345

Journal of the Madras

university

1956 - July.

VOL - 28, NO - 1

Volume XXVIII, No. 1 July, 1956

JOURNAL
OF
THE MADRAS UNIVERSITY

Editor

Dr T. M. P. MAHADEVAN, M.A., Ph.D.

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY
MADRAS
1956

CONTENTS

RATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUE AND EQUIPMENT*

by

R. BALAKRISHNA

The fundamental implication of Rationalization in its reference to industry is the elimination of waste both in effort and in material. The ultimate purpose of it is to economize cost in the production process. Though the objective is simple and indeed very desirable, the achievement of it warrants not only the adoption of certain specific measures but also a reorientation of the mental approach to business. Rationalization therefore is both an attitude and a process. As an attitude it requires the application of the scientific line of thought to economic activity. There should be a rational control of economic life directed deliberately to the common good of the country. The industrialists should develop a new attitude of mind and adopt the scientific method in the conduct of their business. There should be a detachment from preconceptions and the intellectual technique of the scientist should be employed in place of the traditional methods of work.

As a process, rationalization is the name for the unification into a single policy of a large number of pre-existing tendencies and ideas. It may include an intensive application to industry of up-to-date technical methods with an active pursuit of further research. There can also be a standardization and simplification of products and processes facilitating mass production. Rationalization would also involve a scientific utilization of labour through an accurate study of working conditions and by means of an application of the principles of industrial psychology. An industrial combination creating larger units for regulating production and price is another process of rationalization. It is meant for concentrating output in the best firm and for closing down the rest. There could also be better methods of buying requisites and marketing products. The setting up of a central selling agency can be a part

* Paper prepared as member of the Panel of Economists of the Planning Commission in connection with the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan.

of the process. Finally, rationalization of industry can also transcend national boundaries. It may consist of international agreements for the definition of markets and spheres of influence.

It does not however mean that a single scheme of rationalization should embody all these processes. There may be any form of permutation and combination of them according to the requirements of each country. Each country may adopt as many of them as it needs, but every country should reorient its mental attitude before it could claim to have rationalized its industry. Neither could the application of some of the principles of scientific management, such as time and motion studies, by itself entitle an industry to be considered as rationalized. Scientific Management is narrower in its scope and is covered by the wider concept of rationalization. The distinguishing feature is the inter-firm and inter-industry aspect under rationalization as opposed to the insular character of the reform under Scientific Management.

The background of industrial development is a necessary condition determining the progress of rationalization in our country. It was financial power and not industrial ability that pioneered industrial development in India. Obviously, interest has all along been focussed on financial control rather than on the refinement of the industrial structure. This is more than evidenced by the institution of Managing Agency and the motives influencing its behaviour. Profit motive has operated in the narrow context of financial manipulation rather than as the generating force for the improvement of production technique and competitive efficiency. The lack of competition within the country also meant the absence of an external compulsion to rationalize. The import tariff under the protective policy of the State eliminated the fear of foreign competition and created an atmosphere favourable to an uneventful pursuit of business. The lack of training and education on modern lines of the entrepreneurs in India, barring a few exceptions, made business run on traditional lines. There was a general lack of appreciation of the benefits of Scientific Management within a firm. Rationalization as a technique of industrial organization was also very much outside the purview of the Indian industrial magnates owing to the extremely individualistic attitude inherited from their commercial traditions. Finally, there was a rise of the labour organization in the country at a pace much faster relatively to other countries which had a similar industrial evolution. So all attempts at rationalization were forestalled even

where circumstances might have been favourable for a beginning to be made.

However, there do exist certain rationalizing tendencies in India. But they are for the most part at the higher level of administrative policy motivated largely by overall financial considerations rather than by economics of technical management. Obviously, they are not easily perceived by the employees and their organizations. Such tendencies are manifested by Administrative Integrations, Technical Integrations, Mergers and Combinations, Marketing Organizations and Agreements, and, occasionally, of improvements in production techniques. Between 1911 and 1951 there has been a change in the pattern of managerial integration in India. The Indian Managing Agency firms have much wider range of interests than their British counterparts, for they control and manage every variety of concerns. Among the British firms, McLeods and Martins have mainly expanded through amalgamations, while Andrew Yule, Gilander Arbuthnot and Octavious Steel mainly by flotation of new enterprises. During recent years there has been a spreading out of British interests in newer fields of industrial activity, such as rubber, oil, timber, firebrick, electrical and engineering industries. In the jute industry, the movement towards managerial integration has made fairly rapid progress during the last forty years.

In India the concentration of ownership and control has grown mainly through expansion and not so much by amalgamation and absorption. In the jute industry, about one-fourth of the productive capacity is in the hands of two leading British Managing Agency houses, namely, Messrs. Andrew Yule & Co., and Messrs. McLeods Ltd. In the sugar industry, Narangs, Sutherlands, Thapars and Dalmias are the leading magnates. In the coal industry, four Managing Agents control thirty out of a total of sixty companies. Similarly in the tea industry, six of them control 96 companies out of a total of 128. In the iron and steel industry, nearly 90 per cent of the productive capacity is under the managerial control of two big firms, namely, Martin Burn & Co., and Tata Industries Ltd. Martins control and manage the Steel Corporation of Bengal and the Indian Iron & Steel Co., with a perfect technical integration between the two. The Tatas have a vertical integration of the processes in the iron and steel industry. The Western India Match Co., has under its control more than two-thirds of India's match output. Since 1945 there have also been instances of the absorption of smaller Trusts by bigger Trusts for a greater concentration of financial and managerial powers. The British India Corporation acquired in 1946 as a going concern the business of Begg Sutherland & Co. Ltd., of Kanpur.

The foregoing account reveals certain tendencies towards rationalization emanating from the peculiar set-up of the Managing Agency system in our country. Though they are quite laudable by themselves, the approach and the measures adopted are not on all fours with the fundamental principles of rationalization. Most of what has happened is at the higher stages of business management to the neglect of the improvement of productive efficiency and elimination of waste in the conduct of industrial establishments. This is because the Managing Agents have all along concentrated their attention on the overall financial position of the Managing Agency firm. If certain establishments under their care were not yielding adequate returns, others made up the short fall and thus they maintained the profitability of their entire enterprise. What they lost on the swings they made up on the roundabouts. Consequently, there was no compelling necessity for them to examine the causes of low yield in particular establishments, or even in particular industries and improve their technical efficiency through rationalization. Even in starting a new establishment they simply made it conform to the general pattern instead of using their industrial ingenuity and business acumen in designing it on new lines for attaining maximum efficiency in production. It was enough for them if the common type yielded the normal profits, as it would add to the general pool of their earnings, which concerned them more than the maximization of earnings in each individual establishment. In this respect the interests of the share-holders of individual companies were certainly at variance with those of the Managing Agents, but the former had no say in the matter. If instead there were single establishments under the care of entrepreneurs, an improvement of their productive efficiency would have been the only method for maintaining the rate of earning at an adequate level. Thus the existence of the Managing Agency System and the practice of administrative integration have been inimical to the introduction of the measures of rationalization. Earning profits through an improvement of industrial efficiency is a more difficult process than through an adjustment of the yields from different businesses according to their individual fortunes. Sometimes it was to the interest of a Managing Agency firm even to keep an uneconomic establishment going, instead of

closing it down, as their commission from it on production, sale, etc. would accrue if it was kept alive. It is not surprising therefore that the urge for rationalization has been absent in our country owing to the peculiar set-up in which our industry has grown.

One of the essential things for a reorientation of Indian industry is the application of scientific method. Attempts must be made at a proper measurement of productivity. There should be a determination of suitable workloads for the employees, having regard to the prevailing regional conditions. That would facilitate rationalization, which is so important for industries having an export market, like the cotton textile industry. Plant and machinery should also be rationalized by replacement, renovation and introduction of new types capable of better production. There should also be a redesigning of buildings where the general layout is devoid of thought and where internal transport is cumbersome and uneconomic. Even management should be rationalized to improve efficiency and thereby enhance labour productivity. There should be an incessant research into causes of waste which might defy notice under traditional methods of supervision. Measures of quality control could be most profitably adopted, as has been already done in certain establishments. Training of business executives is an essential requirement for the maintenance of efficiency. The existence of uneconomic firms in the industry, as for example in the cotton textile industry, is a perpetuation of inefficiency on account of lack of initiative and intelligence. They should be encouraged to amalgamate wherever feasible to reach the technical optimum.

Some of the industries in India are very much in need of rationalization. In the iron and steel industry, labour is a problem confronting its development. The excessive number of workers that it carries has adverse effects on the cost of production of steel. There should be curtailment of the present complement of labour. The expansion schemes should be made to absorb the excess after a proper determination of the workload of each employee. A conservation of coal for the industry and a judicious use of steel are necessary to have a balance between output and demand. Rerolling mills should be enabled to work double shift by increasing the output of billets and importing them if necessary in order to achieve economic operation. The rerolling mills are in need of reorganization, as their location, pattern of production and technical equipment are unsatisfactory.

In the cement industry several of the units are of an uneconomic size and they should be made to expand. The cost of production and distribution are high, as limestone has to be transported over long distances. The cost of transport could be brought down by a proper location of the factories. As packing charges form a substantial proportion of the cost of cement, attempts should be made to supply jute bags at reasonable prices.

In the heavy chemical industry, the manufacture of sulphuric acid depends on imported sulphur, which is expensive. It is therefore essential to reorient the industry for utilizing other domestic raw materials. Besides, the size of the units is small, resulting in high production costs. This situation has arisen on account of the difficulties of transporting acids over long distances. With a development of acid consuming industries in the centres of acid production, the size of the units may be made to increase. This feature of uneconomic size applies also to the plants producing soda ash and caustic soda.

The main problem of the sugar industry is the supply of cane on account of the competition between gur and sugar industries. Still there is considerable scope for improving the standards of operating efficiency so as to enable the industry to bring down its costs. The present process of manufacture has not ensured the best results in the shape of a high percentage extraction of sugar from cane.

In respect of the jute industry, the main problems are a shortage of raw materials, modernization of equipment and competition in foreign markets of substitutes. A modernization of plant and equipment is an immediate necessity to maintain foreign markets. It is estimated that a complete modernization may involve considerable unemployment. This dilemma will have to be solved by government co-operation. So far as this industry is concerned, rationalization would be a lesser evil than unemployment, as foreign markets have to be maintained.

Under planning, rationalization acquires a special significance. It is no longer to be motivated by the individual incentive for profits in the narrow context of a single business establishment. The outlook has to be more comprehensive and the wider interests of the nation ought to be the ultimate purpose of rationalization. Obviously, special incentives have to be offered if it is to be achieved in the private sector, just as all planning in the private sector

requires inducement. Under planning, the technique of the production function has to be rationalized. It means that there should be an optimum factor combination in each firm. This is as important as overall resource allocation under planning. The purpose of it is to attain productive efficiency. A satisfactory overall resource allocation cannot by itself ensure a high level of efficiency in production in each establishment.

Labour productivity variations may have to be ascertained by the Planning authority and on the basis of a rational scheme of development, encouragement should be offered to high productivity industries. Improvement of production technique in large industries may be permitted by the State wherever the request is reasonable. This does not however mean that there should be any standardization in the equipment of different firms in an industry. Improvements in technique are in the nature of an organic growth and they should be allowed to develop according to the special circumstances influencing each of them. Neither should private enterprise think in terms of only particular forms of technical change as constituting rationalization. For instance, in the textile industry in India there is a firm conviction, though based on false premises, that the introduction of automatic looms is the only measure that could justify the title of rationalization. Actually there are innumerable minor measures of reform which in the aggregate would yield high dividends without involving any unemployment. In the textile industry research into the incidence of breakages of yarn in the loom shed by the presence of fluff in the atmosphere would improve quality and increase output without affecting employment. Under Planning, industrial research may have to be sponsored and encouraged by the State. The State may also have to create a Replacement Fund and meet out of it a part of the cost of replacing out-of-date equipment. This was one of the measures suggested for the rehabilitation of the British textile industry. Some fiscal measures, like the 'Development Rebate', may also be usefully employed for the encouragement of rationalization in the private sector. In other words, rationalization itself should be introduced on a planned basis in the entire industrial structure of the economy, offering suitable incentives wherever necessary.

Some amount of technological unemployment is bound to result from rationalization. But it is unwise to deny ourselves the benefits of nationalization on account of such a contingency. It should be planned and solved in a developing economy by the ingenuity of the State. It is this possibility that should place greater emphasis on Rationalization under Planning than under free private enterprise. But it is curious that in the name of Planning, all attempt at rationalization even by private enterprise is checkmated. Labour opposition to rationalization is based on the thesis that any improved technique would be labour-saving and hence cause unemployment. This may be countered by emphasizing that rationalization comprises many more things besides labour-saving devices and by assuring that even when labour is thus saved, it is only an avoidance of a wasteful utilization of labour. Elimination of a waste of effort is an elementary requirement for progress and even labour would not fail to acknowledge it. Perhaps much of the opposition from those quarters could be met if an unreserved assurance is given that there would be no unemployment in the rationalized industries. There would be no great risk in doing it, as through careful planning most of the personnel rendered superfluous could be reabsorbed in the same industry. With a little care, it could even be done imperceptibly. This is preferable to putting the issue badly before labour and waiting for an answer that is all too obvious.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXISTENTIALISM OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER[1]

by

J. F. STAAL

Department of Philosophy, University of Madras.

I

Existentialism, the so-called latest development of European, or rather, continental (expressed in German and French; in Danish, Dutch, Italian and Spanish) philosophy has created an increasing interest in countries outside those in which it arose: thus firstly, but still in an initial stage, in the "Anglo-Saxon" philosophical climate, in English and American thinking; but more recently also in India, as can be seen for instance from the occurrence of a symposium "Is Existentialism philosophy?" held during the 26th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress (Poona 1951).[2] Unfortunately, the information available in India on the subject is mainly of English origin, be it direct translations or expository or critical studies. And whereas, as far as I know, as regards the former mainly minor works of secondary importance are translated,[3] as regards the latter

1. This article has derived much benefit from the remarks of Prof. Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan (Madras), of Prof. J. L. Mehta (Banaras) and of Dr M. A. R. Panikker (Mysore) and from an unpublished address by Mr. A. van Hasselt (in 1949 in Amsterdam, Netherlands). Miss Sita Chari (Madras) was so kind to improve the diction of the article considerably. I am indebted to them all.

2. There are many more signs of this interest, e.g., a talk on the subject for All India Radio by Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan; and articles by K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, "Existentialism and after" in: Bhavan's Journal, August 14, 1955, by E. Topitsch, "The sociology of existentialism" in: Thought, Sept. 17 and 24 and Oct. 1, 1955, by F. Brandt, "Kierkegaard" in: The Hindu, November 6, 1955, etc.

3. What can be probably called the most fundamental work, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, "Being and time" (1927), is not translated; nor are his other works, apart from a selection (see next note). Likewise the main work of Jaspers (Philosophie, I-III, 1932) and that of Sartre (L'être et le néant, 1943, "Being and nothing") are still untranslated. The works of the forerunners, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, are entirely translated (apart from the complete journals of the former) and Marcel's Journal métaphysique has also been translated.

there seems to be only one entirely reliable author, himself a German.[4] As a result of this, there is an amazing amount of misunderstanding, together with a number of factual mistakes, in the English literature on the subject[5]—a subject which has caused much misunderstanding in the European continent too, mainly on account of its popularity amongst laymen, who lack the philosophical training which is absolutely necessary to understand existentialism, which is itself—notwithstanding the widespread opinion which holds the contrary view—an extremely difficult and highly technical subject, to be compared in this respect for instance with contemporary symbolic logic, not with a newspaper. This is not a denial of the importance of the literary forms of expression, which the French existentialists have used; but it can serve us to stress the fact that only acts of pure thinking will enable us to see what is behind these apparently so divergent opinions, statements and convictions expressed in plays and novels. It is necessary, therefore, to consider first dispassionately the fundamentals upon which the whole building rests, though these at first sight abstruse thoughts are not easy to grasp. This is the only way to see the unity behind the manifoldness and to give a first attempt at an explanation of the facts which baffle so many outsiders and which constitute problems generally left unanswered. Such are the questions like: how is it possible that there are Protestant, Roman Catholic and atheist existentialists? Highly spiritual as well as materialist existentialists? Existentialists, who seem to hold views akin to Nazism or Marxism as well as those who subscribe to the values of the democracies?

There is no country which has sought as much for the unity behind the diversities as India. Why could it not be attempted in India, after the initial misunderstandings which are only natural if one considers the situation in England, America and the European continent itself, to see behind the divergent manifestations

4. Werner Brock, author of: Introduction to contemporary German philosophy, Cambridge 1935, and editor of: M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, London 1949.

5. Two examples from a work of objectively high standard: the Encyclopaedia Britannica (additions for 1948 and 1949). In 1948, Sartre's thesis that existence precedes essence is explained as "that is, there is no fixed human nature". This is a superficial flattening, which makes the statement wholly insignificant. In 1949, existentialism is headed under "ethics", which does not apply to the philosophy of any of the existentialists, not even to Sartre's, whatever impression some parts of his work may give.

of this latest—and, in my opinion, in some respects, highest—development of the European philosophical tradition, the unity? The essential unity, one would be tempted to say, were it not that it may be expected that we have in this case to conceive an existential unity. As a first step upon this road I should like to communicate the following reflections on Heidegger. I have chosen his "Sein und Zeit", which appeared in 1927, as a starting point, as it seems that this is at the same time the most important and the least known book.[6] This work is notoriously and sometimes indeed desperately difficult, and the reproach of presumption could come to me were it not that the following notes presuppose the assumption, that they can only be considered as a first introduction to a subject, the profundity and importance of which lead me to the hope that it may be studied more deeply.

II

In India it is often said that Western philosophy has little connection with life: it does not necessarily influence the actual life of human beings, it does not show to man an ideal after which he can strive, it does not help him in the decisions he has to take daily. But then it is sometimes added, that there are important exceptions to this in the West too, in contemporary philosophy to be found especially in existentialism, "the philosophy which returns from theory to life."

This statement of affairs is misleading, if not wrong, not only because there is a very close connection between Western thought and all the aspects of Western culture, but also because of a reason

6. It is controversial whether Heidegger may be rightly called an existentialist: he repudiates that label because he is mainly interested in the problem of being, and not in man, so that he investigates not the latter as it is manifest in each concrete and unique specimen (which is called "existenziel"), but its being ("existenzial"). In this sense Heidegger objects against the "existenzielle" attitude of a Jaspers, who investigates according to his own formulation "possibilities of existence".—I believe, however, together with the main critics, that Heidegger is in Sein und Zeit almost exclusively dealing with human being in an "existenzial" as well as in an "existenziel" way, and that it is doubtful whether it will be principally possible to proceed to a general ontology.—This is an assumption implicit in this article, which looks upon Heidegger's thought as a fundamental expression of "existentialism". I can not of course elucidate this position here (see e.g., A. de Waelhens, La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger, Louvain 1942, 295-318), neither evaluate Heidegger's later work in the light of this problem (which seems yet to be done),

which is philosophically speaking more important and which exhibits a contrary aim which strives for a loosening of such connections in as far as they presuppose a dependence of philosophy upon aspects of culture. In the West philosophy is essentially different not only from a way of life but even from a view of life or from what is called in German a "Weltanschauung". That is because Western philosophy wants to limit itself to what is certain, or, otherwise speaking, to what is justified in its existence or in its meaning. Western thinking aims at absolute truth and it tries to reach this aim by basing itself upon indubitable data. A Weltanschauung operates with concepts which are in general neither philosophically clarified nor founded in immediate experience. We say, that they are not phenomenologically given or that their ontological status is not clear. By this limitation to what is absolutely certain, however, the results of philosophy in the West seem sometimes meagre to those who want to know as much as possible and who are, therefore, ready to accept truth on account of other considerations: e.g. because of its value for actual life (not for its being phenomenologically given in actual life), because of the high and noble aim it strives for or because of its effectiveness. In this sense meagre indeed is Descartes' conclusion "cogito ergo sum". But his doubt has led us here to something indubitable. Not knowing of any other aim than that of an absolute knowledge, Descartes refused to admit the existence of what is not entirely exempt from the possibility of being doubted.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), once again trying to draw the full conclusions of Descartes' claim, if taken seriously by the philosopher,[7] has developed to great heights the method which was implicitly used by many of the great philosophers, i.e., the phenomenological method. He says that his starting-point lies before all particular points of view. It starts with the total realm of what is immediately given and accessible, previous to all theoretical thinking. This is also the point of departure of Husserl's pupil Martin Heidegger (born 1889), who develops it, however, in a way different from Husserl's. But for him too the test of truth which Western philosophy requires remains the phenomenological test which is generally accepted in continental philosophy since Husserl: to investigate whether *an entity is in fact phenomenologically given.*—In the following introduction I will have to abstain from

7. Cf. E. Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes, Paris 1932.

a critical investigation of the phenomenological basis of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, which is, though first of all necessary, an extremely difficult task requiring extensive analyses. Occasionally, however, we will touch upon the problem.[8]

Heidegger is, rightly, not content with Descartes's Cogito ergo sum (the validity of which he even questions on other grounds), because we do not know what is the meaning and ontological status of this "sum", i.e., we do not know what it means that we ourselves always are. Evidently, it is the kind of being of our own, human being, which has to be questioned if Descartes' argument is to have any significance.—I will try to approach this question from a point of view which occurs in Indian philosophy, though, of course, the problems in East and West are not entirely analogous.

