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THE  
**PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY**

Vol. XXX, No. 1]

[April, 1957

AN ORGAN

OF

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS


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Yearly Subscription Rs. 4  
For Congress Members Rs. 3  
Foreign 8 Shillings or 2 Dollars. Single copy Re. 1/8 or 3 Shillings

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## THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXX, No. 1]

[April, 1957

### On the Hypotheses about "Psychic Spaces" †

By

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The idea that the queer "image-worlds" of dreams, hallucinations and analogous states constitute "quasi-spatial" realms of their own is not new to students of Oriental and Occidental mysticism. The Tibetan "Book of the Dead", so ably presented by W. Y. Evans-Wentz to English readers, describes the "after-death state" as very much like a "dream-world" and its dreams as the children born of the mentality of the dreamer. The "dream-body" casts no shadow; it is not reflected in a physical mirror; it can pass through material obstacles.<sup>1</sup> In the *Zohar*, the central work on the Cabala or Jewish mysticism, sleep is said to be a fleeting image of death; the deceased is said to be endowed with a finer form of body suitable for life in the higher realms of existence.<sup>2</sup> In Islamic mystical tradition, besides the material world (what Ghazālī called 'ālam al-mulk wa'l-shahāda,<sup>3</sup> and the invisible angelic realm ('ālam

† I am grateful to the Parapsychology Foundation Inc. of New York City, especially to its President, Mrs. Eileen J. Garrett, and its General Research Consultant, Professor Gardner Murphy, for the encouragement I received from them in my attempts to confront some theoretical issues of parapsychological research.

1. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, according to Lāma Kazi Dawa-Samdup's English rendering, edited by W. Y. Evans-Wentz (Oxford University Press, 1927). Cp. Evans-Wentz, *Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrine* (Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 167-169.

2. See Ernst Müller, *A History of Jewish Mysticism* (Phaidon Press, Oxford, 1946), Ch. VI, especially pp. 104-105.

3. See Margaret Smith, *Al-Ghazālī: The Mystic* (Luzac & Co., London, 1944), Ch. X, pp. 159-160.

*al-malakūt*), there is a world of dreams (*ālam-al-misāl*), an eclectic state, where the soul or spirit has "preceptions" though the body may be partly lulled by sleep.<sup>4</sup> According to the teaching of the great Protestant mystic, Jacob Böhme, the soul after death dwells in a "derived eternity" where material space-relations are replaced by "magical relations". As a symbol of his "magical consciousness" (*magia*), which can surmount material obstacles and change its "situation" without "traversing distance", Böhme refers to the dream.<sup>5</sup>

The ancient speculation about "quasi-spatial" realms has been recently revived by Prof. H. H. Price<sup>6</sup> of New College, Oxford. He has argued that the idea of "survival after death" can be treated as a legitimate possibility, and not as a hopeless linguistic muddle, if there are "image-worlds" moulded by the persisting memories and wishes of human egos. The hypothesis at least promises an answer to a question which has been regarded by sceptics as the crux of all speculation on "survival": *Where are the dead? Where is the "Next World", if there is one?* Price suggests that "imagy particulars" may have spatial properties (shape, size, etc.) and spatial relations of a kind. It is even possible that "groups" or "families" of them may constitute "objects" of a sort. But (according to Price) they would not bear the familiar kind of spatial relations to sensory particulars and physical objects. Their "spatial location" would be neither more nor less anomalous than that of "dream-objects" which appear to have a sort of "extension" but no *whereness* in some obvious sense when set over against the background of "ordinary physical space".

Price has been careful not to commit himself to any hypothesis about the *geometry* of "imagy worlds". More enthusiastic

4. See J. P. Brown, *The Darvishes or Oriental Spiritualism*, edited with introduction and notes by H. A. Rose (Oxford University Press, 1927), especially Ch. VII, "The Baqtāshis", p. 212.

5. See H. L. Martensen, *Jacob Boehme*, Eng. tr. by T. Rhys Evans; new and revised edition with notes and appendices by Stephen Hobhouse (Rockliff, London, 1949), pp. 175-181. Sādhu Sundar Singh, the noted Indian Christian mystic of modern times, in his "trance-like" states roamed over "image-worlds" extraordinarily like the "spheres" described in "mediumistic revelations" and found it necessary to defend himself against the charge of drifting into the "Spiritualist" and "Swedenborgian" Churches. See Sundar Singh, *Visions of the Spiritual World* (Macmillan, London, 1927), Preface, pp. xii-xiii; cp. p. 49.

6. "Survival and the Idea of 'Another World'", *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (Proc. S. P. R.)*, Vol. 50, Part 132 (January, 1953), pp. 1-25.

speculators have shown far less restraint and freely invoked multi-dimensional models in support of their hypotheses. Henry More (1614-1687), in his *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, speculated on the possibility of "spirits" having "four dimensions". J. R. Smythies,<sup>7</sup> now at Christ's College, Cambridge, has provided a modernized version of the hypothesis. He is convinced that science has not found the "soul", because it has looked for it in the wrong places. He has suggested that perceptual space and the "space of mental imagery" may not be coincident with physical space, but may fall within a *n*-dimensional manifold containing a "mind-stuff" part of which is organized to form a "signalling mechanism" interposed between the physical brain and the ultimate "Observer". A virtue claimed for the theory is that it is a plausible extension of neurophysiology and experimental psychology which postulate various "signalling mechanisms" mediating our awareness of an "external world". Smythies maintains that his hypothesis has important links with *Gestalt* studies of perception which seem to argue for the view that sensory experiences or "phenomenal configurations" follow the dynamic-spatial relations within a presumably physical brain; the two sets of configurations may exhibit structural correspondence or "isomorphism" without being identical. Especially important, according to Smythies, are the studies of the "body-image" (the spatial representation of himself, so to speak, that a man builds up in the course of his life, presumably relying on the "sensory signals" from the eyes, the skin, the vestibule and the semi-circular canals of the ear, etc.) and the phenomena connected with the "phantom limb" observed, for instance, in persons with an amputated arm or leg. Smythies maintains that, if there is a spatially extended psychical mechanism or "mind-stuff" existing in association with the physical body and intrinsically capable of producing mental imagery, not only the phenomena of the "phantom limb" but the disconcerting "visions" experienced under the influence of mescaline<sup>8</sup> can be accounted for. He seeks support for the speculation in Schilder's observation that eidetic, hypnagogic and mescal images share with ordinary mental images certain characteristics, e.g., unwilling changes of shape and size, fragmentation, spontaneous movement. Smythies asks whether the similarities do not point to a common source of imagery.

7. "The Present Crisis in Psychology", *The Aryan Path*, Vol. XXII, No. 11 (November, 1951), pp. 492-499; "The Extension of Mind: A New Theoretical Basis for Psi Phenomena", *Journal S.P.R.*, Vol. 36, No. 666, pp. 477-502.

8. J. R. Smythies, "The Mescaline Phenomena", *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III, No. 12 (February, 1953), pp. 338-347.

M. D. Vernon<sup>12</sup> whether even the stable, accurate and complementarily-coloured eidetic images, which approximate to after-images, conform to Emmert's law which states that the relation between the size of an after-image and the distance remains constant as distance is varied. I should judge that the situation in respect of position, distance and other relevant geometrical features is much worse when we turn to the intricate mescal, hypnagogic, and hypnotically induced hallucinations. H. Klüver<sup>13</sup> found that although certain "form constants" (like "lattice", "cobweb", "tunnel", "spiral") are comparatively frequent in mescaline hallucinations, the altered properties of objects sometimes suggests an altered framework of space and time. There are perplexing changes in the number, the size, the shape and the colouring of objects. All objects may appear to be situated at the same distance; they may all "recede" into space. And there are questions

12. *Visual Perception* (Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 199. Cf. E. G. Boring, "Size Constancy and Emmert's Law," *Amer. J. Psychology*, Vol. LIII (1940), pp. 293-95; for the influence of perspective on the size of the after-image, see K. Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1935), p. 212; E. R. Jaensch, notwithstanding his theory that perception and imagery differentiate themselves out of an "original unity", conceded, in his *Eidetic Imagery* (Kegan Paul, London, 1930), p. 3, that, "For the great majority of adults, there is an unbridgeable gulf between sensations and images."

13. "Mechanisms of Hallucinations" in *Studies in Personality* (in Honour of Lewis M. Terman), ed. Q. McNemar and M. A. Merrill (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1942), Ch. X, pp. 175-207. In an earlier paper on "Mescal visions and eidetic vision", in the *Amer. J. Psychol.*, Vol. XXXVII (1926), pp. 507-515, Klüver admitted that although perception of "depth" and "illusions" (Müller-Lyer, Poggendorf, etc.) did not seem to be influenced very much by mescal, there were great "difficulties of observations". "Surface colours" tended to become "film colours"; in most cases, the form and colour of after-images transformed themselves into the "visionary" phenomena; the determination of size was "very difficult" under these conditions; the approximate constancy of size at various distances found in some eidetic experiments did not seem to obtain. For an example of mescal "distortion of space" for both monocular and binocular vision, see S. W. Fernberger, "Observations on taking peyote," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, Vol. XXXIV (1923), pp. 267-270. Fernberger noted an apparent "lengthening" of "time" owing to an altered estimate of the "filling" of a given "interval"; Klüver noted the "inadequacy" of all assigned durations. For a physiological explanation of mescal visions in terms of retro-retinal structures and choriocapillary circulation, see C. R. Marshall, "A Factor in Hypnagogic Images," *Mind*, Vol. XLV (1936), pp. 67-70. For the earlier mescal experiences of Weir Mitchell and Havelock Ellis, see J. Jastrow, *The Subconscious* (Constable, London, 1906), Part II, iii, pp. 257-260.

about the "degrees of freedom" in "psychic spaces". Our ordinary space has 6 "degrees of freedom": 3 of translation and 3 of rotation. Poincaré once speculated on a tri-dimensional space with 3 degrees of freedom only. Grünbaum<sup>14</sup> has explained that, in such a space, a figure can be transported so that one of its points coincides with an arbitrary point in space; but once the coincidence has been effected, the figure cannot be rotated. How can we be certain that some hallucinatory "psychic spaces" do not realize a "unimodular affine transformation" rather than the familiar group of Euclidean rigid transformations? In affine geometry only *parallel* line-segments can be measured against one another. Is it beyond the bounds of possibility that "psychic spaces" of the kind postulated by Smythies and Hart, although "volume-preserving", are not *generally* "length-preserving" and "angle-preserving"?<sup>15</sup>

The neurophysiologist, J. C. Eccles,<sup>16</sup> in his Waynflete Lectures at Oxford, has advanced the opinion that Smythies's hypothesis of a multi-dimensional "psychic space" may be complementary to the larger hypothesis of a "body-mind liaison" effected in sub-microscopic regions of the brain where Heisenberg's "indeterminacy" has sway. It is well known that Jordan, under the influence of Bohr, proposed the hypothesis of *Verstärkung* according to which an "unpredictable quantum event" initiates and directs a course of events which "avalanche-like" magnifies the effects of the initial event to the level of "macroscopic visibility". Unfortunately, not all quantum physicists are agreed that quantum "indeterminacy" can be put to these uses. Schrödinger is, on the

14. Grünbaum, *op. cit.*

15. The technical issues about the "time-ordering" of "image-worlds" are neglected by Smythies and Hart. Hart seems to require a linearly ordered time for each "Observer", with two intrinsically different directions, "forward" and "backward", along which "movement" can take place. Assuming that the class of subsets  $T$  of a Hausdorff space  $\Sigma$  are linearly ordered by  $\leq (T_1 \leq T_2)$ , it follows that it has a topology, the topology of linear order. A necessary and sufficient condition that this topology is not inducible by a metric is that the class  $T$  is not separable, i.e. no subset of the class is dense in the class. In a metric space, the question turns on the existence of a countable basis. Of course, if the original Hausdorff space is assumed to be metrical, then the family of its dense subsets  $T$  is metrizable. What are the compelling reasons for metrizing the general "psychic spaces" postulated by Smythies and Hart?

16. *The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1953), Ch. VIII.

## The Temporal and the Eternal

By

G. R. MALKANI

The temporal is a fact. The Eternal is only an ideal. But the two are related. The nature of this relation is our main problem.

That which exists in time changes. But mere change has no value. It has value when it progressively realizes an ideal. This ideal cannot itself be in time. What is in time must itself change and progressively realize something else. It cannot be the ideal. It cannot be the goal of any progressive movement. The goal must be fixed. It must be outside the movement. It is that, which being realized, the movement comes to an end and has no further scope. We always ask, progress towards what? The question implies that the goal of progress is not itself progressive. Unless therefore we accept something outside time as the goal, progress itself has no meaning. We cannot determine the different steps which bring us nearer to the goal. Without this approximation to the goal, progress becomes mere process, which has no value and no meaning for life. There is progress when something stands outside a particular movement, when this something is fixed relatively to the movement, and when the movement approaches nearer and nearer to it till it can, in principle, reach it or realize it absolutely. The only real values in this sense are eternal values. Temporal values are at best progressive expressions of the latter.

A view is sometimes propounded that values need not be fixed or eternal. They are themselves infinitely progressive, so that when we reach A, we find that there is something higher still, say B, which is yet to be realized. Our progress is thus, in principle, indefinite and even infinite. This may be so from a finite and human point of view; for we cannot see the highest ideal all at once. But it is not logically true. An *indefinite* progress is no progress. It means that any distance traversed in the direction of the goal makes no difference to the distance yet to be traversed. In other words, however far we go, we do not bring the goal any nearer to ourselves. The distance dividing us from the goal is always infinite. This means that our movement makes no pro-

gress towards the goal. It is not a progressive movement. We are for all practical purposes stationary in relation to the goal. We do not move at all towards it.

We have so far assumed that value is a necessary characteristic of temporal reality. But need that be so? All we can say is that time is an attribute of the reality which we know. Now it is no doubt true that time, as an attribute of physical nature, may be said to realize no value. Physical nature merely changes, it does not progress to anything higher. The same may be the case with respect to life that is purely vegetative. But it is quite certain that time does realize a value for human beings. Value is a human category. It can only be realized in human life. But human life itself is part of human history; and so the latter too can be said to realize a value. The individual has a life of his own, and may progressively realize some ultimate value in it. But human society too has a history. Does this history progressively realize a goal which is outside history? Herein lies the whole question of the meaning and the value not only of human life, but of time itself.

A way of looking at history is that it is a drama which is being played out in time. A drama must have a beginning, a climax and an end. One view is that it is a drama devised and directed by a benevolent God. He created man and endowed him with some of His own spiritual qualities. He created him after His own image. As long as man lived in obedience to His will, he lived in complete peace and happiness. There was no history. But the moment he disobeyed, he had a fall from that state. With this fall history began. All his subsequent efforts are to return to the original state of perfect happiness. Since God gave power to man to disobey, He also felt compassion and love for him in his fallen state. The way He showed His love was a kind of divine sacrifice,—the sacrifice of the lamb of God, Jesus Christ, who freely sacrificed himself, in order that man may be free and in order that he should live. This intervention of God in human history was the climax of the drama. The end is definitely determined by this intervention. It will be the kingdom of God, when the fallen will arise and live once again a God-like life.

