately ignored, some of these forms, and modern logicians may have rightly included them. But they cannot say they are not studying essences of *sensible facts*. Their generalised logic is not generalised enough. There are limits within which the generalisation operates, and the limits are determined ultimately in deference to sensible facts, otherwise called 'actuality'. Language in its freedom may overstep this limit. The sentence 'S is not S', for example, is grammatically all right, though even the most generalised logic would spurn it as even formally absurd. A less shocking, but never logically interpretable, sentence is 'A is identical with itself' or 'A has its identity', the identity of a thing being never logically distinguishable from the thing and usable as its predicate. It is language as free that can go beyond

even the limits of logic. Logic is still an anticipation of reality⁴ — inductive logic through empirical universals and formal logic through pure essences. But language in its freedom need not so anticipate.

Language thus enters into the body of essences, and yet it need not anticipate sensible facts. We have also seen that sensible facts themselves are not constituted by language, though as involving essences they ought to have been so regarded. This makes relevant the problem as to the metaphysical status of language. As constituting essences it is not a mere instrument as the Logical Positivist would like. Yet as not constituting sensible facts it appears to have no metaphysical import. As mere instrument of philosophy and science, again, it cannot be used in any way one likes. The use, we have seen, is determined in whatever way by the anticipation of sensible facts. The function of language is thus intriguing enough. The solution that we only suggest here is (1) that though thought as subtle speech is the highest that philosophy can attain, yet as speaking consciousness it puts in a demand for mere consciousness which is behind even thought as subtle speech, (2) that this demand for mere consciousness may or may not be realised, (3) that speech or *logos*, though it is felt as speaking consciousness, puts in another demand, in another direction, for another principle in association with which mere consciousness has become speaking consciousness, and which in association with mere consciousness has become conscious speech, (4) that the demand for this other principle may or may not be realised, (5) that as pure object this other principle, if at all realisable, can be realised through the self-annihilation of consciousness, (6) that if not realisable, it is only an indefinite fringe round mere consciousness, a fringe which has to be understood in terms of mere consciousness only, understood, that is to say, as either a function of mere consciousness or just its negation, (7) that pure essences are but forms of conscious speech, and the forms of speaking consciousness are the forms of subjective thinking, (8) that none of the facts mentioned till now are sensible facts, otherwise called natural (even mental facts are natural and sensible), (9) that the forms of conscious speech and speaking consciousness are essences

4. In formal logic the anticipation is not conscious. When forms consciously anticipate sensible facts the study of these forms as so consciously anticipating would be what is called *transcendental logic*.

of sensible facts, and yet some of them may not be such essences, being due to the freedom of speech, already mentioned, and therefore serving as a warning to those who in philosophy depend too much on language, (10) that empirical universals, though citizens of the ideal world, belong equally to the natural world of sensible facts, (11) that space, time and probably also number are equally amphibious, (12) that these amphibious entities are the points of contact between the ideal and the natural worlds, (13) that though sensibility is a criterion for naturalness, the characteristic of the natural is that it is *actual*, actuality being no category, but just the stamp of the natural, and lastly (14) that the actual is as much a self-complete world having for its organising principles the *actual* space, time, number and the empirical universals, as the ideal world of essences straight up to the *logos*; and pure consciousness that transcends even *logos* is in its turn a wholly indescribable, but quite feelable, self-complete demand.

As the actual world which is natural and sensible is self-complete, Positivism is fundamentally a correct doctrine. But, historically, the Positivist has blundered in two ways. (1) He has not seen that a philosophy of the ideal world is equally possible, and (2) language, for him, has usurped the function of space, time, number and empirical universals. Sense-data alone do not constitute the actual world. Discrete sense-data are made into a continuous world through space, time, number and empirical universals, and probably also through the empirical unity of self so far as the natural psychical world is concerned. The right task of the Positivist ought to have been to translate all philosophy into the language of sense-data and these principles, not to separate language-forms from sense-data and dismiss them as no facts. The worst part of it is that he could not keep away from all language-forms. His simple facts are yet in the form of a proposition like 'This is flower', 'This flower is red', etc. Are not these propositions already functions of language? Even simple categorical propositions are more than barely sensible facts — the copula 'is' standing not merely for the sensible relation between the sensible facts that correspond to the subject and the predicate, but being also a descriptive tie. The *actual* relation meant by it is a relation by means of space, time, number, empirical universals, etc. The *kṣāṇikatvavādi* Buddhists, including the earlier Vaibhāṣikas who admitted *ākāśa*, *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* and *apratisaṅkhyānirodha*, and probably also Hume and Mill with their principle of association, were more consistent than modern Positivists and Analysts.

If Positivism is one-sided, equally so is the case with modern Phenomenology. Aware of the limitation of naturalism it has indeed discovered the world of essences. But like Kant in the First Critique the Phenomenologist has treated them as mere *pre-suppositions*, not as existent facts (though of a different order). To start with, they as not natural do not indeed appear as *actual* facts. But the essences discovered continuously put forth a *demand*, not yet a realised one, for existence; and we have seen how when the phenomenological voyage is complete we discover also ways to realising the demand.

The Dilemma of Religious Art

by

REV. J. F. BUTLER, M.A., A.M., PH.D.

In this paper I am taking a work or experience of art to be the creation of an object or experience of beauty, generally compounded with some other value of purpose, meaning or expression; and I am taking the compound which thus results to be an 'organic whole' in G. E. Moore's sense of that phrase, *i.e.*, the value of the whole can be, and generally is, greater than the value of the sum of its parts.

I have here to offer that definition dogmatically, because its full justification would need a whole large treatise on aesthetics. Briefly, I hold to it because it seems to me, not of course to account for any and every judgment of taste or view about art in general or about particular works of art (obviously no definition could conceivably do that), but to enable a reasonable account to be given of our whole range of aesthetic experience and aesthetic problems. It enables one, for instance, to become clear about why an arabesque has value, but a Rembrandt has more; why the beauty of nature is not utterly diverse from that of art, but is by no means the same; and so on and so on.

Religious art, on this view, will be an organic whole of beauty fused with religious ideas or feelings or purposes. Thus the theophany in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* combines beauty with religious idea; a temple combines beauty with religious purpose; both have also an element of religious feeling.

Other things being equal, religious art, just because it is religious, excels other types of art. This is because of the superior value of the religious ideas and feelings over the non-religious ones, whether because they simply are so, axiologically, or because, psychologically, they stir deeper and wider areas of our being. Even non-religious people will generally admit that the idea of God is in itself a nobler and fuller concept than that of, say, sexual love, and much nobler and fuller than, say, a geometrical formula. Thus, a poetic statement going deep into the ultimate nature of things (such as the Christian prayer: 'Increase and multiply upon

us Thy mercy; that, Thou being our ruler and guide, we may so pass through things temporal, that we finally lose not the things eternal') stirs us, by its beauty matching the depth of its idea, more than can an equally beautiful statement about a more trivial thing, (like A. E. Housman's lyric: "Loveliest of trees, the cherry now Is hung with bloom along the bough ...'). The El Greco 'Resurrection' in the Prado, Madrid, ranks above the Velasquez 'Rokeby Venus' in the National Gallery, London, because the beautiful representation of a great spiritual experience is a more profound thing than the most perfect study of flesh tones and the curves of the female body. The secular pavilions at Āgra have their charm; the Tāj with its message of mortality is of a higher order of art.

Of course, the 'other things' are not always 'equal'; and then a religious content may not suffice to nullify aesthetic deficiencies. For example, the sentimentality of Gounod's 'Ave Maria' makes it a less fine piece of music than a first-class purely secular song like Handel's "Where'er you walk'. But the finest religious music (a Bach chorale or fugue) excels the finest secular music (say, Mozart's *The Magic Flute*). If due provisos are made, we can say that art reaches its climax in religious art.

In spite of this, religious art seems to be in an all but impossible position. Its dilemma, put epigrammatically, is this — Without religion, it is impossible; with religion, it is superfluous.

Without religion, religious art is impossible. It is quite impossible for its creator. No one could create religious art, of any true quality, unless he knew religion, of as high a level as the religion in his art, at first hand, from the 'inside experience'. His art can indeed be *less* religious than he is (for instance, Haydn was as sincerely a religious man as Bach, and more consistently intended a religious message in his music; yet he was a much less religious musician); but it cannot be *more* religious than he is. On comparatively low levels of art, or in the treatment of artistic themes not the highest, some measure of insincerity, while it prevents the highest levels of art, does not prevent high ones, and indeed may not be without a certain charm of its own: the foppishness of Watteau's love-scenes, for instance, or the empty sensuousness of the later Greek Aphrodites or of the female form in some periods of Hindu work, does not prevent them from having much beauty; the rhetoric of a Lucan or a Wilde makes *fin-de-siècle* art, but art good of its kind. But religious art, if insincere

(and under 'insincerity' here I include not only or primarily moral hypocrisy, but that more subtle sense in which artists are insincere if they stand outside their subject) is spoiled far more than is, say, erotic art by insincerity. For in the 'organic whole' which is a piece of religious art sincerity raises the value very high, insincerity drags it low. Therefore religious art of any high quality requires, in the creator, a religious power equal to that of the religion he expresses. When Aquinas wrote '*O Esca viatorum*' and El Greco painted 'The Burial of Count Orgáz', they were 'in the heavenlies': when the Sārnāth sculptor carved the greatest of the Buddhas there, he had seen deep into the meaning of *nirvāṇa*; the sculptor of the *Trimūrti* at Elephanta or of the Sleeping Viṣṇu at Māmallapuram had seen deep into the mystery of creation.

It is somewhat, though not entirely, the same, with religious art as known to the performer or the spectator rather than to the creator. Performer and spectator do not have the same absolute need of sharing the experience, but they have much of it. For instance, I have heard many French organists play Barch impeccably, even brilliantly, and yet make him sound dull, because by temperament they simply could not begin to know what he was saying. I can only guess at what is the experience of an atheist before a great work of religious art; so far as one can judge from difficult reports, it is a state partly of incomprehension, partly of suspension of the unbelief. Without a sharing of the faith, the art of the faith cannot be either made or apprehended.

Yet, if the faith is there, the art would seem to be superfluous. I can only imperfectly follow the experience of those who know the depths of prayer; but my interpretation of the reports of the great masters of prayer is that they find in it an experience which makes any aesthetic experience — creative, or interpretative, or appreciative — by comparison a waste of time. No one who has seen or heard a man really in prayer could wish him to distract himself with anything else, for anything else is so much less.

That is, I take it, the root cause of the strong 'puritan' strain in all religions. (Perhaps the word 'puritan' is not ideal, since it derives from a historical Protestant Christian movement, and saddles it with an anti-artistic prejudice, whereas its leaders included Brown, one of the best lutanists of his day, and Milton, one of the best organists and quite the best poet of his age, as well as a few cranks and iconoclasts. Dom Gregory Dix is suggestive but incomplete in his thesis that the essence of puritanism is an exaltation

of speech over sight or sound as the paramount religious medium. But the word 'puritan' has come to stay; and its essence should be sought in the fact that direct religious experience is of such high value as automatically to tend to extrude other values from life by virtue of its sheer surpassingness of merit.) In Christianity, it begins in the Bible, notably in the stress on the 'one thing needful': e.g., Matt. 10: 39 and parallels; 1 Cor. 1: 26-31; Phil. 3: 7-11. (Matt. 6: 28 = Luke 12: 27, Phil. 4: 8, and the literary artistry of Christ's parables are cited on the other side, but they are pale and inconclusive by comparison). It continues in the anti-Hellenism of part of the Early Church. In Greek Orthodoxy, it reaches a climax in the (literal) 'Iconoclasts'; in Roman Catholicism, it appears in the Cistercian movement, and in such episodes as Aquinas' famous renunciation of further writing after his ineffable vision; in Protestantism, there is rather more of this trend, with climaxes in the deliberate plainness of the 'Quakers' and such writings as Milton's deliberate renunciation (in a poem!) of all his beloved extra-Biblical culture in *Paradise Regained*, IV, 195-364. In Islam, it is seen not merely in the prohibition of portraiture and animal design (which can be accounted for by the narrower motive of giving no occasion to idolatry), but also in some quite fierce anti-artistic movements in occasional times and places. In Hinduism, which of all the great religions perhaps most naturally finds its feelings overflowing into art, it is nevertheless implicit in the concept of the *saṁnyāsin*, who in the final stage of the religious life (not till then, it is true; but nevertheless then) renounces social life, and with it the arts. There is at least the appearance of sound reason in this constantly recurring trend. For why should one who has seen God and could see Him again trouble to look at anything else? Can other things, indeed, be anything other than distractions and snares?