Concerning the kind of being of our own being, which corresponds roughly to what is called in India the (empirical) soul or the (empirical) self, two possible solutions are suggested in the famous Indian controversy between Buddhism (especially śunyavāda) and Advaita Vedānta: according to the Vedāntins the individual, empirical soul is a substance (dravya), according to the Buddhists what we perceive immediately as our own thoughts, feelings, wishes, etc., are not the attributes of a substance, i.e., the soul, but constitute the only reality, whereas such a substance as soul does not exist at all. Ultimately, the Advaitin holds that the soul can realise its identity with the Absolute, which cannot be called a substance as it has no attributes,[9] whereas the Buddhist defines release simply as the extinction of the skandhas. In the former view, the ontological status of the relation between the soul-substance and its attributes remains unclarified and mysterious at the only level in which such distinctions can be made, i.e., in the philosopher's situation when philosophising, which is incompatible with the status of release.[10] In the latter view, the unity of our

8. In connection with "authenticity"; cf. also below, note 27.

9. In the Vaiśeṣika sūtras substance (dravya) is defined as the substrate of qualities (guṇāśraya). But in Advaita the Absolute is without qualities (nirguṇa).

10. The *objection against* this criticism, i.e., that we will no more raise such problems when released, does not hold from the Western philosophical point of view, because this point of view is only possible in the situation of the actually philosophising thinker. A philosophical justification or any philosophical view or doctrine is ontologically founded in the situation in which we *are* when we philosophise.

consciousness which enables us to speak about "ourselves" and which manifests itself for instance in the phenomenon of memory cannot be explained, as Śaṅkara already observed.[11]

These difficulties disappear when we come to an understanding of Heidegger's approach, which starts with the observation that soul is not a substance.

III

If soul is not a substance, the question remains positively: what is soul? This however is exactly what cannot be asked, because substance is from the ontological point of view what is called in a more logical terminology essence, i.e., what can be defined as the answer to the question "What?" concerning any entity. The essence of an entity expresses what that entity is. If there is no essence, it cannot be said what it is. If soul is not a substance, we cannot say *what* it is. But an entirely different fact is, that we can say *that* it is. Just as the "what-ness" of an entity is called its essence, so the "that-ness" is called existence.

Aristotle had stated that essence does not entail existence: we may know what a unicorn or a straight line is (we may be able to give their definition), but we need not know whether these entities actually exist, and, in fact, they need not exist at all.[12] In the case of the human soul the contrary holds: We do not know what it is, but we know that it is. Heidegger goes further with one highly significant step: Soul is such, that it can principally not be said what it is, as it is not an essence; or rather, its essence lies in its existence and only in its existence.

Heidegger uses a purified terminology, in which vague and ambiguous terms like soul, possibly evoking a herd of inadequate associations, are avoided. Thus he speaks about "Dasein", "the being which we ourselves always are"; I will translate this—rather imperfectly—with "human being". Then he makes the following statement, as an introduction to which the above was intended: *"The "essence" of human being lies in its existence"*.[13] He who understands what is meant here, sees the consequences: the characteristics of this being are not properties or attributes of a substantial being, but they are the modes of being "in" which this being is. Thus, for instance, "understanding" is not a property of the human being; but it is a mode in which this being is, when it understands. Likewise, "pleasure" is not an attribute inhering in the soul, but an act of being or rather the way in which we are when we enjoy. One sees, that, grammatically speaking, substantives are replaced by verbs. (This is historically significant, as it points in the direction of Christian origin (which does not entail dependence upon an exclusively Christian point of view): it is well known that the Semitic languages attach great importance to verbs, whereas the greater importance attached to the noun in Greek is connected with the tendency to think in terms of substance and attribute—grammatically: noun or substantive and adjective. That Heidegger's critical analysis of Greek thinking may also apply to Indian thought is made probable by the fact that Sanskrit attaches an extreme importance to nouns.[14])

The insight that the "essence" of human being lies in its existence determines the program of Sein und Zeit. It has to be specified, however, in a more precise manner. For this, let us turn back to substance or essence in its relation to the categories. In a way which is comparable to the Vaiśeṣika system, Aristotle includes substance, *ousia* in the list he gives of the categories. Elsewhere he substitutes for substance essence, *ti esti* "what (an entity) is". According to Heidegger, this concept has been taken by the Greeks from the surrounding physical world, or, as he expresses it more carefully, "from those regions of being which are different from human being". Likewise, the categories are "determinations of the kind of being of those regions of being which are different

11. Vedāntasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyam 2.2.25: "and on account of remembrance" (anusmṛteśca).

12. Likewise, the ontological proof of the existence of God is meaningful, but not as a proof, because the transition from essence to existence is not justified. Later it was to be realised that any existence is a factor which lies altogether outside the realm of reasoning (cf. below, p. 34).

13. For simplicity's sake I will pass over a difficulty which arises here on account of the fact that Heidegger's term "existence" contains a certain ambiguity, as, in a different and more problematic way, even "Dasein" does (see de Waelhens, o. c., 308, 310-311).

14. In Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, however, much more importance is attached to the verb, as we are dealing here with the interpretation of injunctions enjoining actions.—The observations made here do not mean that philosophical ideas have to be explained by linguistic facts, but that both are connected with and possibly the outcome of a deeper lying mode of thinking in the human being (cf. the author's Parmenides and Indian thought, The Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1955) 81-106, 105).

from our own, human being" (Seinsbestimmungen des nichtdaseinsmässigen Seienden). The transfer of the categories in our thinking to our own being and the application of them in this region of being, where they are forced upon the phenomena, constitutes a fundamental mistake which Heidegger combats throughout his work. In this tendency the full implications are drawn for the first time of an insight which is announcing and manifesting itself since centuries, e.g. in scholastic theology, i.e., that man is not a thing. This has been firstly simply rejected as materialism; but the study of Heidegger shows us that this tendency is much deeper and penetrates the whole of our thinking.

As it is customary for Heidegger, he does not simply criticise and elucidate, but he attempts to show how an idea which he combats could or even had to come into being. Thus he discloses as a fundamental mode of our being the continuous turn to and orientation on account of the regions of being different from our own. This is a kind of metaphysical escapism. The image man makes of himself is taken in the first place from the external reality. It is in his "nature" to turn outside and this tendency can increase to such an extent that we have to speak of a being overwhelmed by things or a being lost in them.

It has been pointed out that the categories cannot help our thinking about the human being. For this purpose we evidently need other concepts. Thus Heidegger introduces as the possible characterisations of modes of our own, human being, Existenzialien, "existentials". Their study constitutes the main task of the Daseinsanalytik, the analytical interpretation of our being. Categories and existentials constitute the two possible characterisations of being. The first help us to answer the question "What?", the second "Who?". With regard to our own being we cannot but ask "Who?", as this being is always our own and as such unique. But Heidegger repudiates the name Existentialism, as philosophy does not deal exclusively with our own being but with being in general.[15] Sein und Zeit as we know it, however, deals almost exclusively with human being; but it was intended as the first part of the complete work, the promised second part of which had not appeared since 1927. In the latest edition, however, (1953) the sub-heading "First Part" was left out; but principally

15. Cf., above, note 6.

it always has to follow and Heidegger's later work contains scattered indications as to the possible contents it could have (which were also announced in the first part in a programmatic form).

At this stage two fundamental questions have to be asked: Why should we start with seeking for existentials? How can existentials be found? These lead us to a more general consideration of Heidegger's concept of philosophy and to a closer inspection of the method he uses.

IV

The discrimination between our own being and other being is quite evident. The distinction between the kind of being of our own being[16] and the kind of being of other being, between the "existential" and the "categorical", is introduced clarified and developed by Heidegger. But this can only be a beginning. Also the information, that the Greeks and therefore also most of the later European thinkers (but also for instance greater parts of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads) operated exclusively with concepts taken from the realm of "things", is not entirely new. But what does this "thing-i-fication" mean? Why does our being turn to the things firstly? What is the *positive* structure of our being, which can probably teach us more than any refinements of the *negative* truth, that its structure is different from the structure of the being of things? Can we answer such questions, however, can they even be asked, if we do not know what is the meaning of being in general, before any specification?

This last question is and remains the pivotal problem of Heidegger's thinking. For him, we will ever remain in fruitless investigations if we do not once realise, that we do not only not know what the meaning of being is, but that we even have forgotten that there is at all a problem of being. The problem seems of no importance and interest to us, as we take it for granted and for self-evident: being is what everything is, it is the emptiest, vaguest and most general of all concepts, a summum genus to which no significance can be given. Thus Śaṅkara, too, calls it superfluous to state that different entities belong to those most

16. The German language expresses this much more adequately as "Sein des Seienden", e.g., "Sein des Daseins", as it would be possible in Greek too.

general genera like substantiality[17] or essentiality (sattā).[18] But then how can it be understood that this being, which means almost nothing,[19] is in each case principally and clearly distinct from non-being? Why is there such an enormous difference, indeed the most fundamental difference conceivable, between these two possibilities: that (an) entity is or that it is not?

Philosophy is the investigation of being in particular but especially in general, as being qua being (as Aristotle said), ontology. As such it has first of all to pose the problem of the meaning of being. This first question takes in actual thinking the following form: how can we find an access to being? For this, we have only to realise that we *are* ourselves. The being which we are always ourselves, human being, must be the starting point of any investigation of being. That we are principally able to ask ourselves the question of the meaning of being denotes at the same time a mode of our being: namely, that we have a first, vague, probably inadequate and partly implicit understanding of being (Seinsverständnis). This we have to develop and to make more explicit. In this sense, philosophy is a mode of our being which is not fundamentally different from but only more explicit than what our life ordinarily is. —As such, philosophy is dependent on our life, and this problematic assertion of Heidegger is of the utmost importance in connection with the problem of truth (which on a phenomenological basis can never be shown to be universal) and of historicism, problems which are discussed later in Sein und Zeit.

It is sketched above how a close analysis of our own being leads to the introduction of existentials and to the investigation of these. It is explained above why we have to start with human being in any general investigation of being. Hence, methodologically, we can but start with the quest of existentials. The remaining question, how this is possible, has to be envisaged next.

In the beginning sections of Sein und Zeit it is made clear that the method to be used is the phenomenological one. Ontology is, from the methodological point of view, phenomenology. It starts considering the things as they present themselves to us and as they are in this presentation. We need not say "as they appear", as if there was necessarily something hidden behind, which "appears". The phenomenological method is the only unprejudiced consideration of entities and does not presuppose any metaphysical theory like that of things in themselves and things as they present themselves to us in appearances. Phenomenon in the phenomenological sense is everything as it is; it is not the result of any restriction based upon metphysical assumptions, as for instance the assumption that the only "reliable" phenomena are sense-data. Heidegger shows at length how ontology can only be phenomenology. The phenomenological method is explicative and interpretative; it shows the phenomena as they are. It does not prove or argue. But it can be sometimes seen in the later parts of Heidegger's work, that this method often provides an insight which makes our questions asking for explanations and proofs superfluous. To denote the explicative and interpretative character of this method, Heidegger uses the term "hermeneutics", following Aristotle, scholastic theology and Wilhelm Dilthey. Thus philosophy becomes "universal phenomenological ontology, originating with and based upon the hermeneutics of our own, human being."

17. Thus making the mistake which Heidegger combats.
18. Vedāntasūtraśāṅkarabhāsyam 2. 3. 7.
19. Hegel equated being and nothing, and Heidegger interprets this in his own way (Was ist Metaphysik? 1929, 36).

V

The previous sections are all only introductory and correspond to selected portions of the introduction and to the first section of Sein und Zeit (which contains 83 sections). We now know why and how we have to seek existentials. "Existentialism" can start, as it were, at this stage. But immediately when we enter upon this path, it becomes clear that Heidegger's entirely new procedures ask considerable effort on the part of our understanding, which is used to think in terms of the conceptual, which meant until now the categorial, the substantial, etc. Therefore, in the beginning portions, our author has again and again to warn us against the misunderstandings which our deep-rooted habits of thought readily accept as solutions. Sein und Zeit remains unintelligible for anyone who does not see the inadequacy of the conceptual thinking analysed above when applied to our own being, Dasein.

Two things are already pointed out in the above considerations: that our being is a being having a kind of understanding for his own kind of being; and that it is a being which is "always my own" (jemeinig). These characterisations of our being must be seen and understood on account of the determination of human being which Heidegger has called "being-in-the-world" (In-der-Welt-sein)—the first existential.[20]

This is an indivisible but analysable unity, as indicated by the hyphens. We should not apply the categories of part and whole or visualise it as something (the I) being located *inside another thing* (the world). Neither is it comparable to the being of our body in the universe. This characterisation belongs to man as he is: it is not as if man were an entity in himself, having in addition to that sometimes a relation to a world. But that our body is in space and that we can have a relation to the world is phenomenologically only possible because we are always being-in-the-world. This concept is immediately seen to be justified when we realise, in the words of de Waelhens,[21] that "there is no "I" if not by and in a relation to something *other than* "I" or because of a relation to an exterior absolute, which, when organised, will become the world of my experience".

All these elucidations have a negative form. This is necessarily involved in the concept, as the latter denotes a structure which is always implicit in everything we think or act or will, which is the cause of the fact that we always "jump" over it, pass over it unconsciously and have it as a silent presupposition. It could be compared to an a priori structure (which shows how, historically, the idea of existentials could develop from the idea of an a priori). It can and has to be further specified *with the help* of other structures which Heidegger's explicative procedure shows in the course of his book. I will try, however, to give two more positive characterisations, one taken from a small but important contribution by Heidegger to a collection of essays presented to Husserl in 1929,[22] the other taken from one of the scientific regions which have been and are still increasingly influenced by Heidegger's work. Thus, the latter shows at the same time something of the considerable influence which Sein und Zeit has exerted also outside philosophy.

20. Heidegger's In-der-Welt-sein has its counterpart in the Indian concept of saṁsāra. Prof. J. L. Mehta writes to me, that Vallabha distinguishes between saṁsāra and jagat, the former denoting the jīva's state of *immersion* in worldliness, the latter referring to the world as objectively real, independent of the jīva.

21. o. c., 36.

22. Vom Wesen des Grundes; reprinted 1931, 1949.

In his essay, Heidegger calls "being-in-the-world" a further determination of "transcendence". That with respect to which transcendence takes place, that to which is transcended, is "world". This is further explained with the help of a sketch of the history of the meanings of the term "world", starting with the Greek *kosmos*. From this he infers, that world is not a kind of being, but a mode of being, as well referring to the totality of being, as also relative with respect to human being. World belongs as such to human being, though it comprises all being, including our own. The human aspect of the phenomenon world is especially stressed in early Christian writings, where it is a symbol for the alienation of man from God, e.g., in the expression "the wisdom of the world". This is the origin of the modern English usage of "worldly", "mundane", "the opinion of the world", "all the world" (i.e., the society), etc. Without being able to follow here Heidegger's line of investigation in full, I did want to suggest with the help of one example how his terms, although often uncommon and generally misunderstood at first sight, are not arbitrarily chosen but are closely connected with established, though often not stressed, meanings.

The second more positive characterisation is never given by Heidegger himself, but has helped me somewhat in understanding the meaning and the phenomenological basis of the "being-in-the-world". If Heidegger's existentials are really fundamental and not mere abstractions, they must apply to the human being in all its aspects, as for instance to human beings being affected by mental diseases. The most important of these are those, where not one aspect of the personality is affected, but the personality as a whole and as such: these are the psychoses, for instance schizophrenia. Medical as well as purely phenomenological observations (which can be the same and which nowadays are consciously combined) have made it perfectly clear that it is wrong to describe the process which is developing here as a kind of mere brutalization or "animalisation" of what is human. On the contrary, the patients are undoubtedly human. Such a being remains necessarily human, but on account of an unimaginable and gruesome lack of communication we cannot apply any words of our everyday language to their situation as a whole—with one exception: we can say and we say in such a case: "he lives in his own world". Here it seems to me that the fundamental existential which Heidegger introduced comes to sight and shows its applicability where everything else (namely the traditional terms: soul, consciousness, feeling, will, thought, adaptation, speech, etc.) fails.—I hope that it is understandable now, too, that the term "world", under the influence of Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik, has taken a new and full significance in contemporary psychiatry on the European continent, e.g. with L. Binswanger.

VI

We have dealt with one of the existentials and though the treatment has necessarily been in a high degree incomplete, it may have given some suggestions pointing in a direction to what is meant and what can only be fully understood by patient study of the original. The further sections of Sein und Zeit deal with other existentials with constant reference to the problem of being and give occasionally and as secondary applications important contributions to the solution of the classical problems of philosophy, for instance the problems of epistemology, the meaning of truth, the reality of the outer world, the origin of language, the meaning of symbols, the problems of historicism, etc. More rarely other thinkers are referred to, but as such Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, Augustine, Pascal, Kant, Kierkegaard, Dilthey and Husserl occur, whereas Descartes and Hegel are critically analysed at greater length (in the former the conception of the world and in the latter the conception of time).[23] The main trend of ideas however, is developed strictly methodologically (which is very different from e.g. Karl Jaspers or Gabriel Marcel) according to the principles laid down in the beginning; and the traditional problems referred to are only considered if and when the analysis is naturally led to their consideration. The major part of Sein und Zeit is entirely new and seems for a long time during study to be unrelated to previous thinking. The problems themselves are new and show occasionally the superficiality of previous problems and solutions.

23. Heidegger's historical interpretations are always highly original, thought provoking and often controversial. Apart from his thesis of 1916 about Duns Scotus, he has written about Anaximander (Der Spruch des Anaximander in: Holzwege (1950) 296-343), about Parmenides (Moira in: Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954) 231-256), about Heraclitus (Logos und Aletheia, o.c., 207-230 and 257-283), about Plato (Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, 1942), about Kant (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 1929), about Hegel (Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung in: Holzwege, 105-192) and about Nietzsche (Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist tot" in: Holzwege 193-247 and Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra? in Vorträge 101-126). Apart from this he has repeatedly written about the poet Friedrich Hölderlin.

Of this part it is therefore principally impossible to give an idea in this short paper. It is especially dangerous—a danger to which several critics have succumbed—to draw premature conclusions from the simple occurrence of terms which evoke certain feelings in some readers, as for instance, death, care or anxiety (Sorge), conscience, guilt, decay, dread. Heidegger has, of course, chosen them not without reason; but in order to know the reason it is necessary to study the whole work thoroughly. We will touch shortly upon some of them, but only after having made still a reference to the concept of time, which plays, as is evident from the title, an important part in the book.

The second half of Sein und Zeit, called "human being and temporality" (Dasein und Zeitlichkeit), deals with a set of problems connected with the analysis of time. There, for instance, our ordinary implicit idea of time is derived from a much deeper-lying mode of being of the human being; thus it can be explained, amongst other things, that we have at all the possibility to be "in" time. The analysis of the notions of past, present and future (where the value of the future is especially stressed, while e.g., Sartre, taking over most of Heidegger's analysis of time,[24] underlines the present)—the analysis of these three notions bears some distant resemblance with Augustine's equally phenomenological interpretation of time,[25] where it is said that past, present and future appear in memory, attention and expectation. Even severe critics of Heidegger have called his analysis of time a lasting contribution to philosophy; but it seems questionable whether it is possible to separate this part of his analysis from the preceding sections.

It is interesting to observe that the phenomenological validity of one of the main distinctions of Heidegger is questionable, i.e. the distinction between "authentic" (eigentlich) and "inauthentic" (uneigentlich), to which I should like to make a reference lastly, as it is central to his thought and as it shows something of the general structure and of the interrelatedness of the topics of Sein und Zeit. — We have seen that according to Heidegger it is a primary tendency of man to turn outside, to lose himself in the world, and then, after returning, to see himself in terms of the

24. Important portions of Sartre's work are excellent French adaptations of Sein und Zeit and often there is a strict correspondance between the French and the German technical terms (for instance "être-pour-soi" and "être-en-soi" for respectively "Dasein" and "nichtdaseinsmässiges Seiendes").

