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


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
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
[January, 1957]

The Notion of Objectivity

by

S. C. CHATTERJEE

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The status of the object of knowledge or the nature of objectivity has been a bone of contention among philosophers of the world from very old times. The problem of objectivity has become rather acute ever since the system of subjective idealism was propounded by Bishop Berkeley in the West and the Yogācāra Buddhists in the East. To the subjective idealists, the objects of knowledge are only ideas in the mind of the perceiving or the thinking subject and have no independent existence of their own outside the mind. This view, however, seems to violate our common-sense belief in the independent existence of all objects. It is also vehemently opposed not only by the old school of common-sense realism, but by all schools of modern realism like neo-realism and critical realism. The idealistic thinkers, on the other hand, contend that the objects of knowledge and even the system of physical nature depend for their existence on relation to some experience or mind. Hence it is worthwhile to consider critically the status that objects of knowledge should be given in philosophy.

It may be noted at the outset that all that we call an object must be *ipso facto* non-mental and exist independently of the mind. When a person thinks about his ideas or emotions, these become as good objects of his knowledge as any physical thing. When we discuss motive and intention as possible objects of moral judgment, they become objects of our knowledge. But from this we cannot

say that ideas, emotions, motives, intentions and the like are extra-mental entities which exist apart from some experience or mind. Hence we cannot accept the realistic contention that all objects of knowledge are non-mental entities and are independent of the mind.

A realistic thinker like the late Samuel Alexander¹ does indeed hold that whatever is contemplated by the mind is distinct from the mind and in that sense independent of the mind. Ideas, thoughts, images, etc., as contemplated by the mind, are all non-mental entities which are independent of the mind. On the other hand, the mental acts involved in them, namely, ideating, thinking, imagining, etc. are not contemplated but enjoyed by the mind and as such are truly mental. But we are to observe here that ideas, thoughts, images, etc., are not, as Alexander himself admits, physical things. If so, we are to say that they are neither physical nor mental, but neutral entities. But this view is obviously contradicted by our immediate experience which testifies that they are contents of the mind itself and are distinct and different from physical things. Further, the enjoying consciousness that, Alexander believes, we have of the mental acts either does or does not amount to a *knowledge* of them. If it does, then the mental acts become objects of knowledge and, on Alexander's view, would cease to be mental. On the other hand, if it does not, we are at a loss to understand how it is possible for us, as Alexander holds, to report anything about them. 'To introspect a mental state', he says, 'is not to contemplate it as an object, but merely to experience it and report more definitely the condition of enjoyment.'² But what we can definitely report on must be definitely known by us. Hence mental acts, like mental states, may become objects of knowledge and yet not cease to be mental.

If all the objects of knowledge cannot be said to be non-mental and to exist independently of the mind, they cannot be regarded as mere ideas of the mind either. Among idealistic thinkers, it is only the subjective idealists who may be said to hold the view that all objects of knowledge are ideas in some mind, which are wrongly taken for external realities. Some realistic philosophers like Bertrand Russell and G. E. More, however, accuse all idealists of

1. Vide his *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, pp. 12 ff.

2. *Loc. cit.*, pp. 17 ff.

committing the mistake of reducing all objects of knowledge to ideas of some mind, either the mind of God or the collective mind of the universe. Russell states the general idealistic argument thus: "Whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of the person thinking of it; therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds; therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is inconceivable cannot exist."³ So also Moore thinks that Berkeley's famous proposition, "*esse is percipi*" 'is a necessary step in all arguments, properly to be called Idealistic, and in all arguments hitherto offered for the Idealistic conclusion'. The necessary conclusion to which, according to Moore, such arguments lead is that 'whatever is, is experienced'; and this, he thinks, is equivalent to saying that 'whatever is, is something mental.'⁴ The American neo-realists also find in the philosophy of Kant and the Post-Kantian idealists a revival of the subjective idealism of Berkeley in a different form, and therefore consider it to be equally guilty of the charge of reducing objects of knowledge to ideas of the mind.

The realistic statement of the idealistic position seems to be hardly correct and fair. It fails to do justice to certain types of objective idealism, especially the Hegelian in the West and the Vedāntic in the East. These systems of idealism hold the view that the objects of knowledge, including physical things, cannot exist apart from some experience or mind. Kant's critical philosophy also may be called idealistic in so far as it holds the same view with regard to physical objects and the whole of nature. But to say that objects cannot exist apart from relation to some mind is not necessarily to reduce them to ideas of the mind. The proposition, 'objects cannot exist apart from some mind' is neither equivalent to, nor does it logically lead to, the other proposition, 'objects are ideas in some mind.' Kantian idealism believes in a world of independent things-in-themselves, which forms the basis and the core of our experience of objects. While the objects of experience can not come into existence as objects unless there is some active experiencing mind to synthesise and categorise the unorganised and unobjectified sense-manifold, there can be no opportunity for experiencing them unless certain influences come from the transcendent world of things-in-themselves and stimulate our sensibility and understanding. Ideas, however, need not wait for such

3. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 21.

4. G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 5-6.

an opportunity, in order to arise in one's mind. Hence we are to admit that, for Kant, the objects of experience are not mere ideas in our mind.

The idealism of Hegel and his followers can hardly be accused of reducing the objects of knowledge to ideas of any mind, human or divine. One of the fundamental principles on which their idealism is based is the correlativity between subject and object, mind and the world. For them, if there can be no object apart from the subject, there can also be no subject apart from relation to some object. To reduce the object to the subject or an idea or state of the subject is to destroy the subject, or at least to undermine the concrete reality of the subject. The absolute as Idea or Subject realises itself as self-conscious spirit in and through its relation to a real world of objects. The world of objects has, therefore, a real existence as related to the absolute mind or spirit.

The different schools of Vedānta in India—Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita and the rest—are idealistic in the sense that they take one, absolute spiritual Being called Brahman as the ultimate reality, the independent cause of the world. Individual selves are regarded as either identical with Brahman or as parts or manifestations of Brahman and completely dependent on it. None of these idealistic systems has reduced the objects of the world to ideas of the individual or the absolute self. The reality of the material world and its objects has been unequivocally recognised in all the Vaiṣṇava schools of the Vedānta like the Dvaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita, although it has been held to be relative to and dependent on Brahman. Even the Advaita Vedānta with its doctrine of Māyā does not countenance subjective idealism. Māyā is the indescribable power of Brahman to cause the appearance of a world of objects. The world of objects as the manifestation of the power of māyā cannot be regarded as unreal and fictitious or as mere dream. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra⁵ severely criticises and repudiates the Yogācāra view that the objects of the world are ideas in our mind. External objects cannot be said to be utterly unreal and non-existent, because they are actually perceived by us, and what is absolutely unreal and non-existent like the hare's horn cannot even appear and be perceived by us. Nor are they like dream-objects, mere ideas or fancies of the mind;

5. Vide Śaṅkara's commentary on Vedānta-sūtra, 2. 2. 28-29.

for while these are contradicted by our waking experience, the objects of our waking, normal experience are not so contradicted. Hence for Advaita Vedānta the objects of the world have an existence which differentiates them from mere ideas of the mind, although it is not describable as either real or unreal.

From what we have stated above it would appear that for objective idealism the objects of knowledge, including physical things, exist only as related to some experience or mind. They cannot exist apart from all relation to knowledge or experience. So it is held by the idealists that all objects or things must somehow be known and we cannot find out anything which is not so known by us. Some American neo-realists like Perry detect in this idealist view the fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament. They think that while there is a genuine difficulty or even an impossibility of *finding* anything that is not known or centred in the ego, it is wrong to conclude from this that all things are known. This conclusion is based on the method of agreement unsupported by the method of difference and is therefore invalid. We cannot argue that because all objects or things which one *finds* are known, therefore all objects or things must be known, unless it can be shown that what is not known is not an object or thing. All that we can legitimately infer from the proposition 'all things which are found by us are known' is that 'all known things are known', and not that 'all things are known', nor that what is not known is not and cannot be a thing. The latter conclusion would be a generalisation by simple enumeration which cannot give us a valid universal proposition. The idealistic view that all things are known, or that a thing cannot exist unless it is known is a fallacious conclusion based on simple enumeration.

Now we are to observe that the idealistic view that objects or things cannot exist apart from some experience or knowledge is not based on so weak and uncertain grounds as generalisation by simple enumeration or definition by initial predication as alleged by the neo-realists. It is not true that the idealists argue that because some objects are known, therefore all objects are known. Nor is it true to say that they make 'relation to mind or knowledge' the defining character of things, only because from the epistemological standpoint we first judge things to be related to knowledge. That this is not really the case and that there are deeper and stronger reasons for the idealist view we shall presently see. Here we want to point out that the existence of an object apart from knowledge cannot be proved. Whether there are any things or objects in the unexplored regions of the universe can

be neither proved nor disproved by us apart from some experience or knowledge of those regions. At least, we can never prove that apart from some thought or experience like ours, there would be what we call objects or things in those regions. Even with regard to an ordinary object like a table, we cannot be sure that it exists as a table when no one perceives it. The secondary qualities of things like their colour, smell, touch, etc. are, on the scientific view, dependent on their relation to our sense organs. If that be so, then apart from relation to our senses, the table will not have any secondary quality and, as such, cease to be a table for us. What are called the primary qualities of things may also be shown to be dependent on relation to our senses and the synthetic activity of the mind. Hence apart from relation to our experience, the existence of the objects of knowledge cannot be proved, rather their non-existence as things with certain primary and secondary qualities follows logically from the admitted fact of the dependence of those qualities on our experience.

What the real status of the objects of knowledge is and why they cannot exist apart from some experience or mind will become clear when we critically consider the nature and constitution of the objects themselves from the most complex to the simplest. By an object we mean any entity which is presented or presentable to our consciousness in any way,—such as sensation, perception, imagination, thought, etc.,—as something other than but referred to consciousness. In this sense objects may be mental or physical, real or unreal and imaginary, sensible or supersensible, and so on. Among such objects the most complex is the world or the universe as a system of innumerable things and beings—inorganic, organic and conscious—which are closely inter-related as parts of one whole. There is no logical absurdity in supposing that the world is only a series of ideas in the mind of the person who thinks about it, like the one he perceives in a dream. But such a supposition obviously goes against our practical activities and social experiences of the normal waking life. These seem to require an independent external world for their explanation. Hence both common sense and science as well as some systems of philosophy believe that the world has an independent existence of its own apart from all thought and consciousness. This view, however, does not stand to reason. The world as a whole contains selves, minds, consciousness and thought as parts of itself. Therefore, it necessarily depends on them and would not be what it is apart from them. Further, the conception of the universe as a system in which the sun is in the centre and the planets revolve round the sun along

their axes with almost mathematical precision, and nature behaves uniformly in all regions, and all things and events are governed by the law of universal causation,—this conception has been reached after centuries of scientific investigation and rational study by human beings in different countries. The world, therefore, exists as a system for educated and cultured people. There is no world-system for undeveloped and uneducated minds like those of babies and of primitive people, far less for the lower animals. The character of the world-system also changed with the advancement of human knowledge, as when the Ptolemaic system was replaced by the Copernican. All this goes to show that apart from the thoughts of men there would be no world as a system, although it is not to be reduced to mere thoughts or ideas in the minds of men. Some realistic thinkers urge that we have an instinctive belief in the independent existence of an external world, although we cannot prove it. But it is to be noted here that even then the existence of the world is relative to our mental structure as determined by certain inherited and inborn tendencies of thought, emotion and action. Apart from man's experience and thought, scientific or instinctive, there would be no world-system, but one formless, universal existence without parts and their inter-relations. The world as a system has its basis in universal existence and is one of the possible interpretations of man's experiences of it, which required many centuries of scientific and philosophical study and investigation.

Less complex than the world, but more complex than particular, individual objects, are such higher complexes as history, society, State, personality, organism, etc. These cannot be said to exist apart from consciousness, for they either contain or imply or both contain and imply consciousness. Thus history is a chronological record of the events and changes brought about by the actions of human beings and natural forces. As such, it contains mind and consciousness, and also implies them to make a record of its events. So also society and the State contain minds as their constituent parts and imply mind or consciousness to comprehend and understand them as such. Personality as a complex of certain bodily and mental factors is centred in one's self-conscious life and has no meaning and existence apart from it. An organism is a compact whole of many minute cells which combine to form its different parts or organs; and it assimilates food from the surrounding world in order to preserve and develop itself, and performs other organic functions. Although the presence of consciousness in an organism below the animal level may be doubted by many,

yet it cannot be doubted that apart from some mind or consciousness to synthesise and inter-relate its different parts and their functions, there would not exist what we describe as an organism. An organism like other higher complexes, therefore, implies consciousness and cannot exist apart from it. Apart from the integrating activity of mind or consciousness, there would be no such complexes, but certain simple existences or one undifferentiated existence as their underlying ground and cause.


Let us next consider the case of relatively simple objects like a table, a chair, a book, etc. Common-sense realism as also neo-realism hold that these objects exist independently of our experience and are directly perceived by us with all their qualities and relations. But a closer and critical study of the facts would show that what are directly given to us in the perception of these objects are certain sense-data such as colour, taste, smell, touch, etc. These sense-data depend upon the relations between our senses and certain external realities or existences. We say 'existences', and not 'objects', because here we cannot speak of an object unless and until sense-data are presented to us by some existent and taken by us as qualities of that existent. So objects like tables, chairs and books come to exist for us when certain given sense-data are interpreted by us as the qualities of some substances existing in space and time, and having certain relations with other things or substances. Such interpretation of sense-data seems to be necessitated by the constitution of the human mind and the exigencies of human language. We can neither think nor speak of sense-data as qualities without relating them to certain substantives called substances which must exist for us in time and space. Hence the ordinary objects of experience have existence only in relation to our mind or consciousness. It may be urged here that *something* must first be given to the mind to work on and interpret as a substance with qualities and relations and that this something exists independently of the mind. To this we are to say that apart from the synthetic activity of the mind to interpret sense-data, there would be no things, not even *something* for us. Hence what is first presented to us in immediate apprehension, without any thought or interpretation, is pure existence without any name, form or quality. We may call it something if we like, but it would be very different from any thing or object of our sense-experience. Further, every object of the world has innumerable qualities and relations; and its existence is inextricably bound up and perfectly continuous with that of other objects, or the whole of existence, just as the

waves in a sea are inseparably connected and continuous with one another and the sea as a whole. If, therefore, we perceive or know an object as having a limited number of qualities and relations, and as delimited in space and time, that must be due to the selective and purposive activity of the mind. Of the innumerable qualities and relations of an object we select only those that are relevant for our present interest and purpose, and cognise it as having only the selected characters. Similarly, although the object is embedded in and continuous with the whole of existence, yet we take it as a separate entity, cut off from the rest of existence, because that serves some of our theoretical or practical purposes. Hence we are to say that the existence of an object as a separate and limited thing is relative to our mind or experience.