This view of history is super-natural and theological. But that is bound to be the case, when we take in our purview the whole of human history. Empirically, we can see periods of rise and fall,—rise in certain respects and fall in others. We can see changes in the kind of values that are most cherished at different

periods or epochs of history. We can see different social groups pursuing different goals at one and the same time. There is certainly no single goal pursued by the whole of human history. Even if there were one, there would be no assurance of its ultimate consummation on purely empirical grounds. We can never answer empirically the question, whither history? There is no rule by which we can judge the direction of the historical process, or the possibility of any goal out of time being realized by it. We can claim no rational guidance in this matter. The only guidance that appears to be possible is that of the scripture. Unless we have faith in the scripture, we cannot judge the ultimates of history,—its absolute beginning and its absolute end. While this is true, and we may therefore have recourse to the scripture to decide what might be the beginning and what might be the end of history, the very notion of history as a unilineal progressive movement, having a beginning and an end, is open to difficulties.

Any beginning of history is bound to be arbitrary. What was the state of affairs before history began? The beginning of history must have a cause beyond it. This cause must be outside history, and therefore outside time. Can any such cause, or an eternal cause, explain what occurs in time or what is essentially temporal? Can time have a beginning in eternity? We might seek to answer this question by introducing the person of God. We might suppose that God, who is eternal, is responsible for the temporal process. He creates time and the world in it. But then does He achieve something new and something valuable thereby? If He does, then such achievement is inconsistent with His eternal perfection. Some philosophers might therefore be inclined to suppose that there was some imperfection in God, which was sought to be made good through the temporal process. They even speak of an evolving or changing God. But then he is not God in any intelligible sense of the term. He is not eternal or outside time. Only a perfect and eternal God can explain, if at all, the emergence of the temporal process through His will. Short of this, he will be part of history, and not a principle of explanation for it.

We have then a standing contradiction. If God is what He is supposed to be, i.e., eternal and perfect, He can indeed will the world, direct the process of history, and realize a value through it. He can give meaning to history and guarantee that it realizes a great purpose. But then what purpose is left for Him to realize when He is eternal and perfect? He is the same at the beginning

of history and also at the end. History has added nothing to the value-content of His being. Since the beginning of history and the end of it coincide so far as He is concerned, has it achieved any value for Him? Is it not wholly meaningless? To put the contradiction briefly, God, the Eternal, gives meaning to history, and yet how can history transcend God and realize a value which is not yet realized in His own being?

We therefore reject the view that the process in time is real and aimed at realizing the highest possible value which is not yet. The only thing to be said in favour of it is that in-so-far as it distinguishes the starting point from the point of termination, it gives meaning to the notion of progress. If a movement starts from a point and merely comes back to it, it has traversed a circular route and made no progress whatsoever. The view which we have been considering seeks to give some meaning to "progress" along a straight route. But can there be such a route meaningfully shaped within eternity?

The difficulties of this view are inherent in the dogma that there is a starting point for the temporal process. A pure secularist cannot accept a starting point and he cannot accept a God and his will as an explanation of time. Time is beginningless and also endless. But if that is so, there can be no such thing as absolute progress. Endless time just goes from one position to another endlessly. *There is no absolute goal of the temporal process as such.* All goals are relative, and so also is the progress towards them. There is progress from a limited point of view and for limited periods. After such periods, there can only be retrogression. There is bound to be a culminating point for a progressive tendency, and then there can only be a fall or decay from that point. Progress is never maintained indefinitely, and the whole of time is not progressing to a final goal. All goals are relative, short-lived, ephemeral. Nothing is eternal and there is no progress on the whole. Time creates only to destroy. Even if there is such a thing as the logic of events, carrying the temporal process through certain progressive phases, progress cannot be maintained indefinitely. Nor can it end in a millennium when further progress is not possible. If a millennium were possible, time itself would stand still. But we are not prepared for that; for we have accepted an endless time and so endless progress.

We have accepted time as beginningless and endless. In such time, progress is followed by regress, so that there is no over-all

progress towards anything. What is gained is as surely lost or destroyed. The historical process can achieve nothing real or enduring. We can go a step farther, and question not only its value-realizing character, but also its novelty-producing character. Time is nothing if it does not create novelties. But in an infinite and beginningless time, all conceivable possibilities must already have been realized, so that nothing new could be brought into existence. What we suppose to be new must have been realized an infinite number of times before, so that it is only a repetition of what has already occurred times without number. By this reasoning, there can be nothing new under the sun. Thus not only is value liquidated, but novelty also is liquidated.

We may not like such a conclusion, which makes time meaningless, and so also our life in it. A third alternative is still open to us. Not a unilinear progress from a lower to a higher level, nor an aimless process that is indefinite, but a cyclic movement that is at the same time progressive. Let us suppose that there is an ideal state of being which is also timeless. There is however a fall from this state. The visible and temporal world, and we in it, constitute a state of degradation. How this degradation has occurred and through what causes is more than we can explain. We merely accept the fact of it. It may be a rhythm of the original reality, in which case no further explanation is necessary. It is so, because it is so. A degradation having occurred, a resurgence is almost a necessity. For this purpose we must suppose that reality or the original ideal state of being is immanent in the temporal process, and that it is directing the whole evolution, through the necessity of its own nature, to capturing once again the pristine glory of the ideal state. It is a sort of home-coming. All we desire is to come back to the point from which we started and which represents our natural and original state, and so our highest ultimate good. To put it in different words, the world, which includes matter, life and mind, has forgotten its own true self, and is in different states of conscious or unconscious mind. The reality immanent in the world however is tending towards shaking off these limitations, and realizing its own Self which is beyond the mind. In the ultimate analysis, we might say that the Supreme Self has forgotten itself in the world and is seeking to know itself through the world. It is a process of self-forgetfulness and self-recovery. The temporal process has thus a meaning. It is a meaning that is immanent in reality as such; for the reasons which account for the fall also account for the movement to-

wards self-discovery and freedom. There is a well-known view in Indian philosophy, according to which, all things are born from perfection, they stay in it, and go back to it. From joy or ānanda are all things created, etc.

This view is clearly an improvement upon the first two views. There is progress, but not a progress from an arbitrary beginning in time to an arbitrary end in it. It is a cosmic process of winding and unwinding, involution and evolution. The process in time also gets meaning. The whole temporal reality becomes an emanation from Absolute Reality, and to that extent it partakes of its nature. This emanation may be a form of self-alienation; but this self-alienation is destined to be terminated and transformed into self-realization. There is progress, meaning and value in all that occurs. But this view too has its own drawbacks. While the temporal reality is rendered significant, the non-temporal and eternal reality is not. There can be no reason in the latter to account for the supposed degradation or fall or self-alienation. If something is eternal, it must stay so. The transition from it to a changing and moving world cannot be accounted for. There is no rational relation between the two. Again, there is no real progress at all. It is a circular movement which gives an appearance of progress without real progress. Evolution does not carry us to a point higher than the one from which we start. It is a case of make-believe only. This view is therefore no more satisfactory than the other two; but it paves the way for one that can perhaps be accepted.

We now come to the Advaitic solution. The essence of it is that the Eternal will ever remain the Eternal. Nothing ever happens to it. There is no degradation, no fall and no emanation. The temporal is a fact. But it is not causally related to the Eternal and cannot be accounted for by it. In fact, there is no *real relation* between the two. At the same time, the temporal is not something in-itself, unrelated to the Eternal and so independent of it. It is what it is only in relation to the Eternal. Something that does not exist in itself but exists only in relation to something else can only be a false or illusory appearance of the latter. The whole of temporal reality is such an appearance. We, through erroneous perception, know the eternal as temporal.

What then explains the temporal reality? The eternal reality does explain it in a way. For it is its ground. We can say of the illusory that it is born out of its ground, stays in it, and goes back to it when it is cancelled through right knowledge. There is thus

some similarity between this view and the last view. But there is also an important difference. The eternal does nothing. There is no fall or degradation from it. The temporal, as we have seen, is an illusory appearance. This appearance is necessarily created, and it can only be created through the power of error. This power of error then, called *māyā*, is the other part of the explanation. At the same time, it is evident that the power in question cannot exist as a reality in itself. It is the very nature of the power of error or of ignorance to require an intelligent ground or *āśraya*. Only an intelligent person can be said to err. The *āśraya* of *māyā* can be no other than the eternal reality itself. Taking this as its support, it can create illusions. But erroneous knowledge, once it is corrected, disappears together with all its creations. It is not a reality and leaves no residue. In fact, it is as illusory as its creations.

What then is the relation of the historical process to Absolute Reality? We shall say that the former is an illusory appearance of the latter. The Eternal appears to us as the temporal. We know the latter, we do not know the former in any explicit consciousness. If we did, the error would be exposed and sublated. We should then cease to give any value or reality to the temporal, which will no longer be a problem for us. We should have solved the problem of the Eternal and the temporal.

Does time have a beginning? Objectively speaking, time and the process in it can have no beginning. Once we accept a cosmos, we must suppose that its rhythm at least is beginningless. There might be cycles of evolution and involution, creation and dissipation, but there can be no beginning to this process as a whole. In another sense, however, the whole of temporal reality must have a beginning. It has a beginning because it is illusory. The illusory is nothing if it is not created. Once therefore we accept temporal reality, we must also accept that this reality, together with all that it implies, namely its apparent beginninglessness and endlessness, are all a creation of *māyā*. *Māyā* indeed is not created; for it is itself the creative principle. But it is nevertheless illusory, and so is its apparent beginninglessness. (What is not known through any *pramāṇa* or method of knowledge and what is dissipated through right knowledge is illusory. Such is *māyā*).\*

\* This is a doctrine of Advaita Vedanta which we cannot expound here at length.

What then is the significance of history for us? It is quite real in our present state, in which we ourselves are part of history. In this state, we must also suppose that it is beginningless and that it is realizing a value for us. The highest value is that of self-realization or self-knowledge. This is only possible in time. So far time is quite real. It is empirically real, but transcendently it is not: Looking at history from the point of view of the Absolute Reality, the whole historical process is just an illusion. Nothing is ever lost or achieved in time. The Eternal is the only reality and the highest value. There is no degradation of it, no emanation from it, and no creation by it. All creation is erroneous creation. The world in time and time itself are such a creation.

Our conclusion is that time is real only as long as we erroneously perceive reality, which is essentially eternal. It is in this state of error that bondage is real, and so is ultimate freedom. We can then speak of time as the gateway to eternity. For does it not lead us to the eternal at the end? But this is the lower stand-point. The higher stand-point is that time and all that it implies is only an illusion, while reality is out of time and so timeless. Nothing is really gained or lost in time.

## Nature of Implication

By

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- 1. A proposition, it is argued, does not assert a connection of content. But it asserts the fact of inclusion within or exclusion from a class. It does not maintain that S is necessarily P; but it asserts that S is P. There can be no relation of necessity between the subject and the predicate within a given proposition. Necessity may appear in the relation between propositions; and this relation may be one of implication.

But is P the class of which S is a member? Is Socrates a member of the class of mortality? On the contrary, mortality is a necessary property of an x called Socrates who is a human being. The nature of Socrates determines or involves the property of mortality. That is, there is no question of S being included in the class P. Consequently the proposition is not a description about a member of a class. It is an assertion about a subject. It affirms a necessary characteristic of the subject that exists as a fact in the objective world. This is a feature which formal logic deliberately ignores.

- 2. Relation between two propositions enables us to deduce one from the other; such a relation is one of implication where one proposition becomes a consequence of the other. "When a proposition q is a consequence of a proposition p, we say that p implies q. Thus deduction depends on the relation of implication."<sup>1</sup>

To begin with, we have material implication. Given the propositions p and q, both may be true, both may be false, p alone is false, and p alone is true. There are only these four combinations of truth and falsehood, and this is said to be known by the matrix method. Either this truth is based on experience or it has no basis in experience. Since experience cannot establish an impossibility, these symbols, when expanded into terms, sometimes fail to have any basis in experience. If these four combinations have

1. *Principia Mathematica*, I. 90.

no basis in experience, then it is a mere arbitrary convention to say that the matrix method gives us only four such possibilities.

However, let us take up these four alternatives. Whenever any one of the first three alternatives is operative, a proposition is taken to imply another; and this is material implication. But a false proposition is said to imply all propositions. When  $p$  is true and  $q$  is false,  $p$  does not imply  $q$ ; otherwise  $p$  always implies  $q$ .

On this view there can be no inference. Take the implication:  $p \supset q = . \sim (p \supset q)$ .  $p$  implies  $q$  means that the truth of  $p$  is not related to the falsity of  $q$ . That is, to know that a proposition is implied by another, we should first know whether it is true or false. But as Cohen observes: "In all sciences the consequences of rival hypotheses, such as those concerning the ether, must be deduced irrespective of their material truth, and indeed as a necessary condition before their material truth can be determined."<sup>2</sup> When we investigate a hypothesis, this implication is of no avail; and "any known fact is implied equally by all hypotheses."<sup>3</sup> In other words, there is no implication from anything and therefore there is no inference.

In every implication we proceed neither subsumptively nor deductively. We begin with a complex of interrelated terms. In this complex each term is relevant to the rest; and such a complex is a whole or a universal. When we consider such a complex, the emphasis falls on the character of the complex; it is always a determinate complex. By implication we therefore mean the relation that subsists in such a complex between one term or relation and the rest. The correlations between the various parts of the complex help us in determining what implies what. That is, the relation of implication holds between terms even if the mind does not recognise it. It is not a very special or unique relation subsisting only between propositions. It subsists between propositions because it is assumed to be already implicit in reality. There can be no implication between two propositions which belong to two different universals. The nusus of the terms related through implication must be within the same universal.

In the Formalist's account of material implication, we find that two assertions which are not at all related to one another are treated as implier and implied. Consider the proposition  $\sim p \supset q =$

2. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 15 (1918), p. 684.

3. Lewis and Langford: *Symbolic Logic*, pp. 261-2.

Any false proposition implies the truth of itself. Then  $\sim (p \supset p)$ .  $\supset. q \supset p =$  Of two propositions if one does not imply the other, then the other does imply the one. The proposition 'the day is rainy' may not imply that 'Socrates died of hemlock'; but the latter ought to imply the former. That is, implication is taken to be only a one-sided relation. But if  $x$  implies  $y$ ,  $y$  must necessarily imply  $x$ . Where there is no such reciprocal relation, we do not have any implication. When a false proposition is said to imply its own truth, we do not have implication. On the other hand, it is a case of material or perfect disjunction which should not be confused with a relation.

Take the proposition:  $\sim (p \supset q)$ .  $\supset. p \supset \sim q =$  if  $p$  does not imply  $q$ , it at least implies that  $q$  is false. 'The day is rainy' may not imply that 'Socrates died of hemlock'; but it implies that Socrates did not die of hemlock. But what is the relation between any two of these propositions? If a rainy day can imply something about Socrates, anything can imply anything. Even this would lead us to the conclusion that the objective world is an inter-related system.

A false proposition implies every other proposition. Then it ought to imply both true and false propositions. As Cohen and Nagel observe: " $2 + 2 = 5$  implies that Saccho and Vanzetti were executed for murder."<sup>4</sup> A false proposition can imply a true one only by negating itself. It can imply a false one only under a highly abstract relationship of identity, consisting of falsehood. Here the identity of an abstract class is mistaken for implication. We are also told that a true proposition must imply every other true proposition. 'Paris is the capital of France' must materially imply that 'the sun sets in the west.'<sup>5</sup> Here too the criterion of implication is sought in an abstract universal called truth. We do not know on the formalist analysis how each proposition taken by itself is true. Nor do we know any specific relationship governing the two save that both are said to be true. This is purely an abstract formal relation.

Every proposition, we hear, can imply a true proposition. The true proposition as well as the false one can imply the true one. If it implies a true proposition, the criterion is an abstract universal called truth which is taken in a formal sense. If it implies a

4. *Logic and Scientific Method*, p. 127.