A seer who has reached his religious goal, and yet continues to trouble himself with art, even religious art, would seem to be in the same kindly but illogical position as a Buddhist Tathāgata. A Tathāgata is enlightened enough to be capable of *nirvāṇa*, and to the enlightened *nirvāṇa* is the only real good; and yet out of pity for mankind (surely possible only for one still feeling separateness) he continues to live and deal with lesser things.

I am not at all sure as to how far this dilemma can fully be met. But I would suggest an approach to an answer, in two parts. The distinction between the two parts rests on Aquinas' distinc-

tion between man as he is on his pilgrimage (*in via*) and man as he is in his Homeland with God (*in patria*)—a distinction which can, for present purposes at any rate, be paralleled in the Hindu distinction between the states of *avidyā* or *māyā* and their opposites.

While he is *in via*, a man's glimpses of his religious goal are only fitful and transitory. For himself, therefore, he needs help to make them more constant and steady. And, if he or his community have been granted revelation above the average, he owes a duty to his fellows to help them in their path to vision; he thus needs media of what may be called, in the widest and quite unpejorative sense, religious propaganda. Partly these helps can be given to himself and others by the moral values of righteousness and by the intellectual values of truth: but in increasing and communicating a vision of the Ineffable art has its part, perhaps the major part, to play. For instance, my own attitude to death has been helped immeasurably by the conclusions of the First and Second Parts of *The Pilgrim's Progress*; and, if I have occasion to expound the purpose of life, I refer my interrogators to the final three cantos of Dante's *Paradiso*.

This use of art, 'in training one's own religious vision and assisting others,' becomes more intelligible if we recall (as against much modern over-individualism in aesthetics) the social nature and function of art as an interplay of personalities, a communal *līlā*, and still more if we accept, as I do personally, C. G. Jung's doctrine that certain basic ideas, many of them religious, figured forth in certain universal symbolisms, lie in the 'collective unconscious', which in some way as yet unexplained transcends our private consciousnesses, and the main key to which is art. (Some of the implications of this have been worked out for Indian temple-art by Dr. Stella Kramrisch; with explicit reference to Jung, they have been applied to Western poetry by Miss Maud Bodkin, and to world-wide architecture by the late Professor W. R. Lethaby; but much work on these lines yet remains to be done).

In via, then, religious art is in a sense eclipsed by religious vision, but in another sense it flourishes under its shadow. It is not possible either to create or to contemplate art during the actual moments of deepest religious insight; but such insights are recalled and assisted and propagated by their 'recollection in tranquillity' (to give a special twist to Matthew Arnold's phrase) as they are translated into art and the translation is read.

The second part of my approach to an answer concerns the place of beauty *in patria*. Can we be so sure, though at first sight it seems obviously necessary, that the total Vision of God will exclude beauty—specifically 'religious' beauty, 'secular' artistic beauty, commonplace earthy beauty? I do not suggest that a redeemed soul will or could in eternity prefer to contemplate religious pictures instead of God Himself; but I do suggest that the types of experience represented by the religious picture, the humanist picture and contemplation of a landscape, as distinct from pure religious ecstasy, are not abolished. In the great Christian symbolizing of eternal life in God, the *Paradiso* of Dante, the key passage is canto xxxiii, 82-90, and there it is explicitly taught that in the Beatific Vision not only is God seen, but all creation is seen in Him. Christian mysticism of the Traherne type declares the same. I hesitate to pronounce as to the content of other people's faiths; but it does seem to me that if Hinduism takes seriously its recently much-stressed doctrines that *māyā* is not mere illusion, and that *mukti*, *mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa*, *samādhi*, so far from being emptiness, are infinite fulness of being, then fruitful parallels can be drawn between the Hindu and the Christian conceptions of eternal life. So here, as with so many philosophical problems, we end in the mystery of the One and the Many!

In conclusion—Do not many of the problems I have here touched on cry out for fuller treatment by scholars of the East and the West working in co-operation?

Inward and Outward Advaita Vedanta

by

D. M. DATTA

Advaita Vedānta teaches all-round non-dualism. It tries to establish the ultimate untenability of the apparent duality of cause and effect, subject and object, Brahman and the world, and Brahman and the individual. If one accepts the truth of Advaita (non-dualism), in which direction should one try for its assimilation (*paripāka*) in life? Inwards, or outwards, or both ways, or in neither of these ways?

It is very often said that not only Advaita, but Indian spiritual discipline in general is a process of inward deepening, and a consequent withdrawal from the outer world. It is also very often supposed that the concern for society and the world so often found in modern Indian Vedantic thinkers is really a result of the impact of western thought, and has little or no roots in ancient Vedānta.

We shall try to show here that this wide-spread idea does not represent even half the truth about even Advaita discipline (*sādhana*) which has to grapple with the outer and the inner, dive in and plunge out, withdraw as well as expand, and even transcend these opposing attitudes based on a mistaken distinction between the outer and the inner. Let us consider these different phases of Advaita discipline, step by step, and try to understand their significance for the Advaita goal.

I

Assuming the central truth of Advaita Vedanta that Brahman is the sole self-subsistent, immutable reality underlying all changing outer and inner phenomena, and is the highest value, it is easily seen that the two most obvious obstacles to the assimilation of this truth are the outer world and the inner ego (*aham*), both of which claim independent reality and value, and generate perpetual attachment and entanglement.

It is to get over the first obstacle that Vedānta, from the earliest Upaniṣadic times, recommends, in addition to reasoning, withdrawal (*dama*) of the senses from the objects (*viṣaya*) of the world, withdrawal (*śama*) of the mind too, and abstinence (*uparati*) from desires for objects. The inward retraction is the reversal (*parāvṛtti*) of the outgoing (*parāk*) tendency of subtler, inner (*pratyak*) forces. The subtle (*sūkṣma*) cravings (*vāsanā*) for objects generate ideas of objects in the intellect (*buddhi* or *viñāna*); these, in their turn, impel the sense-ward mind (*manas*) to flow through some outer sense (*indriya*) to an external object (*viṣaya*), which is obtained or avoided with the help of the motor organs, according as it is pleasant or unpleasant. This pleasure-seeking mechanism progressively externalizing itself encrusts, so to say, the Ātman (or Brahman) in a fivefold sheath (*pañchakośa*)¹ composed of pleasure (*ānanda*) intellect (*viñāna*), mind (*manas*), sensory vital organs (*prāṇa*) and the outer body (*annamaya śarīra*). Identification of the Ātman with this mechanism turns it into a finite and selfish ego (*aḥam*) and entangles it in the world. Inward attention and retraction are necessary for dissociating the Ātman or true self from this fivefold entangling mechanism that enslaves the self, and makes it run after the perishable objects of the world in search of pleasures that allure it, but never satisfy it. Inwardization of the mind is the logical result of the philosophic conviction (about objects being devoid of abiding value) which causes non-attachment (*vairāgya*). The inward search for Ātman, the real, abiding self of man, is also pursued, in another way, through the states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, ascertaining thereby that objects are not necessary for the self's intrinsic consciousness which persists even in dreamless sleep wherein objects disappear.

This inwardizing tendency is noticed throughout the history of Indian thought, and not only in Vedānta, but also in all other non-materialistic schools which believe that the world of outer objects is an obstacle to spiritual progress. So renunciation (*tyāga*), non-attachment (*vairāgya*), sense-control (*indriya-nigraha*), abstinence (*nivṛtti*), inward vision (*antardṛṣṭi*) and self-introspection (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) have passed current in Indian literature

1. Taittirīya, 2.1-5.
2. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4.3.

as terms of praise. There is no doubt again that this has been more true of the monistic Advaita Vedānta, which admits Brahman as the only ultimate reality and value, than of the dualistic or pluralistic systems.

II

But this is only one side of the picture, even in respect of Advaita, not to speak of the other schools of thought. As we have seen, the Advaitin has to practise withdrawal and retraction, not for its own sake, but for being able to dissociate and discriminate his real self (*ātman*) not only from the outer objects, but also from the subtler and inner sheaths by identification with which the self behaves, through ignorance, as a finite and selfish ego (*aḥam*). To get rid of the ego is a much more difficult part of the Advaitin's *sādhana* than to withdraw from the outer world. An aspirant who only succeeds in restraining his outer organs and activities, but fails to control the inner mechanism with which the pleasure-seeking ego tries to entangle the self, falls a prey to lethargy and self-deception. It has been so often the case that the Bhagavad-Gītā has to warn even Arjuna against such a perverted introversion: "One who arrests the organs of action, and yet inwardly thinks of sensuous objects confounds himself; he is called a deceiver".³

As the ego is nothing but the self assuming, under infatuation, the changing roles of a perceiver, actor, and enjoyer, the Advaitin tries to rise above the bondage of the ego by concentration on unchanging consciousness as such which abides through all the changing modes of it. For him, that is the self (*ātman*) or the reality underlying man. Reality, as Śaṅkara⁴ conceives it, is the immutable (*avyabhichārī*) ground of all changing phenomena. Rising above the inner phenomena the Advaitin tries to look at them as a detached and unchanging witnessing consciousness (*sākṣi-chaitanya*).⁵ He cultivates then the attitude of a witness towards the outer world as well. This helps him attain the peak of subjective consciousness (*kūṭastha-chaitanya*).⁶

3. Gītā, 3.6.
4. On Chhāndogya, 6.2.2, et passim.
5. Pañchadaśī, 3.22.
6. Ibid., Kūṭastha-dīpa.

from where he can look on objects with a dispassionate attitude, and loosen the ties (*granthi*) of the selfish ego.

But even this, though enough for the dualistic Sāṅkhya, is not the last step for the monistic Advaita. The attitude of the witness (*sākṣin*) implies the witnessed world that confronts it. The peak (*kūṭa*) implies the surrounding phenomenal plains. The Advaitin must transcend this duality, the sense of being excluded by something which spells for him confinement in the subjective. He can overcome this obstacle of subjectivity by making the ego realize that the immutable self, or the reality in which it is grounded, is also the self or reality underlying the outer world. "He who is in man, He who is in the Sun, He is one".⁷ "That which is here (in the self) is out there, that which is there is here. One who sees as if there were many gets into veritable death".⁸ The feeling of unity with the infinite reality (Brahman) enables the ego to burst the confines of narrow subjectivity, and expand into unfettered self or Ātman that utters: "I am Brahman".⁹ Without this expansion, even in spite of the deepest inwardization into pure subjectivity, that great Upaniṣadic saying can but mean, "I am Brahman", reducing Brahman to only one of its aspects.

The inward search for the reality in man, and the inner realization are, therefore, logically incomplete without the outward search, and realization that the same Brahman is the Ātman, the Reality underlying the inner and the outer. From the earliest times, therefore, we find in the Upaniṣads the patient causal enquiry into the immutable ground of all changing outer phenomena, and the ultimate discovery of the abiding Reality (Sat) persisting through all changes. The result is summed up by the great dictum — "All this is Brahman".¹⁰ The Upaniṣads prescribe a series of meditations on different natural objects as the manifestations of Brahman.¹¹ For a complete spiritual education of Arjuna the Gītā makes him see God manifested in the different orders of existence in the Universe.¹² It says, "One

7. Taittiriya, 3.10.4.

8. Katha, 4.10.

9. Brhadāranyaka, 1.4.10.

10. Chhāndogya, 3.14.1.

11. Ibid., et passim.

12. Gītā, Chap. 11.

who has contacted the Self through yoga sees, with an equal eye, the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self". "He who sees me (God) everywhere, and sees every thing in me, never misses me".¹³ Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara in his various works, and all the major exponents of Śaṅkara's Advaita system carry forward the early tradition, stressing the necessity of realizing Brahman within and without.

One who has realized the Advaita truth in its fulness experiences an ecstatic expansion of his self, as reported in the Upaniṣads and later Advaita works. "One who knows 'I am Brahman', he becomes it all". "Knowing this the sage, Vāmadeva, felt 'I have become Manu, and also the Sun'".¹⁴ Śaṅkara echoes this utterance of the Brhadāranyaka in his Upadeśa-sāhasrī in which the enlightened soul exclaims, "I am all-pervasive (*sarvagata*)". His great follower, Vidyāraṇya, describes, in his famous book of Advaita realization, how the world of objects (*viśaya*) reflects, to a person who has realized Brahman, the infinite joy (*ānanda*) that Brahman is.¹⁵

It should be clear, therefore, that the complete and integral Advaita discipline must be both inwards and outwards. But if we remember that the inner and the outer are only physical images applicable literally only to the world of distinctions, we must also say that ultimately this discipline culminates, in a unitary experience which "knows neither the outer, nor the inner".¹⁶ So it can be said that those who think of Advaita as an inward withdrawal do not get at even half the truth.