Lastly, we have to consider the case of what are generally regarded as the simplest objects of knowledge. Among these may be included sensations and sense-data of which we are immediately aware in sensation, like a patch of green, a sound just heard, or the bare taste or smell of a thing. A sensation is the experience of being immediately aware of a sense-datum. As such, it can have no existence apart from mind. The origin of sense-data depends on the relation of our sense organs with certain external existences, and so they cannot be said to exist independently of our experience. Further, to apprehend a patch of green as green, or even as colour requires the activity of mind to discriminate it from other colours or from other kinds of sense-data, and name it as 'green' or 'colour'. Apart from such discriminative and verbalising activity of the mind, there would be no experience of a patch of green as green or as colour even. Similar is the case with regard to other sense-data. Hence the existence of sense-data is relative to our mind and its sensibility. Apart from these, there would be no sense-data like colour etc., but certain existences which in themselves may have no colour, taste or smell.

Other simplest entities, according to some realistic thinkers, are the ultimates in which logical analysis terminates, e.g. atoms, electrons, neutral particulars, etc., and logical constants like implication, disjunction, etc. These are regarded by them as independent of all thought and consciousness. But we are to observe that atoms, electrons or neutral particulars are not sensible facts; they are certain supersensible entities conceived by the human mind to explain the sensible facts of experience. Whether these entities really exist or not we cannot directly know for certain. But that there is an ultimate reality or existence which underlies and causes the sensible world of phenomena, we cannot deny. And it may

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well be that for purposes of scientific or philosophical explanation the human mind conceives it differently at different times as atoms, electrons, neutral particulars. etc. If it be so, we are to say that such simplest entities as atoms, electrons, etc. are conceptual constructions of ultimate reality or existence and exist only in relation to the mind which conceives and constructs them. As for logical constants like implication, disjunction, etc., they are undoubtedly objects of thought and have meaning and significance only for the mind that conceives and understands them. Some realistic philosophers think that they *subsist* in their own right in the world of being independently of all thought, although they do not *exist* like ordinary facts. But we are to observe that apart from the mental act of conceiving or meaning, they cannot have even a shadowy being called subsistence. What subsistence, as distinguished from existence, is can hardly be understood by any but our conceptual thought. Hence logical constants have a conceptual existence only in relation to some thinking minds. We may go further and say that in a sense they represent reality or existence conceptualised in the form of certain logical relations. Logical relations are true in so far they have their basis in reality or existence, as that is known and thought about by us.

In the light of the foregoing discussion we may conclude that the objects of knowledge are not subjective ideas in our mind, except when we make ideas of the mind themselves objects of our thought or knowledge. All objects of the world, from the simplest to the most complex, have in them pure being or existence as their ultimate basis and essential stuff. It is out of this ultimate stuff that the different objects of the world and the world as a whole are formed or constructed by the human mind through the interpretation of certain data and the application of certain universal forms and categories. Although the appearance of the data and the application of the forms and categories of knowledge depend partly on our mind, yet the ultimate stuff of existence in the objects is independent of our mind and consciousness. It follows that the objects of knowledge, although necessarily related to mind or experience, cannot yet be reduced to mere ideas or contents of our mind. The notion of objectivity is thus found to be trans-subjective despite its subjective implication.

A Positivist Characterisation of Values

by

G. N. MATHRANI, *Bombay.*

Analysis of value-propositions will enable us to determine the character of values. Generally, in the value-propositions occurring in the common speech, value-terms are placed as predicates. For example 'X is good' (where X stands for an action of a certain person or a group of persons, or for a motive of an action). 'X is beautiful' (where X may stand for a painting, a poem or anything else which can be characterised as beautiful). Value terms can also be used as adjectival prefixes of nouns.

Grammatically value terms are sometimes shown as adjectives and sometimes as nouns. According to Logical Positivism value terms as nouns are to be treated as adjectives; as nouns, they are misleading. As nouns, they are merely deification of adjectives. Adjectives are usually considered to be names of qualities characterising things denoted by noun words. Value terms as adjectives are to be distinguished from sensory adjectives (adjectives referring to sensory qualities) such as blue and red, big and small, rough and smooth. In the sense in which red and blue, rough and smooth enter our sense experience, good and beautiful do not enter our sense experience. In short value adjectives like 'good' and 'beautiful' are not names of sensory properties of objects.

The above analysis would suggest that value-propositions are inferences and not perceptions. According to Wittgensteinian school, the questions 'What is goodness?', and 'What is beauty?' are not questions demanding the analysis of the essence of Good and Beauty. They are questions demanding the criteria of the use of the adjectives 'good' and 'beautiful'. Criterion of a value is nothing more than a rule of grammar, a rule about the usage of the value-term, and value-propositions are only instances of the application of the presupposed criterion. For example, the hedonistic theory may be taken as a criterion or a rule of grammar for the usage of the adjective 'good' and not as an analysis of the essence of Good. 'Charity is good' may be shown to be an instance of the application of the hedonistic criterion. The Syntax of the

questions,—‘What is value?’ ‘What is Good?’, ‘What is Beauty?’—misleads the unwary to search for the essence of value.

Controversies about values are either about the validity of a criterion or about the application of a criterion, though apparently sometimes the controversy may seem to be about the nature and essence of a value. The question regarding the implied or presupposed relation between the conditions embodied in a given criterion and the value of which it is the criterion is invalid and cannot be raised.

Wittgensteinian views about values should be distinguished from A. J. Ayer's views. According to Ayer, value-terms are pseudo-concepts and value-propositions are not assertions, but merely emotive expressions and social commands. According to Wittgenstein, rules of grammar (rules governing the usage) and not the methods of verification determine the meaning and significance of verbal symbols. Wittgenstein compares language to chess-game. Chess has to be played by observing certain rules that govern the movement of chess-men on the chess-board. Any movement which is according to a rule is permitted and therefore is valid. Similarly any symbol or a combination of symbols (a word or a proposition) that has a rule or a set of rules governing its usage has a meaning, whereas Ayer postulates verifiability as the criterion of meaning. ‘Verifiability’ roughly may be defined as ‘possibility of confirmation by sense experience.’ Since value terms do not denote anything in our sense experience, they must be rejected as pseudo-concepts. We have shown earlier that for Wittgenstein, if there is an operative rule of grammar determining the usage of a value-term, that value-term is a significant adjective and not a pseudo-concept.

Any one might doubt the positivist character of this theory of meaning. But Wittgenstein's theory is definitely positivist, as the rules of grammar, in their origin and operation, are positivistic. The rules of grammar are derived from an empirical study of language. The rules of grammar are fact-born and not mind-born. They also operate in the empirical realm.

Now we shall show that from Wittgensteinian point of view value-propositions are not emotive expressions or social commands. According to A. J. Ayer, the function of language is to describe facts and express emotions and attitudes. Accordingly he postulates two classes of forms of expression,—(i) representative or

descriptive and (ii) emotive or expressive. Through representative forms of expression we refer to or describe facts, reality or experience (objectively observable and introspectively observable) directly or indirectly. Through emotive forms of expression we express our feelings and attitudes and thereby try to induce similar feelings and attitudes or some other desired feelings and attitudes in the minds of others. Describing emotions is different from expressing emotions. ‘X is anxious about Y’ ‘A is afraid of B’ are descriptive propositions about emotions. In expressive propositions the primary purpose is to release or give vent to one's felt emotions and not describe them. Emotions can be expressed through action and movement, through observable changes in the eyes and facial expressions and also through words and sounds. Expressive propositions are a vocal expression of emotions. They may be named or characterised as articulate exclamations.

According to Ayer, language consists of these two classes of verbal forms, and since value propositions are not descriptive of facts they must be expressive of emotions. To quote Mr. Ayer, “In saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.” “In every ethical judgement the function of the relevant ethical word is purely emotive. It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them.”

That all ethical propositions are non-factual in their contents is a correct analysis, but that all ethical propositions are essentially expressive in character may be questioned. What is the character of the contention that all ethical propositions are essentially and merely expressive of emotions? Is it an empirically verifiable proposition? What is the empirical method for ascertaining whether or not a given ethical proposition is communicative of a thought or only expressive of a feeling? That all ethical propositions are essentially expressive cannot be accepted as an empirically verified proposition, as there is no known method to verify such a proposition. This proposition is more a formal conclusion (a logical implication) from certain presuppositions than an empirically verified truth. The formal argument is ‘There are only two classes of propositions, factual and expressive. Value propositions are not factual. Therefore they must be expressive.’

Ayer's view has to be distinguished from Westermarck's from whom he (Ayer) seems to have derived his view. According to

Westermarck, moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of indignation or of approval. This statement may be subjected to two interpretations,—(i) that genetically moral judgments are preceded and determined by moral emotions (of approval and indignation), (ii) that moral judgments are descriptive, referring to moral emotions. E.g. 'X is good' means 'X is an object of the emotion of approval' or 'X evokes emotion of approval'. The emotion may be original (felt by the person who makes the judgment) or derived (felt by a social authority recognised by the person who makes the judgment). The second interpretation is the commonly accepted interpretation of Westermarck's theory. In either case Westermarck's view does not imply that moral judgments are simply articulate exclamations, which is the expressed view of Mr. Ayer.

Wittgensteinian view is different from both, Ayer's and Westermarck's. From Wittgensteinian stand-point division of propositions into factual or descriptive and emotive or expressive is not sufficiently exhaustive. There are many propositions which apparently are neither factual nor emotive. For example, propositions in Mathematics and formal logic. In formal logic, laws of thought such as the laws of identity and of non-contradiction are neither descriptive of facts nor expressive of emotions, and yet they cannot be rejected as nonsensical and meaningless propositions. According to us, besides the two classes of propositions (descriptive and expressive), there is a third class that of symbolic propositions. The meaning and significance of a symbolic proposition consists in its being an implication of one or more other propositions, or in its implying an implication or a set of implications. In fact, if A. J. Ayer's own language were to be analysed, many of his propositions would be found to be symbolic in character; and if their symbolic character is not acknowledged they will have to be rejected as meaningless and communicative of no sense. Propositions in History and Sciences are mainly descriptive of facts. Propositions in Poetry are chiefly expressive, and propositions in Mathematics and Formal Logic are symbolic. Propositions in Metaphysics are both symbolic and expressive.

Value propositions are more symbolic than expressive in character, and they resemble mathematical propositions more than propositions in poetry. The effort to define, to analyse and to draw out implications distinguishes Mathematics from Poetry, whose soul (essential function) is beauty of expression and not analysis of

thought. Pure poetry is essentially a vehicle for expressing emotions and attitudes; communication of thought and information is a secondary function of poetry. The intellectual content (if there be any) is a part of the poet's felt mental content and a device to transfer his emotions, embodied in his work, to others (who would read his work). It is for that reason that he does not analyse his intellectual content.

In formal Logic, Ethics and other normative sciences there is a persistent effort to define and analyse, which brings out the symbolic character of their contents. As in Mathematics, in Ethics too every value-proposition is a formal implication of some more primary value-proposition. Ayer's stand-point that all value propositions are merely emotive expressions should mean that utterance of every value proposition is accompanied by a suitable feeling state (moral emotion). It is possible to conceive the possibility of a person uttering a value proposition without at the same time experiencing any moral emotion. *Moral evaluation can be as cool and unemotional as mathematical calculation.* Just as in mathematical calculation the result is arrived at by applying certain rules of calculation, similarly our ethical judgments are formed by applying certain moral criteria. It is possible that in the process of applying the criteria of moral values no emotions are felt. This stand-point denies that moral emotions are a necessary accompaniment of moral judgments. But as a matter of fact sometimes moral judgments are accompanied by emotional experiences. In such cases moral judgments tend to become dynamic and may lead to action. But such felt emotions cannot be characterised as the logical content of the moral judgments.

Now we shall discuss the question whether value propositions are verbal or conceptual in their contents and whether they are empirical or a priori in origin.

From the stand-point of Wittgensteinians at Cambridge value propositions are symbolic in character, verbal in contents and empirical in origin. The contention that value propositions are verbal in their contents is derived from the empiricist denial of abstract ideas. According to the empiricist stand-point of Cambridge Positivists, there are no abstract ideas corresponding to abstract words, but the abstract words have a functional significance in the sense that they can be referentially used in various experiential contexts for pointing out common features of experience. Since value

terms are abstract words, and since there are no abstract ideas corresponding to abstract words, value propositions must be verbal in their contents. The use of abstract words is learnt as a result of the study of language. According to them, the rules of grammar of value terms (like all other rules of grammar) are embedded in the language. Therefore value propositions may be said to be empirical in origin.

Personally I do not subscribe to this view. Nor can Wittgenstein's philosophy be identified with any set of positivist opinions. Wittgenstein used to say, "Wittgenstein has no opinions, Wittgenstein has a method and not a dogma." His method is a method of analysis of language and experience. By applying this method of analysis it is possible to arrive at different opinions. Even at Cambridge, opinions based on the method of analysis have been changing. At the earlier stage it was believed that "philosophical propositions are nonsense"; later on, John Wisdom, the foremost of Cambridge Wittgensteinians, developed a view "that philosophical propositions are often times verbal recommendations and that philosophers are not only dupes of language they are also reformers of language."

An effort will be made to show that value propositions are conceptual in their contents and that in one important sense they may even be said to be apriori in origin. According to Dr. C. D. Broad,¹ if abstract words have functional significance, then in a sense there are abstract ideas. According to him, functional use of abstract words is not a verbal game, playing with abstract words according to certain rules of grammar. For Broad functional use of abstract words implies abstract thinking, and he considers abstract thinking to be a mental activity and not merely a verbal activity. It may be pointed out that *denying abstract thinking as a mental activity is a result of wrong analysis of concrete thinking* (thinking of particular objects). That wrong analysis was made by Berkeley, a British empiricist. The conclusions of Berkeley are the presupposed argument in the positivist attempt to reduce abstract thinking to a verbal activity. Berkeley identified particular and concrete ideas with mental images. This is wrong. But Berkeley's famous refutation of Abstract ideas can be shown to be an implication of his wrong presupposition about concrete and par-

1. This refers to Professor Broad's class lectures at Cambridge, during 1936-38.

ticular ideas. His cry in despair about his inability to form an idea of a man in general who is neither tall nor short nor medium in stature, who is neither black nor white, nor yellow nor brown etc. etc., was claimed to be his empirical evidence for denying abstract and general ideas. Analysis of such arguments would make it obvious that Berkeley identified ideas with mental images, and that he denied abstract and general ideas because he could not find in his mind mental pictures corresponding to general and abstract words.