5. Eaton: *General Logic*, p. 228.

false one, the criterion is not implication but pure disjunction. This illogicality is evident in an explanation like the following: "Let an equal number of true and false statements—chosen at random, and regardless of their subject-matter—be written on slips of paper and put in a hat. Let two of these then be drawn at random. The chance that the first drawn will materially imply the second is  $\frac{3}{4}$ . The chance that the second will materially imply the first is  $\frac{3}{4}$ . The chance that each will materially imply the other is  $\frac{1}{2}$ . And the chance that neither will materially imply the other is 0."<sup>6</sup> Here the principle is known as the calculation of chances which is only an imperfect disjunction. Throughout the formalist's account of implication we find only the operation of the disjunctive judgment.

4. Further, a proposition may imply many propositions and yet be inconsistent with them. This arises when the implied is the contradictory of the implier. If two propositions are consistent, then one should not imply the contradictory of the other. Taking 'poq' to mean that 'p is consistent with q', we can express this as "poq" =  $\sim (p \supset \sim q)$ . When p and q are true, then  $p \supset \sim q$  is false; and poq is true when p and q are true. This means that to say that two propositions are consistent is the same as saying that both are true. But two propositions may not be consistent with one another; and yet they may imply one another. This happens when both propositions are false. A false proposition may imply every proposition; but it is inconsistent with every one.<sup>7</sup> The formalist uses the word 'consistency' in an abstract sense to convey the idea of the participation of a proposition in an abstract universal called truth. But consistency reveals the operation of the principle of non-contradiction in reality which is a subject and no quality. It is because of the principle of non-contradiction that a false proposition is inconsistent with every proposition.

This material implication then is no relation.<sup>8</sup> It is a disjunctive judgment, though the alternatives supplied by the formalist are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. The formalist takes the imperfect form of disjunction; and from this he deduces

6. Lewis: *Symbolic Logic*, p. 145.

7. See D. J. Bronstein: *The Meaning of Implication* (*Mind*, 45, 1936 pp. 159-160).

8. See Joseph in *Mind*, 41 (1932, p. 430), 42 (1933, p. 435 ff), 43 (1934 p. 318 ff); Bradley: *Logic*, I, 46-7.

a conclusion which he describes as implication. In other words, his implication is a deduction from imperfect or faulty premisses.

5. Implication involves truth and falsity in propositions. But no proposition can be taken to be true or false in itself and by itself alone. A proposition is true only when it is systematically necessitated by something which is its ground. But there is nothing like such a ground accepted in formal logic. The formalist makes the ground and the necessity thereof disappear altogether. Even in disjunction, an alternative claims to be true by virtue of its relation to the whole. It is governed by the principle 'this or nothing'; and its truth is arrived at in and through the application of the principle of non-contradiction. The formalist employs the word 'implies' in a variety of senses. It is either a disjunctive deduction or a deduction from an absolute negation. As Joseph observes: When the formal logicians "Write  $p, p \supset q, \supset q$ , the symbol  $\supset$  is not used in the same sense each time. That p implies q means merely that in fact it does not happen both that p is true and q false . . . . On the other hand, that p and  $p \supset q$  together imply q is true necessarily . . . . Thus the relation, if any, intended by  $p \supset q$  is one, a knowledge of which requires knowledge of particular fact . . . . To know that  $p, p \supset q, \supset q$  I need only know the law of contradiction."<sup>9</sup> Without taking recourse to this law, the formalist attempts an explanation of the nature of implication. And whenever this principle is rejected, we do not have a concrete whole but a set of discrete particulars which bear no relation to one another. Since implication too is a relation, it cannot subsist between any two discrete particulars. A relation like implication is that which subsists between two objects or propositions even before we apprehend them.

Consider the following three propositions:

"At least one person wrote Waverly";

"At most one person wrote Waverly";

"Whoever wrote Waverly was Scotch."

These three propositions together imply that the author of Waverly was Scotch.<sup>10</sup> This is not a case of material implication. In material implication, a true proposition implies another true one. Then any two of the above three, or only one of them, must materially imply the conclusion. Russell here seems to equate impli-

9. *Mind*, 43 (1934), p. 319.

10. See Russell: *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 177.

cation with entailment.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, a relation is not anything we create. The principle called relation is the way through which we understand reality as an inter-dependent whole. Implication too cannot be conceived apart from such a systematic whole. The three propositions given above refer to a Scotchman whose character or nature necessarily implies the writing of the Waverly. Here from the whole called the Scotchman we derive the implication of writing the Waverly. The whole in this case is the individual Scott. We cannot think of Waverly apart from a Scotchman who alone can be its author. This inability to think otherwise is the essence of implication. It is in other words the principle of specific necessity which distinguishes a systematic whole from a set of discrete particulars.

6. Material implication, we are told, holds between two propositions, *p* and *q*, only when it is not possible to deduce *q* from *p* validly. Strict implication, on the other hand, is taken to hold between a proposition *p* and a proposition *q*, when it is possible to deduce *q* from *p* validly. But the principles of deduction vary from system to system. However, material implication is taken to be wider than strict implication. Where the latter holds, there the former too can hold; and it can hold in those cases where the latter does not hold. This eccentricity is shared by strict implication also; for it holds whenever deducibility is possible and is not possible. If implication can thrive even when it is not possible to deduce, it cannot be a relation. As such, how can we treat one proposition as implying another? Strict implication, on the other hand, claims to be a relation; and yet it speaks only of a possibility. Such a possibility cannot enable us to speak of any implied proposition as true.

Consider the nature of inference. Here we start with a certainty that there are some true propositions. We transfer this certainty to the truth of a specific proposition. We view the specific proposition with reference to the system of true propositions. Our argument would then be that the given proposition is true or nothing is true. The rejection of a conclusion based upon a certain accepted complex would destroy the experienced world. That is, in every inference we have a limited complex and the total character of reality. Though our conclusion is based on the limited complex, we relate this complex to the reality which cannot be modified any further by this complex. We combine

11. See E. J. Nelson in *Mind*, 39 (1930), p. 445 note.

these two into a system and derive our implications. It is the rejection of this explanation that would reduce all implication to a farce.

Inference is a mediated judgment. Implication is an immediate assertion, and it proceeds from a complex or whole more directly. Johnson, however, identifies implication with potential inference. But in such a case we have to say that "P would justify us in inferring *q*, if we knew that *p* was true, whenever *p* really implies *q*." In other words, Johnson introduces the word 'potential' unnecessarily. We normally say that "x threatens *y* whenever it is true that *x* would injure *y*, if he could." We never restrict ourselves to the statement that "x would threaten *y*." Given the two premises 'MaP' and 'SaM' we may say that they together imply 'SaP'. But this is not the same as saying that 'MaP' would imply 'SaP'. In both the cases we have inference. In the first the inference is completely mediated with reference to the universal; and in the second this mediation is understood. The conclusion drawn from two valid and interrelated premises is a deduction which need not necessarily be an implication. When a given set of circumstances compels us to assume something without which the situation is inexplicable we have implication. It is something implied by the facts; and without it no explanation is possible. It is that which we cannot dispense with. In other words, implication is a relation between the members of a whole or a universal. It may hold between the universal and its members, even though in such cases we do not have genuine implication.

7. This principle operates in the judgment; and it can be best understood from the standpoint of the meaning which is taken to be implied by the primary sense of the words. Consider the statement, 'That thou art'. The word 'that' denotes omniscience and other characteristics of the Absolute, while the 'thou' denotes the finite individual. The non-relational identity between the two is effected through implication; for, the 'thou' is related to "Being".<sup>12</sup> It is a non-relational primary apposition.<sup>13</sup> The 'that' and the 'thou' are cognised through the primary denotative power of the words. Do we also cognise the relation between the 'Being' of the two? For instance, in 'The pot is non-eternal', the word 'pot' considered as a class-word finds its predicate incompatible with itself. But we do effect a significant syntactical relation between

12. VP. 275.

13. SS. I. 218-220; NMA 269

the non-eternality and the particular pot. In other words, when the being of a thing is involved, there the primary denotation need not be given up. But where a qualification is applied to one of the terms, there we discard a part of the primary meaning.<sup>14</sup> Thus when we say 'the pot is eternal', the individual pot as such is not eternal; and in order to make the predicate compatible with the subject, we take up the implied sense.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, in 'That thou art' we need not take recourse to implication; for, the primary denotations of the 'that' and 'thou' are not modified in the equation of identity, because it expresses an immediate experience.<sup>16</sup> Hence when the substantive is involved we accept its denotation as it is. But when a qualification is referred to, we may take recourse to implication, provided it can make the syntactical relation compatible.<sup>17</sup>

If the predicate is to hold good of the subject, not of the subject as qualified in a specific way, nor of the qualification, then the predication is true of the bare subject in its primary sense. For instance, the word 'pot' signifies also 'potness' which is its qualification. If the pot is non-eternal, this non-eternality agrees with the particular pot only, and the qualification 'potness' is irrelevant to the context. By pot we primarily mean the particular pot. But in the statement 'the pot is eternal', we have the particular pot as the meaning of the word 'pot'; and the predicate here compels us to take recourse to implication, and thus interpret the word 'pot' to mean 'potness'. 'Potness', therefore, is part of the meaning of 'pot' and constitutes its qualification. If this qualification does not as a subject enter into a relation with a predicate, then we should accept the primary meaning as final, and this primary meaning has everything to do with the particulars only.

Here we have an example of a word capable of meaning two things, and the meanings are imbedded in the same word. The question as to the relative importance of these two meanings depends on the context which here is its relation to a given predicate. But when one meaning thus comes out uppermost as the proper significance of the word, the other meaning is not ignored. It also enters into our understanding; and when we analyse the import of the sentence it too comes out. When we accept the

14. See VP. 276.

15. cf. SS. I. 236.

16. B. 55. 7-57. 1.

17. TP. 334-335; VP. 276.

implied meaning in 'the pot is eternal', we are not accepting a mere associated meaning. We are taking that meaning which is vitally connected or united with the primary meaning of the word. When we thus infer one meaning from another, we accept a close internal relation or necessity between the two things.<sup>18</sup>

8. The implied meaning which comes to us from the word is accepted always as the most important meaning since it fits into the context. In a sentence like 'That thou art' we cognise and sustain the apposition between 'That' and 'thou'. This is not the non-principal meaning, since it is not a sense other than what is cognised. Further in the identity of the 'thou' and the 'that' a part of the primary meaning is still retained; whence it is not a meaning other than the primary expressed meaning. Implication comes here only in the syntactical relation of the substrate to the exclusion of the delimiting qualifications.<sup>19</sup> The final meaning that results thus stands on its own merits and does not serve as a means for something else.<sup>20</sup> Hence it is not the inconsistency of the primary meaning that compels us to take resort to implication. We take recourse to it, when the import is not intelligible in terms of the expressed sense.<sup>21</sup> Thus in a sentence like, 'Let the curds be protected from the crows', we have an intelligible syntactical relation. But the ideal content is not complete. In the expression, 'the hamlet on the Ganges' we have no sensible import at all.<sup>22</sup> As such, through implication we arrive at the principal meaning, and the emergence of this principal meaning is determined by the needs of an intelligible import, and not by the needs of syntactical relation. This is a concrete instance which exhibits the operation of logical necessity.

9. We can now turn to the modern formalist again. Johnson formulates two principles of inference called the applicative and the implicative. According to the former, q can be inferred from p, if p is of the form 'All S is p' and q is of the form that 'the given S is P'. According to the latter, q can be inferred from p, when q is of the form y, and p is a compound proposition which already contains x and y. This principle therefore tells us that p contains x and y; and of these two, x implies y. But what is the nature

18. See VPS. 134.

19. SS. I. 185; AS 34-35.

20. AS. 35.

21. SS. I. 196.

22. SS. I. 204.

of the relation between  $x$  and  $y$ ? How is  $x$  able to imply? We have to say that either the implicative principle of Johnson rests on the applicative relation or on another implicative relation. In the former case, only one relation is enough; and in the latter case, he is committed to a regress.<sup>23</sup>

A few pages later, Johnson observes: There are certain specifiable relations such that, when one or other of these subsists between two propositions, we may validly infer the one from the other."<sup>24</sup> But earlier Johnson wrote that the implicative principle expresses one of the "two fundamental relations which will render the inference from  $p$  to  $q$  . . . formally valid."<sup>25</sup> These two statements contradict one another. Moreover, implication is not identical with inference. An inferential argument relates a subject to a predicate by means of a middle term which must needs be a universal. Through this universal we get a mediated apprehension of reality. But when an apprehended object or proposition gives rise to an implication we have a direct reference to reality in and through a specific necessity.

Johnson's applicative and implicative principles presuppose that we have a good many universal premises with which we may work. These premises are arrived at through induction from particular instances. This process is given the name of "intuitive induction."<sup>26</sup> This variety of induction is said to give us the fundamental principles of induction, besides the self-evident axioms of logic and mathematics. One of the principles of induction is called the counter-applicative one. It takes the form: "What is true of this instance is true of any other instance, and then we can be sure that it is true of all instances." The second is the counter-implicative principle. This can be stated as: "Sometimes when we have made a particular inference which is valid we can see that its validity is due to a certain type of formal relation which holds between premise and conclusion."

The counter-applicative is a restatement of the concept of the abstract universal with reference to a necessity operating in the instances. The second rejects this necessity by introducing a formal relation between the premise and the conclusion. If the conclusion is drawn from the premises, it must have a necessary relation with them. If this relation is said to be formal, it is impos-

23. See Johnson: *Logic*, II. Chapter 1, Section 4.

24. *Ibid.* II. 30.

25. *Ibid.* II. 10.

26. *Ibid.* II. Chapter 8.

sible to arrive at the conclusion. The very validity of the inferential conclusion presupposes the validity of the premise and also the necessary connection with the premise.

10. Formal implication is the formalist's second variety of implication. Here we do not find any necessity operating; and in the absence of necessity we go back to atomic pluralism. Yet Stebbing takes this to be a class of material implications; she observes that "it asserts that in every case of a certain set of cases material implication holds."<sup>27</sup> A formal implication states that "if anything has  $S$ , then it has  $M$ ." "Socrates is a man" implies that "Socrates is mortal"; this is an expression of material implication. But we get the expression of a formal implication when we say that "if anything is a man then it is mortal." If the given has the character of a triangle, this character implies that its angles are equal to  $180^\circ$ . What have we gained by this implication? The implication is nothing new; and it is already contained in the original character of the object. The so-called implication here is an elaboration of the subject term; and a mere elaboration does not exhibit implication. Yet the property of the triangle is a necessary consequence of the figure being a triangle; and the property of mortality is a necessary characteristic of the subject being a man. What we find here is not an implication but a necessity operating with reference to the ground or the system.

Moreover, this alleged formal implication does not refer to universal truths. A formal law does not have any application anywhere, while a universal truth cannot be confined to the mere conceptual level. The formalist thinks that the generalization of material implication, the abstracting of material implication, is in reality a case of formal implication. The difference between these two varieties must then lie in the words employed.

Hume and Mill have contended that there can be no necessary propositions. On the other hand, there are only statements of class inclusion. If this is true, implication is a mere conjunction or disjunction of 'truth-values'. Such a conjunction or disjunction cannot enable us to understand anything.  $A$  is either  $B$  or  $C$  cannot directly imply that it is  $B$ , or that it is  $C$ . A disjunction contains in itself the conclusion it might give rise to. The conclusion here is nothing new, since it repeats a part of the original premise. On the other hand, take a conjunctive judgment ' $A$  is  $B$  and  $C$  and  $D$ .' Here  $B$ ,  $C$  and  $D$  are not related to one another

27. Stebbing: *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 224.

directly; and as such they can be only properties. But no two properties can have the same relation with the same subject at the same time. This is in essence the meaning of the law of non-contradiction, which also tells us that within a given whole, the properties are necessarily related to one another. Moreover, a conjunctive judgment is primarily quantitative and therefore abstract. From an abstract entity we can have no implication whatsoever.