III

If this integral teaching of Advaita Vedānta is grasped, it is not difficult to see that by showing that the real self of man is one with the Self of the universe, and by removing thereby the belief in the narrow ego that prompts all selfish, and anti-social impulses, Advaita can positively promote a genuine love and regard for fellow beings, so necessary for moral activity, social ser-

13. Ibid., 6.29-30.

14. Brhadāranyaka, 1.4.10 Cf. Taittiriya, 3.10.6;—"Aham viśvam bhuvanam abhyabhavam."

15. Pañchadaśī, Chap. 15.

16. Brhadāranyaka, 4.3.21.

vice and human harmony. The whole of the *Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad*, among the earliest monistic works, is devoted to the strong denunciation of one-sided, lethargic spirituality as being worse than even blind worldliness. It presents an integral, balanced outlook that reconciles knowledge and action, enjoyment and renunciation, being and becoming, the mundane and the spiritual. On a much larger scale the *Gītā* presents also the same integral philosophy of life, particularly emphasizing the importance of the social and moral qualities necessary for the realization of Brahman. The great *Purāṇa*, the *Bhāgavata*, teaches the *threefold Advaita*, to be cultivated (a) in thought, by trying to realize the presence of one reality underlying all causes and effects, (b) in action, by replacing the ego by Brahman as the centre of all efforts, in thought, speech and outer bodily movements, (c) and in feeling by trying to realize the unity that underlies the diverse interests and desires of oneself and other beings (who represent, in fragmentary ways, the Brahman, the ultimate enjoyer of all objects).^{17 18} This monistic belief in all men being the finite manifestations of one Brahman logically leads the *Bhāgavata* to conceive an ideal social organization based on love (*prema*), friendship (*maitrī*), kindness (*kṛpā*), forbearance (*upekṣā*) and non-attachment (*asaṅga*). Applying the last principle to material possession, the *Bhāgavata* lays down a striking code for personal property and social justice: "Every person has a right to as much as would fill his belly. He who owns more is a thief; he deserves punishment."¹⁹

Śaṅkarāchārya systematized logically the earlier monistic ideas, and founded the regular Advaita school. Though he distinguished the world of finite, transitory and relative objects from the immutable, infinite and absolute reality, called Brahman, he distinguished the former also from the subjective world of dreams and hallucinations, and also, of course, from the utterly unreal objects like the son of a barren woman. The world was, for him, a manifestation of Brahman, and grounded in Brahman.²⁰ Taken in this philosophical perspective, the world points to its ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*); its values can be, and should be, utilized and re-organized for the attainment of Brahman, the Absolute Value (*paramārtha*).²¹ The instrumental values alone can lead to the

17 & 18. *Bhāgavata*, 7.15.62-65.

19. *Bhāgavata*, 11.2.45-46, 7.14.

20. His *Bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*. 2.1.14-20.

21. *Ibid.*, 2.1.11.

ultimate value. It is through the world that Brahman can be attained. Śaṅkara's life and teachings reflect, therefore, the integral outlook in which the transitory and the immutable, the finite and the infinite, the means and the end are logically integrated in a system of ascending grades of reality and value, in which social organization (*loka-saṅgraha*)²² also had an important place. This outlook is aptly named by K. C. Bhattacharya as "spiritual realism."²³

During the decadent period of Indian social life, the fuller Advaita of Śaṅkara became divorced from life (*Vyavahara*), and became a mere intellectual sport in the hands of some followers, some of whom even developed a kind of solipsism (*drstisrsti-vada*) tending to grant a moral holiday, and "encouraging a premature quietism".²⁴

In revitalizing Indian life, the leaders of modern Indian renaissance—Ram Mohan Roy, Vivekananda, Tilak, Tagore, Gandhi, Aurovindo, Vinoba and others—hark back to the integral outlook of the earlier Vedānta. It must be admitted that the impact of the West and the pressure of modern circumstances made the great modern Indians dig down to earlier teachings for a sounder philosophical foundation of personal and national life, suiting spiritual traditions and the demands of mundane conditions. So, while shifting emphasis to the outer world and practical life, none lost sight of the spiritual values to which the personal, social and national life should be progressively affiliated.

It is found thus that, except for some occasional mispresentations during periods of decadence, Advaita Vedānta tries to give due importance to the outer life in the world, as to the inner life; it is not a philosophy of one-sided withdrawal alone. As Ramana Maharshi, the great Advaita saint of recent times,—whose sole teaching was "Know thyself"—used to say, "Absolute is the self of the cosmos and of every being. Therefore by seeking his self, by the constant investigation, Who am I?, it is possible for a man to realize his identity with the Universal Being."²⁵ "Since we say

22. *Bhāṣya* on *Gītā*, 3.20.

23. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, P. 122 (Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956).

24. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

25. *Ramana Maharshi* (by Arthur Osbourne, Rider & Co.), p. 82.

that Being is one, we ascribe full reality to the world, and what is more, we ascribe full reality to God; but by saying that there are three (i.e. individual, world and God) you give only one-third reality to the world, and you only give one-third reality to God."²⁶

K. C. Bhattacharya, the great recent exponent of Advaita, while laying great stress on "inwardization," says:

"Advaitism as religion and philosophy in one is at once individualistic and universalistic in its spiritual outlook."²⁷ "It is for the strong in spirit to attain the self, and strength consists not in ignoring but in accepting facts—accepting the conditions of the spiritual game in order to get beyond them."²⁸

26. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

27. *Op. cit.* p. 119.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

On the Metaphysical Status of "Past-Present-Future" *

by

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I shall address myself here to the problem whether the framework of modern physics admits of a "past-present-future" series in time as well as a "before-after" series. As is well known, McTaggart and Bergson argued, from widely different standpoints, that the distinctions of "past-present-future" are intrinsically bound up with our awareness of time. Broad argued, in an elaborate fashion, that a language which permits the temporal relations of "preceding" and "following", but not the temporal copulas ("was", "is", "will be"), tends to break down somewhere. My purpose is to find out whether there is anything in modern physical and cosmological speculation which is *incompatible* with the usual assumption of "past-present-future". I shall submit, first, that no incompatibility can be established, at least in the present state of scientific knowledge and, secondly, that the *metaphysical* problems stemming from the temporal copulas cannot be solved by empirical and linguistic analyses.

The time of awareness has three distinguishing sets of peculiarities. The temporal relation of "before-after" is a dyadic, serial, asymmetrical and transitive relation. But this is not all there is to it. A conventionally defined dyadic and serial relation of "preceding" and "following" can be generated from various postulates relating to "linear betweenness" which orders the points of an ordinary line. There is, therefore, a limited analogy between "temporal between" and "linear between" as it figures in geometry and the theory of real numbers. But whereas the time of awareness is "anisotropic" in so far as it distinguishes intrinsically the direction "before" from the direction "after", the ordinary geometrical line is "isotropic" or "bi-directional" in that it does

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not *intrinsically* distinguish each of its two directions from the opposite. A further observation is necessary. Our ordinary notions of "becoming" imply a *march of events* in the *privileged direction*, "future". The "anisotropy" of "before" and "after" is perhaps a *necessary* but not a *sufficient* condition of "past-present-future". If time were analogous to a closed, Riemannian line (the points of which are in a cyclical order¹ (i.e. not ordered by the "linear between" of ordinary geometry), not only the "anisotropy" of "before" and "after" but also the "uni-directionality" of "becoming" would fail to hold in the universe at large. Are there compelling reasons for adopting such unorthodox, mathematical representations of cosmical or local time in modern scientific speculation?

It may be said that the cause-effect relation is dyadic and asymmetrical and that, to the extent physics uses the relation at all, it stands committed to temporal "before-after", since the cause may be said *generally* to "precede" its effect. Unfortunately, the precise mathematical formulations of "causality" in physics do not seem to distinguish the "forward" (+t) from the "backward" (-t) direction of time.² The causal laws of physics are differential equations which do not contain *t* explicitly; given a finite number of parameters, some variable or set of variables is uniquely determined by others irrespective of temporal "before" and "after".³ In fact, the equations confront us with the legitimate

1. H. P. Manning, *Geometry of Four Dimensions* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1914), p. 29, footnote; R. Courant and H. Robbins, *What is Mathematics?* (Oxford University Press, London, 1941), Ch. iv, § 5.

2. The differential equation of a particle vibrating with simple harmonic motion may be set down as

$$\frac{d^2x}{dt^2} + \omega^2 x = 0.$$

The solution, i.e. $x = A \cos(\omega t - \delta)$, is satisfied by the two values of time: +t and -t. The solution which uses -t describes the reversed motions. See V. F. Lenzen, *The Nature of Physical Theory* (John Wiley, New York, 1931), p. 292.

3. The equations of motion of a pendulum, with length *l* (a practically massless bar attached to a massive bob), local acceleration due to terrestrial gravity *g*, deflection θ , and spin φ , are

$$d\theta/dt = \varphi \text{ (say); } d\varphi/dt = -(g/l) \sin \theta.$$

The change of either variable, θ , φ , depends only on the instantaneous state itself (θ , φ) and not on the *date* of this state, i.e., the indication by a clock. Multiplying the second equation by φ , it is possible to show that

$$\frac{1}{2} \varphi^2 + \frac{g}{l} \cos \theta = E \quad (\text{the integral of energy), constant}$$

See L. Silberstein, *Causality* (Macmillan, London, 1933), pp. 128-9.

"reversibility of motions". If the motions of all particles in classical physics are reversed, the particles will retrace their paths. K. R. Popper⁴ has recently questioned the widespread belief that classical mechanics is competent to describe only "reversible" processes and R. Schlegel⁵ has argued that certain solutions of the equation of Newton's second law signify a lack of reversibility. Popper, however, grants that the "arrow of time" is not implied by the "fundamental equations" and Schlegel concedes that the equation of Newton's second law (in a convenient one-dimensional form) is reversible in the sense: (a) that it is the same with the use of either two positive or two negative differential increments of time; and (b) that if it is integrated with a force (*F*) which is a function of space (*x*), the path obtained after a velocity reversal is the reverse of the original path.⁶ The fundamental laws of classical mechanics and dynamics are, in an important sense, "symmetrical" with respect to time and fail to provide us with the "anisotropy" of "before" and "after".

Classical thermodynamics, by contrast, does seem to provide us with an asymmetrical ordering by temporal "before" and "after". It distinguishes the "forward" (+dt) from the "backward" (-dt) direction of time. Entropy signifies the "disorder" resulting from the dissipation of energy in the universe. The second law of thermodynamics tells us that the dissipation takes place irreversibly. We have to distinguish the phenomenological from the statistical interpretations of the law. The phenomenological statement of the law runs: the entropy of a closed system never decreases. If *S* denotes entropy and ΔS an increment of it, the phenomenological statement may be symbolized by $\Delta S \geq 0$.⁷ Difficulties arise when we try to axiomatize the phenomenology by an appropriate syntactics and semantics. The syntactic statement is based on an equation in three variables (the so-called Pfaffian equation) and the semantics is supplied by what is known as

4. "The Arrow of Time", *Nature*, Vol. 177 (1956), No. 4507, p. 538.

5. "Irreversibility and Mechanics", *Nature*, Vol. 178 (1956), No. 4529, pp. 381-2.

6. Newton's second law, in the one-dimensional form, may be taken as $F = m\ddot{x}$. With an $F(x)$, we have path reversibility. With an $F(t)$ solution, we do not, in general, obtain the property of path reversibility. In the special case in which $a(t)$ is a constant in

$$\int_0^t a(t) dt,$$

we have reversibility.

7. H. Margenau, *The Nature of Physical Reality* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1950), p. 217.

Carathéodory's principle.⁸ A part, perhaps a large part, of the formal calculus can be separated from its *interpretation*. Yet, as Max Born and other authorities have remarked, thermodynamics is far from having achieved the separation of the mathematical formalism from the physical interpretations. Concretely, the second law of thermodynamics covers a wide range of irreversible phenomena: heat does not flow "uphill", an ocean liner cannot draw its power from the heat of the ocean, a refrigerator cannot function without a motor and the fast molecules of a gas cannot be separated from the slow ones.⁹ Statistical mechanics, which deals with crowds of particles, constructs a quantity S' which is the analogue of the entropy (S) described by macroscopic and phenomenological thermodynamics. The statement $\Delta S \geq 0$ is statistically interpreted as signifying $\Delta S' \geq 0$ with an *overwhelming probability*. Systems of statistical mechanics were constructed by J. W. Gibbs and Boltzmann. Boltzmann's techniques were greatly improved by the British physicists, Darwin and Fowler.