25. Confessiones XI.

external world of things. When I called this a kind of metaphysical escapism, I alluded already to the fact that Heidegger calls this the inauthentic mode of our being. To this corresponds the authentic mode, in which we see ourselves as we really are. Thus, if we search for the ontological status of the "I", we find phenomenologically first of all in everyday life an impersonal "subject", the hidden subject of "it is thought", "it is said", "people go", etc.: "anybody" (das Man). From this inauthentic mode of being, which tyrannises everyday life, we have to proceed to find an authentic mode of being. Likewise, if we, searching for ourselves as we really are, want to discover our being in its totality, including its extremest possibilities, we have to envisage death, which is the limit, end and determination of life. Here again the inauthentic mode of being of our everyday life tries to adopt an attitude in which it dissimulates the actual significance of death. But when authentic, human being accepts its finiteness facing death, which is the innermost possibility which we always have to envisage alone, though people say that others die and that we ourselves will die only later.

Authentic existence is the acceptance of anticipated death. In this acceptance we perceive the "nothing" of our being and this is the cause of our guilt. For according to Heidegger we are not guilty for some particular action or thought only; but we are in principle guilty, because we are nothing, once and for all, and therefore it becomes possible for us to be guilty for a particular action or thought.[26] To face our own death is the same as to accept our guilt and to envisage our nothingness. Towards this attitude we are led by our conscience, in which it is not the memory of some performed act which intrudes into our self-satisfaction (which would be ontologically

26. Critics of Heidegger have said that he depends evidently on the Christian doctrine of the "status corruptionis" of man. I would say, on the contrary, that, if Heidegger is right in his concept of guilt he is certainly right in remarking (Sein und Zeit, 306, note) that only after this analysis (the only test of which is, whether it is phenomenologically justified) an ontological basis is discovered for such a thing as the Christian doctrine of the status corruptionis. "The ontology of human being ... does not know of sin". That the experiences of Christianity are often at the background of Heidegger's thought does not mean that his thinking depends on them and that it holds, therefore, exclusively in a Christian context; these experiences, however, have only helped to find certain phenomenological data, which could be found elsewhere as well (though, due to historical reasons, less easily).

opaque), but in which the human being calls itself with a silent call and summons itself to accept guilt and to face death, its own inner possibility. The attitude manifest in this acceptance is also called Entschlossenheit, "resolution", and shows as such that authentic existence is not an achievement once and for all, but a status which has to be conquered again and again. This attitude of resolution is not reached by a withdrawal from the world of every day: for it has to perform—only in a different spirit—its daily task just like anybody has to perform it, be it mostly in its inauthentic mode of being, in which "people" escape in their tasks. Authentic being, on the other hand, performs its task and fulfils its duty facing its own reality, accepting its guilt and its nothingness and therefore in a certain mode of detachment from the things of the external world, in which "anybody" is entangled

Though this brief survey of some of the concepts with which Heidegger operates is nothing but a first introduction and does not yet entitle us to draw general conclusions, it may already be supposed that there lies a problem in the usage of the terms authentic and inauthentic: it is the question, namely, whether the way in which Heidegger introduces and utilises them is phenomenologically fully justified. In particular it is questionable whether anything is phenomenologically given which may entitle us to prefer the authentic mode to the inauthentic, as Heidegger does undoubtedly (though he explicitly denies it). It seems likely, that at this point unadmitted presuppositions of a religious character (though without anywhere referring to God) occur. But on the other hand again (cf. above note 26) it is possible that here strictly phenomenological structures are discovered which made in their turn certain religious concepts possible. I venture the criticism, however, that this is unlikely and that we find here a religious attitude which cannot be justified (neither phenomenologically, nor personally by those who adopt the authentic attitude) if no foundation is sought in a God, who is phenomenologically not given (cf. below, VII, sub (4).

I have mentioned this difficulty mainly in order to show that we have always to be cautious not to regard the phenomenological analysis as a view of life, a "Weltanschauung", which would show us how to live and how to think. Heidegger, indeed, stresses elsewhere rightly, that though the phenomenon of resolution or choice turns out to be of central importance in the phenomenological analysis, it does not help anybody in any particular choice, exactly because choice is an entirely personal and a unique act, which is always our own and which we have to perform ourselves. If philosophy would provide us with a manual of instruction for life, it would destroy exactly that which is first of all given phenomenologically in human being and which we regard fortunately—transcending again the phenomenological limits!—as the highest good: our own and personal freedom.[27]

27. An ever recurrent problem of European philosophy, appearing in different forms, is especially knotty in connection with Heidegger: has philosophy indeed to limit itself to phenomenology? An affirmative answer to this question is the point of departure and remains the leading motive of this article. But on that account certain *major problems* are not envisaged, for this affirmative answer itself is assumed and need not be justified phenomenologically. We are here evidently in a circle, as it is often the case in phenomenological research when applied to the human being itself; this has not just to be admitted, but it has to be fully accepted and made fruitful (as it has been done by Hegel, Dilthey and Heidegger). Now questions arise such as: if the phenomenological analysis of human being compels us to accept that human being always tries to go beyond phenomenology, have we to transcend it too? To this the answer has still to be negative. But, when generalised, it becomes more puzzling: if the phenomenological investigation is itself ontologically (phenomenologically) founded in the being of the investigator—which is certainly the case—what is to remain of the so much sought for validity and where is it going to end in? Has each opinion, which is certainly founded in the one who holds it (even if it is not forwarded sincerely!), phenomenological value? Has truth, when its objectivity is denied and apart from authenticity (itself phenomenologically not fully justified), lost all meaning? Does phenomenology annul itself? And has therefore philosophy to go beyond phenomenology? Does that mean, lastly, that it has not only to give up its universality, but that it has to renounce from such claims for ever?—It seems that the last six questions have to be answered in the affirmative. But it is evident, then, that important problems arise. Cf., Sein und Zeit, last paragraph of § 62; § 63. De Waelhens, *o.c.*, 176 sq., 319 sq.—It may be added that actually phenomenology plays a smaller and smaller part in Heidegger's later work, which has been rejected on that account by many, although it is only the outcome of the above situation which is itself a necessary consequence of the phenomenological attitude adopted in Sein und Zeit. If phenomenology is to be saved, it seems that we have to return to Husserl's concept of it and to be content with the limited, though undoubtedly rich and profound, results his method has yielded and still is to yield in the future. Otherwise we have to go consciously beyond phenomenology, for instance in accepting a standard which will enable us to judge whether phenomenological data discovered by a human being concerning his own being are only valid for the thinker concerned, or are valid for human being as such. This may be one of the main tasks for philosophy in the future. But even when it will be impossible to find such a standard which is, if not provably universal, at least generally accepted, it remains highly important to study the phenomenological analysis one human being gives of its own being; it seems that this is not at all realised by those critics who hold that Heidegger has not succeeded in going beyond the analysis of a certain type of human being, historically, psychologically, etc., predetermined. Even if only valid for Martin Heidegger himself, it would be important for all. In that case, however, it is clear that we are far from a "existenziale" and only at a "existenzielle" investigation, in the sense of Jaspers. And then, certainly, Heidegger is nothing but an existentialist.

It remains for me to deal with some of the criticisms and problems which arose round Heidegger and round existentialism in general. The main problem, however, remains whether every concept introduced is phenomenologically justified or at least justifiable; this is the philosophical problem existentialism presents. Most of the following questions, on the other hand, are "layman's" questions and result from the erroneous supposition that what is but a phenomenological analysis were in fact a Weltanschauung. They show the always recurrent desire to go beyond the justifiable content of philosophy into the regions of a view of life, where the ontological status and the phenomenological foundation of entities are no more questioned. In fact, there can be little doubt that much of the popularity of existentialism is due to the fact that it is looked upon as a view of life providing a way of life as well.—The questions are:

(1) Why is Heidegger difficult?
(2) Is existentialism pessimistic?
(3) Is it anthropocentric?
(4) Is it atheistic?
(5) Is it an outcome of the world wars?
(6) Is it irrational?

In reviewing these questions major attention will be given to Heidegger, but other existentialists will be occasionally referred to.

VII

(1) Why is Heidegger "difficult"?

There is sometimes a general complaint about the difficulty of so-called German philosophy. It is argued, then, that French and British thinkers seem generally to manage with the help of a clearer language which is easier to understand (this does not hold in exceptional cases, for instance the French existentialists, neither in the case of a thinker like Whitehead; not to speak of logic, which has become highly technical. On the other hand, some German thinkers are not "difficult", which could even be said, amongst the existentialists, of Jaspers). The question is here evidently, whether the ideas of those, who express themselves in a difficult language could be put in an easier language as well.—Heidegger has in the beginning of his work a reference to this, of which I will try to give an almost literal translation in order to give at the same time an idea of his style[28]:

> "With regard to the unshapeliness and the lack of beauty in the expressions used in the following analyses, it may be remarked: it is one thing to talk about being, it is another thing to examine being on its mode of being. For the latter task not only the words are generally lacking, but most of all the "grammar". If it be permitted to refer to previous and in their level incomparable investigations into being, one may compare ontological sections in Plato's Parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's Metaphysics with a narrative episode from Thucydides, and one will see how unheard of the formulations were, which the Greeks were entrusted with by their philosophers. And as the forces are essentially weaker and in addition to that the region of being which has to be unlocked ontologically much more difficult than that which existed for the Greeks, the circumstantiality and copiousness of the concepts and the harshness of the expressions will increase."

(2) Is existentialism pessimistic?

Optimism and pessimism are attitudes which transcend what is phenomenologically given as in the present, and which, too, cannot be discovered as essentials or existentials in man, as both occur in different individuals. If any of them, therefore, would occur in an existentialist writer, he makes a digression outside the phenomenological and ontological field.

If it be asked, whether the results of the Daseinsanalytik give any reason to be optimistic or pessimistic, it must also be answered

28. The difficulties of a translation of philosophical German into English are sometimes next to insurmountable. To give an instance: one of the most fundamental discriminations in metaphysics, that between "Sein" and "Seiendes" (the Greek *einai* and *on*), cannot be translated literally as both correspond to only one English term, "being" (cf. above, note 16).—There is some analogy with the relation in Sanskrit between sāmānya (or śuddha) sattā and viśiṣṭa sattā, logical terms denoting for instance respectively the being of clay in general and the being of clay in the pot.

first of all that such reflections are outside the scope of the philosophical method. Are they nevertheless wanted, then it may be pointed out that the work of Heidegger has not only shown our "nothingness", our "being thrown in the world", but also the importance of the future as an always open and accessible potentiality as well as the power our decisions have in shaping the lives of ourselves and others. It is in the existentialist's spirit, though outside his scope, to stress that the future is ours and that we cannot talk about it as something outside ourselves, which may go "up" or "down" independently of our own existence.

(3) Is existentialism anthropocentric?

Jean-Paul Sartre has called existentialism a humanism, but though I do not know whether Heidegger has ever reacted upon his booklet, I suppose that he would disagree.[29] I hope I have succeeded in pointing out that there is methodologically but one sound way leading to a general investigation of being: the way starting with our own being. Our own being is most important in this respect and for us; but to attach any primary importance to it apart from this is again transcending the limits of phenomenology.

(4) Is existentialism atheistic?

The Daseinsanalytik can be neither theistic nor atheistic. A phenomenological analysis cannot give any judgment about the existence of entities other than human being.[30] But it is not outside the scope of the Daseinsanalytik to seek for modes of the human being, where there is an experience felt of something which might be called God. That Heidegger has not found such a mode of existence means to me that a divine experience, if it exists, is not essential to every human being, i.e. is not an existential (like being-in-the-world). At any rate, the interpretation of such a mode of being is highly controversial on account of its incommensurability with other experiences and phenomenological data.

29. Elsewhere Heidegger makes a rather disqualifying reference to the French existentialists, where Sartre must be included too.

30. Here lies a difference in the concept of phenomenology according to Husserl and to Heidegger, as the former never considers existence, which is eliminated in advance by a "reduction". ("eidetische Reduktion"). It may be mentioned here too that Husserl himself has rejected the existentialist developments of his method.

I hope that it is clear to those who have followed these reflections until now, that in a Daseinsanalytik there is no place for a discussion concerning the existence of God. This has of course no consequences at all with regard to his possible existence. There is scope in human being for a being-in-relation-to-God (Sein zu Gott), but Heidegger has not found anything of this kind during his analysis. As far as I know, he makes only once a reference to it, in "Vom Wesen des Grundes".[31] This is in the context of an investigation concerning the being-in-the-world, which contains (historically) some idea of "alienation from the divine" (see above, p. 21). For this reason he inserts a note, remarking that the interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world entails no opinion whatsoever, positively or negatively, concerning a possible being-in-relation-to-God. But he rightly adds, that only this interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world or as transcendence can provide a sufficient basis for an investigation into the problem of a possible relation to God of human being.

It may be mentioned here too (as it is a not so well-known piece of information) that Heidegger, when asked, after the war, by a visitor (R. Scherer) whether there was any "group" of which he could say that his attitude differed least from it, "made the surprising remark that he could go along with a liberated Thomism". This need cause no surprise if the real phenomenological significance of the Daseinsanalytik is grasped. To shelter, however, Heidegger and other existentialists in labelled rooms and reject on that account their achievements, is the same as rejecting Plato because he may have "believed" somehow in Greek gods.

It may not be out of place here to say a few words about the other existentialists who are not Christians, i.e. Jaspers and Sartre.

Karl Jaspers' concept of God cannot be dealt with in a few lines. It is well-known that there is Neoplatonic influence in his thinking on this point, but I am not sure after all whether his God is personal or impersonal. If the divine remains in his thinking impersonal, this does not exclude (as it does usually) that we find in his work investigations into and descriptions of the human personality of a rare penetration, which classes him together with the other existentialists on the "'personalist side".

31. 36, n. 56. Also in "Brief über den Humanismus" (1947), as Dr Panikker writes to me.

But for a modern Westerner, to believe in an impersonal God comes very near to atheism (because the personal is almost always, implicitly or explicitly, valued more highly than the impersonal).—It is more important, however, that for Jaspers certainty about God's being is a presupposition, not a result of philosophising.[32]

It is often quoted that Jean-Paul Sartre said that according to him existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position. Though this seems quite clear, I do not think it is so easy to interpret adequately. If atheism means the denial of the existence of God, just as theism means the conviction of his existence, I believe that both are equally unacceptable starting points for philosophy "to draw full conclusions from", simply because neither of them is given phenomenologically in human being. A "divine" factor or form may be given, but to interpret it as divine and to conclude for theism (or, in the absence thereof, for atheism) becomes a very controversial step, as it goes beyond phenomenology. If, on the other hand, atheism means a refusal to start principally with the acceptance of the existence of God, ontology, phenomenology and the Daseinsanalytik are certainly atheistic.

Atheism has become a philosophical problem in Europe in a special way, which has no parallel outside the West, since Friedrich Nietzsche. Instead of a vulgar kind of atheism, being content with the conviction that God does not exist, a more profoundly human and sometimes passionate atheism has come into being, which faces the possibility of the non-existence of God sincerely as a real alternative, affecting, if accepted, the totality of the personality. It is announced in some of the characters occurring in the novels of Dostoievski too ("How can I be good, if God does not exist?"). To pass "existentially" through such a level of thought is purifying for the theist too, at least if he is ready to accept Pascal's insight that there can be no religious sincerety, no belief, without doubt. With this kind of atheism also Sartre's thought is connected.—It may be added here, that Nietzsche, together with Sören Kierkegaard the most direct forerunner of existentialism, is as easily and commonly misunderstood as the existentialists. After the manifold misinterpretations which the literature about him has

32. "Eine Gewissenheit vom Sein Gottes ... ist Voraussetzung, nicht Ergebnis des Philosophierens": Der philosophische Glaube, Zürich 1948, 33.

provided (generally based upon the tendentious misrepresentations of his sister[33]), both inside (e.g. during the Nazi period) and outside Germany, it is perhaps *only* in the works of the existentialists that a good introduction can be found to this thinker, whose work may still contain much which is for the future to evaluate. Indispensable for the understanding of Nietzsche is nowadays Jaspers' book;[33] but there are significant essays of Heidegger too.[34] Such new interpretations show what is already in the texts themselves, but what we have been ready to overlook on account of our prejudices. Thus for instance if we consult the original text where Nietzsche made the statement "God is dead" we read in the beginning, which deals with a madman who is calling on a market "I seek God! I seek God!": "As many were gathered there of those who *do not* believe in God, he caused *much* laughter". Then, later, the madman says: "We killed God—you and I" and lastly: "God is dead".—From this text it is readily seen that there is a vast difference between Nietzsche's personal atheism and the impersonal scientific and materialist atheism: the former is the great and tragic but dangerous act of a free personality, who has chosen; the latter does not at all envisage the choice "existentially", used as it is to the synthetical and impersonal structure of science and because the investigator does not see that, even phenomenologically, "God" stands for "something" in his own existence, even if it be true that such an entity does not exist "scientifically speaking" (which can be perfectly true at the same time).

(5) Is existentialism an outcome of the world wars?

In its simple form this opinion is futile and can be refuted by chronological considerations: Kierkegaard and Nietzsche died long before the first world war (respectively in 1855 and in 1900). The main existentialist works appeared between the world wars: for instance, in the *same* year as Sein und Zeit (1927), Gabriel Marcel's Journal Métaphysique, which has much in common with Kierkegaard, though Marcel did not know his works at that time

33. K. Jaspers, Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens (1936). In English, a very reliable though not very *philosophical* book is: W. A. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist; Princeton 1950.

34. See above, note 23.

(which is significant, as Bocheński remarks,[35] because it shows that Kierkegaard's thinking was closely related to the spiritual climate of those days). Only one existentialist work of fundamental importance (as far as can be seen at the moment) has appeared after the outbreak of the second world war: Sartre's L'être et le néant (in 1943).

Though it is an over-simplification, of the historical-materialistic type, to explain existentialism as an outcome of the world wars, I would not dare to deny that there is any connection. On the contrary, it seems clear that the deepening of the human consciousness with the gradually increasing manifestation of its darker, more irrational and more diabolic aspects, on the European continent and especially in Germany, has resulted in a mentality which is connected both with existentialism and with the world wars. It has become a great problem indeed whether a certain kind of profundity has to be sacrificed because of its dangers. But we need not sacrifice any piece of phenomenological analysis; on the contrary, what we have to sacrifice is generally the erroneous assumption that a certain phenomenological analysis implies a certain view of life or a certain ideology. Thus we see that the philosophical claim of phenomenological justification maintains on the one hand the scientific character of philosophy and avoids on the other hand such apparent, extremely emotional, consequences as those which manifest themselves during war.—In this context I should like to refer to the great novel by Thomas Mann, Dr. Faustus, where this is the central problem and where it is not without significance that the hero's life is inspired by Nietzsche's. This problem and its symbolisation in the fact, that those of us Europeans who have lived through one or through both world wars on the continent, have undergone this as the most deeply penetrating experience in their lives, cause the gap we feel existing between us and the Anglo-Saxon countries, which have liberated us from the Nazi occupation. It causes that we possess a kind of knowledge of the human being, which is, fortunately or unfortunately, not yet existing anywhere else. But it is not the world wars, but their background, for which we may have to go back to what is partly symbolised in the medieval Faust or even to the roots of the culture of the European continent, which can partly explain the origination of existentialism, its development

35. I. M. Bocheński, Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart, Bern 1947, 178.

and the understanding for it. It may be that a real understanding of existentialism for those who do not belong to the European continent is impossible without a detailed study of this background. For this I may be permitted to recommend outside the philosophical literature again the above mentioned novel of Thomas Mann, which is also translated into English.[36]

To grant this problematic connection between existentialism and for instance the world wars means almost to recognise it as a view of life. I believe indeed that it has to be admitted that existentialism goes often beyond the limits of a phenomenological analysis, whereas only Heidegger and Sartre stress the need for such a test. Before re-investigating these other portions, however, we can accept the extraordinary richness of phenomenological observations which the existentialists provide.

(6) Is existentialism irrational?

Any phenomenological analysis is neither rational nor irrational; it is unprejudiced and accepts whatever it finds. But we can, thanks to existentialism, give a deeper analysis of the concept of reason.[37] The proper field of reason is the categories and again especially essence as it occurs in the definition of an entity. But with essence the domain of reason comes to an end; the bare fact that a thing exists, the existence of a thing (existence understood in the pre-existentialist sense, i.e. referring not only to human being) can never be "understood" rationally but only accepted as a contingency. This is for instance shown in the different attitudes and methods of the sciences, e.g. physics and biology, or, as greater extremes, mathematics and history. Reason requires generality, but existence is always unique: whereas essence and attributes refer to something else, existence is in itself. This applies especially to human existence, which is jemeinig, "always my own". Its

36. Thomas Mann, Doktor Faustus—Das Leben des deutschen Tonsetzers Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde, 1947. Translation by H. T. Lowe-Porter: Doctor Faustus—The life of the German composer Adrian Leverkühn as told by a friend, New York, 1948.

In this case it holds too, that most of the English book reviews have missed the central point as it does almost not appeal "existentially." Hence they cannot serve as an introduction to the book.—As another literary introduction to certain aspects of existentialism Dostoievski could be recommended.