11. The third variety is the 'strict implication' of Lewis who accepts the principle of necessity. This variety offers only a *ratio cognoscendi* of necessity, not a *ratio essendi*. The definition of strict implication is —

$$p \text{ — } 3 q. = \sim \Diamond (p \sim q).$$

Here —3 stands for 'strictly implies' while  $\Diamond$  stands for 'possible or self-consistent'. 'P strictly implies q' means "it is false that it is possible that p should be true and q false", or "The statement 'p is true and q false' is not self-consistent." Here we deduce q from p; and as such, if p is true, q cannot be false. If one is true and the other false, the implication would be a contradiction.<sup>28</sup> We have an alternative definition with the symbol '0' standing for 'Consistent'—

$$p \text{ — } 3 q. = . \sim (p0 \sim q).$$

To say that p strictly implies q is to say that p cannot be consistent with the denial of q.<sup>29</sup> Consistency here means that it is not at all possible to deduce the falsity of the one from the other.<sup>30</sup> To be consistent, we cannot affirm the first and deny the second.

But this interpretation does not hold good of necessity. The nature of the hypothetical proposition cannot be equated with that of necessity. For instance, red implies extension, since a red patch is always extended in space. We can think of this implication; and yet we can affirm the red and deny its extension, without facing any inconsistency. P can imply q; and yet p may be consistent with the denial of q. In other words, we should not mistake a property or *ratio cognoscendi* for an essence or *ratio essendi*. Strict implication takes the property into consideration. It has nothing to do with the essence or the character. Where we proceed in this manner, we sacrifice necessity since all necessity is determined by the essence, and not by the property.

28. *Symbolic Logic*, p. 124.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

30. *Ibid.* p. 153.

This theory of strict implication abounds in a number of paradoxes.<sup>31</sup> Let us consider a few propositions.  $\sim \Diamond p. \text{ — } 3 p \text{ — } 3 q.$ <sup>32</sup> "A triangle is not a figure" implies "grass is green." A self-contradictory proposition implies any proposition. Then we have to take recourse to absolute negation or to an abstract class concept as in the case of the material implication. This we have seen is faulty logic.

$\sim \Diamond \sim p. \text{ — } 3 q \text{ — } 3 p.$  A necessarily true proposition is implied by any other. "9 × 7 = 63" can be implied by "Justice Taney wrote the Dred Scott decision." Here too the two propositions are related only externally. Otherwise there must be something in the nature of the latter to imply the former. Where we have external relation, there we cannot speak of implications.

Such paradoxes arise from the fact that symbolic logic ignores the intensional meaning; and it therefore gives an improper meaning to the concept of implication. Implication has always a reference to meaning. "A fasts by day and yet keeps himself fit." In such a case the implication is that he dines by night. This implication is necessarily related to his fasting during the daytime and to his keeping himself fit. Without accepting this necessary relation within one universal, symbolic logic tries to relate two propositions which belong to two different universals.

12. According to Lewis, an impossible proposition implies every other proposition. That is, every other proposition is deducible from an impossible proposition.<sup>33</sup> An impossible proposition can be stated as  $p \sim q$ ; p is both true and false. Lewis proceeds in the following manner:

- i. Assume  $p \sim p$
- ii. If p is both true and false, then it is true. So assert that (i) strictly implies that p is true.
- iii. If p is both true and false, then it is false. So assert that (i) strictly implies that p is false.
- iv. If p is true, then either p or q is true. So assert that (ii) strictly implies that  $p \vee q$ .
- v. If p is false because of (iii), and if because of (iv) either p or q must be true, then q must be true. Do we have any strict

31. See Bronstein in *Mind*, 45 (1936), p. 165..

32. See *Symbolic Logic*, pp. 174, 248.

33. *Ibid.* 230.

deduction here? The second and the third steps are mutually exclusive and they assert two contradictory conclusions. This is repeated in the next two steps with slight modifications. We nowhere find how  $p$  may be true or  $q$  may be true; nor do we find any relation between these two. And from two unrelated propositions we cannot draw any conclusion, since they do not have any reference to the same whole or universal.

13. Implications must take into consideration the meaning of propositions. As Morris Cohen argued: "A proposition devoid of all meaning would be just non-sense from which nothing could possibly be deduced. The particular logical consequences of any proposition surely do not follow from the mere sounds or marks on paper, but from the nature of the objects asserted in the proposition."<sup>34</sup> The consideration of meaning does not allow us to wander from the whole or the universal under consideration. Consequently, we are compelled to recognise the nature and value of necessity implicit in every implication.

Symbolic logic, however, argues that implication has nothing to do with meanings, and that it is a relation of truth-values. In other words, it is an extensional logic. "When we take the extensional approach, we are interested in knowing what can be necessarily concluded from the knowledge of the truth-values of a proposition or set of propositions, without any consideration of the meanings of the propositions."<sup>35</sup> But we can deduce true propositions only from a true proposition. To say that a false proposition implies a true one is to argue not about implication but about the minor premise in a disjunctive judgment. Even then we cannot draw a conclusion if we shut our eyes to the question of meaning.

Lewis, however, recognised that "inference depends upon meaning, logical import, intension."<sup>36</sup> But by using the words 'impossible' and 'inconsistent' in an ubiquitous manner, he runs back into extensional logic. ' $P$  strictly implies  $q$ ' means that 'it is impossible for  $p$  to be true and  $q$  false.' Here 'possible' means 'self-consistent'. The self-consistency of a proposition can be determined only by its meaning which always expresses a fact. And the impossibility of an implication is determined by the law of non-contradiction. Two propositions agree with one another when

34. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 15 (1918), p. 675.

35. Paul Weiss: *On Alternative Logics* (*Philosophical Review*, 42 for 1933, p. 521).

36. *Survey of Symbolic Logic*, p. 328.

they do not qualify reality in two opposite ways. They are inconsistent when one alone implies the contradictory of the other; and when two propositions are said to be consistent, we have to accept that both are true. But as we have seen above, two propositions of the formalist can imply one another and yet be inconsistent with one another. This arises when both of them are false; for, a false proposition not only implies every proposition, but is inconsistent with every other proposition. This unhappy situation is a logical consequence of the extensional logic. But how can we determine the claim of a proposition to be true if we do not enquire into its meaning and into its agreement with reality? Truth as such is not a mere property of the proposition. It is wider and involves the whole of reality.

When every proposition is consistent with itself there can be no contradictory propositions. And the contradictory of a necessary proposition is a self-contradictory one. As such, to say that there are no self-contradictory propositions is to say that— $p$  is no proposition when  $p$  is one. Or it means that there are no necessary propositions. Both these conclusions are not acceptable to the formalist. He cannot accept the former because it undermines his symbolic structures. Nor can he accept the latter since it falsifies his account of implication. In some form or other one has to recognise necessity if one were to speak of implication, and one should accept that there are necessary propositions. The necessary propositions prescribe the conditions that ought to be fulfilled by any proposition. They state some features of propositions whose significance they determine. The conditions that a fact ought to satisfy are stated by these propositions. It is with reference to these conditions that we can speak of implication; and they reveal that all implication is operative within a concrete universal.

14. Implication (Arthāpatti) is one way of explaining the meaning of a word or of a sentence. Its essential feature lies in postulating or presuming something to make something else intelligible and compatible.<sup>37</sup> This postulated something must be closely connected with the thing we cognise, with the thing we are to explain; for then alone can it fit into the ellipsis.

Consider the sentences, 'close it' and 'it has rained'; consider the verbs 'rise' and 'set'. In the first sentence we take the 'it' to stand for the door or window or book or some other thing. In

37. See VP 309, cf. Green: *Prolegomena*, Section 174, P. 5

the second we mean the 'clouds' by the word 'it'. With the verbs we associate the moon or the sun. How are we able to complete those sentences or words in this way? We complete them because the mutual expectancy of the words demands some such filling up of the gaps. Do we follow any inferential principle or not in such a filling up? We presume the necessity of a certain thing to explain something else with which we are conversant.

How is this presumption related to the expressed words? The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka argues that the primary denotative function of the word has a capacity which embraces even the understood sense; for it can fly like an arrow to the farthest regions. But there is no evidence to prove that this capacity is one and unique, since many different objects appear to be comprehended in it. Such a capacity cannot be established because the words can express only their own meanings, and also because the final import of the sentence too can express only that which is embodied in it. Nothing that is already not contained in the word or in the sentence can be expressed by either.

How do we fill the ellipsis? We hear the word 'rise' and from the cognition of this word we supply the word 'sun'. We hear the sentence 'close it' and from the cognition of the meaning in the context we presume that the door is meant. Similarly in an apparently affirmative statement we might apprehend a negation; and in a negative sentence we might perceive an affirmation. Such a state is found in the command 'eat poison'. We cognise a thing and are unable to explain it with reference to the known; we have therefore to presume something unknown. Sometimes a word expresses a meaning and also implies or suggests another. If the primary meaning is the basis of the latter, they can have a causal relation, and then the implied may be inferentially cognised. These two meanings are then apprehended one after the other; the latter is mediated by the former and is then cognised inferentially.<sup>38</sup>

But can we apply the relation of the logical reason to its predicate in the case of the implied meaning? An apparent command like 'eat poison' implies a prohibition; and an apparent prohibition can imply an injunction. These two cannot be related to one another analytically or synthetically. But if one is implied by the other, there must be some relation; and this cannot be proved to

be a relation of invariable concomitance in the case of the implied meaning.

The inference is complete and certain when we get at the conclusion. From the perception of smoke we infer the existence of fire and there is nothing more that can be known. But such a certainty is not found in the case of a single suggesting word. A word gives rise to ideas or feelings. The implied idea does not appear to be even casually related to the expressed one; for the idea of sanctity is not at all a corollary of the hamlet being on the bank.

In implication we do not argue from the causal law but from the principle of consistency. Reality being self-consistent, from any particular we can arrive at any other particular with reference to the real. In such a case any inferential process is not complete until and unless we are able to arrive at the apprehension of the whole since the various parts have their *nisus* towards it.

It is admitted that inference presupposes the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. But this relation need not always be explicit, as it is already implicit in the reason. Thus in the argument 'there is fire on the hill, because there is smoke', reason implicitly recognises the invariable concomitance of the smoke with the fire. Thus the presence of reason is enough for an inference. It is only the uneducated that can arrive at the conclusion of an inference through the relation, for the wise man is satisfied with reason alone.<sup>39</sup> The presence of reason implies its necessary relation with the thing to be known, felt, or proved. To apprehend this necessary relation one does not require a multiplicity of instances. Every experience is general. We understand the universal principles and remember the particular manifestations thereof. A repetition of instances is not going to add to our knowledge of a necessary connection between two things. If such a necessary connection exists, even from a single experience we can arrive at it. "Inductive probability depends rather on the unification of a region of experience than on the number of cases in which similar conjunctions are repeated."<sup>40</sup> The child does not get its fingers burnt every time when it sees the fire in order to assure itself of this power of the fire. A single experience teaches it once and for ever. Here we find insight or intuition working closely in our experiences, and giving us a knowledge of the neces-

39. See *Vyaktiviveka*, 65, III.

40. cf. Bosanquet: *Implication*, p. 63.

38. cf. *Vyaktiviveka* 9-10, 39, 57, 78. See Kir II. 324-6.

sary connections between the presented facts. This knowledge presupposes a system of truths in its turn. "The principle of induction is not a separate and special *a priori* principle, but the fundamental assumption that the universe is a connected whole."<sup>41</sup> In other words, in every correct inductive argument, what we require is an insight into the object; and insight is only a way of looking at an object as intrinsically systematic and distinct; and we thereby perceive its constitutive terms and relations. Thus it is the knowledge of an interrelated system that explains the particular problems. And in all the examples where we take recourse to implication, we have to find a justification for our method in this theory of implication.<sup>42</sup>

15. Something is unintelligible because something else is absent; and to make the something intelligible we presume the existence of that something else.<sup>43</sup> Thus, in the absence of eating at night, we cannot offer an intelligible explanation for the fatness of one who does not eat by day; and we presume his eating at night. To take another example, we have first a cognition that 'this is silver', and later we correct this by saying 'this is not silver'. These cognitions are mutually exclusive, and yet they refer to the same object. But this reference is unintelligible because of two exclusive cognitions. As such we presume that the cognised silver is other than real; nor can we say that it is unreal.

Let us consider another example. It is said that 'he who knows the self overcomes sorrow.'<sup>44</sup> That the knowledge of the self can remove sorrows is unintelligible if we do not presume that sorrows themselves are only appearances. Or when it is said that 'the living Devadatta is not at home', we have to postulate his existence outside his house. In these cases an implied meaning is accepted so that it might render intelligible that which is apparently unintelligible. In other words, an apparent unintelligibility demands the postulation of a new meaning, which new significance it can be said to suggest or imply.<sup>45</sup>

Such an implication arises in two ways. One way appears when the expression is unintelligible. We hear a part of a sen-

41. *Ibid.*

42. But cf. TS. 465 ff; TM 6-7.

43. SV Arthāpatti 8-9, 77; VP 308-9.

44. Chāndogya, 7.1.3.

45. VP. 311.

tence, and we are unable to interpret it properly because of the inadequate syntactical relation. Then the incomplete syntactical structure suggests a word which completes it.<sup>46</sup> Thus the command 'close' suggests a word like the window so that we can have an intelligible import. It is not the needs of grammar that suggest this word, but the needs of logical thought. If we do not admit this suggested word, our apprehension turns futile. That is, the suggested word comes at the bidding of reality, and we have to accept it. The essence of an inference lies "in showing of any suggested assertion that unless we accepted it, our province of truth would as a whole be taken from us."<sup>47</sup>

The other way in which a suggestion arises is from the non-intelligibility of the expressed (*abhihita*). When the expressed meaning of a sentence is unintelligible, we postulate a new meaning, which is in reality implied by the primary meaning. This implied meaning is not the one given by the sentence and yet it makes the sentence intelligible.<sup>48</sup> The suggested meaning is not something brought from outside and imposed on the sentence in question, but is inherent in the sentence itself. The words through their unintelligibility make manifest that which is implicit or latent in them. Hence it is that this process of implication leads to suggestion, and it does not involve any mediation by the middle term in the apprehension of the conclusion or of the new meaning.<sup>49</sup>

16. Implication cannot be treated as an inference. The existence of *x* elsewhere is implied by my apprehension of his non-existence at home. If this is an inferential cognition, the subject would have to be "elsewhere as having a relation to *x* and also to his non-existence at home." Such a relation between the existence of *x* at *p* and the non-existence of *x* at *h* is an impossibility. The non-existence is not causally related to existence; nor is one identical with the other. The *h* as qualified by *x*'s non-existence cannot be the property of *p*, and we do not have such an apprehension. We cognise the house and apprehend his non-existence. This non-existence is not the cause. As such we cannot argue that *x* is at *p* because he is not at *h*. Nor do we cognise either *p* or *x*, both being not immediately given.<sup>50</sup>

46. VP. 311. cf. SVV. 405.

47. Bosanquet: *Implication*, 3; cf. VP 309.

48. SV. Arthāpatti 55-58; VP 313.

49. VP. 314.

50. SV Arthāpatti. 10-16.

When we say that a living person is not at home, we imply that he is outside. Apart from this possibility, we cannot maintain that he is both living and not at home. But to maintain this we should already know that he is elsewhere. That is, the cognition of the implied already presupposes the knowledge to be arrived at.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the presence of rain may imply the existence of clouds. But there are clouds that do not rain. As such one may argue that there does not seem to be any necessity governing the implication of the object here.<sup>52</sup> But the rain as such is an impossibility if there were no clouds that did rain. It is this impossibility that points to the necessity of accepting the validity and actuality of implication as a means of cognition.