Boltzmann and Maxwell, in attempting to deal with the properties of molecular crowds, utilized a hypothesis known as the ergodic hypothesis which may be surmised up roughly in the statement that in a closed, isolated system every elementary state is as likely to occur as every other. The hypothesis necessitates the introduction of the problematic concept of "probability". Technical difficulties present themselves when we try to reconcile the hypothesis with classical mechanics. Von Neumann showed that a weaker form of the hypothesis (the quasi-ergodic hypothesis), to the effect that there exist large classes of mechanical systems which at least *approach* in the long run every possible state, suffices to preserve the foundations of statistical thermodynamics. If we accept "probability" as an *essential* feature of the interpretation, a still weaker form of the hypothesis, the pseudo-ergodic hypothesis of Von Mises, namely that there is an overwhelming probability for the system to pass eventually through all states compatible with its total energy, is enough.¹⁰ I must single out a theoretical issue for emphasis. It is one thing to show that microscopic reversibilities among elementary phenomena (various "balance theorems") are *compatible* with phenomenal, macroscopic irreversibility and quite another to *deduce* the latter from the former, since the

8. E. H. Hutten, *The Language of Modern Physics* (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1956), ch. iv, section 4, pp. 142-145.

9. Margenau, *op. cit.*

10. Hutten, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149.

"deduction" is apt to use various ancillary or supplementary principles, e.g. epistemological concepts relating to "probability" and statistics. Boltzmann utilized the ergodic hypothesis in constructing his celebrated H-function referring to the collisions among molecules. The H-function is the statistical-mechanical analogue of entropy; it exhibits a one-sided ordering in time. Natural processes tend to a state of disorder or dispersal of molecules. If S is entropy, it is related to H by the theorem: $S = -KH$. As S increases, H decreases.¹¹ Can we use entropy for characterizing the "anisotropy" of "before" and "after" and the "unidirectionality" of "past-present-future"? Soon after Boltzmann enunciated his H-theorem, it was shown, on mathematical grounds, that an increase in randomness in a closed system occurs within a limited, though very long, time interval. Once entropy has increased in a closed system, it must inevitably decrease. Hence, Loschmidt urged his famous "objection of the reversal" and Poincaré and Zermelo their no less famous "objection of the return". The set-theoretical arguments advanced by the Russian mathematician, K. P. Stanyukovič,¹² appear to show that the second law of thermodynamics cannot be applied to a universe containing a denumerably infinite number of particles (molecules, atoms, etc.). Doubts about the applicability of the law to the "whole universe" have been voiced by E. A. Milne¹³ and the "new cosmologists", Bondi, Gold and Hoyle. Reichenbach argued that the entropic behaviour of a single, permanently-closed system does not suffice to define a time-direction. Utilizing the suggestion, and also certain fruitful ideas thrown out by Schrödinger, Adolf Grünbaum¹⁴ has urged that "Time's arrow" is defined not by the entropic behaviour of the entire universe but rather by the direction of entropy increase of the majority of (quasi-) closed "branch systems" in the space ensemble of such systems. The utmost that can be said is that the phenomenological and statistical interpretations of entropy are *not incompatible* with the anisotropy of "before-after". It cannot be established beyond all

11. Boltzmann's formula connecting entropy (S) and probability (W) is

$$S - S_0 = K \log (W/W_0).$$

The entropies are additive and the probabilities multiplicative.

12. "Increase or Entropy", abbreviated account by L. Tisza in *Mathematical Reviews*, Vol. 12 (1951), p. 787.

13. *Kinematic Relativity* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 233.

14. "Time and Entropy", *American Scientist*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 1955), pp. 550-572.

dispute¹⁵ that entropy furnishes the very basis of the awareness of "past-present-future".

Cosmological speculation centering round relativistic "world-models" is still in too unsettled a state for confident scientific opinions about the "ultimate nature of time" to be voiced.¹⁶ In almost all the "models", orthodox and heterodox, time is allowed to usher in evolution. Einstein's early "cylindrical" model contained three spatial dimensions belonging to a curved hypersphere and a fourth coordinate x_4 , explicit, isolated, and free from all disturbances.¹⁷ De Sitter's model shared with Einstein's a curved space, but it offered a curved "hyperbolic" time instead of Einstein's "rectilinear" time. In this "hyperbolic" universe, the "lapse of time" at a point P measured by a distant observer is proportional to the distance of P from the observer. For each observer, there is a "horizon" where time appears to "stand still", as at the Mad Hatter's tea-party in *Alice in Wonderland*.¹⁸ It is important to realize, however, that the "slowing down" of time is only *apparent*; everything goes on "normally" for an observer actually situated in the relevant region. Eventually it was recognized that the models of Einstein and de Sitter were *static* solutions of the field equations of gravity and could, in fact, be "limits" of an evolving universe. Seeking a universe in which the density of matter was not zero, Einstein resorted to an arbitrary, universal constant, the "cosmological constant". Eddington, Lemaitre and others found that the "constant" introduced a "repulsion", and consequently an "expansion" of the universe, proportionate to the distance from the point taken as the origin. The Russian meteorologist, Friedmann,

15. E. H. Hutten, *The Language of Modern Physics*, p. 149.

16. See the divergent points of view expressed in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. V, No. 19 (November, 1954), pp. 181-236; the discussion by Gamow, Hoyle and Allan Sandage in the *Scientific American*, Vol. 195, No. 3 (September, 1956), pp. 136-182; and the review of theories and observational data by G. J. Whitrow, *The Structure of the Universe* (Hutchinson's University Library, Hutchinson, London, 1951); Paul Couderc, *The Expansion of the Universe* (Faber & Faber, London, 1952).

17. In Einstein's model, the expression for the line-element is

$$ds^2 = -R^2[d\chi^2 + \sin^2\chi(d\theta^2 + \sin^2\theta d\varphi^2)] + c^2 dt^2$$

where R is a constant, t determines time, χ , θ , φ are the angular spatial parameters. Time varies linearly, independently of space.

18. In de Sitter's model,

$$ds^2 = -R^2[d\chi^2 + \sin^2\chi(d\theta^2 + \sin^2\theta d\varphi^2)] + c^2 \cos^2\chi dt^2.$$

Space and time are interconnected. Measures of time depend on the distance of the observer, $R\chi$.

showed that a model whose spatial metric was a function of time (unlike Einstein's model in which the spatial metric was invariant with respect to time) could allow for "expansion" even without the cosmological constant. Friedmann studied a wide variety of models in which the "cosmological constant" was zero, positive or negative; but he confined his attention to "closed" spaces of "positive curvature". The German astronomer, Heckmann, extended the enquiries to cases in which the space curvature was zero, negative or positive, i.e. cases in which space could be infinite or finite. The "expanding models" are of two types according to the curvature of space. In one set, the radius increases continually from zero at some definite epoch and tends to infinity after an infinite lapse of time. In the other set, at the initial epoch when the expansion began, the radius has a definite non-zero value. With a negative "cosmological constant" and any space curvature, we get "oscillating" models. With a constant of zero, we get either "oscillating" or "expanding" (Type I) models. With a positive "cosmological constant", we get either "expanding" (Type I) or "expanding" (Type II) or "oscillating" models according to the space curvature.

Milne's "Kinematic Relativity" offers us two scales of time, a τ -scale and a t -scale. On the τ -scale, time ranges from minus infinity to plus infinity; on the t -scale, the temporal universe has had a definite origin at a certain epoch. The non-euclidean (hyperbolic) character of the "public space" appropriate to the time-scale is held to account for spectral shifts, the spiral forms of the nebulae and the immense rotational energies. Motions of particles on the t -scale are fundamentally irreversible; time has an "arrow" right from the start.¹⁹ It has been suggested that Milne's universe is a particular case of the Friedmann models: an empty Euclidean space-time relative to "ideal observers"; further, that his t -time is

19. Milne's two scales of time are connected by the formula:

$$\tau = t_0 \log(t/t_0) + t_0,$$

t_0 being a constant of integration referring to the "present age of the universe reckoned on the t -scale." The associated transformation of the co-ordinates leads to the relation:

$$ds = e^{(\tau-t_0)/t_0} d\sigma,$$

where

$$d\sigma^2 = d\tau^2 - c^{-2} d\epsilon^2.$$

and $d\epsilon^2$ is the metric of the infinitely extending hyperbolic "public space" into which the interior of $\tau = ct$ transforms.

$$d\epsilon^2 = d\lambda^2 + (ct_0)^2 \sin^2(\lambda/ct_0) (d\theta^2 + \sin^2\theta d\varphi^2)$$

See Milne, *Kinematic Relativity*, p. 78.

only "probability" and his τ -time is a "statistical measure", because of the similarity of his formula connecting the two scales of time to Boltzmann's formula.²⁰ In the "new cosmologies" of Hoyle, Bondi, Lyttelton and Gold, matter is supposed to be continually created to compensate for the "thinning out" produced by "expansion". Local decreases in entropy can occur in the universe even when increase occurs along classical lines elsewhere.²¹ There is little in all this speculation which casts doubts on the metaphysical status of "past-present-future". On the contrary, the overall impression is one of a predominantly *temporal* universe.

There remain a few unconventional models. E. J. Öpik²² prefers a "closed, oscillating" universe to an irreversible process of temporal origin; he uses a Friedmann-Einstein model with the cosmological constant equal to zero and a positive space curvature. He cautions us, however, that the "repetition" in his "closed" universe is not an "eternal recurrence of things", in Nietzsche's sense. The individual celestial bodies in successive phases of the universe would not be identical, nor their individual inhabitants. Time has its say even in this "oscillating" universe. Gödel²³ showed, however, that the field equations of relativity can be made to yield world-models with *closed* "time-like lines". B. Abramenko²⁴ has exploited the possibility. He has offered a model in which

20. Compare the formula connecting Milne's two scales of time with Boltzmann's formula given in footnote 11.

21. See the discussion of the "new cosmologies" by Paul Couderc, *The Expansion of the Universe*, pp. 220-222; by G. J. Whitrow in the *Occasional Notes of the Royal Astronomical Society*, No. 17 (October, 1954), pp. 82-86; by Fred Hoyle, *Sc. American*, Vol. 195, No. 3 (September, 1956), pp. 157-166. See also the dispute about the elusive "horizon" of the "Steady-State" Universe (requiring a de Sitter metric) in *Nature*, Vol. 175 (1955), No. 4452, pp. 382-383; No. 4454, p. 446.

22. "The Age of the Universe", *Br. J. Phil. Sc.*, Vol. V, No. 19 (November, 1954), pp. 203-214; also *Irish Astronomical Journal*, 3, No. 4 (December, 1954).

23. *Reviews of Modern Physics*, Vol. 21 (1949), p. 447; see also Gödel's "Remark" in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, Evanston, 1949, pp. 560-562.

24. "The Age of the Universe", *Br. J. Phil. Sc.*, V, pp. 237-252. Tentatively, Abramenko assumes that the inverse of radius of "time-curvature" is equal to Hubble's constant (α): $\alpha = 1/p$. Refinements are introduced later, e.g. elliptic time, connection between the radius of "time-curvature" at any point of the ellipse and the major semi-axis, for instance,

$$p = \frac{\alpha(1 - \epsilon^2 \cos^2 \alpha)^{1/2}}{(1 - \epsilon^2)^{1/2}}.$$

time as well as space has a positive curvature. The "arrow of time" curves back on itself; the universe arises, like the fabulous phoenix, out of its own ashes. J. M. J. Kooy²⁵ has advanced similar ideas. The suggested "cyclical ordering" of events in time is unsupported by observational data and quite out of tune with the prevailing cosmologies. J. T. Davies²⁶ rejects, not without some justification, all hypotheses about "time-curvature" as "being a complication at present scientifically unnecessary". Schlegel²⁷ has suggested that the universe as a whole may not have either a "finite" or "infinite" extension in time; it may rather be "atemporal"; time and origin may not be ascribed to it. He grants, nevertheless, that there are processes in the universe with well-defined "forward" directions. He fails to explain how an "atemporal" universe can *meaningfully* include such temporal (e.g., thermodynamic) processes.