37. Cf. the author's Remarks on rationality and irrationality in East and West, to be published in the near future (a first draft, incomplete and without references, appeared in Mysindia, June 19, 1955). Cf. above, note 12.

unicity excludes reason.—Historically, this sense for the unique can be traced back to certain Christian conceptions.[38]

If it would, however, be quite inadequate to call existentialism principally irrational, it has at its first steps in the analysis already to recognise the irrational structure of human existence. It is certainly a fact that reason plays a very small part in it. For Heidegger, reason is a rather superficial phenomenon, to be derived from much deeper lying modes of human existence. "Everything can be proved, i.e. deduced from appropriately chosen assumptions".[39]

VIII

Now we have paid so much attention to world wars and to typically continental or even German habits of thought, it may be rightly asked whether all this is to remain a curious piece of information in the Indian philosophical climate. This may be the case indeed if existentialism is exclusively looked upon as a view of life or as ethics. But the results of a purely phenomenological analysis are universally valid, in India as well as in Europe. The Western striving for verification in the widest sense, i.e. clarification of the ontological status of entities through phenomenological justification of them, has led to investigations of the human being which take into account certain experiences, which occurred because of the circumstances on the European continent but which have led to results entirely independent from this particular origin and which are of the highest philosophical value. Thus it is because of the phenomenological foundation that the existentialist analysis of man has universal validity wherever this foundation is reliable.

Historical considerations may show that it is not unlikely that the study of existentialism in India has a future: for there are points of contact with Indian thought. There is for instance in Advaita Vedānta an ardent desire to go beyond categorical thinking (though there are irreducible differences too[40]) and it is a general device of Indian thought to study man "from within", as Heidegger principally and entirely does. But contact will be only fruitful, when it is constantly realised that we can only be certain about the universal value of existentialism when it is looked upon as phenomenology and when it is studied critically from the phenomenological point of view.

38. See the previous note.
39. Vorträge und Aufsätze 134.
40. Cf. above, note 10.

CORPORATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

by

T. P. SUBRAMONIAN
Department of Economics

I

The problem of industrial finance in India has two aspects—the overall shortage of capital and the difficulty of tapping existing capital. While insufficiency of domestic capital is no doubt a factor hindering economic growth in an under-developed country, the effective mobilization of available capital is an acute problem. One method of attacking this problem of mobilization is the establishment of specialist institutions, like finance and development corporations. An attempt is made in this paper to assess the recent experiences in this direction in India.

As private enterprise has been assigned an important place in India's plans for industrial development, steps to solve its problem of finance assume significance. Where the saving habit of the people is not well developed, any institution for the mobilization of savings is a welcome development. An institution that not only mobilizes savings but canalises it along desirable lines of industrial development is doubly welcome. The investing public in India have often displayed a lack of confidence in direct industrial investment. A specialist institution, which does not directly engage itself in industrial ventures, will be able to instil confidence in the minds of the investing public. By attracting the savings of the people in the shape of deposits, share-capital or debenture-capital and channelling these funds in the most profitable lines of investment, it would serve a very useful purpose. While industry would get the needed finance, the investors would get an adequate return. Another factor which adds to the usefulness of such specialist institutions in India is the prevailing practice of commercial banking, which does not permit of long-term and medium-term lending. As the Shroff Committee reported in 1954, as far as equity capital and long-term finance are concerned, all classes of industries, whether large-scale, medium-scale or small-scale, are experiencing difficulties. Lastly, in the absence of issue and underwriting houses in India, the need for specialist institutions which will also undertake this type of activity becomes all the greater.

Even in industrially advanced countries specialist institutions are becoming important. One of the results of the Second World War is the decline of individual capitalism. The entrepreneurial class with capital has begun to disappear. The spread of egalitarian ideas has resulted in a wide diffusion of purchasing power which can be gathered only through appropriate financial institutions. Special institutions have been found necessary to sponsor new industries requiring large investments and to provide long-term capital to existing industries for expansion and modernisation. With the steady expansion in the scale of business and the increasing complexity of modern industrial organisation, investment calls for special knowledge and skill on the part of the investor; and he may not always be equal to the task. Under a specialist institution, resources are pooled, risks are spread, confidence is created and investment is guided by expert intelligence. An industrial bank or finance corporation is often a convenient intermediary between industry and the investor.

II

Although attempts at industrial banking were made in India even as early as the opening of the present century, the idea of specialist institutions found effective expression only after the end of the Second World War. As private enterprise by itself would not be able to establish such institutions in India, it was but natural that the recent experiments should have been tried under State auspices or with State assistance. In line with the post-war development in many other countries, the Government of India took the intiative and the Industrial Finance Corporation of India was established in 1948, by the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, "for the purpose of making medium and long-term credits more readily available to industrial concerns in India, particularly in circumstances where normal banking accommodation is inappropriate or recourse to capital issue channels impracticable."

The Corporation has an authorised capital of Rs. 10 crores, of which Rs. 5 crores has been issued and paid up, being subscribed by the Central Government, the Reserve Bank of India, scheduled banks, insurance companies, co-operative banks and other financial institutions. Repayment of the share capital as well as a minimum dividend of 2¼% has been guaranteed by the Government of India. Besides its share capital, the Corporation has other sources of

funds. It may issue bonds or debentures which, together with its contingent liabilities under guarantees and underwriting agreements, should not exceed five times the aggregate of the paid-up capital and reserve funds. It may also accept deposits from the public, but these deposits are to be kept for a minimum period of five years and aggregate deposits should not exceed Rs. 10 crores. It may obtain short-term accommodation from the Reserve Bank of India. The Corporation has also been authorised to obtain, with the previous consent of the Central Government, loans in foreign currency from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or otherwise. However, in its eight-year life the Corporation has not resorted to many of the above methods of raising resources; the bulk of its resources has been raised only by the issue of bonds and debentures. The Balance Sheet as at 30th June 1955 shows an amount of Rs. 7.8 crores raised by the issue of bonds and debentures.

The Corporation is authorised to render financial assistance by:

(i) granting loans or advances to or subscribing to the debentures of industrial concerns repayable within 25 years;

(ii) guaranteeing loans raised by industrial concerns which are repayable within 25 years and which are floated in the open market;

(iii) under-writing the issue of stocks, shares, bonds and debentures by industrial concerns, subject to their being disposed of in the market within 7 years. The Corporation can grant loans or guarantee advances only against the security of tangible assets. Under the I.F.C. Act, as amended in 1952, the maximum permissible assistance to a single industrial concern has been fixed at Rs. 1 crore. This limit can be exceeded if the loan is guaranteed by the Government of India. Direct subscription to equity capital of industrial concerns is prohibited, and the Corporation's assistance is confined to public limited companies and co-operative societies.

Table I shows the assistance rendered by the Corporation during 1948 to 1955. In all, 422 applications were received for a total sum of Rs. 60 crores. Of this 164 applications were sanctioned for an aggregate amount of Rs. 28 crores. Of this amount Rs. 14 crores had actually been disbursed by the end of the year 1954-55. The balance included loans sanctioned which were subsequently declined by the applicants or withheld by the Corporation and loans sanctioned awaiting disbursement.

TABLE I

INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA

Applications received, sanctioned and rejected—1948-55.

(*Amount in lakhs of Rupees*)

	1948-49		1949-50		1950-51		1951-52		1952-53		1953-54		1954-55		Total	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Applications received	95	10,32	65	8,76	45	5,48	54	7,30	74	8,26	43	9,00	46	11,27	422	60,40
Applications sanctioned	21	3,42	23	3,77	17	2,38	33	4,45	14	1,44	29	5,27	27	7,34	164	28,08
Applications rejected	33	1,89	44	4,31	22	1,65	19	1,77	30	2,62	27	2,21	18	2,93	193	17,38
Applications under consideration	41	4,88	19	1,84	18	1,81	17	2,03	41	5,23	17	5,11	7	2,34	160	23,24
Applications lapsed or withdrawn	..	..	20	2,80	7	1,10	3	69	6	56	11	1,22	11	3,50	58	9,87

Thus the assistance rendered has by no means been inconsiderable. The number of applications received was the highest in the first year and has, on the whole, declined since then. This was largely because many concerns not eligible for assistance under the Act had applied in the beginning. The aggregate amount pertaining to the applications showed a decline in the first three years and then showed a recovery, the highest amount so far applied for being in the last year 1954-55. The amount sanctioned was also the highest in that year, viz. Rs. 7 crores.

The Corporation's assistance covered a wide range of large industries. Upto the end of the year 1954-55, industry-wise, sugar obtained the largest amount (Rs. 443 lakhs) which represents nearly 16% of the total assistance. Cotton textile gets the next place with Rs. 411 lakhs and cement comes third with Rs. 315 lakhs. Among the other industries assisted by the Corporation are textile machinery, mechanical and electrical engineering, woollens, rayons, chemicals and ceramics, iron and steel and paper.

Though designed to cater to the large and medium-scale industries, the largest part of the assistance has been disbursed in fairly small amounts, i.e. between Rs. 10 lakhs and Rs. 20 lakhs. The Rs. 40-50 lakh slab comes second and the Rs. 20-30 lakh slab comes third. The Rs. 1 crore limit has been exceeded only in one case. New undertakings absorbed the major share (Rs. 15 crores) of the assistance and the balance (Rs. 13 crores) was accounted for by old undertakings.

The record of the I.F.C. for the last seven years does not make gloomy reading. 60 new concerns have been helped to establish themselves and 65 old ones to expand and modernise. There is no evidence of the Corporation having rejected any application on account of lack of funds. If the Corporation has had to reject 193 applications for an aggregate amount of Rs. 17.4 crores, it was because (i) many concerns not eligible for assistance under the Act applied, and (ii) many eligible applicants did not fulfil all the terms and conditions of the Corporation. The remedy for the first lies in greater understanding regarding the precise scope of the Corporation; the remedy for the second in closer and speedier cooperation on the part of the applicants.

The wide disparity between the amount of the loans sanctioned and the amount actually disbursed should compel attention. As noted earlier, upto the end of the year 1954-55, of the Rs. 28 crores sanctioned, only Rs. 14 crores had actually been disbursed. This discrepancy not only causes the Corporation a loss of interest but indicates a short fall in the effective utilisation by the community of the industrial finance provided by the Corporation. It appears that industrial concerns do not generally desire the entire amount to be paid in one lump sum but prefer to obtain their requirements in instalments coinciding with maturity of the commitments for which assistance is sought from the Corporation. In many cases after getting loans sanctioned, the industrial concerns revise their schemes with a view to cut down costs. Difficulties regarding the title to the land of the companies often prevent the Corporation from making funds readily available to the Company. While it is not possible to compel the applicants to take the entire loan in a lump sum, steps to persuade them to reduce the period of non-utilization of loans must be taken. A small penal rate may be levied for such non-utilization. A better understanding on the part of the Corporation of the actual requirements of concerns will be helpful.

Though the Corporation has not rejected any application on the ground of lack of funds, compared to the needs of industry the assistance rendered by it has been far from spectacular. This is probably because (i) the procedure followed by the Corporation does not ideally suit industrial concerns, (ii) the types of assistance that the Corporation has been authorised to render are not exactly those most needed by industrial concerns, (iii) certain types of business authorised under the I.F.C. Act have not been attempted by the Corporation, (iv) the sphere of jurisdiction of the Corporation is too narrow. Let us test these hypotheses.

Delay in the sanctioning of loans is a criticism levelled against the I.F.C. It is even said that this delay deters potential applicants. Delay caused by slackness can never be justified. Delay caused by want of adequate technical staff must be reduced by expansion of such services. Delay that arises from the nature of the procedure of the Corporation is to a large extent inevitable in the early stages. Before sanctioning a loan, the Corporation considers all the relevant aspects of the proposal, such as the technical soundness of the scheme, competence of the management, the profit-earning capacity of the firm and its ability to repay the loan. It also judges whether the industrial concern is likely to make a contribution to the economic growth of the community. None of these steps can be given up with impunity. Speedy consideration of these questions requires detailed and accurate information

provided by the applicant-concern. But many of the schemes submitted to the Corporation are carelessly conceived and hastily prepared and are grossly defective in detailed information. Often the required information is obtained after protracted correspondence. A radical change in the attitude and practices of industrial concerns is called for.

Complaints are made against the stringency of the terms and conditions of the Corporation. The Corporation generally grants loans on the first mortgage of the fixed assets of the companies, like land, buildings, plant and machinery. In the granting of assistance, a margin of 50% is usually kept on the value of the security mortgaged. The Corporation further requires that the loans should be guaranteed by the directors or partners of the managing agency firm in their personal capacity, the guarantee being joint and several. The period of the loan does not ordinarily exceed 12 years. When a loan is granted on such sound and tangible security and after such thorough investigation, one wonders whether the Corporation would be taking too big a risk if, in the interest of industrial finance, the margin is reduced to 25%. Further, the Corporation's insistence on the guarantee of the managing agents, in addition to retaining a 50% margin in mortgage loans, appears an error on the side of caution. A suitable relaxation of these terms may be considered by the Corporation.

The I.F.C. which started with an effective rate of 5% interest on its loans, now charges an effective rate of 6%, i.e. 6½% interest with a rebate of ½% for punctual payment of interest and instalments of principal. Though industrialists have complained against the rate, considering such factors as the interest which the Corporation has to pay on its bonds and the need for providing for bad debts and meeting establishment charges, the rate should be considered reasonable. However, a "sliding scale" of interest rates would relieve possible hardship on new enterprises. The Shroff Committee has suggested an arrangement by which the rate of interest on loans granted should be reduced in the initial years on condition that the assisted company compensates the Corporation when it reaches a profitable stage.

The types of assistance that the Corporation has been rendering may next be examined with reference to the requirements of industry. As the Corporation was set up for the granting of medium and long-term credits, it was not expected to make advances for working capital. But when a company's fixed assets are mortgaged, it sometimes finds it difficult to obtain working capital from banks against hypothecation of floating assets. After the initial two years, therefore, the I.F.C. relaxed its policy and began to advance working capital in cases where such capital could not be obtained from banks. As provision of working capital is the legitimate sphere of commercial banks, such relaxation should be the exception rather than the rule.

As regards long-term assistance, criticisms made may be considered under two heads; first, the business authorised but not followed, and secondly, the business not authorised. Though authorised to subscribe to debentures, the Corporation has not ventured to do it. Loans in the form of debentures which can, at suitable times be placed in the market, are suggested by the Shroff Committee. Experiments in this direction could well be undertaken. Though authorised by the Act, the Corporation has neither guaranteed loans floated by industrial concerns nor underwritten the issues of shares, bonds and debentures. The Corporation's explanation that conditions in the capital market are not favourable enough for such operations is not convincing. For one thing, the capital market must now be considered normal; for another, it is when the capital market is not perfectly normal that institutional underwriting is all the more necessary. If the Corporation is handicapped by the provision that any shares taken up in fulfilment of its underwriting commitments will have to be disposed of within seven years, the provision may be removed, as recommended by the Shroff Committee.

The wisdom of a strict adherence to loan finance with a statutory prohibition of entry into the field of equity capital is open to question. Many industrial concerns in India face more difficulty for equity capital than for loan capital. Similar corporations abroad have tried the experiment of equity participation with success. It is true that equity participation does not assure the Corporation a regular interest payment, but calculated risk-taking might actually bring in a higher dividend. The recommendation of the I.F.C. Enquiry Committee that the Corporation should not participate in equity or risk capital is unrealistic; an experimental diversion of a part of its funds in the direction of equity capital appears highly advisable.

The Corporation's assistance is confined to public limited companies and co-operative societies. Its extension to private limited companies, partnerships, etc. is not desirable, as it would make the Corporation bite more than it could chew.

Coming back to the hypotheses raised earlier, it may now be said that (i) the procedure of the I.F.C. is not on the whole unsuitable and deterrent to industrial concerns; while there is not much scope for its simplification, a liberalization of its terms and conditions may be considered; (ii) while loan finance is important, other types of assistance should also be attempted. The number of suitable applicants will increase considerably if such types of assistance are authorised and followed; (iii) the jurisdiction of the I.F.C. is not unduly narrow and need not be enlarged.

III

Small and medium scale industries face greater difficulty in obtaining finance than large industries. Most of them are organised as private limited companies, partnerships and sole proprietorships. Institutions to cater to their financial needs should necessarily be established on a regional basis with limited territorial jurisdictions. To burden the Central Corporation with this responsibility would be unwise. It was in the fitness of things that central legislation was enacted in the shape of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, which enabled State governments to set up financial corporations to provide medium and long term credit to small and middle-sized industries falling outside the purview of the I.F.C. of India. Financial corporations have so far been established in ten States, viz., Andhra, Bihar, Bombay, Hyderabad, Punjab, Rajasthan, Saurashtra, Travancore-Cochin, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., established in 1949 under the Indian Companies Act, has been brought within the purview of the S. F. C. Act.

The State Finance Corporation Act, 1951, is modelled closely on the I.F.C. Act of 1948 and is therefore open to most of the criticisms discussed earlier. However, certain differences may noted. The S.F.Cs. are authorised to assist not only public limited companies but also private limited companies, partnerships and proprietory concerns. This is but natural, as the aim is to aid small and middle sized industries. The S.F.C. Act has permitted members of the public and even non-scheduled banks to subscribe to a portion of the share-capital of the Corporations. The period for which the S.F.Cs. have been authorised to grant loans and give guarantees has been fixed at a maximum of 20 years, as against 25 years in the case of the central Corporation. The maximum permissible assistance to a single industrial concern is fixed at Rs. 10 lakhs, whereas it is Rs. 1 crore for the I.F.C.

The authorised capital of the State Corporations (except in Uttar Pradesh) has been fixed at Rs. 2 crores, of which Rs. 1 crore have been issued and paid up by most of the Corporations (Ref. Table II). The share-capital is subscribed to by the Reserve Bank, the State government, financial institutions and the public. The Corporations are also empowered to issue and sell bonds and and debentures upto five times the amount of their paid-up capital and reserve fund. They may also accept deposits from the public for periods not less than 5 years, to an amount equal to the paid-up capital. Participation in equity capital is prohibited.

TABLE II

STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Name of Corporation	Date of establishment	Authorised capital Rs. lakhs	Issued capital Rs. lakhs	Loans paid till 31-3-1955 Rs. lakhs
1. Punjab Financial Corporation ..	Feb. 1953	2,00	1,00	22
2. Saurashtra Financial Corporation ..	Sept. 1953	2,00	1,00	6
3. T.-C. Financial Corporation ..	Nov. 1953	2,00	1,00	34
4. Bombay State Financial Corporation ..	Nov. 1953	2,00	1,00	30
5. Hyderabad Financial Corporation ..	Feb. 1954	2,00	1,00	20
6. West Bengal Financial Corporation ..	March 1954	2,00	1,00	9
7. Assam Financial Corporation ..	April 1954	2,00	1,00	—
8. U. P. Financial Corporation ..	Nov. 1954	3,00	50	—
9. Bihar State Financial Corporation ..	Nov. 1954	2,00	50	—
10. Rajasthan Financial Corporation ..	Jan. 1955	2,00	1,00	—
				121

Table II lists the State Corporations established till the end of March 1955. It shows the amounts of loans actually paid by seven of them since inception till 31-3-1955. They make up a total

of Rs. 121 lakhs. The T.-C. Financial Corporation shows the best record not only for magnitude of assistance rendered but also for net profiit earned and economy of management. It is too early to make an appraisal of the working of the State Financial Corporations, as many of them have just begun their business. However, the balance-sheets of the relatively older ones do make a hopeful impression despite the fact that only a small part of the resources has been used. The field open to the S.F.Cs. is vast and pregnant with possibilities.

The first point that comes up for consideration here is the need for a clear demarcation of the spheres of activity of the I.F.C. of India and the S.F.Cs. The need was realised early enough, and at the Conference of S.F.Cs. held under the auspices of the Reserve Bank in August 1954, it was agreed that loans upto Rs. 10 lakhs may be provided by them and applicants for higher amounts were to be directed to the central Corporation. The minimum has been fixed by most of them at Rs. 10,000 and applicants for sums below the minimum were to be directed to the Government Departments which in, several States, provide direct assistance to small and cottage industries.

On the one hand the State Finance Corporations have not been able to utilise their funds adequately; on the other hand, a scrutiny of the financial conditions of small and medium industries shows that the slow progress made by them is due to lack of funds for additional capital equipment and for working capital. This paradox is accounted for by certain peculiar problems faced by the S.F.Cs.

Detailed and accurate information from an industrial concern are necessary before a financial corporation could make a long-term loan. If the I.F.C. dealing with public limited companies should occasionally face difficulty in this matter, it is not surprising that S.F.Cs. face much greater difficulty with their clients. As the Punjab Financial Corporation has complained (vide First Annual Report, p. 12), "a considerable unwillingness is found among a considerable section of the industrialists of the State to take its creditors into full confidence. In some cases, of course, no proper system of accounts exists at all...... Only a few well-managed concerns are able to produce the necessary vouchers and accounts in respect of land, buildings and machinery offered to the Corporation as security—a position which is highly unsatisfactory for the Corporation as a purveyor of long-term credit."