The logical reason in inference is that which is well ascertained as being related to a predicate. The non-existence at home of the living *x* cannot function as reason because we cannot refer it to a predicate.<sup>53</sup> In inference we have a reason that can exist by itself, and its existence is an established fact. It may depend on the predicate for its being, but we do apprehend it without apprehending its predicate. The non-existence of *x* at home, on the other hand, is not specific. It is a non-existence which does not differ from that of the dead.<sup>54</sup>

We have an earlier cognition of the house as having *x* in it, and we know that he is alive even now. The present cognition refers to the house that does not contain *x*. The past and the present cognitions, in association with the knowledge we have, compel us to assume his existence elsewhere. Each taken by itself is incapable of giving rise to this assumption. The mere absence can as well refer to the death of the person, and as such it is not invariably related to his existence at *p*.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, the facts that are relevant to one another imply that without which they cannot coexist.

Here we proceed from a complex of related terms. Each term is relevant to the rest. This complex is made up of *x*, his character of being alive, his absence from home and such other factors. In so far as all these are interrelated and mutually necessary, the complex may be considered as a Universal. This uni-

51. KKK, 402. 5-6. cf. TP. 267. 5-7.

52. NBV, 2. 2. 3, 5.

53. SV. Arthapatti, 19.

54. *Ibid.*, 20-21.

55. *Ibid.*, 22-26.

versal admits of a variation in its terms and their relations; and at any given moment it is a determinate complex. The relation between one term and the rest in that complex, or between one relation and the rest therein, is what is meant by implication. A modification in one factor or relation provides a clue to the modification of the rest. In other words, as against Russell and Whitehead, we have to maintain that implication does not hold merely between propositions. It is a principle that explains the relation of any fact to the system or the complex to which it belongs.

When we find that the facts imply that *x* is elsewhere or that *x* dines by night, we are only maintaining that either this proposition alone is true or nothing is true. If the determinate complex is true, our conclusion is necessarily true. If our conclusion is not true, the complex itself is not true; and when the complex which is an experienced or apprehended world is not true, the reality which presented such a complex ceases to be real. The falsity of the restricted or determinate complex under reference would imply the falsity of the world which it defines. Thus in every implication we unite the determinate complex presented with reality as such. It is this unity which determines the truth of the implied. Either the proposition that *x* is dining by night is valid, or the whole universe that admits a starving and yet healthy and fit *x* is unreal. As Bosanquet put it, it is the principle of 'this or nothing' that is formulated under the name of implication.<sup>56</sup>

17. When the observed facts cannot be accounted for without assuming the reality or validity of something else, this something is said to be implied by the facts.<sup>57</sup> What is thus necessarily implied is true even if it were to contradict our arguments,<sup>58</sup> because the implied refers to fact and compels thought to accept the fact. The facts that are self-contradictory are resolved and harmonised in terms of the principle of implication.<sup>59</sup> That is, implication cannot go beyond the facts. It is limited in its application.<sup>60</sup> Yet within a certain complex we find the implied exhibiting a self-evident truth. It is a truth which we cannot deny without denying the world of experience.

56. See Bosanquet: *Implication*, 5, 10.

57. See SB. 8. 16-18; SV Arthapatti, 1.

58. KKK, 73. 6-8.

59. KKK. 74. 5-6.

60. SVB. 728. 13.

When we know perceptually that fire burns, we treat the burning as a character of the fire. We are compelled by the facts to admit that it is a character of the fire. We cannot think otherwise.<sup>61</sup> Likewise we infer the existence of fire from the perception of smoke because the absence of fire is incompatible with the existence of smoke. Similarly we are obliged to admit that a word has a power to mean something; for, in the absence of such a power, we cannot apprehend the meaning. Even in the cognition of non-existence we have the same principle of implication operating. My apprehension of the absence of *x* at *h* is incompatible with my knowledge of his being alive, if I do not assume that *x* is present elsewhere.<sup>62</sup> Thus the principle of implication is constantly operating throughout our knowledge; and without it, no knowledge is possible.

## Moore's Refutation of Sidgwick's Pleasure Theory : A Critical Examination

By

DR. S. K. NANDI

Moore's refutation of Mill's utilitarianism is based on Moore's contention that Mill committed the naturalistic fallacy. By naturalistic fallacy he means the identification of the 'desired' and the 'desirable'. This identification overlooks the ideal tendency in the concept of the 'desirable', and the 'desirable' is completely denuded of the moral stature so long enjoyed by it. Moore pays Sidgwick a handsome compliment when he holds that it was Sidgwick among the hedonists who did not commit the naturalistic fallacy so common amongst people who believed that pleasure was the sole good and the measure of all human behaviour. Sidgwick's quantitative hedonism<sup>1</sup> has been referred to again and again by Moore in his refutation of hedonism in general and Egoistic hedonism in particular. Sidgwick and Mill were singled out for a sifting critical study, and Moore ultimately rejected both Sidgwick's 'quantitative hedonism' and Mill's utilitarianism. Moore attacked<sup>2</sup> Sidgwick's basic intuition that pleasure alone was good as an end and the logic by which Sidgwick thought that his conclusions could be supported. So far as the practical conclusions of Sidgwick were concerned, Moore had hardly anything to quarrel with.

The task of an ethical hedonist, Broad<sup>3</sup> points out, is to show that nothing is intrinsically good or bad except experiences, that no characteristic of an experience has any bearing on its intrinsic

1. In the Preface to the second edition of his 'Methods of Ethics' published in 1877 Sidgwick made it clear that he was a believer in egoistic hedonism. This he had to do consequent upon the storm of misleading criticisms by eminent critics after the publication of the first edition of his *Methods*. He readily acknowledged his debt to Butler and wrote: "I hold with Butler that 'Reasonable Self-love and conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature of man each of which we are under a 'manifest obligation' to obey. Sidgwick's Egoistic hedonism was inspired by Butler's concept of self-love".

2. *Principia Ethica*, p. 62.

3. *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 152.

61. SV Arthāpatti, 47.  
62. *Ibid.* 3-9; B 697. 6

value except its pleasantness or painfulness, and that the measure of its intrinsic value is the nett balance of pleasantness over painfulness which characterises it. Sidgwick claims that when we steer clear of the numerous sources of illusion which confuse the issue in question, we are bound to accept ethical hedonism. Moore summarises<sup>4</sup> Sidgwick's position thus: "We ought not, he (Sidgwick) thinks, to aim at knowing the Truth or at contemplating Beauty except in so far as such knowledge or such contemplation contributes to increase the pleasure or to diminish the pain of sentient beings. Pleasure alone is good for its own sake: knowledge of the Truth is good only as a means to pleasure". Sidgwick's hedonistic position as stated by Moore is virtually correct. Psychological hedonism as we find in Mill has been rejected both by Sidgwick and Moore. Moore refuted Sidgwick's hedonism and agreed with Plato in the main in showing that 'Pleasure is the sole good' theory was untenable. Moore quoted from Plato's dialogue *Philebus* (21 A) in order to show that pleasure alone cannot be looked upon as an end. In his attempt to knock the bottom out of hedonism, he repudiates both egoism and altruism, i.e., the standpoints of Sidgwick and Mill. Moore in his enthusiasm uncritically accepts Socrates's arguments in the said dialogue. Socrates asks Protarchus: "Would you accept Protarchus, to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?" Then a type of argument has been put in the mouth of Protarchus which has been deliberately designed to discredit hedonism. Socrates goes on denying Protarchus sight, knowledge, memory, intelligence and reasoning on the ground that he (Protarchus) only wanted the 'enjoyment of greatest pleasures', and points out that such an oyster-like life is simply impossible even though it could 'enjoy the greatest pleasures'. If Plato means what he says then certainly the 'enjoyment of greatest pleasures', this 'one blessing in completeness', guarantees all the pre-requisites of such enjoyments. If it is thought that such an 'enjoyment of the greatest pleasures' is possible, and it is actually guaranteed by the hedonists and tentatively accepted by the critics of hedonism, then certainly the conditions precedent for such an enjoyment should also be fulfilled. It is no good logic to argue that beauty is not an intrinsic value, as its production depends on the technique of the artist. Such arguments are outmoded, and the neo-idealists call such techniques as the 'technique of externalisation', and consider them to be external to the value. They have hardly anything to do with beauty

4. *Principia Ethica*, p. 87.

as an intrinsic value. Similarly, hedonism or 'pleasure alone is good' theory cannot be said to depend on the accompanying phenomena. We must remember that such phenomena are there, and they look like contributing to the concept of 'good' as held by the hedonists. But critics of hedonism, e.g., Moore, should have used some caution and should have taken note of the basic fact that the accompanying phenomena such as sight, knowledge, memory, etc., do not contribute to pleasure as good. Pleasure is good in itself, independent of all accompanying phenomena. Moore's pedantism sometimes led him to childish criticism. He criticises Sidgwick and others on the ground that pleasure alone cannot be looked upon as good; 'consciousness of pleasure' should have been substituted for pleasure. It is quite clear that hedonists mean 'consciousness of pleasure' by pleasure, and Moore himself admitted it. To quote Moore:<sup>5</sup> "It may be said that Hedonists have always meant by pleasure the consciousness of pleasure though they have not been at pains to say so; and this, I think is, in the main true". Moore characterises such omission as the "fallacy of confusing means and end". Consciousness has been regarded as means and pleasure as end. This fallacy, even though it were valid, would not undermine the prestige of hedonism. Moore himself admits that such a fallacy (if ever recognised) would not affect the hedonistic position, and yet he does not miss a chance to pinprick the prestige enjoyed by the hedonists, fully knowing that such criticisms did not carry conviction. He writes:<sup>6</sup> "Practically, of course, it would be indifferent at which we aimed, if it were certain that we could not get the one without the other;" theoretically, the "consciousness of pleasure" repudiates the claim of pleasure to be the sole good. If 'consciousness of pleasure' is not substituted for pleasure at least honours should be divided between them. That is what is maintained by Moore. But the mere fact that pleasure is accompanied by the 'consciousness of pleasure' does not go to detract from the claims of pleasure to be the sole good. Because mere accompaniment by a phenomenon or the employment of a medium does not affect the end, i.e., pleasure, in the least. It has been Moore's contention throughout his moral philosophy that the concept of good is and remains indefinable even though it is accompanied by many other phenomena and such phenomena do actually partake of the nature of good. So how could Moore determine the nature and concept of pleasure as an

5. *Principia Ethica*, p. 90.

6. *Ibidem*.

end by the 'consciousness of pleasure' looked upon as a means? The mere fact that pleasure is preceded or accompanied by the 'consciousness of pleasure' does not disprove or repudiate the claims of pleasure as end. The distinction between pleasure and the consciousness of pleasure is a distinction without a difference. Pleasure is always felt pleasure, i.e., pleasure that is conscious of itself as such. An unconscious pleasure is a misnomer. Moore's argument reads like one of his arguments in the refutation of idealism. He distinguishes between Blue and the sensation of Blue. The sensation itself is not blue, according to him, and is bare sensation. Nor is blue a content of the sensation, according to Moore. A flower, such as a rose, may have the colour red, a sweet smell, etc., as its content, in which qualities it might be analysed. Sensation of red, however, is not related to red in such a way that red can be called its content. Sensation of blue and sensation of red have sensation in common, and therefore blue and red must be other than sensation. In the same way one might argue that blue colour and red colour and yellow colour have colour in common, and therefore blue is not a colour, and colour has blue as its object and not as its content. Moore's fallacy consists in making a distinction between pleasure and the feeling of pleasure which is nothing but the consciousness of it. In order to disprove the claims of pleasure Moore puts forward his principle of 'organic relation'. According to him, the ultimate good does not consist in pleasure only but in some other factor along with pleasure. The value belongs to the whole, pleasure and its contemplation, and not to pleasure alone. The experience and its contents may be an organic whole, and any value whatsoever must belong to this organic whole and not to any one part or the other. "Prof. Sidgwick, on the other hand", Moore writes,<sup>7</sup> "applies this method of isolation only to one element in the whole he is considering. . . . It is in fact always misleading to take a whole that is valuable (or the reverse) and then to ask simply,—to which of its constituents does this whole owe its value or its vileness". Here Moore works out his conclusion from the presupposition that the value belongs to the whole, whereas Sidgwick started from the notion that the value was in a part, i.e., pleasure (if pleasure is so considered to be a part of an organic whole.) It is doubtful whether such an organic relation actually exists between pleasure and the consciousness of pleasure. The relation has not been proved to be so by Moore. Moreover, the term 'orga-

7. *Principia Ethica*, p. 93.

nic whole' is not self-explaining. How 'pleasure' and the 'consciousness of pleasure', though apparently different, could form an organic whole, and how they stood related in such a heterogeneous organism has not been explained by Moore. He crusaded against those who used unexplained terms and held them responsible for ambiguities and confusions, and here he shows symptoms of the same disease to which he wants to pose as an expert physician. According to Moore, pleasure has some value and not the whole of it. The natural error, Moore points out, has been with Sidgwick and others to hold that pleasure as a necessary constituent of most valuable wholes has been given the full credit. Other constituents have been neglected. "That this natural supposition does not follow from the premises is certain; and that it is on the contrary, ridiculously far from the truth appears evident to my 'reflective judgment'."<sup>8</sup> If Sidgwick is dogmatic in asserting that pleasure alone is good, Moore is no less dogmatic in repudiating it. Moore's appeal to his 'reflective judgment' is as unconvincing as that of Sidgwick. It may be noted here that Sidgwick is at least more consistent, for he admits intuitions in all the three ethical methods, viz., Intuitionism, Egoism and Utilitarianism,<sup>9</sup> and he may reasonably appeal to his 'reflective judgment'. Moore sounds dogmatic, for he had no such presuppositions. We must bear in mind that 'Pleasure is the sole good' proposition has been an intuition with Sidgwick, and the whole of his moral philosophy is a 'Rationale' of this basic intuition. Sidgwick's contribution to Ethics has been the recognition of intuition as the foundation of the other two methods, viz., Egoism and Altruism. Moore recognises this contribution and considers it to be valuable. But in spite of his obvious advantages, Moore could not always do full intellectual justice to Sidgwick; although it must be said in all fairness that Moore's criticism of Sidgwick inspired men and women to re-read his 'Methods of Ethics' in spite of 'the uniform dull dignity of his writing'.

Sidgwick's quantitative interpretation of hedonism has been subjected to severe criticism, and it has been pointed out by Moore that a believer in Sidgwick's ethics would have to stand for a 'perpetual indulgence in bestiality'.<sup>10</sup> This position, Moore points out,

8. *Principia Ethica*, p. 94.