Common-sense and scientific attempts to deny "past-present-future", either on the familiar, macroscopic, phenomenological scale or on the cosmic scale, have met with indifferent success so far. Our knowledge of time has not been advanced even a hair's breadth by the suggestion that "process" may be only a "local" property or parochialism in the universe. Much glib talk about the "clock-paradoxes" and "time turning into the fourth dimension" in Relativity has tended to blur the mathematical and philosophical issues. Hermann Weyl²⁸ observed, with deep insight, that the contrast of "right" and "left" does not pose as basic a problem for science as "past" and "future". The metaphysical problems stemming from "past-present-future" are not susceptible of solutions on the empirical bases of physics and cosmogony alone. Linguistic analysis

25. *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, Special English Edition, No. 4 (July, 1953), pp. 116-168. Kooy assumes, at one point, a radius of curvature:

$$R = r \sin \pi t/T,$$

where r and T are constants, $t = 0$ denoting the time when "expansion" begins. The observed speed of recession of a stellar system at geodetic arc distance χ , when $\chi d^2 R/dt^2 = -b^2 \chi R$, is calculated as

$$\chi(dR/dt)_{t=t_1} \left(\int_{t_1}^{t_0} \frac{dt}{\sin \pi t/T} = r\chi \right).$$

If χ , θ and ϕ are the co-ordinates in instantaneous spherical space, and τ is "cosmical time", the expression for the line-element in Kooy's "hypersphere" is $ds^2 = r^2 [d\tau^2 + \sin^2 \tau \{d\chi^2 + \sin^2 \chi (d\theta^2 + \sin^2 \theta d\phi^2)\}]$.

26. *Br. J. Phil. Sc.*, V, pp. 191-202.

27. *Ibid.*, V, pp. 226-236.

28. *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1947), p. 208.

may persuade us that the tenses behave almost like "weak tautologies" which cannot be defined or got rid of²⁹; but it is unlikely to penetrate into the metaphysics of time. J. N. Findlay³⁰, who sets out with neo-positivist and neo-empiricist aims, confesses that he is inclined to take more seriously today the metaphysical puzzles about time. Much of Oriental speculation (e.g. in the Vedantic systems) about time is frankly metaphysical; for that very reason, perhaps, it deserves to be re-considered carefully against the background of modern knowledge. If the Vedantic "denial" of the "reality" of time is rooted in mystical experiences, it is misleading to construe it as a common-sense, scientific, or even ordinary logical, denial. The dialectic of time is both more subtle and profound than Western Idealists like Hegel and McTaggart would have it.

29. See D. F. Pears, "Time, Truth and Inference", *Proc. Arist. Soc.* N.S., Vol. I (1950-1951), pp. 1-24.

30. "Time: A Treatment of Some Puzzles" in *Essays on Logic and Language*, First Series, ed. A. G. N. Flew (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1951).

A Positivist Analysis of Descartes' Ontological Arguments for God

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Introduction:

As is well known, Logical Positivism (particularly Wittgensteinian school) is more a method than a dogma. As a method it consists in making a linguistic or grammatical and logical analysis of various philosophical propositions and theories. There are, however, certain presuppositions involved in the method of Positivist analysis, which need not be presented here. In this paper an attempt will be made to analyse Descartes' ontological arguments for God.

Descartes has given two ontological arguments. (i) All clear and distinct ideas are true. I have a clear and distinct idea of God. Therefore my idea of God is a true idea. In other words God exists. (ii) My idea of God is an idea of the all perfect being. Existence is one of the perfections. Therefore God exists.

Analysis of the first argument: In order to estimate the value of this argument, it is necessary to ascertain the meaning and truth of the major premise in the argument, which Descartes claims to be his criterion of truth.

Descartes says, "All clear and distinct ideas are true". What meaning is to be attached to 'ideas'? In the wider sense 'idea' may mean a concept or a judgment. In Meditation III¹ Descartes gives a definition of 'Ideas', which seems to imply that according to him ideas are what in modern psychological terminology would be named as 'cognitive experiences.' In that passage apparently he excludes conative and affective experiences (in his words 'Volitions' & 'Affections') from the category of 'ideas' and includes perceptions, images and conceptions.²

1. In this paper, all quotations from and references to Descartes are taken from 'The Philosophical Works of Descartes' by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross.

2. See 'Works of Descartes' by E. S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross. Vol. I page 159, para II.

In the strict sense, 'judgment' is to be distinguished from 'ideas'. Ideas are said to be the constituents of judgments, and judgments are the composite wholes of ideas. Truth-value belongs to judgments and not to ideas. Ideas may be vague or vivid, obscure or clear, but it is the judgments which can be true or false.

In some places Descartes attaches truth-value to ideas in the sense of 'cognitive experiences.' There, by 'true idea' he means 'a representation of a real object.' Accordingly 'all clear and distinct ideas are true' would mean that all clear and distinct cognitive experiences are representations of real objects. For example, if I have in my mind a clear and distinct mental picture or image of a golden mountain, I should conclude that there must be a real golden mountain of which my idea is a real copy. From the Positivist point of view, the proposition, that all clear and distinct cognitive experiences are representations of real objects, cannot be accepted as a true proposition. The Positivist however would admit that all cognitions are derived from the experiences of real objects, but not that all cognitions or even all clear and distinct cognitions are copies of real objects.

Descartes also draws the aforesaid distinction between judgments and ideas and says that truth-value belongs to judgments.

To quote him, "Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false: for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than the other. . . . Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make, in which I must take the greatest care not to deceive myself."

Accordingly 'all clear and distinct ideas are true' should mean 'all clear and distinct propositions or judgments are true.' What does Descartes mean by 'clear and distinct proposition'? Descartes derives his criterion of truth (all clear and distinct ideas or propositions are true) from his First principle of knowledge (I think therefore I am). In part IV of his Discourse on the Method, he writes as follows. "And having remarked that there was nothing at all in the statement 'I think, therefore I am' which assures me of having thereby made a true assertion, excepting that I see very clearly that to think it is necessary to be, I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true." If

his criterion of truth (all clear and distinct propositions are true) is derived from his First principle of knowledge (I think, therefore I am), the criterion should logically mean that all propositions which logically resemble the proposition 'I think, therefore I am' may be taken as true. The logical characteristics of his First principle of knowledge, which Descartes points out by implication are (1) that selfhood is a necessary presupposition of thinking; (2) that thinking is an indubitable experience for him.

Now the question is "Does Descartes' clear and distinct idea of God logically resemble his First principle of knowledge"? In his First principle of knowledge ('To think is to be'), the predicate is a necessary presupposition of the subject and the subject denotes an indubitable experience; whereas Descartes' idea of God is a concept and not a complete judgment. Even if it be taken as a complete judgment (God exists), with 'God' as its subject term, 'God' is not an indubitable object of experience as 'thinking' is. Thus Descartes' idea of God does not logically resemble his First principle of knowledge and as such his criterion of truth cannot be applied to it.

Another interpretation put on Descartes' derivation of his criterion of truth from his First principle of knowledge is that whatever act of awareness is as clear and distinct as the act of self-awareness should be taken as awareness of a real object. Even with this interpretation of Descartes' criterion of truth, the criterion cannot be applied to the idea of God, because 'self-awareness' implies awareness of the self and not merely of an idea of self, whereas 'possessing a clear and distinct idea of God' implies awareness of an idea of God and not of God himself. Thus logically 'self-awareness' and 'possessing a clear and distinct idea of God' belong to different levels of cognition.

Thus in this section we conclude that whatever interpretation may be put on Descartes' criterion of truth, his clear and distinct idea of God cannot be shown to be an illustration of it.

Analysis of the second argument: 'My idea of God is an idea of the all perfect being. Existence is one of the perfections. Therefore God exists.' Descartes says that the idea of existence comprised in his idea of God is the idea of necessary existence and not of contingent existence. Therefore God necessarily exists. (See Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, principle 14).

This argument may be restated in the following three propositions. (i) Attribute of existence is a necessary part of the idea of
P. 6

God. (ii) Existence as an attribute of God is conceived as necessary existence and not merely a contingent existence. (iii) Therefore God necessarily exists. In other words existence of God is an absolute certainty.

A doubtful presupposition: The idea of God can contain only the idea of necessary existence. From the idea of necessary existence Descartes concludes the reality of necessary existence of God. It seems to me that the Copy theory of ideas is the implied basis of the whole argument. Descartes seems to believe that all ideas are copies of real things. If a given idea contains the idea of contingent existence as one of its constituents, it would be a copy of a contingent existent; whereas the idea of God contains the idea of necessary existence as one of its necessary constituents, therefore that of which the idea of God is a copy must be a necessary existent. That is why he says that God necessarily exists.

From Positivist standpoint, copy theory of ideas is a doubtful presupposition. Ideas are derived from experience, but they need not be copies of real things. If copy theory of ideas be not presupposed, the proposition, that the idea of necessary existence is a necessary part of the idea of God, by itself cannot prove that God is a necessary existent, just as the proposition that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles cannot prove the reality of triangles as defined in the proposition. In Positivist Logic, necessary propositions are said to be verbal in character, that is, they are 'rules of grammar'. 'The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles' is a necessary proposition in the sense that the sum of its three angles being equal to two right angles is a necessary part of the meaning of 'triangle.' It is one of the rules of grammar of 'triangle'. But the necessary proposition about triangles does not by itself prove that there are triangles in the world of reality, satisfying the description given in the proposition. Similarly 'that necessary existence is a necessary part of the idea of God' may be taken as a necessary proposition, but that does not prove that there is an existent corresponding to the definition given in that proposition.

A subtle fallacy of petitio-principii: Psychologically speaking, conceiving is either a case of memory, or of imagination or of belief. Conceiving is a general name applied to anyone of these three activities. Remembering is conceiving, imagining is conceiving and believing also is conceiving. Conceiving something as an existent amounts to believing. Conceiving something as

possessing characteristics X Y Z, but conceiving it as a non-existent is an act of imagination. For example I conceive a man with an elephant's head, but I do not conceive it as an existent. This would be a case of imagination.

According to Descartes, conceiving God as a necessary existent is the basis or the proof of his belief in the necessary existence of God. Conceiving God as an existent is just the same as believing that God exists. Conceiving something as a contingent existent means believing that it possibly exists. Conceiving something as a necessary existent amounts to believing that it necessarily exists. As such the second ontological argument of Descartes presupposes what it is required to prove.

A concealed self-contradiction: Descartes identifies the essence of self with the activity of thinking. The self, according to Descartes, exists in and through the activity of thinking. If thinking stops, the self will cease to be. Thus for Descartes self is a mental function. At the same time Descartes' belief in innate ideas implies the structural theory of self. Innate ideas require to reside in a structure. If self is a function, there cannot be any innate ideas (where will they reside?), all ideas would be acquired. If there are innate ideas implanted by the creator, the self in which they are implanted must be structural in character.

Illusion of syntactical similarity: The second ontological argument of Descartes implies that according to him, existence is an attribute of God. He seems to think that like the attributes of wisdom, power, love etc., existence also is one of the attributes of God. This belief about God's existence being an attribute of God is based on the general belief that existence is an attribute. According to Positivism, this belief is rooted in the illusion of syntactical similarity and is a false belief.

The Positivist Logic points out that the logical implications of propositions containing other attributes as their predicates and of propositions involving existence as predicate are different. For example 'Lions are yellow,' 'Lions are hungry' and 'Lions are real' are all grammatically similar. But logically, 'Lions are real' will have to be analysed differently. 'Lions are real' is an implied presupposition of the other two propositions. 'Lions are yellow' logically would imply that lions (who are a class of real beings) are yellow in colour; whereas 'Lions are real' would imply that 'Lions' is the name of a class of real beings. Similarly 'God is all-powerful' or 'God is all-wise' would be logically different from

the proposition 'God exists' or 'God is a self-existent.' 'God exists' is about 'God', whereas 'God is all powerful' is about God. The former is about a word or a name, the latter is about a real being.

The only sense in which existence could be characterised as a perfection would be that the concept or the idea of a being conceived as an existent should be considered more perfect than the concept of a thing or a being conceived as a non-existent. All this amounts to saying that logically fanciful concepts are less perfect (as concepts) than the concepts of existents.

Existence is a sign of perfection in the concept itself and not in the object conceived. Thus if existence is a necessary part of the idea of God, it is a perfection that characterises the idea of God and not God himself. The perfections that characterise the given ideas cannot be extended to the objects conceived through those ideas. Descartes has made one fundamental mistake. Instead of thinking, that the concept of God in which God is conceived as an existent is a more perfect concept than the concept of God in which God's existence is denied or in which the mind is doubtful about God's existence, Descartes wrongly thinks that existence is a perfection of God. Therefore from the idea of existence in the idea of God Descartes wrongly jumps to the reality of God.

Perfect or imperfect character presupposes the existence of the object concerned. That existence is not a sign of perfection in the object can also be pointed out by analysing the corresponding negative concept. If existence is a sign of perfection in the character of the object, then non-existence should be taken to be a sign of imperfection in the character of the object. But that makes no sense, because a non-existent object just does not exist, so the question of its perfection or imperfection does not arise and has no meaning. It is only existents that can be characterised as perfect or imperfect. If non-existence cannot be a sign of imperfection in the character of the object, then existence also cannot be said to be a sign of perfection in the character of the object. In other words existence is not an attribute.

In his second ontological argument, Descartes' jump from the idea of existence characterising the idea of God to the reality of God is logically unjustified.

Thus we conclude in this paper that God may be a reality, but that reality cannot be proved by Descartes' ontological arguments.

Does Indian Philosophy Need Re-orientation ?

The recovery of its theological background for the re-orientation of Indian Philosophy

by

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I. *Necessity of re-orientation:* *A priori* we can and must affirm that any living philosophy needs a constant re-orientation. And that for two main reasons. If Philosophy is to be something more than a museum piece or a matter of archaeological interest, it has a double link, active and passive, with human Life and Culture. On the one hand, Philosophy as an integral outlook about Reality influences and shapes all human activities and behaviour here on earth; so that any cultural manifestation has always a hidden, at times disregarded, philosophical source of inspiration. On the other hand, human Life, with all its implications, provokes and determines to a great extent the Philosophy of its time, so much so, that a philosopher is always a product of his time and only fully understandable from the cultural background in which he lives.

Thus, it belongs to a dialectical necessity of Philosophy itself to search for a continuous re-orientation of its *tenets* along with the development of human History, and again, to receive a regular re-orientation from culture and human life.

II. *Reasons for re-orientation:* *A posteriori* we can, moreover, discover the urgent need of re-orientating Indian Philosophy, because, due to obvious historical causes, Indian Philosophy has not been present in the shaping of the Indian life of our times, nor has the cultural situation of the world to-day, and of India specially, had a very direct influence on Indian Philosophy, which is and remains altogether a matter of the past, or, at best, a simple adaptation or translation into modern garb, if not a mere repetition, of ancient problems and answers.

Re-orientation does not mean that we have to deny or to ignore the past and be slaves of sheer novelty, but it does not

mean that even the admittedly everlasting problems and their answers have to be, not simply expressed in modern terms, but re-thought and "re-lived" in the actual present by the man of today, though the responses may coalesce with the most traditional ones.

III. *Modern Tribute.* Moreover, almost all interpretations, expositions and even advances in thinking about Indian Philosophy have been done, if not always in dialogue with the Western "modern" philosophy, yet accepting in one way or another the main underlying presupposition of that Philosophy, namely the very conception of Philosophy itself. Even when the differences could not be denied, Indian Philosophers have always stressed that Indian Philosophy is also "rational", also "Philosophy" in the sense the modern West understands it, also "scientific" and the like. In other words, the background out of which Indian philosophy actually comes to self-reflection and the light by which it tries to renew itself or attempts to continue its growth is ultimately to a great extent borrowed from that modern philosophical tradition of the West.

IV. *End of the "modern" age:* Hence, this re-orientation would be completely misunderstood if interpreted in a kind of proud and foolish self-sufficient way of recoiling on itself and getting severed from the West and from the universal tradition of a "perennis Philosophia." On the contrary the reorientation needed is a new link with the philosophical tradition of the world, a new opening to the full human Reality and a recovery of the everlasting and integral conception of Philosophy. At the same time, of course, a closing of the "modern Western heresy."

With an almost absolute unanimity the thinkers of to-day, to whatever trend of thought they may belong, recognise that a new epoch in world history is dawning, that the "modern" culture closes a circle and that we assist at the "end of the modern age." One of the consequences of it is that the very conception of Philosophy, valid in that "modern" period, is untenable and must be revised, re-orientated.

That is the main thesis of this paper, which we are going to formulate and to explain as clearly and briefly as possible. Then, it will appear, as a consequence, that the re-orientation of Indian Philosophy is by no means an Indian problem and in no way a

simple dealing with the past, but a universal philosophical problem, an urgent task of the present and a human responsibility towards the future.

V. *Philosophy versus Theology.* In order to bridge the gulf, not between East and West, which are only two abstractions and incorrect simplifications, but between the "modern" Western Philosophy and the perennial conception of Philosophy, let us formulate our thesis like this: The "modern" concept of Philosophy, accepted in the European philosophical tradition from Descartes down to Nicolai Hartmann, is not the *real* meaning of Philosophy. The common conception of Philosophy as a purely rational, or rather rationalistic, enquiry about Reality or the ultimate Reality is an anti-philosophical conception of Philosophy. Or again, what the modern mind takes for Philosophy is a "scientific", not a *philosophical*, Philosophy. We can, of course, define Philosophy as we like, provided we remain loyal to the given definition throughout our philosophical speculations. We can obviously define Philosophy as rational knowledge about ultimate Reality. But we are neither allowed to identify this *our* Philosophy with what other cultures have understood by Philosophy, nor can we claim that this *our* Philosophy is the ultimate and integral Wisdom about all that is. We cannot assume, without proving it, that there is nothing beyond and besides reason, and that there is no higher instance of any endeavour to solve ultimate problems.

We are now only concerned with the explanation of the thesis. For this we can adduce three different orders of considerations.

VI. (a) *General historical perspective:* If we look at the conception of Philosophy in all cultures of the world, perhaps with the single exception of a *part* of the European period, roughly from Descartes till our times, we find, first of all, that all of them do not distinguish and much less separate Philosophy from Theology. Greece, the Christian Fathers of the Church, the Middle Ages, the Arabic, Chinese, Jewish and Indian Philosophy have always considered that the Queen of all human forms of knowledge, that the ultimate Wisdom about the Universe, including ourselves and God, was Theology, which often they called also Philosophy or sometimes Metaphysics. This Wisdom, Theology or Philosophy, *Brahmajñāna* or *darśana*, was an integral insight, a complete vision of the ultimate truth of human existence. Except for the previously men-

tioned "heresy" of the European culture, Philosophy has never been limited to the one and only rational source of knowledge, but tries to embrace and to sift all possible kinds and modes of informations the human mind can acquire. Moreover, Philosophy is an integral human attitude which requires not only mental acuity, but also moral virtue and a full human development. This Philosophy or Theology is at the service of Man, for it is nothing else than the integral human effort to grasp and understand the mystery of our being and destiny, and by that to save us from hell, from unreality, from mere appearance, from an unauthentic existence here on earth, etc. Philosophy has always been the intellectual part of Religion, the human quest for the understanding of the meaning of the entire World. Philosophy has followed Religion, because philosophy has always been an effort of understanding critically the answers given by Religion.

As a matter of fact, philosophers have not only been believers, but they have built up their Philosophy out of their own faith with the help of their reason as an instrument; they simply wanted to explain and to analyse what they held as true and what they believed. Philosophy was not an irrelevant human activity or a kind of sport or hobby for the privileged few, but was the conscious and intellectual part of Religion, regarded as the most serious problem of human life concerning every mortal here in this world of ours.

Lao-Tse and Confucius, Parmenides and Heraclitus, Śankara and Rāmanūja, Augustine and Thomas as well as Avicenna and Algazali, Philo and Maimonides, etc., all were, properly speaking, theologians, i.e. true philosophers. They did not ask merely for a rational clarification of the sense-data, but for a whole understanding of all *data*, viz. of all that is *given*. Why reduce all data only to the sense data when many other things are also given to us? Why trust only in reason when in fact we give credence also to many other things? A different problem altogether is a philosophical analysis, an intellectual understanding—and intellect transcends reason—of all *given* things, including our forms of knowledge.

In short, Philosophy is not to be considered as the discovery of Reality by means of our reason, but as the integral Wisdom; that is to say, as the intellectual answer of Man to the problem of Existence. The expression of this answer is an intellectual

one and, in consequence, reason is not at all excluded; but it is only a part—though essential—of the human instrument to face the demands of Being and our participation in it.

VII. (b) *The evolution of the concept of Philosophy in the West.* Within the evolutionary process of the European culture we could describe the "modern" conception of Philosophy to understand better its meaning and its limitations.

The colossal adventure of the Western mind began in Greece with the conception common to all cultures that Philosophy is synonymous with Theology, as an integral attempt at understanding the ultimate problems of human life in the light of all forms of knowledge man has. Philosophy is love for Wisdom; and this Wisdom is an experimental knowledge, a sapid "logos" about everything that is, and specially, in consequence, about Being, as the Absolute and as the clue to all that is. Philosophy, or as Plato said, coining a new name, Theology, is not only connected with Religion but is the true Religion. It is a standing preparation for death (Plato), for death is the beginning of the real, everlasting life. The philosopher is a "philomythes" (Aristotle), a lover of the myths, for in them we have crystallised in a popular way (which has to be purified, of course) the meaning of life and the idea of being. Philosophy is the path of salvation (Stoa), for only the contemplation of Being makes it possible to reach that very Being and be united with it. The wise man is he who works for the salvation of his soul (Epicurus).

This Philosophy or Theology includes all forms of knowledge, for everything is connected with the ultimate questions. It is indeed a Science, or better still it is simply *Science*. But science throughout this period down to the Middle Ages means the cognition of things in their causes, i.e. as they *really are*: or more exactly, the knowledge God has about the world. We, by means of Theology and with the help of all our knowing faculties, participate in such a Science. Philosophy contains in seed and in potentiality all that afterwards is going to be denominated *particular sciences*. These are only branches of that Science which is Philosophy, and derive from it their leading principles and again give back to it their results, so that Philosophy can use them for the harmonious welfare or salvation of the whole man.

It is well known that little by little the particular sciences, due mainly to the dialectical pressure of their own methods, got

P. 7

rid of the protection of Philosophy, broke more and more the *heteronomy* under which they lived, and developed themselves into *autonomous* sciences. The whole evolution of European culture is summed up in this double movement of positive emancipation on one hand and negative disintegration on the other. Music, Mathematics and Astronomy began the process, Medicine and Natural History came afterwards. The birth of the "*nuova scienza*", the "new" Physics, is another turning point in the Western culture. Recently we have witnessed the emancipation of the last offspring of Philosophy, Psychology as a "science"; and we can still recognize its crisis of adolescence, stressing its own autonomy and independence, claiming that it has nothing to do with Philosophy, because it wants to be a "science" like the others which have reached so high a prestige.

Now, the most striking fact in this evolution has been that even Philosophy has tried to emancipate itself from that central all-embracing Wisdom. The peculiar fate of this movement however has been not only that the philosophical daughter has gone away from the mother carrying her sacred name of Philosophy, but also that the mother so despoiled, the integral Philosophy, or philosophical Theology, almost lost her central place, her position as the trunk, and became another branch, a partial science. There is the conception of Theology as a pure "Science" too, as a dialectic drawing conclusions from a ready-made Revelation. It goes without saying that we do not use the word Theology as a particular, though "first", science, but in its most genuine sapiential and universal sense.

This divorce was the work which the nominalists in the Middle Ages prepared, Descartes properly started, and the whole "modern" European Philosophy followed. There is, of course, a deeper underlying continuity in the Western Philosophy as a whole, and the everlasting tradition has never completely disappeared. Heresy is understandable only in connection with Orthodoxy, and even its life depends upon it.

It is well known to everybody versed in the evolution of the Western mind what that process was like. Descartes simply drew the consequences of the cultural situation of the Europe of his time (as recent as the middle of the XVII century). And here lies his importance and his limitations all in one. The philosophic-theological Wisdom was suffering a serious crisis from without and from within. From outside, for the autonomous branches

of the particular sciences with their spectacular success were spreading the "belief" that they could save man and make humanity happy with no need of Philosophy or Religion whatsoever. From inside, because the multitude of disparate opinions and irrelevant discussions were shaking the very foundations of that general incontrovertible Wisdom. Descartes wanted with the best intention to save that Wisdom; and as he saw the debility of the "classical" Theology and the prestige and achievements of "Science", he tried to convert Philosophy into a Science too, or at least to introduce the *scientific method* in Philosophy. By this very fact he was emancipating Philosophy to convert it into a "sure", "precise" and "scientific" Philosophy.

In order to establish a sure and incontrovertible system of truth above all discussions of the "Schools", the scientific method of pure Rationalism was introduced. All that I see with clarity and distinction cannot be false, and therefore I must needs accept it as *true*. This is a correct criterion. But why do I assume that *only* that is *truth* which I can accept as *true*? Who told us that Truth does not surpass us, or that our *mind* (*mens*) is the *measure* (*mensura*) of everything rather than the mirror (reflexion) of the "measurability" of being? Why should I accept only what comes to me clearly and distinctly? Is our mind only sensitive to rational evidence? I must, of course, accept as clear and distinct what I see like this; I am not allowed to take as evident what I do not see as such; but why should I reject what I hear for instance, or what I see with less clarity? I should not accept it as "clear", but I must take it as it is given to me. Could it not be that precisely the "ultimate" and most important things are not within the power of sight of my limited naked eye? If I identify truth with what I see clearly as true, I cut off by this very fact all that which lies above or underneath or behind a very particular faculty of knowledge, viz. reason. Philosophy then becomes purely the rational essay to discover the rational frame of Reality.