Here is a basic problem concerned with the nature of industrial management in India as applied to medium and small industries. Greater education, publicity and propaganda on methods of business might help to solve the problem. Associations of small and medium industries must be promoted to bring about an organisational awakening to facilitate beneficial co-operation with financial agencies.

Often applicants find it difficult to mortgage their fixed assets to obtain loans from the S.F.C. While insistence on tangible security cannot, in the interest of the Corporations, be relaxed, a liberalisation of the 50% margin may be considered, as recommended earlier for the I.F.C. With fixed assets mortgaged, industrial concerns often find it difficult to obtain working capital advances and in such special cases, short-term loans for working capital are provided by the S.F.Cs. The S.F.C. avoids overlapping of securities with commercial banks by advancing on security of fixed assets only, leaving floating assets for commercial banks. All the same, it would be preferrable for S.F.Cs. to encourage commercial banks to provide working capital either by guaranteeing their advances or by other agreements.

The prevailing tax-structure of the country is burdensome to medium and small industries and makes it difficult for them either to approach the S.F.Cs. for assistance or to service the loans satisfactorily. A lightening of this burden is called for. Exemption of the applicants from the heavy payment of stamp duty or at least a reduction of the rate of duty is recommended. The Saurashtra Government have set an example by remitting the whole of the stamp duty leviable on the mortgage deeds executed in favour of the S.F.C. for two years from September 1954.

The tax-structure hits not only the borrowing concerns but also the Corporations themselves. A substantial part of the profits earned by them goes in payment of income-tax and corporation tax. In view of the fact that for the first few years the Corporations will be obliged to keep a good part of their funds in short-term deposits with banks or in government securities yielding low rates of interest and in view of the need to build up sound reserves out of their profits, it would be advisable to exempt them from payment of income and corporation taxes during this initial period. The Reserve Bank of India and the State Governments may, in the alternative, assist the Corporation in the initial years by not drawing the dividends on the shares held by them.

Successful assistance to small and medium scale industries require direct acquaintance with their problems. The example set by the T.-C. State Corporation in appointing Regional Advisory Committees to function on a district-war basis may well be followed by the other Corporations. The contacts established between the District Committee and the local industrial concerns will, on the one hand, help to provide the industrial concerns with information regarding the functions and working of the Corporation, and, on the other hand, acquaint the members of the Committee with the nature and needs of the industrial concerns.

IV

Industrial development in an under-developed country is a multi-faced problem. Though lack of capital and credit is an important obstacle to industrial development, there are several allied hurdles to be overcome. The effective utilisation of finance may itself be dependent on solution of other problems. Very often an integrated approach may be necessary, and allied forms of assistance, besides financial accommodation, may have to be provided.

Technical know-how is an important desideratum for the successful promotion and prosecution of modern industry. Organised provision of technical service may be necessary in an under-developed country. Lack of suitable personnel is another drawback; and training may have to be organised for the supply of personnel to man the industries in the managerial, administrative and technical wings. The tendency to tread the beaten tract, sticking to commercial lines and established industries without venturing into fresh fields and pastures new, is characteristic of the generality of enterpreneurs in an under-developed country. Promotion of new and nationally important industries bristles with risks and private enterpreneurs may not readily venture into the field. Project studies will have to be conducted and elaborate expert investigations will have to be undertaken. To perform all these and allied functions, besides and coupled with provision of finance, Development Corporations are required as distinguished from mere financing institutions. Three new Corporations designed to assist in the promotion and development of industries have recently been established in India.

The National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., established in October 1954, is an entirely Government-owned undertaking registered as a private limited company under the Indian

Companies Act. It will have a Board of 15 to 21 Directors, all nominated by the Government, with the Union Minister for Industry and Commerce as Chairman. The Corporation has a paid-up capital of Rs. 1 crore which has been provided entirely by the Government of India. It is empowered to increase its financial resources by issuing shares and debentures. It can also receive grants, loans and advances or deposits from the Central or State Governments, companies or individuals.

The Memorandum of Association of the Corporation defines the principal objects of the Corporation as "the promotion and establishment of industries for the manufacture and production of plant, machinery, implements and goods of any description likely to promote industrial development and to aid and assist any industrial undertaking owned by private companies also with capital and other resources for establishing new undertakings or for running their existing business". Thus it can render assistance to any type of industrial undertaking, be it under the the ownership or management of a government, statutory body, company, firm or individual. The assistance could be in the shape of capital, credit, machinery, other equipment or any other type of facility. It can grant loans or advances to industries; it can subscribe to or underwrite shares and debentures of companies. It can guarantee loans or advances to industries as well as issues of shares or debentures made by companies. With a view to enable the Corporation to exercise control over assisted industrial undertakings, it is authorised to nominate directors or advisers to the concerns. It can also promote, establish or assist any concern formed to set up or run an industrial undertaking.

The NIDC has, at the first meeting of the Board of Directors in October 1954, drawn up a provisional list of industries on which it could undertake investigations in due course. The list includes:

1. the manufacture of machinery and equipment of a number of industries including jute, cotton textiles, sugar, paper, cement, chemicals, printing, mining, construction and mechanical conveying;
2. ferro-alloys, ferro-manganese and ferro-chrome;
3. aluminium;
4. copper, zinc and other non-ferrous metals;
5. diesel engines, marine locomotive and generators;
6. heavy chemicals including sulphur;
7. fertilisers;

8. coke-oven and coal tar products;
9. methanol-formal dehyde;
10. carbon black;
11. wood-pulp for use in the production of paper, newsprint, rayon, etc.;
12. synthetic drugs, vitamins and hormones;
13. x-ray and medical equipment;
14. hard-board, insulation board, etc.

At its second meeting in September 1955 the Board of Directors decided that the Corporation should take up for immediate investigation the projects relating to steel foundries, forges and fabrications of steel structurals printing machinery and manufacture of wood-pulp. The Board also decided to adopt measures to provide financial assistance for the rehabilitation and modernisation of the jute industry.

The NIDC has laid great stress on the manufacture of equipment for a number of industries and purposes. Besides promoting the establishment of heavy machinery industry, the Corporation will also assist the expansion of some of the existing basic as well as large scale consumer goods industries. Project investigations, which constitute a major function of the Corporation, will give the much needed fillip to the promotion of new industries. The emphasis on heavy and basic industries is consistent with the objectives of the Second Five Year Plan. The Corporation might start industries which could later be handed over to private enterprise. By this means private capital which is not sufficiently venturesome could be attracted to new industries.

The importance of sound technical assistance in a scheme of rapid industrialization is realized by the NIDC which has decided to set up a competent firm of consulting engineers. In view of the difficulty of securing qualified personnel within the country, the Corporation has decided that a firm with international reputation should be invited to open an office in India and be paid a retainer fee in the initial stages. The services of this firm will be made available to private industries. The Corporation has also decided to begin with a nucleus of three or four general engineers with wide experience who could advise it not only on technical problems coming before it but also on the choice of suitable consulting and design engineers for preparing the blue-prints of specific projects to be undertaken by the Corporation.

The NIDC is a welcome addition to the specialist institutions in the country. It may serve as an important instrument for securing the harmonious development of industries in the private and public sectors. It is a novel experiment conceived on sound lines; worked properly, it is bound to make an immense contribution to India's industrial development.

The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd., established in January 1955, is intended to assist industrial entrepreneurs within the private sector of India. Unlike the NIDC, it is a private body meant exclusively for the assistance of private enterprise. "Its purpose", in the words of its Chairman, "generally is to assist the creation, expansion and modernisation of such industrial enterprises, to encourage and promote the participation of private capital, both internal and external, in these enterprises and to encourage and promote private ownership of industrial investments". In particular, it will (i) provide finance in the form of long and medium term loans or equity participations, (ii) sponsor or underwrite new issues of shares and debentures, (iii) guarantee loans from other private investment sources, (iv) make funds available for reinvestment by revolving investments as rapidly as prudent and (v) furnishing managerial, technical and administrative advice and assist in obtaining managerial, technical and administrative services to Indian industry.

The Corporation has an authorised capital of Rs. 25 crores, of which Rs. 5 crores has been issued and paid up. Of this Rs. 2 crores was taken up by several Indian banks and insurance companies and certain of the directors of the Corporation and their friends and associates, Rs. 1 crore by British Eastern Exchange Bank and certain U.K. and other Commonwealth insurance companies and other British Companies, and Rs. 50 lakhs by certain nationals and corporations of the U.S.A. The remaining Rs. 1.5 crores was taken up by the public in India.

The Government of India agreed to lend the Corporation a sum of Rs. 7.5 crores free of interest, repayable in 15 equal annual instalments after the expiry of 15 years from the date of the advance. The advance was made in March 1955. Further, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has agreed to lend an amount of $ 10 million for the purchase of imported materials, equipment and services. The loan will be for a

term of 15 years and will bear interest at 4⅝%. The Government of India has guaranteed repayment of the principal and payment of interest and other charges.

Besides, the Corporation is empowered to borrow, provided the amount borrowed together with the amount guaranteed by it does not exceed three times the aggregate of its unimpaired capital, its surplus and reserves and the outstanding advance from the Government of India.

The Corporation commenced business on March 1, 1955. Its Report for the period ending December 31, 1955, shows that though the opening months were devoted to organisational matters, the Corporation agreed to give financial assistance in one form or another in respect of 11 applications and a further 25 were under consideration. Out of the 11 applications approved, five involved the underwriting of public issues of ordinary or preference capital, four called for direct subscription to ordinary or preference capital, and two were requests for loans. The industries assisted includes the manufacture of paper, electrical equipment, fuel injection equipment, chemicals and equipment for the textile industry, the refining of sugar and metal ores, and cotton spinning. The amounts of financial assistance approved ranged from Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore. Although details are not available, the Report says that the Corporation's advice was sought on a number of projects. Considerable attention was paid in the initial months to evolve a suitable machinery for the underwriting of public issues of capital. The Corporation has now decided not to entertain applications from partnerships and individuals.

The I.C.I.C. has just struck its roots. It is a bold venture with a new approach to the problem of industrial finance and development. Foreign private participation in its equity capital is a novel feature of its capital structure. It is an encouraging attempt to supplement domestic resources with capital from abroad while at the same time mobilizing available domestic capital. The arrangement would also help the Corporation in the matter of securing technical assistance from U.K. and U.S.A. The unfettered range of types of assistance it can render should enable the Corporation to formulate its assistance with reference to the particular needs of an industrial enterprise. The effective utilisation of the managerial, technical and administrative services of the Corporation depends largely on the co-operation of private managing agencies and entrepreneurs. As the Chairman said, "the Corporation is not interested in mere money lending—its ultimate objective is promotion and development of industries in the private sector". Its future may be watched with interest.

The National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., was established in February 1955 with a view to assisting, financing, protecting and promoting small industries in India. It has been registered as a private limited company with an authorised capital of Rs. 10 lakhs to be provided entirely by the Government of India. The Government will also give loans to the Corporation for its working capital requirements.

The main objectives of the Corporation are (i) to secure a reasonable share of government orders for small-scale units, (ii) to provide such units as may have secured orders with loans and technical assistance necessary for fulfilling such orders and for manufacturing articles of the type and standard required; and (iii) to try to secure co-ordination between large-scale and small-scale industries so as to enable the latter to manufacture ancillaries, components and other articles required by the former. Besides providing loans, the Corporation is also empowered to underwrite and guarantee loans from banks and similar institutions to small-scale units.

The Corporation's assistance would extend to industries employing less than 50 persons working with power or less than 100 persons working without power and having capital assets not exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs.

In view of the peculiar problems of small-scale industries, which have suffered neglect for a long time, a special Corporation for their development is justified. The Corporation is a sequel to the recommendations of the Shroff Committee and the International Planning Team. It was noted earlier that one of the basic aims of the State Financial Corporations is to render financial assistance to small industries. The N.S.I.C. with a much wider role to fulfil will be a substantial supplement to the efforts of the S.F.Cs.

Organisational weakenesses in regard to the marketing of products and purchase of raw materials and poor managerial and technical know-how considerably accentuate the financial difficulties of small industries. Mere provision of finance without a simultaneous attack on these problems will not produce results.

In so far as the objectives of the N.S.I.C. relate to these problems, it augurs well for the small-scale sector. The employment potential and capital-lightness of the small industries have given them a pivotal place in the Second Plan. As such, an effective co-ordination between the small-scale and large-scale segments, which is one of the objectives of the N.S.I.C., is urgently called for. In the provision of technical know-how, the work of the N.S.I.C. is co-ordinated with the Regional Institutes for the servicing of small industries which were established on the recommendation of the Ford Foundation Team. The latter institutes provide technical guidance to small units in the country in the use of machines, tools and equipment, improvement in the technique of production and use of raw materials.

V

Specialist institutions offer the best solution to the financial and other problems of private industry in India at present. The post-war experiments in India with finance corporations are in line with developments elsewhere in the world. A central corporation to cater to public limited companies and State corporations to serve medium and small industries which are mostly organised as private limited companies, partnerships and proprietorships, constitute a convenient arrangement. But the existence of financing agencies with inadequately utilised resources by the side of industries with insufficiently fulfilled needs is a paradox. The solution appears to lie in a reorientation of the methods and procedure of the financing agencies coupled with a better assessment of the needs of industry.

The establishment of development corporations to tackle a wider range of problems augurs well for the country. There is scope enough in the country for such a variety of specialist institutions. With progressive expansion in their business, they will have to place increasing reliance on public subscriptions to share or debenture capital rather than on State loans and grants. The success of all these ventures depends on how far private industries help the institutions to help them. This would call for a reformation of their methods of business, including systems of accounting, and of their attitude to assisting agencies.

Rapid industrialisation is an important objective of the Second Five Year Plan and the new finance and development corporations will be called upon to help realise the objective.

The Plan envisages that an aggregate amount of Rs. 675 crores will be made available for large-scale industrial expansion and development. As part of the scheme, it is expected that the Central and State Finance Corporations and the Industrial Investment and Credit Corporation will together be able to provide Rs. 40 crores for industry during this period. A sum of Rs. 55 crores has been provided for the activities of the National Industrial Development Corporation, which will devote Rs. 20 crores for the modernisation of cotton and jute textile industries and Rs. 35 crores for pioneering new basic and heavy industries. If necessary adjustments are made in the structure and working of these institutions and if private entrepreneurs also play their part, one may well expect that the programme envisaged will be fulfilled.

AN ANALYSIS OF TWO UNITS OF OBSERVATION IN THE RELIGIO-SOCIAL LIFE OF KERALA *

by

M. S. GOPALAKRISHNAN
Department of Anthropology

I

The South-West Coast of India has attracted attention of scholars and artists by the beauty of her shores and hills, her fields and forests as by the hospitality of the different communities. What has impressed me most there is the temple of Malabar. The *ambalam* in the few places I had visited is a rectangular masonry structure enriched by traditional wood-work and large rectangular bathing tanks. One cannot see the grandeur of architecture in a Malabar village temple as easily as in the centres of pilgrimages, but one comes to know its local importance after sometime spent at such an *ambalam.* It has a unifying force for all communities living near and around it. From the serf (a Cheruma) working in the temple lands to the high priest (a Nambudiri tantri) we find several links of unity which, I should say, create a wonderfully interwoven pattern of society. Still each caste here lives by itself and according to its own traditions.

To a casual observer it may seem that traditions are fast decaying in this region. But in my conversations with the aged in most communities I came to feel that along with the desire for socio-economic change there is still that innate urge to honour traditions.

It was in a very few temples only that I could see any priest of the Nambudiri community. Mostly the priests are from the Embrandiri brahmin community whose traditional home is Kanara:

* In the preparation of this paper based on observations made during three field-trips to the West Coast (1955-56), I am indebted to Professor (Dr.) U. R. Ehrenfels, Ph.D. (Vienna), Head of the Department of Anthropology, University of Madras, for all his kind and constructive suggestions.

Yet Embrandiri Brahmins also speak Malayalam now. They also, like Nambudiris, enter into *sambandham* (marital) relations with the Nair ladies. The Embrandiri whom I met is a priest in an Ayyappan temple and he has his daily food either at the *illom* (house) of the rich Nambudiri in the locality or at the *Kovilakam* (manor-house) of the Rajah where food is cooked and served by Brahmins. In a Kali temple I met a young Embrandiri priest who is also studying for the S.S.L.C. Examination. This example illustrates to some extent how a traditional way of life is combined with the desire to educate oneself in an entirely non-priestly atmosphere.

In addition to his priestly functions, the Embrandiri himself prepares the *naivedya* (offerings) for the deity. In Kali temples the *naivedya* is of sweetened rice and fruits. In Ayyappan temples I found a stone-slab on which coconuts were smashed to pieces as offerings to the deity. To collect these coconut pieces, Nair, Nambudiri, Embrandiri and Pattar Brahmins (i.e., Tamil-speakers settled in Malabar),—children and elders—all gather before the temple.

In the temple there are servants belonging to the Nambisan, Nair and Marar communities. The Nambisan is in charge of the provisions of the temple. He keeps the accounts and weaves garlands for the deity. He is consulted by the Embrandiri priest though he is prevented from getting up the *mantapa* (dais) in front of the deity or the *agrasala* (place where offerings are cooked). The Nair women who are associated with the temple keep the precincts clean, and also wash the vessels in which offerings are prepared. The Marar's function is to play on the drum on festive occasions.

What I saw is that the peaceful inter-relations between castes related to the temple in some functional capacity are in a pattern in which each element of action, ritual or otherwise, completes another that is essential to the working of a temple as a religious institution.

One may say that the temple is a preserver of "Great Traditions".[1] To mention an example, in Malabar the *Velichapad* (an

1. Robert Redfield:—"The Social Organization of Tradition,"—paper published in the Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. XV. No. 1, November, 1955.

oracle) is an interesting figure. Associated with a temple, he gives out oracles in the name of that temple's presiding deity. By caste he may be a Kurup or Nair. I happened to meet a Panicker whom the villagers respected much. On inquiry I heard that he is a Velichapad famous in many parts of South Malabar. He has a status in society and his role is to act as Velichapad in festivals conducted at Vettaikkorumakan temples in Malabar. Vettaikkorumakan is another manifestation of the Lord Ayyappan and the songs in honour of Him are different from those sung in praise of Ayyappan.

I was told that there was none to take this Panicker's place in the future. The status is acquired by birth matrilineally but not inherited from the father. Only a Nambudiri's son by a high-caste Nair woman can come to occupy his position. Others cannot. This illustrates how an occupation is given to an individual of a particular caste whose main duty is to be an oracle. In the past and even now in some places the Nambudiris are the *Uralans,* managers of their own village temple.

Most devotees I met with in Kali and Ayyappan temples were Nairs and Pattar Brahmins. Except on festival days, there are few visitors who come to the temples. Even the poorest and once despised castes come to see festivals, but though permitted by law now to enter the temples they are not seen to make use of this permission by entering the temples. They give their gifts to the Nambisan to be presented before the deity and take away the *prasadam* offered in their names. When I asked a Cheruma whether he had seen a temple from inside, he simply replied: "Some of us go to Palani and some to Kodungalur." In these two places are situated the famous temples of Lord Subrahmanya in the form of a mendicant and that of Goddess Durga, the most famous deity in the west coast. Examinations make some young ones to think of the village god, but otherwise modernism has not much entered temple attendance.

Every temple has a tank nearby and all higher castes use it. All castes also participate in the local festivals and auspicious days of the year and understand very well the responsibilities and mutual obligations in the daily routine of the composite village community.

II

Another unit of my observation was the weekly village market,—the shandy. All castes come to the spot where sellers and buyers meet. These sellers and buyers belonged to castes ranging from the Parayas to the Nambudiris and also non-Hindu castes such as the Muslim Mapillas. The market is held once a week at an important centre which may be a Taluq Headquarter or a central village to which persons from neighbouring villages can come and return by sun-set of the same day.

The shandy where I started my observations is held on every Wednesday in the week at Manjeri in Ernad Taluk of South Malabar. Ernad is a well-known Mapilla centre in Malabar and on the shandy day the Mapillas' elementary schools remain closed. There are also teachers belonging to other castes in Mapilla boys' and girls' elementary schools.

Most of the sellers of vegetables, bead-necklaces for the Cherumas, and coolies are Mapillas. The Parayans are the bamboo basket and mat-makers and the Kumbharans are the dealers in clay vessels. The Chaliyans who are the weavers assemble to sell the hand-woven cotton clothes and the Panans come with their palm-leaf umbrellas. The village black-smiths are there to sharpen sickles and knives.