9. See Broad's *Five Types of Ethical Theories*, p. 151.

10. Moore's fears might have been allayed if he had read Sidgwick between the lines. Sidgwick has shown that the predominance of self-love in man and the habit of regarding pleasure as the ultimate end is not in-

is an outcome of the rejection of Mill's notion of qualitative differences in pleasure. Of course as a consistent hedonist, a faith in the qualitative difference in pleasures is untenable. Both Moore and Sidgwick agree in rejecting such qualitative differences. The paradox of Egoistic hedonism has been sought to be brought out by Moore when he points out that every man's happiness is the sole good in the universe is the main thesis of the Egoists, and this position is riddled with contradiction. How could there be so many 'sole goods' in the universe when it is supposed that there is one universal moral order? Moore fails to understand how a working formula could be evolved in order to accommodate all these personal 'goods'. But this may be noted that 'my own good' as conceived by the seventeenth and the eighteenth century hedonists was incompatible with the "good of other people". Modern hedonists do not find it irreconcilable. At least they recognise the necessity for such a reconciliation, and it was one of the main problems for Sidgwick. As he recognised the 'good of others', he asserted that self-sacrifice was good so far as it ensured to the sufferer greater happiness in the future. So Sidgwick's problem was to effect a harmony of prudence and of rational benevolence, and this has been characterised as one of the profoundest problems of Ethics. In order to solve this seemingly insoluble problem, Sidgwick suggests the postulation of a powerful and benevolent God who will make up to us for those 'sacrifices of our happiness' which we make here and now at the dictates of the Principle of Rational Benevolence. God has been brought in to find for us the happiness which we sacrifice in acting benevolently. Through the intervention of this powerful and divine Guarantor of all the compensations due for our earthly sacrifices, this contradiction of 'My good' and the 'good of others' may be reconciled, and thus morality becomes completely 'rational'. Thus a virtual reconciliation of Egoism and Altruism has been effected. The same conduct which produced the happiness of others would also produce the agent's happiness. Moore rejects Sidgwick's at-

compatible with the highest degree either of pleasure generally or of some kinds of pleasure or even with the more refined and elevated pleasures. (See his *Methods*, Book I, C. 4, for a detailed study). The self-regarding (pleasure seeking) and extra-regarding impulses are not always present in the same moment of consciousness, there being some sort of incompatibility between them. It has been pointed out by Sidgwick that in the ordinary condition of our activity the incompatibility is only momentary and does not prevent a real harmony from being attained by a sort of alternating rhythm of the two impulses. (See *Methods*, Book II, Ch. III for a detailed study).

tempts at synthesising these opposite positions. He calls it the fallacy of Empiricism,<sup>11</sup> the fallacy of thinking that an alteration in facts could make a contradiction cease to be a contradiction. The same conduct cannot be supposed to be furthering the cause of happiness of the agent and of the rest of the world. We think that it is not incorrect to hold that the notions 'my happiness' and 'thy happiness' are compatible. In a rational scheme of the universe, if one's pleasure is properly adjusted, it need not necessarily go beyond its own bounds and clash with the interests of other people. In this type of self-determination the agent's pleasure finds its maximum latitude, and thus the Summum Bonum of the agent is achieved. The goal of rational life is a proper adjustment of mutual claims and interests, so that conflict could be averted. This is the utopia that most moralists have in view. If rationalisation means elimination of apparent contradictions in the light of the inner reason of man, then certainly Sidgwick's solution needs a better and more sympathetic understanding. Sidgwick is not alone in offering such a solution. There are others who moved in the same way. Sri Aurobindo,<sup>12</sup> for example, thought of an empirical order styled as 'Philosophical Anarchism', where claims and counter-claims of individuals have been happily adjusted without the intervention of an earthly agent. This is possible because in this order of things, as envisaged by Sri Aurobindo, individuals live a completely rational life, and in such a life all contradictions are absent. So Sidgwick did not introduce a very preposterous proposition when he held that the agent's pleasure and the pleasure of other people could be achieved through the same human act, if it were inspired by reason; thus egoistic hedonism was not riddled with contradictions as was claimed by Moore. We conclude with Sidgwick's remark:<sup>13</sup> "On the whole, then, I do not think that the common experience of mankind, impartially examined, really sustains the view that Egoistic hedonism is necessarily suicidal". Sidgwick was an honest and unostentatious believer in Egoistic hedonism. He wrote nearly five hundred pages to uphold this theory.

11. *Principia Ethica*, p. 103.

12. See his book 'The Human Cycle'.

13. *The Methods of Ethics*, p. 134.

## On Understanding

By

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1. The task.
2. Some German philosophers.
3. Original Understanding.
4. Derivative Understanding.
5. Their difference.
6. Their interdependence.
7. Understanding the Spoken Word.
8. Understanding the Speaker.
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15. Example of ideal-typical definition.
16. Nature and Function of ideal-typical construction.
17. Concluding comment.

§ 1. We say we understand and we say we do not understand. Both expressions are again understood by us. That is to say we do have an understanding of Understanding, of how and what we understand. This understanding of Understanding is ordinarily vague and unreflective, though we all possess it to a greater or a lesser degree. It is the task of philosophy to elaborate and elucidate it. This paper has the aim of providing an introduction to a circle of problems worked out in modern German philosophy. It would be even better to call this an invitation to our readers to make the acquaintance of this field of philosophy for themselves.

§ 2. Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Max Weber and Karl Jaspers<sup>1</sup> are to be named as the foremost contributors to this field

1. Among the lesser thinkers Heinrich Rickert should be mentioned first.

of philosophy. Benedetto Croce, though not a German, stands in close relation to them and his work cannot be overlooked in a study of this field. Martin Heidegger, Hans Lipps and less directly even Edmund Husserl have also given considerable stimulus, if not provocation. Dilthey was the first among the moderns to conceive of the problem. He gave the name of the method as "Understanding" and of its canon as "Hermeneutic". Simmel provided a more thorough analysis of the epistemology more or less neglecting the need for a metaphysical foundation. With Max Weber the inquiry may be said to have reached maturity. Jaspers has modified Weber's analysis a little in order to provide for a more general application and a profounder philosophical foundation. Croce's work has been much narrower in scope than either Weber's or Jaspers' though nearly equal in thoroughness and clarity. Each had been a recognised master in the art of understanding in some particular field. Dilthey was a biographer and a historian, Croce a historian and a literary critic, Simmel an art critic and a sociologist, Weber the acknowledged greatest sociologist of this century and Jaspers a psychiatrist. In order to introduce our readers to their work I shall neglect all chronology and try to present a few of their main problems in skeleton-like abstraction.

§ 3. "Understanding" in the widest sense may indeed concern itself with everything. But in this pervasive and original meaning of the term the process indicated may itself be vague. If "Understanding" is to have a precise meaning we must call it Original Understanding and contrast it with what we call a Derivative Understanding. Understanding in the original and comprehensive sense then means every method by and through which we come in contact with reality via the intermediacy of reflection. Every method of intelligent apprehension, every manifestation of awareness, is to be comprehended in it—whether it is of Nature or of Man or of God, whether it is realised in the form of an instinctive recognition of what is relevant to one's little bit of life or in the possession of a piece of scientific knowledge or in a creative act of the mind or in necessary historic action.<sup>2</sup> Understanding in this sense is simply the actuality of that being which we ourselves are. It is the subjective actuality of animal, cultural, intellectual and spiritual existence and its contents. It is the reality of the mind in action.


2. The forms and ways of Original Understanding have been analysed by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers.

§ 4. Understanding in the derivative sense is the understanding of what has already been understood in the original way of Understanding. I understand my neighbour and I understand how he understands himself and his world, yet I am not turned into him. This is a fact of experience. Of course there are severe limitations to such understanding. Not everybody understands everyone else or everything in equal measure. Such understanding is very much differentiated in its scope and limits. But we cannot in the interest of being true to experience deny its real possibility.

§ 5. Let us pursue this distinction<sup>3</sup> a little more closely. Original Understanding is also evaluation. One understands and in the same process decides questions of significance and value. To understand is to recognise good and evil, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsehood, sincerity and insincerity, meaning and unmeaning. But Derivative Understanding is value-neutral. That is to say it does not by any inner necessity take sides in the questions of significance and value. It does not recognise good and evil, truth and falsehood. It decides only the questions of right and wrong, relevance and irrelevance, in correspondence with the content and character of the Original Understanding which is its object. Understanding in the original sense implies something like identity of process and result, of content and agent. To understand is here as much as to make something one's own; it is first-hand experience. Derivative Understanding is on the contrary second-hand experience. It is imaginative and reflective, itself not in touch with reality. Being and Understanding do not fall together.

It will not be correct to say that our knowledge is in its inception value-neutral and acquires value only subsequently from our arbitrary prejudices. Knowledge in the way of understanding is also evaluation. There can be no knowledge in the particular sciences without value-reference and value-interest. Our ideas and our ability to recognise value, its negation or absence, determine the scope and limit of possible knowledge. Not only the beginning but also the final reference of knowledge is in value. The origin and the goal of Understanding is one with evaluation; it is what we have called the Original Understanding. Only in the intermediate stage value-neutrality becomes the condition of objective truth. Granted the postulates and the data, anyone, even

3. First made by Jaspers.



if he has interests and a culture utterly different from ours, must, if he grasps the problem at all, come to the same conclusions. This is what we mean by value-neutrality. Such value-neutrality is never given; it has to be achieved every time anew as a necessary stage in the development of Understanding.<sup>4</sup>

§ 6. When we say one is the Original and the other Derivative we do not mean that one is indispensable and the other dispensable, or that one is independent of the other and the other merely dependent. If we look at them from a historical or a biographical point of view, it seems to be clear that Original Understanding itself presupposes that way of Understanding which we have called Derivative. The mind never begins outright. It is what it is only through a backward reference, only through history, only through memory and tradition. The mind transforms as it assimilates. It can distinguish what had been meant and what might or should have been meant. It may assimilate the content as good and true or reject it as bad and false. Or it may hold it in suspense as a possibility foreign to itself. All these activities of the mind may not be fully reflective and self-conscious. Anyhow by remembering them we can grasp how Derivative Understanding is also fundamental and indispensable. On the other hand, it is only out of a background of Original Understanding that it becomes possible for us to understand in the way of Derivative Understanding. One cannot understand originally without the intermediacy of a derivative understanding, without memory and tradition of what has been understood before. But neither can one understand what Chanakya or Aryabhatta understood without a first-hand understanding of politics or mathematics. The two ways of Understanding may be said to stand to each other in a relation of real difference and functional interdependence.

For the sake of simplicity and also because we are here concerned with the basic method of knowledge in the humanistic sciences, i.e. in such sciences as Linguistics, Philology, History, Sociology and Psychology, we shall henceforth mean by the word "Understanding" only the Derivative Understanding.

§ 7. Let us now distinguish between Understanding the Spoken Word and Understanding the Speaker.<sup>5</sup> The Spoken Word means for us every meant content as distinguished from the meant

4. The classical analysis has been given by Max Weber.

5. This distinction has been brought out by Georg Simmel.

object independent of the particular and actual occasion or agency of its being meant. We understand words, symbols, trains of thought and ideas in this way of Understanding. It should mean much more than merely understanding how the contents of consciousness or formulated thought have been brought together or taken out of each other according to the rules of Logic. It should include the understanding of the meant content in its half-conscious and half-rational fullness of images, forms, symbols aspirations and ideals and the being at home in the world they make. It should include participation in the idea that has been realised, understood, expressed or stumbled upon, the idea that provided the order and the direction, that was the limit and the measure, that gave the organic unity and the driving inspiration in the original act of understanding.

§ 8. Understanding the Speaker is a very different thing. It does not discover the meant content as such, but rather the living human being engaged in meaning this or that content. We understand people, their characters and motives, moods and bents, joys and sorrows in this way of Understanding. Philological Understanding and Speculative Understanding are varieties of Understanding the Spoken Word; Historical, Sociological and Psychological Understandings are varieties of Understanding the Speaker. We can say we understand people when we get a clear vision of the structures, sequences and relations within or between their minds. Understanding the Spoken Word and Understanding the Speaker presuppose and condition each other. They can be separated in emphasis and direction but not in the actuality of function.

§ 9. According to the nature of the envisagement of meaning we may again distinguish two types of Understanding.<sup>6</sup> Understanding may mean an immediate perception or intuition of meaning similar to sense-perception and realised in the same act with it. In this way we understand single and particular structures, states or qualities of a mind, of a culture, or of an idea. Admittedly there are cases when we try to infer states and qualities from external signs by fitting them into some code we have picked up. But there are also such cases when we see a man in an angry mood, perceive the insincere quality a hypocrite's smile, feel the gloom in an unhappy household, identify a word etc. Genuine

6. This distinction is from Jaspers.

cases of meaning-perception are part—perhaps we should say source—of our experience just as much as those of sense-perception. Moreover, it is not true to say that we understand only ourselves mirrored in others. We understand also the meant content as such and the experience of another as something we had not known or understood before.

But by this method we get only single and particular things given individually in actual experience. What if we ask—where does this that I understand come from?, with what other understandable things does it relate itself?, how do we understand the relations of structural affinity and necessary sequence among phenomena or contents discovered in different individual meaning-perceptions?

§ 10. So we come to distinguish between Understanding as Meaning-perception and Understanding as Apprehension of Relations between what is revealed in meaning-perceptions. The former is immediate and unreflective and receives here and now the direct touch of a reality or a content independent of one's act of meaning-perception. The latter is reflective, a more or less adequate orientation of a trained imagination and receives merely indirect encouragement and confirmation for its persuasive possibilities from the individual meaning-perceptions.

§ 11. The Understanding of relations is an achieved synthesis in the trained imagination. It must have that evidence of verisimilitude which characterises all understandability. Synthesis would not in this context mean a sort of mechanical engineering or a fitting together of distinct elements in an arbitrary and rationalistic manner. Neither would it mean an act of irresponsible fancy. The type of connection which holds particular understandable elements in this way of Understanding is discovered to be different from the Ground-Consequent relation as well as from the Cause-effect relation and the types of memory-associations. It has according to Dilthey and his successors the general type of a circle in movement in which the understanding of parts and the understanding of wholes control and advance each other. Relational unity among understandable elements is given<sup>7</sup> neither purely empirically nor purely rationally; it is the product of a synthesis formed out of evidence provided by the informed and schooled imagination.

7. As Simmel could show.

§ 12. Let us make this clear with the aid of an example. We often say, we understand that defeat of purpose brings sorrow and its success happiness. Through what kind of a reference can this statement be justified? It cannot be a general rule of causally determined recurring sequence of natural events or a theory of an unconscious ground distinguished from the immediate appearances which would justify our statement. Nor can it be justified as a normative rule imposed or to be imposed by the mind upon the course of actuality. Nor even an intuitively grasped universal and recurring structure of reality can be taken recourse to. Our statement expresses a state of affairs which is not true without exception or apart from the appearances. It expresses rather an idealisation on the part of the mind, an instrument created by it with which to measure reality as we know it. The evidence of verisimilitude it displays implies on the logical side only the subjective possibility of thought and on the material side the objective possibility of real existence. But clarity of understanding and strength of conviction does not as such prove empirical validity. In order to be able to reject contrary and contradictory possibilities we have to individualise the content and submit to verification.

§ 13. The content of our understanding in individual and concrete cases presents a hypothesis that needs verification. This way of Understanding may be called Interpretation, if by Interpretation we mean an active comprehension of a greater or a lesser real possibility. Understanding specialises itself into Interpretation as it descends from the world of general possibilities to the world of particular facts. As ways of verification we may mention three methods. Firstly, there must be some sort of objective response and communication to distinguish our understanding of meant contents and people meaning them from our speculative understanding of the forms of the trees and the shapes of the clouds. Secondly, there must be correlation between different aspects accessible from different points of view through different methods. For example, our intuitive grasp of a person's character is to be compared with what he says to us about himself, and what we know of him from his personal appearance is to be correlated with what we know of him through the reports of others as well as what we know of him through a study of his work. And finally, there must be clarification and confirmation through continuous and mutual correction of parts and wholes in the movement of understanding.