My idea of any object is never exhausted by any one or a number of mental pictures I may form in my mind. For example, my idea of Jawaharlal Nehru cannot be exhausted by any number of mental pictures of him in my mind. Image is a device for directing the mind's attention to the idea of the object. Similarly the use of abstract words is a device for directing the mind's attention to the abstract ideas. It is the noun word 'idea' that misleads the philosopher. It is better to drop the word 'idea' and use the functional word 'thinking'. 'Thinking of concrete objects' and 'thinking of abstract ideas' must be understood properly. 'Thinking of abstract ideas' only means directing the mind's attention to certain common characteristics of a number of objects severally experienced. *In the light of the above analysis, we can now say that thinking of values is more than a verbal use of value-terms. In other words value propositions are conceptual in their contents.* To think of a value is to direct the mind's attention to a number of experiences which embody the given value in varying degrees. Thinking of a value is analysable into, but is not reducible to, thinking of particular experiences.²

Is the knowledge of values acquired from experience or it develops from within? We should, first of all, distinguish between pseudo ethical propositions and proper ethical propositions. All ethical propositions which can be shown to be mandatory in character (authoritative commands derived from the will of God or any powerful human agency) are pseudo ethical propositions. Ethical propositions which are rational recommendations derived from the sense of rational obligatoriness can be characterised as truly ethical propositions. Even the example taken by A. J. Ayer (stealing is wrong) can be shown to be an implication of a social mandate and

2. Refer to the author's paper on 'Positivism and Metaphysics' in the proceedings volume of the *Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1952.

not of any fundamental ethical criterion. Stealing is wrong because it is against the law of personal property.

Again the derived ethical propositions are to be distinguished from the fundamental ethical propositions. For example 'charity is good' can be shown to be a derived moral law from the hedonistic criterion of Good or from any other criterion. The question whether value propositions are empirical or apriori in origin should be confined to the fundamental ethical propositions. *In this connection I draw a distinction between the idea of criterion of value and the idea of distinction between fact and value (desire and desirable).* The idea of the criterion or criteria is first acquired from social environment and afterwards subjected to rational criticism. The idea of distinction between fact and value is derived from the response of rational nature of the human mind to the experience of facts. The idea of 'ought' or 'desirable' is a felt constituent of the rational consciousness of the human self, and as such it is, in a sense, innate. *From language and other social environments we derive value criteria, but value consciousness is derived from our inherited rational nature.* Value consciousness is silenced when we are overpowered by passions and desires, but on the level of Self awareness (awareness of our rational nature) the idea of 'ought' is inseparable from us. To be aware of our rational nature implies the awareness of the idea of 'ought'.

In conclusion, I have to say that according to me value propositions are symbolic in character, intellectual or conceptual in content, and the most fundamental concept in Ethics (the idea of 'ought') is an integral element in our rational Self-Consciousness.

The Meaning and Verification of Truth

by

PRAVAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY

It appears that the meaning of truth differs with a certain difference in the context in which the term is used. The modes of determination of truth also differ with these latter, and the meanings are known from an enquiry into the modes. In other words, the meaning of truth is derived from the method of verification of a statement; and since these methods change with a certain kind of change in the context in which the statement is made, the concrete denotation of the term also changes. The controversy that goes on over the question of the meaning of truth amongst so many philosophers has its basis in the wrong assumption that the term is, or at least should be, univocal, and as such must be used in a certain kind of context only. This is, however, a vain and gratuitous proposal arising out of the philosopher's love of simplicity and clarity. The term is actually used in various senses in various contexts, and our business is to find out and distinguish these various meanings. We cannot and need not persuade people to change their usage of words. A particular theory of truth brings out a particular use of the term, and so far it serves true philosophy well. But in so far as it seeks to offer it as the only meaning at the cost of others, it is confusing, and does not know its proper function.

Let us examine the various meanings of truth in various situations. There are certain statements which are said to be self-evidently true. My statement regarding my present headache is of this type; for by my having headache I mean my feeling of headache, which is admittedly an appearance, and I cannot logically say that what appears to me may not be really appearing. Leaving aside the chance of verbal error, I cannot think that my statement can be false. The same is the case with analytical statements such as, for instance, "all brothers are males". Thus the circumstance of some statements being known as logically or necessarily true gives rise to a particular notion of truth. Nothing is true in this sense which can be thought to be false. To this it may be objected that what cannot be falsified cannot be significantly called true either. For if one does not know what it is

for a statement to be false, what can one really mean by its truth? It is pointed out that the expressions which are self-evidently true are not assertions of objective or public existence, but are mere statements either of private appearances or of logical or verbal implications and, so, are not judgments proper or material propositions which alone are to be characterised by truth and falsity. If a statement asserts nothing capable of being denied or verified on the basis of experience, it cannot be said to be either true or false. However, this criticism of the use of the term "truth" to describe some character of statements of this type assumes another meaning of truth and falsity and also of judgments as fit objects for qualifying with the adjectives "true" and "false". The self-evident truth of a statement means *a priori* certainty with regard to its content, this certainty following from the very meanings of the words used in the statement. In another sense a true statement means one whose certainty is dependent on extra-linguistic or factual matters beyond its content. Therefore, in the first case, a statement may be said to be true significantly in the sense that though this particular statement cannot be thought to be false, one knows what it is for a statement to be so. The deliberate mis-statements are false.

The notion of self-evident truth cannot be applied to statements asserting facts, where by fact one means what can be agreed upon to be there by all observers looking for it, and what is related to other facts through natural laws of co-existence and succession in a common space and time. So for such a statement to be true, the fact alleged therein must be actually there. In other words, what the statement states in the predicate must correspond to a fact, and therefore, must be confirmed by all observers, and must fit in with all the rest of the factual world. Thus we have to adopt a correspondence theory of the meaning and test of truth which, on further analysis, is reduced to a coherence theory. Truth, in this sense, cannot be self-evident; for the statement claiming to be true must be tested against facts which are beyond it and which, again, not being immediately given, have to be determined through a process of comparison and concatenation of judgments whose number is, theoretically speaking, infinite. Thus an operational definition of truth as applying to factual judgments is different from the one applying to non-factual ones examined before; while the latter sort of truth is determinable with finality, the former is, theoretically at least, ever tentative. Thus these two different kinds of truth have to be recognised, and the attempt either to reduce the one to the other or to ignore the one in favour of the other must be abandoned.

The tentative character of truth in the coherence sense follows from the endless number of other statements to be consulted in the verification of a statement for truth in this sense. However, and fortunately enough, experience itself shows that in most cases what is confirmed by a few other statements of other persons on the same matter and/or of the same or other persons on facts causally related to that asserted in the original statement, is seldom reversed by others. They too confirm it, and those very few of them that do not are themselves found to be false when tested in like manner. So that generally one does not require a number of confirmations beyond a certain small limit in order to pass a verdict of truth or falsity. The truth defined by such a practical procedure of its determination may be said to be practically final, though theoretically provisional, and to be an approximation to the absolute truth which is an ideal limit of the series of truths corresponding to the successively greater number of statements confirming it. The ideal limit is approached with the number of conforming statements approaching infinity, and all disconfirming statements themselves being disconfirmed by the former and, so, rendered ineffective. Thus this meaning of truth assumes that an infinity of statements, constituted of those made on a particular fact by different persons and of those made on an infinity of other facts, can be found to form a system. This assumption is partly based on our actual experience within a limited sphere of statements tending towards a system and, so, of truths forming a converging series pointing on an ideal limit. If this assumption is given up as too speculative, that is, as a seductive fallacy, then our coherence-meaning of truth, giving us the theoretically tentative and the practically final truth, will have to be regarded as arbitrary, without any application in our knowledge about nature. This concept of truth will be then like any object of pure mathematics. A point or a line in Euclidean geometry is defined as an ideal object, yet it is an ideal limit of actual objects approaching this state with certain conditions approaching a limiting value. Thus a point may be regarded as an ideal limit of concentric circles with radii approaching zero in length. Because there is convergence to be found in the series of circles, which can be actually drawn on a plane, the concept of a point is not an abstract or unreal one, though one cannot draw it or ostensibly define it. More or less similar is the case of our faith in the systematic unity of the possible perceptual judgments of this world, a faith built on our limited experience of the world so far given to us, where we find our judgments cohering to such an extent as to give us an idea of objects judged to be independent of them.

We would not have thought of an external common world had our judgments conflicted amongst themselves and, so, proved themselves subjective like the illusory ones. If we had more conflicts than agreements and could not organise our experience, there would be no talk of reality and appearance, truth and falsity. The occasional agreements and hints of a system would be treated as accidents in the same manner as we treat similar things happening to our dream-experience. And perhaps we would not notice these phenomena, as we could not compare our experience with that of others, because we would have no language, no social life, no looking before and after.

The pragmatic meaning of truth is to be known from the process of verification of truth recommended by the pragmatist. Success in practice is said to be the test of truth of a statement which is to be judged by what it leads to when acted upon. Now if we mean by success ultimate or true success, as does the realist pragmatist, we know this can be the consequence of our statements being true in the traditional (i.e. correspondence-coherence) sense. The knowledge of what is a fact, or what is really there, produces genuine success if made the basis of action. So this pragmatic meaning of truth practically coincides with the traditional one in-so-far as what would be declared true in one sense would be so declared in the other sense also. In other words, both the traditionalist applying his coherence test and the pragmatist his own test of success will come to pass the same verdict of truth or falsity on a particular statement. However, the difference between the two meanings of truth is also obvious. For though both may mean by truth what is really there, yet by reality or factuality they mean different things in-so-far as they have different criteria for determining it. A criterion for the recognition of a concept is an essential character of it and, so, a part of its meaning. There is also another difference between the two meanings of truth. The coherence meaning of truth does not apply to certain statements, such as those of religion, morals and politics, which are mostly expressions of one's feelings, preferences and commands, though generally they are in the indicative mood and seem to describe some natural matters of fact. The metaphysical statements referring to super-sensuous objects, like God, soul and substance, are unverifiable by the coherence test, and can be neither true nor false in the coherence sense. But truth in the pragmatic sense applies to all such normative and metaphysical statements, for the former sort have their appeal to will and conduct and the latter to our emotions, and both have consequences, either good or bad,

on human affairs. This is a significant difference between the two meanings of truth; for while the statement, "Do not kill" or "You have a permanent soul" is neither true nor false in one sense, it is either true or false in the other sense. We have a meaning of the word "red" other than the ordinary, if we find that while in the ordinary sense it is meaningless to call a political party 'red', in another it is meaningful.

Now passing over to another sort of pragmatism we see that the pragmatic criterion of truth, success in practice, may mean immediate success judged by a feeling of satisfaction. In this sense, adopted by the idealistic pragmatist, we readily see that what is true may be false after a while and, so, truth and falsity are not permanent characters of a statement. They are but what happen to a statement as it functions as a plan of action. Thus the statement, "There is God", when acted upon, may prove true in one context and false in another, depending, as we know, on many other circumstances than the intrinsic truth, if any, in the traditional sense, of the sentence. The statement itself cannot be said to be both true and false at once, if by truth and falsity we mean essential characters of statements; so the pragmatist has to use these terms as descriptive of temporary titles a statement acquires in the course of its active service in human affairs as a tool. It is like a pen of an author, being a success at one time and a failure at another. Thus the idealistic pragmatist does not mean by truth any character belonging essentially and permanently to, and, so, defining, a statement; he means by it a contingent consequence of a statement when it is acted upon. In this he is different from his brothers in the field. The upholder of the self-evidential theory of truth knows a statement to be true from the linguistic (semantical and syntactical) rules themselves without any reference to experience, so he both means and verifies truth to be a permanent character of a statement. The philosopher who takes truth in the coherence-sense means by truth a permanent character of certain statements even though he cannot prove any statement to be true for good, as he cannot exhaust all the possible confirming statements. Yet, as we have seen, he believes in truth being a permanent character of certain statements, because he has found from experience that what is confirmed by a number of statements is also confirmed by others, that indecision regarding the truth and falsity of a statement is speedily eliminated in actual practice where, generally speaking, all evidences agree and point to a verdict of truth or falsity. And because he sees that if truth is not taken as a permanent character of certain statements but as

The Sense of 'I'¹

by

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1. The scope of this paper is to give an analysis of the sense of 'I' in the light of what we find on this topic in the most comprehensive work of Nāgārjuna, viz., the Prajñā-pāramitā-Śāstra (hereafter abbreviated as the 'Śāstra'), which is now lost in the original and is found only in its Chinese translation.² This paper is an attempt to consider in the light of the Śāstra, such questions as: (i) the meaning of the sense of 'I', (ii) the rise of the sense of 'I', and (iii) the different uses of the sense of 'I'. The whole treatment is limited to a consideration of things in their mundane truth (vyavahārasatya).

An important point that emerges from this analysis is that, according to the Śāstra, the sense of 'I' is not only an indisputable but also an indispensable mundane truth. The sense of 'I' which has its significance in the relative distinction that it makes within experience not only holds good in the world but is essential there. It is in fact the root of all distinctions that constitute the mundane truth. But the sense of 'I' would become the false sense of self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi) when what is only a relative distinction is turned into an absolute division, the relative being mistaken for the absolute, and the distinct for the divided.

Another point, not less important than the one noted above, is that the sense of 'I', according to the Śāstra, is the reflection

1. The sense of 'I', the sense of self, self-consciousness, or simply self meaning individual empirical subject, are used here as synonyms. In Skt. citta or Vijñāna is the term used in this connection. See below n. 11.

2. Taisho edn. of the Tripitaka, Vol. XXV, (T. 1509); tr. by Kumara-jīva in the yr. 405 A.D., see Dr. P. C. Bagchi, *Le Canon Bouddhique En Chine*, Tome Ier, p. 197. This is a very big text consisting of one hundred chapters in its Chinese translation. Prof. Etienne Lamotte has published his French translations of the first eighteen chapters along with his scholarly introduction and copious literary and historical notes: *Le Traite De La Grande Vertu De Sagesse*, vols. I and II, publ. 1944 and 1949, Bureaux Du Museon, Louvain.

what accidentally happens to them, there would be no objective knowledge but mere opinions, no science but mere haphazard dreaming; and, so, it is better to start with the postulate that truth is a permanent character of certain statements than with its opposite. The realistic pragmatist also means by truth a permanent character for similar reasons. What he contends against his idealist brother is that if one accepts no hard data or an independent world to start with, if, that is to say, we have a perfectly fluid and flexible environment, then in what sense can we be said to be working, succeeding or failing? There will, then, be no human practice worth the name to test truth and falsity of statements. So, as a methodological policy at least, one has to mean by truth some defining character of statements which are true, even if we may not know them to be so with finality. The realistic pragmatist has some empirical justification too for this meaning. We actually find in our limited experience that in certain cases what succeeds in practice for quite a good while seldom fails later. Thus the statement, "Honesty is good" or "Over-eating is bad," is pretty sure to be absolutely true as it is increasingly supported by practice. The pragmatic test, success in practice, gives consistent results with certain types of statements, just as the coherence test does, and, so, we can speak of an ideal limit of the partially verified truths in both cases. We have to note, however, that all this applies to certain types of statements only and not to all, and this points to the limitation of the pragmatic sense of truth. For though the realistic pragmatist actually means by truth an objective permanent character when he speaks of such a statement as "Fate rules our lives" as true, yet his process of determination of truth does not warrant him to mean anything like that. The belief in fate has so far produced both success and failure in human life, and no indication is found from our experience of these diverse consequences that the belief will succeed in the long run (or, for that matter, that it will fail in the long run). There is no overwhelming or converging evidence for concluding anything like that. So that the realistic pragmatist is here practically on the same footing as his idealist brother; he cannot justly mean by truth in contexts like this anything more than a temporary happening to a statement. He will, therefore, do well if he excludes statements of this kind from his judgment of truth and falsity.

The moral to be drawn from this discussion is two-fold. *First*. There are different meanings of truth, and these do not conflict, as long as their use in different situations to express different characters is kept clear in the mind and not mixed up, out of a zeal

for reducing all variety into a dead uniformity. The philosophical controversies raised over the various "theories of truth", as they are called, are verbal, because they arise out of the ambiguity of the term "truth", which really means many things. *Secondly*, such controversies being essentially about the meaning of truth can be resolved by a procedure such as we have adopted here, *viz.*, enquiring into the sources of different meanings of truth and isolating the different characters denoted by them. The sources are the actual methods the different truth-theorists adopt to test and decide what they severally call "truth". The word "truth" is to be followed to its actual use in various contexts by the truth-theorists, in order to bring out the concrete meanings they assign to it.

of the Unconditioned Reality in the conditioned self-conscious intellect. The sense of 'I', implicating by contrast the sense of not-I, naturally belongs to the world of the determinate. It is a fundamental tenet of the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna that the conditioned changing entity is itself in its ultimate nature the Unconditioned Reality, the Nirvāṇa.³ The uniqueness of the self-conscious principle is that there is immanent in it the awareness of the Unconditioned Reality as its ultimate nature. But in our ignorance, the unconditionedness which is its ultimate nature is transferred wrongly to itself in its mundane nature. It is thus that the conditioned is mistaken for the Unconditioned, the relative for the absolute.

2. In the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Śūnyata in the mundane sphere means, negatively, the denial of unconditionedness and substantiality; and positively, it is the revelation of the conditioned and changing nature of things. The denial here is not of the things themselves, but of the uncritically believed absoluteness and substantiality of things, which are in truth relative and non-substantial. Through ignorance we misconceive, and the misconception consists in the imagination of absoluteness in regard to things that are relative, or the imposition of unconditionedness on things that are conditioned. This is the basic form of error, viz., the error of misplaced absoluteness.

Broadly, avidyā is removed and Śūnyata (the true nature of things) is realized at two levels, the 'mundane' and the 'trans-mundane'. The error in respect of the mundane truth is the naive imagination that everything is unconditioned and substantial. With the removal of this error, it is realized that everything is relative and non-substantial, conditioned and changing. This is to say that all things are śūnya. This is the right comprehension of things in their mundane nature.

"People, while still under the sway of the sleep of (ignorance and) passion ... see the unreal and non-substantial as real and substantial and cling to them. But when they realize the awakening to the Way, then they understand (that the things to which they clung before as real and substantial are indeed unreal and non-substantial) and then they laugh (at their own former foolish imagination)."⁴

3. See below n. 8.

4. T. 1509/103a-b.

"The crooked dog standing by the well barks at its own shadow, ... gives himself up to crooked thoughts, falls into the well (with the intention of killing the dog in the well) and kills itself instead. Just the same is the case with the ignorant. ... (In regard to the body-mind complex) they entertain the thought of real, substantial self, and thus become prone to hatred, etc., in regard to individuals, and fall themselves into evil states of existence."⁵

"The common people, owing to the poison of ignorance and passion, become perverted in regard to everything. In regard to the impermanent they have the thought of permanence, ... in regard to things really devoid of selfhood, they have the thought of self. But when they realise the true Wisdom of the Noble, destroy the poison of ignorance, ... and achieve the comprehension of the truth of impermanence, etc., of things, then they abandon their perversion and do not any more cling to things."⁶

'If people would know through their wisdom the truth of the devoidness of self-hood and of the non-substantiality of things, then their perversion and passion would come to an end.' Now, this comprehension that everything is sunya, i.e., conditioned and changing, which is the right comprehension of the mundane nature of things, might lead one to another kind of error, viz., the error of imagining that the conditioned nature of things is itself their ultimate nature, i.e., that everything is absolutely conditioned. Now, this would mean an absolute division between the conditioned and the Unconditioned, the divided and the Undivided; and in this case, the Undivided would not be the truly undivided, as it would be divided from the divided. The Undivided Being would not be the true nature (Bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things, as It would be absolutely different and completely separate from them. And finally, the Undivided Being would be of no significance to us, the denizens of the world of the divided; for, the divided, particular individual would never be able to realize the Undivided Being.⁷

This, then, is another error, not at the level where the conditioned was mistaken for the Unconditioned, but at a different level. For, here, the conditioned is recognised to be conditioned, but it is mistaken to be absolutely conditioned. This is an error

5. *ibid.*, 691a.

6. *ibid.*, 171c.

7. From the standpoint of the Ultimate Truth there is neither the way nor the fruit; but from the standpoint of the mundane truth 'there is really the way and there is really the fruit' (*ibid.*, 662a).

not in respect of the mundane nature of things, but in respect of their ultimate nature. This is also a case of the error of misplaced absoluteness. For, while the conditionedness of the conditioned and the consequent division between the conditioned and the Unconditioned are alike conditioned,⁸ they are here mistaken to be absolute and ultimate. The removal of this error here means the realization that the things that appear in the world to be relative and changing are themselves in their ultimate nature, the Nirvāṇa,—the Eternal, Undivided Being.⁹

The analysis given above has a bearing on the sense of self:

(i) When the sense of self refers to the mundane nature of the individual, it would be false if it should mean that the individual is an eternal substance; the individual is *sūnya*, i.e., not unconditioned and substantial, but conditioned and changing.

(ii) When the sense of self refers to the ultimate nature of the individual, it would be false, if it should mean that the individual is absolutely conditioned, i.e., conditioned even in his ultimate nature; this would then mean that the individual is absolutely different and completely separate from the Unconditioned Reality; the sense of self in reference to the ultimate nature of the individual would be an unerring sense if it is recognized that the individuality of the individual is not unconditioned; this means the recognition that the individual in his ultimate nature is the Undivided Being, the Unconditioned Reality.

3. Error arises, we could say, when what is true of the ultimate nature is imputed to the mundane nature, when unconditionedness is imposed on the conditioned. The basic error is the error of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*. The object of this *dr̥ṣṭi* is the individual body-mind complex, the empirical self; it owes its being to the individuating act of the self-conscious intellect (*viññāna*) which, having differentiated the undifferented, identifies itself with the differentiated, i.e., the specific complex entity, the body-mind. And in this identification, the intellect, owing to the operation of ignorance, wrongly transfers its sense of unconditionedness, which is its ultimate nature, to itself in its mundane nature. The sense of self is due to the self-conscious intellection; but the falsity in the false sense of self is owing to ignorance.

8. This is in other words the *Sunyata* of *Sunyata* which means that the conditionedness of the conditioned is not unconditioned.

9. *Ibid.*, 198a; cf. *Mādhyamika Kārikas* (M.K.) XXV: 9, 19 and 20.

It is in this self-conscious intellection¹⁰ that the crux of individuality lies. But the self-conscious intellection (*viññāna*) is not itself to be identified with the wrong notion of individuality (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*). It becomes the wrong notion when it functions under ignorance. *Viññāna* functioning under the light of knowledge would be the unerring sense of self. The sense of 'I' is at cross roads; it has a double reference; it shares at once two orders of being, the conditioned and the unconditioned; it is at once a universalizing as well as a particularizing tendency; it can work as much for liberation as for bondage; it can work non-clingingly as well as by clinging. To bring out this fact of the flexibility of the sense of self, the *Śāstra* mentions that the sense of 'I' is *avyākṛta*—ethically undefined, *mṛdu*—flexible.¹¹ What makes the difference in the working of the self-conscious intellect either in one way or in the other is the continuation or the extinction of the perverting force of ignorance. *Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* is perversion at its root. This is to be distinguished from the unerring sense of self.

4. The sense of self or the sense of 'I', according to the *Saṣtra*, is the reflection of the Unconditioned Reality in the conditioned self-conscious intellect; it is the sense of the Real in man.

"The moon is in the sky, but the image appears in the water. The moon of the Universal Reality is in the sky of Tathata, Dharma-dhatu, Bhūta-koti, while its reflection, the sense of 'I' and 'mine', appears in man."¹²

The sense of 'I' in its true form is the sense of the Real immanent in man; the true import, the ultimate original meaning of 'I' is self-being, unconditionedness. But the mind, the self-conscious intellect, under the influence of ignorance, comes to apply wrongly this sense of underivedness to itself in its mundane, i.e., derived, nature, as well as to that with which it identifies itself, and through that to all things that it alights upon.

"The shadow appears only when there is the bright light; when there is no light there is no shadow. Similarly, when

10. Self-conscious intellection, intellect, the principle of self-consciousness—all these are intended to convey the meaning of *viññāna* in this context. *Viññāna* is one of the terms so widely used in the Buddhist texts that it is inaccessible to any one rigid definition.

11. *Ibid.*, 730a.

12. *Ibid.*, 102b.

the kleśas and the samyojanas (products of ignorance) obstruct the light of Samyagdr̥ṣṭi (or Prajñā), then there arise the shadow of 'I' and the shadows of all other things."¹³

"Moreover, it is in the still sheet of water that the image of the moon becomes visible, which is not visible in the disturbed water. In the heart that is stupefied by ignorance, there become visible the sense of ego, the sense of pride and the consequent factors of bondage. But, when the water of the heart is beaten and disturbed by true wisdom, then the ego image and the pride image do not appear."¹⁴

As the possibility of the shadow, there is the light behind; as the possibility of the sense of self, there is the awareness of the Universal Reality, the Prajñā, immanent in every being.¹⁵ It is under ignorance that one misses the moon and sees only the image, and mistakes the image itself for the real moon. It is then that the sense of 'I' comes to be applied exclusively to the object with which the self-conscious intellect has identified itself. And with this identification of the intellect with the specific object, the ultimate meaning of self, viz., self-being, underivedness, comes to be applied, only wrongly, to this very object, and thus the derived comes to be mistaken for the underived. And then the misapplication of this sense of unconditionedness comes to be extended to everything that the differentiating intellect alights upon; every particular individual entity comes to be endowed with underivedness and substantiality, of which it is actually devoid. And thus there arises the clinging in regard to everything.

"On account of the false sense of self one has the sense of ego (as a real separate entity). On account of the lack of the true knowledge of things, one sees everything (as a real separate entity)."¹⁶

This identification of the self-conscious intellect with the specific, conditioned, complex entity as one's own self would lead

13. *ibid.*, 104a.

14. *ibid.*, 102b.

15. Among other passages in the Sastra speaking of the immanence of the Universal Reality in every being, these could be noted here: 'Within the heart of everything there is the Universal Reality, (the ever-present self-being)' (*ibid.*, 563c-564a.) '(This Tathata, the Universal Reality is in every being.) It is in the Buddha, it is also in the bodhisattva, for it is One, Undivided'. (*ibid.*, 653c.)

16. *ibid.*, 102b.

to dividing all the rest as what is external to oneself, in contrast to this specific entity which by virtue of its having been identified with the self-conscious principle itself comes to be considered as internal. Thus there arise the distinctions of the self and the other, the internal and the external. While these distinctions belong to the very essence of the mundane nature of things, and constitute the very form in which the entire mundane existence appears, they are turned into falsity when they are treated not as relative distinctions but as absolute divisions. On the basis of this notion of the absolute exclusiveness of self, there proceeds the other tendency of the principle of intellection, viz., the tendency to unify, but now in terms of 'I' and that which 'belongs to me', the 'mine', i.e., in terms of possession. Thus there arise greed and anger, and the sinful deeds prompted by them.

"From the sense of 'I' there arises the sense of 'mine'. With the rise of the sense of 'I' and the sense of 'mine', there arises the sense of greed in regard to things that benefit the self, and there arises the sense of anger in regard to the things that thwart the interest of the self. Such bonds of passions as these arise not out of wisdom but out of madness and perversion. Therefore they are called the products of stupidity. These three poisons of greed etc. are the root of all klesas. All these owe their being to the (false) sense of self."¹⁷

But the sense of 'I' is not itself committed to giving rise to these poisons. For, it can work as much for bondage as for freedom, as much for doing evil deeds as for doing deeds of merit.

"From the 'I' there arise all deeds that bind as well as all the deeds of merit (that set one free from ignorance and pain)."¹⁸

The false sense of 'I' and the consequent sense of possession arise not only in regard to the entire individual entity, the body-mind complex as a whole, but they arise also in regard to each of the elements within the complex entity, i.e., in regard to each of the five skandhas.

"Owing to the power of the false sense of self, one sees the self in four ways, viz., that 'rupa is I', that 'rupa is mine',

17. *ibid.*, 286c.

18. *ibid.*

that 'in me there is rupa' and that 'in rupa there is myself'. (Similar kinds of views arise even in regard to the other four skandhas). Thus there are altogether twenty kinds of the false sense of self. When one realizes the awakening to the true wisdom, then one understands the falsity of these."¹⁹

In truth, all the activities that arise in the body-mind complex arise without in the least implicating any eternal I-substance. But the ignorant imagine an eternal, independent ego-substance as the knower, the doer of deeds and the enjoyer of the results.²⁰

The denial of such an eternal independent ego-substance that is supposed to inhabit every individual body-mind complex is not the same thing as the denial of agency and moral responsibility of the self-conscious person. Personality which is truly dynamic and organismic itself becomes impossible on the supposition of such an unchanging, ultimate I-substance; the error of misplaced absoluteness cuts at the very root of all dynamic, organismic relatedness which is the essence of mundane life. Śūnyata as the mundane truth is a denial not of mundane life but of the absoluteness that is falsely imposed on the mundane things; it is at the same time a revelation of their essential relativity and dynamism. And that is the only way how agency and moral responsibility become meaningful.

"To deny the individual in the mundane truth is an error. The Abhidharma, no doubt, says that there are things that are pure as well as things that are impure, only he that experiences them is not to be found (Although the Abhidharma says this) it is not correct. If there is no person, then there is no-one to whom the things pure and impure can belong. In this case there would not be any doer, and in the absence of the doer, there would not be either the deeds or their fruits; and thus there would be no bondage or liberation. For example, when anyone feels the burning of fire and keeps away from it, it is not that the fire itself keeps away from fire. When people fear pain and keep away from it, it is not that the pain itself gives up pain."

While the sense of self is an indisputable and indispensable mundane truth, the false sense of self is the root of all afflictions.

19. *ibid.*, 103c.

20. Among other places in the text, ch. 12 is worth noting for a criticism of the soul-theory of the non-Buddhists.

and wrong notions. *Trṣṇā* is in essence the thirst for fulfilment, the thirst for the Real. We seek to realize the Real because we have the basic feeling that our present being as we live now is not the True Being, the basic feeling that we miss the Unconditioned. This thirst for the Real, this sense of the Unconditioned, is the root of our whole being, of all that we feel and think, and of all that we do. The empirical self is wholly constituted of this basic urge to realize the Real. But under ignorance, with no knowledge of the true meaning of this thirst, we seize the conditioned as itself the unconditioned, only to find that it is subject to birth and death. This is the source of pain. *Trṣṇā* as the origin of *kleśas* stands for this thirst as the root of seizing and clinging. *Kleśa* is the painful state of emotional conflict which results from this failure to fulfil the thirst, from this disparity between the expected and the realized.

Avidyā, functioning again through *trṣṇā*, gives rise to *dṛṣṭi*, which consists in the seizing of the specific concepts and the conceptual systems that embody them as themselves absolute and limitless. This is dogmatism, claiming absoluteness for the relative, completeness for the fragmentary. This is perversion. Conditioned by thirst, there is in each individual, the interest, the concern, for the things that satisfy his need; everyone has concern for the things of his interest. But in our ignorance we make the claim of universality and absoluteness to the relative, specific concepts or conceptual systems that embody them, we fail to see that the concepts are specific, and hence limited in their scope, and that they are actually formulated to meet the specific interest that they subserve. This is blindness. All *dṛṣṭis* owe their being to *saṭkāyadṛṣṭi*.

"All the sixty-two *dṛṣṭis* are included in the *saṭkāyadṛṣṭi*."²¹

Both the *kleśas* and *dṛṣṭis* have thus their origin in the false sense of self, the root-error, which consists in claiming unconditionedness for the conditioned, and imposing absoluteness on the relative. It is our ignorance and the consequent imagination of unconditionedness in regard to the conditioned that is at the root of our blindness to the limitedness of our standpoint as well as at the root of all our suffering.

"The common people, out of ignorance, seize the determinate (as the indeterminate) and this gives rise to all the

21. *ibid.*, 605b, 607b.

kleśas viz., *trṣṇa* etc., this in turn gives rise to different kinds of deeds, leading to different kinds of bodily existence and experiences of different kinds of pain and pleasure. For example, the silk-worm emits silk from within itself and gets caught within it, and in consequence suffers the pain of getting boiled up and burnt. This is just the case with the ignorant. But the wise analyses and distinguishes everything, root and branch, and finds that all things are *śūnya*. In order to help all people, he tells them of the nature of the objects of their clinging, viz., the five *skandhas* etc. He tells them: 'You have yourselves given rise to all this, and having yourselves given rise to them you yourselves cling to them (in your ignorance).'

Axiology of Knowledge

by

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The theory of knowledge has been approached from various points of view, such as the psychological, the logical, the sociological, the dialectical and the positivistic.

Of these, the psychological and the logical approaches, which constitute in the main the contents of what may be called the traditional epistemology, study the problem of knowledge in an abstract and hypothetical manner. Taking for granted only the bare existence of the individual mind, the psychological theory of knowledge, for example, attempts to seek the origin and the development of knowledge in the individual consciousness. The logical theory of knowledge, interested in the universal frame-work of knowledge and the criteria of truth, besides taking for granted the abstract existence of individual minds, supposes that knowledge could be fruitfully studied in an abstract and a general way independently of the concrete and specific situation in which it arises. Such an abstract and hypothetical procedure was bound to be predominantly speculative with the result that human ingenuity has created more fanciful problems than offered any actual solutions. No wonder, then, if the psychological theory of knowledge ends in subjectivism and relativism, and the logical theory of knowledge in a sterile scepticism.¹

The other three approaches to the theory of knowledge are comparatively modern. The sociology of knowledge must be credited with studying the problem of knowledge in a concrete way, by taking an account of the social and the historical situation

1. For a fuller exposition of this position see the author's following articles :—

(i) "Ethical theory of knowledge," *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1954.

(ii) "The Nature of Error", *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1955.

in which knowledge arises. It describes the inter-relation between society and knowledge, thus bringing out the social conditioning as well as the social significance of knowledge. But, inspite of its objective and empirical approach, its generally deterministic assumptions and relativistic conclusions are far from satisfactory.²

The theory of knowledge, based on the application of the fundamental ideas of dialectical and historical materialism,³ also studies the problem of knowledge in a still more concrete way, particularly emphasising the importance of human practice and co-operation, in the origin and progress of knowledge. This outlook is certainly commendable in that it gives a novel orientation to the theory of knowledge. But this theory of knowledge, inspite of its scientific professions, appears to be based on a thoroughly materialistic dogma and a very dubious Pavlovian stimulus-reflex psychology.

The theory of knowledge as revealed in the method of logical positivism becomes so very ultra-concrete, that it holds only sensuous experience as valuable, and discredits other varieties of experience, without offering a justifiable principle for such a dogmatic preference of one kind of experience to others.

The axiological theory of knowledge, or more briefly, as I propose to call it, Axionoetics,⁴ proposes to study the problem of knowledge, firstly, by taking advantage of whatever valuable points there may be in the above theories of knowledge; secondly, by avoiding their defects briefly referred to above, thirdly, by taking a comprehensive view of the concrete knowledge situation; and fourthly, by a reorientation of the study of knowledge from the

2. For a detailed criticism of this theory, see the author's article:—"A Critique of sociology of knowledge," *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1953.

3. See Maurice Cornforth:—"Dialectical Materialism", Vol. 3 "The Theory of Knowledge."

4. Derived from Greek *axioō*, to deem worthy. Cornforth would not like this. In his note to the Foreword to his book referred to in the Note above, he remarks that "those who consider Greek a more philosophical language than English call it (theory of knowledge) *epistemology*, or sometimes *gnosiology*." I do not think that Greek is a more philosophical language than any other language like Sanskrit or Latin. The use of technical terms helps clarity and economy of thought. The idea does not become bourgeois because it is expressed in one word, nor does it become proletarian if it is expressed in a mass of words.

point of view of the theory of value. This last point is of central importance.

Knowledge does originate in the individual human mind. But there is a very important element of truth in the view that the so-called individual psychology is essentially a social psychology, which the psychological theory of knowledge has neglected. The human individuals and their minds do not exist, much less grow, in a void. Hence, knowledge neither originates nor flourishes in a social vacuum. It is only such a point of view that will save knowledge from solipsism. The give and take between the individual and the society, action and reaction between the mind and its environment are responsible for the birth, nourishment and growth of knowledge. Knowledge is one of the human institutions of basic importance, and as such, it is intimately related with human life and its values. All human institutions necessarily reflect human values. And just as the various human institutions could be evaluated in terms of human hopes and aspirations, so also we can make a critical evaluation of the institution of knowledge in its concrete achievements.

If we can have the respective philosophies of science, of history, of law, of religion and the like, which deal with them not so much in their formal aspects as their actual content, we can as well have a true philosophy of knowledge. The theory of knowledge, with which we are familiar, makes a formal study of knowledge, which also serves a valuable purpose in its own way, but it could not rightly be called a philosophy of knowledge. The genuine philosophy of knowledge is Axionoetics which makes a study of both the formal and material aspects of knowledge in its intimate relationship with human life. The sociology of knowledge being descriptive may supply, at the most, very valuable data for a philosophy of knowledge which is essentially interpretative and normative. The positivistic theory of knowledge is far from such a philosophy of knowledge, as it has no sense for values at all. The dialectical materialist theory of knowledge comes nearer to the conception of a philosophy of knowledge in so far as it includes according to Cornforth, the role of ideas in social life as a part of its subject matter. The theory of knowledge "helps us to evaluate our ideas, to develop them and use them as instruments of human progress."⁵ But, unfortunately, it has a narrow conception of values which is determined by its dire materialism.

5. "Theory of Knowledge", Foreword.

The concrete knowledge situation, as Axionoetics considers it, involves reference to the knower as a social being with his physical, mental, intellectual, moral and spiritual make-up which measures the value of the knower as a subject in relation to the object of his knowledge. Deficiency in any of these would mar the prospects of his attaining desirable truth. His social inheritance, his cultural background, or the ethics of which he is a representative, go a long way in making the knowledge situation very specific. These supply him with a set of values which he consciously or unconsciously makes use of in his investigation of truth. The general level of knowledge attained, the specific interests and the social requirements also determine the choice of the problems for knowledge, as also the means, the methods and the standards of verification pertaining to the field of investigation. Thus, in the knowledge-situation, there is not merely the triad of the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge, but the whole of this, besides being internally interdependent, moves within the perspectives supplied by the two sets of values, one determined by the scientific spirit, and the other determined by the ends or ideals which the society and the individual place before themselves. The knower ordinarily receives a great deal passively from this concrete situation in which he finds himself. For him, most of the knowledge comes through social sanction or authority. But knowledge does not grow so much by passive reception as by active contribution. The action of the knower on the environment, the change that he brings within it with a specific purpose, which he values and which he brings with him to bear upon his environment, are vastly operative in the creative activity of knowledge. Knowledge does not grow so much by accidental happenings as by planned activity; at least where there is an appearance of an accidental progress of knowledge, there is an active mind full of knowledge to recognise the worth of the accident for knowledge, and even if there is a wanton accretion of knowledge which goes on accumulating irrespective of its significance for human life and its values, the same may ultimately prove to be harmful or useless, if it is not brought within the control of desirable ends. Robert S. Lynd says "Research without an actively selective point of view becomes the dirty bag of an idiot, filled with bits of pebbles, straws, feathers and other random hoardings. If nobody goes about endlessly counting throughout a life-time the number of particles of sand along infinite miles of seashore over all the coasts of the world, why is this? Because there is no point to it, no need to complete

this particular aspect of the jigsaw puzzle of the unknown."⁶ This convincingly shows how knowledge cannot be merely for the sake of knowledge, it must have a sufficient interest for man.

It is such a concrete study of the human institution of knowledge, in the perspective of values, in which it originates the value in which it sustains itself and the values into which it results, that constitutes the chief point of interest for Axionoetics.

In order to justify this new enquiry the various ways in which value seems to be very pertinent to knowledge may be indicated.

(1) The most obvious consideration is that knowledge itself constitutes a value. It is something worthy of human attainment. The more of it the better for the individual and society.

(2) If knowledge has an intrinsic value, does it necessarily mean that all knowledge is of equal value? It will be seen that all knowledge is not uniformly valuable. The value of knowledge depends upon the stage of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. Regarding both of these points there may be a difference of opinion, but the fact remains that all knowledge is not equally valuable. Thus, for instance, as Comte suggests, knowledge grows in value as it passes through the successive stages of mythology, metaphysics and science. According to another point of view, the object of our knowledge gives value to that knowledge; the most valuable object of knowledge being God, or nature, or man. According to a very strong tradition self-knowledge is the highest knowledge. Whatever point of view we may take, it is clear that the value of knowledge has itself to be judged in terms of a certain standard of valuation.

(3) In so far as knowledge itself is submitted to valuation in terms of certain standards of values, these themselves may be consciously or unconsciously entertained by a given society. In this sense, knowledge in the form of a set of beliefs entertained by that society is reflective of the social ethos involving ideas, sentiments and ideals which constitute a system of values. Knowledge comes to be judged in terms of these latent values.

(4) Even though we talk of social ethos or culture which forms a norm for the common men in a given social group, some superior individuals transcend this norm. These individuals who have a

6. *Knowledge for what?* p. 183.

greater keenness for values may help the society to see a greater extension and intension of the values, or may even help it towards a transvaluation of values. Such individuals become the reformers of society. Thus progress is made possible by effective leaders of society, whose knowledge, point of view, or insight could be valued in terms of their worthy or unworthy personalities. In this sense, the value of an individual in the capacity of a knower measures the value of his knowledge.

(5) Knowledge is a result of the cognitive activity, and like every human activity involves a purpose. The activity of knowledge therefore, is meaningful only in relation to the consciousness of a value that constitutes its goal. This cognitive goal is generally recognised as a truth-value. With reference to science, for instance, it is said that "the institutional goal of science is the extension of certified knowledge."⁷

(6) The disinterested pursuit of knowledge to gain such a truth-value itself constitutes a value. This involves the recognition of the methodological procedure of a scientific spirit as a value. R. K. Merton speaks of it as the "ethos of science" or "mores of science" as determined by the goal and method of science. He suggests that an ethical value is implied in these mores. "The mores of science possess a methodological rationale, but they are binding, not because they are procedurally efficient but because they are believed right and good. They are moral not technical prescriptions."⁸

(7) The nature of this ethos is bound to vary from field to field since all the fields of knowledge are not analogous in their subject-matter. The nature of the methodological rationale that is binding upon the seeker of truth-value is determined by the nature of the subject-matter. Axionoetics should consider how these mores vary in different fields of investigation. To consider that the values involved in the ethos of one science constitute a model for every other science and forms of knowledge to follow is to disregard the truth-value itself.

(8) The theoretical problems that the truth-seeker attempts to solve originate in the practical life. The theoretical activity of man is surrounded by the practical activity of man. The dialectical

7. R. K. Merton: "Social theory and Social Structure," p. 309.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

materialist theory of knowledge even goes to the length of asserting the unity of theory and practice, of knowing and doing. Hence Lenin wrote "The standpoint of life, of practice should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge."⁹ It is inevitable, therefore, that in the background of the theoretical purpose there is perhaps a more important practical purpose arising out of human life and its values. Whatever be the system of values inherent in the ethos of science, it will have to be quite in conformity with the fundamental human values. Every human vocation has its specific ethical code or system of values. The mores of science are only one instance amongst other such systems of values which can only be the specific expressions of the universal system of human values.

(9) Even if knowledge is not directly pursued for the realization of certain ulterior ends, when a certain truth-value is reached, it is bound to affect the research worker and the society in general. The disinterested pursuit of knowledge does not mean that the knowledge remains indifferent to life. Nor can life, from which knowledge springs, remain indifferent to what knowledge has to offer it, whether it wants it or not. The utilitarian motive may not, in some cases, be the spring of knowledge; but when knowledge is somehow made available, human life is bound to take cognisance of it, and thus knowledge comes to be applied. In this way knowledge does affect life. In fact, a knowledge which does not directly or indirectly affect life is meaningless, being devoid of value. The role of knowledge in setting new values and upsetting the cherished ones can hardly be denied. The building of character, whether in the case of an individual or in the case of society, when we come to speak of culture, consists in the assimilation and revelation of certain values in the life whether of an individual or of a society.

(10) Knowledge thus evidently stands in relation to other values. The values may be independent of one another in the sense of their mutual irreducibility. But this does not mean that they are unrelated. Thus, for instance, the basic values of truth, beauty and goodness are irreducible to one another, nevertheless they enter into intimate interrelationships. This is because the source of all these values is in the unity of human life and experience. So that, even under what appears superficially as plurality of values there is a basic unity of their organisation in human experience.

9. "Materialism and Empirico-criticism," ch. 2, sec. 6.

It is idle and irresponsible to talk of their mutual exclusiveness or indifference simply because of their irreducible character. In this sense, knowledge and its truth-value are in real relationship with other values. It is not sufficient, therefore, to value knowledge in terms of its truth-value, but it is also necessary to value knowledge in terms of its relation to other values. That is, a truth ultimately must be shown to be a *desirable* truth, because of its power of truly enriching life by the promotion of other values. Truth-value of knowledge is, therefore, the minimum, not the maximum, value of knowledge. The maximum value of knowledge lies in its being in organic relationship with human values in general.

(11) Lastly, the concept of fact or being to be known involves as its essence a reference to value. There is nothing like a fact and a value. Facts are values. Prof. Sorley,¹⁰ for instance, considers God as the embodiment of values, and that reality has a moral constitution through and through. According to Hartmann,¹¹ value is the genuine first mover, the first entelechy, the power behind that which ought-to-be, in fact, the centre of gravity of existence. Being, knowledge and value, therefore, in this sense, constitute three aspects of the same reality. To ignore value is to ignore existence as well as knowledge.

To-day when we find ourselves in a state of crisis for which our knowledge is responsible, let us take heed of Dr. P. A. Sorokin's advice.

"Since man and his values are sacred, the relationship of man to man should be guided by sublime love, as the categoric imperative; since truth, goodness and beauty are absolute values, any further relativization of these, any further degradation to a mere arbitrary convention, becomes out of place. Being one, science cannot claim complete freedom from the control of goodness and beauty, and therefore cannot and should not serve evil purposes.... The same principle applies to art."¹²

10. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 515.

11. *Ethics*, pp. 272-73.

12. *The Crisis of Our Age*, p. 317.

Towards Re-Orienting Indian Philosophy— Hints from a Thomist

by

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The problem of re-orientation proposed for our discussion by the organisers of this Philosophical Congress arises periodically, born of the very freedom of Philosophy and the multiplicity of paths which the human mind can explore in its ever renewed quest for ultimate truth.

It was urged upon the Catholic Church about a century ago, and it may be of interest to consider the reform then undertaken and successfully pursued ever since.

The fermentation of thought during the three previous centuries, the discovery of other civilizations, the youthful efflorescence of the positive sciences, the upheaval of the French and subsequent revolutions, the growing importance of history and evolution in all fields of science, these were the main factors which had brought confusion in the philosophical thought and teaching of many. The number and magnitude of the new problems raised in modern times made some teachers too shy, hence either sceptical or dogmatic, others too bold and adventurous. This wavering affected also the teachers in hundreds of Catholic Institutes of Philosophy scattered all over the world.

Hence it had become imperative to reascertain the aim of the philosophical investigation, the soundness of its foundations, the adequacy of its method, the universality of its outlook, and the truth of its propositions.

It was found that for this tremendous undertaking no better guide could be followed than Saint Thomas Aquinas whose teaching had combined deep metaphysical insight, certainty of method, clarity and balance of expression, catholicity of outlook and, above all, love for truth and intellectual honesty.

However, this return to a master of the thirteenth century should not be a going backwards, a restoration merely of an antiquated body of doctrines. Thomism had been essentially a revolu-

tion, a new synthesis, a genetic mutation. Most of its elements might be found in Aristotle or the Stoics, in Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius or the other Christian Fathers, in Ibn Sinā, Ibn Roshd or Rabbi Moses, but they had been critically digested, purified and integrated into a new doctrine, specifically different from them all, because it transcended them by its universality and admirable consistency.

Hence Thomism was to be restored not only in its principles, method and essential theses, but also in its spirit. Just as it had been a critical synthesis of all the philosophical traditions known by Aquinas, it was to be in our time a common endeavour to integrate critically Cartesianism and English Empiricism, Kantism and Transcendentalism, Positivism and Modern Sciences, Confucianism and the Philosophies of India, Aesthetics and the Social Sciences.

The task to be done was tremendous but it began in earnest in all parts of the world as soon as Pope Leo XIII gave it the initial impetus by his decision of August the fourth, 1879, known as the encyclical letter "*Aeterni Patris*."

Critical editions were prepared. Historians delved extensively into the maze of published and unpublished documents concerning the evolution of Medieval thought. On this solid basis Thomism and cognate doctrines were expounded historically and critically. And having thus recovered their authentic tradition, the new Thomists produced original treatises in Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology, Philosophy of Religion, of Culture, of Nature and Sciences, Aesthetics, Law, Sociology and Social Economics.

It is but natural that most of these works were written by Continental European scholars and remained for a long time almost ignored by English-speaking philosophers. But for the last thirty odd years they have appeared in considerable number in the English book market. Not only translations, but original articles and treatises by English-speaking Thomists are now coming out of the presses with increasing frequency.

The *Bibliographie Thomiste*, published in 1921 by Mandonnet and Destrez and covering the period from 1800 to 1920, counted 2219 titles. The *Thomistic Bibliography*, published in 1945 by V. J. Bourke, covers only the years 1920-1940 but gives 4764 titles. With the increase of the years 1940-1956 this whole production has greatly exceeded the 10,000 mark.

Thomistic works are of course far from being all masterpieces, but the best ones among them have in common a set of qualities which characterizes them as the philosophical literature of our time.

First, they are extremely careful to distinguish the proper scope of the various sciences. For instance, Metaphysics is neither theology, nor faith, nor experimental science. Neither is it history nor poetical experience. But it is the purely rational science of being as being. Its subject-matter is not the mere notion of being, but any existent insofar as, and to whatever degree, it verifies this notion of being.

Second, they eschew unproved postulates and require a solid basis of evidence for the starting point and the fundamental principles of their science.

Third, they carefully define their terms and indicate all the steps of their demonstrations. This is sometimes apt to irritate those who prefer to rely upon their "intuition" to jump to obscure conclusions, but it is a sign both of intellectual honesty and of respect for the reader.

Fourth, their healthy confidence in the human power of reaching truth and even absolute truth in Metaphysics is not a blind belief but the conclusion of a critical enquiry sufficiently complete to overcome the qualified scepticism of Kant or any form of radical scepticism.

Fifth, they have, after the misinterpretations of several centuries, found anew the authentic meaning of "act" and "potency" according to Aristotle and Aquinas. With this wonderful tool of analysis they are able to solve the apparent antinomies of multiplicity, finitude, imperfection, movement, etc. at the various levels of being.

Sixth, they have a consistent theory of the analogy of human knowledge in which they easily integrate the valuable discoveries of Neo-Positivists and Analysts of Language while overcoming the rigidity of their limiting categories. This theory of analogy shows how our power of signifying (hence, of affirming) extends much beyond our power of representing; thus it opens to the scientific investigation of Philosophy the whole realm of the metempirical.

Seventh, because the theory of analogy shows that the exact singularity (or, in some cases, personality) of most beings is but indirectly accessible to Philosophy, their doctrine is never closed

in upon itself but permits itself to be completed by other kinds of exact knowledge, such as Mathematics and the Natural Sciences, History and even Divine Revelation, if it is proved to be credible that such a revelation exists.

Eighth, relying upon Aquinas's principle that truth cannot contradict truth and that no error is such that it does not imply some truth, they critically welcome positions and doctrines different from their own and are especially ready to learn from the other philosophical traditions of mankind. They may have to condemn what, on the solid basis of truth which they have secured, they deem erroneous, but they endeavour rather to complete than to destroy. Thus their system is to be likened not to a closed circle but to a spiral, always intent on expanding itself.

Ninth, they do not try to be original, but true. And they are convinced that the best way to be true is to work together with all the other philosophers, both of the past and of the present and to keep the dialogue with them always open. With their own colleagues, they work in an even closer collaboration and thus form what can be called, not in a pejorative but in the best sense of the term, a school.

I wish now to derive from this brief sketch of the renovation of Thomism a few suggestions which may help those concerned with the present situation of Indian Philosophy.

Since contemporary Thomism shows that it is possible to revive valuable doctrines of the past without being "reactionary", and to synthesize diverse currents of thought without adulterating the intrinsic unity of an open system, I propose that a critical examination of the Indian legacy in Philosophy be pursued by a common effort of all of us in order to discover the "perennial philosophy" immanent in this heritage, in spite of the mutual opposition of its many currents. In the spirit of that basic philosophy it would then be possible to elaborate a full synthesis, at the same time universal and authentically Indian.

I shall even venture to propose for your consideration a few elements which, in my opinion, are integral parts of the fundamental outline of such a synthesis.

(1) The unhampered freedom and the rational fervour which, beyond the dogmatic systematization of the Exegetes, characterized philosophical investigation during the Upaniṣadic period. The *Śruti* was then "being made" by remarkably deep and independent

thinkers; it was not yet believed to be the untouchable and infallible *Śabda*, which Mimāṃsakas conceived as eternally self-subsistent in the manner of Plato's ideas.

(2) Together with that freedom, the recognition that our power of knowing is naturally limited and stands in need of a *pramāṇa* such as *śabda* in order to reach its full possible scope. Though found in a somewhat exaggerated form in Śāṅkara and other Advaitins, this admission is in itself extremely valuable and will help us to avoid rationalistic pride and to remain open to the possibility of an infallible revelation.

(3) Reliance upon experience as the only solid ground for any attempt at ultimate explanations. It is found as such in most *darśanas*, except the *śrutivādas*, and even in the reasoning or *manana* part of the latter.

(4) A firm grasp of the first principles of all human knowledge, such as the principles of identity, contradiction, syllogism, causality, which are implied in that experience. Their theory is found partly in the doctrine of *pramāṇas*, to which almost all the Indian thinkers of the past have devoted a good amount of careful attention, and partly in statements scattered through the works of Śāṅkara and other great ācāryas. The form of metempirical relativism which is so current today can hardly boast of any patents of nobility older than the nineteenth century and is ultimately of foreign extraction.

(5) The method of reflective analysis which consists in deriving from experience, according to the laws expressed in the first principles, all the theses of Metaphysics as the necessary conditions of that experience. Among the many who have practised it, the Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntins in the *manana* part of their *bhāṣyas* have been the most conscious of its possibilities and the most consistent in its use.

(6) The concern with proper definitions, right divisions, strict reasoning, which is so characteristic of the classical thinkers of India that it allows us to speak of them as the "Schoolmen" of India.

(7) The theory of the various meanings of terms in a given context and particularly of *lakṣaṇā* which justifies the metaphysician's pretension of being able to reach and to signify with words realities which cannot be expressed properly by any words (*lakṣyate na tūcyate*, as Śāṅkara says in *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, 2. 1). This theory developed by the Grammarians and Rhetoricians.

ricians, has been integrated into Philosophy by Śaṅkara and his direct followers. Its revival would allow us to meet the challenge of Philosophical Analysis with an adequate instrument.

(8) The desire of knowing the ultimate Reality, which properly defines the undertaking of the Vedāntins, and with some qualification that of the other so-called orthodox thinkers.

(9) The conception of this Absolute as the total Cause from which everything else is produced, by which it is preserved and in which it finds its accomplishment, according to the teaching of the *Brahmasūtra*. The causality of such a metempirical Principle is not easy to conceive. Its explanation in terms of the Sāṃkhya *Parīṇāmavāda* was found inadequate by Śaṅkara, though he had to use such terms for lack of any better technical vocabulary. He therefore tried to overcome their inadequacy with the help of metaphors which signified his intention of asserting the complete transcendence of the Supreme Cause as well as its most intimate immanence in the *jīvātman* and the rest of the world. In the wake of his own effort, his disciples elaborated *vivartavāda* which is surely a more adequate, though still imperfect, theory of the total causality of the independent Absolute. It is, in my opinion, at the level of this formulation that our attempt to find an improved expression of it should take its departure.

(10) The consequent conception of all beings other than the transcendent and unchanging Absolute as "*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*", i.e., as to be defined neither by 'being' in the supreme sense (*paramārtha*) of the term, nor by 'non-being' in the supreme sense of the term. More positively this means that, without being absolute nothing, they are beings in an analogous sense only. Indeed, they do not exist independently but in total dependence upon the only Being which is such by its very essence, and what they are is but an imperfect participation in its fulness. Hence it is ignorance to conceive them as absolutes over against the supreme Being, since they are totally related to It, whereas, the supreme Being, even as their Cause, is entirely independent of them. For It is One, without a second, and *dvaita* is mere error.

(11) The realization that total dependence does not refer to existence only, but also to any activity by which dependent beings develop their own reality and that, for instance, the total Cause of our existence is also the supreme Illuminator of our intellect and the supreme Mover of our will and is therefore our innermost *Ātman*, in the supreme sense of this term (*paramārthataḥ*).

(12) The truth of Śaṅkara's assertion that "the object of our desire for knowledge is the knowledge of *Brahman* up to its complete comprehension, for the complete comprehension of *Brahman* is the highest end of man" (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 1. 1). *Brahman* therefore cannot be designated as impersonal for the proper end of man cannot be of a lower perfection than man himself and man is personal. We may call our supreme End 'transpersonal' if we mean by this absolutely and supremely personal, but never 'impersonal' unless we force this term to mean 'not anthropomorphic', which is not its proper meaning. In the Christian tradition to which it properly belongs, the term 'person' designates any being of intellectual and free nature. Like all other terms which we apply to God analogically or by *lakṣaṇā*, this term also has first to be purified from all its imperfect connotations (*neti, neti*), and then elevated to its supreme sense (*paramārtha*); but, since in its very definition it designates nothing but perfection, it should be attributed to *Brahman* according to its positive content, not metaphorically only and, still less, negatively. In this connection, it should be noted that 'impersonal' is not the proper rendering of '*nirguṇa*' which simply purports to remove from the simplicity of the Supreme even that form of inner complexity which consists in being endowed with attributes distinct from the subject itself. To conceive *Brahman* as personal is to conceive It as *being*, in an absolutely simple way (*akhaṇḍa*), Reality, Knowledge, etc. ("*Satyam jñānamantaṁ Brahma*", *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 2. 1), whereas to conceive It as *having* them is to conceive It anthropomorphically or as *saṁguṇa*.

I do not pretend to have encompassed in these 12 points the whole of that perennial philosophy which I discover in the Indian legacy. It is obvious that it contains besides these a number of other elements of permanent value concerning not only general Metaphysics, but also Psychology, Cosmology and Ethics. I only offer these as a series of basic assertions upon the truth of which it does not seem impossible to obtain the unanimous agreement of contemporary Indian thinkers. As it contains statements of principles and method as well as a few metaphysical theses, it already expresses a certain outlook and spirit in conformity with which it can be developed into a fully articulated body of philosophy which might be the Indian philosophy of to-morrow.

Does Indian Philosophy Need Re-Orientation ?

by

NARSINGH NARAIN

In discussing the philosophy of Dr. Radhakrishnan, our most eminent contemporary philosopher, Prof. D. M. Datta says: "Metaphysics is to him, as to the ancient Indian philosophers, only a rational preparation for the solution of life's problems."¹ This practical bias of Indian philosophy is claimed to be its main distinguishing feature. In the West, we are told, philosophy is merely an intellectual pursuit, having no necessary moral or spiritual implications. In India the philosophical quest is a means to the attainment of the highest spiritual aims. We are further told that Indian thinkers emphasize the need for physical, mental and moral discipline on which the vision of philosophical truth and the achievement of spiritual poise and progress alike depend. For this reason the different traditional schools of Indian philosophy were at the same time the bases of different religious sects—they constituted the religions of the intellectual elite. Philosophy arose out of religion and never detached itself from it. While it is true that one could be religious without being philosophical, there was no philosophy unconnected with religion.

To the above general statement two exceptions must be made. In one case we have philosophy without religion and in the other religion without philosophy. The first is the Cārvāka school (materialists). Unfortunately no exposition of the Cārvāka philosophy by a follower of that school has survived, and we have to depend for a knowledge of their views on the works of their opponents who have set forth the materialist position for purposes of refutation. But it is clear that materialism, with its rejection of future life and the ideal of salvation, could not have formed the basis of a religion in the sense in which religion was then and is still generally understood. In ancient India, as in the West until quite recently, and in several quarters even to-day, materialism has generally been regarded as synonymous with wickedness. The virtuous materialists presented a problem to ancient Indians, as

1. *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 146.

they even now do to many religious people. We are told nowadays that people who call themselves materialists but live a virtuous life are materialists only in theory, as we are told also that atheists who lead a good life accept God in practice, despite their verbal assertions. On the other hand, we find professed followers of religion, and even the Church, being sometimes accused of implicit materialism, the basis of accusation being their concentration on humanistic this-worldly ideals and their loss of active interest in the religious ideal of salvation. Materialism was given the status of philosophy in ancient India because it was an argumentative and outspoken rejection of religion and had to be answered. We can also ignore Indian materialism because, unlike most other schools of Indian philosophy, it ceased to be a living force long ago. In so far as materialism is to be found in India today its inspiration is purely Western.

The second and far more important exception is Buddhism, as propounded by Buddha himself. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Buddha is well-known and has been a subject of much and varied comment. Among the questions he refused to answer or discuss were the existence of God or Brahman, whether the soul and the body are identical or different, and personal immortality. His silence has been interpreted differently by different scholars. Several scholars hold, for instance, that Buddha's silence about God does not mean denial. They may be right, but that would not alter the fact that the things about which he chose to remain silent were no part of his religion. Whether Buddha was at heart a theist, an atheist or an agnostic, it is clear that his religion was indifferent to those 'isms.' It is true that Buddha accepted certain propositions which may be regarded as metaphysical, such as the doctrines of karma and re-incarnation, though in a somewhat different form from that prevalent in his time. If that makes him a philosopher, every one is a philosopher, for every one accepts, or forms, some ideas about the nature of the world in which we live. But it really serves no useful purpose to use the word philosophy in this extended sense. The early Vedic religion was unphilosophical (not entirely, for no religion can be entirely so) because philosophy had not yet developed. Buddha eschewed philosophy deliberately, or reduced it to a minimum because, to quote his own words in the famous dialogue with Malunkya-putta, "this profits not, nor has to do with the fundamentals of religion, nor tends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, the supernatural faculties, supreme wisdom,

and Nirvana."² He neither discussed the nature of the ultimate reality, nor its relation to the world of common experience, nor the origin of the world—questions which loom so large in the various schools of Indian philosophy, particularly in the Vedanta, the most influential of them all, so influential indeed that it may almost be called *the* philosophy of India at the present time.

It may be mentioned here that even in the West the growth of philosophy as an independent study, untrammelled by religious needs and considerations, is a recent thing. Prof. A. N. Whitehead has observed that Aristotle was "the last European metaphysician of first rate importance" who can be said to have been "entirely dispassionate" in his consideration of the question of God. After him "ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions."³ Mr. Bertrand Russell would not exempt even Aristotle and Plato. "Philosophers from Plato to William James," he says, "have allowed their opinions as to the constitution of the universe to be influenced by the desire for edification: knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophistical, to prove that these beliefs are true."⁴ The alliance between philosophy and religion in India may or may not merit such a description, but the point is that the fusion of the two is not altogether a peculiarly Indian problem. The question is whether such fusion is a satisfactory arrangement.

In posing this question it is not assumed that either philosophy or religion can function in water-tight compartments. We are not thinking in terms of a complete separation of the two pursuits but only inquiring whether the sort of union that exists between them in the Indian schools generally is sound and feasible. Some other possible misapprehensions must be cleared up. We do not propose to discuss here the materialist position that the religious goal of salvation is a mirage, for if that position were accepted religion would have to be dropped altogether and there would be no question of it and philosophy being a joint or separate pursuit. We shall also not question the proposition that the pursuit of the religious ideal possesses a higher value than any merely intellectual quest. And if that ideal can best be furthered by the kind of intimate alliance between philosophy and religion which

2. H. C. Warren's translation.

3. *Science and the Modern World*.

4. *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 863.

we are here examining, let that alliance continue by all means. And as regards philosophy itself, if it is said that a purely intellectual inquiry cannot lead it to the highest goal, I would like to demur, but would say that there is no such thing as a purely intellectual philosophy anywhere. There is a great deal of truth in F. H. Bradley's famous epigram: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." Our views are shaped and influenced by all kinds of factors which never find a place in our conscious cognitions. Perhaps even such things as the state of our organs, the character and the quantity of our internal secretions and our longforgotten childhood experiences play a part in shaping our philosophy of life. And for philosophy the philosopher himself is part of the data, because the philosopher is concerned with the total reality, not with certain partial aspects of it. Suppose there is a man who has never loved anyone, whose heart has never gone out to another in distress, he has missed an aspect of reality which no amount of intellectual acumen can supply.

On the other hand, the approach to philosophy is not through faith, as in the case of religion, but through free inquiry born out of curiosity, as in science. The subject-matters of science and philosophy may be different in character, requiring therefore different techniques for dealing with them, but there is a great deal more in common between philosophy and science than between philosophy and religion. The attitude in which science and philosophy have to be approached is the same, namely a readiness to accept facts without being influenced by our wishes and goals and preconceived notions. As Prof. Julian Huxley has put it "One of the main achievements of science has been to reveal that the facts of nature frequently fail to accord either with the wishes or with the apparently logical preconceptions of human beings."⁵ Science may be dealing with the outside of things and not with their "inner soul", as poet Tagore observed, but in the process of doing so it has revealed something about ourselves which cannot be dismissed as lightly as philosophers are often inclined to dismiss scientific facts and theories as of no real significance. It has drawn attention to the limitations of human faculties even at their best. It may be objected that this comment cannot apply to the intuitions of the saints. The answer is that, without questioning the reality or value of these intuitions, there is ample evidence to show that they are no more infallible than the powers of preception and comprehension possessed by ordinary human beings. For instance, the

5. *Evolution: The Modern Synthesis*, p. 456.

rigid atheistic pluralism of the Jaina saints stands in sharp contrast with the Vedanta monism in its several forms, all of which have been propounded by saints. Logic and intuition are both good instruments for unravelling the mysteries of existence, but mankind, both in the East and in the West, came to place an excessive reliance on them, thus retarding the progress of both science and philosophy. Whether we proceed by reasoning or by intuition we come up against brute facts which disturb our neat theories.

Religious initiation everywhere starts with the assumption that one or more persons have reached the vision of the highest truth beyond which there is nothing left to be known or realized. All we have to do is to follow the path blazed by them. That is the first article of faith to which the aspirants are expected to subscribe. The metaphysical propositions placed before them are not merely the results of reasoning applied to the experiences of life but the deliverances of prophets or saints who have had direct perception of the highest truth. If you have doubts about these, logic will not help you—sit down and meditate until conviction is achieved. Since there is no question of independent verification, every one eventually becomes convinced of the metaphysical tenets of his own particular sect. While there is a remarkable similarity both in the conception of the goal of life and in the discipline prescribed for attaining it, among the different schools of Indian philosophy, their metaphysical positions are substantially at variance with one another. But every one gets drilled into acceptance of the metaphysics of his own school. Such regimentation of thought, even if salutary in intent when associated with religion or politics, should be entirely foreign to the spirit of philosophy. It frowns upon doubt and disbelief, and in the religious tradition everywhere unbelievers are threatened with dire punishment. Since we are here concerned with Indian philosophy, we need only refer to the Gita verse which runs as follows: "But the man who is ignorant, who is of a doubting nature, perishes. For the doubting soul, there is neither this world nor the world beyond nor any happiness."⁶

Dr. Radhakrishnan explains that "faith (Sraddhā) is not blind belief. It is the aspiration of the soul to gain wisdom. It is the reflection in the empirical self of the wisdom that dwells in the deepest levels of our being." But this is not the sense in which

6. IV-40, Dr. Radhakrishnan's translation.
P. 8

one hears the word "sraddhā" used in religious discourses and elsewhere. In the *Viveka Chudāmani*, for instance, Śaṅkara says that sraddhā consists in accepting the words of the Sāstrās and the guru as true. Another commentator, Sri S. K. Prem, a yogi, says that "the doubt referred to here is no mere intellectual doubt, which is the precursor of any advance in knowledge—. It is the doubt of the reality of what has once been perceived..."⁷ Whatever one may think of these explanations, it is obvious that the approach by faith is not the right approach for philosophy. When philosophy and religion are lumped together, whether in India or elsewhere, the former tends to become sacrosanct like divine revelation and to degenerate into a barren exercise in the interpretation of texts. It loses its freshness and virility and lives too much in the past. We in India have been concerned too much with proving, to ourselves and the outside world, what is quite true, that the intellectual quality, the breadth of vision and the flights of speculation displayed by our ancestors can compare favourably with anything to be found in the rest of the world. In a country awakening after a long night of political subjection and intellectual stagnation, such self-assertion is natural and necessary, but can be overdone, and continued too long.

It has been said that Indian thinkers, by reason of their intimate acquaintance with both Indian and Western philosophy, are specially fitted to evolve a synthetic world-view which combines and takes account of the best features of both. But this role can only be fulfilled if philosophy becomes an independent pursuit, unfettered by any practical considerations and unhampered by any feelings of loyalty to ancient thought, however great. For philosophy, as for science, anything in the nature of a regional patriotism should be quite out of place. It may be a good postulate for religion that the highest truth and the way to its realization are already known, that the destination and the road to it are fixed for all time to come and we have only to muster up our courage to embark upon the arduous journey and persist in our exertions. For philosophy this is a fatal presupposition.

The bulk of contemporary Indian philosophy, where it is philosophy proper and not simply a handmaid to religion, is concerned with history and interpretation. The rest is mostly occupied with the pleasant task of reconciling divergent ways of thought which, it is claimed, is calculated to advance the spiritual solidarity of

7. *The Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita*.

mankind. There is, however, a careful avoidance of anything which may be construed as a criticism of deeply cherished religious beliefs. The desire not to hurt the feelings of others is no doubt most admirable, but unfortunately philosophy cannot afford to be other than completely frank without stultifying itself. The sense of unity of all mankind and indeed of all existence, has been felt by many individuals in all parts of the world and more specially by mystics. But the effort to build up a metaphysics on the basis of it has taken different forms which have their points of agreement as well as differences; and no purpose is served by emphasizing the former and glossing over the latter. The conviction of such unity is not derived from metaphysics, nor does its value depend upon the kind of metaphysics we erect on it. Moreover, the function of religion is not to give a metaphysical formulation of that unity but to help us conduct our living in accordance with it.

Similarly there seems to be an inborn optimism in the human breast which makes us feel that in the end all must be well, that there is a moral order at the back of the world of common experience. Some hold that this is only wishful thinking and has no correspondence with reality. However that may be, we are here concerned with the fact that this human optimism (or wishful thinking, if you will) has assumed many concrete shapes in the hands of theologians and philosophers. Religion springs from this optimism but is not wedded to any of the particular systems of beliefs in which that optimism finds concrete expression. Even our conception of the goal of life cannot be regarded as sacrosanct. We are witnessing at present, for instance, a conflict between two conceptions of the goal of life, which is perhaps best expressed by the antithesis between what Dr. Schweitzer has called 'world-and-life-negation' and "world-and-life-affirmation". They are not mutually exclusive but the conflict is real; Dr. Radhakrishnan has described it as a conflict between religion and self-sufficient humanism.⁸

When religion and philosophy are lumped together, philosophers are prone to define philosophy in the light of their own religious inclinations or convictions. In the beginning of this essay we referred to the standpoint of Dr. Radhakrishnan. Here is a definition of philosophy by an Indian philosopher belonging to a later generation, Prof. T. R. V. Murti:

8. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*.

That philosophy is not an affair of intellectual curiosity or analysis but a serious spiritual discipline (*sādhana*) directed towards the attainment of Freedom is basic to Indian Philosophy and I subscribe to it without reservation.⁹

This definition completely identifies philosophy with religion, or rather with that path of religion which in the Vedānta system is known as *Jñāna Yoga*. For if philosophy is a spiritual discipline for the attainment of Freedom, there is no function left for religion to perform, and the two words become synonymous. If the line of reasoning adopted in this essay is correct, philosophy should be nothing more than a systematic effort at the formulation of a world-view by taking into account all the available data both in the shape of our knowledge of the external world and of our inner experiences. And so great are our ignorance and our limitations that even when one feels absolutely convinced of one particular world-view, one must recognise that it is liable to undergo revision with the growth of knowledge and understanding. The pursuit of the highest practical ideals is, of course, open to philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Philosophy can best play its part in the shaping of these ideals and in the furthering of humanity's practical interests in the highest sense by confining itself to its own proper objective, namely the search for as comprehensive a vision of truth as our present faculties and the knowledge at our disposal will permit.

9. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 457.

The Alleged Unreality of Time

by

D. Y. DESHPANDE

The question of the reality of time is very old. In western philosophy it is as old as Parmenides, and in the eastern it is probably even older. For over two thousand years a long series of distinguished philosophers have produced reasons calculated to disprove the reality of time. And though there have been counter-attacks from the realist camp, the general impression one is apt to have of the controversy is that on the whole the "unrealists" have carried the day. It might be thought that little if anything worthwhile can be added to that endless controversy. Nevertheless I venture to suggest that it is possible to give one or two arguments which can settle the question more or less decisively against the unrealists. The arguments are not (I am afraid) new; but the times are less mistrustful of time, and so there might be a greater possibility of some of the old arguments carrying conviction.