It is between 4-5 o'clock in the evening that the shandy becomes very crowded. In a village shandy most of the sellers know their buyers and what I found was that transactions took place peacefully and without exchange of hot words. The people say that the prices of vegetables are high and some of them who have garden-plots attached to their houses grow there seasonal food. Here is an example of a Mapilla's reaction to my purchasing from him a bamboo comb and a bead necklace. "It is quite interesting!" he repeated my words roaring with laughter. "For you, what is this for!" My friend who was with me replied to him: "This is a kind of study:" He was puzzled when we moved away from him.

Who are the buyers? Among the higher castes men only go to the shandy. Their women do not. Even today the more unsophisticated among poorer Tiya women working outside do not go on the main roads to return to their homes. They prefer to go by the more secluded foot-paths and over the fields.

The women mostly seen in the shandy are of the Cheruma and Kumbharan castes. One finds in the Brahmin-owned provision shops orthodox Nambudiris at times and even local officials who are all treated with high regard. In the Nair and Mapilla-owned tea-shops one can see the inter-mingling of persons of different castes entering into heated discussions over the latest news in the regional newspaper or over the transfer of some local official of importance.

Malabar was undoubtedly famous for its tanks and the cleanliness of its peoples. Most of the persons of different castes have a bath after their return from shandy. The Nambudiris and the Nairs do not fail to take a bath in the evening. But I did not see many people in the evenings at the temple. The place of worship does not attract as many as the shandy does.

III

In this paper I have only attempted an illustration of the inter-caste relations in Kerala; a preliminary study based on two units of observation—the village temple and the village shandy. Here the pattern of structure in a society still governed by caste is blending with the patterns of economic and ritual requirements. And I feel that both are based on "great traditions."

THE GANGĀS IN THE TAMIL COUNTRY*

by

M. AROKIASAMI

Department of Indian History

I

Ganga Origins and the Tamil Country

The interest of South Indians in the exploration and study of South Indian history has been on the increase in recent times. The history of the Deccan has been well studied; so is it the case with the history of Peninsular India. But that of the interim belt, the land of Karnataka power, has not yet been studied in any appreciable manner, particularly with reference to history and politics in the extreme south of India in their long meandering course of centuries beginning with the dawn of the Christian era.

The action and interaction of Canarese dynasties like the Raṭṭās, Gangās, Chālukyas and the Hoyśālas on the politics of the Tamil country still presents an unploughed field but for the few furrows made by a stray work here and there conceived and carried out by lonely scholars yet to be sufficiently appreciated.

The work of Mr. K. R. Venkatarama Iyer on the Hoyśālas in the Tamil country[1] is one distinctly of this kind and serves as an inspiration for the works of the same kind to rise on the other dynasties as well. The pair of lectures I propose to deliver under the present endowment will bear on the Gangās in the Tamil country.

In spite of the numerous inscriptions of the Gangās collected in the volumes of the *Epigraphia Carnatica* and the model of a treatise based on them by Mr. Lewis Rice in his *Mysore and Coorg from inscriptions,* much research has yet to be done on the long Ganga episode of well over a millenium beginning from atleast

*Lectures delivered under the Sankara-Parvati Endowment on the 27th and 28th of January, 1956.

1. Annamalai University Historical Series, No. VII (1950).

the middle of the third century A.D. The Ganga connections with the Tamil country is yet a largely unwritten tale.

Antiquity of the Gangās

Chālukyan inscriptions frequently mention the Ganga rulers with the title, *Maula*, which means "of ancient unmixed descent" and, as Mr. Rice tells us, "the name Ganga is not an ordinary one". Pliny and Ptolemy, Virgil and Flaccus Curtius, and Megasthenes make mention of the Gangās as a dynasty, which grew to power in the smiling valley of the river Ganga. From the evidence of these writers it is easy to date the origins of the Gangās as a dynasty of a great people as early as the first century A.D., at which Pliny wrote.

Ganga Origin

The stories of Ganga origin mentioned in early Ganga inscriptions, to the birth of the first Ganga ruler from the Ganges, merely emphasise the fact that the valley of the Ganges was the early home of the Ganga family.

The valley of this great river has been the cradle of many dynasties of rulers, both great and small, both northern and southern. Here we find the first contact between the Gangas and the Tamil country. The history of the great feudal families of this region in early times—the Vēḷir chieftains generally designated as the great donors of the Sangam times—clearly points to the same valley of the Ganges as the home of their origin.[2] Hence we find the well-known commentator of Tamil works, Naççinārkiniyar, speaking of the migration of Vēḷir families from this region into the south both in his comment on the *pāyiram* of Tolkāppiyam and on *śutrā* 32 of the same work. Hence again we find the Irukkuvēḷ chieftain in the second century A.D. at Ārayam in the Mysore region of modern times,[3] which soon becomes the kingdom of the Gangās.

Ganga Origin and the Tamil Country

There was thus reason for a very early connection between the Gangās and the Tamil country. The mention of kings and

2. For detailed discussion see Arokiasami, *Early History of the Veḷḷār Basin*, Pt. i.

3. See *Puram*, 201, 202, in which Kapilar addresses the Irukkuvēḷ at Āryam and refers to his northern origin.

cultivators in migration from the north to the south in very early times in the above mentioned comment of Naççinārkiniyar probably refers to the migration of the Gangās among others into the south.

The inscriptions of the Gangās give a narration of the way in which this migration was effected. Priyabhandu, one of the first rulers of the dynasty, when he assumed royal proportions was blessed by God; and Indra vouchsafed to him on that occasion five tokens of his sympathy and support, which were to bring the new king victory against any enemy. In due course these wonderful weapons of war created jealousy among the neighbouring kings, particularly in the mind of Mahipāla, King of Ujjain, who waged war against Priyabhandu for the purpose of wresting from him the five tokens of Indra. War having commenced, Priyabhandu sent his two sons together with his daughter to the south, naming them Dadiga and Mādhava.[4]

Evidently this narration is not to be taken literally. It only indicates the necessity for the migration, which might have been over-population, jealousy of the neighbouring kings or some other cause of the same kind. The inscriptions, from which the information has been drawn, do certainly indicate a situation in which there was growing opposition among the reigning kings of the north, while the information given to us by Tamil writers indicate that there was over-population in the north that made a downward migration necessary. The above referred to comment on Tolkāppiyam points to the latter and the Ganga inscriptions to the former as the cause of the migration. This difference means nothing. The story stated by Naççinārkiniyar in the above reference is even more interesting than what the evidence from the Ganga side tells us. "The entire south having gone to Kailāśa to attend the wedding of the divine consorts, Śiva and Pārvaṭi, it was found necessary for the sage Agastiya to lead a migration to the south."

The Irukkuvēḷ-Ganga Connections

Nothing points to the early connection of these Karnātaka rulers with our region so well as the connection between the Irukkuvēḷs of Kodumbāḷūr and these Kings. Reference has already been made to the presence of the former in Karnāṭaka region in the poems of Kapilar. More convincing evidence is

4. See Rice, Mysore and Coorg, p. 31.

forthcoming in the donative record found on the walls of the Muççukundēśvara temple which purports to record a grant to the Kannada ascetics of the Kālamukha sect and the inscription is written in Kannada characters. A tank is also said to have been made for the use of these ascetics. Their connection with the Pallavās, with whom the Gangās later get closely connected is also another indication in the same direction. The greatest of the chieftains of Kodumbāḷūr bears a Kannada name, Bhūṭi Vikramakēśari, reminding one of the later name Buṭuga. These points have been fully discussed in my book "The Early History of the Veḷḷār basin with special reference to the Irukkuvēḷs of Kodumbāḷūr" and need not tarry us here. But they unmistakably point to a close connection between the Gangās and these Vēḷir chieftains, the first belonging to a family of rulers and the second to a family of cultivators, which brings the much needed confirmation to the statement of the Tamil commentator that families of kings and cultivators were in migration to the south in early times.

The First Capital of the Gangās

"At the time of the foundation of the Ganga kingdom its chief city was Kuvalāla (Kōlar)".[5] But that was not the capital. The well-known capital of the Gangās, Taḷkād on the Cāuvery, was set up by Harivarman only in the fifth century A.D. What was then the original Ganga capital? This question has not been studied so far. From all available sources of information that would appear to have been in the Tamil country.

Here a reference must be made to the Tamil chronicle, *Kongudēśarājākkal*, which points to this fact. Ever since the great Col. Colins Mackenzie obtained this Mss. record it has been studied time and again by scholars of the first order like Wilson, Dowson and Taylor.[6] In recent times the Government of Madras has also published this Mss. with a good historical introduction.[7] I am only quoting the opinion of an erudite scholar like Mr. Lewis Rice, one who has done much to put the history of Mysore on the map of Indian history, when I say that its historical accuracy is sometimes greater than that of inscriptions.[8] The Rev. Mr. Taylor in his

5. Rice, *op. cit.*, 28.
6. See Dowson in *JRAS*, VII; Taylor, *MJLS*, XIV. See also Wilson's *Catalogue*.
7. Govt. of Madras Oriental Mss. Series, No. V.
8. Rice, *Mysore Inss.*

first notice of the chronicle in the *Madras Journal of Literature and Science* speaks of it as "one of the best in the whole Mackenzie collection, being free from fable and supported by dates."[9] This record deals with the ancient rulers of Kongu beginning from the dawn of the Christian era down to the fall of Vijayanagar. The Ganga portion of it is highly informative and it has also received substantial corroboration from the inscriptions of the period.

It is in this work that mention is made of a place called Śkandapura as the Ganga capital, where Ganga kings are said to have been anointed.[10] And the historian need not wander far in his identification of the place since it clearly states, Śkandapurā in Kongudēśam".[11] It was here, according to the same record, that the Reṭṭi Kings of Kongu ruled and there is every possibility of the Gangās succeeding them in that Capital city. Any attempt, however, at its identification in spite of the indication given in the chronicle is bound to be at best conjectural, since there is no place of that name even in the region of Kongudēśam at the present time. Mr. C. M. Ramachandran Chettiar's attempt at identifying the place with Dhārapuram in the Coimbatore district on the ground that it represents a Tamilisation of the sanskrit Śkandapura seems a little farfetched.[12] But from other points of view the identification stands on firm ground. Whether we take the importance the region round modern Dhārāpuram occupied when Pliny wrote or when the Romans traded with South India or when Hyder and Tipu conquered the Kongu country in the XVIII century or when we consider the topography of the region as described in *Kongudēśarājākkaḷ* or from the point of view of the fertility of the locality as referred to in the same chronicle the identification with Dhārāpuram seems to stand four square. *Kongudēśarājākkaḷ* describes Śkandapura as a place situated among fertile fields, which is true with regard to Dhārapuram. From mere geographical point of view the central position occupied by this town in the whole of the Tamil country deserves to be noted.

The only other place that can lay claim to this honour may be Kāngayam situated close to Dhārāpuram, a place which seems to bear in its name the ancient connection with the Ganga. It may be better said to have suffered a sanskritisation when the

9. *MJLS.*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. Kongu Malar, II, 143.

chronicle calls the place as Śkandapura, since both Gangēyam and Śkanda refer to the same god Muruga. On the other hand, Mr. Ramachandran Chettiar refers to old Mahrāṭṭa inscriptions to be found in the local temple at Dhārāpuram, which perhaps point to its having been the capital of the Raṭṭās. The question needs further to be investigated. But the point, which seems undeniable, is the fact that the Gangās had their first capital in the Tamil country and in Kongu, wherever it might have been situated in that region.

The Tamil country, the Origin of the Ganga Power

Such is the connection of the Gangās with the Tamil country and, if some day what has been said above about their capital comes to be verified more thoroughly, the Tamil country will hold itself out as the birth-place of the Ganga power and will revolutionise our knowledge of Karnātaka history.

Strange as this may seem the great title of the Ganga kings, 'Konganivarman', later used in its varied form 'Konganivrṭa' needs to be explained; and it is significant that it is the first rulers of the dynasty who use this title. The very first king of this house, who may be taken as its historical founder, Mādhava, is called as King Mādhava Konganivarman I. It must express without doubt the early connection of this dynasty with Kongudēśa.

Besides this we have certain definite literary and inscriptional evidences to prove this early Ganga connection with the Tamil country. We know for a fact that long before inscriptions refer to the Gangā rulers in Karnātaka the Tamil works of the Sangam times do mention them as persons, who, having come from outside, had settled down in the Tamil country. To quote only one example, the great epic of the Tamils. *Śilappadikāram,* refers to "the Gangās and the many people closely allied with them", who had created a disturbance in the Tamil country:

It is also perfectly evident from historical and linguistic evidences that in early days there was little territorial difference between Kongu, Coorg and Karnātakā and we have the high authority of Rev. Kittel, the Kannada scholar, in tracing the complete verbal similarity between Kongu and Kodgu, which become in course of time Kudagu or Coorg.[13] Mr. W. Lōgan in his *Malabar*

13. *IA.,* VI, p. 100 and the foot-note thereon.

Manual adds a point of great strength, when he says that "the Mysore Rājāhs are still mentioned as Kongarājāhs."[14] Mr. Walhouse[15] takes us to prehistoric times when he says that both the Kongu and Coorg prehistoric remains exhibit striking similarities.

Ganga and the Kalābhra

The conclusion to which these evidences point is that the Gangās had entered very early the Tamil country, though the Tamils had always kept opposing them, as the Tamil works of the first centuries of the Christian era tell us without doubt; and that this entry was effected on account of the ancient connections between Kongu and Karnātaka, regions alike geographically, historically and even geologically. Both the territories are mountainous regions called in ancient classification of the Tamils as the Malnād or Malainād; geologically they are in the same kind of belt and we are informed as late as the days of the Cōḷa king Āditya that gold, now available in Mysore, was available in Kongu as well;[16] and historically Kongu was never under the rule of the Tamil kings as other regions like Cōḷamandalam or the Kingdom of the Pāndyas.

The great problem of the Kalābhra in the Tamil history of the South India seems to get an explanation at this point, if we take into account the statement in *Murṭhināyanārpurānam* that a Kannada became so powerful in early times as to destroy all the erstwhile monarchies of the Tamil country.[17] In fact it is the commonplace of South Indian history that during nearly four centuries, from the third to the seventh, all is silent about these Tamil dynasties while the history of the Gangās marches on from period to period.

Kongu Pērur

Still, the most convincing argument of this crucial circumstance in the origin of the Ganga power in the south is given by the Ganga inscriptions themselves. The two stone inscriptions

14. *Malabar Manual,* I, 662.
15. *IA.,* IV, pp. 12-13.
16. See *Tirutondathogaianthāthi;* also *Mathuraikalambakam* where the term, "Konguraippon" is mentioned.
17. See *Murthinayanārpurānam* as also the comment thereon of Venkayya in *ARE.,* 1908, p. 53.

from Kaḻḻūrgudde and Purale in the Shimōga Taluk of the Mysore State are the earliest records giving us a detailed account of the Ganga origin.[18] They say that Dadiga and Mādhava came down to Pērur and met Ācariya Śimhānandi of the Kranūrgana. "Propitiating the goddess Padmāvaṭi", the records say, "he (Simhanandi) obtained a boon for them and presented them with a sword and a whole kingdom."

Scholars have been identifying this Pērur with Pērur near Cuddapah. That does not appear probable in any way. Pērur close on Cuddapah does not become associated with known Ganga history until very late, until the period of the Kalinga Gangas, pointedly referred to by Pliny as a new dynasty, "gens novissima"[19] and certainly different from the Western Gangas of whom we are speaking here and who are described in inscriptions as "an ancient unmixed race". It is from the connection of these latter Gangas that this Cuddapah-Pērur is sometimes known also as Ganga-Pērur and not from any connection with the Western Gangas.

The inscriptions of Kaḻḻūrgudde and Purale portray the Ganga rise to power purely on a Jain background—Ācariya Śimhānandi, who is referred to in the inscriptions of the Gangas as the *munipati,* who made their kingdom. But one looks for in vain for the vestiges of Jain supremacy to which these records point in Pērur near Cuddapah.

On the other hand, it would appear that at the time the two Ganga princes, Dadiga and Mādhava, were coming down to the south in search of an opportunity to establish their power that they were losing at home, the opportunity was waiting for them. Jainism was then in full play in the south and the whole region was traversed and controlled by Jain ascetics, priests, philosophers and, in a word, great promoters of the faith of Mahāvira. The Tamil chronicle to which reference was made earlier, speaks about this in no ambiguous terms. It refers to many Jain bastis and to many men learned in the Jain lore. The new religion was perfectly organised and disciplined under Pontiffs, who took their residence under the shade of the *shrikaree* tree planted by the side of the bastis and issued orders to their subordinates, the pūjāris, priests, and Gurus. The chronicle makes particular reference

18. *EC.,* VII, Sh. 4, 64.
19. See Rice quoting in his Mysore and Coorg, p. 30.

to three such men—Pañchanandi, Nāganandi, and Gurunandi and says:

> "Thus there were three men acquainted with the sacred books of the Jainas. One among them was Nāganandi, who was fit to instruct kings in the religious system of the Jains.[20]

The evidence of Tamil literature is also in unison with what is described in the chronicle and it is an undeniable fact that of the two northern religions, Buddhism and Jainism, the latter found more congenial soil in the south and continued to enjoy the favour of the Tamils for a period much longer and in a degree much greater than what was given for Buddhism to enjoy. The very quantum of extant Jain literature in Tamil is evidence in point.

In the Kongu region, in particular, Jainism controlled kingship and the Raṯṯa rulers, all but the last, were ruling Kongu under the aegis of Jain Pontiffs. It would appear that the last of the Raṯṯas, Tiruvikrama, gave up Jainism and became a Saivite.[21] He thus brought on a crisis. *Kongudēśarājākkal,* which records these events, refers to an inscription, which purports to make a huge land donation of 500 *cāndacams*[22] to the guru of his new religion, Narasimhabatta of the Bhāradvāja tribe, for the maintenance of the temple of Sankara not far from Śkandapura.

That this simple chronicle of the XVII century does not err or mislead is clear from what we read from authentic Ganga records referring to the installation of Dadiga and Mādhava in power at Pērur:

> "One Mādhava impressing him (Śimhānandi) with his extraordinary energy when he broke into two a stone pillar with a single stroke of his sword, Śimhānandi made a coronet of the petals of the karnikāra flowers bound it on Mādhava's head, gave them (the two brothers) the dominion of all the earth, presented them with a flag made from his peacock-fan and furnished them with attendants, elephants and horses. Along with these he gave them also the following advice: 'If you fail in what you have promised, if you do not approve of

20. *MJLS., op. cit.,* pp. 5-6.
21. *MJLS., op. cit.,* p. 6.
22. The inscription is not traceable; there is however no reason to discredit it especially since the particulars are mentioned. The *candacam* here seems to refer to the area of land in which a *candacam* of paddy (80 Madras measures) could be reaped.

the Jaina sāsana, if you seize the wives of others, if you indulge in wine and flesh, if you form relationship with the low, if you give not your wealth to the needy, if you flee from the field of battle—your race will go to ruin."[23]

Such then is the background of the Ganga rise to kingship in the South and Pērur in Kongu with its hoary Jain traditions answers much better as the place where Śimhanandi met Dadiga and Mādhava than Pērur in the Cuddapah region. It is to be remembered that it is the chronicle of the Kongu kings that describes the installation of the first Ganga rulers in Pērur in all its pomp and circumstance and remains to this day the only evidence on the subject besides the two Ganga inscriptions cited earlier. That Kongu-Pērur, in contradistinction to Ganga-Pērur, was important in Ganga times is borne out by the Kudalūru inscription of Mādhava I,[24] which records the gift of the village of Pērur and mentions its boundaries as "to the West of the river Totla and east of Marukarevisaya", obviously referring to the Totla which flows from the Nilgiris and to the present township of Madukarai near Coimbatore. Śrī Purusha, the great Ganga, in a later day is mentioned in an inscription as making a pilgrimage to this Pērur.

It must be therefore obvious to any dispassionate student of history that the Ganga origin to power begins in the very heart of the Tamil country—a fact not well known and at any rate not sufficiently emphasised. The Gangas account for nearly 600 years of unbroken rule in different parts of the Tamil country and particularly in the modern districts of Coimbatore and Salem from the beginning of the fourth to the end of the ninth century, the date of the commencement of the Cōla empire in South India.

The important part played by Pērur near Coimbatore all through this long period is explicable only from this point of view. We read in Pāndyan inscriptions, for example, reference to Pērur in terms of great praise. It would appear that in those early times entry into this place was considered equivalent to the conquest of the whole of the 'Kongubhumi'. The Madras Museum Plates of the Pāndyan Jatilāvarman referring to the victorious march of Maran Neduñjadayan into the Kongu country contains this exhilarating passage:

23. Ec., op. cit., loc. cit.
24. See Mysore Archaeological Report, 1930.

"Having seen Adiyan (who wore) a resplendant lance turn to fight at Ayirur, at Pugaliyur and at Ayiraveli on the north bank of the Kāviri. . . . when the Pallava and the Kērala having become his allies. . . (he) captured the powerful king of Western Kongu with (his) murderous elephants. . . . subdued Kongabhumi. . . entered the large village of Kāncivāyal in a woody region beautified by flower gardens and built a temple resembling a hill to Tirumāl."[25]

The epigraphist rightly identifes Kāncivāyal with Pērur, which bears that alternative name in the Tēvaram of Appar and later in Tiruviḷayādalpurānam in which the line, "Kongir Kāncivāy-Pērur" occurs.[26] To this day this place is marked off from other places in the Kongu country of ancient times by its grand temple, which bears on its face the relics of the numerous invaders to whom it had been subjected from the days of Śimhanandi and Mādhava to the last ruler of Viajayanagar. Both in the architectural designs and the inscriptions to be seen here as well as the different sculptural forms exhibited here the political history of Pērur is broadly written.