From that very moment Philosophy as a "science", Philosophy as a branch of the old Wisdom, was born. This Philosophy is non-committal regarding the main problems of human existence. These were relegated to Theology. Philosophy is then "sure", "critical", "mathematical", "rational", "logical", "dialectical"; but it is no longer wise; it is not an integral knowledge; it has no saving power, and is no more universal; it is a technical doctrine, a partial wisdom. Even Theology has been dazzled by "Science". The

"Sedes Sapientiae", the Seat of Wisdom, was vacant in Europe for a long time, though on it intended to sit, "Theology", Science and also Philosophy. And precisely here lies the complexity of the problem. The new Philosophy, the daughter, has inherited the pretensions of the mother. I mean to say, all true philosophers within this rational period have felt in one way or another the ultimateness of Philosophy, and have asked about the unavoidable and everlasting problems of our existence: What is Man, wither does he go and whence does he come, what shall he do, etc? Only, the scientific method and the purely rational approach to these supra-rational problems made it impossible to give a full answer to satisfy the human thirst for truth and desire for salvation.

VIII. (c) *Some inner philosophical reflexions.* The very idea of a purely rational philosophy is also philosophically untenable.

Psychologically we can easily prove that it is not my reason alone that discovers the meaning of Reality to me or that forms my philosophical convictions. When I become aware that I am in the world, that I am knowing, willing, feeling, and, in short, living, I have been already for a while doing all this without being conscious of it. When my consciousness awakes, many things have already struck it and many a factor shaped it, and perhaps it is due to that that my consciousness gets awakened. I start my conscious life with certain primary convictions. These convictions need not all be true and objectively correct, and I have the power and the duty to check and to confirm them, so that my lasting convictions are the result of a free act of intellectual discrimination. I say that they are the fruit of an intellectual acceptance and not conclusions of logical deductions; for precisely our most deep convictions, e.g. that of our existence, of good and evil, the origin and goal of our life, are not of a merely rational character. Moreover, the whole instrument by which we try to get an organic understanding of Reality, such as ideas, words, feelings, culture, history etc. and even our own intellect are all "given" to us. Perhaps a science can be without pre-suppositions if we limit and define its field and if we have a footing outside that realm, but no Philosophy can get rid of Being and start out of nothing. For we ourselves, not excluding our reason, are immersed in that very Being and present at the very starting point.

Dialectically we can affirm that the very concept of a mere rational Philosophy is begging the question under discussion. If

I try to philosophize with my pure reason alone, I shall be able only to detect the rational structure of Being. "Reality will be rationality" and nothing else, because my instrument is not sensitive to anything else. Thus, if I presuppose that reason is the only source of knowledge, I shall recognise as real only that which I can discover with my reason, and so I simply abolish and ignore the specific nature of any other kind of supra- infra- or extra-rational Reality. The knowledge of being as being depends on being itself and on the kind of being that I am. Why should I presuppose that I am only reason, or that only with it can I get contact with being? Why should we have this blind confidence in reason and only in reason? Why should we trust, further, only in the conclusions of our reason? We remember that even Descartes had to invoke faith in God in order to justify his trust in reason.

Anthropologically, or even philosophically, we can state again that Philosophy as an ultimate Wisdom cannot rely on reason alone, because it does not belong to the essence of reason to discover Reality nor to lead the human person actively, but only to check and confirm, to explain and verify, what is given to it, and to control passively the behaviour of Man. Besides reason, Man has many other faculties, and even the best part of our intellect is not reason but intuition; and if Philosophy has to be a universal "Science" and an all-comprehensive Knowledge, it cannot be limited only to the statements of reason alone. It has to be integrated in a higher and broader intellection. Moreover, reason itself helped by the higher part of our intellect can discover its own boundary and therefore set a limit to its own pretensions. The working out of this superior limit of reason—as the law of contradiction is its inferior one—is one of the most important problems of the Philosophy of our times, in order to incorporate scientific Philosophy into philosophical Philosophy.

IX. *The meaning of re-orientation.* It is not our purpose here to develop the complementary positive thesis about the concept of an integral Philosophy. Two ideas however may help to connect the above-mentioned reflexions with the problem of re-orientating Indian Philosophy.

The first could be expressed as follows: Re-orientation may signify "to face the East again"; but the Orient is something more than a pure geographical concept or a mere anti-western metaphor.

Orient means the *Origin* of something, (of the direction where the sun arises in Geography), coming from *oriri*, (to rise). Indian Philosophy, as any other Philosophy, or nowadays we can simply say Philosophy as such, must be re-orientated towards its origin, i.e. towards Philosophy itself. Indian Philosophy must be re-vitalised not as Indian but as Philosophy, must go back not simply to the Indian sources of the old Indian speculation, but to the fountainhead of Philosophy as such, that is to say to the problems themselves and to the real living man as he is and exists here and now. Only if we are present, if we are actual, we shall be everlasting. Indian Philosophy must be re-orientated at the hand of Philosophy itself, and not with any other nationalistic or sentimental motive.

And this is already the second idea: Philosophy itself. After the incomparable experience of Western Philosophy, after the destruction and reconstruction of the European adventure, there is no more question of mere repetition of old *heteronomic* abuses, nor also of indulging in *autonomic* reactions and resentments. Precisely the momentum of our historical present is the real possibility of a new *ontonomic* synthesis, in which Unity does not destroy Variety, nor Synthesis Analysis, nor the Absolute the Relative, but everything has its place, its *ontic* order (*ontonomy*) following its proper ontological laws (*nomos*) in this wonderful cosmos of ours. It is thus no question of undoing all that those Western countries have achieved, but of integrating it into a real catholic i.e. universal Wisdom. The "heresy" of the autonomous "modern" Philosophy was perhaps the necessary by-way in order to get rid of the heteronomous patronizing attitude and to develop the full possibilities of the human reason; but now is the right time for a higher recapitulation. It is here that Indian Philosophy can show its full potentiality, if it tries to assimilate all the Western experience and to link it up with the central forgotten line of a theological Philosophy. Whether we have to reserve the name of Philosophy for the scientific, viz. purely rational Philosophy, and call Theology that other more comprehensive Wisdom, or whether on the contrary we have to speak again of Philosophy as all other cultures have done, is perhaps a relevant cultural-political question, but it is not of philosophical gravity. I would be inclined to re-establish the role and central position of Philosophy (*Sophodicy*) as an integral effort towards an ultimate Wisdom and therefore not distant from Theology. It goes without saying that this Philosophy is neither irrational nor

a-rational, and that reason plays an important, essential part, but has no monopoly among the human forms of knowledge and does not exert any kind of totalitarian dictatorship.

Summarizing, or better reaching the summit of our problem, we discover again that cosmic and triumphant law of the Cross which is valid here also for the destiny of Indian Philosophy: It must disappear, it must die, it must surrender and consecrate itself to the real problems of Man to-day, being detached from everything which it could be attached to just because it is Indian; and so it will rise again not only more truly Indian, but also more universal as an integrating part of an oecumenic everlasting Philosophy.

Discussion

INWARD AND OUTWARD ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

by

G. R. MALKANI


Prof. D. M. Datta is a scholar of renown and what he writes deserves to be read with respect. He has raised an important issue in his paper on "Inward and Outward Advaita Vedānta". Certain points raised by him, however, cannot be allowed to pass without questioning.

It is admitted that part of the *sādhana* of Advaita Vedānta is withdrawal from objects of the world and discrimination of the real Self from the different sheaths with which it is falsely identified by us in our ignorance. The last hurdle is the ego or *aham*. The two are very closely related, and almost inseparable except in dreamless sleep. This makes the task of discrimination at this point very difficult. But it can nevertheless be achieved. The actor and the enjoyer, the perceiver and the thinker, are after all momentary entities, and we can be said to be witnesses to their passing in some sense. Our true Self is the witnessing consciousness, which is unchanging (*avyabhicharī*) and immutable (*kūṭastha*).

It is also agreed that Advaita Vedānta does not stop with the discrimination as Sāṅkhya does. For Sāṅkhya, it is enough that the Self is distinguished from prakṛiti in all its forms, both gross and subtle. The Self as thus freed enjoys its *kaivalya* or aloneness. For Advaita Vedānta, this is not enough. The Self still remains discrete, separate. It is not one and the only reality. It is not Brahman. Prakṛiti stands, and other Selves also stand. This indicates a further step. If the Self is completely dissociated from prakṛiti, prakṛiti will even cease to appear to it. What is no possible object of knowledge to intelligence is nothing at all. At least it cannot be *other than* or *different from* intelligence. In the same way, the so-called other Selves, both freed and unfreed, will cease to be possible objects of knowledge. It is only as long as a Self is joined to prakṛiti through lack of discrimination that he can distinguish himself from other Selves, and vice-versa.

P. 8

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12/2/53



knot of union with prakṛiti is dissolved, no ground is left to the freed Self for any distinctions whatsoever, which naturally fall to the ground, and become quite meaningless. Advaita Vedānta is therefore quite emphatic that there cannot be essentially many Selves. The Self is by its very nature self-luminous and self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*); and what is *svaprakāśa* can neither be known by another nor know itself. There cannot therefore be *two* entities which are both self-luminous.

Advaitism takes this natural step from the pluralism of Sāṅkhya to non-dualism. But if that is so, mere discrimination (*viveka*) or negation (*nêti, nêti*) will not suffice for the saving knowledge. The Self must be known in a positive way as non-dual or as one with Brahman, the reality that is without a second. Herein comes the aid of śrūti as *pramāṇa*. All that we have to do is to *recognise* that the Self as dissociated and freed from all relation to the not-Self is verily Brahman and has all the qualities, both intrinsic and extrinsic, that Brahman alone possesses. We do not *add* to our knowledge of the Self after the process of negation (*nêti, nêti*) is over. The Self is there in all its perfect and naked glory. The veritable Almighty God is facing us face to face. All we need is the act of *recognition* on the part of the intellect. Nothing divides the intellect from the truth except its own ignorance and lack of recognition. Śrūti enables it to remove this self-imposed screen. It is so very similar to our knowledge of the moon on hearing the statement "the dominant light in the sky among the stars", or our knowledge of the tenth lost man on hearing the statement "thou art the tenth". When this saving knowledge of the Self arises, nothing is left to be done. The Self is not to be united with an outward-lying ground of the world called Brahman. The world is simply not there. It is completely negated in Brahman, even as the illusory snake is negated in the underlying rope. The knower of *ātman* has no duties to the world or to society. His *sādhana* is complete when he knows his Self as the non-dual reality. There is no ego left, and with the ego has disappeared all duality.

This natural evolution of Advaita Vedānta from Sāṅkhya has been misrepresented by Prof. Datta. As soon as the Self is discriminated from the ego, it has lost its narrow subjectivity. It has become the infinite. Only it is to be so recognised. There is no question of any expansion outwards. We cannot therefore agree with Prof. Datta's statement—"Without this expansion, even in spite of the deepest inwardization into pure subjectivity, that great Upaniṣadic saying can but mean, 'I am Brahman', reducing Brah-

man to only one of its aspects". Does Prof. Datta suggest that the deepest inwardization into pure subjectivity is insufficient to get rid of the ego completely? If so, then the process of inwardization is clearly incomplete. We have need to go farther in the direction of pure subjectivity and beyond the ego. Or does he mean to suggest that although the ego is completely eliminated in the process, something else remains to delimit the Self and detract from its completely non-dualistic character? But what possibly can this something be? We fail to understand its nature.

Prof. Datta says, "The inward search for the reality in man, and the inner realization are logically incomplete without the outward search," This is really reversing the order of priority and the order of importance of the two spheres of investigation, the outer and the inner. We begin by seeking to know the truth about outer nature. Unfortunately, no argument based upon reason can lead us conclusively to what is beyond nature and is the cause of nature. We accept this transcendental cause on the testimony of scripture. It is primarily a faith. Or if it is knowledge in some sense of the term, it is neither complete nor direct. Brahman, the transcendental cause, is taken to be a distant and problematic reality. It is only later that we undertake an investigation of the inner man. But here there is no blind alley. The Self or the *ātman* is by its very nature immediate (*pratyak*). When therefore we consciously recognise the Self for what it is, we find that it is veritably the infinite. It is Brahman. We need then know nothing else. It is found to be the reality of both the inner and the outer. What is important to note is that after the "inner realization" of the *ātman*, no outward search is necessary.