§ 14. The concepts and images then with which we understand are to be described as "ideal-types". They are constructions in order to measure and systematically characterise individual cases which are significant only in their uniqueness. They are not general concepts built according to the scheme of *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica* and under which the actual case can be subsumed as an example. They are not definitions of essences arrived at by means of fixing the most widely visible features. They are ideal limiting concepts, with which and against which reality can be measured and its distance or approximation to the ideal-type judged. The general concepts, the class concepts, the so-called "laws" and "theories", which we meet with in the work of the psychologist, the historian or the sociologist, are merely applications of the principle of ideal-typical construction. The ideal-types bring out not what binds things together but what individualises them. Only ideal-typical construction enables us to distinguish a problem or even to formulate it.

§ 15. The State, for example, may be ideal-typically defined as that community which can, within a certain territory, claim successfully the monopoly of legitimate physical force. Physical force is not the normal or the only means at the disposal of the State, but it is characteristic of it. This definition does not say what the essence of the State might be—whether of the modern State or of the State in all times—or what duties the State should have, but only,—if social organisations, which do not at any time take recourse to force, exist and no others, the concept of the State as we know it would no longer have any meaning. This definition presents an ideal-type; it indicates neither the substance nor the function nor the value of the State but its recognisable identity.

§ 16. These ideal-types are value-neutral. They represent idealisations, not ideals. They are ideal in the sense of being non-actual, not in the sense of being immanent value. They are constructed by our imagination by a one-sided exaggeration of what we actually meet with in experience, or they represent what we very rarely discover in experience in the so-called "classical cases". They have an ideal or utopic character, and build up an ideal world in their interrelations with one another and their immanent meaning-consequences. In the world of actuality we find change and imperceptible transitions; but in the world of the ideal-types we find sharp differentiations and clear disjunctions. The ideal-types may be said to be abstracted from reality, if we

mean by abstraction not that they are taken from reality as soup is taken from chicken, but that they are created by the mind on the basis of actual experience with reality and endowed by it with understandability. The ideal-types are imposed by the mind upon reality in the mind's efforts to understand reality. Their construction makes recognition, comparison and measurement possible and is justified by fruitfulness in the acquisition of particular knowledge and adequacy in the interpretation of meaning.

§ 17. Because we wish to keep the scope of this paper limited and make it only an introduction to a vast field of philosophical investigation, we have to cut our discussion short and end this paper here. We shall not even mention the problem of the relation between the analysis of causal-relations and the understanding of meaning-sequences, or the problem of the role of ideas of totality and unconditionality in the apprehension of understandable structures and relations. If this little paper succeeds in initiating a discussion among our readers these and many other problems may eventually be brought forward.

## Modern Biology and the Theory of Organicism in Psychology

By

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Organicism has emerged as a sound foundation for theorising in modern Psychology. Developments in Philosophy, Physiology, Biology, Embryology and even in the physical sciences down the ages have led to its acceptance as a sound theoretical foundation for modern psychology. The purpose of the paper here is to analyse and evaluate the relationship of Biology and Organicism in Psychology.

Organicism as a view-point emerged out of the controversy between teleology and vitalism on the one hand and the mechanistic physico-chemical doctrines on the other—a controversy, still existing among biologists, though most of them have now accepted the natural science and the organismic point of view. Teleology and Vitalism as special forms of the anthropomorphic analogy of the anecdotal period in biology before the evolution of the biological science as an objective and experimental natural science, could not be accepted in scientific biology because of the extreme form of inner determination they advocated at the total sacrifice of the determination from the environment. The other extreme, that is, the mechanistic view-point could not also survive because of its programme of explaining life, behaviour and consciousness in terms of physics and chemistry. Psychology as the science of experience, behaviour or consciousness was influenced by one trend at one time and by the other at another time. Neither biology nor psychology could take life and consciousness as the result of an additive total. With the doctrine of evolution and particularly the theory of emergent evolution, life and behaviour, or in the higher forms of organisms, reason and consciousness, were regarded as emergents and not as mere repetitions of what was there in the previous forms of existence. The natural science gradually rejected the vitalistic notion of the 'elan vital', the entelechy or the vital force or any notion that sounded mysterious and supernaturalistic. Natural science and organicism are the positions that

emphasise the importance of the organisation or the integration of parts, wherein life and consciousness come as emergents. To explain life the biologist has not to go the machanist way, since life as an emergent is something more than physical elements put together and governed by physical and chemical laws; nor has he to suppose a mysterious and super-natural vital force. Life is obviously best explained as an emergent from the organisation, which contains it.

The naturalistic organismic view does not, however, reject the evidence for plan and design in nature. The difference between Vitalism and Organicism is one of theoretic interpretation. The vitalist holds that nature, organic or inorganic, is inexplicable in terms of the ordinary causal sequence and, therefore, is led to bring in something super-natural. The naturalist differs from him in holding that nature, organic or inorganic, is self-explanatory. Thus he puts teleology or finality beyond the scope of science and finds the explanation for life, for instance, in the field itself. External teleology is out of the question; even internal or immanent teleology is not something to be considered by the natural scientist. Professor C. J. Warden writes in this connection:—

"It should be remarked at the outset that the interpretation of the scientific attitude, here offered, while consistent with the general body of scientific facts, is one which clearly recognises the distinctiveness and importance of biological categories. The biologist has every reason to protest against both supernaturalistic concepts and the notion that his science can be reduced to a few general formulations, derived from narrowly conceived physical science. Natural science need not be a dogmatic mechanistic system in ceasing to be metaphysic."

It takes all that is objectively found in nature and since the organism, as such, is something of the physico-chemical, the physico-chemical principles of explanation based on organismic lines, but without teleology and vitalism, have a place in the science of the organism. The physico-chemical point of view is adopted by biology as a natural science, though the novelty of life and behaviour as emergents from the inherent organisation of the living is also recognised. To find that certain laws, derived, in the first instance, from physical phenomena, can be extended to cover biological phenomena is not to reduce biology to physics, but to bring both physics and biology to that extent under the same system of general natural laws. It is the task of science to take full

account of the divergencies as well as the similarities of the natural order.

Taking divergencies into account means taking the novelties emerging in the process of evolution into account, and accepting the autonomy of the stages of existence within the whole system; and similarly the different sciences can have their common points no doubt, but that does not mean that they are not autonomous within their own fields with their own novel problems. To quote from Warden again:—

"If we regard each and every field of science as a part of the larger science of nature, it is difficult to understand how the autonomy of biology can be called in question any more than that of the physical sciences. None are autonomous in the absolute sense, in as much as each is merely a department of natural science, taken as a whole, but each is relatively autonomous in so far as the phenomena, which it studies, present divergencies from those other fields. The unity of natural science is attested by whatever laws are found to apply generally, regardless of the type of phenomena on which the discovery was made. There is no such thing as extending a physical law into biology any more than the opposite; when such apparent extension is possible by verification in the latter field we have merely shown that the law is general for natural science. That verification of natural laws is always necessary in all fields exhibiting phenomena markedly divergent from those occurring in the fields of discovery goes without saying. As is well-known the precise formulations of physical science cannot be taken over directly into biology or even into chemistry in all cases. Certainly the law of gravity holds for all living systems, but this does not mean that a squirrel dislodged from a limb falls to the ground like Newton's apple. And while the principles of the lever apply to the movement of the appendages of animals, this fact may be of small value to the naturalist in the analysis of such movements."

Thus it is clear that while biology takes life as something more than merely a physico-chemical additive total and recognises the novelty of life, and its manifestations in the shape of activities, as emergents in the entire process of cosmic evolution, the explanation for these emergents is not as something lying outside the living or as something supernatural or as some supra-organic mysterious vital force. Modern biology seeks

the explanation or description of life and its phenomena in the living organism itself; the organism is the basis for all that it does or manifests in the environment; and an organism has no meaning apart from the environment, with which it is in constant dynamic relationship. The organism-environment complex means a dynamic inter-relationship, not an absolute self-determination, which all forms of vitalism take for granted, nor an absolute determination from outside, which all forms of mechanism take for granted. Whatever the organism does or manifests is to be explained in terms of the stimulus and the organism taken together. Formulating the Organismic point of view in biology, Warden writes again:

"The biological realm includes almost an endless variety of natural systems, which has arisen as the natural outcome of evolutionary specialisation. Although these systems differ widely among themselves, in concrete organisation, a certain unity is attained by the presence throughout of living processes. These processes are not only basic to the concrete phenomena but serve as well to characterise the level of living organisation as a whole. As Spencer has remarked, life itself is constituted by the continuous adjustment of internal and external relations. This adjustment includes such processes as metabolism, growth, reproduction and behavioural activity. The Spencerian formulation, while somewhat abstract, has the merit of placing the proper emphasis upon the functional aspect of the living system. In harmony with his principle, it may be said that the most fundamental and general concept in biology is that of 'organism-in-environment'. The term organism, when taken alone, really carries the full implications of this more exact formulation, since an organism cannot exist apart from an environment. It thus appears that the natural unit in the biological realm is the organism as a whole within its environmental setting. . . . It is important that this broader conception be kept in mind in seeking to interpret the results secured by all forms of biological analysis. This organismic approach is in general harmony with the best traditions of the science of biology from the time of Aristotle to the present day."

As opposed to this point of view, Elementarism in Biology emphasised more of analysis and regarded the cell to be the primary biological unit rather than simply a subordinate part of metazoan body. Elementarism is largely a product of the laboratory carrying analysis to an extreme and has reached its natural

limit in the analytical procedures of modern genetics. Laboratory analysis has its place, no doubt, in experimental biology but that does not necessarily lead to elementarism. It is only when laboratory analysis led to elementarism in biology that the revival of organicism began as a reaction against extreme analytical views associated with cell theory, which experimental biology had arrived at in the last century on physico-chemical lines. Since the last decade of the last century, extreme elementarism, based on the analytic procedure, has been steadily attacked by prominent biologists, and evidence in support of the opposite theory is pouring in almost every day from the biology laboratories, particularly from the studies of the developmental sequence of organisms. It is being more and more recognised that life and behaviour are phenomena, which cannot be explained by analysis alone, however fine and rigorous the experimental procedure may be. Differences in the biological world and among individuals of the same class are due not to the number or quantity of the cells and protoplasm but to their typical organisation. The story of the life of the individual or of that of a particular species, to which the individual organism belongs, be it the lowest in the scale of existence or the highest, is not told fully merely by describing it as the result of juxtaposition of units or by a sweeping generalisation of a principle governing all individuals of the group. This does not mean that science will not generalise, but that a general principle may be found to be operating in particular individuals of the group while the uniqueness of the individual's organism-in-the-environment has to be recognised, and similarly the uniqueness of the organisation, characteristic of a particular natural order, has also to be recognised.

The theory of organicism is known for its emphasis on the uniqueness of the characteristic organisation, which makes an individual different from others and one class of organisms different from other classes, in spite of the fact that there are also similarities of organisation and behaviour. Another far more important point, emphasised by organicism, is that there is nowhere a chaos; what appears to be chaotic is only relative lack of organisation, and absolute mechanism has no place in the universe, organic or inorganic. Evolution is the process of emergence of higher forms of organisation from the lower, and with every change in organisation some new behaviour appears which can never be explained by the mechanistic and the strict analytic procedure. The doctrine of emergence is a necessary accompaniment of the doctrine of

organicism and has become the rallying cry for many, who hold decidedly progressive views. The conviction is becoming more and more prevalent that the evolution or development of the organism cannot be properly understood without a recognition of its integrated character. This principle has now been recognised as of greater importance in the domain of behavioural adjustment. The third important principle, which necessarily is the basis of the organismic point of view in biology and psychology is what Spencer called the General-to-Specific Sequence with its far-reaching results. Evidences in support of this developmental direction have been over-whelming from Biology, Psychology and from other organic sciences.

With these fundamental principles one can give an idea of the theory of organicism, a doctrine, which recognises the uniqueness of organisation at every stage as the basic factor determining the behaviour or the property of the organism. This is what is gradually taking root even among modern physicists and chemists, that in order to complete the scientific description of even simpler systems more attention must be paid to individual and class differences, no matter how slight these may be. The concepts of individuality, self-regulation, organism and the like represent the emphasis of the biologist upon the fact of organisation in living systems. Thus William Emerson Ritter, a Zoologist, in the concluding paragraph of his book "The Unity of the Organism, the Organismal Conception of Life" writes:—

"The final gathering-up-and-putting-together may now be made of all that has been said about the physico-chemical aspect of the organism on the one hand and about its psychical aspect on the other. That is to say we are now ready to epitomise the results of our examination of the ancient and honourable but withal unsolved problem of how body and soul go together. As regards the body or the physical, we have been led to the physico-chemical conception of the organism as a well-nigh inconceivably complex mass of substances mostly in the colloidal state operating as a system of phases in dynamic or constantly changing equilibrium. As regards soul or the psychical, we found also a series of phases of activities, namely the phases of intellect and reason, those of instinct, those of feeling and emotion, those of the will, those of the tropisms and simple reflexes, and finally those of simple protoplasmic response. According to my hypothesis the phases of the biochemico-physical sort and the phases of the psychical

sort have common ground in the organism as a whole, the phases of intellect and reason corresponding to the cerebro-spinal nervous system, the phase of instinct corresponding to the autonomic nervous system, the phases of feeling and emotion corresponding mainly to the glandular and the visceral systems, those of the will to the body-muscular system, those of the tropisms and simple reflexes to the receptor-conductor-effector system, and finally those of simple protoplasmic response to the fundamental protoplasmic mechanism of response, whatever be its structure.

According to the scheme presented in the sketch and summed up here, just as physical functioning and physical form reach back to the very dawning of animal life both in the individual and in the race or type, so consciousness with its nether limits in what, following the terminology of Embryology, might be called pro-consciousness, is an attribute of all animal organisms. As comparative Anatomy and Physiology have made us familiar with the physical aspects of animal organism existing as the fully realised or developed adult or germ at the other end of the same series, exactly so its psychology gradually familiarising us with the realised or the adult mind at one end of the ontogenetic series and as the unrealised or the germinal mind at the other end of the series. When we affirm that the completed individual organism is latent in the germ we must understand that the psychical aspect no less than the physical aspect is so latent. With very little doubt, it seems to me, the real meaning of the so-called sub-conscious and of psychoanalysis as a method of investigating it is that the ontogenetic stages of the psychic life of the human organism are being discovered and that a method of investigating these stages is being worked out. Freud and his followers have been and still are somewhat in the dark, I think, as to just what they are doing, albeit their discoveries and methods are of the utmost importance."

Among Organicists the well-known German Zoologist Oskar Hertwig may be included. His formulation and explanation of the theory is very clear as would appear from the following passage:—

"Physics encounters the same difficulties as Physiology whenever it is concerned with the peculiar effects produced by bodies as a result of their intrinsic composition or as chemical elements. Like every plant or animal species every chemical

body presents its special problem when its mode of action is traced to the behaviour of its component elements or, as commonly stated, to the elements, which explain it. The same statement may be made in regard to properties as in regard to effects, since we cannot derive by simple addition the properties of their constituent atoms, the properties of all the cells from their molecular compounds or the properties of animals and plants from those of their cells. We must say rather that the effects and properties of a composite whole are essentially determined by what the technician calls the configuration of a system consisting of simpler parts, i.e., by the conditions of the system. These still remain nevertheless under the influence of and in dependence on the general environment, which acts upon them."

J. S. Haldane, in his 'Philosophy of a Biologist' endorses the same view-point. Thus he writes:—

When we examine closely the characteristic features of life we find that although every part and activity of a living organism or of the environment, connected with it, appears to be determined by its relations to other parts and activities, yet the determination is normally so co-ordinated with the other parts and activities of the organism that the specific structure and activities of the organism are maintained or reproduced. Though, therefore, there is constant activity or process in every part of the organism, each activity or process, together with the normal structure, which is only an expression of this activity, tends to be maintained or reproduced in a certain specific manner. Hence to describe the phenomena we are compelled to assume that though any detail which we perceive may appear superficially to be an isolable physical or chemical phenomenon, yet the isolation is only apparent and the phenomenon is really an aspect of the particular form of maintained co-ordination, which we call life. By an artificial process of abstraction we cannot neglect the maintained co-ordination, which we see, and this is what we do when we endeavour to interpret the phenomena physically or chemically.

In the development and maintenance of a living organism the co-ordination is very evident. The development of each part can be shown to be dependent on the other parts, including the immediate environment and the more closely develop-

ment and maintenance are studied the more evident does this become. But the particular manner in which the parts and environments influence one another is such that the specific structure and activities of the organism are developed and maintained. They are unmistakably developed and maintained as a whole and this is what we mean when we say that the organism lives a specific life. The conception of its life enables us to predict the general behaviour of its parts so long as it is alive and in particular it enables us to predict the general manner of its reproduction from the rudimentary part of the same organism.

Throughout the treatise on the nature of the living organism Haldane has clearly developed the notion of co-ordination both of structure and function of the organism. He says that when we look only at the immediate details of what is happening in a living organism we seem everywhere to find processes which appear to be or which we imagine to be either capable of being actually described in terms of physical science or to give a promise of being capable in future of such description. But all these processes are in actual fact co-ordinated in such a manner that the organism tends to maintain and reproduce itself, and this co-ordinated maintenance is what is life or the basis of life. Life is thus not something supernatural; it is an emergent of this co-ordinated structure of the organism, and as such the distinction between the physical and the biological aspects of the living vanishes. Life means and is organisation and co-ordination. As an example of the co-ordinated and integrated nature of life and its processes, Haldane cites the process of blood circulation. The detailed investigations of Harvey and his followers, he points out, might seem on superficial examination to show that the blood is simply pumped out and circulated mechanically by the action of the heart. But it has also been shown and is still being shown in greater details that circulation as a process is everywhere co-ordinated locally, and generally with what is required locally for maintenance in structure and activity of each part of the body, so that the blood propelled by each beat of the heart as well as the frequency of the beat is determined in this way. Special stimulations or inhibitions acting locally bring this about, and it is the requirement of the tissues and not primarily the action of the heart which determines the rate of circulation through each part. There have been attempts to describe the process of blood circulation as the work of an elaborate system of machinery. The process was

depicted in this manner since the middle of the last century. But it is surprising when one looks into the history of the organism how the heart, blood and all the amazingly delicate details of blood vessels, associated nervous system and their behaviour have really come to be differentiated from an embryo with no such mechanical structure, and are actively maintained as normal structures acting normally. The machine theory, however useful it is upto a certain point, gives no account of this and similar phenomena which are met with everywhere in the bodies of living organisms. The function of respiration also shows the co-ordinated nature of the organism's activities.

Biology has further emphasised, along with the emphasis on the co-ordination and organisation of structure, that the living organism is also essentially adjustive in nature. The tendency of an organism to respond in specific ways is more or less definitely bound up with the typical morphological pattern, which it possesses. The structural pattern is set to function in a characteristic manner and, therefore, differences in typical adjustive functions are to be traced to the differences in the structural patterns of the organism. With the evolution of the body structure, stimulus-response functional patterns have also evolved. These diverse functional 'sets' inherent in the organism as characteristic of the morphological patterns, which also imply readiness on the part of the organism to react more or less specifically to various situations, are referred to as 'action tendencies' — a concept, which recognises the importance of the internally determined dynamic factors in behavioural activities. These action tendencies have been known by various names, "drives", "urges", etc., as they are construed and studied under experimental conditions. They represent the organism as an integrated and functioning system, determined fundamentally by the inner urges and the external factors to which it adapts itself as a result of its inherent co-ordinated morphological pattern.

Biologists have also emphasised that there is no real support for the notion that the primary units of behaviour consist of isolated movements of the reflex type, or of the petrified instinct type, and that behaviour adjustment is not a matter of the combination of reflexes by exercise or practice. On the contrary, as already hinted at, the work of many biologists has favoured the view that the larger patterns of behaviour appear from the first as integrated wholes. The specification of simpler units like reflexes within the larger patterns is only a later phase of develop-

ment. The general-to-specific sequence is the rule; from mass action to differentiated action is the sequence of growth everywhere in the organic world. Therefore, it is the discreteness rather than the integration of movement patterns that requires explanation. The integrated nature of behaviour springs from the integrated nature of the organism and hence the inherent morphological unity, and not from mere practice or exercise. Explanation of organised behaviour lies with the organism itself; its behaviour is organised because it is itself organised.

One of the fundamental characteristics of organisms is the tendency to give rise to new types from time to time under appropriate conditions. Evolution of the new species is in itself a process of differentiation on a larger scale. Taking the phyletic series as a whole the dominant tendency is towards greater complexity of organisation, more definite individuation of parts, and correspondingly much better specification and organisation of behaviour patterns. Diversity of behavioural capacity and variation in the typical adjustive behaviour are to be explained in terms of the variation and specification and also of the higher forms of structural integration, which organisms attain in the process of evolution.

Thus Biology supports the theory of Organicism, and Psychology cannot afford to ignore the conclusions of Biology.

## The Philosophy of the Church Fathers

By

HARRY A. WOLFSON

Harvard University Press

Professor Harry A. Wolfson's book, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, like everything else he has done, deserves the attribute "monumental". Through 608 tightly packed pages filled with textual quotations, he tenaciously pursues the development of the cardinal principles of early Christian thought. Three other well-known books of Wolfson's had preceded this one, viz., *Philo*, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, and *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*. The three books, *Philo*, *Spinoza* and *The Church Fathers* follow a uniform scheme. *Philo* is really the hinge to which the latter two are connected, because Philo's philosophy is taken to be the fountain-head from which issues a considerable part of the stream of ideas that run through the thought that forms their subject-matter. Apart from these two allied works, we are told by the author that *The Church Fathers* is planned to be the third of an independent and integral series of studies, when the project is completed — and we hope sooner or later it will be — we will have a tidy little Wolfson library to consult on problems relating to a rather obscure, and nowadays very much neglected, area of philosophical scholarship.

The hellenized Jewish Philosophy of Alexandria, of which Philo was the originator and chief representative, is an essential link in the chain of the history of Western philosophy. Between Greek Platonism and Christian Platonism there was a Hebrew Platonism — which was Philonian. The principles of Philo were taken over by early Christian thinkers and developed on their own unique lines, so as to provide, as Harnack has said, "a scientific doctrine of religion", which raised their faith "from the province of authority and obedience into that of clear knowledge and inward, intelligent assent". Writers have often complained that the world has not fully realized how much Western civilization owed to the Alexandrian Christian thinkers; to this Wolfson would add, to their forbears the Hebrew Platonists, chiefly Philo. In the words of Dean Inge, the contribution of these Alexandrian

Christians to the history of thought was "a serious and not unsuccessful attempt to combine in their creed the immanence and transcendence of God, universal law and human freedom, the universal and the particular in Revelation, a lofty standard of practical ethics and world-forgetting contemplation". Wolfson would whole-heartedly agree with this verdict, but would also insist upon emphasizing the persistent pattern of Philonism that appears in all their thinking. In fact he says that Philonism should be taken as "the general prolegomenon to the major problems of religious philosophy for the seventeen centuries following Philo" (page v). So Wolfson tells us. Accordingly Wolfson has in *The Church Fathers* set to himself the task of examining the debt that Philosophy owes to the thinkers of this era and the common debt those thinkers owe to Philo. However, one should wonder whether the extent of the debt on both counts is not a little over-rated.

The problems dealt with in *The Church Fathers* are all presented, analysed and developed according to a uniform plan which also determines the formal structure of the work. Now let us try and see how he works it out. For each problem he first presents a general analysis, then makes a hypothesis, by way of forecast, as to its possible development, which is finally checked against the conclusions that a historical-analytical study of the various statements culled from the writings of representative thinkers in whose hands the problem underwent development, yields. From this logical deductions are made. That is the essence of what he calls the hypothetico-deductive method, which is adopted by him. The whole assumption behind this method is "that every philosopher in the main course of the history of philosophy either reproduces former philosophers or interprets them or criticizes them", and that "the uttered words of philosophers at their best and fullest are nothing but floating buoys which signalize the presence of submerged, unuttered thoughts" and "there is a latent process of reasoning between these uttered words" (page vi). It is the task of scholarship to bring the hidden and the latent to the surface.

The three problems that Prof. Wolfson discusses in *The Church Fathers* are (1) The relation between Faith and Reason, (2) Trinity and (3) Incarnation. There is also a fourth section in the book, entitled "The Anathematized", which considers the thought of the Gnostics, and more or less appended to the main body of the work. The first is a direct development from the Philonic problem, "with some variation", while the other two are non-Philonic in origin. Even so, on these non-Philonic problems

themselves Philonism exercised a determining influence in the course of their development. The large use by John of the logos doctrine in explaining the original pauline notion of the pre-existent Christ is just one instance of it.

In connection with the first problem-Faith and Reason-Wolfson shows how, though Philosophy was disavowed by the original Christian teachers, who drew an absolute contrast between the wisdom of God and the wisdom of men, their successors tried to evolve a faith "harmonious with Philosophy" (page 11). The trend, which began with Justyn Martyr and Aristides, progressed through Clement of Alexandria and Origen till it culminated in people like Augustine and John of Damascus.

In the task of accommodating Faith to Philosophy various important issues cropped up, for example the meaning to be assigned to the scriptural texts, the notions of God, Providence etc. In all these matters the Church Fathers followed Philo, who had defined the area of movement. In this respect there were two principal things undertaken, viz., (1) the reinterpretation of Scripture, which was allegorical, after the manner of Philo and (2) the reinterpretation of Philosophy. Some very interesting results accrued from this double enterprise. For example, the doctrines of Logos and Nous, which were already transformed in the hands of Philo into metaphysical hypostases, received further personalistic reorientation from the Christian thinkers. During the course of the development, in many ways Logos and Nous were indistinguishable from each other in terms of both character and function. But in the end Logos was fixed as the pre-existent Christ and Nous as the Holy Spirit, two persons of the Trinity. Obviously all the metaphysical concepts that the Fathers handled became identified with the content of beliefs that were received extra-philosophically, or so to say, by revelation. Certainly the conceptual system itself was not developed for its own sake by any of these protagonists of revealed doctrine. The conceptual system that remains after the extraction of the theological content, around which it is wrapped, does not seem to amount to much and lacks in profound originality, in each one of these cases, except perhaps Origen and Augustine. The Philosophy of the Church Fathers often turns out to be more apologetic than pure Philosophy. Referring to most of these Fathers (not of course including people like Augustine), a thinker like Etienne Gilson makes the following verdict, "In short we should say that the Philosophy of these Christians was but that particular branch of theology which we

call apologetics" (The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 40) A careful study of Wolfson's volume will back up this conclusion. Moreover, one interesting fact that the reader will be impressed with is, that the dogmatic form of the faith in order to defend which the apologetic was developed was itself in part the creation of that apologetic.

Philosophy was pressed and squeezed in order to extract from it desirable fruits in the interest of creed. Moses Maimonides, another Jewish Philosopher like Philo, but who lived in the middle ages, wrote, "When they laid down their propositions (they) did not investigate the real properties of things; first of all they considered what must be the properties of things which should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with these properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the identical argument which has led to the assertion, and by which they either supported or refuted a certain opinion". (Gilson op. cit. p. 41). We should agree with Prof. Wolfson that a great deal of the credit for providing the framework of the Philosophy of Religion for later thinkers like the Church Fathers must go to Philo; but then we should also add that we must lay at Philo's own door the blame for the unduly dogmatic nature of their Philosophy. Maimonides would agree with us. Zeller too makes a similar pronouncement as ours.

Our contention is that if Philo is responsible for stimulating the philosophical activity of the Church Fathers, he is also at least in part responsible for their twisting Philosophy for dogmatic purposes. The occasion for making this observation and one or two observations below is our confrontation with a Philo who in Professor Wolfson's able hands assumes what we feel an exaggerated importance. Wolfson thinks that Philo had a great influence not only among the Judea-Christians but even among the pagan thinkers. We will make two observations now. (1) It is extremely doubtful whether Philo had any influence in the pagan world. (2) Even among the Christian thinkers there was a group — those of Antioch — who were completely uninfluenced by Philonism.

On the first count we may remark that while Wolfson says, "In the general history of Philosophy Plotinianism may be considered a revision of the Philonic version of the Platonic theory of Ideas" (page 202), we have Dean Inge, not an inconsiderable authority at that, saying on the contrary, "The extent of the influence exercised by Philo's writings in the first century and early


part of the second is very difficult to determine. As regards pagan Philosophy he remains both then and afterwards outside the pale. Neo-Platonism so far as we can judge is not directly indebted to him" (Alexandrian Theology, E.R.E.). We may also mention that there are other scholars, Dahne for example, who contemptuously dismiss Philo altogether. However, Professor Wolfson has made a laudable effort to rehabilitate Philo in the history of Philosophy. The amount of labour put out for the purpose is astounding.

On the second count we must say that, in the volume under consideration, Wolfson does not make it obvious that there was another group of Church Fathers who were completely outside the circle of Philo's influence. The corpus of ideas brought in by them also forms some important strands in the final product of early Christian speculation, however theology-ridden that speculation might have been. They belonged to Antioch. Most important among them were Paul of Samasota, Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. There are marked differences between their thought and that of the Philonic Alexandrians. First of all Diodorus and Theodore contested the Philonic-Alexandrian method of interpreting scripture, the allegorical method, and propounded instead the historical and grammatical method of exegesis. Scriptures for them were history and contained spiritual lessons, which however were to be deduced from them and not arbitrarily imposed upon them. Harnack and others tell us that the basis of their thought was Aristotelian and not Platonic. It was even anti-metaphysical. Their Philosophical method was empirical. Radical opposition in many ideas are seen between these men and the Alexandrian, Philonic thinkers. Man for example is understood by the Antiochenes not in terms of the immanent logos, in the stoic style of the Alexandrians, but as a natural being endowed with free-will. Mortality rather than sin is man's greatest enemy. Theodore for one had a fully thought out conception of human nature and destiny in purely empirical terms. In real Aristotelian fashion, the history of man is treated in terms of the struggle of the will towards a perfection which can come only from a new creation, by ascending to a new stage of existence. Harnack says that in logical consistency Theodore's conception surpasses that of the Greek (meaning Alexandrian) Fathers. Again Harnack, Bethune-Baker and others show that the Antiochenes had a theory of Incarnation closely connected with their theory of man, and based on the Aristotelian conception of *ousia*, which was of course taken by them to denote a particular individual.

In the light of all these it is difficult to uphold the excessive importance which Professor Wolfson assigns to the Philonic framework to the history of early Christian thought. By the same token we will also find ourselves without sufficient grounds to say that Philo had any determining influence upon pagan thought, that is to say, pure philosophy. And as we have observed earlier, even the shortcomings of those fathers who were tutored by Philo must also be shared by him.

Lastly, we may add that while Platonism (or Philonism) and Aristotelianism mingled together under the aegis of what was held to be revealed faith and flowed on in one single stream for centuries, Philosophy never assumed the status of a free agent, but was in bondage till it broke itself loose from theology, at the end of the middle ages. The strain of science in the thought of the Antiochenes — who had even accepted an evolutionary view of the universe — lay dormant through all those ages when Philosophy had been lulled to sleep by the leaders of thought whose primary preoccupation was with theology.

J. G. ARAPURA



Q.M. 2, N25

Printed by G. Srinivasachari, B.A., at the G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras and published by Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, E. Khandesh.

N57-30-1

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