The Pāruvis and the Taḷakādites

We have thus to predicate a period of Ganga rule in Kongu from the fourth century A.D. until the transfer of capital to Taḷakād in the time of Harivarma in the following century. This was the period of Konganivarman I and Mādhava I—a period replete with important events, which marked the growth of the Ganga power. It is this growth that the transfer of capital to Taḷakād on the banks of the Cauvery also indicates. Of the two inscriptions of Harivarman so far known to us one is to be found in Tanjore,[27] and that also speaks of this growth, which first took place in the Tamil country.

It is generally supposed that the Gangas ruled over Kongu from Ṭaḷakād after this transfer effected by Harivarman. It would, however, appear that a member of the Ganga royal house was always stationed in this region to rule over it almost as an independent sovereign. Such was the rise of a dynasty of collateral Ganga rulers whom we may conveniently designate as Kongu-Gangas.

25. *IA.*, XXII, p. 73.
26. See *Eyarkonkaikāmanāyanārpurānam*, v. 88.
27. IA., VIII, 212.

These seem to have belonged to the Pāruvi house of Ganga royalty.

The following may be set out as our arguments for these conclusions:

The Tamil chronicle *Kongudēsarājākkal* tells us that only in Vishnugōpa's time the two regions—the Karnātaka and the Tamil country—came under the rule of one house, that of Talakād, which would imply that in the period prior to this ruler the two regions were ruled independently by two different Ganga houses. Vishnugōpa held them together during a long period of nearly half-a-century of his rule. After living to a ripe old age he, having despaired of an issue, chose for his successor a scion of the Pāruvi house and he was Mādhava II.

Ganga inscriptions do not however mention this adoption. The Tamil chronicle on the other hand, mentions not only this but another adoption as well—the adoption of Dindikāra (to be probably identified with Avanīta). Still, the question of choosing between these two sources of information is easily decided, since the grants of the Gangas on their own showing mark a time-space of 137 years between Vishnugōpa and Konganivarman II (from SS. 210 to 347)[28] and yet mention only two kings for this long duration, while there is evidently room for one or even two kings. The evidence of the chronicle thus appears to be more credible than even that of inscriptions.

It is while adverting to this that Mr. L. Rice, who arrives at the same conclusion says that the evidence of the chronicle is even more trustworthy than that of inscriptions. But whence comes this variance? The omission of the adoptions in the inscriptions is to be explained by the circumstance that these rulers, who are not mentioned in the inscriptions, are Paruvi rulers, whom records of the Ṭalakād house do not naturally include. Prof. J. Dubreuil says the same thing when he writes:

"I am of the opinion that both the genealogies are correct; but they are of two different dynasties."[29]

The Pāruvis were closely connected with the Tamil country and had Kongu as the centre of their activity. Both as a matter

28. See Fleet; IA, VII, 102; IA, V, 136; Rice: Mys. Inss., 289.
29. Ancient History of the Deccan, 105.

of necessity and as a result of extraordinary prowess so frequently do they get appointed to the throne at Ṭalakād ruling over both Karnātaka and the Tamil country that during long periods of years the distinction between Karnātaka and the Tamil country was completely annihilated. Durvinīta, the great ruler who put the kingdom of the Gangas on the path to empire, was one of this variety, Pāruvi, who secures the throne at Talakād by force of arms. Several Ganga grants and particularly the Uttānur, Mallohalli and Hebbūru plates clearly set forth the way in which Durvinīta succeeded to the kingdom of both the Pāruvis and the Talakādites.[30] The Uttānur plates refer to this event as follows:

"pittraparaśutā samvarjityāpi
Lakshmyā svayam abhipratyalingita."

The reference here is clearly to the Lakshmi of sovereignty which embraced Durvinīta, though "it had been intended for the son of another." Some writers expain this statement by postulating a *svayamvara* form of marriage or, what is worse, by postulating two wives for Avanīta, Durvinīta's father. We have no confirmation of these random suppositions in any of the inscriptions of the Gangās. Besides, it transpires one's understanding why the wise Avanīta should have discarded a person like Durvinīta, whose later history makes him one of the greatest of the Ganga kings. The term 'pittraparaśuta', which has given rise to this conclusion, seems to bear the translation, "the son of another" better than "another son". Thus broadly translated the passage under reference would read as follows:

"The throne was intended for the son of another; but Durvinīta by force of arms made the Lakshmi of sovereignty embrace him."

The distinction made here between the Gangās of Śkandapura and the Gangās of Talakad must now be taken as established.

The Gangās and the Pallavās

The Ganga copper plates of Mallohalli and Udayendiram mention a victory of Konganivarman I against the Bānas, to whom, as the records graphically say, he became "a wild-fire."[31] The Kandasāla grant of his son, Mādhava, states that "Konganivarman

30. Mys. Arch. Report, 1936, p. 36.
31. EC., IX, Bb. 67.

possessed wide renown acquired in a number of battles."[32] It is not easy to explain why Konganivarman fought the Bānas, unless we connect him with the Tamil country as we have done. In the opening years of the fifth century the Bānas were in alliance with the Pallavās, whose western boundary they guarded. The Kadamba king Mayūraśarman is said to have levied tribute from the Bānas to rouse the anger of the Pallavās. Subsequently the Bānas became settled feudatories of the Kadambās. It was at this juncture that the Gangas in Kongu came to the help of the Pallavās. Hence the Udeyindiram grant says that Konganivarman" was consecrated to conquer Bānamandala" and he became according to another Ganga record, "the forest fire to the Bāna stubble."

Victories over the Gangās gave the Bānas the first cause for greatness and it was achieved under the aegis of the Pallavās. The Pallava-Ganga alliance of which we have demonstrable proofs in the history of the Ganga-Pallavās and that of the Nolāmba-Pallavās, is a point to be noted here, since that gives one an idea of the Ganga influence in the Tamil country. Harivarman himself, who later changed his capital to Talakād, claims to have been crowned by the Pallava.[33] Konganivarman I seems to have made good use of the support of the Pallavās to set up his kingdom on sure foundations. His son and successor, Mādhava, is thus seen reigning peacefully cultivating all the arts of peace and culture, himself becoming "the touch-stone for testing the gold of learned poets," to use the language of an epigraph.

32. Mys. Arch. Report, 1925, No. 15.
33. *EI.*, XIV; Mys. Arch. Report, 1930.

THE GANGAS IN THE TAMIL COUNTRY

II

Ganga Rule and the Tamil Country

We must distinguish three sets of Gangā rulers in the Tamil country. The first set comprises the early Gangās, who can be called the Gangās of Skandapura; the second set is formed by the imperial Gangās who begin their rule over our region from the time of Avanīta onwards; and the third group consists of the Ganga feudatory rulers, whose rule lasted even as late as the fourteenth century A.D.

Conquests of Durvinīta

Quite early in his reign we find Durvinīta busy conquering the Kongu region, that had been occupied in parts by the Cēras and the Pallavās during the period of internal disorder in the Ganga kingdom prior to his accession to the throne. Kongu had belonged to him by right as a Pāruvi in power; and yet it had been lost to him temporarily. Hence we find his very first victories placed in this very region. Such are the victories of Andāri, Ālattur, Porulare, and Pennāgarady mentioned both in the Uttānūr and Nallāla plates. Epigraphists have identified these places of Durvinīta's victories in the region of Coimbatore and Salem and in the region of the Pallavās, the ancient Tondaimandalam. Beginning from the Kongudēśa, the conquering monarch would appear to have carried his victorious arms as far as the Pallava kingdom. The victories of Pennāgarady and Ālattur must be identified without doubt with Pennagaram in Salem and Ālandūr near Pallāvaram. In the same way the Coimbatore region also saw the victorious march of Durvinīta. Here he destroyed the Cēra influence, that had gathered strength, by the conquest of Punnāta-Pannāta, which entitled the Ganga king as "the Lord of the whole of Punnāta-Pannāta."

The Identification of Punnāta-Pannāta

The identification of the Punnāta region needs some explanation. The Komaralingam copper plates of Ravidatta,[34] which is the

34. *IA.*, XVIII, 362 ff.

only record on the Punnātarāja mentions the grant of Pungisōge (a village in Coorg) and a few other Canarese villages "to persons to whom they belonged" and among these places one called Eḷagōvanūr is also mentioned, which may well refer to Coimbatore. The Cēra inscriptions of the period found in Veḷḷalūr near Coimbatore, which mention Cēra rulers like Viranārāyana and Ravikōdan clearly imply Cēra penetration in the Coimbatore region in the period just prior to that of Durvinīta.[35] Ravidatta was a Cēra feudatory in this category and the Punnāta kingdom, of which he is mentioned as the ruler, must have comprised the Coimbatore region as well. The discovery of the record which refers to the Punnāta-rāja at Komaralingam in Udumalpet Taluk of Coimbatore district is very significant. The kingdom of Punnāta must have therefore comprised a territory connecting Coorg and Coimbatore, parts of which must have been included in it. Ptolemy's description of Punnāta "as a land of beryls" definitely points to Kangayam as a part of this kingdom, since from ancient times that was the land of beryls. The statement of Col. Mark Wilks in his History of Mysore[36] that:

> "Cēran united Kāngiam (*sic*) and Salem to the dominions of Kērala or Malabār"

seems to set the seal of approval on the identification of Punnāta with a region reaching out from the south of Coorg along the Western ghats to as far south as Kāngayam in the district of Coimbatore. Hence perhaps the kingdom was called Pannāta, literally meaning many lands. The term Punnāta itself may be a corruption of the Tamil Ponnādu, meaning the land of gold, for which Kongu was famous in early times.

Durvinīta and the Ganga Foreign Policy

The epoch-making change effected by Durvinīta lay in the great change he made in Ganga foreign policy, in that he chose to ally with the Chālukyās as against the Pallavās, who had been the great supporters of the Gangās till his accession to the throne at Ṭaḷakād. Durvinīta was the contemporary of Pulikēśin II, whom he made his son-in-law by a master stroke of policy. It must be remembered that the great Pallavā-Chālukyā conflict of the VII century in South India was to a large extent supported by

35. *ARE.*, 1910, pp. 147-48.
36. Rice; Mysore, p. 5.

the Gangās on the Chālukyan side, by Durvinīta and Bhuvikrama in the seventh century and by Sri Purusha in the eighth. The Pallavās were defeated in quick succession. The defeated Pallavās sought the alliance of the Rāshtrakūtas as against the Chālukya and the Ganga and that ended in the defeat and imprisonment of Śivamāra II, the Ganga king, who was subsequently crowned king at Taḷakād by the Pallava and the Rāshtrakūta, who jointly presided over the ceremony. This was the great event of the first quarter of the IX century, the year 813 A.D.

This year 813 A.D. marks a great change in the history of the Gangās in the Tamil country. The vast kingdom of the Gangās was now divided into numerous provinces and was given to virtually independent Governors, who were scions of the royal house. The power of the Ganga rulers of Kongu became severely circumscribed from this change. On the one hand there was the curtailment of territory, since it was apportioned to numerous Governors and on the other they felt the control of the supreme hand at the centre. It is during this period that we hear of a grant[37] to a Jain temple at Śripura near Nilgiris at the request of one Nirgundarāja, who was possibly the ruler of West Kongu.

The Ganga-Pallava Alliance

The Pallavās once more gained the support of the Gangās. A whole family of them began to rule over Noḷambāvadi and became known as the Noḷamba-Pallavās; while in the south the Ganga-Pallavās established their power in the region of the two Arcots, the south and the north, and we read of one of them, Prithvipati I, giving up his life happy at the thought that his Pallava ally, Aparājita, had won the day at Śripurambiyam.[38]

It is a common place of South Indian history that the victory of Śripurambiyam led on to the rise of Āditya and the Cōḷa empire, which fast covered like a summer cloud the entire Tamil country and even beyond. During this period the Gangās were made to lose perforce their influence in this region, though we find the Cōla Parāntaka I conferring the Bāna sovereignty on the Ganga prince, another Prithvipati (the second of the name), in 921 A.D.[39]

37. *EC.*, IV, Ng. 85.
38. *EI.*, IX, pp. 87 ff.
39. *SII.*, ii, 387.

Thus the Gangās end their connection with the Tamil country almost in the same way in which they began. Their rise to power, which owed a great deal to the support of the Pallavās, was possible because there was the danger of the Bāna alliance with the Kadambās on the western front of the Pallava kingdom, whence the Ganga king was created as "a forest-fire to the stubble, the Bāna."[40] Now towards the close of their independent rule in the Tamil country we find the Cōla king conferring the "Bāna sovereignty" on the Ganga. In the long period that lies between these two events lies the 600 years of Ganga history in the Tamil country, a period which had seen the incoming of many powers foreign to our region, particularly, the Chālukya and the Rāshtrakūta, all in the wake of the Gangās.

The Last Ganga King in the Tamil Country

The lithic grant of Rakkāsa Ganga, the last of the dynasty to rule over the Karnātaka, acknowledges Cōla overlordship.[41] In the final quarter of the eleventh century A.D., the Cōla dominion was firmly established over the entire Tamil country and Karnātaka. As early as 1004 A.D. Rajendra had captured Taḻakād. We find the Gangās now seeking shelter under the Chālukyas and the Hoyśālas. Under the latter the talent of Ganga nobility was put to proper use and it gave a good account of itself. Men like Gangarāja and Udayachandra played important roles in the history of the Tamil country during this period; the former captured Taḻakād from the Cōlas and the latter helped the good administration of the Hoyśāla in the Tamil country.

Ganga Feudatories in the Tamil Country

In spite of all these administrative changes Ganga feudatories still functioned in our region. Rulers like Śiyagangan mentioned in the reign of Kulottunga III, Panchanādivanan-Nīlagangarāyan mentioned in the reign of Rajaraja III, another Nīlagangarāyan mentioned in the reign of Jatāvarman Śundara III and a Nīlaganga of the time of Kulottunga again are mentioned in inscriptions of the period coming from Chittoor and Chingleput.[42] Their period ranges from 1180 and 1304 A.D., according to these inscriptions.

40. See, for ex., EC., IX, Db. 67.
41. *EC.*, III, Md. 78.
42. V. Rangachari, *Inss.*, I, Chittoor, 64; *SII*, III; 122, 207, 589 of 1919; *H.I.S.*, I, p. 370.

The Government Epigraphist in his report for 1913[43] opined that because Nīlagangarāyan is referred to in an inscription as *piḻḻaiyār* of Vijayagandagōpala[44] and Rājarājaśāmbuvarāyan of about the same time is also mentioned in the same way[45] both these feudatories were brothers and sons of Vijayagandagōpala. It was also argued by the Epigraphist that since Rājarāja Śambuvarāyan bears the usual Pallava title of *Āḻapirandān* like Kopperunjinga all these rulers belonged to the same stock. All these feats of identification are absolutely confusing and do not serve much useful purpose. The term *piḻḻaiyār* seems to be a variant of *piḻḻai* and may just mean a feudatory. It is only in this surmise we can expain Mahibāla-Bāna being called *piḻḻai* of the Pāndyan king Māravarman Kulaśēkhara I. This seems to have been the XIII century fashion, since all these records are dated in the second half of that century.

There seems to be more meaning in identifying the four Gangarāya rulers above mentioned with the worthy descendants of the Gangās in the Tamil country, serving the Cōla and the Pāndya as feudatories. One of them, Nīlagangarāyan of the 7th year of Rājarājacola III calls himself clearly as "Chōla-Gangā"[46] and the range of their inscriptions would define their feudal kingdom within the limits of the old Tondaimandalam.

There is also the possibility of their having descended from the old Ganga-Pallava line. The region over which they ruled adds a plausibility of its own to this supposition. Whatever this might have been Panchanandivāna Nīlagangarāyar has left his mark in Tirumaḻizai, the well-known Vaishnava village of the Chingleput district. The numerous orders issued by him are still to be seen imprinted on the walls of the local temple, which possibly owes its origin to this ruler. The name Nīlaganga-Vinnagaṟam, which the temple bears, and the name, Nīlagangacaturvedimangalam, which the village Tirumaḻizai bears in inscriptions of the XIII century, lend great support to this conclusion. Ganga influence in the Tamil country easily penetrated through these Ganga-Pallava rulers, who descended from both the Ganga and Pallava houses and were therefore popular among the people. The village of Ukkal in North Arcot district was known for a long time

43. *ARE.*, 1912-13, p. 126.
44. 117 of 1912.
45. 302 of 1912.
46. 535 of 1912.

as Aparājitacaturveḍimangalam after the great Ganga-Pallava of the name, who defeated the Pāndya and gave the Cōla tiger, the future emperor Āditya, in the words of Prof. K. A. N. Sastri, "a taste for blood".

The Influence of the Gangās in the Tamil Country

The Ganga rule lasted in our region for atleast 500 years from the middle of the IV to the middle of the IX century and the Ganga influence lasted much longer. As indicated above we have inscriptional records of Ganga descendants going upto even the XIV century. It would be at once obvious that the period of the Ganga rule in the Tamil country is one longer than that of the Moghuls in India or even that of the British in recent times, both of which lasted only for 300 years.

The Gangās along with the Pallavās opened a new epoch in South India. The civilisation of the three centuries preceding their advent in this region was, though great, something different from that of the new age inaugurated by these two dynasties. To understand this we must go back to their origins. The northern origin of the Gangās has been established. Prof. R. Satyanātha Iyer in his *Political and Cultural History of India* Vol. I writes that the Western Ganga dominion was named Gangavādi, "why, we do not know".[47] We can explain that only with reference to the Ganges origin of these people. It is now too late in the day to be speaking of the southern origin of the Pallavās, as some still do. Whether they are the Pallavās of the North-west or not they belong to the people who had migrated from north to south in early times. Reference has already been made to the plausibility of the Gangās being included among the Kaḷābhrās. It would appear that the Pallavās also partook of the same character. I realise that this is a very bold statement to make in view of the fact that in the VII century it was the Pallava-Pāndya combination that defeated the Kaḷābhra combination. But we must remember that it was just at that time the Ganga-Pallava combination broke and Durvinīta sought the alliance of the Western Chālukyas. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that all through the dark period of the Kaḷābhra interregnum the Pallavās were the only rulers along with the Gangās to keep their heads above water in the whole of South India. In fact during the darkest part of this period inscriptions record no less than 16 Pallava rulers—the dynasty of the Sanskrit charters and the Gangās were equally going strong. It is true that during this period the Pallava charters are issued from various places all over the kingdom and not from Kānchi. That only shows that there was natural opposition to their rule in the south and the theory of the Cōla occupation of the place during the period must appear to be well verified, especially since Kumāravishnu in a later day speaks of having recaptured Kānchi from the Cōla enemy.

47. Political and Cultural History of India, I, 291.

(a) *On Administration.*—The Ganga northmen brought with them a distinct type of administrative system, in many ways well developed and with particular emphasis on local administration. One can never tire of saying that the Mauryan system of government was a model of administrative system; and these men coming from the north were soaked in that system. So far as the Pallavās are concerned there is little doubt that they were closely following that system. Dr. S. K. Iyengar has forcefully emphasised this point in two of his lectures on the evolution of the Hindu administrative institutions in South India.[48] The Ganga administrative system also partook of the same model as may clearly appear from the administrative divisions into which their kingdom was divided, the province, the district, the village, the offices of the Provincial Governor and the Village Headman, the system of multiple taxes, customs duties, the employment of well organised army and the use of the *nīti śāstras* as a grammar of administration.

South Indian polity was informed of a well ordered administrative system, it is true, for centuries before the new age of the Gangās commenced. Our Sangam poems are redolent with classical examples of good government, just taxation, the inescapable arm of the law, impeachable justice of kings and of kings who died when injustice was pointed out to them. The poets of that age acted everywhere as political philosophers and were royal advisers on the move. But all this did not mean a codified system of administration and the student of South Indian polity during the Sangam times cannot escape the feeling of a spent diver in the trackless ocean of Tamil poetry diving for the unattainable pearl of a political system.