Prof. Datta emphasises the so-called great dictum "All this is Brahman". But it cannot be compared in its significance and importance to the really great dictum (*mahāvākya*)—"Thou art that" (*tattvamasi*). The former leaves us at the problematic stage, for we do not know what Brahman really is, except through certain descriptive formulae given by the scripture. The latter transforms the descriptive formulae into direct knowledge. The "inner realization", if it is truly inner, needs no further aid or addition from any investigation of the outer, which can only lead us away from the truth. It is only when the outer is completely transcended, that the Truth stands revealed in all its completeness. The very distinction of the outer and the inner is then rendered meaningless. When the Gita says, "One who has contacted the Self through yoga sees, with an equal eye, the Self in all beings and

all beings in the Self", the meaning is not that the things are real in the Self or that the Self can only be perceived in things which are therefore necessary to it. The meaning is that the Self alone is real, and that you can only perceive the Self through the negation of all things, both inner and outer. This negation is just the way to pure subjectivity and that inner realization which we all seek. We therefore think that the statement of Prof. Datta — "So it can be said that those who think of Advaita as an inward withdrawal do not get at even half the truth"—is wholly misleading. Is it a withdrawal from outer nature only? Or is it a withdrawal from nature as such, both inner and outer? If it is the latter, as we think it should be, can it be said that the Self as thus known or realized has any of the egoistic attachments which detract from its wholeness or non-dualistic character? If it is a withdrawal in a literal sense, it can only end at the *pratyagātman* which is Brahman, the non-dual reality.

Prof. Datta seeks to base on his interpretation of Advaita Vedānta a sort of moral philosophy. If my Self is one with the Self of all human beings, and in fact with the Self of the universe, there is reason why I should love all fellow beings and serve society in general. (In practice we do not carry this philosophy to cover all creatures whatsoever). He praises Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad for its activism. "It presents an integral, balanced outlook that reconciles knowledge and action, enjoyment and renunciation,....." The same is true of the Gīta which presents "the same integral philosophy of life....." Now it is possible for any-one to advocate an integral philosophy of life which combines knowledge with action and feeling. But it would be wrong to suppose that Advaita Vedānta provides any ground for such a combination as the only means for realizing the ultimate truth. Advaita Vedānta is very emphatic that the *only* means to final release from bondage or *mokṣa* is knowledge (*jñānāt-eva-tū-kaivalyam*). Action and devotion are no doubt aids to knowledge, for they purify the mind and make it fit for knowledge. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that morality and devotion, in the *sādhana* of Advaita Vedānta at least, have the same primary importance as knowledge of Brahman. As a matter of fact, when this knowledge arises, there is no room for any kind of religion in the conventional sense. There is no room for social activity and devotional activity. The world and the individuals in it are all parts of a dream that is now gone. No-one is so senseless as to be anxious to return to the dreamland, which he has left behind, in order to serve the figures and the images that he met there. Thus no kind of morality or social

work can be built on the foundations of Advaitic knowledge. Morality is left far behind as part of a land to which one no longer belongs. One is beyond morality. The very distinction of the moral and the immoral has lost its meaning for him. The Enlightened One has no duties and no obligations. A perfectly free soul cannot be tied to any chains, even if they are the chains of morality. Morality belongs to the mere human, the finite, the imperfect. It does not belong to the divine, the infinite, the perfect. Has not the man of knowledge, who has eliminated the last vestige of egotism from his being, become the divine? For the same reason, the religion of duality, of God and man, has lost all appeal for him. Whom can he worship when there is no other? He has become the All. To make Advaita Vedānta the ground of justification for morality and religion is to make the ridiculous attempt of making the greater as a means to the lesser, or even of making truth a means to falsehood.

The fact is that the whole philosophy of Advaitism is twisted by Prof. Datta to suit his own predilections. He is loth to call the world 'illusory'. He says, "The world was, for him (Śaṅkarāchārya), a manifestation of Brahman,....." Again he says, "It is through the world that Brahman can be attained. Śaṅkara's life and teaching reflect, therefore, the integral outlook in which the transitory and the immutable, the finite and the infinite, the means and the end are logically integrated in a system of ascending grades of reality and value, in which social organization (*loka-saṅgraha*) also had an important place." This may be a form of confused Western Idealism, it is certainly not Advaita. You simply cannot combine the finite with the infinite, the transitory with the immutable in a more real whole. The characteristics are just antagonistic. If the finite is real, the infinite cannot be, and vice-versa. That is the view of Advaita Vedānta, according to which the world is quite illusory (*mithyā*) and Brahman alone is real. Advaita Vedānta may after all be wrong if it advocates the illusoriness of the world-appearance. But it is no service to truth to accept Advaita and then distort it out of shape.

Prof. Datta presses his attack further. He is not satisfied with running down the withdrawal aspect of Advaitic *sādhana*. He makes bold to identify a certain cherished principle of Advaitic philosophy for the interpretation of the world-appearance, *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, with the decadent phase of Indian social life. He might be right on theoretical grounds if he differs from that view. Unfortunately he has not given those grounds, so that we could examine

them. He has resorted to the cheap way of dogmatic condemnation of what he does not like. He says, "During the decadent period of Indian social life, the fuller Advaita of Śaṅkara became divorced from life (*vyavahāra*), and became a mere intellectual sport in the hands of some followers, some of whom even developed a kind of solipsism (*dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭivāda*) tending to grant a moral holiday....." *Dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda* may be right or wrong. It cannot be disposed of by calling names and confusing issues. The way to truth is arduous and serious thinking, not cheap condemnation.

I should not like to say anything which should appear to detract from the greatness of certain leaders of thought of modern India. But when Prof. Datta brings them forward as illustrating his thesis, I cannot but join issue. He says, "In revitalizing Indian life, the leaders of modern Indian renaissance — Ram Mohan Roy, Vivekananda, Tilak, Tagore, Gandhi, Aurovindo, Vinoba and others — hark back to the integral outlook of the earlier Vedānta..... So, while shifting emphasis to the outer world and practical life, none lost sight of the spiritual values to which the personal, social and national life should be progressively affiliated." I have no objection in calling the great leaders here named as Vedāntists in their own way. Certainly Vedānta covers many shades of opinion and is not to be identified with Advaita Vedānta. But the thesis of Prof. Datta is that Advaita Vedānta itself, except during periods of decadence, "tries to give due importance to the outer life in the world, as to the inner life;....." If that is his thesis, it is singularly inapt to bring in those great names as examples of persons who have fully understood Advaita Vedānta and lived it in their lives. Nobody would ever dream of going to any of those leaders, except Vivekananda, in order to understand Advaita Vedānta. Truth is a jealous God. It cannot tolerate affiliations to political or social greatness. All in all, the thesis of Prof. Datta can satisfy only those who are so impressed by Western culture and Western philosophy that they have no patience with the extremely hard task of self-realization as understood by genuine thinkers in the Advaitic line.

Book Review

A Story of Indian Culture, by Sri Bahadur Mal, M.A., Ex-Principal, D. A. V. College, Ambala; Sarvadananda Universal Series, Volume XVIII; pp. 350, Price Rs. 5; Published by Vishweshwarananda Vedic Research Institute, Sadhu-Ashrama, Hoshiarpur.

The present book is a handy volume on the highly complex Indian culture. The work is called 'A Story of Indian Culture'. In a sense the word 'story' seems to have been appropriately used, for it keeps the interest of the reader sustained from the beginning to the end. But in another sense it may mislead some into thinking that it does not possess greater value than that of a story. That, however, is not the case. Under that humble title the work is really serious and valuable by any standard. The general editor of the series rightly calls it "small in its volume but great in its approach and comprehension" (p. vii). It is "a sort of running commentary on the march of Indian culture through the ages" (*Ibid*). Our author brings to bear on his subject deep study and a good deal of original thinking. This makes the book informative as well as thought-provoking.


The work consists of five 'books' and an Introduction. Book I treats of 'Indian Culture in the Vedic Age'. Book II gives an account of the 'Movements of Reform' like Buddhism and Jainism, Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism'. Book III shows how 'Vedic Religion Becomes Hinduism' and "is chiefly concerned with tracing the genesis of all later developments in Hinduism", and so it may be regarded as the key-section in the whole book. In this part, light has also been thrown on the "creative activity of Hinduism" in various fields and the spread of Indian culture outside India (Author's *Preface*, p. x). Book IV deals with 'Hinduism in Middle Ages' and Book V covers the 'Modern Period'.

Indian culture is essentially integral in its character; and though occasionally in its long history a particular aspect of it might have come to receive an exaggerated emphasis at the cost of others, the equilibrium was sure to be restored subsequently. This leads our author to think that "we are coming back to the spirit of the ancient vedic culture" (p. 11), which is another name for verve and vigour, dynamism and vitality, the triumph of spirit over matter and all that the latter stands for. The so-called mild and

peaceful Hindu character is a sign of decay and degeneration according to our author, and he presents a masterly analysis of the causes of this decay (in Chapter VIII, Book III); and these should come as an eye-opener to the present-day Indians. Especially the author's following warning seems to be timely and relevant in the present-day context: "..... and even after the country has become free, a great vigilance has to be kept against all fissiparous and anti-national tendencies in the form of casteism, provincialism and communalism" (p. 299).

The pen of an Aryasamajist is evident throughout the book and it may not be palatable to the die-hard Sanātani section. But our author is nowhere dogmatic on any issue, howsoever controversial. He always takes a reasoned and balanced view of things. He is always governed by sincerity of purpose and courage of conviction. Still in such a work as this, some differences of opinion on this point or that seem to be quite natural. We may cite one instance. In his account of Advaita Vedānta our author refers to the "static and unchanging character of the Absolute". It seems the word 'static' is inappropriate in the case of Brahman, for this is after all a relative term. Brahman is beyond both the static and the dynamic, the changing and the changeless (*Kṣara* and *Akṣara*). So also we differ from his further remark, "How the appearance takes place and why, is a mystery, for which Śaṅkara gives no satisfactory explanation" (Pp. 246-247). As against this, one may contend that all other explanations of the world-appearance are pseudo-explanations, for they involve us in all sorts of contradictions. To recognise something as error due to ignorance is the last word by way of explanation and does not leave any residual problem once the error is dissipated by the knowledge of the substratum of that error. All doubts and uncertainties are possible only so long as the Reality is not known. This explanation alone does justice to the essential nature of Brahman as we find it described in the Upaniṣads (*Ekamevādvītyam*). 'Verily there is no diversity here', so declare the Upaniṣads (*Neh nānāsti kiñchan*). This, however, is not to deny the empirical reality of the world.

The get-up of the book does not come upto the mark. There are many printing mistakes. There is no index. But these flaws do not detract from the value of the book itself. One stands to read it with profit. We congratulate the author on his successful performance.



S. M. CHINGLE

Books Received

1. *Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic* by Susil Kumar Maitra, Price Rs. 8/-.
2. *Non-Absolutes* by Basanta Kumar Mallik, published by Vincent Stuart Publishers Ltd., Price 26 s./- net.
3. *Jaina Psychology* by Mohan Lal Mehta, published by Sohanlal Jaindharma Pracharak Samiti, Price Rs. 8/-.
4. *Studies in Philosophy* by Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Vol. I, published by Progressive Publishers, Price Rs. 17/50 n.p.
5. *The Idealist Tradition*, edited by A. C. Ewing, published by The Free Press, Price \$ 5-50 cents.
6. *Ockham: Philosophical Writings*, edited by Philotheus Boehner, published by Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., Price 21 s./- net.
7. *Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind* by Harold H. Joachim, published by George Allen and Unwin, Price 10 s.-6 d. net.
8. *Introduction to the Vedarthasangraha of Sree Ramanujacharya*, published by the Mangalore Trading Assn. (Private) Ltd., Price Rs. 3/-
9. *A Critical Study of Śrīharṣa's Naiṣadhīyacaritam* by Dr. A. N. Jani, published by Oriental Institute, Baroda, Price Rs. 15/-.
10. *Approach to Reality* by A. G. Javadekar, published by Oriental Institute, Baroda, Price Rs. 6/25 n.p.
11. *Dattātreyā* by His Highness Sri Jaya Chamarajendra Wadiyar Bahadur Maharaja of Mysore, published by George Allen & Unwin, Price 21 s./- net.
12. *The Interplay of East and West* by Barbara Ward, published by George Allen & Unwin, Price 10 s./6 net.
13. *Patterns of a New Philosophy* by Frederick Mayer and Frank E. Bromer, published by Public Affairs Press, Washington, Price \$ 3-25 cents.

14. *On Selfhood and Godhood* by C. A. Campbell (Gifford Lectures), published by George Allen & Unwin, Price 35 s./- net.
15. *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Edited by S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, published by Intercultural Publications Inc., New York, Price \$. 5.
16. *Sri Aurobindo* by M. P. Pandit, published by Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Price Rs. 4.
17. *Sri Aurobindo (War and Self-Determination)*, published by Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Price Rs. 2.

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