1. It is admitted by all (including the unrealists) that we do experience temporal succession. That events are experienced as happening one after another is what everybody will allow. Those who hold time to be unreal freely admit that it is experienced; only they maintain that that is all the reality time has. They maintain, in other words, that time is only a mode of *appearance*; it is not a mode of being. For a number of reasons (which are well-known) it is held that the real must be timeless; and since succession is nevertheless experienced and cannot be dismissed as the figment of the imagination, it is declared to be at best an appearance of a timeless reality. To the question why the timeless should appear to us *sub specie temporis*, the general answer given is that the temporal appearance must be due to some imperfection in our cognitive apparatus. Our perception of the temporal is thus really the misperception of the timeless.

2. The reasons put forth to prove that the real cannot be temporal are too numerous to be dealt with here. In this paper I shall suppose them to have been successful in proving their point and shall confine myself to pointing out one or two difficulties in the unrealist thesis.

A Note on Jung's Conception of Psyche

by

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The Behaviourist's analysis of man's mental life into reflexes and reflex arcs and the mechanistic interpretation of human mind as an assemblage of images resulted in a gross misunderstanding of human behaviour. The forms of behaviour which are peculiarly man's own were deliberately ignored and the basic fountains of psychic life, the foundations of human personality, were forgotten in the oblivion of the materialistic and mechanistic reality. Psycho-therapeutic phenomena have thrown a flood of light on the reality of the subliminal forces of our personality that were hitherto eclipsed under the mechanistic dogma. Psycho-analytic studies have shown how the picture of reality may be distorted by the instinctive drives and complexes that lie beyond the threshold of consciousness.

Freudian recognition of the unconscious functioning of our personality failed, however, to fathom the deeper and more potential factors in human personality, as the real nature and the actual scope of the unconscious were missed in the abyss of sex-psychology. It was left to Jung to postulate better concepts to signify the extensive fields of our psychic life. He does it not only by recognising the unconscious forces of our personality but also by extending the frontiers of the unconscious to a limitless extent.

Jung's conception of *psyche* is based on a better appreciation of the unconscious and its functions. The unconscious for him is not a store-house of repressed complexes and forgotten experiences; on the contrary it is the source of our instinctive drives and a basis for a collective approach to our social and moral problems.

Jung distinguishes three kinds of mental levels—conscious, personal unconscious and collective unconscious. Psyche comprises of both the conscious and the unconscious processes. The unconscious contents of our psyche may be personal or collective. The former belongs to the individual, whereas the latter is common to the whole of mankind. The personal unconscious consists

3. The first of these difficulties is the following. The unrealists hold that what is timeless is perceived by the human understanding as temporal. But the following consideration should make this view look extremely suspicious. Even with such cognitive faculties as we possess (and God knows they are far from perfect!) We seem quite able to apprehend timeless things. For example a mathematical series such as the series of natural numbers is a timeless series. The natural numbers are said to form a timeless series because they do not succeed one another like events. They have a definite order, of course; for each number has its own place which it cannot exchange with any other number. Nevertheless the series they form is not successive because the numbers do not come into existence one after another and then pass away. Indeed they do not come into existence at all, for they are not the kind of things which come into existence. No doubt we apprehend the numbers successively; but we also perceive that the relation which generates the series is non-temporal. The timelessness of the number-series is thus quite compatible with the successive knowledge of its terms. That is to say, we draw a clear distinction between the fact that certain terms are successive and that they are successively perceived.

4. Now if this point is granted, the question at once arises: If the human mind is able to apprehend timelessness, are we justified in thinking that succession is a mode of appearance only, and not of reality also? If we were incapable of apprehending timelessness, there might be some justification for suggesting that the timeless appears to us as temporal owing to our cognitive imperfections. But if with even the meagre apparatus that we possess we are well able to perceive eternity, the fact that we perceive something as successive would be strong evidence that the reality perceived was itself successive and not eternal.

5. Now the sole reason given for thinking that succession is an appearance of a timeless reality is the alleged contradictions involved in the notion of succession which have been pointed out by a long line of philosophers from Parmenides to McTaggart. If those contradictions are really involved in the notion of succession, then notwithstanding the fact that succession is undoubtedly perceived we should find it really hard to uphold the reality of succession. But it may be doubted whether any of those alleged difficulties is really insoluble; and if they are not, then the representation of time as the moving image of eternity loses all its cog-

ency. However it is not my intention in this paper to enter upon an examination of those alleged difficulties involved in the concept of time. What I propose to do, as I have said before, is to show the difficulties involved in the alternative proposed by the unrealists.

6. This brings me to the second of my arguments. Let us grant that the perceived succession is only an appearance of a timeless reality, that in reality nothing happens and nothing follows anything. Let us grant that there is succession only in our apprehension of reality. But then what are we to say of this succession in our apprehension? That our experience is successive is, I think, beyond doubt. But if succession is riddled with contradiction and therefore at best only an appearance of a timeless reality, then the succession in experience can be no more real than the succession in objects; and the succession in experience will have to be declared to be no more than an appearance of the timeless.

7. It will be worth while to stop here and try to understand clearly what can be meant by this conception. What exactly is meant by saying that the succession in our experience is an illusory appearance of a timeless reality? This would be (I think) that in reality our experience of reality is a timeless series of terms which do not really succeed one another, but only appear to do so. This implies not only (i) that there is a non-successive real world which appears successive, but also (ii) that there is a non-successive knowledge which appears successive. Not only is reality unfolded to us successively; our knowledge of reality is also unfolded similarly. Now I suggest that this notion of a timeless knowledge appearing temporal is perfectly non-sensical, and I shall proceed to say why I think so.

8. It is obvious to begin with that there can be no knowledge without a knower. If then there is a timeless knowledge of the timeless things-in-themselves, there must be a knower who knows them timelessly. Whether there is anywhere such a knower is not easy to say. In any case it seems fairly certain that none of us is such a subject, for our mode of knowledge is obviously successive. But it is suggested that our self has two aspects, one empirical and the other transcendental, of which the first is temporal and knows temporally, whereas the second is timeless and knows time-

lessly. The transcendental self is the self as it really is in itself, whereas the empirical self is the same self as it appears. Now I wish to suggest that this distinction between the transcendental self and the empirical self is untenable for the following reasons.

9. The distinction between appearance and reality is one which seems fairly obvious when applied to objects. It is easy to understand how an object may appear differently from what it is, for many things do so appear. For example, a straight stick partly immersed in water looks bent. But this distinction seems to me to be totally inapplicable to the subject. The transcendental self is the self as it really is; and the empirical self is the self as it appears. But appears to whom? For we must remember that appearance is a three-term relation requiring not only (i) the thing which appears and (ii) what this thing appears *as*, but also (iii) the subject to whom it appears. Now which is the third term of this relation in the present case? To whom does the transcendental self appear as empirical? Not to the transcendental self surely, for this is the self as it really is and this self must perceive reality as it is, for it has been postulated for this very purpose. Just because the self as it is known to us is incapable of apprehending reality as it is (i.e., as eternal), the transcendental self is invoked by us. And it cannot be to the empirical self, for the empirical self is what the transcendental self appears *as*, not what it appears to. In other words, it is the second term of the relation of appearance and not the third. It is thus obvious that in the absence of the third term there can be no appearance of the transcendental self. It would seem therefore that there is no self other than the one with which we are familiar and which perceives things successively. But if there is no transcendental self, which knows things timelessly, then the succession in experience cannot be explained as the appearance of a timeless reality, and must be admitted to be an irreducible fact.

10. This suggests two reflections. (i) If we are willing to accept succession in experience (and this we have seen to be unavoidable), then the reason for declaring succession in nature to be an appearance of a timeless reality vanishes. For if we are going to accept succession ultimately, there is nothing to be gained by merely postponing the admission to a later stage. Since succession in experience must be accepted as an irreducible fact, we might as well accept succession in nature itself.

11. The second reflection is the following. (ii) When it is realised that we are forced to accept succession in spite of the alleged contradictions involved in it, I think that much of the breeziness with which those contradictions were welcomed by the unrealists will vanish and they will be disposed to be somewhat more critical of them. It is possible that instead of rejoicing in contradictions, they may want to get rid of them; and if in this frame of mind, they look about for likely solutions, they will discover that several perfectly respectable solutions of those difficulties have already been given. It is not unlikely that some of those solutions might carry conviction.

of the repressed material,—subliminal perceptions and forgotten experiences. The collective unconscious which is a totality of *archetypes* expresses itself mostly in phantasies and occasionally in dreams. Archetypes are something like the “organs of pre-rational psyche.”¹ They are, in other words, “pre-existing forms of apprehension,” the great “primordial images.” These archetypes, according to Jung, are potentially latent in the brain-structure which is almost the same in all human beings. The formation of archetypes is due to the recurring experiences of life, and they signify the varied experiences of our remote ancestors.

In Jung’s analytical psychology the psyche enjoys a full-fledged reality, having its own structure and being subject to its own laws. It is not a secondary manifestation, an epiphenomenon, but a factor *sui generis*.² The mind of a new-born child is not a *tabula rasa*. “The unconscious psyche of the child”, says Jung, “is truly limitless in extent and of incalculable age.”³ It consists of an enormous range of things, and is overpowered with a panorama of age-long facts, primordial images and mythological themes. That such things exist in the child’s psyche is evident from his dreams which are strikingly mythological and full of meaning.

The conscious personality which consists of ideas that are directly connected with the ego is the superstructure based on the foundation of the collective psyche. “By virtue of its indefinite extension the unconscious might be compared to the sea, while consciousness is like an island rising in its midst.”⁴ Ideas which have lost their intensity sink into the unconscious, while new ideas emerge out of the collective psyche. “The unconscious is the matrix out of which consciousness grows.”⁵ Thus the so-called individuality of a person is nothing but an “excerpt of collective psyche.”⁶ The *persona* is only the mask of the impersonal unconscious, “a mask which simulates individuality making others and

1. C. G. Jung: *Psychological Reflections*: Edited by Joland Jacobi. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1953, p. 36.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

3. *Development of Personality*: The collected works of C. G. Jung, 17. Trs. R. F. C. Hull. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1954, p. 45.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

6. C. G. Jung: *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, Trs. C. E. Long. Baillier, Tindall and Cox. London, 1922, p. 457.

oneself believe that one is individual, whilst one is acting a part through which the collective psyche speaks.”⁷

Though it would appear that according to Jung there is no dichotomy of the conscious and unconscious personality, as, he believes, the former is only an excerpt of the latter, still analytical psychology attributes dual functioning to the psyche. The psyche according to Jung “is not an indivisible unity but more or less a divided totality.”⁸ The duality of psychic functioning occurs at two levels—the individual or the ego-level and the collective or impersonal level.

The ego according to Jung consists of *record-images* resulting from sensations and feelings, and images of past experience. Ego and consciousness are so interconnected that it is impossible to conceive of the one without the other. Sensations received from the different parts of the nervous system and the images of different times cohere together to form a conscious experience, because consciousness acts as a cohesive force to unite the different images that result in an experience of the ego. Consciousness acts as a sort of “gravitational force” to bring together those processes and contents that make up an experience of the ego.⁹ Jung also speaks of the ego-complex which forms the centre of our individuality.

Now Jung’s conception of psyche may be summarised as follows. Psyche comprises of both the conscious and the unconscious processes of our personality. The conscious factors group themselves round the ego, while the unconscious archetypes are kept alive in the collective psyche. The so-called individuality with its ego-consciousness is the development based essentially on the collective psyche.

The following problems arise out of Jung’s conception of the psyche,—the nature and the origin of archetypes and the way in which all sensory and memory images group round the ego. Jung disposes of any questions relating to the beginning of psychic structure as metaphysical. But the problem arises: how are the

7. *Ibid.*

8. C. G. Jung: *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, Trs. H. C. and Cary F. Bayners. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London, 1928, p. 256.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

archetypes able to find a place in the human psyche? Jung's argument that they are inherited in the brain-structure is thoroughly inconsistent with his conception of the psyche. It is understandable how ideas can be transmitted from one generation to another, unless the archetypes are assumed to be inherently capable of existing without being associated with any material substance. Again it is difficult to follow Jung when he says that consciousness acts as a cohesive force in the realm of the ego. Consciousness is only a manifestation of the ego, and coherence in the ego cannot be explained by its manifestations. Broad's "Compound theory" which is also known as two-factor theory enunciated in his *Mind and its Place in Nature* seems to supply the missing links in Jung's conception of the psyche.

According to Broad the mind is not a single substance. It is a compound of two substances neither of which has the characteristics of the mind. The elements that interact in order to form the compound, the mind, are the 'psychic factor' and the 'bodily factor'. Perception, reasoning, remembering etc., are the joint functions of the psychic and bodily factors. Consciousness is not a manifestation of the psychic factor as such, on the contrary it is the property of mind which is the compound of psychic and bodily factors.¹⁰

Jung is right when he says "body and soul are not two entities but one and the same life",¹¹ for one cannot function without the other. This is again consistent with his statement that "being that has soul is living being."¹² The psyche is truly limitless in extent, but our mind is only connected with a very small portion of the psychic factor. The structure of the psychic factor and the processes that go on within it are not comprehensible to the human mind, for the psychic factor is outside the realm of mind and knows nothing about the space-time categories within whose frame-work the whole of mind's experiences are organised. The archetypes may be regarded as the impressions cast on the psychic portions outside the region of the mind capable of forcing themselves occasionally into consciousness.

Thus the following new and meaningful conceptions emerge out of the discussion. Mind is the field of bodily interaction with


10. C. D. Broad: *Mind and its Place in Nature*. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London, 1929.

11. C. G. Jung: *Psychological Reflections*, p. 5.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

the psyche (psychic factor). Consciousness manifests itself whenever there is an association between the brain and the nervous system on the one hand and the psyche on the other. Ego is the self-consciousness which is the result of the identity of the bodily factor with the psychic factor. Archetypes are the impressions which the psyche carries of the previous minds. Multiple personality is due to the bodily interaction at two unconnected regions in the psyche.

This appears to me a legitimate and intelligible way of understanding the psyche and its constituents. The field of psychology as we know it today confines itself to the mind, viz. the region of bodily interaction with the psyche. Parapsychology is, however, endeavouring to bring out facts relating to the other portions of the psyche. Psyche is a field yet to be explored. It opens out an immense field of investigation. In order to unravel the mysteries of human mind, ESP or any paranormal phenomena, we have to concern ourselves with the psyche that is beyond the conscious mind.



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