It was this system that became a *fait accompli* during the days of the Gangās and the Pallavās, who covered between themselves

48. S. K. Iyengar, Evolution of Hindu Adm. System, Lectures III & IV.

the whole of our peninsular region for a period of not less than 500 years. Mr. B. L. Rice quoting from the Kannada lore of the period gives a sentence which underlines this statement:

> "The King was considered as a good administrator, one who evolved order from chaos and helped to maintain the same. Such a one was to be called a master or *dore*, the rest were men of straw or *pulmanasar*."[49]

Most of the Ganga kings appear as diligent students of administration. Mādhava I Konganivarman specialised in law; to Mādhava II is ascribed the authorship of *Dattakaśutra* or the law of adoption; Durvinīta, tutored by the celebrated Pūjyapāda, wrote a *vrti* or commentary on the 15 *śargās* of *Kirātārjuniya*.

The Gangās appear as rulers intent on good administration, as may be obvious from the fact that they always appointed only members of the royal house as governors of the provinces, both in the interest of sound administration and to make use of the provinces as a training ground of the potential rulers of the country. Thus the province of Kongalnād, 8,000 was successively committed to the care of one royal prince or another—Ereganga, son of Śivamāra to be followed by Butugā, son of Śatayvālkya II, and Ereyappa respectively. Each of these Governors was given independent charge of administration and we have the remarkable example of the Ganga king seeking the Governor's permission in Kongalnād while making a grant of land in that province.[50] Such was the administrative decentralisation combined with administrative discipline that lay at the bottom of the Ganga method of government.

(b) *The Growth of the Village Community.*—In their ardour for effective decentralisation the Gangās reached down to the village, which they made a small independent republic under its Headman, the *nalgounda* and its revenue authority in communication with the royal officers, the *maniagar*. These two offices which subsist to this day in our region are unforgettable souvenirs of the Ganga method of administration; and truly enough the *goundars* fill the very region, which had once seen Ganga rule in a pre-eminent manner—the districts of Coimbatore and Salem. The terms, *nal-goundan*, literally the good Headman, is mentioned

49. Rice, Mysore & Coorg, 167.
50. See the Kulgāna grant of A.D. 725.

in certain inscriptions as *nad-goundan*, probably a variant of *nāttu-goundan*, the term *nādu* meaning the *ūr* or the village. The term, *ūr-goundan*, is very common in the aforesaid districts of Coimbatore and Salem and the counterpart of this office is designated in other parts of the Tamil country as *nāttānmai*. The distinction of setting up an office like this, a community head as distinct from the official head of the village known in south India in earlier times, goes to these Karnātaka rulers of the Tamil country and they may be considered as the fathers of village communities in South India as the Pallavās in their own right are the fathers of the autonomous village, that reached its full development under the Cōlas.

Many are the inscriptions that refer to the importance of this office. The Harihara plates edited by Dr. Fleet refer to the gift of land for exploit performed by one Rāmadēva, son of a *gounda* or village chief in securing a lady of the royal household from danger. The village thus granted was Dēvanūru still to be seen 15 miles S.W. of Talakād.[51] An inscription from Shirkārpur dated in 918 A.D. shows the office of the *nal-gounda* being continued to the widow on the death of her husband, which would indicate that this was a strictly hereditary post and one that resided like royalty, in worthy families.[52]

(c) *On Finance.*—The Ganga system of administration was based on sound finance. Though the people were overburdened with too many taxes, one may be sure that the administration was not wasteful. Perhaps it was the most careful government that was ever designed in the middle ages in South India. The Gangās were the first to calculate the financial resources of each of their provinces. Thus Banavāse is described as 12,000, Gangavādi as 96,000, Nolambāvadi, 32,000, Kongalnād, 8,000, Pannād, 6,000 etc.—figures that once baffled the historian and now explained as referring to the annual income of each province calculated in *nishkā*, a Karnātaka coin equivalent to the *varāha* of the Tamil country.[53]

(d) *On Justice*—Justice was administered in the same rough and ready manner as was known to prevail in those times but punishments were so deterrent as to eradicate offences and offenders. Thus an inscription records that the destroyer of a tank

51. *IA.*, VII, pp. 168 ff.
52. *EC.*, VII, Shirkarpur, 219.
53. Rice, *op. cit.*, 174.

incurred the same guilt as the one who has committed the five great sins.[54] Kings were equipped with armies but not without cause would they go to war. The period of Harivarma was a period of dynastic change and the division of the kingdom between the two houses of Pāruvi and Taḷakād—a circumstance that might have easily led to war and yet we hear of no wars and the whole transaction comes off in the most natural manner. The composer of the Tamil chronicle, *Kongudēśarājākkal*, brings out this situation beautifully when he says:

> "By the four devices of peace, division, tribute, war (sama, bētha, dhāna, tandam) he (Harivarma) derived tribute from many kings."[55]

(e) *On Society.*—Perhaps the greatest influence of the Ganga rule in the Tamil country was in the field of social change. The Gangas were Brahmans with connections with great dynasties like the Ikshavākus, who ruled to the north of the Krishna between 225 and 345 A.D. One of the Nagārjunakonda inscriptions refers to the Ikshavāku princess being married to the king of Banavāse."[56] They were men steeped in śāstraic lore as has been already pointed out. They were naturally to be the bulwark of the new Hinduism that was about to sprout in South India after the long night of the unorthodox faiths. In spite of it or perhaps because of it the first Ganga ruler Konganivarman I is made to swear allegiance to Jainism. What follows is an inspiring story of high diplomacy which succeeds in supporting Hinduism without causing displeasure to a whole host of Jain *munis* and *munipatis*. The Gangās may be said to have extended their support equally to both the religion of Vishnu and that of Śiva. If Konganivarman was a Jain, Vishnugōpa was a Vaishnava, Govinda was a Lingāyat, and his brother Śivakāma, a Saivite, while the last two well-known rulers, Guṇaluttama and Malladēva II were Jains. The Gangās would appear to have maintained Jainism as the court religion and given the freedom of conscience to the people including themselves. It was in this subtle way that they nurtured the orthodox religion in South India at a time when it badly required a supporter. The Pallavās did build numerous temples to the Hindu deities; but it required all the talent of an Appar to bring round Mahendravarman from Jainism to Saivism. The Gangās were like

54. *EC.*, III, Sr. 34.
55. *MJLS.*, XIV, p. 7.
56. See *ARE.*, 1926-27, pt. ii.

deep water running as an undercurrent to fertilise the Hindu faith. Inscriptions describe both Avanīta and Durvinīta as having protected "castes and religious orders." The Bangalore Museum plates of the latter describe him as "Vaivasvata Manu in his effort to protect the castes and religious orders of South India." The custom of granting *dēvadāna* lands to temples and the creation of caturveḍimangalams and the grant of *brahmadēya* gifts to Brahmans were begun at this time and that more by the Gangās than the Pallavās. The Tanjore grant[57] of Harivarma details an interesting episode of a debate between a Buddhist and a Hindu exponent on their respective systems of philosophy. The subject for the debate was the reality of the soul. There was a public debate and the king presided. The Hindu exponent winning the day, the king was pleased, gave the victorious exponent—the Brahman, Mādhavabhatta—the title of *Vādibhaśimha* (lion to the elephant disputant) and the grant of the village of Ōrekōdu. The boundaries of the village being mentioned as the foot of the hill with Erepādi and Komāramangalam on either side strongly favour the identification of the place in Salem district.

It was again under the aegis of the Gangās that the fanatic system of Saivism known as the system of Kālamukha fathered on Lakulīśā flourished first in Karnātaka and then in the Tamil country and it required all the energy of the Pallavās to put them out. The Mēlpadi grant of the North Arcot district dated in 1020 A.D. is a grant made to Lakulīśa and further down in Kodumbāḷūr in the old state of Pudukkōtah, we find the Irukkuvēls of Kodumbāḷūr subscribing in a special manner to the Kālamukhās. The Mūvarkōvil inscription from this place refers to Mallikārjuna of the Kālamukha sect who is presented by the Irukkuvēl chieftain a big *matha* with eleven villages for feeding fifty ascetics of the same sect. He is also said in the same record to be a disciple of Vidyārasi,[58] perhaps the same who is mentioned in the tank bund inscription in Dharmapuri[59] as Vidderasi. The inscription in the pond-wall of the Muccukundēśvara temple of the same Kodumbāḷūr seems to refer to the same Vidderasi.[60] These facts show that this new form of Hinduism became very current in South India during this period and the pond-wall record above referred to is

57. *IA.*, VIII, 212 ff.
58. *ARE.*, 1907-08, pp. 87-88.
59. *EI.*, X, pp. 64-65.
60. 141 of 1907.

written in Kannada characters. We also know from other records that the Kannada country was the home of the Kālamukhās during this period and we understand that almost one quarter of Belgaum, the old Vēḷgrāmam, belonged to the Kālamukhās at this time.

Along with good government agriculture and industry prospered in the Tamil country under the Gangās, who introduced numerous gradations of coins, measures and weights. The *khānduga* measure still current in Salem district as *Cāndacam* is one of the kind; and the *gadiyana*, the gold coin of the Gangās, was used even in the Cola days in South India.

Numerous villages sprang into existence all over the Tamil country both as a result of growing economic life and for administrative convenience. Places like Ēḷūr, Thōḷūr and many others like them sung by the *Tēvāram* hymners of the period are villages that grew up during this time. Great unity was found among the people, who seem to have organised many feasts and pastimes as common endeavour. It would appear that people organised even hunts in common. Mr. Sewell in his *Lists of Antiquities* makes mention of an inscription in *vatteḷutu* in Oddappatti, a village to be seen to this day near the Railway station at Bommidi, which eulogises a hero who died in a *mānvēttai* or deer-hunt.[61]

(f) *On Culture*.—Though clear evidences are not to be had to show that the Gangās helped the increase of the cultural level of the people, there can be little doubt that the learned Gangās paid great attention to the education of their subjects. Durvinīta gets a place in Nripatungā's *Kavirājamārga* and Śri Purusha is said to have written a learned treatise on the science of elephants, *Gajaśāstra*. Numerous are the poets and grammarians, that swarmed the court of the Ganga and Akalanka's *Ashtaśakti*, Gunabhadra's *Uttarapurāna*, Ugraditya's *Kalyānakaraka* besides numerous other works written by men like Pampa, Asāga, Vimala, Udaya, Nagārjuna and Jayabhandu were written during the period with the support and to the honour of the Ganga court. Mādhava *Daṭṭakaśūtra* has already been referred to.

There can be no doubt that in an atmosphere so charged with literary productions of high repute as that of the Gangās we and

61. 212 of 1910.

our culture also benefited. The great *Nāladiyār* of the Tamils considered only second to the *Tirukuraḷ* for its wealth of experience and fund of truth, was the work of Jain ascetics composed and collected during the period of the Ganga rule in our region. In a later period when the Gangās were ruling in Kongu probably as the feudatories of the Hoyśālās great works were again composed in that region. Prominent among them were *Mākathai* of Konguvēḷ and *Nannūl* of Bavananḍi both of whom were Jains. The commentary of Adiyarkunallār on the far-famed *Epic of the Anklet* arose at about the same time and from the same region.

Some historians would place the author of *Nannūl* in the Tondaimandalam region on the ground that Sanakāpuram mentioned as the birth-place of Bavananḍi is to be found near Kānchipuram and that an inscription of his patron, Śiyagangan, is to be found in that place. It may be obvious that evidences such as these cannot be taken to clinch the issue, since no less than four places with the same name, Sanakāpuram, exist in the Tamil country,[62] and the discovery of a donative record of Śiyagangan in Kānchipuram cannot testify to the location of his kingdom. Donations were made to temples then, as now, from distant places without the donor visiting the place. If a record of Śiyagangan is found in Kānchipuram, two other records of his are found at Valaikādu and Kālahasti in Chittoor district.[63]

On the other hand, the only evidence speaking to the kingdom of Śiyagangan is to be found in *Kongumandalaśadakam:*

> " Olkā perum Bavananḍi
> Entrōthi upakaritha
> Valkāvalan Śiyagangan
> Ninrāḷ Kongumandalame."—Stanza, 5.

Sanakāpuram of Bavananḍi is also mentioned clearly in the same work as a place in Kurumbunād, one of the 24th divisions of Kongu:

> "Thungāppulamai Bavanandi māmuni thōnri vaḷar
> Kongirkurumbu thanilāthinātha Guruviḷangu
> Mangupoḷir Sanakāpuramum Kongumandalame."

Here reference is made to Sanakāpuram as the place of the birth and growth of Bavananḍi and mention is also made of his guru

62. See T. A. Gopinatha Rao; Sen Tamil, IV.
63. 432 of 1929; 285 of 1902.

More than all this is the Jain background from which we have to view Bavanandi and his work. Reference has been made to Jain supremacy in Kongu for nearly a period of 600 years and the Coimbatore region bears on its face the numerous marks of this long period of Jain influence in the bastis and inscriptions referring to donations to Jain temples, particularly in the Vijayamangalam area of Erode Taluk. It is in this region that the village Sanakāpuram is to be seen; it is from this region again that the poet Konguvēḷ rose in the XI century, the commentator Adiyarkunallār in the XII and the Grammarian Bavanandi followed him in the same century.

Still, the point that I wish to emphasise here is not so much the region from which Bavanandi came as the patron under whom his Grammar was written. That it came to be written under the inspiration of Śiyagangan is quite on the cards. His inscriptions place him in the XII century, to which Bavanandi also is assigned. More than all this the above mentioned *Kongumandalaśadakam* makes a clear mention of this:

> "Gangakurisiluvakka nannūlai kaninthu pugal
> Thungāpulamai Bavanandi................"

Mahāmahōpadyāya Dr. U. V. Swaminatha Iyer in his edition of the grammar of Bavanandi makes special reference to the part played by the Ganga prince in the evolution of this work. He tells us that to facilitate the knowledge of the Tamil grammar, which was hard for the common man who tries to understand *Tolkappiyam*, Śiyagangan saw to *Nannūl* being written.[64]

Events of Hoyśāla history also make it highly probable that in the XII century Kongu was placed under a Ganga feudatory of the Hoyśālās. Those were days of Hoyśāla advance into the Tamil country when, as an inscription of Vishnuvardhana Hoyśāla says, they shook the foundations of Kongu reaching as far up as the Nilgiris[65] and we know that the Ganga general Gangarājah was the prominent General of the Hoyśālas during the period. From this period onwards we find Hoyśāla inscriptions appearing in larger and larger numbers in the districts of old Kongu—those of Coimbatore and Salem—upto atleast the XIII century. The events connected with Śiyagangan and Bavanandi must, therefore, be taken as well authenticated.

64. Nannūl (Swaminatha Iyer's Edn.) Intro, 12.
65. Fleet; Pali and Old Canarese Inscriptions.

What was the contribution of the Gangās in the Tamil country to temple architecture? It is a little curious that the Gangās, who were Pallava contemporaries in the south, have left to us very few remnants of their architectural style. The reason may be that they were otherwise engaged and the art of temple building was a new art in South India during the period of their rule. What little we know of their temples in our region are from the Noḷāmba Pallavās and their ruins are to be seen to this day in the Dharmapuri area. Four of the pillars of the Noḷāmba style are to be found in the Mallikārjuna temple of the place and in Virupakshapuram. The unique architecture of the Mallikārjuna temple at Dharmapuri constructed in all probability in early X century by the well-known Mahendrādhirāja-Noḷāmba is an example of Kannada-Pallava art of the times. This important ruler described in the lithic record of the period as "the sole lord of the lady, the Gangamandala" left his name in Adamankottai, which was known even in the days of the Hoyśālas as Mahēndramangalam—such was his great influence over the region.

Conclusion

In fine, that the influence of the Gangās was very great in the Tamil country cannot be denied. It created a new spirit among us—a spirit that naturally mixed with our own civilisation and culture. Long after the Ganga period was over Vijayanagar found this to her advantage in our land. A Tamil epigraph from Gudimangalam in Coimbatore district dated in SS. 1458 is signed in Kannada by the royal officer[66] from which it would appear that the new empire made good use of this spirit and Kannada was even then one of the popular languages of the Tamil country.

66. 136 of 1916.

Symbolism—A Psychological Study: By Dr. Padma Agrawal. Manovigyan Prakashan, Banaras, 1955. Pp. 342. Price Rs. 10/-.

The conception of the unconscious has a long history and has been suggested as a plausible theory with a variety of emphasis and meaning by notable thinkers, among whom may be mentioned Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Nietzsche. However, it was given a scientific basis and justification only by Sigmund Freud. Freud describes the psychic process in its dynamic topographic and economic relations, of which the dynamic aspect assumes very great importance in his psychology. He endows ideas with dynamic energy which makes their permanent repression difficult, if not impossible. The repressed idea never dies but awaits an expression, like the pent-up steam, all the while increasing its pressure and tension by a complex stewing in its own slimy juice. These repressed libidinal forces constitute the dark and mysterious unconscious, which, to Freud, supplies the master-key to dream analysis, and pathological phenomena to religion and mythology, art and literature. Freud reduces all our psychic activities to sex, broadly understood. Art and literature employ symbols that give a clue to the basic libido. The artist knows "how to elaborate his day-dream so that they lose that personal note which grates upon strange ears and becomes enjoyable to others; he knows, too, how to modify them sufficiently so that their origin in prohibited sources is not easily detected," writes Freud in his "Introductory" Lectures (pp. 314-315). He drew attention to the resemblances between religious ritual and the ceremonials of obsessional neurosis. Of course, dreams were the *via regia* to Freud. Thus, psycho-analysis uses the term 'symbol' as the author of the volume under review puts it, in a specific sense, making it stand for an expression of those repressed desires of the unconscious which are erotic in nature (p. 11). Symbolism is the regressive conciliation of the intrapsychic conflicts between the conscious and the unconscious.

The author holds with Jung against Freud that the psychic energy is generic, something like the *elan vital* of Bergson, the 'will' of Schopenhauer. Jung's collective unconscious phylogenetically acquired with its archetypal images is a truer source of symbols than Freud's personal unconscious of an essentially sexual character.

The author also holds that the symbols do not have a fixed meaning, but have a dynamic value. She also maintains that symbolisation often has, besides the sexual import, religious, moral and social significance. The meaning of the symbol may vary in accordance with the 'predominant urge of the individual' (p. 35) which depends on heredity and environment. Religious function is not perversion of sexuality. God "is the pattern after the archetypal image of the Deity of the unconscious. Every person has an unconscious spiritual longing," (p. 40).

The author has taken pains to show, and has succeeded in it, that Freudian interpretation of symbolism in religion, art and literature is inadequate and too lop-sided to be true. Yet it is a moot question how far it is true to say that the higher psychic activities of man are bound up with the primordial beginnings alone and whence he gets the sense of morality in religion and the powers to transform the primitive into the profound in art and literature. It can be said that man is something more than the collective psyche, id and the libido.

P. K. SUNDARAM

Speeches of President Rajendra Prasad—The Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Price Rs. 7/8; 15sh. $2.50. pp. 317.

This volume contains Dr Rajendra Prasad's speeches and writings from January 1950 to May 1952—from the day he was sworn in as the President of the Republic of India to the day he was elected President, after the first general elections in 1952. The speeches cover a wide range of subjects and some of them deal with the important problems which re-awakened free India has to face. We have, here, the President's thoughtful appraisal of the life and work of eminent people, like Srinivasa Sastri and Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt. The President's interest in educational and cultural matters will be evident to any one who reads his speeches on—The Public School System, Education and our present needs, The Mission of Universities, Universities—the Future Saviour, to mention a few.

Dr Prasad speaks from his rich and varied experience and the earnestness with which he speaks is reflected in every line. One is tempted to quote a large number of passages. But even a few will serve to whet the appetite of the reader. In his address to the Joint Meeting of the Inter-University Board of India and the Executive Council of the Universities of the British Commonwealth, the President expresses his hope that their "deliberations will help the universities to recognise that it is they who will be the leaders of thought and action in the age to come and it is they who will control and guide the unlimited power and resources that knowledge has placed in the hands of man." (p. 298). Addressing the Indian Academy of Sciences, the President makes an appeal which gains in force because of the wise restraint with which he expresses himself: "My impression is that science does not take things for granted, but tries to understand them before it accepts them. I suggest that the same may be done before anything is rejected and that nothing be cast away merely because it is old." (p. 302). In the midst of the students of the Doon School at Dehra Dun, the President says that he feels "any such meeting with these soldiers of the future comes to me like a breath of fresh air into the cloistered rooms of office. They appear to me to be a resurrection—the resurrection of that past when the world was so new, so fresh and so wonderful to me. But even more than that, they are to me the promise of the future. Their bright faces reveal to me the shape of things to come in my country and in the world. Their youth is an eternally binding promise to me that even after we, who are now approaching the end of the Scriptural span of life, have been called away to render an account of our days, the cause which alone gave substance to our being and significance and purpose to our lives would continue to be upheld for all time to come.' Here speaks the voice of one of the noblest sons of India!

The attractiveness of the volume is enhanced by a number of fine photographs of the President.

V. A. D.

Printed and Published by G. Srinivasachari, B.A., at G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras.